You are giving Smith too much credit for things that he did not do. He served well and ably at Acre.
He was not a good and loyal subordinate in the Mediterranean and Admiral Collingwood preferred not to have to be saddled with him in theater. Smith operated on his own 'agenda' seeking favor with the Neapolitan Bourbons while supposedly being a loyal British naval officer.
Maida itself was not a decisive victory. It was a tactical victory which could not be followed up and the British, who had no transport, little artillery or the ability to mount an offensive with the troops ashore, were forced to reembark and return to Sicily. The French occupied Calabria and the country was eventually pacified. Massena was the strategic winner in southern Italy, not Smith. Smith was not present at Maida, he was busy sailing up and down the southern Italian coastline in his flagship. He was not in charge of operations ashore.
Smith's actions were neither innovative nor successful in Italy. Joint operations (those conducted by more than one branch of the service, usually land and sea forces) were practiced by commanders more talented than Smith for years, before Smith was even whelped. Henry Lloyd wrote about the possibilities of British joint operations. Lloyd was also a more experienced officer than Smith.
Regarding the Calabrians, they proved to be less than useful operating with the British.
There is an excellent section on the Maida campaign and Smith's shenanigans during that campaign in The War in the Mediterranean 1803-1810 by Piers Macksey, 121-148.