1808, the Point of Implosion for the Napoleonic Empire: How the Peninsular War shows that the Empire’s Policy of Enlargement Lacked a Political and Cultural Relativism
By: Ignacio Paz
The south of Spain is abound with scorching dry heat, vast expanses of empty, withering fields, dusty light-brown landscapes full of rock, clear cloudless blue skies, and lush olive trees that stand in opposition to growing desertification. The geography that was made famous by the many “Western” films that were shot there makes up the majority of Andalucia, an autonomous community in Spain whose economy relies on two essentials – agriculture and tourism. The coastal regions, which boast the “Costa del Sol,” are home to thousands of expats and are visited by many more. Naturally, the tourism industry has popularized the locales targeted by tourists, further increasing the historical knowledge of the locales. In contrast, visitors overlook the traditionally more agrarian inland area, and by extension its history is neglected. Nowhere is this better demonstrated than in the province of Jaen, which lacks even a famous city from which to profit. Few would guess the historical importance of Jaen. There, amidst the crops and the rocky countryside, a battle was fought that marked the beginning of the end for one of the world’s most powerful empires. There, Napoleon Bonaparte’s project for a European union began to crack due to overexpansion.
Historians have fiercely debated why Napoleon Bonaparte intervened in Spain, and there is still no consensus. There may never be; Napoleon has been described as “a character unfinished, like Hamlet; and like Hamlet, a puzzle – full of contradictions, sublime and vulgar.” It goes without saying that if Napoleon is an unfinished character, then his acts, policies, and ideas are his unfinished dialogues. Still, historians attempt to discern them, and I will attempt to define Napoleon’s ambiguous ideas as well, in particular, how they connect to the Peninsular War of 1808. However, this thesis does not attempt to explain why Napoleon risked his Empire by intervening in the Iberian Peninsula, except for a brief commentary; nor does this thesis attempt to link Napoleon’s expansion of 1808 with his others; It also does not attempt to compare the Napoleonic Empire with the European Union (and explain the implications of such comparisons), except for the obvious allusions. Instead, this thesis attempts to explain why Spanish opposition to a French-imposed regime was so strong – perhaps the strongest of oppositions by the locals than in any other part of French-controlled Europe. But it will do so, not by invoking the traditional causes of “rey, religion y patria,” but by examining the Peninsular War as an example of the Empire’s disregard for the social and cultural differences between Spaniards and the rest of Europe and its lack of insight into the politics of Spanish society.
The elements of regionalism and socio-cultural differences were much stronger causes than the classic argument of “King, religion and motherland” in fermenting opposition to French occupation. The issue of socio-cultural differences can only be explored by looking at the diverging identities between Spaniards and the rest of Europe, a gap made even more apparent when many of Europe’s countries began to identify themselves more and more as a cosmopolitan society inspired by or in opposition to the French Empire. The Empire’s revamped notion of citizenship allowed for a break from the past in how the nations of Europe identified with each other and how each nation identified itself. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire redefined it as a pledge of loyalty to a state-building government that in turn works for the betterment of the society under its jurisdiction while abiding to the many human rights and ideals made popular. Conversely, Spaniards’ notions of citizenship were extremely weak and tied to the institution of monarchy and the Catholic Church. But before examining the differences between the two models it is necessary to explain the development of a Spanish cultural identity.”
To suggest that all Spaniards shared a common cultural identity may be naïve, considering the regionalist tendencies of the society, which will be discussed in a later section. For the sake of this thesis’ argument, it suffices to say, however, that even if the cultural identities in the peninsula were just as divisive as its politics, they shared a lot more with each other than with the rest of Europe. That said, Spanish identity was in no way a natural force – it was constructed in a variety of ways, and, for all its intents and purposes, failed to root in Spanish society. It did, however, succeed in making Spaniards believe they were part of a community that was somehow fundamentally different from the rest of Europe.
The beginning of the construction of a Spanish identity is very easy to date: 1492. This was when Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castille completed the Reconquista of Christian Spain with the fall of Granada, the last Moorish stronghold. Soon afterwards they issued an edict that expelled the Jewish population, and 10 years later they would enforce a similar pragmatic toward all unconverted Moors. The issue of ‘Spanishness’ became fixed with the Roman Catholic faith. Spaniards were once again part of Christian Europe; they were reunited with their European brothers. At least, that’s what it would seem on the surface. It would seem that religion helped to create homogeneity to the country – homogeneity being a key step in the development of many later nation-states. However, the link between Spanish identity and religion is a superficial one. Despite the use of the Inquisition as a means to homogeneity, like later countries would do with the rail system and mail post, the state could only prove one’s faithfulness to a point, and in the end the Inquisition’s intrusion into the private life has been grossly overestimated. Current genetics have revealed that the numbers of Jews and Moors who converted has been greatly underestimated, suggesting that as much as 20 and 11 percent of the population on the peninsula today has Sephardic Jewish and Moorish ancestry, respectively. Most of the converts did so unenthusiastically (the main goal of the Inquisition was to find out the ‘false’ converts) and fostered a detachment to Catholicism within the family in various ways. In addition, revisionist historians such as Edward Peters and Henry Kamen argue that while there were periods of heavy activity during the reigns of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Inquisition quickly became a venue to simply humiliate people whose neighbors had grudges against them for some reason or another. It did however play a critical role in censorship, especially during the Counter-Reformation, which was seen as a life-or-death struggle for Spain’s link to Rome and the rest of Europe (with the thought that the Roman Catholic Church was much more invulnerable outside of Spain due to its test of time).
The fervor through which the Spanish monarchy and the Inquisition suppressed possible heretical works during the Counter Reformation could be a reason for why literacy was so discouraged. While it would become much more flexible in the 18th century in allowing works of the ‘Enlightenment’ to enter Spain, the problem of literacy was still around (the literacy rate did not reach 30 percent until 1860, while it had already reached 50 percent for France at the outbreak of the French Revolution), and it would indirectly hinder Spain’s possible acquiescence in following a ‘French’ regime because of the average Spaniard’s inability to absorb such works.
Ironically, even as Spain attempted to link itself with the rest of Europe and be the best European (i.e. Catholic) country, a backlash occurred against Spaniards in the public opinion of several countries. Rome and its Pope were of course extremely proud in Spain’s religious zeal, even if such zeal was just on paper, and this pride is what led to Ferdinand and Isabella being named Los Reyes Católicos. However, with the instigation of the Protestant Reformation by Martin Luther in the 16th century, things that appeared, or even smelled, of corrupted Rome-based Catholicism were critiqued like never before. Spanish history and the homogeneity of Spain became termed as La Leyenda Negra. The legend as prescribed by (mostly) Protestant and Anglo-Saxon historians and writers depicted the Inquisition as an evil machine of torture chambers and mass executions run collectively by the Church and the Spanish monarchy. Even in those countries that were solidly Catholic
Though the Spanish monarchy vehemently stuck to religion as the basis of its identity, many other groups began to use other, non-religious, terms to categorize the elite humans of the European continent. Some believed this identity was based on geographical terms, others thought it had to do with climate, and a growing group believed it had to do with a progressive agenda of political rights. The latter form of identity gave ‘European’ a “cultural, humanistic value based on the traditions of the so-called classics, on the cult of ancient Rome, on the study of ancient thought.” Increasingly, this thought was expressed through works of the pen, which meant, as Roberto Dainatto said, that if countries like Italy or Spain had not “participated in this progress of letters, could they be said to be Europe at all?” France was famously the heart of this movement, and many of its Enlightened philosophers began to argue that the spread and bonds of enlightened letters could create a cosmopolitan civilization where the barriers of nationality would be broken. The Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers was an early attempt to showcase fields that were nationality-blind and be further advanced by all Europeans; however, as Dainatto again says so well: “The universalistic claim of the Encyclopedie’s cosmopolitanism was doomed to encounter the diffidence of any parts of humankind, let alone Europe, that did not feel exactly French. Was it possible that, in order to become cultured, modern, and European, one had to become, also, French?” It’s this question that really strikes a chord with the theme of this thesis – did ideas that were molded so heavily by the French inherently make them French? And if others followed them, were they attempting to be French? There are those that would agree, while others would argue that the ideas, though expressed in a language of nationality (for a lack of any other language), could be applied to foster a cosmopolitan civilization. The dialectic is similar to the argument today of whether Georgians supporting ‘Western’ parties are supporting the West, or just its ideals, or both.
Spaniards, who were increasingly described as religious fanatics and lacking any ‘European’ qualities, were hostile to a French-oriented form of societal identity from the start. Strongly regionalist, they were already struggling to accept the idea of a national form of identity – to expect them to think in broader terms would be naïve. To add fuel to the fire, the negative perception of Spain had evolved from La Leyenda Negra to have an arguably ethnic tone that covered the entire people. Montesquie’s Lettres Persanes, for example, demonstrates how the French viewed Spaniards as devoid of culture and reason. This attitude was not solely directed towards Spaniards, though, which led to revisions of a ‘European’ identity formed around thought. Giambattisto Vico of Italy and Johann Gottfried von Herder of (what came to be) Germany created an “ideology and methodology of a subaltern Europe [that was]…pitted against the unbearable hegemony of France.” Spain had Juan Andrés, a philosopher, historian and Jesuit. When Charles III expelled the Jesuits, Andrés moved to Italy where he was confronted by accusations from Italians that Spain had corrupted Italian taste. In retaliation he wrote Dell'origine, progresso e stato attuale d'ogni letteratura that argued that “the first flashes, which gave blinded Europe some light, came from Spain; therefore we can reasonably say that the origin of modern literature derived from Spain”. As the crossroads of different cultures, Spain was at a unique position to take advantage of the best parts of each of them, such as Jewish economic ingenuity and Arab poetry. The country was “the synthesis of world culture… Even more important, Spain was depicted as the origin of all that is modern in Europe – the origin of rhymed poetry, of the roman, and of modern theater.”
To classify Andrés as a nationalist would be unfair – he used a nationalist discourse to counter anti-Spanish sentiments, but he was committed to a cosmopolitan outlook of society. It was the later use of his works by extremely nationalist and patriarchal people like Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo (considered as a Spanish Fichte) in the late nineteenth century that distorted opinion of him. Once again, Dainotto explains this distortion well:
The work that was supposed to decenter a profoundly Francocentric Europe; the work that was supposed to undermine the presuppositions of a nationalistic way of looking at literature through the magic of a nascent comparativism – this same work became a nationalist monument to Spain’s nostalgias and ambitions.
Andrés also played into the argument over the competing superiority of northern and southern Europe, which has been suggested prompted Germaine de Stael to talk of the superiority of German culture. Still others thought Andrés was simply using a nice, fluffy cosmopolitan language in order to hide his nationalistic intentions; Rousseau was one of the more famous skeptics of cosmopolitanism, because he believed that behind such concepts “lurked the hegemony of some state powers – France, or even Russia in the case of Poland – which were arrogant enough to legitimate their interests, ambitions, and even ways of living as universal or European.” By 1808 the different takes on Andrés’ work was known by most Spaniards, but the most accepted ones were the anti-cosmopolitan, and the more ethnocentric interpretations. Spain was rife with anti-foreign sentiment, but particularly against French modes of thought.
As explained, by the time of the French Revolution the French had come to believe themselves to be the carriers of a new cosmopolitan way of life. The different nationalities of Europe were in fact not foreign, but regarded as long lost brothers, and they believed in the plausibility of recovering their fraternité. After coming to power Napoleon attempted to institutionalize this ‘way of life’ via his Empire, which was a pinnacle of centralization and standardization arguably unmatched until the European Union – in short, he “favored rules of universal application.” At the same time, he recognized that “National habits” were necessary to respect the traditions of the different ethnicities in the Empire. This was not necessarily a new concept. It was the legacy of the empires before Napoleon – the Roman Empire, and Charlemagne’s Empire. More importantly, he tried to emulate the universality of these past empires, relying strongly on the tool of modernity. This included the philosophes’ idea of civilization as a “progress of reason” and was applied to the economy to encourage innovation and on civil law through the Code Civil to encourage an imagined political community. It was hoped this community could form a political unity of Europe, just as it was believed there was a historical unity of Europe, and the bonds would be based on ideals of the Enlightenment, so embodied in France herself. Furthermore, Napoleon believed wholeheartedly that the modernity’s integration would be more useful in creating an empire “as a confederation in the model of ancient Greek federations or of the American Congress” much more than any battle.
This was easier said than done, however. Military mass conscription forced thousands of Frenchmen, who would have otherwise remained in France, to venture out to the different corners of Europe. To them, it was difficult to get over the cultural differences they encountered, and many of the new regimes that were set up were run primarily by the French with local collaborators - a gesture that many of the locals viewed as culturally snobbish. Conversely, the French-run/organized regimes frequently thought the locals were being obstructionist in taking such a long time to accept their better ideas and rights, and for that reason few regimes completely revolutionized their territory and instead slowly introduced progressive laws. 
What the Napoleonic Empire failed to grasp was that the forced liberation of non-French people was in itself a form of cultural imperialism. The act of one group imposing its ideas on another group, however beneficial or universal they might be, implies that the former group of people believe themselves superior to the latter group, simply adding to the tension between the two. It is the debate of our times – what is the legality of expecting a set of values to be adhered to across borders and cultures? What determines one set of values to be superior over another? One answer to these questions is the idea of ‘cultural relativism’ in dealing with issues; one must examine issues within the local culture. The more divergent the culture is, the more pertinent it is for one to understand it, and the more solvent different cultures are, the easier and fairer it is to apply a common set of values to deal with issues. So, when the philosopher Immanuel Kant said that a “cosmopolitan constitution” could only occur once “all the societies of the world were ruled by republican and representative governments” he is implying that republican virtues are superior, but that it cannot be imposed – if they are indeed superior, then all cultures will eventually have them, albeit gradually.
However, is Kant’s logic justified? If a person sees someone starving, even if it is for cultural reasons, his first impulse is to help them. Additionally, historical examples have time and time again proven that there are criteria that can be used to measure the ‘rightness’ of a people’s values and laws. These include, but are not limited to: how the society in question treats its members, particularly the disadvantaged like the poor or women; its economy, life expectancies, child mortality rates, and the sustainability of its relations with its neighbors and environment. The Napoleonic Empire improved these aspects, except for its sustainability. This was ultimately caused by the Empire’s commitment to homogeneity of ideals. Though Darwin’s survival of the fittest theory was not around to lead people to think that the key to survival was for everyone in their society to be all the same, rid of weak links, a similar line of thought was introduced by the French Revolution. A society could only be as good as its weakest republican. Scientifically, we now know that diversity makes a society stronger. The legacy of the Empire would be recycled in the European Union, but with heavy modifications, one of which was the motto “Unity in Diversity” – the strength of Europe is now based on the diversity of cultures and ideas (to a point), as shown by Europe’s rising, but unitary, regionalism.
So now that the development of Spain’s identity in the context of ‘Europe’ has been explained, I will discuss how its internal conflicting identities, as expressed by regionalism, contributed profusely against the regime of Spain’s most underappreciated monarch – Joseph Bonaparte.
“Patriotism in the modern sense did not exist in Spain, and, what is more, could not exist, for the country had not gone through the processes that were the sine qua non of such feelings.”
The classic interpretation of the Spanish War of Independence reduces its reasons to “patria, rey, religion”, and while they are significant in explaining the strength of the opposition against the French, there is a lot more subtlety with these terms than has rarely been explored before. The war cannot be simplified in these three categories alone; the reasons for the conflict are multi-faceted and diverse, and are all interconnected in various ways. However, the overarching sentiment of regionalism in Spain can perhaps best explain the fundamental basis for the struggle, while taking into account the intricacies that formed and created the structure of Spanish society. Explaining how the society was structured helps to understand its culture and its flaws and strengths, and demonstrates how and why these elements played out amidst the forced juxtaposition of the French model that came about in 1808.
Affairs, corruption, political and family intrigue, and backstabbing; these terms are usually associated with a television soap opera, but in the Spain of 1808 it was real life. Few European monarchies during the Napoleonic era were free of black sheep: Czar Paul of Russia, King George III of Great Britain and Queen Maria I of Portugal were all three mentally unstable, and many more rulers were either dimwitted or downright moronic. But, “among this collection of grotesques, the royal family of Spain set a record of viciousness and moral degradation.” After the enlightened despotism of Charles III the Spanish people had the unfortunate luck to be ruled by his piggish son Charles IV, though ‘ruled’ is too generous a term. While Charles IV was a classic Bourbon ruler, devoting most of his energy to workshop craft rather than statecraft, the real ruler was the Prime Minister Manuel de Godoy. Godoy had quickly risen as the favorite at court, helped by the fact that he was sleeping with the Queen Maria Luisa. It is a rather sad commentary on Charles IV that almost everybody in Spain except him knew of the relationship between the Queen and Prime Minister.
Though Manuel de Godoy was very skilled, having made peace with France in 1795 and subsequently an alliance, he was ruthless, greedy and immoral. His extremely outspoken manners made him many enemies, with Prince Ferdinand as the most hateful and profiled one. Ferdinand was widely know to also despise his parents, and after gathering a group of anti-Godoyists around him, called “el Cuarto del Principe,” attempted to stage a coup. Godoy soon learned of the plans and informed Charles IV who threw his son in jail and tried him for treason. After a verdict of “not guilty” in January 1808 he was released, though kept at a distance and mistrusted by the court. All this Napoleon watched with disdain – the idea of the Spanish people being stuck with despicable rulers like Charles IV just proved to Napoleon the just cause of the Empire’s expansion – but also with an eye for opportunity.
Napoleon had always taken the alliance with Spain with a grain of salt, never quite trusting the rulers he viewed with such disgust. Nevertheless, he decided to suck Spain for all it was worth, which was usually not much. Its colonies proved useless because of British blockades, and an attempt to destroy the British fleet with the combined Spanish and French fleets failed at Trafalgar in 1805. Surely, though, Spain could help Napoleon’s Continental System. Napoleon had introduced the system as a common market for his Empire, allies and satellite states, such as Spain. Part of its regulation entailed that Great Britain could not partake in trade with this common market, in the hopes that Napoleon could economically beat the British into submission and force them to sue for peace. Though its benefits are heavily criticized, the Continental System undoubtedly helped to foster a “sense of continental solidarity…largely in opposition to Britain, as ‘Europeans’ became conscious for the first time of their economies existing in some sort of whole.” It’s worth pondering that this example of European conceptualization could hardly be fostered in Spain, as its ports would soon be in ‘rebel’ control and would be trading with their future allies, the British. Still, Spain was pretty diligent in enforcing the Continental System during the years it was allied to Napoleon. Its neighbor, Portugal, was not.
Convincing the Spanish government to let the French army cross its country on its way to conquer Portugal was hardly an effort. On the contrary, Godoy readily agreed, with the stipulation that a piece of Portugal would become his principality. The deal was finalized in the Treaty of Fontainebleau, signed on October 29, 1807. Less than two months later, the French captured Lisbon. However, Godoy soon realized that Napoleon was never going to given a piece of Portugal to him and thought of using the Spanish people against the French forces. He had already published in 1806 a Manifest to the Spanish Nation, which was an appeal to insurrection against an ambiguous enemy, which had incidentally blackened his image forever in Napoleon’s eyes. So Napoleon knew that his short time ally could become a potential enemy. Using the pretense of Portugal Napoleon sent more and more troops into northern Spain, quietly taking control of Barcelona and Pamplona, until there were 100,000 French troops in Spain.
The Spanish court, as usual, was slow to react and in the end decided that resistance was futile, choosing instead to fly to America. They made it only 48 kilometers outside of Madrid when a mob of soldiers and peasants invaded the palace they were staying at in the town of Aranjuez – though some historians have linked this “Flight to Aranjuez” to the “Flight to Varennes” the Spanish story is under a completely different pretense, and the mob’s target was not the King, but Godoy, who was viewed as the reason for all of Spain’s problems. The court in turn pressured Charles IV to abdicate in favor of his son, who was soon proclaimed King Ferdinand VII. The new King turned around and returned to Madrid, which was now occupied by the French under Marshal Murat. Now safe, Charles IV attempted to regain his throne and appealed to Napoleon through letters. The Emperor now had his opportunity, and played the two competing monarchs against each other, tricking them into coming for a meeting to the town of Bayonne at the French border, without each knowing the other would be there. As soon as Ferdinand arrived Napoleon placed him under arrest and ordered him to abdicate his throne in favor of his father, who shortly thereafter arrived and tried to hit him with his cane. After a few days of silence, Ferdinand agreed and handed the throne to Charles IV, who had already made a deal to hand it over to Napoleon. The documents signed to legitimize the deal were signed on May 5 and 6. Charles IV, his wife and Godoy (who had remained with them throughout the ordeals of the previous two months) left for a life in exile while Ferdinand was placed under house arrest at the French foreign minister Talleyrand’s chateau of Valency.
Napoleon’s decision to intervene and kick out the country’s rulers was without a doubt one of his most important ones. Did he not see the dangers in this? Did he not himself discourage rash revolutionary tactics, but instead encouraged gradual introduction of liberal, modern institutions? The basic answer that I have found is that Napoleon’s Republican/Robespierre side got the better of him – nothing but a complete switch of the current corrupt Bourbon dynasty could regenerate the Spanish people. As for the reactions of the people? Napoleon’s greatest failure is perhaps that he “judged nations by the sample of their rulers.” The idea that Spaniards would ever cause a stir because of Charles IV or Ferdinand VII did not once enter his mind – here was a complete lack of political and cultural relativism on the part of Napoleon.
The fact was that the Spanish people had an extremely unique political system to the rest of Europe – it was very federalist, which would seem to beg the question: why didn’t that mash well with the Empire? Quite simply, the Spanish people did not realize this and it was never planned for Spain to be incorporated into the Empire per se, but be a satellite state, though the term as it turned out should have rather been ‘satellite states of Spain’. Few realize that the term “the Spanish state” is a misnomer during the Peninsular War. What consisted of Spain was an assortment of crowns ambiguously brought together by a coercive monarch. The state to a Spaniard at the highest level would mean the monarchy, and while the institution was supreme it was supported insofar as the integrity of localism was intact and did not do too bad of a job. Even when the people regarded the reign of Charles IV as inept, they blamed his minister. Still, they did not hesitate to replace their loyalties to Ferdinand even as Charles continued to breathe. The fluidity of the monarchial ties to the people underlies the importance of regionalism and it was not new – the old Hapsburg dynasty was replaced the Spanish War of Succession by the Bourbons just a hundred years before.
The suggestion that ‘Spain’ never formed into a modern nation-state comparable to France or Great Britain is ironic when considered that Spain was one of the first countries to introduce the “early modern absolutist state,” an antecedent of the nation-state. Soon afterwards, the development of the absolutist state of Spain stagnated along with the economy and culture for a variety of reasons. For the next couple centuries identity was more similar to one found in an empire – the Spanish state was an empire, with Castile (Madrid) at its core and the rest of the country in a loose allegiance to it. What brought them together was the continuation of the imperialist project overseas (which caused an amnesiac effect on people to forget the political inequalities at home) and Catholicism, the only uniform policy pursued by the Ferdinand and Isabelle, and a very realist one: “In a country so totally devoid of political unity as the new Spain, a common faith served as a substitute.” Other than this Spain’s states were governed by their own traditional laws, making Spain a plural rather than unitary state. Their political identity was based on regions and any allegiance to the monarchy was based on a common “civilizational identity, not a national one.”
Meanwhile, back at the capital rumors were spreading about the French kidnapping their monarchs and when French forces tried to escort the remaining members of the royal family, the 13-year-old Prince Francisco’s crying “set off a revolution.” The anxious crowds outside the palace at the Plaze de Oriente attacked the French soldiers, who in turn shot and dispersed the crowd. More attacks were to follow, though, leading to the casualties of over 30 French and several hundred Spaniards. Goya’s Dos de Mayo immortalized the day. Having pacified Madrid Murat recommenced that a convening of grandees and notables, similar to an Estates-General, appeal to Napoleon for a new king. Napoleon likewise asked and 91, almost two-thirds of them, went to Bayonne, and proclaimed the Emperor’s brother Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain on June 15, as duly constituted by the new constitution. At the same time widespread revolts were destabilizing the country, which were in reaction to the foreign army occupying their lands, not necessarily against the new king. However, because of Spain’s particular regionalism, it had to look for a ‘national’ leader for the people to rally for, and found him in Ferdinand VII, Ferdinand El Deseado.
Joseph Bonaparte was Napoleon’s eldest brother; he was good-natured, honest, and had strong republican virtues. There is no doubt he would have introduced great and badly needed reforms to Spain, but he was different from most of the French in that he understood the importance to respect and maintain the institutions of the people whose land he was now in. He planned on letting the Church relatively continue its stronghold over the lower masses, and letting the feudalism of Spain remain intact for the time being. He planned on gaining the trust of the people, he was to be their king, their premier representative. He would look out for their interests and not France, a source of repeated friction between Napoleon and Joseph. While Joseph should be commended for his cultural relativism, he lacked a political one and failed to realize that Spain’s regionalism, which was already a hindrance to the previous monarchs, would not allow for the sort of political homogeneity that he was expecting to deal with. The most important one being how he believed that the French forces could leave after entering Madrid. Though he was right in wishing their leave as soon as possible to gain the trust of the people seizing Madrid did not mean seizing Spain; “to occupy Vienna might mean to conquer Austria. To occupy Berlin might be to conquer Prussia. But Madrid had no such dominating position in Spanish sentiment.”
Spain’s regionalism had made it difficult for the Catholic Monarchs to choose a capital without offending a region, and perhaps that is why they alternated frequently between cities, and chose Granada, a city untouched by the regionalism, as a main capital. Philip II would create a capital in his image in 1561, and chose the very center of Spain, a move suggesting intentions to buildup the heart of Spain. Instead, it led to increased antagonisms between Castile and the other regions, as Madrid more and more sucked the resources from its surrounding areas. A regional dialectic, similar to the North versus South one of Italy, began between the center and the periphery, accentuated by the overseas imperialist project, which logically should have spurred the importance of the coastal cities, but instead profited Madrid as all trade had to be relegated to the capital first.
The regionalism allowed for most of the Spanish army to leave Madrid and prepare against the French. At the same time, the different regions proclaimed Juntas in a declaration of independence – it is notable that Junta of Seville gave itself the title of “Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies,” a claim that the other local juntas refused to accept. Catalonia was perhaps the most regionalist part of Spain and its tradition of guerrilla warfare spread throughout much of Spain. So, while Joseph did not want to play the part of conqueror, he realized that he needed the French army to pacify the country, after which time he promised he would gain the trust of the people. He did not have much time to do so, when General Castaños defeated the French under Dupont at Bailen on July 19, forcing Joseph to evacuate Madrid. This opportunity to take Madrid was wasted by the rebels, however, at the instance of Seville to have celebrations of the victory. General Castaños soon realized that the main cause of delay was the city’s intentions to use his army against the Junta of Granada, highlighting the danger that Spain would disintegrate in petty quarrels. At the urging of the general, a meeting and creation of a Supreme Central Junta occurred in September. They could hardly agree on anything – the easiest subject was that of allying with the British, who had already landed in Portugal.
The missed opportunity allowed for Napoleon to personally command a French army and take back Madrid on December 3. However, here Napoleon as well missed an opportunity: the repeated victories of the French over the Spaniards had left the rebels in disarray, but were not broken. If he had listened to Joseph, who had begun to understand the reality of Spain, Napoleon should have increased the army and created a thrusting movement throughout the whole of Spain, a surge so to speak. Instead, he returned to Paris and left command of the inadequate armies to several generals, none of who followed Joseph’s orders against pillaging, which only increased the locals’ hatred of the French. Joseph’s arguments for control over the French armies fell on deaf ears back in Paris: “An enslaved Spain will be an enemy from the start. A free Spain will always be a friend.”
Despite the overwhelming obstacles in front of him, Joseph Bonaparte did his best to overturn public opinion. He knew better than anyone the importance of this ‘cultural relativism’ when it came to Spain and repeatedly tried use a variety of tools of public discourse to link himself with the Spanish cultural heritage, such as the theatre. He supported Spanish theatre that “underscored the ‘enlightened’ nature of his reign and which attempted to link him with the Spanish national past”; he created dozens of little plazas in Madrid to open up the city; he made plans for Goya to run his future Prado museum; he even appointed Juan Andrés the royal librarian. All this demonstrates Joseph’s desperate attempt to show himself as a Spaniard – he was now José Bonaparte. He was the monarch that regularly visited the wounded in the hospital, who offered amnesties to rebels, who went to bull-fights (legend has it that the modern colorful outfits were designed by Goya on Joseph’s initiative) and mingled with Spanish society as much as possible. He formed a capable administration of Afrancesados, or ‘Frenchified’ by their enemies, which included many of the enlightened Charles III’s regime. Many of them did not necessarily support the French but saw in Joseph as the carrier of all the reforms needed to complete Spain’s unification with Europe. Try as he might in having a cultural relativism, Joseph did not understand the ambiguity of a Spanish culture, there were many Spanish cultures.
Unfortunately for Joseph, his influence could not change rural opinion at all, which was so heavily under Church domination. This is not to say, however, that the Church was an even stronger factor than regionalism; on the contrary, they are intertwined. The regionalism of rural versus urban had led to Catholicism’s strength in the rural areas in the first place, which was seen as a way to communicate and find their own political space. As in any historical narrative it is important not to let ulterior motives cloud the interpretation. Too often history is hijacked by special interests and the Spanish struggle in 1808-1814 is no exception. The conflict that consumed Spain has been called many things: for conservatives it was a “Catholic crusade for throne and altar” and the Marxist interpretation shows it as struggle empowered by the lower classes, but almost all of Spanish historiography defines it as a nationalist war, despite the anachronistic implications. There was a Patria to be sure, but it was one related to a region, for “a Spaniard’s natural emotional loyalty is to his pueblo, to his province.” More importantly, they identified themselves against other Spaniards from different villages or provinces, and even more so against all foreigners. This concept of municipal patriotism is easy to understand when one remembers that the country was never politically unified.
The idea of the Peninsular War as a manifestation of the Spanish people rising up in a rush of nationalism has been created in part by myth. Interestingly, non-Spaniards were the main perpetrators in establishing this nationalist myth. The Leyenda Negra became proof of the Spanish will to continue its own path, however distorted, for the sake of patriotism. At the same time, the British created a romanticizing of Spain due to its adventure and sense of passionate purpose. Literature on the subject in Great Britain skyrocketed and launched a myth of Spain as a backward, passionate, quaint country full of flamenco dancers and peasants who still believed that Jews had horns and tails. The myth of the Peninsular War as the battleground of Europe has received huge boosts by institutions like the European Commission that promulgate the idea of a “People’s Europe” and a construction of “an imagined European Community” via history.
Another important factor was that so few people realized the benefits of Joseph’s regime. This was partly because Joseph hardly ever controlled more than Madrid, but it was more so because he failed to take into account the complexities of Spanish society. Its framework was very different from the rest of Europe. Though it was divided by three estates, their concept of nobility meant “only honorific privileges,” and the middle class was made of many lesser nobles called hidalgos, and some entire groups believed they were nobles by birth even if it not recognized by the state, such as the Biscayans. So while the Napoleonic Empire could take advantage of the support of the lower classes that felt like lower classes in other countries, in Spain, there was no “political vacuum” for Spaniards to feel roused to support Joseph Bonaparte in significant numbers.
Without a doubt, however, the biggest problem to Joseph was Napoleon who refused to understand this cultural relativism and viewed the Spanish as merely a rabble. Inevitably, this led to greater numbers of British troops entering the Peninsula, the Junta successfully fortifying itself and holding out at Cadiz, and guerrilla forces terrorizing the French and the afrancesados. After 5 years of anxiety, depressions, ridicule and 4 threats of abdication Joseph Bonaparte left Madrid for good in 1813, when General Arthur Wellsley turned the tide in Spain and eventually was knocking at the southern gates of France in 1814. Joseph’s tale is one of regret, regret for what could have been in Spain. Instead, Spain was ripped apart by its memoire of collaborators, loyalists, and within those camps conservatives and liberals. It opened the floodgates of regionalism, which arguably flooded the country up until the Spanish Civil War of 1936. The greatest regret of all, is the fact that the restored Ferdinand VII, in whose name thousands (perhaps as many as a million) of Spaniards died, revoked any of the reforms achieved and reinstituted the Inquisition that Joseph had abolished. Soon the people would turn against him, and ironically the French would intervene to restore him not even a decade later. The notorious guerrilla leader of northern Spain, Francisco Espoz y Mina visited Joseph years after the war in England and “regretted that Jose Primo was no longer king of Spain, the restored monarch, Ferdinand VII, being such a tyrant. Espoz told Joseph he would have accepted him as king if he had dismissed his generals and French troops.” It appears that Joseph’s relativism was right all along.
It’s similar to many tales of Restoration Europe, except those smart enough, kept many of the reforms and benefits of the Napoleonic Empire. With the knowledge of the 20th century, one can better appreciate the Napoleonic Empire for its similarities to the European Union. It demonstrates the description of Napoleon as a man of two worlds – the old and new. He was a man ahead of his times, as well as of it, which perhaps reveals the greatest problem with his form of government. The mix of traditionalism and modernity could never work; one would inevitably have to beat the other. Yet the mix was done by Napoleon with the idea that it would be a system that could better confront the overwhelming models of the ‘old world’ – to play their game and hopefully beat them at it. This logic is inherently paradoxical, and yet the restoration governments upheld the hybrid characteristics of the system.
And yet for all its merits the Empire lacked the foresight to realize the backlash when a people feel their identity is being wiped out systematically. And the Spanish people had good reason to fear that would happen to them – most of Europe seemed to be ‘French’, were they going to allow it? It seems Napoleon took a people too much with the Peninsular War. While the Napoleonic Empire prided itself on its centralization and lack of political or cultural (as far as ideas) diversity, Spain was the opposite. But Spain would be a rare case in which the majority of its people maintained the traditional values. And it was Napoleon’s inability to understand this – to not understand how a people could not appreciate the benefits he brought, that led to the great implosion of his Empire.
And if practicality is what matters, then one can question the practicality of Napoleon’s Empire. Not in its justifications, but in its logistics. The democratization of the empire can be seen in its senate, which did a fair job in representing the different peoples under its jurisdiction. However, to create the political unity that Napoleon had wanted there would have been need of a mass media that carried the message of the state to all the people – which in turn demands relative similar and strong levels of educations across the continent as well as thousands of translators to better incorporate the different cultures. Perhaps, as Biancamaria Fontana has suggested, ‘national sentiment’ was logistically better suited for society to politically communicate due to the technical (in)capabilities of the time. That does not necessarily mean nationalism, but more of a localism, an idea championed by Germaine de Stael. The alternative was not a Europe “dominated by the more advanced and sophisticated French culture, but of an integrated unity that depended on a variety of traditions and local experiences to preserve political liberty as well as to promote artistic achievement.”
Using the Peninsular War as a case study for the relevance and importance of a cultural and political relativism can benefit interventions of a similar nature in the future. The war has been described as “Napoleon’s Vietnam”, but it is more similar to the Iraq War. The comparison of the Peninsular War to the Iraq War serves, not to make a political statement about the validity of intervention, but to explain the effectiveness of intervention. Respect for the way things are run, the processes of the society, are key in being partners, not occupiers, and even then, the indigenous society could want to manage things for themselves. For as J. Christopher Herald says, no matter how ‘right’ an outside society’s values might be “the consistent liberal must concede that a nation has a duty to defend the values it believes in, even if they happen to be impractical or different form his or her values.”
Andreas Fahrmeir in Napoleon and his Empire: Europe, 1804-1814, ed. Philip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
Anthony Pagden, The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 2006).
Binacamara Fontana, “The Napoleonic Empire and the Europe of Nations,” in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (U.S.A.: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 2006)
Charles Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon: guerillas, bandits and adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814 (New Haven, 2004)
Charles J. Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
Cris Shore, “Inventing the ‘People’s Europe’: Critical Approaches to European Community ‘Cultural Policy’,” Man, 28 (Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 1993), p. 779-800.
David T. Gies, “Glorious Invalid: Spanish Theater in the Nineteenth Century,” Hispanic Review, 61 (University of Pennsylvania Press, Spring 1993), p. 213-245.
Diego Saglia, “ ‘O My Mother Spain!’: The Peninsular War, Family Matters, and the Practice of Romantic Nation-Writing,” ELH, 65 (The John Hopkins University Press, Summer 1998), p. 363-393.
Douglas W. Foard, “The Spanish Fichte: Menéndez y Pelayo,” Journal of Contemporary History, 14 (Jan. 1979), p. 83-97.
Edward Peters, Inquisition (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1988)
Gabriel Tortella, The Development of Modern Spain: An Economic History of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Trans. Valerie J. Herr (United State: Harvard University Press, 1994, 2000).
Heinrich von Brandt, In the Legions of Napoleon: The Memoirs of a Polish Officer in Spain and Russia, 1808-1813, trans by Jonathan North (London: Greenhill Books, 1999)
Henry Kamen, The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision (United States: Yale University Press, 1997, 1998).
Jacques Léon Godechot, The Napoleonic Era in Europe (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1971)
James Van Horn Melton, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
J. Christopher Herold, The Age of Napoleon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963, 2002)
Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Penguin, 2005).
John Huxtable Elliot, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716 (London: Penguin Books, 1963)
John Newhouse, “Europe’s Rising Regionalism,” Foreign Affairs, 76 (Council on Foreign Relations: Jan-Feb 1997), p. 67-84.
Jose Alvarez Junco, “The Formation of Spanish Identity and Its Adaptations to the Age of Nations,” History and Memory, 14 (Indiana University Press, Fall 2002), p. 13-36.
Jose Casanova, “The Spanish State and its Relations with Society,” State, Culture, and Society, 1 (Springer, Winter 1985), p. 109-136.
Julián Juderías, La Leyenda Negra (Salamanca: Junta de Castilla y León, 1914, 2003).
Lynn Hunt, The French Revolution and Human Rights: A Brief Documentary History (Bedford Books, 1996).
Martyn P. Thompson, “Ideas of Europe during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 55 (Jan. 1994), p. 37-58.
Michael Broers, “Cultural Imperialism in a European Context? Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Napoleonic Italy,” Past and Present, 170 (Oxford University Press: Feb. 2001), p. 152-180.
Michael Glover, Legacy of Glory: The Bonaparte Kingdom of Spain, 1808-1813 (New York: Scribner, 1971)
Miguel Artola, Los Afrancesados (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1989, 2008).
Mini Hollywood and Texas Hollywood reside in the province of Almeria and while they serve today as mere tourist attractions they were used to film scenes in more than 100 films, especially in the 60’s, including The Magnificent Seven and The Bad and the Ugly. Jim Mackie, Mini Hollywood and Texas Hollywood, February 2008, (2 May 2008) Andalucia Travel Guide.
Nicholas Wade, “Gene Test Shows Spain’s Jewish and Muslim Mix,” New York Times, Dec 5 2008: A12.
Ole Waever, “Europe Since 1945: Crisis to Renewal,” in What is Europe: The History of the Idea of Europe, compiled by Pim den Boer (Open University: London, 1995).
Pablo Fernandez Albaladejo, “Cities and the State in Spain,” in Cities and the Rise of States in Euroe, AD 1000 to 1800, ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans (Westview Press Inc., 1994).
Patricia Tyson Stroud, The Man Who Had Been King: The American Exile of Napoleon’s Brother Joseph (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
Philip Wayne Powell, Tree of Hate (United States: University of New Mexico Press, 1971, 2008).
Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1975 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Roberto M. Dainotto, Europe (in theory) (Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press, 2007).
Ronald Fraser, Napoleon’s Cursed War: Spanish Popular Resistance in the Peninsular War, 1808-1814 (Verson, 2008).
Steven Englund, Napoleon: A Political Life (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004).
Stuart Woolf, “The Construction of a European World-View in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Years,” Past and Present, 137 (Nov. 1992), p. 72-101.
Stuart Woolf, “French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire,” Past and Present, 124 (Aug. 1989), p. 96-120.
Stuart Woolf, Napoleon’s Integration of Europe (New York: Routledge, 1991).
 Mini Hollywood and Texas Hollywood reside in the province of Almeria and while they serve today as mere tourist attractions they were used to film scenes in more than 100 films, especially in the 60’s, including The Magnificent Seven and The Bad and the Ugly. Jim Mackie, Mini Hollywood and Texas Hollywood, February 2008, (2 May 2008) Andalucia Travel Guide.
 The Costa del Sol, comprising of much of the coastline of the Malaga province is home to thousands of British expats and is jokingly called the “Costa del Golf” because of the 45 golf courses in the region.
 The histories of the cities of Granada and Seville have especially profited from tourism.
 Steven Englund, Napoleon: A Political Life (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. xiv.
 See Lynn Hunt, The French Revolution and Human Rights: A Brief Documentary History (Bedford Books, 1996).
 “The study, based on an analysis of Y chromosomes, was conducted by biologists led by Mark A. Jobling of the University of Leicester in England and Francesc Calafell of the Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. They developed a Y chromosome signature for Sephardic men by studying Sephardic Jewish communities in places where Jews migrated after being expelled from Spain in 1492 to 1496. They also characterized the Y chromosomes of the Arab and Berber army that invaded Spain in A.D. 711 from data on people living in Morocco and Western Sahara.”
Nicholas Wade, “Gene Test Shows Spain’s Jewish and Muslim Mix,” New York Times, Dec 5 2008: A12.
 There are stories, for example, about how Catholic-practicing Spanish families today have a tradition of lighting a candle every Friday evening and hide it in a cupboard, without knowing its origins.
 Edward Peters, Inquisition (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1988). Henry Kamen, The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision (United States: Yale University Press, 1997, 1998). Kamen estimates about 2,000 people were executed between 1480 and 1530. He also says that the State of Texas executes more people in a year than the Inquisition did in ten.
 Gabriel Tortella, The Development of Modern Spain: An Economic History of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Trans. Valerie J. Herr (United State: Harvard University Press, 1994, 2000).
James Van Horn Melton, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
 Julián Juderías, La Leyenda Negra (Salamanca: Junta de Castilla y León, 1914, 2003). This was where the term was first coined, whose author defends the Spanish side. Revisionist historians that followed him revealed the truth of the Inquisition and argued that Spaniards were more progressive in certain areas than their contemporaries, such as how it was encouraged to inter-marry with the American natives in the colonies.
Quote from: Philip Wayne Powell, Tree of Hate (United States: University of New Mexico Press, 1971, 2008).
 This refers to how the people of Europe thought themselves better than the peoples outside of the continent, and even national rivalries allowed for the French to think that the English were better than Native Americans.
 Anthony Pagden, The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 2006). This book compiles a variety of different interpretations on what makes a ‘European’ identity throughout history.
 Roberto M. Dainotto, Europe (in theory) (Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press, 2007), p. 34.
 Ibid, p. 98.
 Ibid, p. 99
 Englund discusses the “General Laws” that the Empire wanted to impose over the people, commenting that “ ‘General Laws’ meant the French model – not that it was French per se, but that it was a product of the Enlightenment and Revolution.” P. 334.
 “As Paul Hazard pointed out long ago, the term cosmopolitan in eighteenth-century Europe more often than not came to signify ‘someone who thought à la francaise.’” Martyn P. Thompson, “Ideas of Europe during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 55 (Jan. 1994), p. 37-58.
 The argument that societies have to undergo progressive levels of identity has been applied to Russia for example – Russians currently have to undergo a nationalist phase before entering the internationalist outlook of other countries. And at the time of the French Revolution Russia was regarded as “striving to emerge from an earlier stage of civilization.” Stuart Woolf, “The Construction of a European World-View in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Years,” Past and Present, 137 (Nov. 1992), p. 72-101.
 Dainotto, p. 115
 Ibid, p. 118
 Dainatto, p. 132
 Douglas W. Foard, “The Spanish Fichte: Menéndez y Pelayo,” Journal of Contemporary History, 14 (Jan. 1979), p. 83-97.
 Ibid, p. 132.
 Ibid, p. 135-136.
 “The explanation lies in French thinking about the nation, which implies that the nation has a mission and that it has to act and be recognized by others, first on the European and then on the international scene. This is not to suggest that the French regard themselves as a chosen people with a mission. The French idea of France is not that the French people are superior in principle; but the values France represents are universal values: human rights, political rights, and the idea of the state-nation…The French have, through the French Revolution, a particularly intimate relationship with these values.” Ole Waever, “Europe Since 1945: Crisis to Renewal,” in What is Europe: The History of the Idea of Europe, compiled by Pim den Boer (Open University: London, 1995), p. 184.
 Englund, p. 334.
 Stuart Woolf, “French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire,” Past and Present, 124 (Aug. 1989), p. 96-120.
 “The Code Civil introduced a very different concept of membership of state – a membership not tied mainly to political rights and much more difficult to acquire or lose than political citizenship; an innate quality rather than a result of residence or occupation. The ‘quality of being French’ in the Code Civil was membership of an imagined community participating equally in the benefits of French civil law. This membership could not be lost inside the country by anything short of’civil death’. This quality of being French was thus independent of gender and criminal records.”
Andreas Fahrmeir in Napoleon and his Empire: Europe, 1804-1814, ed. Philip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
 Binacamara Fontana, “The Napoleonic Empire and the Europe of Nations,” in The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, ed. Anthony Pagden (U.S.A.: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 2006), p. 122-123.
In 1807 Napoleon wrote to his brother Jerome, king of Westfalia: “The benefits of the Code Napoleon, the publicity of procedures, the establishment of juries should be the distinctive characteristics of your monarchy. And, to be honest, I trust more to their efforts to extend and strengthen your power than to the results of the greatest victories. What people would submit itself again to an arbitrary government [that is, Prussia] after having enjoyed the benefits of a wise and liberal administration?”
 Michael Broers, “Cultural Imperialism in a European Context? Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Napoleonic Italy,” Past and Present, 170 (Oxford University Press: Feb. 2001), p. 152-180.
 Pagden, p. 6.
 Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Penguin, 2005).
 John Newhouse, “Europe’s Rising Regionalism,” Foreign Affairs, 76 (Council on Foreign Relations: Jan-Feb 1997), p. 67-84.
 Charles Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon: guerillas, bandits and adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814 (New Haven, 2004), p. 89.
 J. Christopher Herold, The Age of Napoleon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963, 2002), p. 201.
 Jacques Léon Godechot, The Napoleonic Era in Europe (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 136.
 Englund 325.
 Godechot, p. 136.
 Herold, p. 210.
 In the 16th and 17th centuries Spain was victim of inflation due to an overproduction of Gold, the decline of trade and power after England’s destruction of the Spanish Armada, and general bad luck when it came to kings, and their administrations. Jose Casanova, “The Spanish State and its Relations with Society,” State, Culture, and Society, 1 (Springer, Winter 1985), p. 109-136.
 John Huxtable Elliot, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716 (London: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 108.
 Ibid, p. 84
 Casanova, p. 120.
 Herold, p. 212
 Michael Glover, Legacy of Glory: The Bonaparte Kingdom of Spain, 1808-1813 (New York: Scribner, 1971), p. 24.
 Pablo Fernandez Albaladejo, “Cities and the State in Spain,” in Cities and the Rise of States in Euroe, AD 1000 to 1800, ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans (Westview Press Inc., 1994), p. 177.
 Glover, p. 54.
 Ibid, p. 96.
 David T. Gies, “Glorious Invalid: Spanish Theater in the Nineteenth Century,” Hispanic Review, 61 (University of Pennsylvania Press, Spring 1993), p. 213-245.
 Charles J. Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
 Miguel Artola, Los Afrancesados (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1989, 2008).
 Woolf, p. 234
 Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1975 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 58.
 Jose Alvarez Junco, “The Formation of Spanish Identity and Its Adaptations to the Age of Nations,” History and Memory, 14 (Indiana University Press, Fall 2002), p. 13-36.
 Diego Saglia, “ ‘O My Mother Spain!’: The Peninsular War, Family Matters, and the Practice of Romantic Nation-Writing,” ELH, 65 (The John Hopkins University Press, Summer 1998), p. 363-393.
 Heinrich von Brandt, In the Legions of Napoleon: The Memoirs of a Polish Officer in Spain and Russia, 1808-1813, trans by Jonathan North (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), p. 167.
 Cris Shore, “Inventing the ‘People’s Europe’: Critical Approaches to European Community ‘Cultural Policy’,” Man, 28 (Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 1993), p. 779-800.
 Herold, p. 204.
 Stuart Woolf, Napoleon’s Integration of Europe (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 234.
 Patricia Tyson Stroud, The Man Who Had Been King: The American Exile of Napoleon’s Brother Joseph (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), p. 165.
 Fontana, p. 125
 Ronald Fraser, Napoleon’s Cursed War: Spanish Popular Resistance in the Peninsular War, 1808-1814 (Verson, 2008).
 Herold, p. 232
Placed on the Napoleon Series: January 2010
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