Report of General Blake to the War Council, on the Surrender of Valencia.

Valencia, 9th January 1812

Although the loss of Valencia was for a long time both foreseen and forewarned, it is impossible for me to take up the pen to inform Your Excellencies of it without feeling the greatest sadness. One had to fear (and indeed, it was feared) this disastrous development, after one saw the city of Tarragona succumb. The brilliant defense of Sagonte, the union of forces which that siege had given rise to, the energetic attitude which the officers and the soldiers manifested [and] their oath to fight bravely, had given birth to hopes both well-founded and encouraging: these lasted until 25 October. After that day, everything took on a reduced and sorrowful aspect; Only a political revolution, or some other extraordinary development which would have deprived Marshal Suchet of the supplies and reinforcements which he awaited, could have postponed for even one moment the destiny of Valencia, and my plan was to support this place as a long as it was possible, without entirely compromising the fate of the small army that composed its garrison. The safety of these troops would depend upon the way in which they defended their position at Quarte and Manissès. Anchored on this position and supported by my cavalry, I could at my liking and according to the circumstances, choose to offer a general engagement, drawing from Valencia the troops that remained there, or to evacuate this place leaving only a small garrison to capitulate, and preserve the army. The large number of enemy forces and the great turning movement that they had made upon their right flank had barred us from using the Old Road to Madrid, which is the best road in the direction of the capital, and it was unavoidable that we moved upon the two roads to Cullera, which border the right bank and left bank of Lake Albufera. On 25 December, the enemy crossed the river between Manissès and Ribaroya, and threatened to cut off the troops at Quarte. But Zayas' division, which was at Mislata, opposed this movement and nullified its effect. I cannot be sure if it was from fear of this movement or of some other combination that the entrenchments at Quarte and Manissès were evacuated without having been attacked. Those at Manissès only sustained light fire. The [enemy] cavalry had full freedom to act, and the artillery was not retreated, but abandoned, with the exception of five guns conducted to Valencia. During this span of time, a reinforcement of two battalions of the Castile Volunteer Regiment were sent to Quarte, but these battalions finding Quarte already evacuated, took position near to Chirivella; the troops at Milasta were reinforced by a battalion of the Advanced Guard division with several pieces of artillery, and two other battalions were held ready to execute the same movement, when it was seen that the forces at Quarte had quit this post, and were fleeing in disorder towards Chirivella,(22) pursued by the enemy. Zayas' division, not having any reason to occupy Mislata, carried out its retirement step-by-step to Valencia, while facing down the enemy infantry and the cavalry.

It is easy to imagine the embarrassment in which we found ourselves at Valencia, embarrassment which it had not been difficult to prevent, if, while thus occupying our particular attention, we had not thought of other things. Wishing to sortie from the city with the greatest possible number of troops without exposing the inhabitants to too great misfortune, and considering that this enterprise, due to its extreme importance, should be maturely considered, it appeared suitable to me to submit the issue for the deliberation of the Generals, assembled as a council. All were of the opinion that it was necessary to try a sortie at once, arms in hand, and it was agreed that this sortie would take place by the Saint-Joseph Gate on the night of the 28th to the 29th. The dispositions which were to precede this movement were carried out in silence and under the cover of the darkness of night; but within only a short distance of the city the troops placed in the lead encountered some obstacles owing to the nature of the ground. The enemy outposts took alarm, very sharp firing erupted on both sides, and thus failed this enterprise, which could only succeed under the condition that it remain unknown to the enemy until the exit of all of the columns. The army then returned to take up its old positions facing Quarte. My plan had been to make a new attempt a few days later, but a demonstration by the people made me renounce this idea and constrained me to restrict myself to the brief defense of which Valencia was capable.

The enemy executed a regular [siege] attack with the greatest vigor against our lines facing Saint-Vincent and Mount-Olivette; on the 4th, they were already within a short distance of the fosse. The opinion of the Generals and the commanders of the army assembled together in council was then to give up the lines and to withdraw into the city. This retirement was carried out during the night with neither disorder nor confusion, and without the enemy perceiving it, even though in certain places their observation posts were only eight or ten steps from the fosse; the field artillery and some of the large caliber pieces were brought into the city, the others were spiked. The next day around two o'clock in the afternoon, the bombardment began and was continued night and day through the 6th, 7th and 8th . Its ravages upon the buildings and among the inhabitants were terrible, the devastation extended everywhere, and the troubles of the people always kept growing: their situation was indeed all the more cruel, since the city of Valencia did not have any shelter that was proof against shells.

I received, on the 6th at mid-day, a summons from Marshal Suchet which I rejected. But, on the 8th, the people were so beset, and I, myself, was so shocked to find myself without resources and without the hope of relief, closely pressed by the trenchworks of the enemy, and having nothing to oppose them but a weak wall, that I resolved to enter into a negotiation for the evacuation of the city. It seemed impossible that forty-eight hours would elapse before large breaches were opened, and that then the city would be open to all the horrors imaginable. I cringed at the idea of uselessly continuing the defense for four or five days, at the price of such great and such terrible sacrifices.

The enemy General not having agreed to any to my proposals, I assembled the commanders of the army as a council to propose new terms, and it was after the deliberation of the council and with a majority of the votes that the capitulation was concluded, and of which a copy is attached. In light of this capitulation, tonight the French took possession of the citadel and the Ocean Gate, the Spanish troops will exit tomorrow.

I hope that Your Highnesses will want to ratify the agreed exchange of prisoners, and consequently send your orders to Majorca. As for that which touches upon me, the exchange of the officers of my rank, the time when it could take place being extremely remote, I believe myself condemned to captivity for the remainder of my life, and I regard the moment of my expatriation as that of my death. But if my services were acceptable to the nation, and if until this moment I did not cease deserving well of it, I urgently beg Your Highnesses to condescend to take under your protection my large family.

May God protect, etc.

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