The Retreat Continues

Peter Bagration: The Best Georgian General of the Napoleonic Wars

By Alexander Mikaberidze, Chairman of the Napoleonic Society of Georgia

Chapter IX: Eluding French Envelopments

The 2nd Western Army began its march from Bobruisk on June 28. The main forces of the army moved on two echelons: in the first echelon, the 8th Infantry Corps, in the second, the 7th Infantry Corps. The first echelon moved off from Nesvij at 6:00 pm on June 28, and the second in the morning of June 29.

Marching in this order, the main forces of the 2nd Western Army arrived in Tymkovichy on the evening of June 29, where Bagration received the Czar's new instructions through imperial aide-de-camp Volkonsky. Alexander I wrote to Bagration criticizing the movement of 2nd Western Army to Bobruisk as extremely damaging to the Russian position and insisting on the necessity of moving on Minsk. The Czar pointedly remarked, "I do hope, that after reception of my commands ... you shall again redirect the army to its former destination…."

Unfortunately, the context of Alexander's instructions corresponded not at all to existing conditions. Bagration therefore did not change the movement of the army, which had already been set in motion. He replied to the Czar, explaining in detail the serious position in which the 2nd Western Army found itself. Bagration then informed Alexander that the army would continue movement to Bobruisk, which only the extremity of its situation compelled it to do.

Bagration's army continued its march, and on June 30 it reached Romanov and on July 1, Slutsk. The army's progress was reliably covered by the rear guard, which was still composed of Platov's corps, strengthened by Vasilchykov's command. When the enemy advance elements began to contact his rear guard, Bagration took the additional measure of reinforcing Platov with the Vorontsov's Grenadier Division.

During June 29, Platov's rear guard covered the army's departure by deploying south of Mir in readiness to repulse any new approach by the French. That evening, having carried out its task, Platov began a withdrawal in the wake of the main army. Early on June 30, the Cossack commander instructed the Grenadier Division to move via Timkovichy and then to follow on to Romanov. The division was to be at all times mid-way between the main army and Cossack rearguard. Aide-de-camp General Vasilchykov was ordered to follow the Grenadier division, in a position between it and the Cossacks. By June 30, the rearguard had arrived in Nesvij.

On the night of July 1, Platov with ten Cossack regiments, the Lithuanian Uhlan Regiment, and the Don horse artillery, departed Nesvij and followed Vasilchikov. The withdrawal of all these forces was covered by a specially allocated rear guard of two Cossack Regiments under the command of Major-General Karpov.

While the 2nd Western Army marched from Nesvij on the Bobruisk road, the French command prepared a new offensive against it, deciding to undertake in a second attempt to surround and destroy Bagration. To this end, Davout's Corps, which had reached Minsk about midday on June 26, was divided into two groups. One group under Davout's personal leadership, was ordered to advance southeast, leaving open the area of Bobruisk as a way of retreat of 2nd Western Army and, together with the Corps of Jerome Bonaparte to threaten Bagration with a double blow. In this group there were 29 battalions and 34 squadrons numbering 21,000 men.

The other group, under command of Grouchy (7 battalions and 27 squadrons, about 9,000 troops) was ordered to move northeast to seize Borisov and thereby cut off that possible escape route of the 2nd Western Army, in a case Bagration managed to avoid contact with Davout and to pass along Berezina or Dnepr to the north in order to unite with the 1st Western Army.

General Emmanuel Grouchy

Napoleon warned Davout by a special letter of just such a possibility. "It is seemed to me obvious," Napoleon wrote, "that Bagration first of all should make an attempt to move up the left bank of the Berezina. As soon as he finds out that you have occupied Borisov and are moving in this direction, he will try to move up the right bank of the Dnepr and when, at last, be is convinced that it is equally impossible, he will probably proceed via the Dnepr to Smolensk." The avant gardes of both forces moved on the specified routes immediately after the occupation of Minsk, and within a few days the main forces were set in motion also.

Along the direction of Grouchy's approach there was actually not a Russian army at all. The only barrier for the French was the fortress of Borisov, the defense of which was badly organized. Construction to strengthen the defenses was yet unfinished as French forces approached. The garrison of city consisted of two units of sappers, two spare, under-strength battalions of Jagers, and Cossacks. The aggregate number of garrison was only 400 men, under the command of Colonel Gresser. There was no field artillery in Borisov at all and only 16 iron siege cannons.

Having received information that the enemy was approaching Borisov, Colonel Gresser decided, in view of the obvious insufficiency of his garrison, to evacuate Borisov, having first destroyed in all foodstuffs, weapons, and ammunition, and to retire through Mogilyov and Bobruisk to rendezvous with the 2nd Western Army.

On the orders of Colonel Gresser, the Russians burnt 1960 quintals of flour, 183 quintals of oats, 2345 quintals straw, and 19,500 pounds of hay. Moreover, 100 pounds of gunpowder were poured into the Berezina and 16 cannons were destroyed or damaged. The garrison of city burnt the bridge over the Berezina and at 10 o'clock in the morning on June 30, Gresser's command marched out on the road to Mogilyov. Later that very same day, advanced elements of Grouchy's forces entered the city.

At the same time Grouchy reached Borisov, Davout approached Bobruisk from Minsk. By July 1, the advance guardof this thrust reached Jegumen, and its reconnaissance elements appeared at Svyloch, 40 miles from Bobruisk. The arrival of the enemy in the immediate proximity of Bobruisk again created menacing conditions for the 2nd Western Army, placing Bagration again between two fires - Davout's Corps to the front and Jerome's Corps to the rear.

The Russian commander only learned about these events on July 1, when the main forces of the 2nd Western Army had reached Slutsk. Having considered his situation, Bagration decided to force-march his army to Bobruisk, to anticipate the enemy's closure of this route from the closing net. With a view to accelerating the army's movement and to maintaining freedom of maneuver, it was decided to dispense with all extra transports. According to Bagration's order, all vehicles, except for food and an infirmary wagons, were directed to Petrikov, thereafter to pass on through Pripyat, and to concentrate in Mozyr, arriving under the protection of the reserve corps. To cover the transports during their movement to Mozyr, a special force under command of Vice-Colonel Klenovsky was allocated to it, consisting of a Grenadier battalion, the Slutsk garrison command, and some Cossacks.

Of great interest is Bagration's organization of the army's march. The marching order was designed to force an exit past Davout's blocking position and, simultaneously, to beat off attacks by Jerome from rear. The 7th Infantry Corp with the 27th Infantry Division, the Novorossyisk and Chernigov Dragoon and the Izymsk Hussar Regiments, with most of the Cossacks, made up the first echelon, with the task of repulsing any enemy attacks while moving on Bobruisk. The 8th Infantry Corps, with the rear guard of Platov and the Grenadier Division, composed the second echelon and was ordered to resist to Jerome Bonaparte's corps. Meanwhile the army's remaining transports moved between 7th and 8th Infantry Corps, covered by them both from attacks by Davout or Jerome.

To successfully execute Bagration's plan, it was necessary that the transports have time to proceed on the road to Petrikov a safe and sufficient distance. Furthermore, it was necessary that the first echelon march sufficiently far along its route to permit space for the movement of the transports that remained with the army, and finally for the other forces of the 2nd Western Army.

In this situation the important role fell to Platov's rear guard which was tasked with delaying the enemy long enough to gain at least a day's march for the main forces of army. Bagration ordered arrangements for the withdrawal of the rear guard with a view to minimizing pressure on his army. "If they will leave us in peace for two or three marches," Bagration wrote to Platov, "then I hope we shall make well of the business."

Bagration had intended to start his march from Slutsk to Bobruisk on July 2. However, owing to a delay of the transports' departure to Mozyr, the commencement of the march was postponed for an entire day. This situation rendered yet more important the role of Platov's rear guard in delaying the approach of the enemy by all means at its disposal so as to provide the main forces of the 2nd Western Army an unhindered march from Slutsk, and the transports on road to Mozyr enough time to reach a safe distance.

In connection with changing circumstances, Bagration sent further orders to Platov, instructing him to place the forces entrusted to him in Romanov and to use all means to retard the enemy's advance through the night of July 3. Then, on the night of July 4, Platov was to move via Slutsk and to halt on the road to Glusk (at a fork to Petrikov), and to remain there throughout the day.

In accordance with Bagration's instructions, Platov settled the rear guard at Romanov with the following dispositions. The 5th Jager Regiment was put in Romanov itself. The Don horse-artillery, divided into two batteries of 6 cannons in each, occupied advantageous ground on the Wusvo River (northeast of Romanov). Platov arranged his main forces on the right bank of the Wusva: on right flank, in bushy thickets, two Cossack regiments under command Ilovayskyt; in the centre, Karpov's command; on the left flank, in brush to the east of Savkovo, Kuteynikov's brigade. Cossacks were also deployed ahead of the main forces. The reserves also took up their allotted posts: the Ataman regiment, for the centre and Vasilchikov's command, east of Romanov.

Platov intended to defeat the enemy advance guard and to throw them back from Romanov. In case of approach by superior French forces, he intended to deploy his troops at the river and, having destroyed bridges, to defend this position until nightfall, as ordered.

On the morning of July 3, the advance guard of the French army's right wing went over to the offensive against Romanov. The 1st Chasseur à Cheval Regiment, being one of the best French cavalry regiments, moved in the lead. At the approach of the enemy, the Cossacks, refused to engage and began to retire. Pursuing them, the enemy approached Romanov, where it met Karpov's forces, as the latter mounted a riposte.

Persuaded of the numerical superiority of Russian forces, the French regimental commander was preparing to fall back when he received fresh orders categorically instructing him to attack Platov. Required to sustain his offensive action, the French reorganized and the 3rd and 4th squadrons were advanced. In the meantime, Platov, having realized the enemy's weakness, mounted a sudden and powerful counter-attack.

Karpov's command struck the enemy from the front, and Ilovaysky's Regiment together with Kuteynikov's brigade hit them from the flanks. French resistance collapsed and the cavalry were put to flight, with the Cossacks in vigorous pursuit.

The 1st Chasseurs were completely defeated. The Polish general, Kolachkovsky, a participant, remarked in his notes that it was escape was possible only for those with a good horse. "This brilliant regiment," observed Kolachkovsky, "totaling about 700 cavalrymen, has lost half of numbers and might not recover at all during this campaign."

When the chief of the right wing's advance guard, Latour-Maubourg, received the report on this defeat, he quickly set out for Romanov with all of his light cavalry. Platov's troops halted their pursuit and moved to the left bank of the Wusva, and there settled down in two groups to the north and south of Romanov. The bridges over the river were burnt.

Arriving at the river, the French advanced a battery and engaged the Russians across the river with a heavy fire, which was warmly returned. The Russians divided their fire effectively: six cannons of the Don artillery engaged in counter-battery fire while the other six targeted the enemy cavalry. The French suffered uncomfortable losses and were compelled to withdraw.

The Russians stood throughout the rest of the day at Romanov. Toward evening, Platov received instructions from Bagration: to leave a mounted rear guard in Romanov, and to move his other forces to Glutsk, reaching there by the morning of July 5. In obedience, Platov made preparations overnight and began moving on road Slutsk on July 4.

The 2nd Western Army's march from Slutsk to Bobruisk was made in very difficult conditions: a sandy road which traversed a continuous marshland, summer heat and wood fires, few and underpopulated villages, lack of drinking water - all this made for a debilitating passage. Nevertheless, Bagration's forces successfully overcame the difficulties of the march. On July 5, the first echelon of army arrived at Bobruisk, and on July 6, the balance of his army concentrated there.

As a result of skillful organization and rapid accomplishment of the march, the 2nd Western Army eluded French forces on the way to Bobruisk, and thus another French plan to cut off the withdrawal of the 2nd Western Army and to destroy it by envelopment again failed.

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