Much To Be Desired: The Campaign Experience of British General Officers of the War of 1812

By John R. Grodzinski

The aim of this article is to examine the provincial and divisional commanders of Upper Canada, focussing on what experience they brought to Canada . The literature of the War of 1812 often emphasizes the relative experience British officers had over their American counterparts and this paper seeks to determine whether this was true and if not, where the key element of command lay.

The British army that served in the North America during the War of 1812 was not among the best fielded by Britain during the Napoleonic Wars. This is particularly true of the Army of Upper Canada, which due to a variety of factors became the cockpit of the northern theatre, witnessing many key campaigns and important battles. For Britain , this is where the war would be won or lost. Indeed, the longest and most difficult campaign of the war occurred in the Niagara Peninsula of Upper Canada during the summer and fall of 1814. That 125 day long epic struggle pitted two well trained and led American divisions against a mixed grouping of British and Canadian regular units supported by incorporated and provincial militia and native allies.

However closely enthusiasts of this conflict may hold it to their hearts, the War of 1812 was, for the British, a sideshow to the much larger and important global conflict, waged largely against Napoleon. Until the summer of 1814, British strategy was defensive, merely to hold the line and avoid an escalation of the conflict to even larger proportions. As few troops as possible were assigned there, as least until the spring of 1814, when Bonaparte’s abdication freed up units in Britain and elsewhere for service in North America. Until to that point, the United States Army had more troops on the ground, at least on paper, than the British and Canadian regulars in North America.

It was in Portugal and Spain that Britain fielded it’s largest “disposable” force led by Wellington between 1808 and 1814. Wellington received the lion’s share of resources and had priority for reinforcements. For example, during the winters of 1812/13 and 1813/14, Wellington was reinforced to the “greatest possible strength.” In early 1813, when many units with long Peninsular service were worn out or well below strength, they were exchanged and three depleted infantry battalions and four regiments totalling 2,000 men were sent home, while four new hussar regiments with 1,600 sabres and 3,000 men in six new battalions were received.[1] Half the establishment of drivers and horses belonging to the ordnance in Britain were also sent to Portugal .[2]  Furthermore, new general and staff officers were provided to run this growing army. By May 1813, Wellington had 81,276 British, Portuguese, Spanish soldiers under his command. [3]

Rotating units was not a luxury enjoyed in British North America. Service in Upper Canada wore units out. The 41st and 49th Regiments were the two principle infantry units in Upper Canada when war broke out in July 1812. Between then and the peace of 1814, the 41st participated in 18 principle actions, while the 49th was involved in eight. The 1st Battalion, 8th Foot had been in Halifax since 1808 and arrived in Upper Canada during the fall of 1812, where it fought 12 actions, including Chippawa, Lundy’s Lane and the siege and assault of Fort Erie during 1814.[4] The list goes on and on as unit after unit, including the 89th, 100th and 103rd Regiments, arrived in the upper province and was subject to prolonged periods of campaigning. Even when large-scale reinforcements became available, most of them were not made up of experienced Peninsular veterans as American historians tend to relate, rather, 23 units of the 44 infantry and artillery units sent came from a variety of garrison locations or other commands, while the remainder came from Peninsular Army and only a handful of those units actually saw action in North America.[5] 

This does not mean that Canada had not received any reinforcements prior to 1814. The total number of British troops serving in Upper and Lower Canada rose from 6,034 in June 1812 to 14,623 by December 1813. Problems lay in getting general and senior officers to fill key command or staff billets. Several general officers were already serving in North America in 1812 but only a handful of them were considered suitable for higher command. On two occasions during 1813, the commander of Upper Canada was relieved due to poor performance. Five more general officers arrived in Canada during 1813 and early 1814 and they were of mixed value, further complicating the selection of commanders. Given that the British Army List for 1813 listed over 500 general officers why were more not made available for North American service and why did the commander of the forces, Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost not press for more?

Leadership, particularly that exercised by those occupying senior posts, is, one would assume, as important as soldiers in wartime. This group oversees training, coordinates movement, arranges cooperation with naval forces and ensures that the field force is properly equipped, fed and cared for. They also formulate strategy, develop plans and lead troops in battle. Within Upper Canada, these responsibilities were conducted by two groups of officers. Firstly, was the provincial commander who held command over the troops and was also the civil administrator. Below him were several subordinate commanders that were eventually organized in three territorial commands known as divisions.

Before continuing, the “experience” within a military context must be defined, as several interpretations are possible. The first type is that experience gained over a lengthy career, where an officer holds a variety of line and even staff positions providing experience in a number of areas. These include the development of leadership style, mastering the art of conducting combat operations, training personnel and conducting staff duties. As the staff were a small group, many officers might have little or no staff experience, while others might have held positions within the colonial government, which offered them experience with higher political, strategic and operational issues, including financial management, civil-military relations, mobilization and cooperation with other services or departments, such as the navy or treasury. Perhaps the most important position one would hold during this time is unit level—whether that is a battalion, regiment or battery—command, where one exercises command over soldiers and conducts tactical operations in the field.

The yardstick most often held against the officers serving in Canada was Peninsular experience. Indeed in later years, one could suffer much professionally given the favouritism extended to “P[eninsular] & W[aterloo] boys.” British forces in Iberia were exposed to the latest tactical developments; they were organized into permanent brigades and field divisions, fighting over difficult terrain, cooperating with allies and guerrillas and using complex, synchronized strategies against a larger and often more experienced foe. The question must be asked, had more general officers been provided with recent campaign experience have made a difference in North America? Would they have flourished or been undone by the vastness of the theatre, the paucity of infrastructure and the lack of a figure like Wellington? Experience is important, but not always the panacea we make it and experience gained in one theatre is not always applicable to another. American commanders had nothing comparable to the Peninsula or a garrisoning an empire to draw upon, but during 1813 and 1814 several of them demonstrated very effective leadership. These officers were unique among their peers in that they maintained currency with emerging doctrine, while demonstrating competent leadership. Through effective training and hard work, they could equal or better British regular officers.

However, as the British employed a defensive strategy in North America between June 1812 and June 1814, did that necessarily mean that general officers had to operate similarly to their Peninsular brethren, who were engaged in an offensive campaign? The record of those general officers that actually led in battle in the northern theatre is not very good. Brock demonstrated excellent strategic insight in formulating the strategy to defend Upper Canada, but was a poor tactical commander. His bold march against Fort Detroit involved no real plan other than making a demonstration before the fort; there was no provision for any scaling ladders or other equipment had it not worked. At Queenston, his charge proved futile and worsened the British position. Sheaffe may have ultimately won this battle, but proved less effective as commander of Upper Canada and at York in May 1813. Procter’s retreat from Amherstburg was a disaster and he chose to make his stand on poor ground. Vincent was present at Stoney Creek, but played no role in the battle, while Sir George Prevost demonstrated a penchant to call off battles early, as he did at Sackets Harbor and Plattsburgh. At Chippawa, Riall had no plan at all, other than a textbook engagement, which devolved to a shootout, while his reconnaissance before the battle missed the essential information he should have gained regarding the Americans forces he faced. Drummond was unique in that he commanded at Lundy’s Lane, the largest battle fought in the northern theatre, and also led the siege of Fort Erie.

Could it have been that in North America, where distance often made timely response to developments nearly impossible and the presence of the general officer commanding even less likely, that greater decentralization was necessary. Did that place greater reliance on having colonels and lieutenant colonels, often present in the place of concern and best able to respond to the situation than awaiting a general officer to arrive? This group of field officers could therefore have been the most important level of tactical leadership, between 1812 and the summer of 1814, exercising responsibility for tactical engagements, while their superiors played a greater coordinating role, ensuring the provision of supplies, reinforcements and other resources, including the provision of naval cooperation. If this is true, then sending a number of experienced field grade officers to serve on the staff in Canada, where they could easily be freed from their duties to command ad hoc formations or provincial units, may have been a more prudent option then providing more general officers. Officers such as Cecil Bisshopp, Thomas Evans, John Harvey, Robert McDouall, Christopher Myers and Thomas Pearson are but a few of this key group and all performed admirably during the war. [6]

This study examines 11 officers who commanded in Upper Canada. A brief synopsis of their service is provided and their campaign experience is summarized in the accompanying chart. Observations and conclusions are provided afterwards.

It must also be pointed out that this study does not include four general officers, Robinson, Brisbane and Power, sent to Canada in command of brigades intended for the campaign against Plattsburgh, which is outside of the realm of this study, while Sir James Kempt led a brigade intended to attack Sackets Harbor from Kingston, but eventually took command at Kingston. Robinson was briefly moved to the Niagara, but neither he nor Kempt significantly influenced the remainder of the 1814 campaign. [7]

These four men were of a different breed, having campaign experience unlike other general officers that served in Upper Canada. For example, James Kempt went on the expedition to the Netherlands in 1799, to Egypt in 1801 and commanded a battalion at Maida in 1806. Kempt was quartermaster general in Canada from 1807 to 1811 and was then transferred to Wellington’s staff before being given brigade command in February 1812. Kempt was wounded leading the division at Badajoz in 1812 and led a brigade in the light division during the campaigns of 1813 and 1814, before being selected to go to Canada .[8] The service records of these four officers are considerably different than the other general officer that served in Canada .

Before continuing, a synopsis of each of the officers under consideration will be provided.

Commanders in Upper Canada

Four officers held the post of general officer commanding in Upper Canada.

Major-General Isaac Brock (July – October 1812)[9]

Born 1769

Arrived Canada : 1802

Brock joined the army in 1784 and brought his regiment, the 49th Foot to Canada in 1802. He was promoted brigadier-general in 1809 and to major general in 1811. Brock briefly commanded the forces in Canada during 1811. Brock had only been in action once, as commanding officer of the 49th Foot at Egmont-aan-Zee, in the Netherlands on 2 October 1799, although he also participated in the Baltic campaign of 1801.

Major-General Sir Roger Hale Sheaffe (October 1812 – June 1813)[10]

Born: 1763

Arrived in Canada : service 1787 – 1798, 1812

Sheaffe joined the Royal Navy in 1773 and transferred to the army in 1773. He served in Ireland from 1781 to 1787 and then in Canada from 1787 to 1798, after which he returned to Britain . Sheaffe served under Brock in the Netherlands in 1799 and the Baltic in 1801. Sheaffe returned to Canada in 1802 with the 49th Foot. In 1811, he was promoted major general.

Major-General Francis de Rottenburg (June – November 1813)[11]

Born: 1757

Arrived Canada : 1810 (appointed 1808)

De Rottenburg served in the French Army of Louis XVI and in the Polish war against Russia in the 1790s, where he was wounded at the Battle of Praga in 1794. In 1795, he was commissioned into a foreign corps of the British Army, eventually earning a name as a light infantry specialist and commanding officer of the 5/60th Regiment, the first British unit to be equipped with rifles. De Rottenburg led his battalion during the Irish Rebellion and was present at the taking of Surinam in August 1799. He also wrote a treatise about light infantry and commanded a light brigade from 1808, which he led during the Walcheren campaign of 1809. De Rottenburg had been appointed as a brigadier general on the North American staff in 1808, but did not arrive until 1810, by which time he was a major general. His first command in North America was the Montreal District. On 19 June 1812, he replaced Sheaffe as the commander in Upper Canada and held that post until December of the same year. [12]

Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Drummond (November 1813 – February 1815)

Born: 1772

Arrived Canada : served 1808 – 1811; 1813

Drummond joined the army in 1789 and by 1794, he was commanding the 8th Foot and saw active service in the Netherlands during the ill-fated expedition of 1794-1795. In 1799 he took his regiment to the Mediterranean and participated in the Egyptian campaign in 1801. In 1804, he was promoted brigadier-general and to major general the following year. During 1805-1807, he was second-in-command in Jamaica , followed by three years as second in command of Canada , between 1808 and 1811. In 1811 he was promoted lieutenant general and given a district command in Ireland . In 1813, he was selected to take command of Upper Canada.

Division Commanders

As the war progressed, Upper Canada was divided into several commands. Initially these were based on they key points of Kingston, the Niagara and Detroit. Eventually, they evolved into three divisional commands, representing geographic rather and field formations. The history of each division is provided below.

Right Division

The Right Division was formed on 15 June 1813, consisting of the territory around the Detroit frontier. It was destroyed at the Battle of the Thames in October 1813.

Major-General Henry Procter (Command at Detroit since August 1812; June to October 1813)[13]

Born: 1763

Arrived Canada : 1802

Proctor joined the British Army in 1781 and served around New York in the latter stages of the American War of Independence. He appears to have had no other campaign experience before arriving in Canada in 1802. In February 1813, he was promoted to brigadier general and appointed commander on the Detroit frontier, until his division was destroyed in October 1813.

Centre Division/Right Division

The Centre Division was also formed on 15 June 1813 and initially included the territory from York to the Niagara frontier. In October 1813, it was consolidated with the survivors of the Right Division and renamed the Right Division.

Major General John Vincent (Responsible for the Niagara frontier from February 1813, Right Division from June – October 1813)[14]

Born: 1765
Arrived Canada : 1802

Vincent joined the army in 1781 and eventually joined the 49th Foot. He served in the West Indies in 1793, participating in the taking of Saint-Dominigue and Haiti , and also served in the Netherlands in 1799 and Copenhagen in 1801. He was sent to Lower Canada in 1802 and spent the next nine years at York and Fort George and in June 1812 was at Kingston, where he eventually assumed command of the frontier before moving to Niagara in early 1813. He was later relieved of command at his own request, citing health problems.

Major General Phineas Riall (October 1813 – 25 July 1814)[15]

Born: 1776

Arrived Canada : 1813

Riall joined the 92nd Foot in 1794 and three years later, went on half-pay for seven years. He served in Ireland and commanded a brigade during the 1809 expedition against Martinique and the Saints. He then went to serve on the staff in Britain before arriving in Canada in 1813, taking command of the Right Division until he was capture at Lundy’s Lane on 25 July 1814.

Major General Henry Conran (July – August 1814)[16]

Born: ?

Arrived Canada : 1814

Conran was commissioned in 1780 and in 1790 went to the East Indies, serving in the campaign against Tippoo Sahib in 1791-92 and at the siege of Pondicherry in 1793. He also served at Ceylon and in 1800 was at Ferrol, Gibraltar and Cadiz before going to the West Indies in 1804. He was in England in 1807 and then returned to the East Indies. He arrived in Canada in May 1814 and replaced Riall, but was soon out of action due to a broken leg.

Major General Louis De Watteville (September 1814)[17]

Born: 1776

Arrived Canada : 1813

De Watteville served in Flanders in a Swiss regiment in Dutch service and was also in Switzerland and Germany during the campaigns of 1799 and 1800. In 1801, he was appointed commanding officer of the Regiment De Watteville, serving in Egypt , Malta , Naples and Sicily. De Watteville went to Cadiz, Spain in 1811 when ordered to take his regiment to Canada in March 1813. Arriving in Kingston that May, he took command of the garrison and in June 1813 he was promoted to major general and given command of the Left Division until October. He also briefly commanded the Right Division in September and October 1814.

Major General Richard Stovin (October – December 1814)[18]

Born: ?

Arrived Canada : 1796-97, late 1813

Stovin joined the army in 1780 and served at Martinique and Guadeloupe, where he commanded a wing of the army, in 1794. He was taken prisoner in 1794 and was released two years later. He was on the staff in Canada from1796-97 and at St Domingo in 1798. He took his regiment to the Netherlands in 1799 and went to the Mediterranean the following year and went to the East Indies in 1804, where he was present at the siege of Gonowee in 1807. In 1811, Stovin was promoted major general and arrived in Canada during 1813, where he commanded both the Centre and Right Divisions during 1813 and 1814.

Left Division/Centre Division

Formed on 15 June 1813, the Left Division included the area from Kingston to the Lower Canadian frontier. With the restructure of October 1813, it was renamed the Centre Division and responsible for the territory from Kingston to Coteau du Lac. East of that lay the Left Division, which continued to the provincial capital of Quebec.

Vincent. (Command at Kingston from August 1812 to February 1813) See entry above for bio.

De Watteville (July – October 1813) See entry above for bio.

Major General Duncan Darroch (October 1813 – February 1814)[19]

Born: ?

Arrived Canada : 1812

Darroch gained his commission in 1792, serving in Ireland during the rebellion, Hanover, the Cape of Good Hope and in Spain and Portugal before arriving in Lower Canada in October 1812. He moved to Upper Canada in early 1813 and took command at Kingston until the end of the year; he was then sent to serve on the staff in Halifax.

Stovin (February – July 1814). See entry above for bio.

Kempt (July – October 1814). No bio provided as noted above.

De Watteville (October – December 1814). See entry above for bio.

General Officer Experience: A Summary

Based on the information above, the following summary can be provided of each officer’s service:

Name	Campaign Experience 1793 – 1814							Colonial Govt
	West Indies 1793	Netherlands 1794-95 or 1799	Egypt 1801	Baltic1801	Walcheren/ West Indies 1809-10	Peninsula 1808-14	Misc
Brock	-	1799	-	X	-	-	-	-
Sheaffe	-	1799	-	X	-	-	-	-
De Rottenburg	-	-	-	-	Walcheren, 1809	-	Surinam 1799	-
Drummond	-	1794-95	X	-	-	-	-	X
Division Command
Conran	-	-	-	-	-	-	India 1791-93	-
Darroch	-	-	-	-	-	X	Ireland, South America	-
Procter	-	-	-	-	-	-	America 1781-83	-
Riall	-	-	-	-	West Indies, 1809	-	Ireland	-
De Watteville			X			Cadiz, 1811-13	Europe; Maida 1806	-
Stovin	-	1799	-	-	-	-	St Domingo 1798; East Indies 1807	-
Vincent	X	1799	-	X	-	-	-	-

Observations and Conclusions

Half of the general officers to hold command appointments in Upper Canada were serving in Canada before the declaration of war in 1812. Three were general officers before 1812, while the remainder achieved that status in 1813:

Major General Brock
Major General Sheaffe
Major General De Rottenburg
Colonel Proctor
Lieutenant Colonel Vincent

Four of these officers had served continually in Canada since 1802. Proctor arrived in Canada with the 41st, while Brock, Sheaffe and Vincent came with the 49th Foot in 1802. De Rottenburg was in Canada from 1810. Darroch arrived in Canada just after the war began.

Aside from De Rottenburg, none of the officers to commander in Upper Canada gained any campaign experience after 1801.

As for the five remaining officers who held commanding Upper Canada, Drummond, Riall and De Watteville arrived in 1813, while 1814 arrivals included Conran and Stovin.

Drummond was the only “fresh blood” to command Upper Canada. He had not actively campaigned since 1801, but did bring considerable experience as a governor.

Proctor appears to have had the least campaign experience, having only served during the latter stages of the American War of Independence when combat operations were very limited.

Only two officers, Darroch and De Watteville had served in the Iberian Peninsula.

Stovin had an interesting mix of service, including Europe, the West Indies and the East Indies, including the siege of Gonowee in 1807, between 1798 and 1807. De Watteville had been in Dutch service before commanding a foreign corps in British service.

Conclusion

Six of the 11 officers examined in this study received no campaign experience after 1801. Among this group were three of the four provincial commanders. The other five officers had limited campaign service, including one who had almost none. Those who had served in the West Indies and at Walcheren probably gained an appreciation of the difficulties of amphibious operations and joint operations with the navy, which may have served them in 1813. Nonetheless, the majority of these officers had not seen recent operational experience, forcing them to rely on their wits and whatever leadership and training experience their years of service had granted them. If considered solely from years of service, this was an experienced group; they gained their commissions in the 1780s or early 1790s, giving them upward of 20 or more years of service by 1812. This must count for something. Those officers with long service in Canada also benefited by the knowledge they had gained of local conditions, terrain, movement, their Native allies and other officers serving in the province.

The War of 1812 may have been a sideshow war, but one that employed the second largest field force deployed by Britain . The wartime leadership of Upper Canada did not come equipped with recent campaign experience, versed in the latest methods of all arms cooperation or new staff procedures. It consisted, in the main, of officers with limited field time, but with many years of service and often with a familiarity of the ground and conditions in Upper Canada. They were not incompetent, nor were they brilliant; they thus represent an average level of capability. Whatever skill they had was challenged by a wily and adaptive foe, which had considerably less experience at every level of command. In 1828, Wellington testified to a select committee of the House of Commons, noting he was “astonished that the officers of the army and navy employed in that country were able to defend those provinces,” and chalked their success up to “the inexperience of the officers of the United States in the operations of war.”[20] Wellington may have been correct, although he might have acknowledged that a similar lack of experience in the operations of war by the general officers commanding in Upper Canada. The difference came with having a group of professional and experienced lieutenant colonels that often proved effective field commanders.

The only question remaining is whether Sir George Prevost should have sought better general officers. Given the expanse of the theatre and the ultimate number of troops to serve in North America, his command was the most important after Wellington’s, which must have given him some influence with the Horse Guards and Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. Yet, how actively did he do so, if at all and what response did he receive? This topic will be the subject of a later study.

Notes: