Thanks, Art, good points, especially the importance of tactics (see Nosworthy's work).
Sorry that the previous postings were not as lucid as should have been. Three quick clarifications:
1. The fluid field. In remarking on the battlefield not being static, did not intend to suggest that generals made things up as they went along. Rather that MacD's formation changed as he got into position, as he prepared the square and as he advanced. This was merely intended to highlight the fluidity of the battlefield situation; some histories read as if the authors believed MacD's formation was inflexibly riveted together, dropped down out of the sky and stayed rigidly within its pattern as the soldiers stolidly slogged ahead unblinking. Clearly not the case.
If we look at the evolution of MacD's command over time in the most general terms, for instance, we see:
- That his first task ("ŕ tout prix") was to "halt the rapid march of the enemy" (per his report)
- He then had to form up for the coming advance while holding his position under heavy fire.
- Then came the advance, in (dis)concert with Nansouty and others.
- Finally the maneuvers to force the Austrians out of Süssenbrunn and Gerasdorf.
2. Casualties. You are, of course, quite correct on both points: (a) that national differences matter in terms of officer:enlisted ratios, and (b) that the type of lead or iron flying about influences the outcome in what Bleibtreu and other German authors called "blood losses."
Only point in previous post was to outline a possible system of estimating that would seem to suggest relatively good approximations of losses when we have little information--in this case, no idea how many were wounded by musketry or cannon balls, etc. By using only data from the same formation in the same battle, one would hope to narrow the possible number of losses to a fairly accurate range. But the results remain at best an estimate.
3. 112e de Ligne: this regiment was assigned to Lamarque's division at Wagram (Severoli stayed at Pressburg with a much diminished command), so Col Penne's report suggests that his regt was the first of the regts in column on the left side of the square and that Lamarque's two battalions of the 92e were among the four (from Lamarque) deployed.
Apologies for the lack of clarity initially and best wishes to the Southern Hemisphere!