Interesting analysis. A few things to remember that might help: Napoleon was in the Austrians' rear and had cut their line of communication. He was also reading their mail. He had also captured a major depot. His handling of the battle itself was not expert and he almost lost. However, Scharnhorst made an interesting comment on the campaign, in that he stated that the French could have lost a battle and still continued, as the Austrians were cut off from their bases to the east and Napoleon's maneuver crossing the Alps had stopped their offensive into southern France. Suchet had also defeated Elsnitz on the Var and was moving east. The Austrians had already lost the campaign by the time Marengo was fought.
That isn't even close to the situation in Germany with Moreau. Moreau also demonstrated that he didn't want to work with Napoleon, was jealous of his command in Germany, and took his time in assisting, as ordered, the creation and support of the Army of the Reserve. That in itself denotes a lack of both selflessness and professionalism for the common goal. Also, if Moreau had lost at Hohenlinden, what would have happened with the campaign as a whole? He certainly hadn't cut off the Austrian army and put them in a very disadvantageous postion. Hohenlinden was a meeting engagement, something akin to two blind men trying to box.
Your listed similarities are interesting, but they neglect the overall strategic picture that clearly demonstrates the significant differences between the two generals and campaigns.