Actually, I can think of a number of examples of French deployment, movement and massing of artillery in Spain by line artillery units that indicate a fairly high tactical capability -- although it pains me to say it.
The prime example is Albuera where the French artillery commander, GdB de Ruty pushed his guns forward and massed them in a very good position that enfiladed much of the allied right flank. It is my supposition that it was the French artillery that inflicted the majority of the allied casualties at that battle, certainly it was the arm that inflicted the most casualties on the Fusilier Brigade when it advanced, as numerous eyewitnesses attest to the fact that the Fus Bde came under heavy artillery fire well before it came into contact with the French infantry.
When the French infantry failed and fled, it was de Ruty's and his gunners, assisted by the cavalry, who held off the allied infantry long enough for Soult to get across to the opposite side of the stream and regroup his forces.
De Ruty's command seems to have been rather a catch all of various units, some foot and some horse, and -- apropos of the seemingly endless arguments over which nation had the better artillery weapons -- the majority of its pieces were Gribeauval 4 and 8-pdrs with a lot of howitzers.
From this, two points might be made. First, the French guns in service might not have been as technologically advanced as their opponents but even average weapons, well commanded, can be very effective.
Second, whether or not it was in print or not, there was clearly a workable tactical doctrine in the French artillery of aggressive movement, massing and deployment of artillery. Tactical doctrine evolves from the ground up, not from the top down, and it often takes a considerable time before the state of the art, as represented in action, finds its way into print.