The Left Wing: Marshal Michel Ney, prince de La Moskowa
The Corps Commander: General de Division Drouet, comte
d’Erlon
The Initial Advance: I Corps marches towards Quatre Bras
‘You will save France’: I Corps is diverted
to Ligny
‘They are enemies!’: Vandamme’s
III Corps wavers at Ligny
‘A most perilous situation’: I Corps marches
back to Quatre-Bras
Assessing d’Erlon’s responsibility |
By Stephen Millar
“D’Erlon, as we have seen, actually arrived close on the
field of Ligny, halted for a short time, and then, leaving Durutte’s
division of infantry and Jacquinot’s brigade of horse on the
right flank of the Prussians, led the bulk of his corps back to Frasnes
in obedience to Ney’s order. Hence, he was totally useless, either
to Ney or Napoleon, as if he had remained at Jumet. ‘Twenty thousand
men and forty-six guns,’ says an able French author,
‘had been led about, from mid-day until nine in the evening,
between two battle-fields, distant six miles from each other, without
taking part in either.’ Their timely presence at Quatre Bras
would have placed Wellington in an extremity of peril, while their
actions on the right flank of the Prussians would have destroyed Blucher.
So reason the military critics; but while we may know what has been,
speculations on what would or might have been, had something happened
which did not happen, are seldom among the fruitful pages of history.
Nevertheless the cause of d’Erlon’s movement is a fair
subject of inquiry; for, undoubtedly, his promenade from Jumet to
Villers Perwin, and from Villers Perwin to Quatre Bras, was a misfortune
for the French and a piece of good luck for the Allies.”
-- George Hooper, Waterloo, the Downfall of the First Napoleon:
A History of the Campaign of 1815, 1862.
“If comte d’Erlon had executed the movement upon St.
Amand which the Emperor had ordered, the Prussian army would have
been totally destroyed and we would have taken, perhaps, 30,000 prisoners.”
-- Marshal
Nicholas Soult, Napoleon’s chief-of-staff, in
a dispatch dated 17 June 1815
Although it was uncommon, the success, or failure, of an entire Napoleonic
campaign sometimes depended on the actions or decisions of a single
general officer.
An example of this occurred at the Battle of Marengo on the afternoon
of 14 June 1800, when the combined attack of General de Division Desaix and General de Division Boudet against the advancing Austrians had
ground to a halt. As the outcome of the battle and the campaign hung
in the balance, General de Brigade Francois-Etienne
Kellerman’s
heavy cavalry charged the Austrian left flank, forcing 2,000 Austrian
soldiers to surrender. With
French morale restored, Napoleon launched his final, successful attack,
driving the Austrians back to their starting positions. Faced with
this defeat, the Austrians agreed to the Armistice of Alessandria the
next day, ending Napoleon’s Second Italian Campaign.
It also happened on 14 October 1806, when General der Kavallerie Friedrich
von Kalckreuth refused to use his two Prussian reserve divisions to
defeat Marshal
Louis-Nicholas Davout’s III Corps at the Battle
of Auerstadt. The opportunity to ‘cancel out’ Napoleon’s
same-day victory over General der Infanterie Friedrich zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen
at Jena was allowed to pass; Prussia, largely succumbing to defeatism,
was subsequently occupied by Napoleon.
Military historians have often speculated if this could have occurred
in the 1815 Waterloo Campaign. Was there a single French general officer
who could have completely changed the outcome of Napoleon’s final
campaign?
The Left Wing: Marshal Michel Ney, prince de La Moskowa
The obvious candidate is Marshal Michel Ney, duc d’Elchingen
and prince de La Moskowa – the commander of the left wing of
the Armee du Nord. It
was Ney who failed to use his superior strength on the morning of 16
June to secure the vital crossroads of Quatre Bras.
The ‘Bulletin of the Army’ for 20 June 1815 – the
first official French account of the campaign – inaccurately
describes the Battle of Quatre-Bras four days before as a successful ‘holding
action’:
“On the left, Marshal Ney marched on Quatre Bras with a division
which had fallen on an English division which was placed there, But,
attacked by the Prince of Orange with 25,000 men, part English, part
Hanovrians in the pay of England, he pulled back on his position
at Frasnes. There he engaged in multiple combats; the enemy endeavored
to force it, but in vain, the Duke of Elchingen awaited 1st Corps,
which arrived in the night; he restricted himself to hold his position.”
In truth, Ney’s inaction at Frasnes
that morning
– and his defeat by Field-Marshal Sir Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke
of Wellington, later that same day at Quatre Bras – was an almost
fatal setback for Napoleon’s plans for the campaign.
According to Colonel Pierre-Agathe Heymes,
Ney’s aide-de-camp, the marshal had Bachelu’s 5th Infantry
Division and Pire’s 2nd Cavalry Division from Reille’s
II Corps available at 0800, along with Lefebvre-Desnoettes’ Imperial
Guard Light Cavalry Division. These
forces made no attempt to force the crossroads; however, Bachelu’s
chief-of-staff, Colonel Trefcon, later said his division moved off
in the early morning, but was unable to get into position until several
hours later:
“At eight o’clock we received
orders to march upon Quatre-Bras. We directed ourselves at that point,
but through some wrong maneuvers, we were not at our final positions
towards noon.”
The fact remains, however, that until 1500 on 16 June, the only Allied
troops opposing the French left wing at Quatre-Bras were the 7,900
men and 16 guns of Perponcher’s 2nd Netherlands Division. It
was not until Napoleon’s orders – and a third message from
Napoleon’s chief-of-staff, Marshal Soult – reached Frasnes
at 1100 that Ney issued orders for I and II Corps to move to Quatre-Bras. Ney
replied to Soult’s message, saying:
“All the intelligence tells that there are about 3,000 enemy
infantry at Quatre Bras and that there is not much cavalry. I think
that the dispositions of the Emperor for the later march on Brussels
will be executed without great obstacles.”
After Foy’s 9th
Infantry Division arrived at Frasnes about 0945,
Ney possessed 8,891 infantry, 1,850 cavalry and 22 guns. Prince
Jerome’s 6th Infantry Division, which had still been clearing
Gosselies at 1300, arrived after the fighting began. The
marshal has been greatly criticized for keeping these troops inactive:
“He then [in the morning] had two
infantry divisions, and a cavalry corps within striking distance of
Quatre Bras, which at the moment was held by one Dutch-Belgian division,
one brigade of which had already been roughly handled! The French had
probably never been nearer victory and yet so far from it, as when
Ney hesitated south of Frasnes. Every moment’s delay gave the
Allies time to concentrate whereas an immediate attack would have
found them completely unprepared. Ney, however, waited.”
When the French began their attack in the early afternoon, it started
late and was badly coordinated; Perponcher’s infantry grimly
held onto Quatre-Bras. Then at 1500, Picton’s 5th Division – the
first in a steady stream of reinforcements to bolster the Allied line.
During the course of the fighting, Ney received a series of dispatches
from Napoleon’s General Headquarters at Fleurus. Contemporary
accounts conflict over the details of which aide-de-camp carried which
original (or copied) dispatch, but it appears that two distinct orders
arrived. The first message, delivered between 1600 and 1615, was Soult’s
1400 written order, saying “…it is the
intention of His Majesty that you will also attack what is in front
of you, and that you, after having repulsed it vigorously, fall back
on us in order to surround the [Prussian] corps I just mentioned to
you…” The
second message was Soult’s written order of 1515, saying“…His
Majesty gives me the responsibility to say to you that you must maneuver
at once so as to envelop the right of the enemy and fall quickly on
his rear; this army is lost if you act vigorously; fate of France is
in your hands…”
The aides-de-camp who delivered these orders from General Headquarters
included Colonel de Forbin-Janson, Major Marie-Elie-Georges-Eleazard
Baudus (later wounded at Waterloo) and General de Brigade Charles de
La Bedoyere [see below].
Sufficiently reinforced by early evening, the Duke of Wellington – who
took over command after the battle had commenced – went over
to the offensive at 1830. By the time the fighting had ended at 2100,
Ney’s outnumbered troops had been driven back to their initial
positions in front of Frasnes.
Had Ney seized the initiative and secured the crossroads earlier that
morning, it would have had greatly altered the course of the next two
days. But a French victory against Wellington at Quatre Bras would
have required the presence of both Reille’s II Corps and d’Erlon’s
I Corps. Any chance of a victory at Quatre Bras – or, as events
subsequently showed, a decisive victory over Generalfeldmarschall Gebhard-Leiberecht
von Blucher’s Prussian army at Ligny – depended entirely
on the timely arrival of I Corps. Therefore, it was actually the actions
of d’Erlon on 16 June, which would determine the outcome of the
Waterloo Campaign.
The unusual course of events surrounding I Corps’ movements
on this day are well known:
“The 1st Corps (d’Erlon) had been delayed, and when its
leading division under Durutte reached Frasnes shortly after 4 pm,
it was directed by one of the Emperor’s staff officers, who was
carrying a message to Ney, to march on Brye. Durutte consequently turned
to his right, and was followed by the remainder of the Corps. When
Ney heard what had happened, he ordered d’Erlon to return,
with the result that the 1st Corps marched back, reaching Frasnes
about 9 pm. It is consequently apparent that the services of 20,000
men had been wasted during the day. The loss entailed by this marching
and counter-marching may be judged from the fact that the head of
the column had reached Frasnes about 4 pm. Frasnes was only 2.5 miles
from Quatre Bras.”
D’Erlon’s two critical actions that day – his failure
to bring I Corps into action either at Quatre-Bras or at Ligny – occurred
within three hours of each other. Had he accomplished either one, Napoleon
would have probably avoided a defeat in the Waterloo Campaign – despite
Ney’s earlier inactivity at Frasnes.
The Corps Commander: General de Division Drouet, comte d’Erlon
Jean-Baptiste Drouet (born Rheims 29 July 1765 – died Paris
25 January 1844) began his military career on 21 October 1782, with
the Regiment Beaujolais. He left the regiment in 1787, but re-enlisted
with a Rheims battalion on 7 August 1792, reaching the rank of general
de brigade on 25 July 1799 as a divisional chief-of-staff with the
l’Armee du Danube et d’Helvetie.
Promoted to the rank of General de Division on 27 August 1803, Drouet
later fought at the battles of Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland (where
he was wounded). Created comte d’Erlon on 28 January 1809, he
later gained extensive experience in Spain as a corps commander. D’Erlon’s
final battles of the First Empire were against Wellington at Orthiez
(27 February 1814) and Toulouse (10 April).
D’Erlon rallied to the Bourbons during the First Restoration
and was made commandant of the 16th Military Division at Lille. King
Louis XVIII awarded d’Erlon the Order of St. Louis on 2 June
1814.
Nevertheless, d’Erlon joined Napoleon during the Hundred Days
and was given command of I Corps in the Armee du Nord on 6 April 1815.
General de Brigade Victor-Joseph Delcambre, baron de Champvert (born
Douai 10 March 1770 – died Paris 23 October 1858), was appointed
to be d’Erlon’s chief-of-staff.
I Corps consisted of 20,000 men in five divisions: the 1st
Infantry Division, commanded by General
de Brigade Joachim-Jerome Quiot, baron
du Passage; the 2nd Infantry Division, commanded by
General de Division Francois-Xavier,
baron Donzelot; the 3rd
Infantry Division, commanded
by General de
Division Pierre-Louis Binet, baron de Marcognet; the
4th Infantry Division, commanded by General de Division Joseph-Francois,
comte Durutte; the 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by General de Division
Charles-Claude, baron Jacquinot. In addition, 1st Corps had five foot
artillery batteries and one horse artillery battery (a total of 46
guns) under the command of General de Brigade Jean-Charles Desales
and five companies of the 1st Engineer Regiment commanded by General
de Brigade Marie-Theodore-Urbain, baron Garbe.
On 2 June, just prior to the beginning of the Waterloo Campaign, Napoleon
raised d’Erlon to the Imperial peerage.
When Ney joined the Armee du Nord on 15 June, Napoleon gave him command
of its left wing – composed of I Corps, General de Division Honore-Charles-Michel-Joseph,
comte Reille’s II Corps, and General de Division Kellermann’s
III Cavalry Corps. Although the Emperor’s initial plan for a
march on Brussels the next day was subsequently altered (after a Prussian
infantry corps was discovered at Ligny), Ney’s initial primary
objective remained: advance and secure the cross-roads at Quatre Bras.
The Initial Advance: I Corps marches towards Quatre Bras
The disposition of I Corps during the night of 15/16 June was as follows:
Durutte’s division between Gosselies and Jumet; Donzelot’s
division in front of Jumet; Marcognet’s division at Marchienne-au-Pont;
Quiot’s division at Thuin. Jacquinot had one cavalry brigade
at Solre-sur-Sambre; d’Erlon was in Jumet with Jacquinot’s
second cavalry brigade.
Napoleon’s 0830 orders for the left wing were delivered to Ney
at Frasnes by General de Division Charles-Auguste-Joseph, comte Flahaut
de la Billarderie about 1100. These
orders, in which the Emperor anticipated a French advance on Brussels,
read in part:
“…You should dispose of your troops in the following
manner: the first division, two miles in front of Quatre-Chemins, if
it is not disadvantageous; six divisions of infantry around Quatre-Chemins,
and a division at Marbais, so that I can bring it to me at Sombreffe
if I need it; it would not delay your march besides; corps of count
of Valmy, which has 3,000 elite cuirassiers, at the intersection of
the Roman Way and of that of Brussels, so that I can bring it with
me if I need some, as soon as my decision is made, you will send the
order to him to come join you. I wish to have with me the division
of the Guard commanded by General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, and I send to
you two divisions of the corps of the count de Valmy [Kellermann] to
replace it…I [have] adopted this general principle during
this campaign: to divide my army into two wings and a reserve. Your
wing will be made up of four divisions of the 1st corps, of four
divisions of the 2nd corps, two divisions of light cavalry and two
divisions of the corps of the count de Valmy. That should not be
far from 45 to 50,000 men...”
About an hour later, d’Erlon received his instructions from
Ney. Conforming with the Emperor’s instructions, Durutte, Marcognet
and Donzelot were to advance to Frasnes; Quiot was to place his division
at Marbais; the infantry’s advance was to be covered by Jacquinot’s
light cavalry.
Several factors now contributed to delay I Corps’ advance towards
Quatre Bras, not least of which was the immense congestion created
by almost 50,000 men on the single main road. Units from Reille’s
II Corps were still moving through Gosselies at 1300, forcing I Corps’ leading
division (Durutte) to halt:
“Ney’s orders to move on Frasnes [2.5 miles south of Quatre
Bras] arrived at midday, but owing to Reille’s corps moving to
their appointed position, d’Erlon was obliged to wait until these
troops had cleared the road. At the commencement of the Battle of Quatre
Bras, d’Erlon had only reached Gosselies.”
At Gosselies, d’Erlon halted I Corps and sent out a reconnaissance
patrol to check out a false report of enemy troops; this delayed his
advance from the town until 1430 or 1500.
‘You will save France’: I Corps is diverted to Ligny
About 1600, D’Erlon and Delcambre had ridden ahead of Durutte’s
division, with the intention to meet Ney at Frasnes and inform
him of I Corps imminent arrival. D’Erlon’s news would be
crucial for Ney, because the marshal has just received orders from
Soult, written at Fleurus at 1400 [see above]. Ney’s mission
was to force the enemy back at Quatre-Bras, then advance along the
Namur road and assault the Prussian right flank in the area around
Brye. However, these orders would be impossible to complete without
the arrival of the 20,000 men of I Corps.
Half an hour later, when Durutte’s 4th Infantry Division had
advanced about seven kilometres north of Gossilies, it was intercepted
on the Brussels road by one of Napoleon’s aides-de-camp. This
officer was carrying
“…the famous penciled note ordering the whole corps to
change direction and march on Lignin…The ADC who delivered these
instructions convinced d’Erlon’s divisional commanders
that the orders came directly from the Emperor himself, and forthwith
the whole corps changed direction towards Viler Erwin. The bearer of
the message now galloped after d’Erlon himself who was nearing
Fronses, and upon catching up with him showed him the note and informed
him that his corps was moving towards Ligny.”
The identity of this General Headquarters officer has never been definitively
established, but “d’Erlon himself says that it was [General
de Brigade] La Bedoyere, one of Napoleon’s favorite ADCs, who
delivered the message, and if anyone could recognize a member of the
Emperor’s staff it was d’Erlon.” Other
sources say it was a colonel named Laurent or Colonel de Forbin-Janson,
both of whom were aides-de-camp at Napoleon’s General Headquarters.
It is also known that these officers carried orders from Soult to Ney
between 1515 and 1530 on 16 June.
General
de Brigade Charles-Angelique-Francois Huchet, comte de La Bedoyere (born Paris 17 April 1786 – executed
Paris 19 August 1815) was an officer who had held several staff and
command positions during the First Empire. He had been an aide-de-camp
to Marshal Jean Lannes and Prince Eugene de Beauharnais as well as
later commanding the 112th Line Regiment. He had rallied to Napoleon
in 1815 as colonel of the 7th Line Regiment; Napoleon rewarded him
with the rank of General de Brigade (26 March) as well as raising La
Bedoyere to the Imperial peerage (4 June).
If La Bedoyere was indeed the mystery
aide-de-camp, he would have probably been carrying a copy of Soult’s
1515 order (sent from Fleurus at 1530). As for the ‘penciled
note,’ La Bedoyere must have forged the document himself, probably
in a misguided attempt to expedite Soult’s order.
British historian William Siborne disagrees about the officer’s
identity, saying it was Colonel Laurent who was actually responsible
for sending I Corps to Ligny:
“The movements of d’Erlon’s corps admits of being
satisfactorily explained. Napoleon, having received information that
d’Erlon had been left in reserve in front of Gossilies, and inferring,
perhaps, from this circumstance that Ney was sufficiently strong to
be able to hold his ground at Quatre Bras, without further aid than
what he had at hand, resolved upon employing this corps upon the Prussian
right flank; but in the meantime, d’Erlon had, in pursuance of
instructions from Ney, continued his march towards Quatre Bras; and
having himself preceded in advance, had reached Frasnes, at which place
Colonel Laurent found him, and communicated to him the Emperor’s
order for the march of his corps upon St. Amand; adding that on coming
up with the head of his column, he had taken upon himself to change
its direction of march into that of St. Amand.”
According to I Corps artillery commander General de Brigade Desales – who
recalled the contents from memory – the 1545 note, addressed
to d’Erlon and signed by Napoleon at Fleurus, read:
“The enemy lowers his head into the trap that I intended for
him. Bring at once your four divisions of infantry, your division of
cavalry, all your artillery, and two divisions of heavy cavalry which
I place at your disposal; carry you, I say, with all these forces the
height of Saint-Amand and…Ligny. Comte d’Erlon, you
will save France and will cover yourself with glory.”
In contrast to d’Erlon’s statement, Desales said the aide-de-camp
who delivered this message was a member of the Imperial Guard (La Bedoyere
was a line officer).
The divisional commanders in the vanguard of I Corps, Durutte and
Jacquinot, were highly experienced officers; Durutte had fought through
both the Russian and Leipzig campaigns, Jacquinot (another veteran
of Russia) was almost killed at the Battle of Dennewitz in 1813. While
neither general would have completely disregarded La Bedoyere’s
orders, it is important to note that they did not call an immediate
halt and wait for further instructions from their corps commander,
located about half an hour away. Not a single general officer thought
La Bedoyere’s order was anything less than genuine; the note,
however, was not recorded at Napoleon’s General Headquarters
nor did it survive the Waterloo Campaign:
“The mystery of the penciled note
that Napoleon was supposed to have sent to Marshal Ney, after sending
the…3:15 pm. dispatch, in which the Emperor ordered Ney to
send d’Erlon’s I Corps across to Ligny has puzzled historians,
and caused endless speculation. Napoleon himself never mentioned
any such written communication, either penciled by himself which,
given the state of his handwriting, would have been almost illegible,
or that he dictated the same to one of his ADCs. If Napoleon had
just received information that Ney was heavily engaged at Quatre-Bras,
then he would not have deprived him of a whole army corps. How and
who actually ordered d’Erlon’s divisions to march on
Ligny remains one of the enigmas of this campaign.”
La
Bedoyere then informed d’Erlon he would ride ahead to Ney and
inform the marshal about Napoleon’s order, but he never arrived.
It is at this moment that d’Erlon is given the first of two opportunities
to change the outcome of the Waterloo Campaign:
“D'Erlon’s Corps was probably the key to victory.
This corps, which could have sealed the fate of the Allies at Quatre
Bras or the Prussians at Ligny, was wasted by marching and countermarching
all day between the two battles and contributing to neither.”
Although the 4th Infantry Division had already turned off towards
Ligny, d’Erlon’s remaining three infantry divisions were
still moving up the Brussels road (it should be noted that one of the
1st Division’s staff officers later wrote that the division’s
baggage-column never lost visual contact with its parent unit nor did
it leave the Brussels road). It
appears there was sufficient time for d’Erlon to ride south,
intercept at least two of his divisions and personally countermand
La Bedoyere’s order; those divisions which had already off the
Brussels road could be ordered to turn back towards Quatre Bras, bringing
up the rear of I Corps.
Although such an action by d’Erlon might well have created additional
confusion for his divisional commanders, in hindsight, it would have
been worth the risk. Under those circumstances, I Corps’ 20,000
men and 46 guns would have reached Quatre Bras in time to engage Wellington’s
Allied army:
“… had Durutte’s division and the divisions following
it been pushed forward [to Quatre Bras] they would have reached the
scene of action before Wellington’s reinforcements had turned
the scale in favor of the Allies.”
But d’Erlon, believing he was acting on Napoleon’s direct
command – and having no information about the desperate struggle
raging at Quatre Bras
– decided to accept his new orders. He sent Delcambre ahead to
inform Ney of the change of advance and then rode off in the direction
of Villers-Perwin to find Durutte’s 4th Infantry Division.
Historically, the damage done to the Napoleon’s campaign by
La Bedoyere’s actions was immense:
“I Corps would have made a difference at either battlefield…At
Quatre Bras, a victory and a skillful pursuit would have sent the
Allies running to Brussels instead of giving them the chance to reform
themselves at Mont-St-Jean.”
Not only did the absence of I Corps rob Ney of any chance of defeating
Wellington at Quatre Bras, I Corps’ unexpected appearance during
the final stage of the Battle of Ligny nearly caused the morale of
General
de Division Vandamme’s III
Corps to break. D’Erlon,
however, would soon be given a second chance to change the outcome
of the Waterloo Campaign – this time by helping Napoleon to inflict
a decisive victory over the Prussian regiments of Blucher’s Army
of the Lower Rhine.
‘They are enemies!’: Vandamme’s
III Corps wavers at Ligny
After turning off the Brussels road at 1630, Jacquinot’s and
Durutte’s divisions advanced to a point northwest of Villers-Perwin.
These unknown units were then observed by troops of Vandamme’s
III Corps about an hour later – advancing directly towards the
rear of the corps’ left flank. The result was predictable:
“At just after 5 pm, seeing the depletion
of the Prussian reserves, and having kept an adequate mass of decision
in hand for just such an eventuality, Napoleon now ordered the Imperial
Guard, together with the cuirassier division [actually the IV
Cavalry Corps] of General
[de Division Edouard-Jean-Baptiste, comte] Milhaud to break the Prussian centre. While these formations were making
their way forward, General Vandamme galloped across from the left
wing bringing news that a massive enemy column was marching on Fleurus,
and only some three miles away with the intent, it seemed, of turning
the French left…Vandamme was convinced that part of Wellington’s
army had come across to succor the Prussians, and when an officer
from his staff who had been sent to identify this new development
came riding back shouting, ‘they are enemies, they are enemies!’ the
panic caused soon spread along the ranks like wild-fire. General
[de Division Etienne-Nicolas, baron] Lefol’s division broke
back in panic and [General
de Division Jean-Baptiste, baron] Girard’s
division (now commanded by Colonel Matis, the two other generals
of brigade being wounded) was forced to abandon St.-Amand la Haye
to meet the threat of a flank attack. Lefol turned his cannon on
his own men to stop them fleeing the field.”
Napoleon, expecting any reinforcements from Ney to be advancing down
the Namur road towards Brye (and not towards the rear-area of III Corps),
had little choice but to suspend the Imperial Guard’s preparations
for the final attack on Blucher’s battered center. He also moved
the eight battalions of General
de Division Philbert-Guillaume, comte Duhesme’s Young
Guard Division and General
de Division Jacques-Gervais, baron Subervie’s 5th Cavalry Division to the left wing to bolster
the wavering III Corps. An aide-de-camp was then sent out to determine
the identity of the advancing column.
He returned at 1830 to report the column was composed of French troops.
As the column was later observed to be retiring towards the west, away
from Vandamme’s sector, the Imperial Guard’s preparations
were resumed. The French assault against the Prussian centre was launched
about 1945.
In order to be objective about d’Erlon’s actions between
1830 and 1930, it must be noted that Napoleon himself contributed to
d’Erlon’s dilemma by not taking full advantage of I Corps’ unexpected
arrival. It would have made d’Erlon’s decision much easier
had Napoleon’s aide-de-camp given him a verbal order to attack
Blucher’s right-flank:
“Napoleon, even in the opinion of Jomini, his admirer, is held
to have committed a ‘manifest fault’ in neglecting to send
a positive order to d’Erlon – who,
‘by the happy error of an aide-de-camp,’ had arrived so
opportunely – to march at once upon Brye.”
It is possible that Napoleon had falsely concluded that as I Corps
had arrived, d’Erlon was acting under Soult’s previous
orders and already knew his corps was expected to assault the Prussian
right flank. Nevertheless, Napoleon’s surprise at d’Erlon’s
arrival from the wrong direction clearly shows he had not given La
Bedoyere any penciled order written at 1545.
The complete details of La Bedoyere’s role in diverting I Corps
to Ligny may never be known; he was executed for treason by King Louis
XVIII’s new government in Paris soon after Waterloo (19 August
1815).
‘A most perilous situation’: I Corps marches back
to Quatre-Bras
Ney was probably informed of I Corps’ new line of march by Delcambre
sometime before 1730. The meeting with the marshal must have been an
unpleasant experience for Delcambre; unable to secure the crossroads
as ordered, Ney had been expecting the arrival of the 20,000 men of
I Corps. Now, the marshal was being told
– after the fact – that his hoped-for reinforcements were
marching towards Ligny.
Although most historians agree on what subsequently occurred at this
meeting, two separate versions might be possible: that Ney did, or
did not, give Delcambre explicit instructions to recall I Corps. The
commonly accepted version of events (which is also corroborated by
d’Erlon) is that the corps commander returned to Quatre Bras
as the result of a direct order from Ney:
“Then, in one of the costliest blunders of the campaign, Ney
sent Delcambre back to d'Erlon with express orders to disregard Napoleon's
command and come to Quatre Bras immediately. Ney's peremptory directive
reached d'Erlon just as his corps was on the outskirts of the Ligny
battlefield. The general was confused, torn between two conflicting
sets of orders. He decided to turn back to Quatre Bras, because, he
explained later, "I felt for the marshal to recall me in spite
of Napoleon's wishes, he must have been in a most perilous situation.”
Siborne also accepts d’Erlon’s account of these events:
“All at once this column was observed to halt, to indicate an
indecision in its intentions, and finally withdraw from the field.
D’Erlon had in fact just received from Ney a peremptory order
to join him without delay, with which he was resolved to comply, probably
concluding that he was bound to do so from the circumstances of his
having been in the first instance placed under the marshal’s
immediate command; having ascertained also from the Emperor’s
aide-de-camp that he was not the bearer of any instructions whatsoever
from Napoleon as to his future movements, and that the appearance
of his corps on that part of the field of battle had been quite unexpected.
This pressing order had been dispatched by Ney immediately previous
to the arrival of Colonel Laurent on the Heights of Gemioncourt.”
In the second version of events, Ney didn’t give Delcambre a
direct order for d’Erlon to return; instead, he sent d’Erlon
a situation report about the fighting at Quatre-Bras. This
could be possible for four reasons:
1. By recalling I Corps, Ney would be countermanding a direct order
from the Emperor.
2. D’Erlon took an hour to decide on his next course of action
after Delcambre returned.
3.
Ney’s after-action report on 16 June puts the blame solely
on d’Erlon for I Corps’ march and counter-march.
4.
Ney’s campaign report to Joseph Fouche, duc d’Otrante,
dated 26 June, makes no mention of recalling I Corps:
“On
the 16th, I received orders to attack the English in their position
at Quatre Bras. We advanced towards the enemy with an enthusiasm
difficult to be described. Nothing resisted our impetuosity.
The battle became general, and victory was no longer doubtful,
when, at the moment that I intended to order up the 1st corps
of infantry, which had been left by me in reserve at Frasnes,
I learned that the Emperor had disposed of it without advising
me of the circumstance, as well as of the division of Girard
of the second corps, on purpose to direct them upon St. Amand,
and to strengthen his left wing, which was vigorously engaged
with the Prussians. The shock which this intelligence gave me
confounded me. Having no longer under me more than three divisions,
instead of the eight upon which I calculated, I was obliged to
renounce the hopes of victory; and in spite of all my efforts,
in spite of the intrepidity and devotion of my troops, my utmost
efforts after that could only maintain me in my position till
the close of the day. About 9 o'clock, the first corps was sent
me by the Emperor, to whom it had been of no service. Thus 25
or 30,000 men were, I may say, paralyzed, and were idly paraded
during the whole of the battle from the right to the left, and
the left to the right, without firing a shot.”
In
any case, Delcambre left Ney between 1730 and 1800, rejoining d’Erlon
about half an hour later. D’Erlon
then halted I Corps while he and his staff debated the situation.
I Corps’
vanguard, Durutte’s and Jacquinot’s divisions, were near
the Roman road, northwest of Wagnelee; the rest of the corps was stretched
out behind them, all the way back to Quiot’s division, which
was still on – or in the vicinity of – the Brussels road.
Although
Delcambre had no doubt told d’Erlon of what he had seen at
Quatre Bras, d’Erlon’s two other senior staff officers,
Desales and Garbe, wanted I Corps to continue towards the battlefield
at Ligny. The discussion lasted for about an hour:
“Poor d’Erlon was once more confronted with a dilemma. After
coming within sight of the battlefield of Ligny, he had received
yet another order, this time from Marshal Ney, who in a fit of fury
at being deprived of almost half his original force had, upon being
informed that d’Erlon was marching towards the Ligny battlefield,
sent an urgent message instructing the general to retrace his steps
and return to Quatre Bras. This order was not only to deprive Napoleon
of a resounding victory over the Prussians, but is hard to justify
because, with the distance involved, it would mean that d’Erlon’s
troops could not possibly arrive back before nightfall. Also, the
fact that both Ney and d’Erlon were aware that the order to
move the I Corps across to Ligny came from Napoleon himself, then
it seems strange that both men chose to disobey a direct command
from their Emperor. That there was indeed a state of uncertainty
in d’Erlon’s mind is shown by the fact that before turning
to march back towards Quatre-Bras, he dropped off Durutte’s
division and his cavalry facing Wagnelee in case they would be needed.”
This
is the second time in three hours that the commander of I Corps was
given an opportunity to change the outcome of the Waterloo Campaign;
all d’Erlon needed to do was to continue to follow La Bedoyere’s
forged order and bring his men into action. Even had Delcambre carried
an explicit order from Ney to return, d’Erlon must have known
I Corps was better placed to assist Napoleon rather than Ney. Having
already reached the edge of the Ligny battlefield, there was no guarantee
that I Corps could make it back to Quatre Bras in sufficient time
to be of any use.
At
around 1930 a decision was reached: d’Erlon decided to return
to Quatre Bras (minus Durutte’s and Jacquinot’s divisions)
in order to reinforce Ney. This course of action, probably the single
most critical decision of the Waterloo Campaign, would prove to have
immense consequences:
“Although the French were victorious [at Ligny], their victory
was not complete because a good portion of the Prussian army escaped
destruction. Things would have been different if Ney, or even only
d'Erlon's Corps, would have arrived on the Prussian right flank. This
would probably have meant the destruction of the Prussian I and II
Corps, thus about half of Blucher’s army. With his forces so
much reduced, Blucher would not have been able to march on Waterloo
on 18 June and Napoleon would have won that battle and thus the campaign
too.”
I Corps, after spending the entire day unengaged, finally arrived
at Quatre Bras at 2100, after the fighting had ceased.
Historian George Hooper sums up d’Erlon’s actions on 16
June this way:
“…He [Napoleon] estimated that a march and skirmish
would give Ney possession of Quatre Bras; and, finding the Prussians
in his own front more numerous than he expected, Napoleon sent the
formal orders through Soult for Ney to fall upon the Prussian right
as soon as he had beaten Wellington. If it were to be admitted that
Laurent or La Bedoyere, who carried the first dispatch, meeting or
overtaking the 1st corps en route to Fronses, took upon himself,
as the best interpreter of Napoleon’s order, to direct it at
once upon St. Amend, all the statements are reconciled. For, on that
supposition, d’Erlon would have marched in obedience to what
he believed to be a direct order from Napoleon. Hearing that the
1st corps had arrived, although in a quarter where it was unlooked
for, Napoleon would have inferred from its presence on the field,
that Ney had been successful without it, and would hastily conclude
that d’Erlon would act forthwith on the Prussian right. Ney,
having Soul’s actual words, would be surprised at the conduct
of the staff officer, and putting the true construction on the written
order, would see the error committed by that officer, and endeavor
to instantly repair it by recalling the 1st corps. D’Erlon,
receiving no orders from the aide-de-camp sent by Napoleon to
communicate with him on the field, would naturally obey the mandate
of Ney, his immediate superior, retrace his steps, and hasten
back to Frasnes.
“In this conjectural explanation Ney is exonerated from the
blame Napoleon showers upon him, and d’Erlon appears in the
light of a weak man, overcome by a sense of responsibility, and attracted
hither and thither by the influence of his two superiors.”
Assessing d’Erlon’s responsibility
Napoleon’s decisive defeat in the Waterloo Campaign could have
been prevented. This reversal of historical events would have happened
on 16 June – two days before the battle was fought – had
d’Erlon brought I Corps into action. There are two versions of
this hypothetical scenario; the first requires a French victory at
the Battle of Quatre Bras, the second requires a decisive French victory
at the Battle of Ligny:
1) On the Armee du Nord’s left wing, Wellington’s Allied
army is defeated by Ney at Quatre Bras. The Allied army either falls
back on its reserve at Hal (17,000 Netherlands and British troops)
to secure its lines of communication with the English Channel or,
pursued by the French, Wellington decides against defending the Mont-Saint-Jean
ridge near Waterloo and retreats to Brussels.
2) On the Armee du Nord’s right wing, the Prussian Army of the
Lower Rhine is decisively beaten at Ligny and unable to co-operate
any further with the Allied army. Wellington’s defense of the
Mont-Saint-Jean ridge would likely have then ended in an Allied defeat.
How Wellington would have subsequently deployed his Hal reserve in
that event remains open to speculation.
As commander-in-chief of the Armee du Nord, Napoleon himself has been
given a share of the blame for d’Erlon’s actions:
“Strategic mismanagement on Napoleon’s side was compounded
by the failure to make the most of the element of surprise. This was
due, partly to the physical state of the leading French infantry formations
which on the 15th had marched some 20 miles over bad roads in suffocating
heat; partly to poor staff-work and contradictory orders on the 16th
which lead to the useless marching and counter-marching of d’Erlon’s
corps between the two battlefields without taking part in either.”
But it was d’Erlon’s two decisions on 16 June which proved
to be the most crucial; the presence of I Corps could have changed
Ney’s defeat at Quatre Bras or Napoleon’s indecisive victory
at Ligny. By accepting La Bedoyere’s forged orders at 1700, d’Erlon
ensured a British victory at Quatre Bras; by rejecting them at 1930,
he allowed the Prussian army to avoid a potential disaster – events
which were both required for Wellington’s and Blucher’s
decisive victory at Waterloo two days later.
I. Online sources:
http://tkline.pgcc.net/PITBR/Chateaubriand/ChatindexB.htm
http://www.waterloo-campaign.nl/
http://web.genealogie.free.fr/Les_militaires/1789-1815/
http://www.1789-1815.com/
http://www.waterloo1815.de/
http://napoleon-monuments.eu/Napoleon1er/Drouet.htm
http://www.napoleonic-literature.com/
http://www.wtj.com/archives/napoleon/nap615be.htm
http://www.napoleon-series.org/
http://home.tiscali.nl/erwinmuilwijk/pdf-files/16-3.pdf
http://www.historynet.com/
http://www.charles-de-flahaut.fr/1857a.html
http://www.archives.lib.soton.ac.uk/wellington/pdfs_for_all/waterloo_gash_edit.pdf
http://www.battlefieldanomalies.com/
http://www.2ebgc.nl/Geschiedenissen/Perponcher_Luitenant-Generaal%20Baron%20H.G.%20Graaf%20de.doc
http://ameliefr.club.fr/Charles-de-la-Bedoyere.html
http://jean.gallian.free.fr/comm2/Images/genealog/forbin/p3b.pdf
http://www.orthez-1814.org/
a) Charras, Jean-Baptiste-Adolphe, Histoire de la Campagne de 1815:
Waterloo, 1863.
b) Hooper, George, Waterloo, the Downfall of the First Napoleon:
A History of the Campaign of 1815, 1862
c) Siborne, William, History of the War in France and Belgium
in 1815, 1848.
Notes:
[1] Waterloo,
the Downfall of the First Napoleon: A History of the Campaign of
1815, pp. 137-138.
[2] Francois-Etienne
Kellermann (4 August 1770-2 June 1835) was promoted to General de Division
on 15 July 1800. He was the son of Marshal Kellermann (who was later
created duc de Valmy).
[3] French
victory in the War of the Second Coalition was sealed with General
Moreau’s defeat of Archduke John’s army at Hohenlinden,
near Munich, on 3 December 1800.
[4] Michel
Ney (born Saarlouis 10 January 1769) was executed in Paris for treason
on 6 December 1815.
[5] http://www.wtj.com/archives/napoleon/nap615ce.htm
[6] http://home.tiscali.nl/erwinmuilwijk/pdf-files/16-3.pdf.
General de Division Gilbert-Desiree-Joseph Bachelu (born Dole 9 February
1777 – died Paris 19 June 1849) had been created a baron on 29
August 1810; General de Division Hippolyte-Marie-Guillaume de Rosnyvinen,
comte de Pire (born Rennes 31 March 1771 – died Paris 20 July
1850) had been promoted on 15 October 1813; General de Division Honore-Charles-Michel-Joseph,
comte Reille (born Antibes 1 September 1775 – died Paris 04 March
1860) was promoted to the rank of Marshal of France on 17 September
1847 ; General de Division Charles, comte Lefebvre-Desnoettes (1773-1822) had
previously commanded the chasseurs-a cheval regiment in the Imperial
Guard.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Lieutenant-General
Hendrick-George, baron de Perponcher-Sedlnitzky (1771-1856) had been
promoted on 21 April.
[9] Nicholas-Jean-de-Dieu
Soult, duc de Dalmatie (born 29 March 1769 – died 26 November
1851) was given the post of chief-of-staff of the Armee du Nord on
9 May. Marshal Berthier (Napoleon’s chief-of-staff during
the First Empire) did not join the Emperor during the Hundered Days;
he died in Bamberg, Bavaria on 1 June.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Histoire
de la Campagne de 1815: Waterloo, p. 183. General de Division
Maximilien, comte Foy (3 February 1775 – 28 November 1825)
had previously been a divisional commander in Portugal and Spain.
[12] General
de Division Prince Jerome Bonaparte (born Ajaccio 15 November 1784 – died
Villegenis 24 June 1860) was Napoleon’s youngest brother and
former King of Westphalia.
[13] http://www.napoleonic-literature.com/RA_Journal/SidelightsOnWaterloo.pdf
[14] Lieutenant-General
Sir Thomas Picton (born 1758) was later killed at the Battle of Waterloo.
[15] http://napoleon-series.org/military/battles/c_waterlooorders6.html
[16] http://napoleon-series.org/military/battles/c_waterlooorders6.html
[17] Ibid.
[18] Delcambre
had previously commanded the 5th Voltigeur Regiment in the Imperial
Guard.
[19] D’Erlon
was promoted to the rank of Marshal of France by King Louis-Philippe
on 9 April 1843.
[20] http://www.charles-de-flahaut.fr/1857a.html.
Charles-Auguste-Joseph, comte Flahaut de la Billarderie (21 April 1786 –
1 September 1870) is generally believed to be the illegitimate son
of Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, prince de Benevent.
[21] http://www.wtj.com/archives/napoleon/nap615be.htm
[22] http://www.waterloo-campaign.nl/
[23] http://www.battlefieldanomalies.com/ligny/07_commencement.htm
[24] http://www.battlefieldanomalies.com/ligny/07_commencement.htm
[25] Ibid.
[26] http://www.waterloo-campaign.nl/.
Colonel Laurent was an artillery officer; Colonel Charles-Theodore-Alexandre-Palamede,
comte de Forbin-Janson (1783-1849) was the eldest son of General de
Division Michel-Palamede, marquis de Forbin-Janson.
[27] http://ameliefr.club.fr/Charles-de-la-Bedoyere.html
[28] History
of the War in France and Belgium in 1815, p. 234.
[29] http://napoleon-series.org/military/battles/c_waterlooorders7.html
[30] http://www.1789-1815.com/drouet.htm
[31] http://www.battlefieldanomalies.com/ligny/07_commencement.htm
[32] http://www.waterloo-campaign.nl/
[33] http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/battles/hundred/c_chapter3.html
[34] Ibid.
[35] http://www.napoleonic-literature.com/RA_Journal/SidelightsOnWaterloo.pdf
[36] http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/battles/hundred/c_chapter3.html
[37] General
de Division Dominique-Joseph-Rene Vandamme, comte d’Unsebourg
(5 November 1770-15 July 1830) was an experienced corps commander who
had been raised to the Imperial peerage by Napoleon on 2 June.
[38] http://www.battlefieldanomalies.com/ligny/07_commencement.htm
[39] Waterloo,
the Downfall of the First Napoleon: A History of the Campaign of
1815, pp. 138-139.
[40] http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/napoleonic_wars/3458966.html?showAll=y&c=y
[41] History
of the War in France and Belgium in 1815, p. 235.
[42] http://www.waterloo-campaign.nl/
[43] http://napoleon-series.org/military/battles/waterloo/c_waterlooney.html
[44] http://www.waterloo-campaign.nl/
[45] http://www.battlefieldanomalies.com/ligny/07_commencement.htm
[46] http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/battles/hundred/c_chapter4.html
[47] Waterloo,
the Downfall of the First Napoleon: A History of the Campaign of
1815, pp. 138-139.
[48] Wellington’s
reserve force at Hal, about 11 kilometres from Waterloo, was under
the command of Lieutenant-General Prince Frederik of the Netherlands.
[49] http://www.archives.lib.soton.ac.uk/wellington/pdfs_for_all/waterloo_gash_edit.pdf
Placed on the Napoleon Series: November 2007
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