Between Inspections and Corps: The Russian Divisional Structure, 1806
- 1810
Effects of Divisional Reorganization on Operations: Persistence
in use of Ad Hoc Columns
By Robert Goetz
While the divisions were used as an operational structure in the war
against France in 1806-7, the Finnish campaign of 1808-9 and the campaign
in Poland of 1809, the 1806 reorganization did not impose any particular
operational structure on the Russian commanders. The example of the
Russo-Turkish war of 1806-12 reveals that the traditional method of
forming ad hoc columns from available forces prevailed despite the establishment
of a divisional structure for the forces committed to this war, and
only influenced organization of the Army of Moldavia in the last year
of the war. Additionally, the brief tenure of FM Kamensky in command
of the Russian armies in Poland in December 1806 also demonstrates a
reversion to the shuffling of regiments into formations without regard
to maintaining consistent higher formations.
Use of Divisions
in Moldavia, 1806-12
The Army of Moldavia provides the most dramatic example of deviation
from the divisional organization. The successive commanders of this
army from 1806-1810 reorganized the divisions into ad hoc columns mixing
the regiments from several divisions in each, a practice that persisted
until Kutusov took over the army in March 1811.[i]
There is no consistent discernible divisional structure in the Army
of Moldavia until the winter of 1810-11 when the withdrawal of divisions
required reorganization along divisional lines. Even taking into consideration
the practical considerations that might require detachments, formation
of smaller ad hoc units and reorganization of units, the organization
of the Army of Moldavia represents a continuance of the traditional
organizational practices.
In the first actions of this war, conducted by Michelson, forces from
the 11th and 12th Divisions were organized into
an Advance Guard, two smaller bodies under the command of Miloradovich
(commander of 11th Division) and Kamensky-1 (commander of
12th Division, and a Main Body under the command of Meyendorff.
Later in the campaign the two columns commanded by Miloradovich and
Kamensky-1 were reorganized into an five columns, each with 4-6 infantry
battalions, 4-10 squadrons of cavalry and artillery.[ii]
While all of the regiments assigned to Miloradovich’s column were from
his own division, Kamensky’s column and Meyendorff’s main body included
regiments from both divisions. The reasons for breaking up the formal
commands are not clear, but the distances involved and the need for
a larger number of smaller commands required some redistribution of
forces. The newness of the divisional structure and the distance of
the Moldavian front from St. Petersburg may also have played a role.
However, the practice of breaking up the divisions to form ad hoc commands
is also demonstrated in the organization of forces under Prozorovsky,
who succeeded Michelson in command of the Army of Moldavia.
During the winter of 1807-8, Prozorovsky was reinforced by four additional
divisions: the 8th from the war against France in Poland,
the 15th from the forces that had just returned from the
Mediterranean, the 16th which had been formed from recruits
in 1806-7, and the new 22nd Division which had just been
formed from established regiments drawn from existing divisions.[iii]
As there was no significant fighting in 1808, these divisions remained
intact. When hostilities resumed the next spring, the divisions initially
remained recognizable. At Braila in May of 1809 Prozorovsky organized
his forces into three “corps” under Kamensky-1 (Commander of 12th
Division), Essen-3 (commander of 8th Division), and Markov
(commander of 15th Division). Olsufiev-3 (commander of 22nd
Division) was also present with a portion of his troops along with a
detachment from 13th Division. Miloradovich, with his own
11th Division and portions of 22nd Division, was
operating in the vicinity of Bucharest. The 16th Division
appears to have remained in reserve. However, although the forces were
allocated to larger commands by divisions, within these commands columns
were still formed in the traditional way – by assembling individual
regiments and battalions. The assault columns formed from the Russian
right at Braila included regiments from four different divisions.[iv]
In July 1809, Prozorovsky reorganized his army into a Reserve Corps
and a Main Army. The Main Army was further subdivided into two parts:
a force to defend Wallachia and a force to invade Turkish territory
south of the Danube. While the divisions of Essen-3 (8th
Division) and Miloradovich (11th Division) remained largely
intact, less some detachments, the remaining columns were composed of
assorted regiments and battalions. Platov’s column, for example, included
regiments from four different divisions. Therefore, while the army
was composed of six divisions and was divided into six main parts that
did not conform with the divisions. Moreover, the regiments were reorganized
into different columns than they had been in a few months previously.[v]
The organization of forces by Kamensky-2 for the storming of Rustchuk
(4 August) and the battle of Batin (7 September 1810) reveal the use
of the traditional wings and columns with regiments from all of the
divisions allocated to the columns without regard to the original divisional
structure. At Rustchuk, Kamensky-2 formed his troops into five columns.
The regiments in these columns were from seven different divisions and
the infantry columns (four of the five) were each comprised of regiment
from 3-5 different divisions. Moreover, the organization of the forces
changed between Rustchuk and Batin. None of the columns at Batin had
the same composition as the columns at Rustchuk. This clearly demonstrates
a reversion to traditional practice where formations were not established
for the duration of the campaign. However, it is interesting to note
that Kamensky’s general dispositions in October 1810 placed his forces
in winter quarters by their original divisions, demonstrating the use
of the divisions as an administrative structure even where the divisions
were broken up for operational purposes.[vi]
The reasons for the different practices in the northern armies and
in the Army of Moldavia during this period are not certain, but several
possible explanations can be suggested. First, the reorganization appears
to have been implemented first in the north (nearest the capital) and
to have then been put into effect in stages. This may have resulted
in some delay in implementing the structure formally in the Army of
Moldavia and, once the forces were on campaign they were not reorganized
into formal divisions. This explanation addresses the deviations from
the formally established structure in 1806-7, but fails to address the
deviations in 1809-12 after a period of almost complete inactivity in
1808. This also fails to explain the break-up of established divisions
sent from Poland to Moldavia in 1807-8.
A second possible explanation is that the commanders of the Army of
Moldavia were more persistent in clinging to the old ways than were
the generals in Poland and Finland. This certainly applies to Michelson
and his successor, Prozorovsky. While it seems clear that some old
dogs resisted the learning of new tricks, this hardly explains the continuation
of these deviations under Kamensky-2, a younger general fresh from the
wars in Poland and Finland.[vii]
A final possible explanation is the differences in operational needs
in fighting the Turks. This, on the surface, seems reasonable. However,
the similar practice of creating smaller ad hoc columns in Finland was
performed within the divisional framework, not in place of it. This
would seem to indicate that the deviation from the established divisional
structure did not have any specific tactical purpose beyond, perhaps,
distributing fresh regiments evenly among the columns. In all probability
the main reason for the deviations in the Army of Moldavia stems from
the distance of the Turkish frontier from the capital and the considerably
greater level of autonomy enjoyed by the commanders there.
Operations in the Caucasus against both the Turks and Persians also
demonstrate the continued use of ad hoc columns. This is perhaps more
understandable than other instances considering the broken terrain of
the region and the relatively small number of troops committed to a
large, difficult region with an unstable and often hostile population.
Nevertheless, the designation of two divisions to cover Georgia and
the Caucasus in February 1807 seems to imply allocation of specific
regiments to distinct regions. In practice, the divisional structure
seems to have been ignored for operational purposes from its inception
until 1811.
In 1807, FM Count Gudovich organized his forces into three bodies for
his campaign against the Turks. The largest column was composed of
9 battalions, 3 squadrons of dragoons, and 3 Cossack regiments. The
other columns included battalions and squadrons from several regiments.
While the full details of the regiments involved are not available,
the regiments known to have been included in these columns were from
both the 19th and 20th Divisions. General Tormasov,
who succeeded Gudovich in 1809, organized his forces along similar lines,
forming small columns composed of regiments from both the 19th
and 20th Divisions in both the 1809 and 1810 campaigns.
In the operations of both Gudovich and Tormasov it appears that the
regiments of the 20th Division, reinforced by additional
regiments of the 19th Division, engaged the Turks and their
allies while the remainder of the 19th Division defended
the Caucasus line.[viii]
In 1811, Tormasov received the command of a new army forming in Volhynia
to oppose the expected French invasion. Tsar Alexander then “divided
the troops in the Caucasus into two independent parts” when in fact
they had been formally divided into two parts since February 1807.
The forces assigned to Georgia under the command of GL Marquis Paulucci
included 2 grenadier regiments, 5 musketeer regiments, four jäger regiments,
one dragoon regiment, 3 heavy artillery companies and 2 light artillery
companies along with Cossacks and some garrison regiments. The remaining
forces under the command of GL Rtyschev were to cover the Caucasus line.[ix] This operational division of forces may represent
the first implementation of the divisional structure in the Caucasus,
as there is no mention of separate divisional commanders before this
time. Therefore it seems that formal divisional structure was imposed
on the forces in the Caucasus and Georgia through direct imperial intervention,
though not according to the formal organization that had been established
four years earlier.
4.2.3 FM Kamensky in Poland, December 1806
One additional example demonstrates the reversion to the traditional
organization of ad hoc columns. FM Kamensky, on assuming command of
the combined Russian armies in Poland for six days in December 1806,
had immediately issued orders to form columns for an offensive. When
Kamensky arrived and assumed command, the Russian army was deployed
to defend the line of the Narew and Ukra Rivers. Two divisions, the
2nd and 6th, covered the left and center of the
position while the Advance Guard (drawn primarily from 4th
Division) and 3rd Division covered the right. The jäger
regiments of these divisions, augmented by some musketeer regiments
from the 2nd and 4th Divisions and supported by
light cavalry and Cossacks, were deployed on the river line as a first
line of defense. In the second line stood the remainder of the forces
roughly a day’s march to the rear. The reserve, 4th Division,
stood another day’s march to the rear at Pultusk.[x]
Instead of concentrating the regiments of 3rd Division to
form one column and sending 4th Division forward to form
the second column, Kamensky divided 4th Division into three
detachments. The first detachment of two regiments was sent forward
to Nowemiasto, the second of one regiment and the heavy cavalry of 4th
Division, was sent to join the bulk of 3rd Division at Lopaczin
the next day. A third detachment of one regiment and some uhlans marched
on the third day to join the first detachment. This placed two regiments
of 3rd Division and four of 4th Division under
the command of GL Bennigsen in one column, while the other column consisted
of four regiments of 3rd Division and one of 4th
Division plus a large body of cavalry from both divisions. Further,
both GL Sacken, commander of 3rd Division, and GL Golytsin,
commander of 4th Division, were assigned to the right column.[xi]
Thus Kamensky’s deployment demonstrates the reversion to the traditional
practice, as it would have been equally effective – and in fact would
have required shorter marches – had he simply assigned the two divisions
to concentrate at the two selected points under their respective commanders.
Notes
[i] The commanders of this army were Michelson
(1806 to August 1807), Prozorovsky (September 1807 to August 1809),
Bagration (August 1809 to February 1810), Kamensky-2 (February 1810
to January 1811) and Kutusov (March 1811 until the end of the war
in 1812). See Mikhailovsky-Danielevsky, Russo-Turkish War
for a thorough description of the commanders and operations.
[ii] Nafziger, George. “Russian Army of
Turkey, Russo-Turkish War, 16 October 1806” and “Russian Army of Turkey,
Russo-Turkish War, Late December 1806.” Unpublished Orders of Battle.
[iii] Mikhailovsky-Danielevsky, Russo-Turkish
War, I, p. 82.
[iv] Ibid., I, pp. 96-99.
[vii] Kamensky-2 in particular first rose
to prominence in the war in Poland, assuming command of the 14th
Division after the death of GL Anrep and was therefore quite familiar
with the divisional organization.
[viii] See Mikhailovsky-Danielevsky’s Russo-Turkish
War of 1806-1812, Volume I: Chapters VII and XVI and Volume
II: Chapters IX and XIX for details on operations in the Caucasus.
[ix] Mikhailovsky-Danielevsky, Russo-Turkish
War, II, p. 136.
[x] Carl von Plotho, Tagebuch wahrend des Krieges Zwischen Russland und
Preussen einerseits, und Frankreich andrerseits, in den Jahren 1806
und 1807, Berlin, 1811, pp.14-16.
[xi] Bennigsen, I, pp. 81-87.
Placed on the Napoleon Series: December 2002
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