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Peter Bagration: The Best Georgian General of the Napoleonic WarsBy Alexander Mikaberidze, Chairman of the Napoleonic Society of Georgia "There are no good generals In Russia. The exception is Bagration." Napoleon, 1812. Chapter VII: The Retreat BeginsThe Retreat of the 2nd Western Army began on 17 June. The army moved in the direction of Zelva and Slonym, and were covered by two rear guards - horse and infantry: The Cavalry rear guard, consisted of the Akhtyrsk Hussars, Lithuanian Uhlans, and one Cossack Regiment with horse-artillery, was under the leadership of Bagration's aide-de-camp, General Vasylchykov. The formation of two rear guards was caused by necessity to ensure the rear of the retreating the 2nd Army was not attacked by the enemy army. To supply the army with the food during the march, every regiment choose a group of soldiers led by an officer. These groups, went ahead of the columns, and requisitioned food from the local farmers. Bagration insisted that the requisition of the food must take place without using violence against the inhabitants. The 2nd Western Army had to accomplish a difficult task. They had to march 250 miles to the safety of Minsk, while the enemy who occupied Vilna on 16 June were only in 160 miles from Minsk. Bagration was confident that the army could do it. "I calculated marches in the way, that on June 23 my headquarters should be in Minsk, the advance guard further, and other units already near Sventsyan" -wrote Bagration to A.P. Ermolov. A Change of OrdersBut the well-organized retreat of the 2nd Western Army was broken by the Czar's intervention. At 2:00 p.m. on 18 June in Zelva the aide-de-camp of Czar, Colonel Benkerdorf handed to Bagration Alexander's orders, directing him to change his line of retreat. Bagration was ordered to march the army along the Shara River and to link up with the 1st Western Army near Novogrudok or Belitsy in a general direction on Vileyko. Thus, the 2nd Western Army would have to make a difficult and dangerous flank march near the main enemy forces which were already in Vilna. This was dangerous, because the 2nd Army had to make 10 marches at a distance of only 4-5 marches from the enemy. The Russians would be forced to move in remote, marshy territory and to cross the Niemen River. All this inevitably could result in a delay and the army would be under the threat of attack from not only from the front by the enemy's main forces, but from the rear by the forces of Jerome Bonaparte. Obliged to obey the order of Czar, Bagration had to decide which route to take. First of all he had to choose one of two specified in Czar's order directions. The way on Bileyko through Belitsy was shorter and convenient but it passed too close to Vilna, and consequently, was also more dangerous. Bagration has selected the second way - through Novogrudok. Though this way also passed remote and marshy territory, and was over bad roads, but it was far from Vilna and reduced the probability of meeting the enemy. Besides by moving through Novogrudok, which was closer to Minsk, it was easier to link up with the 27th Infantry Division, that was at Minsk. Bagration issued following orders: To the 27th Infantry Division: concentrate in Novogrudok and to expect arrival there of the main forces of the 2nd Western Army; The order was given that very day. The Army would retreat in two columns, each about a day's march from the other and both covered by the Cavalry and infantry rear guards. Special attention was paid to the necessity of informing everyone the objective of the retreat, including the soldiers. Moving in a new direction, the 2nd Western Army concentrated at Slonym by June 19. On the next day it made a 40 kilometer forced march and reached Dvorets. In an effort to speed up the march, all excess baggage was abandoned. All transports, not stipulated by the staff, was directed from Dvorets to Stvolytchy and Nesvij to following on to Minsk or Bobruisk. On June 21, the 2nd Western Army continued its movement and, having made again the forced march for 40 kilometers, has arrived in area Novogrudok. Its advanced units have reached Delyatichy on the Niemen, crossed the river,and entered Nikolaev and Ivye, sending some units further north. In Novogrudok, the 27th Infantry Division joined the army. The movement of the 2nd Western Army from Volkovysk to Novogrudok was accomplished with extreme speed. Starting on June 17 from Volkovysk, the army had reached the Niemen in five marches, marching 150 kilometers in 5 days. The average rate of a march per day was about 30 kilometers, but in the last two days the army covered 40 kilometers per day. At Nikolaev and Koledzan erection of bridges began. In the meantime to the north of Nikolaev, the situation deteriorating. On June 16, the French occupied Vilna. The Russian 1st Western Army, refusing battle, retreated in the direction of Sventsyan and Dryss. Napoleon's calculation of defeating the Russian armies near Vilna had failed. Realizing it was impossible to crush the 1st Western Army at the frontier, Napoleon decided to concentrate all his efforts against the 2nd Western Army. To discover the direction of retreat of the 2nd Western Army, Napoleon pushed out on the major roads departing from Vilna to the south and a southeast, strong advance guard. On June 17 one of these advance guards, moving to the south from Vilna, found at Bolshye Solechniky Russian forces under Major General Dorokhov. This group was the advance guard of the 4th Infantry Division of the 1st Western Army and was moving from Oran in a northeast direction to unite with the main force. On the same day, the other advance guard of the French army that was covering the southeast from Vilna, received information on the deployment of the Russian forces in the vicinity of Oshmjany. These forces were part of the flank guard of the 3rd Cavalry Corp of the 1st Western Army pulling back to Olshan and Smorgon. On June 18, at Bolshye Solechniky there was a fight, in which the Russians have repulsed the French advance guard. However, having received information that enemy forces were located to the north, Dorokhov was forced to direct his group to Olshan. He hoped to join the main forces of the 4th Infantry corps. Simultaneously, near Oshmian, a battle between the French advance guard and the flank guard of the 3rd Cavalry Corps took place. Russians defeated all the assaults of the superior enemy forces, and thus ensured the retreat to Smorgon by the main forces. They went back to Oshmian following the main forces of the corps on the night of 19 June. Having received reports concerning the appearance of the Russian forces at Lidu and Oshmian and of the battles that had been fought at Bolshye Solechniky and Oshmian, Napoleon assumed that these forces were the part of the 2nd Western Army and that it was moving from Grodno to the northeast, to join the 1st Western Army. Based on this incorrect assessment of the situation, Napoleon decided to make a decisive assault on the army of Bagration and destroy it. Napoleon ordered a force led by one of the most talented military commander of the French Army, Marshal Louis Davout to attack. This force was composed of 2 infantry and 1 curaisser divisions and 4 brigades of light Cavalry; totaling 33,864 men. Davout's forces began the offensive on 19 June. This operation led to the Russian forces deployed to the south and southeast of Vilna being cut off from their line of retreat, which would have allowed them to join the 1st Western Army in a short period of time. This effected the Cossacks of Platov's and Dorokhov's Corps. Dorokhov' retreated from the Bolshie Colechniki to Olshan, and being informed about the marchg of the enemy forces to the Oshmian, gave up of the idea of joining the 1st Western Army . He moved to join the 2nd Western Army by the road to Bishnev-Volojin on the night of 20 June. Platov's Cossacks, having left Grodno on June 16, retreated to the east and by 21 June reached a location just north of Nikolaev. At the same time these events were occurring, the 2nd Western Army was preparing to cross over the Niemen. According to the Bagration's order, the army was to concentrate on the left bank of the river by 10:00 p.m. on 22 June and to be ready to cross the river. With the purpose of the further clearing armies of excessive transports, the soldiers were authorized to take only the most necessary vehicles (those for the wounded, artillery, and food) and even these were strictly limited. Generals could have only one carriage and the divisions and corps commanders could have one vehicle for its staff. All other transport, including the private vehicles belonging to officers, were concentrated at Korelichi, where they were divided into two groups: one to cross the Niemen at Koledzani, with a view of sending them further to Ivenec, Rakov and Minks, while the other would go direct to Mir and, Minsk. After the crossing, a rest for armies of the 2nd Western Army was necessary, and with the approach of darkness army was divided into two columns. The first column, under the command of Lieutenant General Raevsky (commander of the 7th Infantry corps) had 28 battalions, 8 squadrons, 72 foot artillery and 24 horse artillery cannons, and sappers were ordered to move from Nikolaev on Vishnev. For each column, special advance guards were formed. The advance guard of the first column consisted of the Novorossisk and Chernigov Dragoon Regiments, while the advance guard of the second column was formed by the Akhtir Hussars and one cossack Regiments. The rear guard was composed of the Vasil'chikov's Cavalry Corps reinforced by the Narva Infantry and 6th Jager Regiments. General Bagration was prepared to change his decision to split the army into two columns and on two roads. If necessary he would keep the army in one column and through Bakshti to Volojin. More ChangesOn the morning of June 22, the 2nd Western Army began to cross the Niemen at Nikolaev. By the end of the day only part of the second column had cross. The other column would cross the next morning. On the evening of June 22, Bagration and his staff arrived at Nikolaev. Here he received the report from Dorokhov (from Volojin) with the message, that his group which has been cut off from 1st Western Army and pursued by the enemy and that he was moving to join forces with the 2nd Western Army. Dorokhov asked for instructions from Bagration. Also, an official report from Platov arrived, informing him of the skirmishes between the Cossacks and the enemy in the evening of June 21 and on the morning of June 22 to the south of Vishnev. He also told Bagration of a large enemy force in the vicinity of Vishnev. From these reports, Bagration correctly concluded that the enemy was advancing on the 2nd Western Army. His only viable option was to stop the extremely dangerous flank march, and try to cut his way through the enemy to safety. But General Bagration decided not to take this course, but to continue his mission. He asked Platov to hold down the enemy in area of Vishnev and be ready to strike together with the 2nd Western Army in the rear of the enemy, to destroy it, and to provide an opportunity to join with the 1st Western Army. Bagration ordered Dorokhov to remain as long as possible Volojin and only as a last resort to retreat to Kaidanov. Simultaneously with these orders, General Bagration made some changes to the marching order of the 2nd Western Army. Late at night on June 22, Bagration issued the following orders: The army would concentrate at Bakshti on June 23 in readiness to begin movement in one column to Volojin. Bagration understood well the difficulties his army would face. Later in the official report he wrote to Czar Alexander: "The reconnaissance of the roads leading from Nikolaev to Vishnev and Volojin through woods and bogs, made it rather difficult for the army to maintain a fast course; and the high level of water in the Niemen due to a heavy rain, has complicated its crossing ... represented me already a great difficulty to march through territory already occupied by the enemy" On the night for June 23, General Bagration received disturbing news about the approach of the right wing of the French armies. They were moving to Slonim from Volkovysk, and also to Lipshniki via Grodno. These events forced him to make further changes. If the French right wing had remained idle, the 2nd Western Army might have marched to Vileyko, without a threat to its rear. With the enemy moving, the rear of the 2nd Western Army was in danger. Bagration understood, that even if the 2nd Western Army managed to crush the French forces under Davout and to unite with the 1st Western Army, it would be at the expense of heavy casualties and most his transports. His force would be so weakened, that even with the unification of the two armies, it would not give them a greater advantage. Furthermore, in the event of failure to destroy Davout, it would be caught between Davout and the advancing French right wing. All these circumstances forced Bagration to abandon the plan of retreat for the 2nd Western Army as ordered by the Czar. Bagration decided to retreat to the Nesvij, and from there to go either to Minsk or to Bobruisk Borisov, in an effort to unite with the 1st Western Army. "This decision is regrettable, - wrote Bagration from Nikolaev to Platov "but it as much is necessary". On the morning of June 23, Bagration ordered the crossing of the Niemen to stop and for the 2nd Western Army to start moving towards direction Delatichi, Negnevichi, and Korelichi. The army would march in the following order:
At the head of army was the advance guard, consisting of the Narva Infantry, 5th Jager, Akhtir Hussar, Lithuanian Uhlan, and the Kiev Dragoon Regiments,horse artillery, and three cossack regiments. The advance guard had 4 infantry battalions, 20 squadrons, 12 horse artillery guns, and 3 cossack regiments. General Vasil'chikov commanded. Having made the decision to retreat from Nikolaev and move in a new direction, Bagration informed Platov about it. He asked him, even though he was not formally assigned to him "by detaining the enemy to not submit even the slightest bits of information about our retreat." The Cossacks must stay put on 23 and June 24, and might during the night of June 25 withdraw to Nikolaev. "After that," - wrote Bagration - "...We shall search together means to unite with the 1st Army. It is the only way which gives us time to concentrate and to not lose much." Waiting for an answer from Platov, Bagration remained in Nikolaev till 4:00 p.m. on 23 June. Not having receiveda reply, he sent Platov a second letter in which, again having confirmed the offer stated in the previous letter, asked Platov to inform him of his decision. "If I remain here till now, it is only to wait to hear what you will do." At the same time Bagration specified, that the ferries built by his army at Nikolaev and Koledzani, would not be destroyed and would be guarded by a small force until midday of June 24. Then they would be destroyed. General Bagration also sent orders to Dorokhov to retreat to Stolbtsi and unite with the 2nd Western Army at Novy Swerjen. On the evening of June 23, the 2nd Western Army reached Korelichi. Knowing that he had to get to Minsk before the French, Bagration issued new orders to accelerate the march in Korelichi the special order. He demanded the commanders of divisions, corps, and regiments to use every means possible to keep the army together and to not exhaust the troops, however the pace had to be picked up. The army kept the same marching order with the advance guard in the lead departing at 7:00, followed by the 7th Infantry Corps - at 8:00 the 8th Infantry Corps left; and at 9:00 the rear guard or one hour after the departure of the 8th Corps. Bagration gave the following instructions for regulating the march: after covering 5 miles from the place of lodging for the night, the troops could rest for 1 hour, after 10 miles - for 2 hours, after 15 miles - for 3 hours and etc. On halts it was ordered that the soldiers did not have to rise before anybody, except for Czar if at last he joined to army. The signal "Field-Marshal" was cancelled. (The signal of "Field-Marshal" - a drumbeat on which for half an hour or hour prior to the beginning of a campaign the army rose from a camp and prepared to marched.)
According to the order the 2nd Western Army would move towards Mir on the morning of June 24, and bivouac there that night. Bagration remained in Korelichi until 8:00 p.m., waiting for news from Platov and Dorokhov. Soon word from Platov was received, in which he stated that according to instructions of Bagration, he would move his corps on 24 June from Baksht to Nikolaev and on the night of June 25, would cross the Niemen. Platov also stated that he was sending a force under Captain Tarasov to take over the ferry across the Nieman. General Bagration was particularly interested in a message from Major General Dorokhov (which was sent with Platov's report) about the retreat of the enemy from Volojin. Having received this news, Bagration made the assumption, that Davout, being sure that the 2nd Western Army would cross the river at Nikolaev, had decided to concentrate all his forces at Vishnev in order to prevent their movement north. Based on this assumption, Bagration concluded that he had the opportunity to link up with the 1st Western Army by moving towards Novy Swerjen, Maidanov Minsk.
General Platov's MovementsOn June 24, Bagration asked Platov to let him borrow Volojin's force, together with Major General Dorokhov's, and to use these forces to draw the enemy's attention away from Volojin. Bagration advised Platov to send from Nikolaev and Baksht a strong forces to Vishnev and to trick the French into thinking the main army was approaching. Bagration notified Platov, that his position at Vishnev would be maintained by three dragoon regiments under the command of Major General Siversa. In the meantime, the main forces of the 2nd Western Army, would be moving by forced marches towards Novy Swerjen and on June 25 would be in Kaidanov -- about 40 miles from Minsk. In the instruction it was emphasized, that the successful movement of the 2nd Western Army to Maidanov depended on the feint at Volojin by the Cossacks and Dorokhov's group. Once the main army reached Kajdanov, Bagration would detach two Cossack regiments to support him. However this plan was not carried out. Owing to almost complete absence of roads, Platov's Corps could not move to Volojin. A reconnaissance of the area by the cossacks determined the location of the enemy infantry. Platov decided, having already directed a force of five hundred soldiers of the Ataman Regiment under the command of Major General Kutejnikov to assist Dorokhov, to allocate other forces of the Corps to the diversion at Nikolaev. From there they would move towards Stolbtsi and Kaylanov, that is in the same direction as the 2nd Western Army. The decision of Platov disturbed Bagration, but he proceeded with his plan to get to Minsk before the enemy. On June 24 Bagration directed to Platov a new letter with a request to move his Corps across the Niemen in area of Koledzany, unit with Dorokhov, and then follow on to Ivenets, Rakov and Radoshkevichio. In this case, specified Bagration, the cossacks screening all roads to Minsk from the enemy, would render essential assistance to the 2nd Western Army. After moving from Karelichy, Bagration wrote Platov one more letter in which has again repeated the request. He wrote: "I kindly request you to provide ways to Mr. Dorokhov to unite with you and that you, having complied with my offer, followed the path suggested to your excellency, screening the roads to Minsk from the enemy. If you, make favorable marches and screen the rear of the of the 2nd Army to Minsk, it will perhaps be easy to cut off enemy forces on road to Minsk... ". However Platov's attempt to follow the directives specified by Bagration were not successful. By the night of June 24, the Cossacks had beaten back several attempts of the enemy to move from Vishnev to Bakshta and to Nikolaev. On the night of June 25, the Corps crossed the Niemen at Nikolaev, destroyed the bridge and ferries, and moved on to Deliatichi, Lubchu, and Koledzan, intending to recross the Niemen there. With the retreat of the 2nd Western Army from Nikolaev, Napoleon's plan to surround and destroy it by double blows from the two French forces under Marshal Davout and Prince Jerome failed. Its failure was due to General Bagration's success in determining the enemy's intentions and to avoid their attacks.
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