I could not see that SÚnarmont, himself, declares his implementation of a new doctrinal concept, or that he suggests that his actions be repeated as part of regular practice.
I am further intrigued to note in Becke's essay (which closely echoes statements in the Revue d'artillerie article previously mentioned) the implication that SÚnarmont's artillery offensive may really have been the product of incremental problem-solving rather than a coherent plan in his mind.
Becke observes, early in the operation, after Capt. Ricci's 10 guns went forward, "that the unsupported battery was insufficient to control the superior Russian artillery", so SÚnarmont "rode back to get a reinforcement" of more artillery from Victor.
In other words, SÚnarmont was intelligently solving a tactical problem step by step, rather than implementing a newly conceived, full tactical doctrine and/or plan. To the extent that SÚnarmont's self-confidence and courageous follow-through produced the outcome for the massed French artillery, rather than it being an outcome of a developed concept, was the action at Friedland really seen at the time as a new doctrinal concept for French artillery, or (as Becke suggests) an audacious act by a talented artillery commander? To the extent it was NOT YET seen as a "new" doctrinal concept, (1) when did a massed artillery offensive come to be seen as a doctrinal objective, or (2) is there less new about the action than first meets the eye?