Research Subjects: Government & Politics

From “Alliance Balance” to “Coalition Equilibrium”: Austria’s Transformation of the last Coalition against Napoleon

By: Franz-Stefan Gady

Abstract:

Why did Austria join the last coalition against Napoleon when it did in August 1813? This paper will attempt to provide a systemic explanation to that question arguing that a major paradigm shift occurred in alliance formation and subsequently, in the whole of international politics channelled by the Austrian Empire. Austria in 1813, ended up in a crucial role transforming the last coalition against Napoleon from a traditional 18th century “alliance balance” to a 19th century “coalition equilibrium”.  The reason for that was that Austria with the emergence of Napoleon, and its own relative decline in power, could no longer play the 18th century European balance of power game. It also could not live under Napoleonic hegemony due its archaic state structure threatened by revolutionary France.  The prevailing ancient European alliance balance inhibited the European states to balance Napoleon. Austria, from a position of strength, was able to enforce a new “coalition equilibrium” and keep it intact as long as it dominated the coalition. With the decline of Austrian power and the French threat the coalition dispensed.

About the Author: Franz-Stefan Gady is an analyst at the East West Institute. He has previously worked as an adjunct research assistance at the Institute for National Strategies Studies of the National Defense University in Washington DC, working on regional security issues. He was also an analyst for the Project on National Security Reform, a congressionally funded non-profit organization founded to reform the national security structure of the United States. He holds an M.A. in Strategic Studies/International Economics from SAIS, Johns Hopkins University and has served in the Austrian Army and the Austrian Foreign Ministry working on various security issues. He can be contacted under fgady@ewi.info.

Introduction

Why did Austria join the last coalition against Napoleon when it did in August 1813?

This paper will attempt to provide a systemic explanation to that question arguing that a major paradigm shift occurred in alliance formation and subsequently, in the whole of international politics channelled by the Austrian Empire. Austria in 1813 ended up in a crucial role transforming the last coalition against Napoleon from, what Edward Vose Gulick has coined, traditional 18th century an “alliance balance” to a “coalition equilibrium”[1] It was the first country in Europe to recognise the futility of the old system of alliance balances to deal with Napoleon and initiated a coalition equilibrium which eventually would lead to the French Emperor’s first abdication.

It is no coincident that this “metanoia, a turning around of the mind”, as Paul Schroeder called it occurred in Austria.[2] The reason for this change of pattern was Austria’s particular systemic role in Europe and the impossibility of reconciling the old 18th century “balance of power” equilibrium and “alliance balance” with Austria’s very existence.

The paper is structured into three main sections: a theory section dealing with the definition of the two systems of alignment and summarising the critics of this approach, a systemic overview of Europe and Austria embedded in the “balance of power” paradigm before and during the Napoleonic Period and lastly, a chronological history of the formation of the “coalition equilibrium.”

The systemic overviews and theoretical discussions should illustrate the main theme running through this paper that Austria faced two hostile systems: the 18th century balance of power paradigm as well as the Napoleonic Hegemonic Empire. The latter only accelerated the process started by the former by which Austria in the end would be deprived of its Great Power status. Consequently, a radical new form of approaching international politics was needed. In terms of coalition forming, this meant a switch from the primarily power-based “alliance balance” to the “coalition equilibrium,” which was to be the nucleus of a new European order.

Theory

The “Alliance Balance”

Edward Vose Gulick coined the term “alliance balance” to name the most persisting form of equilibrium strategy in systems operating under the balance of power paradigm. The basic premise of the “alliance balance” is to organise the “state system so skilfully that every weight in the political mass would find somewhere a counterweight.”[3][4] This “system of counterweights” was the key ingredient to keeping the European state system more or less intact in the 18th century. Each state, acting in its own selfish interest akin to Adam Smith idea of the self regulating capitalist market equilibrium, would balance each other out through the formation and counter-formation of alliances. Gulick points out that the literature of the period precisely accepts this system of “counterweights” and the overall balance of power paradigm.[5]

As James Sofka  emphasises, this system is more or less based on Newtonian ideas that assume that the international system,“ evolves through cycles of peace and war, much as a swinging pendulum moved between fixed poles without ceasing its motion and operates on the idea international politics operated according to quantifiable principles.”[6] Territories, armies, and financial reserves could be calculated and the exact power of a state derived from them. Ideally, the system of “counterweights” would work best if relative parity would be achieved with the opponent. In such a system, “each state aggressively pursued its own interests with little regard for others beyond simple prudence. No systemic principles of order existed in this Hobbesian universe of state relations…”[7]The major weaknesses of this system are its selfish uncooperative character as well as its sole reliance on raw power (i.e. military). States allied and counter-allied against various perceived threats undermining each others capabilities to the point where a stronger power could take advantage of it. Napoleon demonstrated this skilfully with Russia and Austria in 1804, and Prussia in 1806. Still the system would persist unless one major player decided to abandon it and take a radical new course.

The “Coalition Equilibrium”

Gulick defines the coalition as being an agreement similar to the alliance signed by four or more powers or a number of alliances directed towards the same end.[8] The first difference, albeit a superficial one, is size. Second and by far the most crucial difference in comparison to the “alliance balance” is the “breaking of party lines”.[9] Gulick argues, “Countries which may normally be allied to the aggressor nation join the opposition in order to thrust down an attempt toward preponderance.”[10] . Thus, the greatest achievement of a “coalition equilibrium” is the breaking down of inhibiting alignments, abandonment of the classical system of counterweights and full focus on the defeat of the hegemonic power. The logical implication of this, although not mentioned by Gulick, is the acceptance of a temporary imbalance of power and a trust that if old enemies decide to join a common cause, then neither of the two will try to exploit that situation. The “coalition equilibrium” requires the powers to accept “self limitation” in their pursuit of raison d’etat. In other words, they needed a conscious abandonment of selfish power aggregation for the sake of unity or other high political principles detached from pure power considerations. Essentially this was the teaching of Niklas Vogt, a German legal scholar, whose study “Das System des Gleichgewichts” (The System of Equilibrium) proposes the creation of a “continental equilibrium” as well as some legal and rational regulation of the European state system “as the highest ethical goals of politics” in the words of Sofka.[11] Gulick carefully points out, however, that the coalition equilibrium can only get its opportunity for development in a great international crisis when the existing system itself is in danger of overthrow.

It is also important in a shift from “alliance balance” to “coalition equilibrium”, like in all a structural changes in a system, to have a strong leader initiating this change. It is a pre-condition as Kegley and Ramond state, “The struggle over rules is prejudiced by the selection to leader ship of a successor which can be expected to press for new rules of alliance designed to cement the new international order.”[12] As we will see in the case of Austria, this leader’s preferences will be, “for rules conducive to an environment where the alliance leader is safe, secure and indeed a leader.”[13]

Gulick, although outlining the general advantages and applicability of a “coalition equilibrium’, neglects to analyse the structure of and evolvement of such a grand alignment. Consequently, the author of this paper proposes three conditions based on the case study below for the evolvement and structure of an equilibrium coalition: First, a successful coalition has to be hierarchical structured with one nominal leader rather than equal partners. Second, the leader as well as the other participants must have clear cut military objectives agreed in consensus during the conflict. Third, a post conflict scenario has to be present at the ceasing of hostilities encompassing the interests of all participants of the coalition in order to prevent a recession into old “alliance balance” behaviour.

Critics of the Systemic Paradigm Shift

Did this paradigm shift really occur? Did Great Powers ever voluntarily abandon the “balance of power” paradigm? A vast amount of literature has been published on this subject.[14] Scholars such as Bruce Conin in his book Community under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation or Robert A. Kann in his article “Metternich: A Reappraisal of his Impact on International Relations” support the thesis of a paradigm shift.[15] Additional support can be found in Charles W. Kegley’s and Gregory A. Raymond’s study on the transformation of alliance norms in the wake of global war or “systemic transforming wars” as they call it. Although not specifically dealing with “balance of power” they nevertheless embrace the thesis that at the end of a “systemic transforming war”, as were the Napoleonic wars, a major shift in alliance norms usually occurs.  Michael Sheehan concurs, “During the revolutionary period the classical eighteenth century balance of power was overthrown. It was the change from one system to the other.”[16] Paul W. Schroeder is probably the strongest supporter of this paradigm shift as can be seen in the amount of publications he dedicated to that subject.[17]

Critics such as Enno E. Kraehe on the other hand argue that no paradigm shift occurred and that post-Napoleonic order did rest on a “balance of power paradigm”. Charles Webster supports this assertion by stating that the principle of law, i.e. legitimacy, “…cannot be said was followed with any consistency” and that it “is not strange that the principle of balance of power should have appealed with great force.”[18] Douglas Dakin concedes that the Vienna system rested on “some sort of balance of power,” but fails to elaborate.[19] He attributed the success of the last coalition and the Congress of Vienna to the general war weariness in Europe rather than political equilibrium.[20]

Consequently,  the general argument  put forward by Webster and Kraehe emphasises that the system which followed the defeat of Napoleon was a pure return to 18th century balance of power considerations and therefore, to “alliance balance” for the simple fact that the rule of law never superseded the pure struggle for power. As a result, the coalition equilibrium and subsequently the political equilibrium initiated by Prince Clemens Metternich, the figure most identified with this supposed paradigm shift, was nothing more than a disguise of selfish power considerations by the individual Great Powers such as Austria. 

Sofka points out that these divergent views are primarily the product of dealing with the two systems as two complete different entities, rather than seeing how they supplement each other. He states: “It is most accurate to speak of the “balance of power” as an aspect of Metternich’s diplomacy but never its governing principle.”[21] and “…exploitations of temporary power relationships, were a means, and never an end in the themselves in Metternich’s statecraft.”[22]  Consequently, in order to frame a more accurate picture of the issue, a careful historic and systemic study of the system, persons and events surrounding Austria’s accession to the coalition seems necessary.

Systemic Overview

I: The 18th century European System

The structure of the late 18th century European system was anarchic, multi-polar and dominated by 5 Great Powers.  The general paradigm of 18th century Europe was the “balance of power”. The word paradigm here is carefully chosen since the concept of the “balance of power” is a very elusive and vaguely defined one. Whether it means an automatic self-regulating system or a “policy wholly dependent on manipulation by shrewd political leaders…”is far from clear.[23] Thomas S. Kuhn’s definition of paradigm neatly provides a theoretical foundation for a discussion of this ambivalent term.

 Paradigms in his opinion are nothing else than “some accepted examples …from which spring coherent traditions…” yet, which “Simultaneously were sufficiently open ended to leave all sorts of problems…to resolve.”[24]  Applied to international relations starting with ancient Greece, the 18th century European prince found various examples in history (traditions so to speak) of such a conduct of states. It was above all the mindset of the European courts and its ministers which upheld this vague paradigm supported by the general premises of the age of enlightenment such as raison d’etat and scientific progress free of all ideologies based on reason. A classical description of the balance of power can be found in Francis Bacon’s essay “On Empire” already written in 16th  century: ”During the triumvirate of Kings, King Henry the Eight of England, Francis the First, King of France and the Charles the Fifth Emperor, there was such a watch kept that none of the three could win a palm of ground but the other two would straightway balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war…”[25] Other accepted examples apart from alliances (confederations) and war included territorial compensations and indemnities as instruments for accruing power and capability.[26].

The goal of the “balance of power” was thus a political equilibrium for which “there is relatively widespread satisfaction with the distribution of power…”[27] Theoretically, this could be achieved through two means. First, in making all states equally powerful through territorial compensations and indemnities  or second, through alignments  For obvious historical reasons  an “equal distribution of power among princes”( the obvious pre-condition for an equilibrium) was not feasible due to the post 1648 fragmentation of Europe into Small, Middle and Great Powers, different geo-strategic vulnerabilities and historical and dynastic traditions. Alliances, therefore, were the only means to tackle the ambitions of a powerful aggressive state seeking to enlarge its territory and its status among the Great Powers and to keep the balance intact.

Pre-revolutionary Europe for a number of reasons marked the heyday of the “balance of power” paradigm and the “alliance balance” in international politics. First, in the 18th century ideology played no large role in alliance behaviour. Second, all European Great Powers were more or less of equal strengths in terms of nominal power. The smallest Great Power like Prussia had a huge, well-disciplined army, whereas the backwardness of imperial Russia was compensated by its enormous manpower. France, by far the most powerful state, had to split its resources in order to maintain a big navy to threaten England and an army to protect its western frontier whereas England had a small army, but a huge navy which could not threaten the central empires but only France’s overseas ambitions. The Austrian Empire compensated for its inadequate army and state finances with its historical role as the protector of the small German princes and the manpower distribution they had to make in times of war as well as their outer-German possessions.[28] Third “power” in pre-industrial, pre-nationalist Europe was relatively easy to measure in terms of land, population and relative income of the respective territory, a fact which led to swifter conclusions of hostilities and transparency. Fourth, the training, tactics and strategy of all European armies was basically the same.  The wars of the Spanish and Austrian Successions as well as the Seven Years War and their accompanying alliances were classic examples of campaigns fought among armies of nominal equal strengths with limited objectives that were intentionally or unintentionally maintaining the balance of power in Europe (so-called cabinet wars).

II: Austria in the European System

Austria, as has been argued in the introduction, faced an unfavourable systemic paradigm. Even if the empire adhered to the prevailing balance of power principles gaining new territories (i.e. increasing internal capabilities) and being militarily successful, the very system Austria would help to defend eventually would be the cause of its destruction.[29] 

Paul Schroeder points out that the balance of power for most European statesmen meant nothing else than a “balance of conquest”.[30]  He emphasises however that

“the Austrian Empire has arisen only partly through conquest and could not survive [my italics] by it. It was a Hausmacht, a multiethnic, patrimonial state, par excellence, based far more on tradition, dynastic succession, successful marriage, and territorial compromise. Its monarch exercised authority over his/her hereditary lands through a host of diverse legal and traditional claims and claims far more than naked power, and presided over Germany as traditional elected leader, not a sovereign at all.”[31] Henry Kissinger argued that “Austria was the seismograph of Europe. It was certain to be the first victim of any major upheaval because war could only increase the centrifugal elements of a state whose sole bond of Union was the common crown.”[32]

To summarize, the 18th century balance of power paradigm for Austria was counterproductive in two ways. First, a state so diverse, situated in the middle of the Continent, faced by Prussia in the north, Russia and Turkey in the east and France in the west could not adequately increase its internal capabilities, i.e. large enough armies without provoking a large coalition against it. Prussia, another central power, which attempted  to compensate for its disadvantageous central position with a large army, faced a continental coalition devastating the kingdom in a matter of years. Austria thus faced the classical “security dilemma”: “security measures taken by one actor are perceived by others as threatening”[33]. Schroeder supports this assertion by stating  that “Austria illustrates in classic fashion the security dilemma…the very effort of one state to achieve military security provoke counter measures from opponents leading to greater individual and general insecurity.”[34] Thus, Austria from a theoretical point of view would never be able to find allies against another hegemony as long as the system of “counter balances” existed even it was militarily inferior due to its unfavourable geographic disposition. Second, the raw concept of the balance of Power stood in direct opposition to dynastic rights, international law and historical claims to lands; all of the three were apart from military power, the foundation of Austrian rule. This situation would worsen throughout the Napoleonic Wars when these pillars of Austrian power were under siege from Revolutionary and later, Imperial France with their radical ideas and hunger for universal domination.

The internal contradiction of Austria’s power was piecemeal acceptance by Austria’s emperors starting with Maria Theresa, Joseph II, Leopold II as well as Emperor Francis II. It did not, however, affect alignment decisions.[35] Only in 1812 with the defeat of Napoleon in Russia, the old balance of power system in ruins and overshadowed by the already crumbling Napoleonic Empire as well as the Prussian abandonment of Napoleon and alignment with the Czar, open up the first real opportunity for Austria to propose a new form of alliance, which finally would abandon “the concept of counterweights” by introducing the “coalition equilibrium” which would remain intact until 1822. Austria’s very existence would depend on its formation.

III: The French Revolution and its Impact

The French Revolution and the rise of a structural revolutionary changed many of the traditional 18th century balance of power pillars. From a systemic perspective, a challenge by one Great Power of the balance of power paradigm and its attempt to establish hegemony over Europe is enough if left unchallenged to let the system equilibrium collapse. As Kegley and Raymond state: “The decentralised, laissez faire system of legitimized competition among sovereign equals came under direct attack as Napoleon sought to replace the Westphalia system with an imposed, hierarchical organization which would place authority for the management of interstate relations under centralised rule.”[36] The means, however, by which the French proposed to force the change were much more threatening to the system structure than under Louis XIV and his bid for hegemony.[37]

First, by means of a nationalistic ideology inspiring the entire population and second through increased internal capabilities, i.e.  the levee en masse as well as the grand armee led by a brilliant strategist and tactician, Napoleon Bonaparte, who as it turned out could offset the balance of the entire continent. The two combined proved the perfect nightmare for dynastic multinational empires like Russia and Austria as well as kingdoms like Prussia. In a period of months in 1792 as Goethe pointed out after the cannonade of Valmy the old system lay in ruins and the “old methods of warfare had collapsed”.[38]

At the same time, however, while the revolutionary storm was sweeping over Europe the leaders of the old monarchies on the continent and England still operated under the old balance of power paradigm facing various structural constraints because of it. The classic example would be the first partition of Poland in 1772 and its consequences. In 1794, in their balancing effort and despite sensing the danger of France, both Austria and Prussia, although allied, each decided to leave an entire army in Galicia and Silesia in order to keep an eye on the activities of the former enemy and now ally in the newly acquired Polish territories.[39] They still feared each other as much as they feared the new élan of the revolutionary armies. From a theoretical point of view, Gulick states the major problem with such an approach to alliance formation: “Success [in the alliance balance] depended on the emergence of an equilibrium out of the un-coordinated and largely uncooperative efforts of competitors representing different states.”[40] Given the rather uncooperative and competitive character of the international state system since the peace of Westphalia in 1648, cooperation was very difficult to achieve.

The later history of the various failed coalitions against revolutionary and later Napoleonic France proved that sustained cooperation was impossible to achieve for two reasons. First, a general problem which all the leaders of old Europe faced and which has been pointed out by scholars like Hans J. Morgenthau as a major deficit of “balance of power“ theory, was the assessment of power itself. [41]  The old monarchies at the beginning tended to underestimate and later overestimate the capabilities of France. Second, despite what international relations scholars like Kenneth Waltz argue, the question was not whether to balance against or bandwagon with the hegemony, but whether to do anything at all.[42] States not immediately threatened like Prussia in 1804 or Russia in 1809 and, despite popular opinion, Britain for a large period of time from1792 to 1815 decided not to act at all when neighbouring Great Powers faced virtual annihilation. As Paul Schroeder pointed out, “The British far from being steadfastly on the continent were ready at various times to come to terms with French hegemony.”[43] This emphasises the realist proposition that the first goal of any state is to survive in the international system by any means even it means the abandonment of the “balance of power” paradigm.

A case in point is Prussia in 1804 which feared Austria and Russia as much as it feared France.[44] A defeat of the two powers by Napoleon would favourably shift the balance of power in the east for Prussia. By not supporting Austria, Prussia thought that she could finally be the leader of all Germany, push Austria eastwards to check the Ottoman Empire which would bring it into conflict with Russia threatening the alliance of the two and at the same time, create a counterweight against both Russia and Napoleon by deciding to mediate in the last weeks of the War of the Third Coalition in 1804 in order for Austria not to face total annihilation. Although the classical balance of power had physically collapsed in Europe by 1799, the European courts still vehemently clung to it. The “Pitt Plan” and its considerations put forward by the British government in 1804 further support this assertion.[45]

IV: Austria and the French Revolution

“The French Revolution has insofar perpetuated the Ancien Regime in terms of Foreign Policy as to still see Austria [next to Britain] as its main enemy.”[46]  By 1812 Napoleon was at the height of his power. Almost constant warfare from 1792 to 1812 has reduced Austria to the status of a second rate power, economical, militarily and financially weak and a de facto ally of France. Austria after 1809 a second rate power was first and foremost bidding for time. Time in order to recuperate from its defeat and marshal its internal capabilities as well as time to wait for favourable conditions to bring about a change in the system by means of diplomacy or if necessary by war. 

After its defeat in 1809, largely attributable to the reluctance of Russia and Great Britain to join the fight against France, Austria loss much of its territory in the peace of Schönbrunn. Austria lost the Illyrian provinces, its access to the sea, its Polish concession as well as the hereditary lands of Salzburg and Tyrolia. It had to restrict its army to 150 000, pay reparations and  more or less had to consent to be a vassal of Napoleon and his empire by helping to enforce the continental system.[47] The marriage of Archduchess Maria Luis with the Emperor of the French in 1811 guaranteed the dynastic links of this unequal partnership, at least this was Napoleon’s belief. In 1812, it had to contribute an army corps of 30.000 troops for Napoleon’s Russian campaign, practically the only troops Austria could raise due to the state bankruptcy of 1811. Austria was on the brink of collapse fearing internal revolution as well as external upheaval.

Thus Austria’s political dictum in those years as stated by foreign minister Clemens von Metternich was, “All the plans of the poor central powers [Austria and Prussia] must be directed towards not being ground to powder.”[48]  Austria was in reality threatened by two Flank Powers, Russia and France. Austria feared nothing else more than a “second Tilsit”, referring to a treaty signed in 1807 in which the two flank powers had divided up Central Europe among themselves and excluded Austria from the negotiation table. Thus, in order to avoid such an arrangement the Empire nominally aligned with France in the short term but its long term commitment to balance France was unquestionable.

 First, France and Austria were ideological enemies; the one was a nationalistic revolutionary power and the other was the oldest status quo dynastic state in Europe. Their differences made any cooperation in the long term and as equal partners impossible.  As Driault states,

“Napoleon could not make common cause with the house of Hapsburg, whose whole policy was counter-revolutionary.”[49] The historic evidence supports this assertion. Even before Napoleon’s Russian campaign, Emperor Francis I dispatched a letter to Prince Regent of England stating that Austria would “uphold the principle and natural hostility towards France”.[50]  Metternich concurred when he told the envoy of Hanover, Hardenberg, “Austria had no alternative, that she would never cease considering herself the core of resistance to Napoleon.”[51] During the Russian campaign Metternich assured the Russian Emperor in describing Austria’s attitude that “Russia would find an active friend in the French camp without having to meet an enemy in war.”[52] 

Second, on the personal level Napoleon, a structural revolutionary and man primarily concerned with power in all its forms encountered in Metternich a man who was primarily concerned in the limitation of power as well as the sanctity of dynastic rights, treaties and international law. “Because of his overweening ambition and ego he was as much the cause of the wars of 1796-1815 as were the forces unleashed by the French revolution,” write Byman and Pollack.[53] “Napoleon not only profoundly shaped French intentions; he was also a crucial component of French power. Napoleon’s military skills were so great, that as an individual, he affected the balance of continental power.”[54] He was a “force multiplier” as the Duke of Wellington remarked. Metternich (Austria) on the other hand was interested in a system that he describes in his own words as one “within which a balance would exist without permanently mobilised armies and interminably marching troops.”[55]

Austria, therefore, faced a hostile systemic environment under Napoleon. The emergence of a structural revolutionary, who challenged the system more directly than the “balance of power paradigm” ever could, only accelerated that process. The paradox was that Austria stood as the protector of a system which constantly undermined the Empire’s power at the same time when it faced a revolutionary who wanted to substitute his lack of legitimacy with sheer military power and who thereby irrevocably was the arch enemy of the sole power standing for legitimacy, dynastic and historical claims. From a structural perspective, both were inevitable on a confrontation course.

The timing of the final confrontation, however, had to be careful chosen for through this confrontation Austria had to re-structure the system if it wanted to prevail. Austria could not solely rely on power as has been illustrated. Yet, the paradox was that in order to reform the system and initiate the “coalition equilibrium,” it had to maximize its raw power (i.e. military). Not, however, to coerce or balance former opponents, but to show that it voluntarily abandoned the old “balance of power” and “alliance paradigm” for the sake of coalition unity and the desired European equilibrium. “Austria’s welfare linked far more clearly to the European equilibrium than to any local advantages she might salvage in the form of territorial aggrandizement.”[56]

The long term goals of Austria were peace and tranquillity.[57] The means to achieve that goal were the “coalition equilibrium,” abandonment of the balance of power and 18th century “alliance balance”. In 1812, developments finally presented Austria with the opportunity to assume leadership and construct “coalition equilibrium;” yet, only if it played it cards right.

The Transformation

I

France had been severely defeated in Russia. Prussia defected and joined Russia, who had armies standing in east Germany awaiting the French onslaught. Austria had retired its auxiliary corps of 30000 into Galicia. Metternich immediately saw the implications of this situation.[58] Austria held a “flank position” and although weak at the moment could exploit that position to her advantage. As Gulick pointed out in summarising Metternich’s thoughts, Austria was encumbered by three important ties to France: the marriage between Napoleon and Archduchess Marie Louise, the peace of 1809 limiting the Austrian army to 150,000 men and the alliance of March 1812; conversely, Austria had raised the auxiliary corps nominally under French high command.[59] Metternich in an elaborate scheme gradually managed to cut this ties which inhibited his freedom of action.[60] He was able to get the approval of Napoleon to raise the Austrian troop level, abandon the alliance treaty as well as manage to marginalize the dynastic ties between Austria and France. At the same time, Metternich already consulted with the Russian Emperor and signed a preliminary agreement in March 1813 indicating vaguely Austria’s policy towards the Allies without, however, committing himself to any rapid action.[61]

Meanwhile, the war dragged on with Austria as a spectator. The Russians and Prussians were beaten in the bloody battles of Bautzen and Lützen respectively while the French also sustained heavy casualties. All three armies were exhausted, depleted and in need of rest and reinforcements. Austria was marshalling its military resources and soon would have a field army of 300.000. Neither side could now permit itself to antagonise Austria. The Empire was the holder of the balance and only its commitment would make the formation of a “coalition equilibrium” possible.

 On June 1st 1813, Metternich managed to get Napoleon’s as well as the Allies’ acceptance for an armistice orchestrated by Austria which was to last for almost two months.[62] Both sides agreed for Austria’s armed mediation. Here, Metternich already made the first steps in assuming the leadership of the Coalition by making the other nations accept that all communication between the antagonists would run through Austrian channels. Metternich was still reluctant to enter the fight even though he it as inevitable. As Harold Nicholson states,” He foresaw the inevitable end, but wished to postpone Austria’s intervention until the hour when all others would be exhausted and he could intervene with the maximum effect. He therefore played for time.”[63]  As Great Britain[64] suspected Metternich tried to avoid war and strike a deal with Napoleon since war in general ran contrary to Metternich’s political philosophy: “One characteristic of war is that once it has begun laws are no longer imposed by the will of man but by force of circumstance…”[65] Risking his last asset, the Austrian army, “scraped together by the last effort” of the financially depleted empire, as Rothenberg states to soon would make all future attempts to influence the system futile.

England, the most persistent of Napoleon’s adversaries, refused to accept armed mediation by Austria due to a number of reasons. First, in the British opinion, Metternich was primarily concerned in a continental peace ignoring Britain’s maritime and colonial interests. Second, the mere fact that Austria was mediating implied that Napoleon might stay in power, something unacceptable to the English for whom “Bony” was their archenemy, not France per se. Third, the British government was not able to comprehend Austria’s general course of action (few could at that time) and regarded it as a selfish move by Austria to gain diplomatic acceptance in both camps without commitment.[66]

On June 24th, Austria concluded with Russia and Prussia the treaty of Reichenbach. Metternich agreed to put four demands to Napoleon: the dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, return of the Ilyrian provinces to Austria and the establishment of the Hanseatic Towns of Hamburg and Lübeck.[67] If these demands were not met, Austria would enter the war on the side of the allies. The strengths of Austria’s position during the negotiations is well illustrated by the agreement of the three signatories (Austria, Prussia, Russia) to partition the Grand Duchy of Warsaw among themselves although this, as Gulick puts it, “ran exactly counter to Russian plans.”[68]

The interview between the two took place on June 26th. Metternich could get the Emperor of the French to accept an extension of the armistice to August 10th by which time Austria would fully be mobilised.[69] Metternich withheld, however, the exact terms of peace mentioned above and suggested a peace conference to convene in Prague from mid July to mid August. It gave Austria the much needed extension in order to secure her entry into the war from the strongest possible position. The peace conference failed for a number of reasons, but the most striking being that England after rejecting Austria’s mediation was not invited and Russia, as England’s ally, could not make a separate peace.[70]

Metternich however had achieved his objectives. Austria was fully mobilised and could claim leadership of the coalition. “The very size of her (Austria) war effort, 480.000 men mobilised and 300.000 combat troops available for operations clearly entitled her to be named The Supreme Allied Commander.”[71] On July 28th, Count Metternich declared to the French representative Caulaincourt that Austria would declare war unless a treaty was signed by August 10. Metternich, however, withheld the above mentioned demands until August 7th which gave the French no time to reply. Bonfires on hills around Prague on the night of August 12th signalled Austria’s entry into the war on the Allied sides.

Austria’s entry into the war at such a late point explains the success of the coalition for it guaranteed Austria’s leadership diplomatically represented by Metternich’s as the main voice of the Allies even before Austria nominally joined the Coalition as well as Austria’s crucial role in planning and organising the campaign. The success of the Battle of Leipzig was largely attributed to the work of Austrian Field Marschall Radetzky and his strategy of not engaging Napoleon directly up to the point where the Allies would have clear numerical superiority.[72] As Rothenberg states, “Radetzky’s strategic dispositions often revealed an almost-Napoleonic talent for the exploitation of time and space, the concentration of superior forces, and the principles of attack and pursuit.”[73] “Its [Austria’s] leadership of the coalition was an established fact…An Austrian Field Marshall [Schwarzenberg] was commander in chief of the Allied armies…Metternich was in effect the prime minister of the coalition,” as Kissinger notes.

Furthermore, the formulation of clear cut objectives and a post conflict scenario which all members of the coalition could agree to happened on September 9th with the Treaty of Teplitz and later despite a short crisis within the coalition, with the treaty of Chaumont on March First 1814.[74] Lastly and most importantly, Austria’s leadership role enabled the formation of a true coalition equilibrium, i.e. a breaking down of party lines and old enmities as well as the abandonment of the balance of power paradigm for a political equilibrium by accepting a “self limitation” of power.

The last point mentioned above deserves careful consideration since it signifies the essence of the Coalition equilibrium and will be discussed in the next section by analysing the treaty of Ried signed on October 8, 1813 where Bavaria, Napoleon’s closest German ally, joined the coalition as Austria’s ally. As Kissinger remarked, “Coalitions against revolutions have usually come about only at the end of a long series of betrayals and upheavals…”[75]

II: Bavaria - The Coalition Equilibrium at Work

As stated in the theory section, “self limitation” is a major pre-requisite for the establishment of coalition equilibrium. In the 18th century, such a move would not have been possible. If one power would have decided not to annex or occupy a certain territory, then another power would have intervened and moved in itself with disadvantageous consequences for the former—a classic zero-sum game. The division of Poland stands as archetypal example where Austria and Prussia had to participate out of power constraints, although they did so reluctantly. Consequently, small powers were easy prey if abandoned by their allies. For example, when Bavaria, a small power who was more or less abandoned by its ally France in 1813, lay defenceless at the mercy of Austria, Austria could have annexed the territory but it decided not to.

In 1812, Bavaria and Austria had been enemies for over two hundred years. For two centuries, Munich had been the closest German ally of France in its struggle against Austria. Between 1805 and 1809, Bavaria had annexed large parts of Austrian territory and suppressed two bloody rebellions led by peasants. Time and again it had provided the biggest German contingent to Napoleon’s grand army. Austria, on the other hand, since the middle of the 18th century tried to obtain Bavaria as part of its Empire in exchange for the Austrian Netherlands on numerous occasions.[76]

In October 1813 with Bavaria virtually defenceless and strong Austrian armies at its borders, the dream of every emperor since Joseph II finally seemed to come true. Yet, on October 8th, Austria (i.e. Metternich) signed an alliance with Bavaria in which it guaranteed Bavaria’s full sovereignty, promised to fully compensate it for the territory it had to return to Austria.[77]True, one reason why Austria did this was to prohibit a German unification by strengthening individual German sovereignty vis a vis Stein, advisor to the Emperor of Russia, who envisioned a great German state excluding Austria. Gulick concurs with this assessment of the Treaty of Ried.[78] Kissinger and Nicoloson in their comprehensive studies of this period do not pay any attention at all disregarding the importance of the agreement. Only Paul Schroeder sees in the treaty “a signpost of emerging deeper changes in International Politics.”[79] 

In 1813, Bavaria at the commencement of hostilities favoured neutrality.[80] Austria could have been content with that decision for Bavaria then would not constitute an armed threat to Austria’s interior lines and the Austrian army “poised on the Salzburg frontier” could have been withdrawn for some other purpose.[81] Yet, Metternich insisted on Bavaria’s participation.[82] Many other German states, especially Prussia, were reluctant, if not outright hostile, to the accession of the oldest French ally among the German states to the coalition and treated Bavaria for a long time after with disdain.[83]

Ostensibly Bavaria’s acceptance and signing of the treaty was not surprising; it’s a clear example of a weaker power joining with a stronger power in order to gain some profit and avoid defeat in a large conflict. Austria had already tried a couple of times to lure Bavaria away from Napoleon by promising territory in exchange for military service, the classic eighteenth century form of coalition building. Thus specific goals and precise military objectives should have been stated in the agreement.

Yet, the treaty of Ried hardly mentioned France, said nothing of military victory and declared the aims of the alliance as “the re-establishment of an order of things in Europe which assures to all their independence and future tranquillity.”[84] Far from being the treaty of an offensive military alliance it codified universal principles for a post war settlement with an almost Wilsonian type of rhetoric.

As Schroeder argues this “demonstrates a quest for equilibrium in the absence of balance of power.”[85] For balance of power considerations would have led Austria to occupy Bavaria thereby increasing its internal capabilities checking Prussian and future French domination of Germany as well as spoiling any dreams of a unified Germany without Austria’s consent. Yet, Austria refrained from using force although it had the capabilities to do so.[86]

“What induced Bavaria to agree to the alliance was a promise that Austria would be restrained and compelled to respect Bavaria’s independence and interests not by counterveiling powers (my italics)….but by a general legal and political system in Europe designed to ensure political equilibrium…”[87]  Austria by signing the treaty renounced its power base in South Germany severely inhibiting any future attempt to dominate German issues from a position of material strength. The treaty of Ried, however, guaranteed the defection of almost all states of Napoleon’s confederation of the Rhine even Murat’s kingdom of Naples over to the allies. [88] As Sofka states, “If Austria’s interests alone motivated Metternich’s policies, it is arguable that he would not have pursued an ambitious or idealistic a design as this would provide for general peace. Rather he could have employed the more expedient and direct tactic of forming a special alliance [i.e. alliance balance]…to guarantee Austria’s security.”[89] Bavaria would certainly not have received a magnanimous treatment under such conditions.

Yet in the words of Schroeder: “Here was the time at which Austria changed course…”[90] This was also the time in which the coalition equilibrium most strikingly emerged with one key player abandoning for its own sake and in a larger sense for Europe’s sake the “alliance balance” and thereby, the old 18th century conception of the balance of power.

Conclusion

To conclude one needs to re-articulate the main systemic arguments put forwarding this paper in order to answer the question of why Austria decided to join the last coalition when it did. First, Austria could no longer play the 18th century European Balance of Power game and yet, it could not live under Napoleonic hegemony for reasons discussed. Second, the prevailing alliance balance inhibited the European states to balance Napoleon. Third, a “coalition equilibrium” not based on the balance of power was the solution for Europe as well as Austria.  Austria, from a position of strength, was able to enforce the coalition equilibrium and keep it intact as long as it dominated the coalition. With the decline of Austrian power and the French, threat the coalition dispensed.

As AJP Taylor notes, “Austria was a European necessity, Europe was an Austrian necessity.”[91] A Great Power abandoning the narrow selfish accumulation of power for the sake of a greater equilibrium and acting out of the strong position as it did in 1812-1813 marked the fundamental transformation of 18th century power politics to the 19th century equilibrium. The first sign of this transformation was the switch from the “alliance balance” to “coalition equilibrium”.

From 1812 to1822, Metternich succeeded in maintaining the “coalition equilibrium”. Once France was constrained, however, the coalition little by little fell back to the old system of alliance balance which ultimately led to the 1914 alignment blocs and caused the First World War. Gulick emphasises, “a coalition equilibrium could not supersede a system of alliance balance without establishing its superior workability.” Metternich under Austria, the state which through its internal structure could not return to the old system, upheld the workability as long as it could through the “conference system” or, as some historians called it, the “Metternich system”[92]. With the overall decline of Austrian influence and relative power in the post-Napoleonic years, the political equilibrium and consequently, the coalition equilibrium was doomed to fail.

Notes:

[1] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 77.

[2] Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 6.

[3] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 81.

[4]  Ibid.

[5] Ibid. Gulick emphasises in particular the work by Sioue Favier Politique de tous les cabinets de l’Europe  a collection of essays by famous French statesmen of the 18th century

[6] James R. Sofka, “Metternich’s Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for Perpetual Peace”, The Review of Politics  60, no. 1 (1998): 132.

[7] James R. Sofka, “Metternich’s Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for Perpetual Peace”, The Review of Politics  60, no. 1 (1998): 133.

[8] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955),78.

[9] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 81.

[10] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 88.

[11] James R. Sofka, “Metternich’s Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for Perpetual Peace”, The Review of Politics  60, no. 1 (1998): 119.

[12] Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, “The Long Cycle of Global War and the Transformation of Alliance Norms”, Journal of Peace Research 26, no. 3 (1989) 266.

[13] Ibid.

[14] For a full list see: James R. Sofka, “Metternich’s Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for Perpetual Peace”, The Review of Politics  60, no. 1 (1998): 124.

[15] Robert A. Kann, “Metternich: A Reappraisal of His Impact on International Relations”, The Journal of Modern History 32, no.4, (1960) 333-334.; Bruce Cronin, Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 143.

[16] Michael Sheehan, “Balance of Power- History and Theory”, (New York: Routledge, 1996) 116.

[17] Paul W. Schroeder, “The 19th Century International System: Changes in Structure”, World Politics 39, no.1 (1986) 1-26. “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?”, The American Historical Review 97, no.3 (1992) 683-706. “Metternich Studies since 1925”, Journal of Modern History 33, no. 4 (1961) 237-260.

[18] Sir Charles Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815, (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963) 165-166.

[19] Douglas Dakin, “The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 and Antecedents” in Europe’s Balance of Power”, ed. Alan Shed, 13-14 (London: Macmillan Press: 1979).

[20] Douglas Dakin, “The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 and Antecedents” in Europe’s Balance of Power , ed. Alan Shed, 13-14 (London: Macmillan Press: 1979).

[21] James R. Sofka, “Metternich’s Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for Perpetual Peace”, The Review of Politics  60, no. 1 (1998): 136.

[22] Ibid. 134.

[23] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contenting Theories of International Relations – A comprehensive Survey, Fifth Edition, (New York: Longman, 2001) 41.

[24] Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Third Edition, (Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1996) 10.

[25] Francis Bacon, “Of Empire” in  Essays and New Atlantis, (New York: Roslyn, 1942) 80. 

[26] Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 6.

[27] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contenting Theories of International Relations – A comprehensive Survey, Fifth Edition, (New York: Longman, 2001) 41.

[28] For a full description of capabilities of 18th century Great Powers see  Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, (London: Routledge, 1987), 18-34.

[29] The following two paragraphs are an expansion of Paul Schroeder’s arguments presented in Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 33-35.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Henry Kissinger, A World Restored- Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1957), 8.

[33] Glenn H. Synder, Alliance Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 17.

[34] Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 34.

[35] Murray Forsyth, “The Old European State System: Gentz versus Hauterive”, The Historical Journal 23, no. 5 (1980), 523-528.

[36] Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, “The Long Cycle of Global War and the Transformation of Alliance Norms”, Journal of Peace Research 26, no. 3 (1989) 274.

[37] Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of Great Powers- Economic Change Military Conflict 1500-2000, (London: Random House, 1988), 72-83.

[38] Gunther E. Rothenberg, “The Habsburg Army in the Napoleonic Wars“, Military Affairs 37, no.1 (1973) 1.

[39] Siegfried Fiedler, Taktik und Strategie der Revolutionskriege 1792-1848, (Augsburg:Bechtermünze,1988), 125.

[40] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 86.

[41] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contenting Theories of International Relations – A comprehensive Survey, Fifth Edition, (New York: Longman, 2001) 43.

[42] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contenting Theories of International Relations – A comprehensive Survey, Fifth Edition, (New York: Longman, 2001)532-540., Glenn H. Synder, Alliance Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 27.

[44] Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 280.

[45] For detail see Henry Kissinger, A World Restored- Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1957), 38-39. and Sir Charles Webster, “The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815”, (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963) 34-43.

[46] Siegfried Fiedler, Taktik und Strategie der Revolutionskriege 1792-1848, (Augsburg:Bechtermünze,1988), 123.

[47] Louis Bergeron, Die europäischen Revolutionen 1780-1848, (Augsburg: Weltbild,2000), 157-158.

[48] Henry Kissinger, A World Restored- Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1957), 25.

[49] Edouard Driault, „The Coalition of Europe Against Napoleon”, The American Historical Review 24, no.4 (1919): 619-620.

[50] Heinrich Drimmel, Österreichs Sernstunde- Aspern und der Aufstieg eines Kaisertums, (Wien:Amalthea,2002), 206.

[51] Henry Kissinger, A World Restored- Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1957), 23.

[52] Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna- A Study in Alliance Unity 1812-1822, (London: Harvest, 1946), 41.

[53] Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, „Let Us Now Praise Great Men- Bringing the Statesman Back In”, International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 127.

[54] Ibid. 125.

[55] James R. Sofka, “Metternich’s Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for Perpetual Peace”, The Review of Politics  60, no. 1 (1998): 123.

[56] Ibid. 127.

[57] Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 471.

[58] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 122.

[59] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 112.

[60] For a detailed discussion see Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 111-115.

[61] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 77.

[62] Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna- A Study in Alliance Unity 1812-1822, (London: Harvest, 1946), 34.

[63] Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna- A Study in Alliance Unity 1812-1822, (London: Harvest, 1946), 41.

[64] C.S.B. Buckland, “An English Estimate of Metternich, February 1813”, The English Historical Review 39, no.154 (1924) 256-258.

[65] James R. Sofka, “Metternich’s Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for Perpetual Peace”, The Review of Politics  60, no. 1 (1998): 123.

[66] C.S.B. Buckland, “An English Estimate of Metternich, February 1813”, The English Historical Review 39, no.154 (1924) 256-258.

[67] Sir Charles Webster, “The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815”, (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963) 26-27.

[68] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 112.

[69] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 114.

[70] see 123-124 Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 80-81. Henry Kissinger, A World Restored- Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1957) 46-47.

[71] Gunther E. Rothenberg, “The Habsburg Army in the Napoleonic Wars“, Military Affairs 37, no.1 (1973) 4.

[72] Siegfried Fiedler, Taktik und Strategie der Revolutionskriege 1792-1848, (Augsburg:Bechtermünze,1988), 130.

[73] Gunther E. Rothenberg, “The Habsburg Army in the Napoleonic Wars“, Military Affairs 37, no.1 (1973) 4.

[74] Edouard Driault, „The Coalition of Europe Against Napoleon”, The American Historical Review 24, no.4 (1919): 620.

[75] Henry Kissinger, A World Restored- Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1957) 13.

[76] Brigitte Vacha, Die Habsburger- Eine europäische Familiengeschichte, (Graz:Steyria,1992), 317.

[77] Daniel Klang, “Bavaria and the War of Liberation 1814-1815”, French Historical Studies 4, no. 1 (1965) 23.

[78] Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1955), 116.

[79] Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 480.

[80] Daniel Klang, “Bavaria and the War of Liberation 1814-1815”, French Historical Studies 4, no. 1 (1965) 25.

[81] Daniel Klang, “Bavaria and the War of Liberation 1814-1815”, French Historical Studies 4, no. 1 (1965) 23.

[82] On October 6 the Austrians gave the Bavarians 40 hours to accept their final offer.

[83] Daniel Klang, “Bavaria and the War of Liberation 1814-1815”, French Historical Studies 4, no. 1 (1965) 26.

[84] Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 481.

[85] Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 482.

[86] Siegfried Fiedler, Taktik und Strategie der Revolutionskriege 1792-1848, (Augsburg:Bechtermünze,1988), 128.

[87] Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 482.

[88] Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 483.

[89] James R. Sofka, “Metternich’s Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for Perpetual Peace”, The Review of Politics  60, no. 1 (1998): 127.

[90] Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 483.

[91] AJP Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948), 39.

[92] G. De Bertier de Sauvigny, Metternich et son temps, (Paris:Hachette, 1962), 132.

 

Placed on the Napoleon Series: April 2010

 

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