Section 4:  
Amusettes in the Netherlands, c1794

SOJ-6(14)
Amusettes at Boxtel, 14 & 15 September 1794
by Garry David Wills (Caseshot Publishing)

The following comprises a translation of part of H.P.R. Porbeck's work by Geert van Uythoven, which focuses on the use of Amusettes at Boxtel\textsuperscript{101} in 1794. Porbeck served in this campaign as an officer in the Hessian army.

Translated by Geert van Uythoven

The combat of Boxtel, on 14 & 15 September 1794, was fought between the Anglo-Allied army commanded by the Duke of York, and the French army under Pichegru. On the 14th, the Allied outposts behind the Dommel river were attacked by the French. The 'Campagne-Journal' of General Düring says the following: [Geert van Uythoven]

"General von Hammerstein in the meanwhile, ordered me through his adjutant, [First] Lieutenant von Scheither, to return the horse artillery [two 6-pdr cannon] and the supporting forces, consisting of the Irvine's Hussars and the Hompesch Chasseurs à Pied. The General [von Düring himself] answered [von Hammerstein] that this was impossible, and proved that he was not able to maintain his post [Boxtel] without them. In spite of this, he received this reply: 'As necessary as the General [von Düring] believes it is, to leave the horse artillery in Boxtel, it is impossible for General von Hammerstein to do without them. As General von Hammerstein without doubt will make the best use of these guns, he will take full responsibility if a cannon, after having defended itself long enough, would be captured [by the enemy], and will know how to make use of his heavy guns at St. Michiels-Gestel. However, if he [General von Düring] would like to have outpost-cannon ['Vorposten-Cannonen'], the General [von Hammerstein] offers to send him 2 amusettes. However, these must only be sent forward in case of an attack, and not deployed earlier. Lieutenant Ritter will give the order to them [the Amusettes] to leave at nightfall.'\textsuperscript{102}

As no mention is made in the documents I have about these amusettes afterwards, it is possible they never had a chance to arrive before the French attack materialised. However, the use of an amusette is mentioned during other events: [Geert van Uythoven]

"About an hour later then at Boxtel, the enemy started his attack near St. Oedenrode, Wolfswinkel, and Breugel. They arrived on the plain in front of St. Oedenrode with a superior cavalry force, and an infantry column on the road from Beest, whose strength could not be ascertained because of the intersected and closed terrain. Our outposts were immediately pushed back to the main pickets, and the enemy attacked with two columns. They could not make much progress, because of the resistance offered by the pickets, which were reinforced with an amusette under Ensign Findorf, and directed by the Jäger-Captain Ochs from Hesse-Kassel who directed the troops outstandingly; and by the flanking batteries positioned on the other side of the stream, consisting of the battalion-guns of the grenadiers, commanded by Ensign Brückmann."\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{101} G.D. Wills (2011), Wellington's First Battle
\textsuperscript{102} von Porbeck, p.455-456
\textsuperscript{103} von Porbeck, p.471-472
"... At the same time, the enemy with numerous cavalry threw our pickets at Breugel and Wolfswinkel back across both bridges there. They tried to take these [bridges], but were prevented from doing this by the heavy and effective fire of the Hanoverian Jäger and the Loyal Émigrés, supported by an amusette."104

"... Around evening, from the tower in Breugel it was clearly discovered that the enemy marched behind Son [village] with 4 squadrons, 2 battalions and 3 cannon, from which they fired several cannon shots at Breugel [village] during the night. Finally, the enemy infantry tried to capture the bridge several times, but this was prevented by the amusette which was positioned here, and fired with the utmost effect."105

"[15 September] The bridge at Nijnsel however was already strongly held by the enemy, and even our strongest attack was not able to repel them. This caused the brave Major von Drieburg to lead in person a hundred grenadiers under Captain von Behr, and a hundred Loyal Émigrés, to attack the enemy with the bayonet and to become master of the plain near the bridge. Because of the outstanding dispositions of the major, and the exemplary bravery of Captain von Behr and Ensign Ahrens, as well as Artillery-Ensign Findorf, who acted with both amusettes with much energy and aggressiveness, without doubt this goal would have been reached, had the enemy not at the same time managed to force the right flank of St. Oedenrode (...)"106

HPR von Porbeck, Kritische Geschichte der Operationen welche die Englisch-combinirte Armee zur Vertbeidigung von Holland in den Jahren 1794 und 1795 ausgeführt hat, vol. 1, 1802

Additional Material (Garry Wills)
The soldiers and units involved were;

**General von Hammerstein** was a Hanoverian commanding the Advanced Guard of the Duke of York’s army, charged with the task of maintaining the outpost line along the River Dommel. The Duke of York’s main body was several miles further back behind the River Aa.

**General-Major von Düring** was a Hesse-Darmstadt general commanding one of von Hammerstein’s Brigades.

**Major von Drieberg** commanded the 2nd Hanoverian Grenadier Battalion. Captain von Behr also served in this unit, he was wounded in this action along with 15 other ranks and a further 4 men died.

**Jäger-Captain Ochs** was an officer in the Hesse-Cassel Feldjäger Battalion who later became a General commanding Westphalian troops for Napoleon.

**Second Lieutenant Ritter** commanded 2 guns of the Hanoverian Horse Artillery.

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108 John de Brett, *A collection of State Papers, relative to the war against France*, 1802, vol.1, p.436
110 Adam Ludwig von Ochs, Leopold Hohenhausen (freiherr von), *Biographie des Generals von Ochs*, 1827, p.117-120
111 M.J.C. von Ditfurth, *The Hessians in the Campaign of 1793; 4 & 5*, vol. 2, 1889, p.252-268
von Hammerstein’s report gave his own dispositions as follows:\[113\]

**RIGHT WING [GM von Düring]**

**At Boxtel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Men of all ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hesse-Darmstadt Chevauxlegers.</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choiseul Hussars.</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hompesch Hussars.</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York Rangers.</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse-Darmstadt Jäger.</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse-Darmstadt Light Infantry-Regiment</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse-Darmstadt Infantry-2 battalions</td>
<td>1345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Leib Grenadiers and the Landgraf regiments)\[114\]

**At Olland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Men of all ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hesse-Cassel Life Dragoons, 5 Squadrons</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse-Cassel Fusilier-Battalion</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CENTRE [GM von Hammerstein & Sir Robert Laurie]**

**At St. Oedenrode**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Men of all ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English Light Dragoons, 8 Squadrons.</td>
<td>1182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7th, 11th, 15th &amp; 16th Light Dragoons)[115]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Hanoverian Cavalry[116], 2 Squadrons.</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse-Cassel Jäger.</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanoverian Infantry, 2nd &amp; 3rd Grenadier Battalions[117]</td>
<td>1067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Battery Horse Artillery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**At Breugel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Men of all ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th Hanoverian Light Dragoons, 2 Squadrons.</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanoverian Jäger, 1 Company.</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyal-Emigrés, 1 Battalion.</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEFT WING [GM von Linsingen]**

**At Aerle**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Men of all ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10th Hanoverian Light Dragoons, 2 Squadrons.</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussars von Rohan, 2 Squadrons.</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussars von Salm, 2 Squadrons.</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanoverian 1st (Light) Grenadier Battalion.</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanoverian Jäger, 1 Company.</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Infantry Battalion, Von Rohan.</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½ Battery Horse Artillery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\[114\] E.H.A. Sabron, *De Oorlog van 1794-95 op het Grondgebied van de Republiek der Vereenigde Nederlanden*, vol.1, 1892, p.199


\[116\] von Porbeck, p.416

\[117\] This battalion comprised two companies; see; *Stamm- und Rang-Liste des Kurfürstlich Hessischen Armee-Corps vom 16ten Jahrhundert bis 1866*, 1866, p.55 & 158

\[118\] von Porbeck, p.415-417

\[119\] P. Hofshroer, *The Hanoverian Army of the Napoleonic Wars*, 1989, p.8
Ditfurth and subsequently Keim, gave different strengths and units for the specific garrison of Boxtel itself.\textsuperscript{120,121}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leib Grenadier and Landgraf (Hesse Darmstadt) infantry</td>
<td>840 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hompesch Jäger</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse Darmstadt Chevaux-Leger (1 squadron)</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse Darmstadt Jäger</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hompesch Hussars</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irwin Hussars</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse Darmstadt Foot Artillery (4 guns)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanoverian Horse Artillery (3 guns)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total; 1118 infantry, 538 cavalry and 7 guns

**Concluding Remarks**

Demet’s analysis (q.v.) shows that the Hessian infantry are unlikely to have been supported by amusettes of their own. He further demonstrates that the amusettes involved were both Hanoverian 1-pdrs,\textsuperscript{122,123} deployed in support of the Jäger units.\textsuperscript{124}

Interestingly, in his autobiography, Ochs states that when he retreated under fire, through St. Oedenrode towards Kovering on the 15\textsuperscript{th}, he had with him the Hesse-Cassel Feldjäger battalion, the Hanoverian Jäger company, and a 100 Hanoverian Grenadiers, but he had only one cannon with him.\textsuperscript{125} Whether this cannon was an amusette (in which case one must have been left behind) or a battalion gun supporting the Grenadiers (in which case the amusettes were not considered by Ochs as “cannon”) is not clear.

This analysis confirms Geert’s contention that the amusettes offered to General-Major von Düiring remained at St. Oedenrode rather than reinforcing the position at Boxtel.

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\textsuperscript{121} M.J.C. von Ditfurth, *The Hessians in the Campaign of 1793,4 & 5*, vol. 2, 1889, p. 252


\textsuperscript{123} F.H.A. Sabron, *De Oorlog van 1794-95 op het Grondgebied van de Republiek der Vereenigde Nederlanden*, vol. 1, 1892, p.200


\textsuperscript{125} Adam Ludwig von Ochs, Leopold Hohenhausen (freiherr von), *Biographie des Generals von Ochs*, 1827, p.120
Amusettes at Boxtel, 14 & 15 September 1794
By Paul Demet

Although the evidence is patchy, I think it is most likely that the amusettes in action at Boxtel were 2 1-pdrs attached to the Hanoverian Jäger. My reasons for reaching this conclusion are set out below, considering each of the three light infantry contingents in turn.

Hessen-Darmstadt Bn Guns
The Hessen-Darmstadt Feldjäger-Corps and Leichtes Infanterie-Bataillon formed part of the Brigade taken into British pay under a Subsidy Treaty dated 5th October 1793. The treaty states that each battalion of infantry is to have 2 field pieces, but the specification of the force referred to in the treaty is missing. The Brigade was reviewed by the British Commissary, Major William Gunn, at Darmstadt on 21st October and the return sent to Dundas on 5th November. It shows the 2 guns and artillery detachments for each of the infantry battalions (including the Battn Lt. Infantry) but none for the “Chasseurs”. Beck states that “Die Geschütze des Feldartillerie-Korps bestanden 1793 aus 3-, 6-, und 12 Pfunder Kanonen und aus 7- und 10 pfündigen Haubitzen” (i.e. no reference to amusettes) and that the artillery sent to the Netherlands consisted of 8 Dreipfunder-Kanonen. This all seems to indicate that the Hessen-Darmstadt Feldjäger-Corps did not have any amusettes of their own. If they did it would not have been necessary for von Hammerstein to offer tosend them as quoted above.

Hessen-Kassel Amusettes
The Hessen-Kassel Jäger-Bataillon was part of the corps provided under a Subsidy Treaty dated 10th April 1793. The treaty states that each battalion of infantry is to have 2 field pieces. An additional force, including the Füsilier-Bataillon was added under a Second Convention signed on 23rd August 1793. A copy of Major Gunn’s muster return for the first body of troops sent to Dundas on 18th July 1793 shows the states for each regiment mustered in late June/early July. 2 3-pdr cannon and artillery detachments are shown for each battalion, but none for the “Chasseurs”. The additional force was reviewed by Major Gunn at Hanau on 21st October and the return sent to Dundas on 5th November. It shows the 2 guns and artillery detachments for each of the infantry battalions, except for the “Battalion Füsiliers”, who have none. It is known that the Hessen-Kassel light troops sent to Champagne in 1792 had amusettes, but Has does not record any for the new units sent to the Netherlands.

Hanoverian Amusettes
The “State of the additional Body of Hanoverian Troops taken into the pay of Great Britain” attached to the “Article of Agreement relative to an additional Body of his Majesty’s Electoral Troops to be taken forthwith into the Pay of Great Britain” dated 7th January 1794 includes a Light Infantry Regiment of 10 companies, including 2 of Chasseurs, with 43 men “For the service of Artillery”. Both Sichart and Reitzenstein state the new 14th Light Infantry Regiment had 6 amusettes, instead of the usual 2 3-pdr cannon per battalion.

References:
126 A Collection of State Papers (1794) pp 27-31
127 National Archives, Kew, WO 1/167 pp 597 et seq
128 Beck (1884) p 83
129 Beck (1884) p 105 - this agrees with Gunn’s return referred to above
130 SOJ-6(16) p65
131 A Collection of State Papers (1794) pp 5-10
132 A Collection of State Papers (1794) pp 12-13
133 National Archives, Kew, WO 6/7 pp 195-201
134 National Archives, Kew, WO 1/167 pp 597 et seq
135 Has (1913) p 248, although only the Jägers took their 2 1-pdrs on campaign, as the Leichtes-Bataillon sent theirs to Rheinfels
136 Has (1913) especially pp271 and 280
137 A Collection of State Papers (1794) pp 42-3
138 Sichart (2006) p 44
139 Reitzenstein (2008) p 400
This leaves the question of how the amusettes were allocated between the 10 companies of the 14th Regiment. In the absence of a clear statement in any of these sources, I have collected the following snippets, mainly from Scharnhorst’s writings on the 1794 campaign:

I. Menin 26th-30th April 1794
   a. Garrison included 2 battalions of the 14th Light Infantry (excluding the 2 Jäger companies which were near Mouscron) and 4 1-pdr cannon
   b. 2 amusettes were with the 1st Battalion 14th Regiment
   c. 1 amusette was lost in the breakout

II. Near Mouscron 26th-28th April
   a. 2 companies of Hanoverian Jägers under Generalmajor von Wangenheim (replaced by Generalmajor von Oeynhausen on the 27th)
   b. 1 company of Jägers in the 2nd attack column had an amusette, but no mention is made of the company in the 1st column having one

III. March from Rouselar to Thorout 21st May 1794
   a. The 2nd battalion of the 14th Regiment had the 3 amusettes (ie the original 4 less the 1 lost at Menin PD)
   b. No mention of any cannon with the 1st battalion

IV. Allied forces on the Dommel 30th August-12th September 1794
   a. Around Wolfswinkel and Breugel Hammerstein had 1 battalion and 2 amusettes
   b. No mention of any other amusettes in Hammerstein’s force

My interpretation of this is that 2 of the Regiment’s 6 amusettes were normally allocated to each battalion of the 14th Regiment and 1 to each company of Jäger. This is compatible with the way the Regiment served, with the 1st and 2nd battalions acting on a battalion basis, but with the Jäger companies acting separately. It is also consistent with the usual allocation of 2 cannon to each Hanoverian infantry battalion, albeit normally 3-pdrs. It is also significant that the officer commanding the amusettes is identified by Porbeck as Fähnrich Findorf (or Findorff), who was a Hanoverian artillery officer.

Conclusions

Of the German light troops in the Netherlands, only the Hanoverians can be shown to have had amusettes and the 2 present at Boxtel under the command of a Hanoverian artillery officer are consistent with an allocation of 1 per company to the Hanoverian Jägers present at the battle. The remaining 3 amusettes, after the 1 lost at Menin, were presumably with the 1st or 2nd Battalion of the 14th Regiment, which were not present at Boxtel.

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140 Scharnhorst (1856) pp 6-7
141 Scharnhorst (1856) p 42
143 Scharnhorst (1798) p 361
144 Sichart (2006) pp 369-370. Scharnhorst’s account of the dispositions for the attack does not mention the amusettes – Scharnhorst (1801) pp 158-160
147 His name is spelt correctly in Porbeck (1802) p 471, but incorrectly as Tindorf on pp 270 and 274 of the Relation des Gefechts bey Bocel (1802)
148 Heinrich Findorf was promoted from Oberfeuerwerker to Fähnrich on 3th November 1793 (Annalen (1794) p 344)
References

A Collection of State Papers relative to the war against France now carrying on by Great-Britain and the several other European powers, (1794), J. Debrett, London.

Annalen der Braunschweig-Lüneburgischen Churlande, Achter Jahrgang Zweites Stück (1794).


Porbeck, H.P.R. von (1802). Kritische Geschichte der Operationen welche die Englisch-combinirte Armee zur Vertheidigung von Holland in den Jahren 1794 und 1795 ausgeführt hat, Bei Friedrich Bernhard Culemann, Braunschweig


Relation des Gefechts bey Boxtel an der Dommel, am 14ten und 15ten September 1794, (1802), Neue Bellona, Zweiten Bandes IIItes Stück, 257-282.


During the disastrous Anglo-Dutch War 1780-1784 a new party, the Patriots, entered the Dutch political scene, uniting the discontent with the policy of the ruling party, the Orangists. In 1783 the Patriots started to arm themselves and formed trained bands, called free corps. The Province of Holland followed a Patriotic line (especially Amsterdam) and the Stateholder went to the Province of Gelderland. A civil war seemed eminent. In 1787 Princess Wilhelmina, wife to the Stateholder Prince William V, was detained by a Patriotic free corps. She appealed to her brother, King Frederic William II of Prussia, for help. He sent Ferdinand of Brunswick with an army of 20,000 Prussian soldiers to restore order. After some sharp fighting the free corps were chased away, the Patriot movement was abolished and its leaders went into exile in France. During the previous turbulent years the government was very prudent with artillery: movement of guns and ammunition was restricted for fear from falling into the hands of the Patriotic free corps. Due to falling of production there was a shortage of artillery.

The Dutch government started to buy foreign-made artillery to fill the shortages, first in 1785 they bought a number of bronze guns from the Wilhelm Graf von Lippe-Schaumburg (1724-77). The Schaumburg guns, included 45 1-pdr falconets or amusettes. Probably these are the same, used at Boxtel. The other guns were expensive and of mediocre quality, hardly worth the price of scrap metal. Then the Dutch government turned to Berlin to order 36 new 6-pdr bronze cannon. Prior to his active involvement by sending troops the Prussian King followed a policy to strengthen the Dutch army. The delivery of some new artillery pieces from the Royal gunfoundry fitted well within this policy. A contract was made with the Royal Prussian gunfounder in Berlin J.G. Maukisch. These guns were to be delivered in June 1785.

However, this time the Dutch Artillery officers were not prepared to accept second hand left over guns, like those of Lippe Schaumburg, and insisted on a quality on par with the guns produced by Maritz. Paravicini de Capelli informed the Stateholder about his doubts. He advised the use of English pewter [tin] and Hungarian copper, and the guns had to be casted solid and bored by a horizontal boring machine, following the Dutch pattern of 1772. Finally, the Prussian gun proofing was unknown to the Dutch. In order to get things right large scale drawings of the required gun pattern were sent to Berlin. The guns were not to be engraved with the weapon of the States General, because this could be done later (and cheaper!) in the Netherlands. In his letter to the Raad van State of 22 August 1785 Paravicini de Capelli states that the 36 metal guns from Berlin would arrive very soon. In the same month gun carriages were ordered for them. Then the 36 Prussian guns disappear from the records, they are no longer special, as their pattern was identical to the other Dutch 6-pdrs. At present I have not yet found them in any armament list; the guns presumably were sent to the southern frontier. Probably the gunfounder Maukisch inscribed his name on the base ring, as was prescribed for Dutch made guns.

149 Wilhelm Graf von Lippe-Schaumburg (1724-77) accompanied his father in Dutch service during the War of Austrian Succession, and was present at Dettingen (27 June 1743) and then fought in Austrian service during their in their Italian campaign (1744-48). He succeeded his father on the 25 October 1748, as ruler of a principality of the Holy Roman Empire [German] that had for many years had provided mercenary troops for the Dutch army. He was an important commander during the seven years war and was the distinguished allied commander of the artillery at Minden. In 1762, he commanded the defense of Portugal at the request of the Marquis de Pombal against the Spanish invasion. In 1763, he rebuilt and trained the Portuguese Army to a more professional standard. He was also an influential military theorist.


151 As described in SOJ-6(10), p. ??
