you correctly observed: "Tactical doctrine evolves from the ground up, not from the top down, and it often takes a considerable time before the state of the art, as represented in action, finds its way into print."
Doctrine is ALWAYS a codification of successful practices in previous wars. This leads to the perennial observation that we train to fight the last war. Forward thinking military forces expend considerable effort to try to think ahead, but this is always an uphill fight against the inate conservatism of any organization, and it takes the risk of not follwoing what has already been proven to work.
The period after any major war is always a fruitful time for new manuals. During the war everyone is a busy fighting the war. Old manuals remain in place with increasingly large elements ignored or modified (often at regimental level) based on hard earned experience of what did not work under the existing doctrine.
A prime example is the British infantry manual throughout the period was the Dundas manual. There were a number of tactical practices that became commonplace during the period that were either proscribed by Dundas or not envisaged at all. In 1824 a new manual was published, generally refered to as the Torrens manual. This codified practices that became commonplace and standardized methods that had varied by regiment or at the whim of various generals. One can easily see the foundation is based on Dundas, and it is very interesting to read the two together and observe differences. In this way one can understand much better just how the infantry fought during the period.