Thanks, some remarks:
1) Aster cites after the Odeleben's original edition (in German), so we have no translation problem.
2) Of course one cannot compare Wellington's behavior before the lines of Torres Vedras in 1810 with N. at the Elbe at the end of September 1813, since Wellington had months to prepare and implement his measures. In contrast, N.'s decision to give up the right bank of the Elbe fell around 25th Septemer 1813, some French-Allied corps were still on the right bank, others had already had withdrawn to the left bank to fight against the Bohemian army. Blücher crossed the Elbe on October 3rd, two weeks later the decisive battle of Leipzig was fought. So, N. had only 1 week to evacuate / sweep (? - räumen) the right bank of the Elbe. As Aster (Odeleben) says, most French commanders implemented only the measure to take the cattle with the army (in order to get the troops feeded, which is well understandable). On the other hand side, Saxony was (end of October) really devasted, since the French-Allied army has lived for months and the Russo-Austro-Prussian troops had lived for weeks out of the country. There are heart-breaking memoirs about the conditions in and around Dresden or Meissen, for example (I could give here some references, if needed). So you can ruin a country as an ally, too.