The Franco-Georgian Diplomatic Relationship: 1810-1811

The Franco-Georgian Diplomatic Relationship
From the Letters of the King of Imereti Solomon II
to The Emperor Napoleon I, 1810-1811

Part II: Courting Counter-Weights: a Search for Balance

The second half of the 18th century had witnessed a significant rise of the Kingdom of Kartli. Contemporary Georgia was a mosaic of kingdoms and principalities, nominally under either Turkish or Persian suzerainty, but actually maintaining considerable degrees of autonomy and independence. Measures were taken to settle the depopulated areas, the settlers being exempted from taxation for several years. The sale of peasants without land was prohibited. Silver mining and processing started at Akhtala and Alaverdi (Kakheti). In Tbilisi a mint was opened, a printing press, a glass works; salt and soap were produced, as well as firearms, artillery pieces, etc. Private enterprises began to operate, like brick kilns, tobacco factories, gunpowder works, oil presses, dyers' shops. Home and foreign trade expanded. New towns sprang up. The Darial highway was opened, connecting Georgia with the Northern Caucasus.

King Erekle II (1741-1798) strove to raise Georgia to the European level of development. He invited specialists from Western Europe and sent Georgians there to master various specialties. He also made persistent efforts to improve relations with Russia. Erekle II needed Russian support for his dynasty, threatened by bitter rivalries among the children of his wives, and for his country against a reassertion of Persian power by a strong shah seeking to rebuild the empire of Nadir Shah. The Russian policy towards Transcaucasia was to create a Christian state rallying the Georgians and Armenians under the Russian banner and providing a secure buffer zone from Persian and Turkish incursions. Mutual interest thus dictated the Russo-Georgian treaty, signed in July 1783, at Georgievsk. In signing this treaty, Erekle undertook to renounce all dependence on Persia or any other state but Russia. He and his posterity were confirmed forever in possession of all territories under their sway; the kings of Georgia, on succeeding to the throne, would request and receive from St. Petersburg their insignia of investiture. Erekle was to conduct negotiations with foreign powers only after securing the approval of the Russian authorities. In response, the Russian sovereigns were pledged to treat Georgia’s foes as those of Russia and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Georgia. The Georgian nobility was to have the same privileges as the Russian aristocracy and special facilities were to be afforded to merchants in both states. The treaty was to remain in force permanently and any modification was to be made only by the voluntary consent of both parties. The treaty stipulated also the stationing in Georgia of two battalions of Russian infantry with four guns and the eventual recovery by force of arms of Georgia’s ancient territories now in possession of the Ottomans.

The arrival of Russian troops alarmed the Turkish frontier pashas, particularly Suleyman Pasha of Akhaltsikhe. Suleyman was a descendent of the Georgian Atabags (grand constable) of Samtskhe and had tried to maintain friendly relations with Erekle. Through mediation he was trying to take advantage of the enfeebled state of Turkey to restore the autonomy of Samtskhe and set himself up as a sovereign prince. The Russo-Georgian convention was a serious threat to his ambition. In it, the empress undertook to assist Erekle to reconquer Georgia’s lost territories and there was no doubt that it was Samtskhe (Suleyman’s domain) that was meant. Accordingly, Suleyman sent presents to Omar Khan of Aravia, urging him to invade Georgia from Daghestan. In August 1785 Omar Khan entered Kakheti with 20,000 soldiers and advanced southward to Tbilisi. Fearing a battle with the Russian regular troops, the khan marched across Kartli to Akhalkalaki, spreading terror and destruction. Joining forces with Suleyman, Omar Khan undertook a raid into Imereti and then took up quarters at Akhaltsikhe in preparation for the spring campaign.

The Russian protectorate over Kartli-Kakheti precipitated also a serious crisis in Istanbul. The Ottoman government saw in the return of Russian troops to Tbilisi a direct threat to their Anatolian frontier. They were able to cite, in support of their objections, Article 23 of the Kuchuk-Kainarji Treaty of 1774, in which Turkish suzerainty over all Georgia had been recognized by Russia. On October 14, 1784 Catherine’s minister, Alexander Bezborodko wrote to the Russian ambassador at Istanbul:

Our business is to correct the error of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji about Georgia, in which that country was completely neglected, and correcting it not indeed on paper, but de fait. That land is very important to us… But it would be a pity if war broke out prematurely over it[1]

However, the promise of protection and military assistance was not fulfilled by Russia. When the second Russo-Turkish war broke out in 1787, Empress Catherine the Great ordered her troops to evacuate Georgia and to concentrate forces for the Balkans campaign. Thus, Georgia was abandoned without a fight and in 1795 the Shah of Iran, Agha Mohammed Khan, invaded Eastern Georgia, ravaging it and capturing its capital, Tbilisi. King Erekle II was forced to take refuge in Kakheti. In 1796 Catherine the Great sent an army back into the Caucasus, but after her death, the new Tsar of Russia, Paul I, recalled the expeditionary force and left king Erekle alone to face another Persian invasion. In his well-researched study of the history of Georgia, David Lang writes, “By withdrawing her troops in 1787, failing to send them in time against Agha Muhammed in 1795 and again evacuating Georgia in 1797, Russia had undeniably forfeited any juridical right to demand Georgia’s continued adherence to the Treaty of Giorgievsk”

Nevertheless, the Georgian kings continued their pro-Russian policy and endeavored to renew the Russian protectorate, despite increasing pressure from Ottomans and Persians. Yet, the St. Petersburg Court had a different view on the future of Georgia. In 1799, Tsar Paul I moved Russian troops into Georgia; the following year he issued a decree abolishing of the Kingdom of Georgia and annexing of it’s territory. The 900-year-old Dynasty of Bagration was thereby overthrown. The assassination of the Tsar Paul in March 1801, postponed the process of integration of Georgian territories into the empire, although not for long. In September 1801, the new Tsar, Alexander I, published a manifesto confirming his father’s decree on the annexation of Eastern Georgia and established a Russian system of administration.

But the last representatives of the Bagration dynasty continued their struggle against Russia. Princes Alexander and Teimuraz fled to Persia and tried to induce the Shah to oppose the Russians. Seeing a general dissatisfaction with Russian administration in Georgia, the princes also appealed to the nation to fight for independence. But in 1804, General Prince Paata Tsitsianov[2], the governor of eastern Georgia, went on the offensive, defeated the Persian armies and seized the Persian fortresses, forcing the Shah to conclude a peace treaty with Russia. The defeat of Persia in the war against Russia doomed the hopes of the Georgian princes to use the Persian army to liberate their native land. Yet, losing one ally, they began looking for other possible source of an assistance. It is noteworthy that in their quest for independence, the Georgian princes were ready to ally themselves with Persia or the Ottoman Empire - both Islamic states - against fellow Orthodox Christians, the Russians. Yet, in 1783, only 20 years earlier, one of the major factors for concluding the military alliance with Russia was their shared religion.

Facing the Russian offensive, Fath-Ali, Shah of Persia, requested the assistance of Britain in accordance with the terms of the 1801 Anglo-Persian treaty. As was to be expected, London shied away from her obligations. Britain’s excuse was that the treaty in question did not contain any provision guaranteeing British assistance to Persia in case of Russian aggression. But it was really the gestation of the Third anti-French Coalition that caused Britain to refuse her aid. Fath-Ali Shah had, therefore, no alternative but to turn to France for help. During the winter of 1804, while he was fighting against the Russians in Caucasus, he wrote a letter to Napoleon, in which offered to join France in a dual attack on Russia. In reply, in March 1805 Napoleon sent two unofficial envoys to Persia to see how the land lay. These envoys were Amédée Jaubert, his interpreter during the Egyptian expedition, who spoke several Eastern languages including Persian and Georgian, and Alexander Romieu, the commissioner for commercial relations in Corfu, a career officer who was ordered to study the military system of Persia.[3] Both men carried letters from Napoleon to Fath-Ali Shah encouraging him to resist Russian ambitions. In Tehran, French envoys met the Georgian Princes and promised to support them against Russia.

One of the princes, Teimuraz Batonishvili, son of the King George XIII, met French envoys[4] and gave them a letter to Napoleon on 30 March 1809[5]. Addressing Napoleon as “the most powerful monarchs,” and “the most benevolent sovereign,” the Georgian prince described the state of affairs in Georgia, emphasizing the aggression of the Tsars of Russia into Transcaucasia and the vicious overthrow of the Bagration dynasty. “We do hope to receive your assistance, and ask you to protect us…. We do appeal for the return of our realm and it is upon the will of Your Excellency to decide our fate…. For your benevolence, we would spare no effort to serve you… and praise Your Excellency forever…. “[6]

Prince Teimuraz hoped that Napoleon would be interested in negotiating with Georgian princes, employing them in his overall policy against Russia. The Prince was ready to travel to France and meet the Emperor, if necessary. “If you wish, I would rejoice to meet Your Excellency”[7] It is noteworthy that in his dispatch, Teimuraz referred to a previous letter to Napoleon, but is had obviously been lost and never reached its destination.

While the rulers of Mingrelia, Abkahzia, and Guria gave support to Russia in the war against Turkey, this was far from the case with the king of Imereti. King Solomon had never intended to observe the oath of allegiance that had been extorted from him in 1804 by force of arms. He was in extreme peril since, apart from the Russians, he had to deal with the Ottoman Empire’s advance from the southeast and with the internal intrigues of nobles of the four main principalities of western Georgia. Solomon did not oppose Russian supremacy, but wished to remain independent in return for military support to unify the whole Georgia and liberate the Georgian territories occupied by Turks and Persians. But St. Petersburg had different plans. In 1804 the governor of eastern Georgia, General Paul Tsitsianov demanded his surrender and, receiving Solomon’s refusal, moved Russian troops into Western Georgia in April 1804. Facing superior Russian forces, Solomon was compelled to submit and on 25 April 1804, accepted Tsitsianov’s demands. Thus, Western Georgia lost its sovereignty, although Solomon remained on his throne. In 1805-1808 Solomon remained under Russian sway but did not give up hopes of liberating his kingdom while at the same time closely watching European politics.

Meanwhile Napoleon achieved astonishing successes defeating Russian and Austria in 1805, Prussia in 1806 and then Russia in 1807. As a result, the whole of Europe fell under the sway of the Emperor of France. Encouraged by Napoleon, the Ottomans declared war, in 1806, on Russia and king Solomon decided to use this chance to instigate a rebellion. Though the war began successfully for Solomon, whose troops ambushed and annihilated a Russian convey in 1809, eventually it became ruinous for the kingdom of Imereti. Solomon’s dominions were encircled by Russian troops and the commander in Chief, Alexander Tormassov, decided that the time had come to remove the fractious monarch.

Solomon’s position was not a strong one. He had alienated the princes of Dadiani (rulers of Mingrealia) and Gurieli (Guria), by his attempts to deprive them of their territorial possessions. Although most of the common people were loyal to him, several of the nobles of his court, led by Zurab Tsereteli, were devoted to Russian interests. In January, 1810, the new governor of Georgia, Alexander Tormasov (1809-1811), dispatched an ultimatum demanding that Solomon hand over some members of the Imeretian nobility and his heir, Constantine, as hostages and that he reside permanently under Russian surveillance at Kutaisi. Solomon refused the Russian demands. In response, troops were sent from Tbilisi and Solomon’s forces were defeated. The King was declared deposed and soon afterwards was captured in the hills and escorted to Tbilisi, although two weeks later he managed to escape from prison disguised as a peasant.[8]

Inspired by the King’s escape, the people of Imereti rose against the occupying power. Several fierce engagements were fought, but the insurgents were decisively defeated. In addition, famine and plague broke out, causing an estimated total of 40,000 deaths. A Russian administration was set up in Kutaisi under pravitel, with a special advisory council appointed from the local nobility and Russian officials. The country was divided into four districts (okrug) and placed under the martial law.[9]

[1] Grigorovich, N. Kantsler Kniaz Alexander Andreevich Bezborodko [Chancellor Prince Alexander Bezborodko] (St. Petersburg, 1879-1881), I, 455.

[2] Prince Tsitsianov was a scion of the Georgian noble family, Tsitsishvili. He was an officer with a distinguished record in Russian Army. He was also a distant relative of the widow of King George XII, Queen Mariam, who had been a Princess Tsitsishvili.

[3] Akti cobrannie Kavkazskoi Arkheograficheskoi Komissiei, II, 149; I. Tabagoua, Sakartvelo-safrangetis urtiertobis istoriidan [From the history of Franco-Georgian Relationship] (Tbilisi, 1974) 13.

[4] Prince Teimuraz was particularly close with General Gardane and out of respect wrote a special dictionary for him - “Vocabularro Italiano-Persico et Turco composto da Sua Altezza Serenissimo Timuraz Miurza, Principe die Giorgia”, which was lately published in Paris. For additional information, see General Gardane, Journal d’un voyage dans la Turquie d’Asie et la Perse, fait en 1807 et 1808, Paris-Marseille, 1809; Sh. Khantadze, Teimuraz batonishvilis “italiur-sparsuli-turkuli leksikoni” [Italian-Persian-Turkish Dictionary of Prince Teimuraz], Literatura da Khelovneba, (Tbilisi, 1950) N39.

[5] Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, Archives, Memoires et documents, “Perse”, t.XI, 1809, f. 221

[8] P.G. Butkov, Materially dlia novoi istorii Kavkaza [Materials for the Modern History of the Caucasus], (St. Peterburg, 1869) III, 392-93; K.A. Borozdin, Imeretinskaya Tsaritsa Maria [The Queen of Imereti Maria] (St. Petersburg, 1893) 622-23.

[9] N. Berdzenishvili, Sakartvelos istoria [History of Georgia] (Tbilisi, 1958), I, 407-408; G.V. Khachapuridze, K istorii Gruzii pervoi poloviny XIX veka [On the History of Georgia in the First half of the 19^th Century] (Tbilisi, 1950) 98-99.


Early Georgian-Russian Relations Russian Protection: Fickle or Absolute Russia as Georgian Enemy: A Search for Allies Georgian Appeal to Napoleon Russia Absorbs Georgia Notes	The Franco-Georgian Diplomatic Relationship The Franco-Georgian Diplomatic Relationship From the Letters of the King of Imereti Solomon II to The Emperor Napoleon I, 1810-1811 Part II: Courting Counter-Weights: a Search for Balance By Alexander Mikaberidze, Chairman of the Napoleonic Society of Georgia The second half of the 18th century had witnessed a significant rise of the Kingdom of Kartli. Contemporary Georgia was a mosaic of kingdoms and principalities, nominally under either Turkish or Persian suzerainty, but actually maintaining considerable degrees of autonomy and independence. Measures were taken to settle the depopulated areas, the settlers being exempted from taxation for several years. The sale of peasants without land was prohibited. Silver mining and processing started at Akhtala and Alaverdi (Kakheti). In Tbilisi a mint was opened, a printing press, a glass works; salt and soap were produced, as well as firearms, artillery pieces, etc. Private enterprises began to operate, like brick kilns, tobacco factories, gunpowder works, oil presses, dyers' shops. Home and foreign trade expanded. New towns sprang up. The Darial highway was opened, connecting Georgia with the Northern Caucasus. Early Georgian-Russian Relations King Erekle II (1741-1798) strove to raise Georgia to the European level of development. He invited specialists from Western Europe and sent Georgians there to master various specialties. He also made persistent efforts to improve relations with Russia. Erekle II needed Russian support for his dynasty, threatened by bitter rivalries among the children of his wives, and for his country against a reassertion of Persian power by a strong shah seeking to rebuild the empire of Nadir Shah. The Russian policy towards Transcaucasia was to create a Christian state rallying the Georgians and Armenians under the Russian banner and providing a secure buffer zone from Persian and Turkish incursions. Mutual interest thus dictated the Russo-Georgian treaty, signed in July 1783, at Georgievsk. In signing this treaty, Erekle undertook to renounce all dependence on Persia or any other state but Russia. He and his posterity were confirmed forever in possession of all territories under their sway; the kings of Georgia, on succeeding to the throne, would request and receive from St. Petersburg their insignia of investiture. Erekle was to conduct negotiations with foreign powers only after securing the approval of the Russian authorities. In response, the Russian sovereigns were pledged to treat Georgia’s foes as those of Russia and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Georgia. The Georgian nobility was to have the same privileges as the Russian aristocracy and special facilities were to be afforded to merchants in both states. The treaty was to remain in force permanently and any modification was to be made only by the voluntary consent of both parties. The treaty stipulated also the stationing in Georgia of two battalions of Russian infantry with four guns and the eventual recovery by force of arms of Georgia’s ancient territories now in possession of the Ottomans. The arrival of Russian troops alarmed the Turkish frontier pashas, particularly Suleyman Pasha of Akhaltsikhe. Suleyman was a descendent of the Georgian Atabags (grand constable) of Samtskhe and had tried to maintain friendly relations with Erekle. Through mediation he was trying to take advantage of the enfeebled state of Turkey to restore the autonomy of Samtskhe and set himself up as a sovereign prince. The Russo-Georgian convention was a serious threat to his ambition. In it, the empress undertook to assist Erekle to reconquer Georgia’s lost territories and there was no doubt that it was Samtskhe (Suleyman’s domain) that was meant. Accordingly, Suleyman sent presents to Omar Khan of Aravia, urging him to invade Georgia from Daghestan. In August 1785 Omar Khan entered Kakheti with 20,000 soldiers and advanced southward to Tbilisi. Fearing a battle with the Russian regular troops, the khan marched across Kartli to Akhalkalaki, spreading terror and destruction. Joining forces with Suleyman, Omar Khan undertook a raid into Imereti and then took up quarters at Akhaltsikhe in preparation for the spring campaign. The Russian protectorate over Kartli-Kakheti precipitated also a serious crisis in Istanbul. The Ottoman government saw in the return of Russian troops to Tbilisi a direct threat to their Anatolian frontier. They were able to cite, in support of their objections, Article 23 of the Kuchuk-Kainarji Treaty of 1774, in which Turkish suzerainty over all Georgia had been recognized by Russia. On October 14, 1784 Catherine’s minister, Alexander Bezborodko wrote to the Russian ambassador at Istanbul: Our business is to correct the error of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji about Georgia, in which that country was completely neglected, and correcting it not indeed on paper, but de fait. That land is very important to us… But it would be a pity if war broke out prematurely over it[1] Russian Protection: Fickle or Absolute However, the promise of protection and military assistance was not fulfilled by Russia. When the second Russo-Turkish war broke out in 1787, Empress Catherine the Great ordered her troops to evacuate Georgia and to concentrate forces for the Balkans campaign. Thus, Georgia was abandoned without a fight and in 1795 the Shah of Iran, Agha Mohammed Khan, invaded Eastern Georgia, ravaging it and capturing its capital, Tbilisi. King Erekle II was forced to take refuge in Kakheti. In 1796 Catherine the Great sent an army back into the Caucasus, but after her death, the new Tsar of Russia, Paul I, recalled the expeditionary force and left king Erekle alone to face another Persian invasion. In his well-researched study of the history of Georgia, David Lang writes, “By withdrawing her troops in 1787, failing to send them in time against Agha Muhammed in 1795 and again evacuating Georgia in 1797, Russia had undeniably forfeited any juridical right to demand Georgia’s continued adherence to the Treaty of Giorgievsk” Nevertheless, the Georgian kings continued their pro-Russian policy and endeavored to renew the Russian protectorate, despite increasing pressure from Ottomans and Persians. Yet, the St. Petersburg Court had a different view on the future of Georgia. In 1799, Tsar Paul I moved Russian troops into Georgia; the following year he issued a decree abolishing of the Kingdom of Georgia and annexing of it’s territory. The 900-year-old Dynasty of Bagration was thereby overthrown. The assassination of the Tsar Paul in March 1801, postponed the process of integration of Georgian territories into the empire, although not for long. In September 1801, the new Tsar, Alexander I, published a manifesto confirming his father’s decree on the annexation of Eastern Georgia and established a Russian system of administration. Russia as Georgian Enemy: A Search for Allies But the last representatives of the Bagration dynasty continued their struggle against Russia. Princes Alexander and Teimuraz fled to Persia and tried to induce the Shah to oppose the Russians. Seeing a general dissatisfaction with Russian administration in Georgia, the princes also appealed to the nation to fight for independence. But in 1804, General Prince Paata Tsitsianov[2], the governor of eastern Georgia, went on the offensive, defeated the Persian armies and seized the Persian fortresses, forcing the Shah to conclude a peace treaty with Russia. The defeat of Persia in the war against Russia doomed the hopes of the Georgian princes to use the Persian army to liberate their native land. Yet, losing one ally, they began looking for other possible source of an assistance. It is noteworthy that in their quest for independence, the Georgian princes were ready to ally themselves with Persia or the Ottoman Empire - both Islamic states - against fellow Orthodox Christians, the Russians. Yet, in 1783, only 20 years earlier, one of the major factors for concluding the military alliance with Russia was their shared religion. Facing the Russian offensive, Fath-Ali, Shah of Persia, requested the assistance of Britain in accordance with the terms of the 1801 Anglo-Persian treaty. As was to be expected, London shied away from her obligations. Britain’s excuse was that the treaty in question did not contain any provision guaranteeing British assistance to Persia in case of Russian aggression. But it was really the gestation of the Third anti-French Coalition that caused Britain to refuse her aid. Fath-Ali Shah had, therefore, no alternative but to turn to France for help. During the winter of 1804, while he was fighting against the Russians in Caucasus, he wrote a letter to Napoleon, in which offered to join France in a dual attack on Russia. In reply, in March 1805 Napoleon sent two unofficial envoys to Persia to see how the land lay. These envoys were Amédée Jaubert, his interpreter during the Egyptian expedition, who spoke several Eastern languages including Persian and Georgian, and Alexander Romieu, the commissioner for commercial relations in Corfu, a career officer who was ordered to study the military system of Persia.[3] Both men carried letters from Napoleon to Fath-Ali Shah encouraging him to resist Russian ambitions. In Tehran, French envoys met the Georgian Princes and promised to support them against Russia. Georgian Appeal to Napoleon One of the princes, Teimuraz Batonishvili, son of the King George XIII, met French envoys[4] and gave them a letter to Napoleon on 30 March 1809[5]. Addressing Napoleon as “the most powerful monarchs,” and “the most benevolent sovereign,” the Georgian prince described the state of affairs in Georgia, emphasizing the aggression of the Tsars of Russia into Transcaucasia and the vicious overthrow of the Bagration dynasty. “We do hope to receive your assistance, and ask you to protect us…. We do appeal for the return of our realm and it is upon the will of Your Excellency to decide our fate…. For your benevolence, we would spare no effort to serve you… and praise Your Excellency forever…. “[6] Prince Teimuraz hoped that Napoleon would be interested in negotiating with Georgian princes, employing them in his overall policy against Russia. The Prince was ready to travel to France and meet the Emperor, if necessary. “If you wish, I would rejoice to meet Your Excellency”[7] It is noteworthy that in his dispatch, Teimuraz referred to a previous letter to Napoleon, but is had obviously been lost and never reached its destination. Russia Absorbs Georgia While the rulers of Mingrelia, Abkahzia, and Guria gave support to Russia in the war against Turkey, this was far from the case with the king of Imereti. King Solomon had never intended to observe the oath of allegiance that had been extorted from him in 1804 by force of arms. He was in extreme peril since, apart from the Russians, he had to deal with the Ottoman Empire’s advance from the southeast and with the internal intrigues of nobles of the four main principalities of western Georgia. Solomon did not oppose Russian supremacy, but wished to remain independent in return for military support to unify the whole Georgia and liberate the Georgian territories occupied by Turks and Persians. But St. Petersburg had different plans. In 1804 the governor of eastern Georgia, General Paul Tsitsianov demanded his surrender and, receiving Solomon’s refusal, moved Russian troops into Western Georgia in April 1804. Facing superior Russian forces, Solomon was compelled to submit and on 25 April 1804, accepted Tsitsianov’s demands. Thus, Western Georgia lost its sovereignty, although Solomon remained on his throne. In 1805-1808 Solomon remained under Russian sway but did not give up hopes of liberating his kingdom while at the same time closely watching European politics. Meanwhile Napoleon achieved astonishing successes defeating Russian and Austria in 1805, Prussia in 1806 and then Russia in 1807. As a result, the whole of Europe fell under the sway of the Emperor of France. Encouraged by Napoleon, the Ottomans declared war, in 1806, on Russia and king Solomon decided to use this chance to instigate a rebellion. Though the war began successfully for Solomon, whose troops ambushed and annihilated a Russian convey in 1809, eventually it became ruinous for the kingdom of Imereti. Solomon’s dominions were encircled by Russian troops and the commander in Chief, Alexander Tormassov, decided that the time had come to remove the fractious monarch. Solomon’s position was not a strong one. He had alienated the princes of Dadiani (rulers of Mingrealia) and Gurieli (Guria), by his attempts to deprive them of their territorial possessions. Although most of the common people were loyal to him, several of the nobles of his court, led by Zurab Tsereteli, were devoted to Russian interests. In January, 1810, the new governor of Georgia, Alexander Tormasov (1809-1811), dispatched an ultimatum demanding that Solomon hand over some members of the Imeretian nobility and his heir, Constantine, as hostages and that he reside permanently under Russian surveillance at Kutaisi. Solomon refused the Russian demands. In response, troops were sent from Tbilisi and Solomon’s forces were defeated. The King was declared deposed and soon afterwards was captured in the hills and escorted to Tbilisi, although two weeks later he managed to escape from prison disguised as a peasant.[8] Inspired by the King’s escape, the people of Imereti rose against the occupying power. Several fierce engagements were fought, but the insurgents were decisively defeated. In addition, famine and plague broke out, causing an estimated total of 40,000 deaths. A Russian administration was set up in Kutaisi under pravitel, with a special advisory council appointed from the local nobility and Russian officials. The country was divided into four districts (okrug) and placed under the martial law.[9] To be continued. Notes [1] Grigorovich, N. Kantsler Kniaz Alexander Andreevich Bezborodko [Chancellor Prince Alexander Bezborodko] (St. Petersburg, 1879-1881), I, 455. [2] Prince Tsitsianov was a scion of the Georgian noble family, Tsitsishvili. He was an officer with a distinguished record in Russian Army. He was also a distant relative of the widow of King George XII, Queen Mariam, who had been a Princess Tsitsishvili. [3] Akti cobrannie Kavkazskoi Arkheograficheskoi Komissiei, II, 149; I. Tabagoua, Sakartvelo-safrangetis urtiertobis istoriidan [From the history of Franco-Georgian Relationship] (Tbilisi, 1974) 13. [4] Prince Teimuraz was particularly close with General Gardane and out of respect wrote a special dictionary for him - “Vocabularro Italiano-Persico et Turco composto da Sua Altezza Serenissimo Timuraz Miurza, Principe die Giorgia”, which was lately published in Paris. For additional information, see General Gardane, Journal d’un voyage dans la Turquie d’Asie et la Perse, fait en 1807 et 1808, Paris-Marseille, 1809; Sh. Khantadze, Teimuraz batonishvilis “italiur-sparsuli-turkuli leksikoni” [Italian-Persian-Turkish Dictionary of Prince Teimuraz], Literatura da Khelovneba, (Tbilisi, 1950) N39. [5] Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, Archives, Memoires et documents, “Perse”, t.XI, 1809, f. 221 [6] Ibid [7] Ibid [8] P.G. Butkov, Materially dlia novoi istorii Kavkaza [Materials for the Modern History of the Caucasus], (St. Peterburg, 1869) III, 392-93; K.A. Borozdin, Imeretinskaya Tsaritsa Maria [The Queen of Imereti Maria] (St. Petersburg, 1893) 622-23. [9] N. Berdzenishvili, Sakartvelos istoria [History of Georgia] (Tbilisi, 1958), I, 407-408; G.V. Khachapuridze, K istorii Gruzii pervoi poloviny XIX veka [On the History of Georgia in the First half of the 19^th Century] (Tbilisi, 1950) 98-99. Placed on the Napoleon Series: August 2001 [ Research Index \| Government Index ]

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