Hans (if I may) the subject at hand is N. and his failure to build temp bridges west of Leipzig. The larger issue of overall strategy is not at issue.
My point, almost from the beginning, is that the key to understanding why the temp bridges were not built is to know what N. stated about the situation. The Oct. 20 GA bulletin is N.'s view on the issue, and, of course, it is delusional. In the Oct. 20 bulletin, N. describes the situation of the French Army leaving the battlefield "victorious" right up until the early bridge explosion cut off "12,000" men and, with only a little insight, this tells us that using the single road and blowing it up in the face of the enemy was his strategy. The only failure, according to N., of his strategy was the early detonation of the bridge.
Thier explains in some detail that it was important in N.'s view to make a slow organized retreat during daylight rather than a quick evacuation at night. The entire form and nature of the French Army's retreat from Leipzig was, by the design of N., to make it look as little as possible like the retreat of a defeated army.