Many thanks--would certainly be interested in a a copy of the 'doctrinal' system!
Sadly, almost no additional information on the location of regts in Broussier's or Lamarque's divisions. As mentioned earlier, we are limited in sources (pending future visits to Vincennes) largely to MacDonald (report and memoirs), Broussier and the snippet from Lamarque/Seras in Pelet/Gachot when it comes to these tactical details.
The only other bit is an extract from Col. Penne's report (112e Ligne) in his regt's history, p. 52: "La division marchait la gauche en tête; le régiment formait le tête de colonne et marchait sa droite appuyée derrière la droite du 92e, qui marchait en bataille. Le reste de ces mouvements est assez connu..."
So, somewhat helpful and one could only wish that the rest of its movements were indeed "well known"!
An additional challenge, of course, is that the battlefield is not static. Formations changed according to movements, threats, losses and circumstances. Reading MacD's report, for instance, one could conclude that parts of his two divisions (B and L) were in line before the grand attack and that he formed them into two deployed lines so that the second line could fill in and support the first as the first dwindled during combat, which, to reiterate, seems to have happened before the actual advance.
Losses: ratio of officer to enlisted is based on what the Army of Italy (only) suffered. That seems a reasonable method of determining losses for a specific formation (not comparing to Austrians or to French in a different part of the field) and minimizes the chances of some outlier statistic skewing the results. Thus accepted the Army of Italy's official report of losses (350 officers and c. 6,000 enlisted) for a ratio of approx. 1:17. This seems to comport fairly well with the loss ratio of officers to men in those few cases where we have enlisted losses for individual regts: 112e comes to approx 1:19 for example, 106e to 1:16.