The French employed their artillery aggressively and sometimes very recklessly being willing to lose guns to gain an advantage. One thing that has to be realized to my mind is that tactics are not always either stated in a manual and at times are developed from stated doctrine. The manuals are one thing, actions on campaign and on the battlefield the other.
For example, French horse artillery tactics were not codified, at least not originally, but were developed on the battlefield by the artillery commanders from company on up. Eble, for example, was a horse artilleryman as was Foy. Foy's oft-quoted dictum, 'get up close and shoot fast' was not in the manuals and it demonstrates quite bluntly how French artillery, both foot and horse, were employed.
Using one example such as Austerlitz illustrates virtually nothing. Statistically, it is an outlier. Take a look at Jena and Auerstadt for examples of aggressively handled French artillery, and Davout's use of an inferior artillery in numbers to be at the right place and the right time repeatedly during the action and not always in company strength. And it doesn't stop with Jena and Auerstadt. French artillery commanders used artillery to make decisive assaults, for economy of force missions, such as at Ocana in Spain.
Lastly, as Peter Paret stated quite succinctly in Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, manuals and regulations are a basis for studying and discovering how armies fought during the period. But you also have to look at other primary source material, such as period memoirs, to see what tactics were employed. Noel's, Boulart's, and Faber du Faur's memoirs help immensely in how artillery was used on the battlefield. Regulations, ie doctrine, is a starting point and not holy writ. The French artillery commanders by and large were an aggressive, imaginative group of officers who would use their guns when and where they saw fit.
Good generals had massed artilery for years. That isn't the issue. The issue with the French is that they made their artillery arm one of decision turning it into a supported combat arm, not merely a supporting one as the other main belligerents did. The French artillery arm was an offensive weapon and the examples of that use at Jena, Friedland, Raab, Hanau, Lutzen, Wagram, Ocana, Ligny, and Waterloo confirm that employment.