My suspicion that SÚnarmont's accomplishment was less of a doctrinal invention, and more of a logical development of the tools' potential is reinforced by the British artillery charge at Talavera. I think it unlikely that British artillery field officers there had studied SÚnarmont's action at Friedland two years earlier, or sought to emulate the fellow who was quite literally across the olive orchards from them, yet Lt-Col. Robe gathered three brigades of artillery together (18 pieces of ordnance) and conducted a veritable artillery charge with them, a counter-attack against Laval's division, and appears to have been witheringly successful. Robe didn't have as good a press agent as SÚnarmont :o)
But I suspect the solution arose from resolving a roughly similar tactical problem with similar tools to hand. In other words, there are moments and circumstances, in which artillery, if suitably organized to facilitate control and mobility, and if courageously and thoughtfully led, could be applied by any nation to aggressively solve a tactical problem. But that didn't make the solution a tactical doctrine, consciously grasped by colleagues...did it?
Unfortunatly Dave Hollins is not longer with us in this forum - wasn't there already a similar handling of Austrian artillery at the battle of Neerwinden?
I always hesitate to take over inventions by that or that nation or general, close examination of sources usually show that the identical thing (but with less press) was performed in other nations as well - earlier or at the same time.
Otherwise I agree with your conclusions. What seemed to happen is that artillery officers took the tactical initiative - not waiting for the commander in chief to order.
Now is that doctrine? I would say doctrine is to allow subordinates to show initiative.