Military culture, representing a common understanding of the relationship between war and society, matters because it is an important factor impacting military effectiveness. Modern armies take much of their culture from the societies that produce them but those armies and societies also reflect their war experience. Throughout the War of 1812 deficiencies were demonstrated of a decentralized, unsystematic American military dependent on citizen soldiers to conduct offensive operations, even against small numbers of regular troops. The contrast of inexperienced, untrained, and poorly lead American forces, evident early in the conflict, to the discipline and bravery of regular American forces central to the Niagara campaign of 1814 prompted a change of national military policy that pushed the citizen militia into the background and to the founding of a standing “regular army” lead by professional officers.

Why did the military experience of the War of 1812 result in the establishment of an American regular army culture focused on obedience, preparedness, audacity, and tenacity in battle? The answer seems intuitively obvious in the historical narrative: Humiliating battlefield defeats in 1812 and 1813 demonstrated to politicians the need for a regular army led by skilled officers. Those same defeats taught novice officers surviving combat the requisite leadership and management skills to attain a modicum of tactical success in 1814. Finally, when the Peace of Ghent was signed, select officers were retained to provide valuable skills and service to the nation despite political distrust and expense of a standing army. Such a rational explanation overlooks the intensely emotional essence of war, combat, and some of the intangible facts and circumstances bringing the United States to war in 1812. This essay argues that the emotional aspects specific to political and battlefield imperatives associated with American conduct of the war led a group of officers to adopt particular cultural preferences as rational solutions to practical wartime challenges.

The regular officers who fought the War of 1812, particularly veterans of the 1814 Niagara campaign, embodied a common ethos that valued obedience, preparedness, audacity, and tenacity in battle because these qualities, developed by trial and error, enabled them to build an army capable of winning in combat. This ethos, embodied by the small group of officers surviving combat and post-war military establishment reductions, came to be institutionalized over time as those officers dominated national military leadership from 1815 until the early 1860s. The ethos constituted the unique characteristics of American military culture. Rather than emphasize American weaknesses and failures, this work identifies the origin and essential components of American military culture by examining the interaction of American ideals, government goals and objectives, and the War of 1812 war experience in the context of the first war fought by a young constitutional democratic republic. In 1814, the American regular officer corps displayed a recognizable pattern of behavior that enabled them to establish a tradition of confronting seemingly impossible circumstances to successfully advance American military interests.
Society, Government, and the Regular Army

The liberties of a people are in danger from a large standing army . . .

Brutus, January 24, 1788³

Security against foreign power danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. . . . A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision.

Publius (James Madison), January 19, 1788⁴

If . . . that with England all hope of honorable accommodation is at an end . . . The final step ought to be taken; and that step is WAR. . . . It is by open and manly war only that we can get through it with honor . . . and if we are decided and firm, success is inevitable.

National Intelligencer, April 14, 1812⁵

The acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching.

Thomas Jefferson, August 1812⁶

At the time war was declared, American politicians saw using military force to seize foreign territory as unprecedented and involved establishing a standing army, an act fundamentally at odds with republican ideals of liberty. From this perspective, the War of 1812 was a series of first acts by a young republic. It was the first war declared and fought under the Constitution by a sitting President working within a two party political system. Additionally it was the first war with geographic objectives situated outside the territorial limits of the United States. As a result, the President, his administration, and Congress could not look to precedent for guidance or solutions but were required to rely on ingenuity, debate, and compromise to craft and balance policy, means, and acts. During the War of 1812, the central civil problem for the United States government was to find the political will to legitimize, raise, and fund a military force that was obedient to Federal authority and capable of defeating British regulars defending Canada. Aggravating these conditions was the practical problem of appointing officers capable of implementing national military plans calling for invasion. Over the course of the war, the constitutional system of checks and balances combined with dissenting domestic political opinion and hard facts to shape events in ways that were unexpected. Among these was the congressional authorization of a peacetime standing army at the war’s conclusion.⁷

The causes and ultimate American aims of the War of 1812 are matters for continued historical debate but the historical literature is clear that the American military goal was to conquer Canada as a means of achieving war aims.⁸ Conquering Canada also provided a setting to “satisfy” American honor in trial by combat.⁹ Honor is asserted here because doing so highlights Democratic-Republican expectations surrounding how military operations were to be conducted. Specifically, honor demanded courageous combat by military forces, as in a duel between
gentlemen. Linking the metaphor of war as a duel satisfying honor to expectations of military performance seems plausible for several circumstantial reasons. In 1809, following a heated political argument on the floor of the Kentucky House of Representatives during which Henry Clay felt his honor tainted, Clay challenged Humphrey Marshall to duel. During the illegal duel, the principals exchanged three rounds of pistol shots at a distance of about thirty feet, wounding both duelists. Clay insisted on a fourth round but the seconds intervened to end the contest, declaring honor of both gentlemen satisfied. In Clay’s mind, a battlefield and a field of honor were similar, if not the same, because immediately afterward he described the place where he and Marshall dueled as “the field of battle” rather than the field of honor. Evidence does not suggest that Clay’s attitude toward settling matters of honor changed in the years between 1809 and 1812. On April 1, 1812 United States Representative, Speaker of the House, and prominent “War Hawk” Henry Clay implied that national honor and individual honor should be viewed from a similar perspective saying “what would disgrace an individual under certain circumstances would disgrace a nation.” A few days later, an editorial, attributed to Clay, appeared in the National Intelligencer claiming “It is by open and manly war only that we can get through it with honor and advantage to the country.” Taken together, the written record implies that, in Clay’s view, Code Duello standards of conduct should be applied to a war fought to “satisfy” national honor, a war he openly advocated.

Some Democratic-Republicans (Jeffersonian Republicans) – a faction dubbed the “War Hawks” by Federalists – deemed Canada vulnerable from a military point of view. Further, American seizure of Canada would provide diplomatic leverage to obtain concessions from Britain. The Madison administration agreed with the assessment and purpose of invasion. Writing to South Carolina governor John Taylor, Secretary of State James Monroe asserted Canada would be invaded as a means of bringing war with Great Britain to a satisfactory conclusion. Explaining the war policy of the United States, Henry Clay wrote in December 1813: “Canada was not the end but the means, the object of the War being the redress of injuries, and Canada being the instrument by which that redress was to be obtained.”

At a superficial level, American possession of Canada as a bargaining chip to induce British concessions had merit. Great Britain was not directly assailable by the United States because doing so required confronting the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy included over 500 vessels whereas the United States Navy had 16 vessels of all sizes. However, Britain’s Canadian possessions could be attacked overland. Moreover, demographic and political considerations suggested Canadian defenders might not resist invasion or could be defeated in detail. In 1812, the American population was about 15 times the size of Canada’s population and intermingling of Canadian and American populations along the Canadian frontier suggested that a potentially disaffected Canadian populace might welcome American forces and rise in rebellion against the British. Further, with a frontier of about 900 hundred miles, the geographic scale of the Canadian-American border dwarfed the size of forces available for military employment, making small scattered garrisons vulnerable to sudden concentrations of attacking troops.

Such geo-political circumstances suggested that the British military response to American attacks into Canada would be modest and slow, too late to stop American conquest. Possessing an army of 250,000 men but exerting every effort to maintain an army on the European continent in opposition to Napoleonic France, Great Britain garrisoned Canada with about 7,000 British
and Canadian regular troops thinly deployed among scattered settlements along a single line of communication (the Great Lakes and associated waterways) that, for hundreds of miles, was contiguous to the border of the United States. Wilderness conditions magnified the difficulties posed by geographic scale. Along the border, travel by any means was slow, hazardous, and perhaps impossible in periods of bad weather. Moreover, and perhaps decisively, all Canadian British forces drew support from Great Britain, necessarily entailing a time-consuming transatlantic voyage for resources sent to North America. If the United States acted with speed, British reinforcements would come too late to stop an American invasion and occupation of Canada. Consequentially, the United States’ military aim was to conquer Canada quickly, before Great Britain could win the war in Europe or send troops and ships across the Atlantic. The expectation of Democratic-Republicans, controlling both houses of Congress and the Presidency, was, by invading and occupying Britain’s Canadian possessions at small cost, American demands might be secured during peace negotiations.

This war policy, geo-political assessment, and strategic solution were never accepted as appropriate by Federalists either at the Federal or State level. They put forward numerous objections. Objections they maintained throughout the war. Political dissent and partisan opposition to Democratic-Republican plans raised fundamental questions about the authority of the Federal government to use State militia or even Federal volunteers outside national boundaries without the consent of individuals or State authorities. In this situation, the Federal government was forced to confront and attempt to resolve a central problem of a constitutional democracy when forming and using military force: Military culture, founded on unquestioned obedience (enforced by punishment) to choices made by authority, is diametrically opposed to American cultural values. Founded on an egalitarian ideal exalting individual freedom of choice, American culture eschews coerced or compelled service and obedience, questions authority, and achieves governmental accountability and legitimacy through dissent. Describing the soldier’s condition, Elisha Reynolds Potter (1764–1835), a Federalist representing Rhode Island who served as a private in the Revolutionary War, said “...as soon as a man signs an enlistment for a certain time, and receives his bounty, from that time he ceases to have any will of his own until his time expires. He becomes a regular soldier to all intents and purpose, to be shot or hung, or otherwise punished, according to martial law.”

The salient legal problem of the Democratic-Republican policy was that the Constitution did not envision the United States attacking foreign powers and so did not provide for that contingency or for using militia outside of American territory. To implement their political vision, Democratic-Republicans needed an expeditionary army composed of troops that would recognize federal authority outside of United States territorial boundaries. The practical problem facing Democratic-Republicans was overcoming dissent to obtain consent from individual citizens as well as State authorities to form a Federal army sufficiently powerful to successfully invade Canada. In this way, the War of 1812 poignantly highlighted the American failure to resolve the tension between republican ideology and the practical need for an effective and reliable military establishment.

Strict constructionist reading of the Constitution by Democratic-Republicans prohibited reliance on militia or volunteers as an invasion force because that interpretation provided the legal rational for exercising political dissent. Democratic-Republicans recognized the unprecedented
aspect of their policy vision as early as March 1810. In debate, Archibald Van Horne (1758–1817), a Democratic-Republican representing Maryland, noted that marching “militia or volunteers into Canada . . . was a new way of making war.”24 The crux of the legal problem was pointed out by Erastus Root (1773–1846), a Democratic-Republican, representing New York: “. . . to the question whether the President may call the militia out of the jurisdiction of the United States the Constitution is perfectly silent.”25 Turning this observation to serve partisan opposition, Federalist congressman Elisha Potter declared “You cannot carry the militia out of the United States by the Constitution.”26

Political opposition to the war policy meant that New England states would not provide militia or purchase war debt, actions that hindered the ability of the national government to wage war. Further, State appointed militia commanders and individual militiamen could legally and did, albeit capriciously, refuse to obey Federal orders. As a result, commanders in the field could not confidently use State militia forces because they were “undisciplined,” “unreliable,” and contributed to disastrous battle results. Emotionally invested in and politically committed to war and conquest of Canada as a military objective, Democratic-Republicans overlooked constitutional questions and relied on patriotic fervor to obtain the army required to invade Canada. Unable to enlist sufficient regular troops and in need of additional forces to wage expeditionary war, the President requested and, in early 1812, Congress authorized 30,000 Federal volunteers and the “detachment” of militia to Federal service.27

Judged by disappointing regular army enlistment prior to and during the war, the American public was apathetic toward the Democratic-Republican war policy. Congress authorized about 35,000 regulars but only an estimated 6,400 to 6,700 men were serving.28 At the time war was declared, less than 20 percent of the congressionally authorized regular army was in service. Despite wartime increases of regular army authorizations, enlistment bounties, and the efforts of Democratic-Republican polemicists to portray military service as a frolic, the American public response to calls for enlistments was disappointing.29 By 1814, regular troops had become so difficult to recruit that Congress considered, but rejected, resorting to conscription.30 At the end of the war, the regular army numbered only about 35,000 soldiers of an aggregate authorization of 62,274.31 Undersubscribed regular army authorized strength reduced American military capabilities, compounding the difficulty of Canadian conquest.

To form an effective army, in addition to enlisting troops, Madison needed to appoint officers.32 Traditional historical interpretations emphasize officer inexperience and incompetence as causes for failure to successfully invade Canada.33 Although these interpretations are undoubtedly accurate, it is also accurate to observe that the War Department, possessing neither service schools nor experience in conducting offensive warfare against regular forces, was unable to describe the personal or technical characteristics required of officers to successfully lead American regular troops into Canada. Offering commissions to roughly 3,300 men, finding men willing to consent to military service as officers was not as difficult as recruiting soldiers.34 The difficulty was finding and selecting men with proven military talent, knowledge, or skill to fill positions in the expanded army.

Particularly problematic was the appointment of general officers. The two sources of appointees available to Madison, Revolutionary War veterans or younger untried officers, each featured
severe weaknesses. From this perspective, the War of 1812 can be thought of as a search for effective generals. In 1812, the United States Military Academy at West Point was not yet a source for senior officers because, of the 89 graduates, only 65 were serving and all were low in rank. The tiny Regular Army that existed over the 29 year period between the conclusion of the Revolutionary War (1783) and 1812 was not an attractive source for general officers because that force, widely scattered performing garrison and constabulary service (albeit intermittently punctuated by Indian wars), offered almost no opportunity for a generation of officers to practice employing large formations or demonstrate military ability. These officers, serving in small scattered detachments on the American frontier, were proficient in the tactics and supply of small groups, marching and bivouac in the wilderness, the construction of temporary defenses and shelter, and the building of roads and blockhouses. Such experience produced a cultural tradition of improvisation, resilience, and courage but almost no experience with large bodies of troops, and no combat experience facing regular forces. The Revolutionary War veterans’ war experience was conducting operations in a manner ensuring the survival of the American army rather than bravely risk the destruction of the Continental Army in battle facing regular troops. These military cultures’ values were very different from the culture required to successfully conduct large scale offensive campaigns against determined British and Canadian regulars backed up by Indian auxiliaries in Canada. President Madison, left to choose between elderly Revolutionary War veterans or younger men who were untried, appointed the veterans.

As a matter of political expediency and necessity, American policy makers ignored the practical logistical, operational, and tactical difficulties of invading Canada. American arms were to succeed on the basis of courage alone. In hindsight, it seems obvious that to conquer Canada, the United States needed a military organization prepared and able to fight as an expeditionary force operating under frontier conditions, and led by capable officers, particularly generals, who would and could suffer the destruction of that force in audacious offensive operations and combat. In 1810-1811, the divided Eleventh Congress, faced with an escalating crisis with Great Britain, did nothing to prepare the country’s military for war. As a result, American military forces were not ready for war when war was declared. Possessing an impotent military organization, the United States lacked the means to implement the political vision of successful Canadian invasion. To Democratic-Republican dominated official Washington, preparation for war was not an impediment to declaring war because American will, courage and audacity were deemed be sufficient to honorably overcome British opposition.

War – American Humiliation

It is said that we are not prepared for war, and ought therefore not to declare it. This is an idle objection, which can have weight with the timid and pusillanimous only.

*National Intelligencer*, April 14, 1812

The young have never seen service, and the old are past it . . . I see, as you do, the difficulties and defects we have to encounter in war, and should expect disasters . . . But the weakness of our enemy there [in Canada] will make our first errors innocent, and the seeds of genius . . . among our military men . . . will soon, I hope, to our force add the benefits of skill.
Thomas Jefferson, August 1812

We have just heard with equal astonishment & concern, that Genl Hull, has surrendered by capitulation the army under his command at Detroit . . . The circumstances attending this most mortifying & humiliating event are not known, but . . . there appears to be no justification of it.

James Monroe, August 28, 1812

By any objective measurement overall American efforts to invade Canada during the War of 1812 were, at best, disappointing, at worst, catastrophic. Over the course of 32 months, American commanders repeatedly attempted invasion but were foiled in nearly every instance. Employing trained regular troops, experienced British officers blended attack and defense at operational and tactical levels to largely achieve their strategic aim – the successful defense of Canada. Although American military failure was problematic from a policy perspective, American failure to match British tactical gallantry was particularly galling because it sullied American honor by demonstrating a lack of courage. To the embarrassment of many Americans, American military officers learned their trade, and policy imperatives, by trial and error. By the end of the war, American politicians realized that aggressive and experienced regular army officers were required if the United States Army was to effectively implement national policies involving extra-territorial operations.

In August of 1812 Thomas Jefferson was only half right. American efforts to invade Canada were not innocent but disastrous because British military weakness in Canada did not offset American lack of élan, vigor, knowledge, and skill. Instead of merely marching to win Canada, British regulars forced an unprepared and inexperienced American army to engage in combat, retire, or surrender. During 1812 and 1813, these options proved ruinous for American arms because those forces were not prepared. In contrast, along the Niagara frontier in 1814, prepared American regulars successfully met British regulars in combat, an act satisfying American honor. American regular forces were able to be effective in combat because, as a body, they were able to muster sufficient audacity, preparation, skill, and, most importantly, troop discipline to seriously challenge their British and Canadian opponents at a tactical level. In doing so, American regular forces demonstrated courage by suffering as well as delivering crippling casualties. In this way the emotional imperative of the war, satisfying American honor, was achieved.

In 1812, American military operations in Canada were cataclysmic. Unable to find a more suitable candidate, Madison pressed Revolutionary War veteran and governor of Michigan Territory William Hull to accept appointment as a regular army Brigadier General to command forces advancing to Fort Detroit and crossing into Canada to seize Fort Malden. Hull’s force was comprised of the 4th U.S. Infantry Regiment (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James Miller), three regiments of Ohio militia infantry (commanded by militia Colonels Duncan McArthur, Lewis Cass, and James Findlay) and a troop of militia cavalry. The militia was summoned to service by Governor J. Meigs. Hull failed to inspire confidence in his militia commanders and he had no confidence in the combat capability of his troops. After advancing from Urbana, Ohio, constructing 200 miles of road through the Black Swamp, and having his supply line raided by Indians, Hull was cornered at Fort Detroit. Faced with siege and threatened with the possibility
of Indian massacre of women and children should his troops fail in battle, he surrendered his force without a fight at Detroit on August 16, 1812.\textsuperscript{44} Hull, subjected to court-martial charged with treason and cowardice, was found guilty and sentenced to death but had his sentence commuted by the President.\textsuperscript{45} Hull’s campaign, court-martial, and public reaction can be convincingly interpreted as a clash of generational cultural values.\textsuperscript{46}

Major General Henry Dearborn, Revolutionary War veteran and Secretary of War during the Jefferson presidential administration, was appointed to command northeast sector of the United States from the Niagara River to the New England coast. He delegated operational and tactical responsibility for invading Canada to New York militia Major General Stephan Van Rensselaer.\textsuperscript{47} Van Rensselaer’s surprise attack across the Niagara River at Queenston (October 13, 1812) failed when, at the height of the battle, militia refused to cross the river, compelling him to helplessly watch part of his army surrender. The event prompted his resignation in disgrace.\textsuperscript{48} His replacement, Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, a regular army officer first commissioned in 1808, despite vainglorious proclamations, failed to aggressively attack from an abundance of caution arising from the notion that he must not be defeated; New York militia Brigadier General Peter Buell Porter, an eyewitness to events, publically accused Smyth of cowardice resulting in a bloodless duel. Smyth was quietly dropped from the army rolls.\textsuperscript{49} In November, after months of unsuccessfully attempting to have New England governors provide militia, Dearborn ordered his army out of Plattsburgh, marched 20 miles to Canada and then returned to camp when the militia he did raise refused to cross the international border.\textsuperscript{50}

Political reaction to unexpected, and therefore shocking, military defeat attributed to dishonorable conduct by American general officers was predictably vicious. A mortified Henry Clay wrote “Of Hull's treachery . . . I do not think it worth investigation whether the act is to be attributed to treachery or cowardice. It was so shameful, so disgraceful a surrender, that whether it proceeded from the one or the other cause he deserves to be shot.”\textsuperscript{51} Lucidly, Albert Gallatin pointed out “The series of misfortunes experienced this year in our military land operations exceeds all anticipations made even by those who had least confidence in our inexperienced officers and undisciplined men. . . . The conduct of Hull, Rensselaer, and Smyth cannot be accounted for on any rational principle.”\textsuperscript{52} Thomas Jefferson offered advice to President Madison “Hull will of course be shot for cowardice & treachery. And will not Van Renslaer [sic] be broke for cowardice and incapacity?”\textsuperscript{53} Notwithstanding commander witch hunts, apparently no one within the United States government was prepared to identify and correct the underlying systemic causes of military failures.

In 1813, limited successes in Upper Canada west of the Niagara River provided the United States some military progress. However, those gains were too modest to force Great Britain to concede to American war aims. Equally important, tactical combat failed to demonstrate the courage demanded by American honor. Rather than reflecting an improvement of American tactical prowess, success came as a result of American naval victory on Lake Erie. Of the five Major Generals on active service in 1813, only one, William Henry Harrison, acquitted himself successfully on campaign.\textsuperscript{54}

Initially outnumbered, Major General William Henry Harrison (Governor of Indiana Territory, regular army veteran, and Indian fighter), organized and trained militia, and in the spring of 1813
resisted a British offensive. Central to Harrison’s defense was Fort Meigs, an exceptionally strong structure composed of picket logs reinforced by mounds of earth with blockhouses and batteries commanding all approaches. Harrison forces successfully withstood two attempted British attacks at Fort Meigs (a siege May 1-9, and July 20, 1813) and repulsed a British attack at Fort Stephenson (August 2, 1813). A month later Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry defeated the British navy on Lake Erie Sept 10, 1813. American control of the lake cut-off reliable logistical support and permitted Harrison to turn the flank of British forces at will, conditions causing British forces to withdraw to the north. Harrison pursued the British, culminating in the Battle of the Thames (also called the Battle of Moraviantown, October 5, 1813). The battle resulted in American victory and the death of Harrison’s longtime adversary Shawnee chief Tecumseh. Fought late in the year, Harrison did not follow up the victory with an advance on Burlington Heights. However, the battle ended major fighting west of the Niagara River as well as Indian attempts to form a confederacy. Snubbed by Secretary of War Armstrong, Harrison offered his resignation which was accepted by Armstrong during an absence of the President.

Instead of advancing toward Montreal, Dearborn, in what has been characterized as the “best-planned and best-fought engagement of the entire war,” seized Fort George (May 1813) following a successful amphibious assault orchestrated by then Colonel Winfield Scott and Commodore Perry. The offensive collapsed when American forces failed to exploit their initial success. Fort George, garrisoned by militia after Dearborn withdrew his regular troops to Sackets Harbor, was evacuated in December. American militia later burned Queenstown and Newark. Outraged, the British retaliated by capturing Fort Niagara and ravaging the American side of the Niagara River, burning Buffalo, Black Rock, and other towns.

In July 1813 Major General James Wilkinson, yet another Revolutionary War veteran, replaced Dearborn. Unfortunately, Wilkinson was no more aggressive than Dearborn, writing to Secretary of War Armstrong “in case of Misfortune[,] having no retreat, the army must surrender.” In November, his troops, advancing slowly from Sackets Harbor down the St. Lawrence River, were defeated by a smaller British force at the Battle of Crysler’s Farm (November 11, 1813) and entered winter quarters at French Mills. The failed piecemeal attack at Crysler’s Farm was staged by Wilkinson but tactically commanded by Brigadier General John P. Boyd as directed by Major General Morgan Lewis (Wilkinson’s Quartermaster General). When Wilkinson did lead his command, to attack La Colle Mill (March 30, 1814), his incompetence was demonstrated prompting his removal.

The year 1814 marked a sea change in American tactical conduct. As 1813 ended and 1814 began, Secretary of War John Armstrong, Jr. appointed a new group of general officers who were young, vigorous, and, after two years of campaigning, experienced. In contrast to civilian government officials, the trauma of experiencing military disasters and disappointments of 1812 and 1813 led surviving American officers to draw several conclusions about the practical conduct of war. First among these was that the key requirement for units to be effective tools in combat was for commanders to acquire obedience from soldiers and subordinate officers. New York militia Brigadier General Peter B. Porter complained to New York Governor Daniel D. Tompkins in 1814 “The commanding officer . . . should be able to order and not be obliged to request obedience to his measures.” Obedient soldiers were disciplined, meaning they reliably followed orders without dissent or discussion. Several additional conclusions were related to the
first: Relying on regular forces avoided constitutional arguments that undermined the obligation of subordinates to render obedience. In addition, obtaining obedience from subordinates required preparing them for service and combat. By providing the wherewithal to engage in combat, preparation infused individuals of all ranks with self-confidence and pride, making the force confident of victory. When troops and subordinate officers were reliably obedient, a commander could have confidence that orders would be carried out. Furthermore, for officers, obedience extended from simply following orders to include the obligation to display initiative, aggressively act independently and innovatively using resources at hand in ways supporting and advancing a superior’s vision and intent. That intent called for, as a matter of national honor, American forces to successfully invade Canada or suffer destruction in the attempt. Confident in subordinate obedience, some officers, particularly generals appointed in 1814, changed their attitude toward the acceptability of combat and casualties so that military operations would render a decision. Although all of these points were prominently exhibited by the officers serving in Brown’s “Left Division” during the 1814 Niagara campaign, the last point was particularly evident as revealed by the extent of the casualties suffered on campaign.

**War – American Vindication**

*Obedience – implicit obedience* must be learned before men can be said to possess discipline, or be prepared for war. This cannot be learned in the sweet social walks of domestic life. The ordinary operation of civil affairs, in our beloved country, is as deadly hostile to every principle of military discipline, as a complete military government would be to a democracy.

Lieutenant Colonel Edmund P. Gaines, January 20, 1813\(^{65}\)

It is fortunate for the army and this nation that a fair experiment has been made with a part of our land forces, that a few brave men have met the enemy and triumphed over a superior number of troops hitherto esteemed the best in the world [the British Army]. But the general execution of the plan of campaign has been disgraceful.

Major General Jacob Brown, November 1814\(^{66}\)

In 1814, American forces failed to successfully invade Canada but demonstrated that American regulars were a match for British regulars in combat. The distinctive and celebrated feature of the 1814 Niagara campaign was American units remaining under the control of their officers while in combat against British regulars, forcing the British to yield ground.\(^{67}\) By maintaining cohesion under trying circumstances, mostly regular American forces and their officers, demonstrated courage and proved they were equal to British regulars in terms of emotional control and perhaps superior in stamina. The invasion failed because American forces returned to the United States rather than remain in Canada over the winter. That Major General Jacob Brown’s 1814 Niagara campaign ultimately failed to achieve the strategic and operational goal of seizing Canadian territory seemed less significant than demonstrated American improvement in battlefield performance.\(^{68}\)
Astonishingly, the major blow of the 1814 American invasion of Canada was undertaken with fewer than 3,000 regulars – less than ten percent of the total regular forces available – along the Niagara River. Major General Brown, commanding the “Left Division” was directed by Secretary of War Armstrong to “assail the Fort [Fort Erie] by land and water; push forward a corps to seize the bridge at Chippawa [sic]; and be governed by circumstances in either stopping or going further.”

Supply across the Niagara River was to be by boat at the end of a slow overland supply route running from Rome to Batavia and onto Buffalo. As the campaign of 1814 unfolded, Americans advanced along a single line of operation. With each advance, the American ability to achieve local numerical superiority was reduced because the British were able to reinforce field forces when falling back on successive strong points while simultaneously moving additional troops forward. Without numerical superiority or advantage through maneuver, combat became a test of stamina, material, and morale for soldiers of all ranks. Decided by frontal attacks and exhaustion of forces without achieving a decisive outcome, combat was intense, in some cases prolonged, and deadly for both sides.

From the perspective of a war of national honor, the 1814 Niagara campaign battles were significant because possessing the battlefield after suffering casualties offered irrefutable tangible proof of American courage and determination. At the Battle of Chippewa (July 5, 1814), Winfield Scott’s brigade of 1,300 regulars met Major General Sir Phineas Riall’s 1,500 advancing regulars in what has been described as a fair fight. Scott won the engagement because Riall, having left the safety of his defenses to deliver an attack that would drive brittle American militia back, was surprised to confront a defending regular force prepared to engage in combat. A more compelling demonstration of American courage occurred about three weeks later at the Battle of Lundy’s Lane (also called the Battle of Niagara Falls, July 25, 1814). Major General Jacob Brown, with a force of about 2,400 regulars, attacked Major General Sir Gordon Drummond’s force of about 3,000 British and Canadian regulars defending a hilltop and road junction. During a long and intense nighttime engagement, both sides fought to exhaustion.

Brown’s army was as disciplined and obstinate as British regulars. During July 1814, Brown’s Left Division suffered cumulative casualties of more than 20 percent of the regular army strength (Table 1: Casualties for Regular Brigades, Brown’s Division). For some British regiments cumulative losses were also devastating. For example, the 89th Regiment of Foot began the mid-summer campaign with 500 troops, by late October only 60 troops, commanded by a captain, remained – a cumulative loss of 88 percent. By maintaining unit cohesion American forces proved they possessed discipline despite crippling losses and intense prolonged combat.
Table 1: Casualties for Regular Brigades, Brown’s Division

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<th>Brigade</th>
<th>Return July 1, 1814</th>
<th>Return July 31, 1814</th>
<th>Implied Casualties</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>432</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ripley’s Brigade</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,405</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>544</td>
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Table 2: Casualties for Selected Regiments, Brown’s Division

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<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Officers</th>
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<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>348</td>
<td>139</td>
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<tr>
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<td>416</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>Scott</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st</td>
<td>Ripley</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Battle of Lundy’s Lane illustrates the intensity of combat characterizing the campaign. At the outset of the battle, elements of Scott’s brigade, waiting reinforcement, remained in formation for hours while experiencing effective artillery fire coming from a British battery posted on a knoll beyond musket range. In some regiments, officer losses exceeded 50 percent and total losses almost 60 percent (Table 2: Casualties for Selected Regiments, Brown’s Division). These regiments were effectively destroyed but retained their willingness to respond to orders issued by surviving officers. 78 While Scott grimly waited reinforcement, he ordered Major Thomas S. Jessup (25th Regiment) to conduct a flanking movement through woods east of the British position. The attack captured an important road junction, turned the British left, and captured numerous British prisoners, but was too weak to decisively break the British defense. 79 The crisis of the battle came when Colonel James Miller’s 21st Infantry Regiment, stormed the height of the knoll, capturing at bayonet point the active British artillery battery that had ruined Scott’s Brigade. The attack was delivered in darkness without rehearsal or illumination, involved an advance of perhaps 300 yards, silent deployment in line along a fence about 100 feet to the front of the British artillery battery, and, after capturing the battery, successfully withstanding repeated British counter-attacks. Miller justifiably called the battle “one of the most desperately fought actions ever experienced in America.” 80 The length of the battle added to the pressure on morale by creating shortages of ammunition. Alexander McMullen, a private in one of Brigadier General Peter B. Porter’s militia regiments, probably expressed a common emotional response of soldiers when obligated to face an enemy army with an empty cartridge box: “This to me was one of the most trying moments of my life.” He continued, saying “I felt my situation to be an awful one, and I did sincerely wish that the British army, who were on the hill in view of us, might not come down to commence the engagement again.” 81 Militiaman McMullen apparently did not consider running away and maintained his post as did Brown’s regulars. Demonstrated discipline achieved by valor rescued American honor debased by previous humiliating defeats. 82
After the Battle of Lundy’s Lane, Brown’s Division retired to Fort Erie, there to suffer a prolonged siege ended by a daring American sortie. Major General George Izard with about 4,000 of his 5,500 troops of the “Right Division” was dispatched from Plattsburgh to reinforce Brown’s Left Division and advanced on the strongly entrenched British position at Chippewa. Izard, the only senior American officer who possessed formal European military training, was prudent instead of audacious. To conserve American forces, Izard deferred fighting a pitched battle against an entrenched foe. Moreover, with winter setting in, Izard abandoned Fort Erie and the Canadian side of the Niagara River to go into winter quarters near Buffalo. Izard preserved American forces for an 1815 campaign but was heavily criticized for his actions. As anticipated by Izard, American movement from Plattsburgh to the Niagara frontier induced Sir George Prevost, Governor General of Canada, to advance with a force of about 10,000 men along the Lake Champlain route to Plattsburgh. The British suffered a defeat on the lake, precipitating a return to Canada without a fighting a major land battle.

Three key aspects of the campaign account for improved American combat performance. First, after two years of personally conducting war, new appointed general and field grade officers were proven veterans knowledgeable of the realities of campaigning along the Canadian frontier with American troops. Second, applying their hard won expertise, these experienced American officers meticulously prepared themselves and their troops for the campaign. Third, these same officers were prepared to risk the destruction of their forces in combat to pursue national military objectives. Taken together, these aspects enabled American forces to exhibit valor and remain obedient to command, independent of battlefield tactical or operational circumstances.

Brown’s army became a disciplined force because troop welfare needs and training were provided to supply the means to fight, hone skills, and ultimately improve morale. Brown credited preparation with making his division ready to fight. Preparation and discipline proved to be inseparable, but preparation extended beyond drill because it also involved making individuals and units ready to fight. Historians generally attribute the Left Division’s success to the training it received under the direction of Brigadier General Winfield Scott in camp at Buffalo in the spring of 1814. Private Alexander McMullen describes drill lasting all day from reveille (beat at “4 o’clock”) until “retired to rest,” (apparently shortly after nine p. m.), a 17 hour training day. Drill included all levels of the command structure from “Sergeants” (company or regiment) drill through “Adjutant-General” (brigade) drill. Drill at all tactical levels provided officers an opportunity to hone their skill at maneuvering large bodies of troops. However, the transformation of 2,000 regulars “almost in a state of perfect nakedness” and equally ill equipped militia into an army of men physically able to endure Scott’s training program and rigors of active campaigning required more than drill to form an effective military force. Camp sanitation standards were introduced and enforced to ensure the health of the troops. A regimen of weekly inspections was instituted to determine the serviceability of the men’s personal weapons and equipment, with shortages put on requisition. It was while forces were assembled and slowly clothed and equipped that Scott’s training program was instituted with the overall goal to make Brown’s division ready to fight. The effect of the camp routine was not lost on Private McMullen: “Constant exercise, wholesome provisions, and strict discipline soon made our regiment have another appearance.” Here, from a private soldier’s perspective, is a report of key elements needed to obtain discipline from American troops.
In addition to physical and mental readiness, Scott’s “camp of instruction” armed soldiers with pride and confidence, linking preparation to discipline at an emotional level. Brown’s troops worked hard to look like soldiers and parade like soldiers – they expected themselves to act like soldiers. Healthy, well fed, clothed, and armed soldiers were physically capable of battle. Close-order drill through brigade level prepared officers and men mentally for battle by combining knowledge and practice. Soldier emotional response to hard work and preparation was pride and confidence in oneself, officers, and the unit. Soldiers could and wanted to be obedient and disciplined. In a reciprocal manner, officers were proud of their soldiers, and confident of success. Scott said “I have a handsome little army . . . I am most partial to these regiments. . . . If, of such materials, I do not make the best army now in service . . . I will agree to be dismissed . . . “\textsuperscript{93} Preparation, pride, and confidence gave Brown’s Left Division the wherewithal to confidently engage in battle and win at the tactical level.

**Peace, Mandated Reduction, and Reorganization**

I recommend to your care and beneficence the gallant men whose achievements, in every department of the military service . . . have so essentially contributed to the honor of the American name . . . A certain degree of preparation for war . . . affords also the best security for the continuance of peace. The wisdom of Congress will . . . provide for the maintenance of an adequate regular force . . .

James Madison, February 18, 1815\textsuperscript{94}

Those qualities which essentially distinguish an army from an equal assemblage of untrained individuals, can only be acquired by the instruction of experienced officers. If they, particularly the company and regimental officers, are inexperienced, the army must remain undisciplined, in which case, the genius, and even experience of the commander, will be of little avail. The great and leading objects, then, of a military establishment in peace, ought to be to create and perpetuate military skill and experience.

John C. Calhoun, December 12, 1820\textsuperscript{95}

The War of 1812 established that an effective regular army was an indispensible national asset for the President to execute international policy. The 1814 Niagara campaign proved that, by 1815, the United States had constructed a military organization capable of implementing national military policy by winning in combat. The national experience of the War of 1812 changed public and political opinion to permit the retention of a standing army because events demonstrated the necessity of a regular army when waging war against a European power.\textsuperscript{96} Consequently, in his February message delivering the treaty of peace (Treaty of Ghent) to Congress, President Madison warned against precipitate demobilization and, offering no role for militia, urged retention of the regular army.\textsuperscript{97} Regular officers were to perpetuate a military ethic and culture to provide the United States a force to deter war and immediately respond to international events.

Expansion of congressionally authorized regular forces between 1808 and 1815 was dramatic in terms of both scale and structure. In 1808, the regular army organization “consisted of one
artillery and two infantry regiments and a small corps of engineers,” commanded by one brigadier general, an authorized total of 3,284 officers and men. At the final wartime expansion, March 1814, the army consisted of three regiments of artillery, one of light artillery, forty-six regiments of infantry, four of riflemen, and three regiments of dragoons, for an authorized total of 62,674 officers and men. This expansion represented a 19-fold increase in authorized strength over a period of six years. The actual strength of the regular army was uncertain but was significantly less than the authorized total. In September 1814, 34,029 men were reported in troop returns, about 50 percent of the total authorized but an increase of more than ten times the size of the regular army in 1808. To support the expanded army, Congress also established general staff departments: adjutant and inspector general, ordinance, quartermaster, purchasing, hospital and pay. In terms of senior leaders, 341 general and field grade officers served during the War of 1812. Of these, 242 were on the rolls in June 1815.

Such a large regular force was financially unsustainable. Despite presidential calls for maintenance of a ready military establishment and immediately following Senate ratification of the Treaty of Ghent, Congress acted to relieve crushing national financial pressures. On March 3, 1815, Congress reduced the regular army authorization 80 percent to 12,383 officers and men and total commissioned officers to 674 with only eight generals and 38 field grade officer slots provided in the line formations. Aggregate general and field grade officer rolls were reduced about 75 percent to total 62 officers. Of the 62 wartime generals and field grade officers who retained their commissions, 18 were veterans of the 1814 Niagara campaign (29 percent of the total) and an additional five fought at the Battle of New Orleans. Of the seven generals on the army register of 1816, four were generals who conducted the 1814 Niagara campaign, and a fifth commanded at the Battle of Plattsburgh. Taken together, more than 70 percent of the general officers surviving the reduction were generals serving in the 1814 northern campaigns.

The government, both the presidential administration and the Congress, required officers who were willing and able to fight. It rewarded those who did fight and removed officers who did not display those qualities. Although general officer performance was the most visible change, conferred brevet promotions indicate that regiment and company grade performance also dramatically improved in 1814. During the War of 1812, 150 brevet promotions were conferred with almost eight of very ten brevets awarded in 1814 (Table 3 Brevets Conferred 1812–1815). About two-thirds of these brevets were conferred on company grade officers and one-third on field grade officers (Table 4 Brevets Conferred in 1814 by Command Level). Only four brevets were conferred at the general officer level. Moreover, almost two-thirds of the brevets were granted for conduct during the 1814 Niagara campaign (the battles of Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and Fort Erie in Table 5 Brevets Conferred in 1814 by Battle). Between 1812 and 1815 only nine officers received two brevet promotions, suggesting exceptional performance was not limited to a few individuals. The record supports the assertion that, as a group, Brown’s junior officers were consistently gallant.
Table 3 Brevets Conferred 1812–1815

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Brevets</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1812</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1813</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1814</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>150</td>
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</table>

Table 4 Brevets Conferred in 1814 by Command Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brevets</th>
<th>Percent 1814 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company Officers (CPT, LT, Ensign)</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimental Officers (COL, LTC, MAJ)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Officers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1814</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 Brevets Conferred in 1814 by Battle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battle</th>
<th>Brevets</th>
<th>Percent 1814 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chippewa</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lundy’s Lane</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Erie</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plattsburgh</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Battle</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Service</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1814</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Army 1815 selection process retained officers who had displayed dash, aggressiveness, and tenacity during wartime campaigns. These officers possessed a record of fighting, particularly when such action was reckless but necessary. Senior officers making significant contributions were singled out and, “In recognition of their achievements, Congress voted to strike gold medals for Generals Jacob Brown, Andrew Jackson, Winfield Scott, Eleazar Ripley, Edmund Gaines, Alexander Macomb, James Miller of the regulars, and Peter B. Porter”, a militia officer. The government wanted officers with war-fighting talent. The group of officers explicitly selected to remain on the rolls of the regular army after 1816 had demonstrated their war-fighting quality by acting aggressively, with audacity, determination, and tenacity in combat. The War of 1812 marked the emergence of a stable American profession of arms because the “disastrous events of the War of 1812 discredited the prewar army and permitted a generation of young officers to rise to high command positions”, remain in those positions for long periods, and form a distinct American military culture.

Continuing financial pressures caused succeeding congresses and presidential administrations to revisit the size of the peacetime military establishment. In 1821, when faced with the prospect of another congressionally mandated reduction, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun proposed to
Congress a plan for a peacetime Federal regular military establishment allowing the government to prepare for future hostilities by creating and perpetuating military skill and experience, especially required among company and regimental officers. In his report, Calhoun emphasized that discipline, implying obedience, was the quality distinguishing an army from an assemblage of individuals.\textsuperscript{112} In response, Congress further reduced the regular army to 5,586 men and 540 officers overseen by one major general, three brigadier generals, and a general staff.\textsuperscript{113} However, this reduction was the last important cutback and reorganization of the nineteenth-century peacetime army and marked the un-official adoption of the cadre plan outlined by Secretary Calhoun.

By retaining a small peacetime military establishment, Calhoun and Congress inadvertently provided peacetime regular army officers with professional focus.\textsuperscript{114} The cadre plan provided officers with two focal points: 1) the army was charged with an explicit and permanent mission to defend the nation from outside threat, and 2) charged officers to function as “a storehouse of military expertise for use in future mobilization.”\textsuperscript{115} Combined, these themes gave the officer corps a clear sense of purpose and a stable structure. Although the size of the army was reduced by Congress, officers surviving the reductions were able to maintain the military culture formed during the war because they were charged with that task.

**Cultural Legacy**

The birthplace of the [American] regular army is not at Valley Forge, but along the Niagara in 1814.

Donald E. Graves\textsuperscript{116}

The validity Donald Graves’ claim lay in a post war officer corps dominated for more than 40 years by the veteran generals and regimental officers of the 1814 Niagara campaign who were specifically selected by the government for retention because they embodied the experiences of that war – and were expected to pass on the values of the resulting culture to succeeding generations of officers. These veterans were the core members and senior leaders of what has been called “The Old Army,” the military cultural legacy of the War of 1812.\textsuperscript{117}

Dominance by the veterans of the 1814 campaigns was especially evident in general officer ranks. As the only surviving Major General, Jacob Brown dominated the immediate post war period because he was appointed the first Commanding General of the Army and headed the board of generals that recommended officers to be retained in the 1815 reduction. Three generals, Alexander Macomb (commanded at the Battle of Plattsburgh), Edmund P. Gaines (commanded during the Siege of Fort Erie), and Winfield Scott (commanded a brigade at the battles of Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane) dominated the army’s top command structure through most of the antebellum era.\textsuperscript{118} Bitter rivalry between Gaines and Scott led to Macomb succeeded Brown as Commanding General of the Army. However, Scott succeeded Macomb. Scott served in this post from 1841 until 1861 when he was replaced by Major General George B. McClellan.

The shared war experience, sudden reduction in numbers, and resulting common culture created a sense of unity and separateness among regular officers. That sense of unity, called
“corporateness,” constituted one of the three characteristics of a profession.\textsuperscript{119} Williamson Murray convincingly posits that “military culture may be the most important factor not only in military effectiveness, but also in the processes involved in . . . preparing military organizations for the next war.”\textsuperscript{120} The surviving 62 general and field grade officers of the War of 1812 did not constitute a unified professional cadre, but did share, as a group, a wartime experience that constituted a shared conviction that could be acted on and ultimately institutionalized. As was the case for the most senior officers, the great majority of the officers in the middle rungs of the officer corps received no formal military education but had learned their trade on the battlefields of the War of 1812. For these officers “Only a relatively large, disciplined regular army, led by experienced officers and possessing well-organized staff services, could prevent a repetition of the confusion and near collapse of 1812 and 1813.”\textsuperscript{121} The basis for the shared conviction was a shared culture rooted in combat experience.

Conclusion

\textit{Reposing} special trust and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities of . . . I do strictly charge and require those Officers and other personnel of lesser rank to render such obedience as is due an officer of this grade and position.

U.S. Army Officers Commission\textsuperscript{122}

In the period following the War of 1812, American society developed common cultural institutions that reflected how American society wanted to see itself. The resulting surging nationalism included the creation of a large body of patriotic literature glorifying events, demonizing opponents, and establishing heroes – romantically idealizing in image, verse, song, and literature harsh military realities.\textsuperscript{123} From a national cultural perspective, the events and personalities of the War of 1812 were abstracted into national symbols that became so pervasive they formed the very fabric of American patriotism. Examples are so common that they can be uncomfortably trite: The national anthem glorifies Major George Armistead’s defense of Baltimore Harbor at Fort McHenry; General Andrew Jackson’s defense of New Orleans has passed into myth and popularly known through song lyrics, most recently in Jimmy Driftwood’s “The Battle of New Orleans” (1958);\textsuperscript{124} Oliver Hazard Perry’s announcement of victory on Lake Erie: “We have met the enemy, and they are ours . . .” has morphed into a well known 1970s pop-culture Pogo invention “We have met the enemy and he is us.”\textsuperscript{125} Seen in the cultural context of remembrance by Americans, the War of 1812 may be a forgotten conflict but the military cultural traditions spawned by that conflict are so ubiquitous that the event is simply invisible.

The values and attitudes of the 1814 Niagara officers – honorable obedience, gallantry, and sacrifice – are equally pervasive in American military culture and define many military cultural concepts for American’s at large. As reflected in the language of an Officers Commission, American soldiers of all ranks are expected to stoically render obedience, act heroically, and, if necessary, die in combat while honorably and faithfully performing their duty. The officers of the War of 1812 provided a cultural legacy and structure based on their war experience which formed the basis of an American military profession.\textsuperscript{126} War of 1812 American military culture
mattered because it was an important factor impacting military effectiveness and the ability of government to implement policy.

Combining studies of society’s and government’s impact on military events and the military narrative of the War of 1812 identified the origin and some essential components of a unique American regular army officer culture. By focusing on American successes, this essay demonstrates that, by the end of the War of 1812, the American officer corps displayed a pattern of behavior that enabled them to overcome hazards and difficulties, even systemic inefficiencies. In doing this, these officers established a tradition of confronting seemingly impossible circumstances to successfully advance American military interests. Regular officers who fought the War of 1812 embodied a common ethos that emphasized obedience, preparedness, audacity, and tenacity in battle because these qualities enabled them to build an army capable of winning in combat when opposed by a regular force. That culture came to be institutionalized over time because those officers dominated national military leadership during the antebellum period.


For discussion of Democratic-Republican conversion to the idea that war was the only alternative to national humiliation see Norman K. Risjord, “1812: Conservatives, War Hawks and the Nation's Honor,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 18, no. 2 (Apr., 1961): 196-210; For example of political rhetoric, see National Intelligencer, April 14, 1812 quoted in Papers of Henry Clay, 1:645-8.


11 Annals, 12th Congress, 1 sess., Supplemental Journal, unnumbered page preceding 1589. Available online at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/amppage?collId=llac&fileName=024/llac024.db&recNum=203 (accessed August 5, 2013); also Passage of the Embargo Bill, [April 1, 1812], Papers of Henry Clay, 1:641.

12 National Intelligencer, April 14, 1812 quoted in Papers of Henry, 1:645. The editorial suggests that war was seen as a duel to satisfy honor sullied by years of unfruitful negotiation and trade sanctions. Although not an official government publication, Bernard Mayo characterizes the National Intelligencer as “the administration’s gazette” with the editorial attributed to Speaker of the House Henry Clay by British diplomats, see Mayo, Henry Clay, 504, 504n1, 504n2. The editorial rhetoric employs intangible emotional concepts such as honor, manliness, and courage to make arguments supporting a war policy.

13 The appropriateness of “War Hawks” as a descriptive term was debated in 1964, see Alexander DeConde, “The War Hawks of 1812: A Critique,” Indiana Magazine of History 60, no. 2 (June 1964): 152-154; and Norman K. Risjord, “The War Hawks and the War of 1812,”

For quote, see Clay to Thomas Bodley, December 18, 1813, in Papers of Henry Clay, 1:842. James Monroe wrote to John Taylor, June 13, 1812 quoted in Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 4n5.  


For size of the British army, see Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World. New York: Collier Books, 1962, 123. For a scale map of the Canadian border, see Hickey, War of 1812, 310-1, Map 1 The Northern Theater. The length of the border is impressive even by modern standards. British and Canadian regular strength in Canada is from Coles, War of 1812, 36, 39-40. The British garrison was composed of four line regiments of foot, and the 10th Royal Battalion, totaling about 4,000 soldiers, the remaining 3,000 were Canadian regulars organized in five units. In contrast, Weigley estimates British forces in Canada total less than 5,000, see Weigley, History, 118.

For a contemporary geo-political assessment, see National Intelligencer, April 14, 1812, reprinted in Papers of Henry Clay, 1:645-8. For claims the editorial was authored by Clay, see Mayo, Henry Clay, 504, n. For discussion, see Coles, War of 1812, 1-39; for discussion of Canadian vulnerability in a European context, see Black, War of 1812, 46-52; Stagg, “James Madison and the ‘Malcontents’,” 557-85; and Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 5-7, especially 5.  
15 For discussion see Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 4-5; Hickey, War of 1812, 72-5; and Coles, War of 1812, 34-6.
16 For discussion see Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 5; Hickey, War of 1812, 73-4; Horsman, “On to Canada,” 1-24, especially 18-9.
18 For discussion of efforts during the post Revolutionary War period to reconcile creating an effective and reliable military force with the republican axiom that standing armies are incompatible with liberty see Lawrence Delbert Cress, “Republican Liberty and National Security: American Military Policy as an Ideological Problem 1783 to 1789,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 38, no. 1 (January 1981): 73-96. For argument that the militia system was sound but improperly implemented see Robert L. Kerby, “The Militia System and the State Militias in the War of 1812,” Indiana Magazine of History, 73, no. 2 (June 1977): 102-124.
31 Weigley, History, 119, 121.
32 Similar arguments might be made discussing Secretary of War, War Department, and staff appointments. Here discussion focuses on field forces.
34 Stagg, “United States Army Officers in the War of 1812,” 1006.
35 Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 380. The United States Military Academy began commissioning officers in 1802, all of whom were trained as engineers not line officers.
37 Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, vii-viii.
39 Skeen, Citizen Soldiers, 13-6.
40 National Intelligencer, April 14, 1812 quoted in Papers of Henry Clay, 1:646. For discussion of the political significance of the editorial and claims it was authored by Clay, see Mayo, Henry Clay, 504-5, 504n1, 504n2.
43 For map see “Northern United States, 1812, Summary of Operations in the North, 1812-1814,” Operations of 1812, 1813 and 1814, War of 1812, Atlases, Department of History, United States Military Academy.
http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/War%20of%201812/OperationsNorth.gif (accessed August 26, 2013).
44 Hickey, War of 1812, 80-4; Elting, Amateurs, to Arms, 24-34.
45 Hickey, War of 1812, 80-4; Quimby, Operational and Command Study, 1:48.
46 Eustace, 1812, 36-75.
47 Elting, Amateurs, to Arms, 19-20, 38; Horsman, War of 1812, 43-4; Quimby, Operational and Command Study, 1:55-84, especially 1:61-2, 1:64-5.
50 Elting, Amateurs, to Arms, 52-4; Hickey, War of 1812, 88.
54 Quimby, Operational and Command Study, 2:484.
55 For narrative see Hickey, War of 1812, 135-40; Horseman, War of 1812, 81-5, 99-103; also Quimby, Operational and Command Study, 1:89-146.
56 For discussion of Perry’s efforts on Lake Erie, see Elting, Amateurs, to Arms, 95-7.
57 Previously Harrison defeated Tecumseh’s warriors at the Battle of Tippecanoe (November 7, 1811) by applying tactics learned as a staff officer during Major General Anthony Wayne’s Fallen Timbers 1794 campaign, see Elting, Amateurs, to Arms, 22-4; 55-64, 103-115.
58 Elting, Amateurs, to Arms, 114. Armstrong appointed Andrew Jackson Major General to fill the vacancy left by Harrison.
59 Horsman, War of 1812, 95; Hickey, War of 1812, 139-40; Quimby, Operational and Command Study, 1:231-4; and Elting, Amateurs, to Arms, 120-3, for quote, 123.
60 Wilkinson to Armstrong, October 19, 1813 quoted in Hickey, War of 1812, 145, 380n101.
62 Quimby, Operational and Command Study, 2:481-4; Hickey, War of 1812, 144-5.
63 Quimby, Operational and Command Study, 2:481-94.
64 General Porter to Governor Tompkins, March —, 1814, Cruikshank, Documentary History 1814, 2:380-1. Prior to his war time militia service, Porter was a leading congressional Democratic-Republican War Hawk, see Hickey, War of 1812, 30.
67 The American ability to face regular forces has been described as achieving “tactical equilibrium,” see Barbuto Niagara 1814, 309-18, especially 315, 318. The condition of soldiers responding to their officers as a unit, sticking together, can be described as cohesion.
68 Other legendary events occurred in 1814 but did not highlight the role of regular forces or feature high American casualties. British coastal raids were turned back by mostly militia forces, albeit only after the burning of Washington and a long distance bombardment of Fort McHenry (under the command of a regular officer) barring the entrance to Baltimore harbor. Spectacularly, at the battle of New Orleans, Major General Andrew Jackson’s scratch army of local militia, frontier sharpshooters, pirates, and modest number regular troops (all supported by artillery and protected by breastworks) mauled a regular British force while suffering almost no losses. Brigadier General Alexander Macomb’s heavily outnumbered brigade turned back a British advance at Plattsburgh on Lake Champlain but did so without a pitched battle because the British lake flotilla was decisively defeated causing the British commander to return his troops to Canada rather than attempt to supply a large army in New York over frontier roads.
69 Barbuto, Niagara 1814, 310.
70 Armstrong to Brown, 9 June 1814, Brown’s Letter Book 1:85-90 quoted in Quimby, Operational and Command Study, 2:515, 2:583n74; Compare Secretary of War Armstrong to


For an illustration that portrays troop deployments at the beginning of the campaign, see Barbuto, Niagara 1814, 156, Effective Strengths, 30 June 1814.


For operational narrative, see Barbuto, Niagara 1814, 167-83; and Quimby, Operational and Command Study, 2:523-7; For a battle study, see Donald E. Graves, Red Coats & Grey Jackets The Battle of Chippawa, 5 July, 1814 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1996); For tactical map, see “The Battle of Chippewa, 5 July 1814,” The War of 1812, Atlases, Department Maps, The History Department at the United States Military Academy, http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/War%20of%201812/ChippewaBattle.gif (accessed August 16, 2013). For Brown’s official report, see Brown to Armstrong, July 7, 1814, John Brannan, Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States, During the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15 With Some Additional Letters and Documents Elucidating the History of That Period. Washington City: Printed by Way & Gideon, 1823, 368-71. Available online at http://archive.org/details/officialletterso00bran (accessed August 16, 2013).


For Miller’s narrative see, Cruikshank, *Documentary History 1814*, 1:105-6, for quote 1:105. For discussion, see Graves, *Battle of Lundy's Lane*, 128-31. Darkness, topography, the roar of nearby Niagara Falls, and close by supporting attacks all contributed to concealing the attack from premature discovery.


For example, see Weigley, *History*, 129; Hickey, *War of 1812*, 185-6; and Jeffery Kimball, “The Battle of Chippawa: Infantry Tactics in the War of 1812,” *Military Affairs* 31, no. 4 (Winter, 1967-1968): 171-3. Traditional emphasis on training as a causal factor for Brown’s success might be overdone because training American forces was not unique either to Brown’s Left Division or 1814 campaigns. Major General George Izard, commanding the Right Division...

88 The Narrative of Alexander McMullen, Cruikshank, Documentary History 1814, 2:372. McMullen’s unit only had ten days of training, see Graves, “Re-examination of Winfield Scott’s Camp at Buffalo in 1814,” in Bowler, War Along the Niagara, 49.

89 Barbuto, Niagara 1814, 123-4, 350n26. Scott complained to Major General Brown, on 17, 22, and 23 May 1814. Numerous primary source documents capture the effort to resolve equipment and clothing shortages; for example see Brown to Armstrong, May 30th, 1814, Cruikshank, Documents Relating to the Invasion, 24-5. For efforts to equip the militia see General Porter to Governor Tompkins, March —, 1814, Cruikshank, Documentary History 1814, 2:380-1; General Peter B. Porter to the Secretary of War, Canandaigua, March 27, 1814, Cruikshank, Documentary History 1814, 2:382; General Peter B. Porter to Governor Tompkins, Canandaigua, March 27, 1814, Cruikshank, Documentary History 1814, 2:383-4; General Peter B. Porter to the Secretary of War, Canandaigua, May 3rd, 1814, Cruikshank, Documentary History 1814, 2:390-1; General P. B. Porter to General Brown, Canandaigua, May 26th, 1814, Cruikshank, Documentary History 1814, 2:398-9; General Porter to Governor Tompkins, Canandaigua, May 26th, 1814, Cruikshank, Documentary History 1814, 2:399-400; and General Winfield Scott to General Porter, May 29th, 1814, Cruikshank, Documentary History 1814, 2:400-401. Shortages can be attributed to American manufacturing limitations, see Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 378-80.

90 For Scott, health of the troops was the first object, see Graves, “A Re-examination of Winfield Scott’s Camp at Buffalo in 1814,” in Bowler, War Along the Niagara, 46; also Barbuto, Niagara 1814, 131.

91 Barbuto, Niagara 1814, 123-4.

92 The Narrative of Alexander McMullen, Cruikshank, Documentary History 1814, 2:372.

93 Winfield Scott, May 1814 quoted in Graves, “A Re-examination of Winfield Scott’s Camp at Buffalo in 1814,” in Bowler, War Along the Niagara, 43.


97 President Madison’s address to Congress February 18, 1815 in United States Congress, Annals of the Congress of the United States, 1789-1824, Senate, 13th Congress, 3rd Session


99 Skelton, “High Army Leadership” 254, 254n5; For discussion and graphic illustration of the expansion, see Skelton, American Profession of Arms, 9-11, 10, Figure 1.1 Authorized Strength of U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1784-1815.

100 Stagg, “Enlisted Men Survey,” 620.

101 Skelton, “High Army Leadership,” 271, Table V Attrition of General and Field Officers, 1808-1815.

102 Skelton, “High Army Leadership,” 273, Table VI Geographical Distribution of General and Field Grade Officers in Reduction of 1815.

103 Hickey, War of 1812, 296-8. The Treaty of Ghent was signed December 24, 1814, ratified February 16, 1815, and delivered to Congress February 18, 1815.


107 Skelton, American Profession of Arms, 110-4; also Skelton, “High Army Leadership,” 272. The Niagara generals were Jacob Brown, Edmund Gaines, Winfield Scott, and Eleazar Ripley. Alexander Macommanded at Plattsburgh. Also retained were Andrew Jackson, Robert Swartwout (as quartermaster general), and Daniel Parker (adjutant general and inspector general).

108 Figures compiled from “List of Officers on whom Brevets were Conferred” in Hamersly, Regular Army Register, 184-8.

109 Barbuto, Niagara 1814, 323.


113 Annals, Appendix, 16th Congress, 2nd Session, 1798-9. Available online at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=037/llac037.db&recNum=894 (accessed September 23, 2013); for analysis and discussion, see Skelton, American Profession of Arms, 128.


115 Skelton, American Profession of Arms, 129.

116 Barbuto, Niagara 1814, 319. Epigraph from the concluding chapter.


118 Skelton, American Profession of Arms, 110-1.

119 For short definitions of corporateness and characteristics of a profession, see Huntington, Soldier and the State, 8-10; and Allan Reed Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. New York: Free Press, 1984, 126-7. For a more detailed discussion, see Allan Reed Millett, Military Professionalism and Officership in America. Columbus: Mershon Center of the Ohio State University, 1977, 2-3.


121 Skelton, American Profession of Arms, 114-5, for quote 115.


125 For Commodore Perry quote, see Quimby, Operational and Command Study, 1:269. For a popular discussion of the Pogo quote see ”We have met the enemy... and he is us," personal website of Marilyn White, I Go Pogo, http://www.igopogo.com/we_have_met.htm (accessed August 26, 2013).