The examples of deployment always focusses upon the Guard artillery and not upon Line Artillery in the late period. The experience and training was concentrated rather than distributed. It is interesting looking at the Guard Artillery Manual still ignored the formation of Grande Battery. Have you got examples of how Grande Batteries were directed? This would be interesting reading. There is some instructions in the 1824 Manual and only general outlines in Gassendi.
Can you give me a page reference to "Drouot's large battery destroyed the Prussian/Russian center at Lutzen in 1813 paving the way for a Guard infantry assault that literally had to walk on the dead bodies and pieces of bodies as the dead were so thick on the ground." Are you referring to the the Guard massed 60 pieces that stopped the attack permitting time for the counterattack. The counterattack stalled when the infantry advanced beyond the beaten zone. The area was barely 1000 yards from the guns. Artillery does not have the range of later battles.
- What did Drouot do at Ligny in 1815? The battle was upon the fierce village fighting.
- Why did the French not use their horse artillery to support their cavalry in the later battles? The classic example is the poor showing at Borodino, Waterloo and I cannot remember an example for 1813.
Hanau is a very interesting example where a very old tactic was used to devastating effect. The Bavarians held the French until their ammunition was exhausted. Interesting the effect of logistics that is missed in the French accounts.
I do not understand the concept of Artillery being able to win a battle alone. Artillery is still a support arm. The cavalry can take ground but not hold it. The infantry are excellent at holding ground. The artillery facilitate the actions of the other arms. I know of no battle that has been won by the artillery alone.