1) Correspondence between Sir S Smith and Dom João
a) so, not in Sir S Smith’s published papers (or unpublished mss)?
“If it still exists, it would be located in the Portuguese/Brazil Archives of
Dom João papers. It would most likely be in French. Smith wrote and understood
French, Spanish, Italian, but I am not sure about Portuguese, but, presumably,
Smith would have used French in communicating with a royal.”
b) quite possible that a copy is held in some archive in Lisbon / Brazil
c) that is written in French is pure conjecture
“Public record? It is simply poor historical writing to never mention the
position held by a key player. Few people living today, off the top of their
head, know the "public record" about who or what Strangford was or did. As a
historian you can and must afford the ink to properly introduce important
characters. This clearly was not done in your work, regarding Strangford.”
a) mea culpa - I did incorporate some more detail in an earlier version, but it had to be trimmed.
b) However, Strangford’s role in the development or (even) implementation of British policy in relation to Portugal was extremely limited - please note “there were a number of much weightier external drivers and internal pressures than localised British diplomatic pressure[” (my emphasis here, not in the original.
c) Strangford, did have a more active role when in post in Brazil. Specifically in supporting appointments to the regency council. This is both acknowledged in my MA and referenced.
d) In summary he played a minor role in the affairs of Portugal at the time, 1807, was not instrumental in implementing British policy (in comparion to Stuart, for example), and therefore does not merit further attention in the MA (in my opinion)
3) Sir S Smith’s role
“Little consequence? The complete lack of recognition of Smith's key role
indicates, to any knowledgeable reader, that the events surrounding this
critical and important event in Portugal's history simply has not been fully
investigated by the writer or the writer is in someways biased against Royal
Navy influence in the events. Which is it? Pretending to limit the scope of
the work is but a poor excuse. And, as previously stated, that London sent Sir
Sidney was a major statement of serious intent that would have been fully
understood in the court of Lisbon.”
a) See my post above referencing the work of Macaulay
b) I made substantial use of, and clearly referenced my indebtedness to, two specific historians and their published works namely Hall and Robson (see below) – a quick search for “Royal Navy” will confirm both the significance of that arm in sustaining both the Portuguese economy and the alliance with Britain
c) My MA has more of a focus on British policy, its implementation in relation to Portugal and the effects on Portugal. It is not a study of maritime history or naval warfare, but does incorporate relevant insights from specific studies (principally mercantile, but also military, in nature)
d) To that end, I would repeat that, Sir Sidney’s role in escorting the Portuguese court to Brazil is of little consequence in relation to the focus of my MA
e) Perhaps this might help clarify my conclusions
“But Britain’s dispatch of a powerful fleet and a significant expeditionary force, with orders to escort the Portuguese royal family to Brazil and, if not, seize the Portuguese fleet, destroy or otherwise put it beyond use, were perhaps the decisive factors in the implementation of the “Brazil plan”. p. 57 referencing Martin Robson, ‘The Royal Navy in Lisbon, 1807-1808’, in Malyn Newitt and Martin Robson (eds.), Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal, 1807-1820, (Lisboa : Imprensa das Ciências Sociais, 2004)
* Hall - “In addition to Muir, Hall is essential for British strategy and the combination of military and naval resources committed to the Iberian theatre.” p. 14 (my emphasis here, not in the original)
** Robson - “Moreover, the strategic location and capacity of Lisbon’s harbour were an unquestionably important factor in defining competitive economic advantage and a successful maritime strategy. pp. 32-33 (my emphasis here, not in the original)
*** “For British policy and, in particular, British policy in relation to Portugal, Spain and South America see, respectively, Newitt and Robson and Lynch and Paquette. “ pp. 12-13 (again, my emphasis here not in the original)
* Christopher D. Hall, British strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1992)
Christopher D. Hall, Wellington’s Navy: Sea Power and the Peninsular War 1807-1814, (London : Chatham Publishing, 2004)
** Martin Robson, ‘The Royal Navy in Lisbon, 1807-1808’, in Malyn Newitt and Martin Robson (eds.), Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal, 1807-1820, (Lisboa : Imprensa das Ciências Sociais, 2004)
Martin Robson, Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: alliances and diplomacy in economic maritime conflict, (London – New York : IB Tauris, 2011)
*** Malyn Newitt and Martin Robson (eds.), Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal, 1807- 1820, (Lisboa : Imprensa das Ciências Sociais, 2004)
I will respond to your points about the work published in 1809 in due course.