New French Ambassador

French Goals

War with Russia

Impact of the Treaty of Tilsit

1808 - 1815

Franco-Turkish Relationship during First Empire

Part 2: 1806 - 1815

Selim realized that he had obviously chosen the losing side, and with the defeat of Russia at Austerlitz, he now felt free to ignore his previous agreements with them. He now refused to ratify the 1805 Russo-Turkish defensive alliance. Moreover, he suspended negotiations with the British ambassador. The result of the Treaty of Pressburg also convinced Selim, now more than ever, that France was a power to be reckoned with either as a potential friend or enemy. Therefore, in February of 1806, the Porte officially recognized Napoleon's title as Emperor. Pierre Ruffin now hinted to Selim that Napoleon might be able to help him regain the Crimea from Russia and promised that, since Russia was the enemy of France, Napoleon would never make a separate peace prejudicial to Ottoman interests.

The Reis Effendi (the Turkish Foreign Minister) is quoted as having said that:

"it was hoped that Napoleon would put his sword back into the sheath only after...giving the Crimea to the Ottomans" and that "God wishes not the destruction of the Ottoman Empire since He has predestined to us a savior in Bonaparte."

But, it must be emphasized that although Selim had now recognized Napoleon as Emperor, he had not yet completely severed diplomatic relations with the Russians and he was still a bit hesitant to jump into an official alliance with Napoleon. Nevertheless, he did, by the end of February, send his close friend, Muhib Effendi to Paris to work for better relations between their two empires.

A New French Ambassador

In 1806 as well, Napoleon decided to send a new ambassador to Constantinople. This was General Horace Sebastiani. Through Talleyrand, his foreign minister, Napoleon sent these instructions for Sebastiani:

"My ambassador to Constantinople...is by all circumstances and by all means, to inspire the confidence and security of the Porte; to make well understood that I have never desired the Empire of Constantinople, that I want, as much that is in me, to pacify all factions, reorganize and reestablish, if it is possible, that formidable empire The constant object of my politics is to make a triple alliance of myself, the Porte and Persia, indirectly or implicitly aimed against Russia...I want to regain the influence that I lost through skill, insinuation, confidence, and by no means arrogance, force or menace I do not at all wish to partition the empire of Constantinople...I want to reaffirm and consolidate (it)...to serve me, such as it is, in opposition to Russia."

As this letter indicates, Napoleon had decided to step up his diplomatic efforts at the Porte, his major objective being to use the Turks in his conflict with Russia. One reason that Russia, by this time, so occupied his thoughts and goals had to do with his plans for the creation of the "Continental System." The central goal of this system was the creation of a continental blockade of all European ports to British goods. By the end of 1806, Russia would be the last major power that still remained to be brought within this system. Thus, with the help of the Ottoman Empire, Napoleon hoped to be able to maneuver Russia into a position whereby it could either be persuaded or forced to abandon its English ally and join Napoleon's system. Moreover, an armed conflict between Russia and the Turks could help Napoleon achieve his goal all the more quickly by forcing Russia to fight a two front war (against the Turks in southeast Europe and the French in Western Europe). If Persia could be added to the equation as well, thus forming a triple alliance with Napoleon and the Turks, then matters could be made even worse for the Tsar militarily.

French Goals

Therefore, after Sebastiani's arrival at the Porte, his primary goal was to encourage an outbreak of hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and Russia and to persuade Selim to make a military alliance with France. In order to achieve his objectives, it was necessary for him to convince the Porte that the Russians were intent on the destruction of his empire and that only with French help could Selim possibly hope to keep his empire intact. To do so, Sebastiani had only to exploit certain issues, which, over the past few years, had grown into potential points of conflict between the Turks and Russians. One of these issues was the Serb revolt.

As mentioned earlier, in 1804 the Serbians revolted and by 1805 had, without the aid of the Porte, succeeded in expelling their cruel and corrupt janissary masters. It was at this time that Alexander, who had been intently observing these events, decided that he might be able to use the situation to advance Russia's influence at the Porte as well as its influence in the Balkans among the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Sultan. Alexander therefore encouraged the Serbs to send a commission to the Porte professing their loyalty, but demanding that they be granted certain rights. Among the rights they demanded was the right to keep their arms and garrison their own towns and see to their own defense rather than be forced to accept a new Ottoman military administration. One reason, Alexander wanted the Serbs to have these rights was because he had long dreamed of the creation of semi-independent states in Eastern Europe that would look to Russia for guidance and leaders

Selim did not like this, having ordered the Serbs to lay down their arms after the expulsion of the janissaries. Moreover, Selim grew steadily suspicious over Russian meddling in the Balkans. In 1806, encouraged by the reopening of better relations with France as well as by their promises of support, Selim began to mobilize his armed forces for war against the Serbs (as well as to protect himself from any hostile moves on the part of the British or Russians).

Selim acquired a fetva from the Shaykh-al-Islam declaring the Serbs to be the enemies of Islam, after which he officially declared war on them. When the Russians (as well as the Austrians) offered to mediate between the Serbs and Turks, Selim rebuffed them. These actions, among many others on the part of the Porte, served to increasingly convince Alexander that the Porte was giving in more and more to French influence and that he must move to protect the interests of Russia. Another action taken by Selim, which further angered the Russians, was his order to place strict limitations on the future use of capitulations by non-Muslim subjects. Selim declared that now only Ottoman subjects active in the service of foreign embassies could receive berates (everyone else had to give theirs up or risk the confiscation of their property). This affected the British and Russians more so than the French because their commercial activity in these areas was greater. Selim took this step to lessen the influence of foreign agents, primarily the Russians, on his non-Muslim subjects

Therefore, in early 1806, Alexander decided to mobilize Russian troops on their southern border of the Dneister river and the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. These forces were to be used in case of further "threats" from the Turks or the French. Alexander told Italinsky in March that if the Porte showed any more pro-French signs that he would occupy the principalities with his forces. This Russian mobilization, no doubt, further increased the Porte's suspicions of Russian intentions as well as Selim's willingness to listen to future French promises and encouragement.

Thus, by the time that Sebastiani arrived at the Porte in August 1806, the stage was already set for a potential conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. All Sebastiani need do was encourage Selim in the belief that the Russians were plotting the destruction of his empire by backing the Serbs as well as other potentially rebellious subjects. Sebastiani particularly singled out the Hospodar princes of Moldavia and Wallachia. Sebastiani was most probably aware of the great dislike and suspicion Selim had for these two men. since their appointment to their posts in 1802, Alexander Morousi of Moldavia and Constantine Ipsilanti of Wallachia had been thorns in Selim's side. The descendants of Greek Phanariote administrators, these men were Greek nationalists by sentiment and Orthodox Christians by faith. Moreover, they were extremely pro-Russian in their politics. Through fear and bribes they had managed to gain considerable influence at the Porte (usually acting on the behalf of Russia). Many members of Selim's council hated them. The Reis Effendi is said to have referred to them as "Greek dogs" and once told a dragoman that Selim was only waiting for favorable news from his new ambassador in Paris to mete out justice to them. It seems that at the time of Sebastiani's arrival, Selim was already contemplating the deposition of these men. Ruffin apparently claimed that the Sultan had been ready as early as July to put them out of office. Selim had reasons to believe that Morousi and Ipsilanti had connections to Paswan Oglou, a rebellious notable who flouted the authority of the sultan in Bulgaria.

Therefore, Sebastiani had only to assure Selim of French support if he took such an action. In early October, Selim expelled the two princes from their offices and replaced them with two pro-French phanariotes. He gave no official reasons for taking such action. In doing so, he was violating an 1802 agreement he had made with Russia. In the Russo-Turkish Convention, signed in 1802, Selim had allowed Alexander to place Morousi and Ipsilanti in office for a term of seven years. These terms were not to be disrupted unless both powers agreed that there was just cause. Actually, over the years, Selim had complained to the Tsar about these hospodar's behavior, only to be ignored.

As a result, the Russians and British were incensed, suspecting that Selim's rash action was the product primarily of Sebastiani's intriguing. Yet, while the promises of the French to support the Ottoman Empire no doubt did playa role in influencing this action, it still appears that Selim had his own personal reasons for it as well. It is possible that Selim may have meant this to be an open signal to the Russians that the Ottoman Empire was now reasserting its independence. One scholar suggests that since the Russians were menacing the borders of Moldavia and Wallachia, then Selim may have hoped that such a forceful move would make him appear stronger in the eyes of his subjects. Regardless of what his reasons may have been, this action-was to produce results that were favorable to the French, but for which Selim was apparently little prepared.

War with Russia

Alexander immediately used the deposition of the hospodar princes as reason to move 35,000 Russian troops across the Dneister into the principalities. He also decided to now send money and arms to the Serbs. In addition, Russia and Britain now threatened war. The possible gravity of the situation must have hit Selim, for on the 16th of October, he quickly reversed his decision and reinstated Morousi and Ipsilanti. To understand why Selim was so shocked when Russia threatened war over this issue, it is necessary to know that during much of 1806, the Russian ambassador, Pierre Oubril, had been in Paris trying to negotiate an acceptable peace with Napoleon. He'd finally negotiated and even signed a treaty so humiliating to Russia that Alexander refused to accept it. Before the Tsar's refusal, however, Sebastiani told Selim of this treaty and recommended that Turkey now demonstrate the independence that France guaranteed her. Thus, Selim, unaware that the treaty between France and Russia had been rejected, must have felt that it safe for him to take such actions in the principalities. But, it was too late. Alexander now had a foothold in the Ottoman Empire that he would not easily relinquish. Because a Russo-Turkish war was what Napoleon desired most, Sebastiani continued to encourage Selim to stand up to the Tsar and to replace the princes once more.

In the meantime, the British ambassador, Arbuthnot, theorized that perhaps a show of force aimed against Constantinople would convince to Porte to abandon its relationship with the French and renew favorable relations with Britain and Russia. Thus he threatened Selim that if he did not dismiss Sebastiani from the court and return to his former alliances, then Constantinople would be attacked by a British war fleet. Once again, Selim appeared ready to give into threats, possibly because he realized that the fortifications and defenses of the city were not strong enough to fend off such an attack. However, when news of Napoleon's latest great victory over the Prussians at Jena-Auerstadt (October 14, 1806) was relayed by Sebastiani, this news (like that of Napoleon's previous victories) served to strengthen Selim's resolve.

In early December, 1806, Napoleon wrote to Selim:

"Prussia, who was in league with Russia, has been destroyed...(the) Poles have risen and formed armies to re-conquer their independence. It is the moment to re-conquer what is yours. Pursue the Hospodar rebels...in their place put true servants and the hospodars of your choice. Do not accord to the Serbs the concessions that they demand. I have charged my ambassador to contact you with all the necessary arrangements to yield long to Russia will weaken you and you will lose your empire."

Sebastiani echoed the words of his master to Selim, telling him that he must defy the Russians and that Napoleon would never abandon him. Yet at the same time, Sebastiani wrote back to France commenting on the poor, outdated condition of the shore batteries and other fortifications at Constantinople. Therefore, Sebastiani set out, with the help of engineers sent from the French army of General Marmont in Dalmatia, to begin at once to improve and fortify the city's defenses. The engineers worked on the fortifications of the city itself as well as those at the entrance of the port (apparently on both sides of the straits so as to catch the British fleet in a crossfire). Sebastiani informed Paris that 600 canons and mortars were put into the batteries as well as munitions and supplies for making red-hot shot.

It wasn't until December 12 that Selim received confirmation of the Russian occupation of the principalities. His only recourse seemed to be war. Thus, Selim made the fateful decision to request a formal alliance with France and to declare war on Russia and England. The declaration of war was issued against Russia on December 24, 1806.

By February 19, 1807, the British fleet of Admiral Duckworth made its way into the Sea of Marmara en route to Constantinople. Having had to wait for favorable winds had already slowed their mission and when the fleet finally arrived at the city, Arbuthnot wasted even more time trying to negotiate a peaceful solution. Sebastiani had told Selim and his council to stall the British for as long as possible.

All of this gave the French and Turks extra time in which to finish strengthening the fortifications. When the defenses were ready, Selim defied the British. Now finding the city too well defended to attack, Duckworth was compelled to withdraw by March 1. His fleet suffered heavy damage from the shore batteries as it left. It would seem then that instead of frightening the Turks into submission, Arbuthnot had succeeded only in pushing them closer into friendship with France. This victory was hailed throughout the city and no doubt helped to strengthen the relationship between the Porte and the French. Sebastiani received many gifts from the sultan and he and the French engineers were awarded the Order of the Crescent.

As soon as he learned of the failure of the British fleet, Napoleon felt that the time had come to turn the Ottoman Empire's military forces against Russia. He wrote to Selim: "Let me know of all your needs. I am sufficiently strong and sufficiently interested in your success, for reasons both of friendship and of policy, so that I shall refuse you nothing."

It would seem then that in the years since 1802, Napoleon and his ambassadors had now achieved the goal for which they had worked so hard: full military and diplomatic cooperation with the Turks. However, by mid 1807 events occurred which were to change not only the Ottoman Empire, but also the position it held in Napoleon's grand schemes.

After the failed Duckworth expedition, Selim's ability to effectively serve Napoleon militarily against Russia was decreased as a result of brewing internal crises in his empire. The military reforms, which Selim had been working toward since the beginning of his reign, had, as mentioned earlier, led to massive discontent within the janissary corps. In addition, Selim had also faced growing opposition to his reforms (as well as to his European tastes) within the ranks of the ulema. His main supporter within this body had been his friend, the Grand Mufti. Yet, upon his death in early 1807, opposition began to coalesce between members of the ulema and leading janissaries who plotted Selim's overthrow. Instead of forcefully dealing with these rebellious elements, Selim sought to appease them with concessions.

This failed to work. By late May / early June, the janissaries revolted and this revolt spread throughout parts of the empire. Eventually, Selim was deposed, imprisoned and replaced by his cousin, Mustafa IV, who immediately began dismantling the hated reforms. At first, Selim's overthrow alarmed the French. They wondered whether this revolt had occurred because of Selim's cooperation with them, and they worried that Mustafa might move to renew Ottoman relations with Great Britain and Russia. In the end, they were wrong on both counts.

Impact of the Treaty of Tilsit

Soon, however, this turn of events would matter little to Napoleon. Within two weeks of Selim's deposition, Napoleon won the decisive military victory over Russia, which he had longed for, at Friedland on June 14,1807. This victory gave Napoleon the hold he needed over Tsar Alexander. Thus his need for Ottoman support was no longer vital to his objectives. In addition, Napoleon felt that he was free to use the recent events in Constantinople as justification for entering into a separate peace with Russia.

The subsequent Treaty of Tilsit (signed July 7, 1807) ended the war between France and Russia. Because Napoleon needed this treaty to gain Russia's cooperation in the Continental System as well as its promise of neutrality (in regards to his efforts at this time against the British in Spain), he was willing to agree to many provisions that were prejudicial to his Turkish ally. Among the articles that dealt with the Ottoman Empire, the most shocking declaration was that France would abandon its alliance with the Turks, after which Napoleon would help to negotiate a peace between the Porte and Russia. In accordance with this, a secret clause further stipulated that if negotiations for a Russo-Turkish peace were to fail within three months time, Napoleon would join Alexander in making arrangements to partition areas of the Ottoman Empire. The treaty also called for Alexander to fully recognize all of Napoleon's conquests and to agree to withdraw his forces from Moldavia and Wallachia. Russia was also to abandon the Ionian Islands and the port of Cattaro (which Russia had seized since 1805) to Napoleon.

Thus, with the signing of this treaty it seems that, almost overnight, Napoleon's pro-Turkish policy was completely shoved into the background now that he'd achieved his objectives concerning Russia. Two days after the treaty was signed, Napoleon wrote to Talleyrand:

"...Commandant Guillemont...is to take a letter in which you will notify the Grand vizier of the peace that has been concluded and the articles of the treaty that concern the Porte He is to get the Grand vizier to suspend hostilities and to conclude an armistice with General Michelson who will evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia...but that the Turks are not to enter those provinces before the treaty is set. You must discern for my ambassador (Sebastiani) that my system concerning the Porte is shaky and at the moment of changing...that it depends on (whether) the best friendship exists between Russia and me… The Emperor Alexander has passed twenty days here and I have to hope that our union will be constant. Yet, the fate of Selim has been on my heart …"

When the news of Tilsit reached the Porte, the Turks were stunned and upset over the fact that such a treaty had been concluded without their even being invited to participate in decisions, which obviously affected their future. Napoleon may, as his letter indicates, or may not, have been truly concerned over Selim's fate and his future. Nevertheless, Tilsit dealt a huge blow to what little prestige the deposed sultan had left (given the fact that many blamed him solely for committing the empire to the policy of cooperating only with the French). When loyal Albanian troops attempted to free him, Selim was murdered by palace eunuchs. In the long run, it may have been better for Napoleon if Selim's overthrow had never happened. Later when he again wished the aid of the Ottoman Empire the new sultan would be less inclined than Selim to listen to his promises. However, it is possible that Tilsit might have served to turn Selim against Napoleon. Unfortunately historians will probably never know.

In addition, Napoleon's policy had now placed Sebastiani in the difficult position of convincing the Porte that they had not been "stabbed in the back" at Tilsit. Eventually, the Porte did accept this treaty primarily because of its promise of Russian withdrawal from the principalities. Yet, the Turks would not easily forget how Napoleon had dealt with them. For Napoleon, Tilsit was definitely a diplomatic victory. In sacrificing his Ottoman ally, he'd achieved the reestablishment of French control in the Adriatic as well as the other concessions and promises of cooperation from Russia. But after devoting so many years to building good relations with the Ottoman Empire, did he really mean now to join Russia in its dismemberment? Some scholars feel that this was not very likely. It is more probable that Napoleon had engaged in such schemes only to tempt Alexander or stall him with hopes of spoils in southeast Europe. Other scholars believe that Napoleon had not yet really decided whether to push for the integrity of the empire or for its annihilation. We may never know. But what is obvious, however (or became obvious in the months to follow) was how truly unstable the new Russian/French alliance was and how conflicting perceptions over the future of the Near East contributed to that instability.

As early as 1808, when Alexander and Napoleon met for a second time at Erfurt, discussions over a future partition of the Ottoman Empire became very heated, the two emperors wrangling over the issue "like an uncommitted crime." Napoleon absolutely refused to ever let Russia have Constantinople, that is, unless France could be given full control of the Dardanelles. This suggestion was out rightly refused by Alexander.

Eventually they decided that the topic should be shelved for the moment and both powers agreed to guarantee the integrity of all possessions of the Ottoman Empire (with the exception of the principalities). The French had achieved an armistice between Russia and Turkey on August 24, 1807 at Slobosia in Austria. But, by 1808, Alexander had still failed to pull his forces out of the principalities. At Erfurt Napoleon thus agreed to let Russia retain the principalities and now even said that he'd intervene in the Russo-Turkish war (on the side of Russia) in the event that Turkey was ever aided by an outside power. (Napoleon apparently made these promises in return for territorial concessions in Europe). The truce at Slobosia lasted a little under two years until finally the Turks realized that Russia had no intention of evacuating Moldavia and Wallachia. In addition, they were extremely bitter over the fact that Napoleon had sacrificed their interests.

1808 - 1815

The years 1808-1811 witnessed a steady breakdown not only of Russo-French relations, but also of Franco-Turkish ones as well. By 1811, Napoleon was contemplating an invasion of Russia and he therefore hoped to bring the Turks once more under his spell. In attempting to do this, he tried to seduce them with promises of spoils in the principalities and the Crimea. But, he was too late. Both the Porte and the new sultan, Mahmud II, exhausted from the years of fighting Russia, were by this time considering a peace with Alexander. Thus Napoleon's overtures fell upon deaf ears. One also has to consider that Britain was threatening that they would force the Dardanelles and burn Constantinople if the Turks accepted Napoleon's terms. But, in reality, the Turks needed little pressure. They'd already learned a hard lesson about trusting Napoleon's fickle promises.

In May 1812, just prior to Napoleon's ill-fated invasion of Russia, the Turks would sign the Peace of Bucharest with the Russians. As a result of this treaty, which ended a war from which both parties were anxious to withdraw, Turkey regained Moldavia and Wallachia in return for giving Bessarabia to the Russians. This time, they didn't require Napoleon's help to regain what was theirs.

Napoleon must have realized the mistake he had made in turning his back on his Ottoman ally. As for the Turks, they obviously realized the mistake they made in trusting the promises of Napoleon. In the end, it appears that the Ottoman Empire was merely a pawn in Napoleon's diplomatic game with his European rivals. Once he had achieved his goals, (or in the case of Russia, believed he'd achieved them), he left the Turks to fight a war into which he had encouraged them.

From 1812 to 1815, the major events of Napoleon's last years of power had little to do with the Near East. Faced by a plethora of problems in Europe and within France as well, Napoleon's attention was increasingly drawn away from diplomatic issues in the Near East as well as any other "oriental designs" he may have retained.

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