I concur with you Hans that the information acquired is most incomplete. The common sources are many times from the French perspective or general sources, sometimes of unsubstantiated qualifications (often combined with self enhancement and bias) with some current authors making broad assumptions based upon the foregoing which are then propagated by more junior researchers as fact due to the stature in the west of the proponent author.
In regard to the proportion of guns used in the field by Russian artillery compared to other armies, I am posing this question in specific to some sources I have in the East. It strikes me as amusing that all of these untrained, uneducated and tactically inferior Russian troops did not appear to be deemed so for example by the Prussians in 1750s.
I submit that the use of proportionately large numbers of artillery pieces per unit during the Napoleonic wars is a long held Russian doctrine that was continued right through to the Second World War, If the Russians used more guns, and fired more rounds per gun when possible, I doubt that some wit of the era on the receiving end, would be drily commenting .. oh well, not sporting... really not up to our accuracy standards particularly if receiving fire from vigorously crewed Unicorns who could fire accurately with a choice of ordinance. My modest inquires with this regard are pointing me more towards the development and maturation of a sustained Doctrine. An example of this consistent Doctrine from the Russian school can be seen in 1943 in the formation of specific Soviet Artillery Penetration Corps created to provide overwhelming volume of fire. For example, one artillery penetration corp firing a single volley from 356 guns and mortars and 3456 rockets from 846 launchers across a 2 to 3 km front. (appox 3812 rounds per volley).
What is the difference if muzzle loaded canon are being used in the like manner, (volume of and weight of fire) in the Napoleonic Era? There is no difference in Operational Doctrine. After all, incoming is incoming. And seems to me if the Russian artillery was , not capable on a given day, or from a given decision, of fire and movement because of training or whatever circumstances, then the use of all of their assets and their prodigious supply of ammunition in the best manner possible, is sound strategy. I would think also, it is sound strategy that if the Russian officers and troops are not as experiences in field tactics and gunnery drills as the veterans of the French army, then fine. even it up by numbers.