Military Subjects: Battles & Campaigns

 

“Universally Esteemed by His Brothers in Arms:” Lieutenant Edward de Salaberry, R.E. at Badajoz, 6 April 1812

By John R. Grodzinski, FINS

Canada is not likely to spring to the forefront of any discussion of the Napoleonic Wars. Although Canada , or more properly, British North America, became the key theatre of a related Napoleonic conflict - the War of 1812 - it played a minor role in the greater struggle that occurred in Europe. The colony did provide a number of its sons to the Royal Navy and British Army; some served in Europe. One of them was Édouard-Alphonse D’Irumberry de Salaberry, one of four brothers from that family who served in the British army. Édouard or for purposes here, Edward, was commissioned into the Royal Engineers in 1810 and was killed during the assault on the Santa Maria bastion during the third siege of Badajoz on 6 April 1812. This is his story.

Édouard-Alphonse D’Irumberry de Salaberry was born on 20 June 1792 in Beauport, Lower Canada, the youngest son of Ignace-Michel-Louis-Antoine d’Irumberry de Salaberry and Françoise-Catherine Hertel de Saint-François. Édouard’s father, Louis, came form a prominent family that benefited from colonial and imperial patronage, and was well connected with the elite in Lower Canada and with certain great English and French families. When Edward Augustus, the fourth son of George III, and later the Duke of Kent, served in Quebec from August 1791 to January 1794, he established a lasting friendship with Louis that included becoming godfather of Louis’ youngest son Edward and sponsoring all of Louis’ sons into the army.[1]

Louis’ son Maurice was born in 1783 and upon entering the army went to the East Indies. Francois, who was younger by two years, followed him there. The eldest son, Charles, born in 1778, joined the army as a volunteer at age 14 and had an illustrious career, serving with the 5/60. He later raised the Provincial Corps of Light Infantry, which served with distinction during the War of 1812. Charles also led the Canadian-British force that defeated Major-General Wade Hampton’s American division at the battle of the Chateauguay on 26 October 1813.[2]

The youngest Salaberry was baptized by Bishop Charles-François Bailly de Messein on 2 July 1792 in the presence of his godfather, Prince Edward Augustus, and his godmother, Thérèse-Bernardine Mongenet, also known as Mme de Saint-Laurent, the Prince’s mistress, an event that did not fail to create a small scandal. On 16 July 1806 Edward, then 14 years of age, embarked for England on the Champion for his education and to begin a military career.

When Edward arrived in Portsmouth during August, his three brothers met him and the four de Salaberry boys went off to Gosport, where Charles was stationed. There, they joined by two cousins and celebrated their reunion, which had been arranged in part by the Duke of Kent who had recalled Maurice from Ireland . The Duke was very generous to all of four boys, who sat in his personal box at concerts, benefited from his sponsorship, and gave ear to his counsel. The Prince and Mme de Saint-Laurent treated Edward as if he were their own son. They provided him with a private tutor and paid for him to attend the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. Through the Prince, Edward was in the company of many of the leading figures of the day, including the Duc d’Orléans,[3] the former lieutenant governor of Lower Canada, Sir Robert Shore Milnes, Major-General Frederick Augustus Wetherall, the Prince of Wales, and various Spanish and English generals and admirals.[4]

During 1809, Edward spent time with his brother Charles, who was staying at Kensington Palace in London recuperating from the Walcheren Expedition. The reunion spanned Christmas and was the last time the two would meet.[5] Towards the end of 1809 Edward spent six months in training in surveying before gaining a commission as second lieutenant, Royal Engineers on 21 July 1810.[6] Soon afterwards, Edward departed for the Iberian Peninsula.

Little information has been found on Edward’s activity once he arrived in Portugal . He was advanced to first lieutenant on 1 May 1811.[7] On 18 December of the same year, Edward was ordered to take a detachment of 18 men from the Royal Military Artificers (soon to be known at the Royal Sappers and Miners) employed on the Lines of Torres Vedras, plus an embodied company, to Cuidad Rodrigo. For his opening moves of 1812, Wellington planned to take the strategic towns of Cuidad Rodrigo and Badajoz, controlling the northern and southern routes from Portugal into Spain . By 5 January 1812, Wellington’s divisions were concentrated and the front and began moving to Cuidad Rodrigo, arriving there three days later to begin the siege. Wellington expected this would take 30 days before the fortress could be stormed.[8]

Meanwhile, Edward and his party of 41 men departed for Cuidad Rodrigo on 2 January 1812. They brought with them a number of mules carrying a large assortment of entrenchment tools needed for the siege. The party experienced unfavourable weather and the roads were very poor, causing many of the mules to succumb to fatigue. After a very difficult march lasting 17 days over very rough roads, they arrived at their destination on the very night Cuidad Rodrigo was assaulted and too late to take part in it.[9]

During the next few weeks, the army moved south, pausing briefly to complete the arrangements for the next siege, arriving before Badajoz on March 16th. Badajoz lay in the valley of the Guadiana on the left bank of the 300-yard wide river where a smaller stream, the Rivellas, flows into it. Before the war, 16,000 people lived within the town’s walls. The fortifications consisted of an enceinte of eight bastions, each named after a saint, and running from the northwest end of the town around to the northeast, where a castle was built on the heights overlooking the juncture of the Rivellas and Guadiana. There were also two important outer works; one just south of the town was the Pardaleras, a crown work of two bastioned fronts; across the Rivellas were two fortifications, known as the Picurna and San Roque, that guarded the eastern approaches to the town. On the northern side of the Guadiana, were Fort San Christobal and a small tête de pont, which protected a bridge from Badajoz. The walls and bastions averaged 30 feet in height, rising to 130 feet at the castle. A 25-foot deep ditch surrounded most of the fortress.[10] General Armand Phillipon was the governor of Badajoz and he had 5,003 men under his command and plenty of artillery. Badajoz had withstood two previous sieges during 1811 and the defences had since been improved. For his third attempt, Wellington had assembled an investing corps of three divisions with about 12,000 men that would later be reinforced.[11]

The task of the besiegers was to cut off the fortress’ communication with the outside world and then invest it, first by taking the outer works and then constructing a series of trenches, known as parallels, that allowed the guns to be sited closer to the walls. Siegecraft was the domain of the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery who oversaw the placement of the trenches and guns, and all associated work. This was backbreaking, ceaseless labour to which each division provided up to 1,200 men on a 24-hour rotational basis. The heavy siege guns laid down a regular bombardment against the base of the walls that eventually brought it down, creating a pile of rubble that troops could scramble up and gain entry into the fortress. It was generally held that a breach should be sufficiently wide to allow the front of a column, 30 men wide—about 90 feet—to enter it, although when possible, much wider breaches were attempted.[12]

Wellington assigned responsibility for the siege to his senior engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Fletcher. The Corps of Royal Engineers always had too few officers for the work that was required of them. At Badajoz, Fletcher had four majors, five captains, 13 lieutenants (four of whom were only present for the latter stages of the siege), with 115 members of the Royal Military Artificers, who provided the engineer workforce, joined by another 120 men of the line trained in sapper duties, and two officers from the Royal Sappers and Miners who volunteered to act as assistant engineers.[13] The number of engineers declined as the siege continued and casualties were suffered, including Colonel Fletcher, who was wounded during the French sortie from Badajoz on March 19th, which sought to destroy the works completed to that point.

The siege commenced on 16 March 1812 when work on the first parallel commenced to the east of Badajoz. Nine days later, the first six batteries opened and their fire supported the attack on the Picurna that night, allowing work to commence on the main breaching batteries. As with the other engineer officers, Edward de Salaberry was involved, working under the supervision of Captain John A. Williams and assigned to the 4th Brigade, working along a particular section of the siege lines. Both would have surveyed the ground and progress of the fire carefully, knowing they might have to lead the storming troops to the breaches once the attack went in.[14]

By the end of March, the breaching batteries were in place and their fire concentrated on the two southeastern bastions, the Trinidad and Santa Maria, where the main assault would eventually be made. Two breaches soon formed, and by April 5th, they were declared “practicable,” meaning they were large enough for the assault to proceed. The breach in the face of the Trinidad bastion was 150 feet wide and described as “steep,” while the flank of the Santa Maria was “battered from the level of the ditch.” The construction of the walls made this breach more difficult form, causing it to have a narrower width of 90 feet. Fearing the enemy had retrenched the two breaches Wellington ordered the creation of a third one and a 40 foot wide breach was made on the east end of a curtain wall connecting the two bastions that day.[15] All was ready for the assault, now scheduled for the night of 6 April. The French were not passive at this time, and as the breaches were formed, they built defensive walls behind them and also set mines and obstacles in them, in order to stop any attempt to take the fortress by storm. In addition, the besiegers were unable to destroy the sluices near the San Roque, designed to create a false lake to the east of Badajoz, known as the inundation. This failure eliminated any chance of a direct assault from that direction.[16]

Wellington’s plan involved a combination of direct attacks on the breaches, escalade of the walls and feint attacks. The main effort would be the direct assaults using two divisions, Major-General Charles Colville’s 4th Division with 3,500 men and the Light Division, with 3,000 men under Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Barnard. Colville would take the Trinidad bastion—including the breach in the curtain wall—while the Santa Maria bastion was assigned to Barnard’s Light Division. Further north, two secondary attacks, aimed at distracting the French, would be made by the 3rd Division, “furnished with long ladders,” against the castle, while the 5th Division would take on the Saint Vincent bastion, which lay by the Guadiana River at the north western side of Badajoz. These attacks were by “escalade,” by which the leading troops would rush the walls and use ladders to climb up to the parapets and try to get in. All this would occur in the dark, which afforded the greatest protection to the storming parties and also the conditions for the greatest confusion. In one of those curious, but not uncommon twists of military operations, the main attacks unexpectedly failed, while the subsidiary attacks succeeded in brilliant style.[17]

Wellington’s orders placed the 4th Division on the right and the Light Division to the left of the attack.[18] It was a channelled approach whereby the two divisions would have to skirt inundation for about 300 yards before reaching the outer part of the defences; en route, the Light Division would pass a quarry to their left. Both divisions would then make for the centre of the curtain that lay between the two bastions before reaching the ditch before the main wall. Once in the ditch, the 4th Division would wheel right, while the Light Division moved to the left, towards the breaches.[19]

Two engineer officers familiar with the ground would guide each of the assaulting divisions to their objectives. The officers assigned to the Light Division, “Captain [John] Williams, having Lieutenant de Salaberry under his orders,” were to conduct “the light division to the breach in the flank of the bastion of Santa Maria.”[20] The specific duties assigned to each team of Royal Engineer officers included the following:

“These officers will immediately take charge of their parties of carpenters and miners, volunteers from the Royal Military Artificers, or the men of the line doing duty with the department, who have been told off in the park to accompany the several assaulting columns.”[21]

Each assault or storming party employed the same established procedures, dividing the lead elements into three basic groups, the covering party, then the forlorn hope, followed by the stormers. The leading elements were specially organized and equipped to enhance rapid movement through obstacles and provide supporting fire. Each division provided an advance party of 500 men, carrying 12 ladders that would be used to move into the ditch, along with another group carrying hay bags to be cast into the ditch. After them, came the main body of the division.[22]

The covering party (called by Wellington the “firing party”) of the Light Division included four companies of the 1/95th (the left wing of the battalion) under Major Cameron. Upon reaching the edge of the covered way, it was to extend to the left and maintain fire against the French on the ramparts. Next was a party of six volunteers from 1/95th under Lieutenant William Johnston carrying ropes that would be used to pull aside the chevaux-de-frise, large pieces of timber stuck with sword blades and metal used to plug breaches. Then came the forlorn hope—so named as its members were not expected to survive, but for those who did came the promise of promotion or money—under Lieutenant Horatio Harvest of the 1/43rd, who despite being advised by his commanding officer that he would soon be gazetted as captain and given command of a company, insisted on his right as senior lieutenant to go.[23] Major Peter O’Hare of the 95th led the storming party, which included one hundred volunteers from each of the 43rd, 52nd and 95th Regiments. [24] Captain James Fergusson, who was still recovering from two previous wounds, commanded the party from the 43rd. [25] Selected men of the Royal Sappers and Miners also accompanied the column, bearing ladders, hatchets and crowbars.[26]

During this time, Edward would have been busy reviewing the minutiae of the assault with the officers and units involved. This would have included confirmation of timings, the details of each route, the duties of each element within the advance party and other important details. Like many present, Edward was most likely overwhelmed by the enormity of the coming task and horror that would ensue. And like many of his fellow officers, Edward experienced a premonition of the great danger that lay ahead.[27]

On 6 April, at 2100 hrs, the Light Division assembled near a small bridge over the Calamon, a brook tributary of the Rivellas, about 1,000 yards from the breaches, before moving forward until it was about 300 yards from the breaches.[28] Everyone waited in silence for the assault to begin. Suddenly the air was broken by a voice “giving orders about the ladders…so loud it might have reached the ramparts.” Luckily, “nothing beyond croaking frogs responded to the ill-timed voice.”[29] The town clock then struck ten and the French sentries along the walls called out successively, as the British soldiers laying in wait figured to report “All’s well in Badahoo.” A fireball then rose from the bastion of Santa Maria and fell near the axe and crowbar parties, which was quickly extinguished with two shovelfuls of earth.[30]

Shortly afterwards a suppressed whispering announced that the forlorn hope was moving ahead and two minutes later the assault parties advanced.[31] The ladder party provided by the 52nd crept quietly through the broken palisades of the covered way. Led by Ensign George Gawler and accompanied by Edward de Salaberry, the soldiers soon reached the ditch and planted six ladders against the counterscarp, the outer wall of the ditch, just in front of the salient part of an unfinished ravelin, a small defensive work just in front of the curtain wall. Edward, Gawler and “about twelve or fifteen men were” in the ditch, when, “with a blinding blaze of light and a regular chorus of explosions of all kinds, the enemy’s fire opened.” The ladder party pushed up the unfinished ravelin hoping to find a way to the centre breach, but the summit proved impassable due to incessant fire from the Santa Maria bastion, which “poured incessant charges of grape.”[32]

Men now flowed into the ditch, while others crowded along the edge trying to get in. Officers and men from different regiments became intermingled and a series of rushes were mounted, in a vain attempt to enter one of the breaches. The French engineers fired a series of fougasses, improvised mines constructed by making a hollow in the ground and filling it with explosives and projectiles; mines and powder barrels hidden in the ditch, logs rolled down the walls, tar barrels and artillery fire. A horrible scene ensued as scores of men were slain, scorched or disabled. Many were drowned when they jumped into a flooded portion of the ditch. Casualties mounted, particularly among the leaders. Lieutenant Harvest from the forlorn hope was dead as was Major O’Hare. Captain Fergusson received a nasty head wound. Only two officers of the advance escaped unhurt. By cruel mischance, both Williams and Edward de Salaberry, responsible for leading the storming party into the breach also fell. It is not certain which went first, whether they fell leading the men forward or in trying to rally them, but the outcome was the same; Williams was severely wounded and Lieutenant Edward de Salaberry was dead. The loss of these two men, who knew the topography of the breaches “had the most serious effect during the rest of the storm.”[33]

This horrible check was followed by a brief pause before the main bodies of each division reached the edge of the ditch and began moving in. The troops suffered severely as they dribbled over the counterscarp.[34] Order collapsed as soldiers from both divisions became intermingled, and the engineer officers leading the 4th Division, Captain William Nicholas and Lieutenant Anthony Emmett[35] tried to move men into the Santa Maria breach. Emmett soon fell, severely wounded, while Nicholas “made incredible efforts to fore his way with a few men into” the bastion, leading at least two rushes, receiving at least four wounds. He was hit again[36] leading about 70 men in a third effort and had to be dragged off the field to get medical attention.[37] Upwards of 40 attacks were made to get though the breaches in the bastions. Many of these were uncoordinated and involved fewer than a company at a time. Most were shot down before they reached the breach. As midnight approached, the attacks began to peter out, as the men stayed in the ditch, unable to advance and unwilling to retreat. In two hours, the 4th and Light Divisions had suffered almost 2,000 casualties from a combined total of 6,500 men. Shortly thereafter, Wellington ordered both divisions withdrawn. For the French, it appeared Badajoz would hold.[38]

Ironically, while the main attack had failed, the secondary attacks met with complete success. The 3rd Division also moved off at 2200 hrs, crossed the Rivellas and despite facing strong pressure, got their ladders onto the wall and there men into Badajoz. A brigade of the 5th Division also scaled the walls successfully and moved into the town. The situation had changed dramatically and as British troops now poured in and the garrison surrendered at 0700 hrs on 7 April 1812.[39]

Wellington now controlled both routes into Spain . The storm of Badajoz cost him 3,713 casualties, while the overall loses, including the siege, were 4,670 men. Not surprisingly, those in the main attack suffered the most; the 4th Division lost 925 men, while the Light Division experienced 919 casualties.[40]

Among the many dead that lay near the mouth of the Santa Maria breach was Edward de Salaberry. Near him lay a comrade in arms that also knew Canada well, Acting Captain Francis Gwillim Simcoe of the 3rd Battalion, 27th Foot from the 4th Division, son of Lieutenant-General John Graves Simcoe, the first lieutenant governor of Upper Canada. Francis was born in England and spent a portion of his childhood in Upper Canada and Quebec before joining the army in 1808. The young Simcoe was no stranger to Badajoz, having been there briefly during the fall of 1809.[41]

Twenty-four officers of the Royal Engineers were employed in the siege and storm of Badajoz, four of which only arrived the day before the assault. Of the total casualties, four were killed[42] and nine wounded. Lord Wellington’s despatch following the fall of Badajoz, acknowledged the important role played by the Royal Engineers, and named several for their good conduct. Among those mentioned by Wellington were Captain John Williams,[43] but not his subordinate de Salaberry. His epithet came from Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Fletcher and expressed the feelings of those who knew him: “He was universally esteemed by his brothers in arms, and all mourn his death.” It was a tragic end for Edward, considered the most gifted, in intellect and character, of the Salaberry sons. Of the four brothers, only Charles survived to perpetuate his family name; Maurice died of fever in India in 1809, while François-Louis, serving with the Royal Scots,[44] met a similar fate in 1811. Edward, the pride of his family and godson of the Duke of York, was the only member of the family to die in battle and was one of a small band of “Canadians” to serve under Wellington in the Peninsula.[45]

Notes:

[1] J. Patrick Wohler. Charles de Salaberry: Soldier of the Empire, Defender of Quebec. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1984, p. 27.

[2] Charles-Michel D’Irumberry de Salaberry, Canadian Dictionary of Biography On Line, at http://www.biographi.ca/EN/ShowBio.asp?BioId=37052&query=de%20AND%20salaberry

[3] Lieutenant/Captain Paul St Pol, the son of the Duc D’Orleans, led the Light Company of the 7th Foot at Badajoz, where he was severely wounded, and dying 17 days later after acute suffering. Like Edward de Salaberry, St Pol enjoyed the friendship of the Duke of Kent and one wonders if the two junior officers ever met at the Duke’s residence. St Pol had been gazetted captain a few weeks before the assault, but died ignorant of the fact. W. Wheater. Historical Records of the Seventh or Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. Leeds, 1875, p. 117n. John A. Hall. A History of the Peninsular War, Volume VIII, The Biographical Dictionary of British Officers Killed and Wounded, 1808 – 1814. London: Greenhill Books, 1998, p. 505.

[4] J. Patrick Wohler. Charles de Salaberry: Soldier of the Empire, Defender of Quebec. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1984, p. 29, 44, 45.

[5] J. Patrick Wohler. Charles de Salaberry: Soldier of the Empire, Defender of Quebec. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1984, p. 51.

[6] Captain T.W.J. Connolly. Roll of Officers of the Corps of Royal Engineers from 1660 to 1898. Chatham: W. & J. Mackay & Co., 1898, p. 19, no. 442. John A. Hall. A History of the Peninsular War, Volume VIII, The Biographical Dictionary of British Officers Killed and Wounded, 1808 – 1814. London: Greenhill Books, 1998, p. 165.

[7] Captain T.W.J. Connolly. Roll of Officers of the Corps of Royal Engineers from 1660 to 1898. Chatham: W. & J. Mackay & Co., 1898, p. 19, no. 442. John A. Hall. A History of the Peninsular War, Volume VIII, The Biographical Dictionary of British Officers Killed and Wounded, 1808 – 1814. London: Greenhill Books, 1998, p. 165.

[8] Sir Charles Oman. History of the Peninsular War, Volume V: October 1811 to August 31, 1812. London: Greenhill Books, 1996, p. 165.

[9] Whitworth Porter. History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume I. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889, p. 279-280.

[10] Whitworth Porter. History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume I. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889, p. 288. Frederick Myatt. British Sieges of the Peninsular War. Staplehurst: Spellmount Limited, 1987, p. 27.

[11] Sir Charles Oman. History of the Peninsular War, Volume V: October 1811 to August 31, 1812. London: Greenhill Books, 1996, p. 228.

[12] This is a summary of Chapter 1 of Frederick Myatt. British Sieges of the Peninsular War. Staplehurst: Spellmount Limited, 1987, while the information on preferred breach sizes comes from Lt Col Sir John May. A Few Observations on the Mode of Attack and Employment of the Heavy Artillery at Cuidad Rodrigo and Badajoz in 1812. London: T. Egerton, 1819, p. 25n.

[13] Whitworth Porter. History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume I. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889, p. 296.

[14] Major General Sir John Jones. Journal of Sieges Carried on by The Army Under the Duke of Wellington in Spain During the Years 1811 to 1814, Volume I. London: John Weale, 1846, p. 155.

[15] Lt Col Sir John May. A Few Observations on the Mode of Attack and Employment of the Heavy Artillery at Cuidad Rodrigo and Badajoz in 1812. London: T. Egerton, 1819, p. 23, 25n.

[16]Major General Sir John Jones. Journal of Sieges Carried on by The Army Under the Duke of Wellington in Spain During the Years 1811 to 1814, Volume I. London: John Weale, 1846, p. 380. Ian Fletcher. In Hell Before Daylight: The Siege and Storming of Badajoz, 1812. Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1994, p. 22.

[17] Sir Charles Oman. History of the Peninsular War, Volume V: October 1811 to August 31, 1812. London: Greenhill Books, 1996, p 244-245. J.W. Fortescue. A History of the British Army, Volume VIII, 1811-1812.Uckfield: The Naval and Military Press, 2004, p. 394-395.

[18] Major General Sir John Jones. Journal of Sieges Carried on by The Army Under the Duke of Wellington in Spain During the Years 1811 to 1814, Volume I. London: John Weale, 1846, p. 196, 197.

[19] Willoughby Verner. History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, Part II, 1809 – 1813. London: John Bales, 1919, p. 372.

[20] Major General Sir John Jones. Journal of Sieges Carried on by The Army Under the Duke of Wellington in Spain During the Years 1811 to 1814, Volume I. London: John Weale, 1846, p. 384.

[21] Major General Sir John Jones. Journal of Sieges Carried on by The Army Under the Duke of Wellington in Spain During the Years 1811 to 1814, Volume I. London: John Weale, 1846, p. 384

[22] Sir Charles Oman. History of the Peninsular War, Volume V: October 1811 to August 31, 1812. London: Greenhill Books, 1996, p. 244.

[23] Sir Richard Levigne. Historical Records of the Forty-Third Regiment, Monmouthshire Light Infantry. London: W. Clowes & Sons, 1868, p. 161. John A. Hall. A History of the Peninsular War, Volume VIII, The Biographical Dictionary of British Officers Killed and Wounded, 1808 – 1814. London: Greenhill Books, 1998, p. 265.

[24] Willoughby Verner. History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, Part II, 1809 – 1813. London: John Bales, 1919, p. 374-375.

[25] Sir Richard Levigne. Historical Records of the Forty-Third Regiment, Monmouthshire Light Infantry. London: W. Clowes & Sons, 1868, p. 161.

[26] T.W.J. Connolly. The History of the Corps of Royal Sappers and Miners. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1855, p. 186.

[27] Dictionary of Canadian Biography On Line at http://www.biographi.ca/EN/ShowBio.asp?BioId=36597&query=de%20AND%20salaberry

[28] Rev. William Leeke. The History of Lord Seaton’s Regiment (The 52nd Light Infantry) at the Battle of Waterloo. London: Hatchard and Co., 1866, p. 346.

[29] Sir Richard Levigne. Historical Records of the Forty-Third Regiment, Monmouthshire Light Infantry. London: W. Clowes & Sons, 1868, p. 161.

[30] Rev. William Leeke. The History of Lord Seaton’s Regiment (The 52nd Light Infantry) at the Battle of Waterloo. London: Hatchard and Co., 1866, p. 437.

[31] Sir Richard Levigne. Historical Records of the Forty-Third Regiment, Monmouthshire Light Infantry. London: W. Clowes & Sons, 1868, p. 161, 162.

[32] Rev. William Leeke. The History of Lord Seaton’s Regiment (The 52nd Light Infantry) at the Battle of Waterloo. London: Hatchard and Co., 1866, p. 347.

[33] Sir Charles Oman. History of the Peninsular War, Volume V: October 1811 to August 31, 1812. London: Greenhill Books, 1996, p. 248, 249.

[34] Sir Charles Oman. History of the Peninsular War, Volume V: October 1811 to August 31, 1812. London: Greenhill Books, 1996, p. 249.

[35] Emmett later served in the New Orleans expedition and as the commanding engineer at St Helena during Napoleon’s captivity. John A. Hall. A History of the Peninsular War, Volume VIII, The Biographical Dictionary of British Officers Killed and Wounded, 1808 – 1814. London: Greenhill Books, 1998, p.192.

[36] Lieutenant Pitts described Nicholas’ wounds were described as follows: “one of the wounds through the lungs, and two ribs broke, his left arm broke below the elbow, his left knee touched on the cap, his left calf and right thigh grazed with musket balls.” Whitworth Porter. History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume I. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889, p. 307.

[37] Nichols died eight days later. John A. Hall. A History of the Peninsular War, Volume VIII, The Biographical Dictionary of British Officers Killed and Wounded, 1808 – 1814. London: Greenhill Books, 1998, p. 436.

[38] Whitworth Porter. History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume I. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889, p. 305, 306. Sir Charles Oman. History of the Peninsular War, Volume V: October 1811 to August 31, 1812. London: Greenhill Books, 1996, p. 249.

[39] Summary from Ian Fletcher. Badajoz 1812: Wellington’s Bloodiest Siege. London: Osprey Military, 1999, p. 66, 67, 78, 79.

[40] Sir Charles Oman. History of the Peninsular War, Volume V: October 1811 to August 31, 1812. London: Greenhill Books, 1996, p. 594-595.

[41] J. Patrick Wohler. Charles de Salaberry: Soldier of the Empire, Defender of Quebec. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1984, p. 29. Mary Babcock Fryer. Our Young Soldier: Lieutenant Francis Simcoe, 6 June 1791 – 6 April 1812. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1996, p. 17, 80, 117.

[42] Of the officers of engineers who conducted the columns during the assault, Lieutenant Lascelles and De Salaberry were killed, Captain Nicholas mortally wounded and Captain Williams and Lieutenant Emmett severely wounded. John T. Jones. Journals of the Sieges Undertaken by the Allies in Spain in the Years 1811 and 1812. London: T. Egerton, 1814, p. 143

[43] Captain John A. Williams, was made second captain, RE on 24 June 1809. He was killed during the siege of Burgos in September 1812. John A. Hall. A History of the Peninsular War, Volume VIII, The Biographical Dictionary of British Officers Killed and Wounded, 1808 – 1814. London: Greenhill Books, 1998, p. 599.

[44] “Lewis” de Salaberry is shown as having received a commission as lieutenant in the 1st Foot on 28 March 1805. Army List, 1811, p. 111.

[45] Whitworth Porter. History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume I. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889, p. 309, 310. Dictionary of Canadian Biography On Line at http://www.biographi.ca/EN/ShowBio.asp?BioId=36597&query=de%20AND%20salaberry

 

Placed on the Napoleon Series: July 2007

 

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