Section 1:

Monhaupt’s ‘About the use of horse artillery’¹

By Geert van Uythoven

General Lieutenant von Monhaupt (1775-1835) wrote an in-depth thesis in about 1808 when he was a Captain and was not published until a year after his death. It included historical examples, about the use of horse artillery. When writing this thesis, Monhaupt had already sixteen years experience in the Prussian army, and had participated in several campaigns, not without distinction. As such, this thesis gives an interesting insight in the contemporary views about the horse artillery, and its use in battle, in relation to the other arms.

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Preface to Über den Gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie

Translated by Geert van Uythoven

The expert reader of the following pages will note at more than one instance, that these were written down already many years ago; they came to existence around the year 1808, at which time they author had already served about sixteen years, and had participated in several campaigns, not without distinction.

The experiences done during the eventful years following this period, the high position the author held later, as well as his continuous duty with an arm to with he belonged nearly continuously, and to which he has dedicated himself with an exceptional predilection and zeal, cannot have remained without influence on the views of its destination, and the essence of its organisation, especially while it came to the foreground during this period of time, while because of the infantry operating in huge masses the abilities of the cavalry had been weakened, needing a new element to regain former balance. The system of the horse artillery, about which much has been discussed, was able to fulfil this role for the most part, and maybe in a way which was not completely suited to fulfil it completely. In any case, the means and material to fulfil this role completely were not present yet. This labour however has been found among the papers inherited from the author, and should also be presented to the military public in the near future.

Possibly, the same public will accept this small piece positively, at least being interested in it, to read the ideas of an experienced and acute officer of the horse artillery, about its use for nearly a generation ago. For this reason, nothing has been left out or added, and one has taken care even not to change something in the expressions, to maintain the original spirit and tone.

¹ LG Monhaupt (1836), Über den Gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie, Berlin.
“If one wants to establish the use of horse artillery, it is necessary to investigate its powers and other characteristics beforehand. Its powers consist of its speed and adroitness. Speed means, that it is able to move quickly, over great distances, able to execute quick movements in the face and under fire of the enemy. Especially while executing the latter it [i.e. the horse artillery] is not surpassed by the cavalry, because these have to ride in close formation in battle during all movement, and save energy and breath; therefore they can only move at the trot or gallop, except for the shock, speeds that always can be followed by the horse artillery. Experience has learned that the horse artillery is able to keep up with the cavalry for distances of several thousand paces, even for miles.

This is the natural result of the situation the cavalry finds itself in during strategic and tactical movements; as the cavalry horses also have a heavy burden to carry. The order of the cavalry also has to be maintained during the most fatiguing forced marches, breath and energy has to be saved, even more as for the horse artillery. Otherwise the cavalry, when they have to engage in combat directly after such a march, will find itself in a precarious situation; instead, the horses of the horse artillery have the time to regain their breath and powers once combat has started.

**Examples of Horse Artillery**

*During the combat near Wald-Algisheim (27th March 1793), the horse artillery battery of the present-day Major Lange was attached to the Cavalry Regiments ‘Herzog von Weimar’ and ‘von Lottum’, which the Herzog von Weimar led against the Neiwinger Cavalry. The combat began on the great chaussee between Roth village and the Erbacher Hofe. The enemy was defeated and pursued to Wald-Labersheim, a distance of about an hour. During this engagement the Battery von Lange followed the cavalry all the time, although they came from Schöneberg, and had covered the road from Schöneberg to Stromberg in a hurry just before, without having had the time to catch their breath.*

*The same battery, together with the Hussar Regiment ‘von Eben’ (30th March 1793), thrown back from the Esselborner heights to behind the paper mill of Alzel, a distance of more than half an hour, without delaying the hussar regiment, although it was necessary to defile nearly the whole distance.*

*The same battery, beside the one of the present-day Major von Hahn, together with the Dragoon Regiments ‘von Schmettau’ and ‘von Katt’ (27th December 1793) left a position at Bergzabern and retreated about 3,000 paces, to redeploy on this side of Bergzabern, and to engage the enemy which turned our left flank. The horse artillery arrived at the same time as both dragoon regiments, although the cavalry rode as fast as possible.*

*In the year 1794, I was attached with two cannon of the Battery ‘Lange’ to two squadrons of the Dragoon Regiment ‘Anspach-Baireuth, at Hitschenhausen village, five hours in front of Kaiserslautern. This post had the purpose to observe the roads of Homburg and Zweibrücken. The enemy turned our right flank over Schonenberg and Münchweiler, and from there easily could have cut us off over Ramstein. It may be clear that we covered the road from Hitschenhausen to*
Ramstein, which has a distance of two hours, as fast as possible. It was not necessary for the cavalry to delay their movement because of me.

In the meanwhile the season, the condition of the roads, as well as the kind of soil and its condition, of course has effect on the proportion of speed of the horse artillery compared with that of the cavalry: however, the first will always, even under the most unfavourable circumstances, maintain enough speed to keep up with the latter. The horse artillery battery of Major Lange (this is the exercise battery from Potsdam) was at the Rhine during the whole war. Although it was, especially during the 1793 campaign, from all horse batteries that were with the army the one that was used most often, and the most times exposed, never the case that it was not serviceable in any way.

Further one finds, that the horse artillery is more feared then the foot artillery, because it combines the same firepower when in position, with a much greater ability for speed and adroitness. And because the fire of the horse artillery is much more devastating as that from the infantry, and is combined with the adroitness and speed of the cavalry in their movement, it will surpass both in long range combat, and solves the problem of combining both characteristics. This combination connects the horse artillery tight with the cavalry, from which at the same time both arms, especially in open terrain, receive great independence. The cavalry is withdrawn from its isolated situation, in which they would have to evade fighting, or would be defeated, as soon as the enemy engaged them with firearms. Connected with the horse artillery, they [i.e. the cavalry] can defend themselves against all attacks of combined arms, or attacking these as soon as they are strong enough for not having to fear the enemy cavalry.

The only thing, which especially could be a problem for them [i.e. the horse artillery], are the enemy tirailleurs, when these are favoured by the terrain. In such a case, a number of cavalrymen would have to dismount and to engage these. Therefore, it was not right to withdraw the carbines from the dragoons.

To which profit this is, is illustrated by the following examples.

**Examples**

The retreat of the Austrian army under General Wurmser, from Hagenau, marked the end of the 1793 campaign at the Rhine. The corps of the Prussian left wing, which partially supported the Austrians, partially maintained communications of both armies, concentrated near Bergzabern, were also greater part of the Austrian right wing arrived. Seven Prussian infantry battalions, besides ten dragoon squadrons and two horse batteries, received order to cover the retreat of these troops. Probably it was also intended to support the blockade of Landau from here by keeping the enemy busy for some time. Finally, these troops took up positions a quarter of a mile from Bergzabern.

The right wing stood at a vineyard at the foot of the mountain range; the centre was positioned on a row of level heights, across which the road from Bergzabern to Kron-Weissenburg was; the left wing was formed by the ten dragoon squadrons, to which a horse artillery battery was attached. The other horse artillery battery was positioned just to the right side of the road. The outposts were formed by some squadrons of the Hussar Regiment ‘von Wolfrat’, and two Jäger companies. Already at daybreak all remaining troops had left. At 1 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy arrived, with great numerical superiority. Immediately the outposts were engaged and thrown back, after which the enemy advanced to attack the right wing. But soon it became clear of the feebleness of the attack, that the enemy only wanted to mask his real intentions. The Duke of Brunswick, who was present, therefore turned all his attention to the enemy right wing, whose strength and movement could not be ascertained because of the broken terrain in which it was, and which was situated a few thousand paces further away then the [Prussian] left wing. Soon thereafter it was discovered that the enemy with his cavalry, followed by infantry and artillery, was turning our left flank, marching in a great hurry to the heights behind Zabern. If he would have succeeded in reaching this objective, we would have been taken in the left flank and in the back, and pushed back against the mountain range, which would have brought us in a desperate situation. To prevent this, the cavalry and the horse artillery received order to retreat immediately and to oppose the enemy left of Zabern. At this
occasion, there was ridden as fast as the straps would endure. Nose-bags and port-manteau's, carbines and pistols, hats and greatcoats were lost during the ride. Some ammunition caissons turned over in a ditch at a causeway, and several horsemen were ridden down. They succeeded however in reaching Zabern before the arrival of the enemy, and took up positions. The enemy, much surprised by this bold manoeuvre, halted and gave up the attempt. If he however would have dared to attack, both arms would have been able to hold them at bay long enough for the infantry to pass Zabern, and to take up positions on the heights just behind this town.

When later during this campaign the Prussian army advanced to the Lorraine border after the capture of Mainz [Mayence], Fürst Hohenlohe left Laurecken with his corps to take up new positions between Homburg and Zweibrücken. Near Küssel, were a marching camp was arranged, or maybe earlier, message was received that an enemy corps of about 6,000 strong was in a lightly entrenched camp near Altstädt and Limbach village. It was decided to try to destroy this corps. For this purpose, the whole corps would turn the left flank of the enemy, to cut it of from the Saar [River]. A detachment of this corps however, consisting of four battalions, five squadrons, a heavy battery and a half horse battery, commanded by General von Eben, would have to advance from Küssel directly to the front of the enemy camp. Probably this detachment had the task to keep the attention of the enemy fixed, and at the same time to occupy the road which leads from Altstädt and Limbach to Homburg, along which the enemy could retreat to either Blieskastel or Zweibrücken. The following morning, before daybreak, the corps marched accordingly to the above dispositions. A terrible heat caused great suffering. Therefore, the infantry and foot artillery of General von Eben was not able to keep up with the cavalry and horse artillery which formed the advance guard, and lagged far behind. About a half mile from the enemy camp an enemy post was encountered, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, about 1,200 men strong, which had taken up position in much broken terrain. Because of this, General von Eben probably suspected that the enemy had received message from his movements and was already marching to Homburg, the enemy post having the task to cover this march. To try if it would be possible to prevent this, the attack could not be delayed. The attack could be made even more safe, because nothing was to fear from the enemy cavalry, which was only about 200 horses strong. Therefore it was decided to attack, without waiting for the infantry to arrive. The horse artillery, with a strength of five guns, attacked the enemy advanced posts and threw them back. The mass of them [i.e. the enemy] had concentrated near a solitary building at the side of the road, and the left wing of his infantry rested on this building. Before them, two 8-pdr cannon of his horse artillery were positioned. The right wing rested on an alder grove; his cavalry was retreated behind this line. After having surveyed these positions, and not having discovered any reinforcements, the horse artillery engaged both enemy guns and drove them back after a short fight. The enemy infantry, unsettled by this, ran away and threw themselves in an alder grove behind their line. The enemy cavalry and the horse artillery retreated, took up another position again after about 4,000 paces, and by their fire they prevented a further retreat of their infantry. In this way it went all the way back to the enemy camp, in which the enemy was still present. However, the rout of their defeated forward post had demoralised them so much, that they left the entrenchments in front of Altstädt, and routed across the Blies. This attack would not have been possible without the presence of the horse artillery.
Supporting Cavalry Charges

The horse artillery is also necessary when the cavalry charges, because the cavalry has always to approach the enemy at sword-length, to be effective. Therefore, cavalry combat is properly speaking close combat, and because of its physical characteristics, it is a perfect weapon to destroy infantry and artillery. To use this quality, the enemy line must have been pierced, or the engagement already decided and the enemy routing. In both cases, the aid of the horse artillery is necessary; then although Von Bärenhorst proves that it is for other arms impossible to resist a cavalry charge, experience learns that an attack by cavalry on infantry or artillery seldom succeeds. Cause of this is the morale weakness of which the cavalry suffers, when it has to engage against fire-arms. One of the most striking examples of this is the combat near Neustadt in Upper-Silesia between the Prussian Infantry Regiment 'von Manteuffel', and the Austrian cavalry under General von Laudon. If this general had only half his cavalry and a horse artillery battery instead, the Regiment 'von Manteuffel' would not have made itself immortal in this engagement.

Further, all cavalry combats must succeed, in any case the cavalry never can be allowed to be chased from the field, if their failure should have no disadvantageous results for the other arms, i.e. for the army itself; because part of it will lose by this their cover and support; the enemy instead receives a great superiority. Other arms in different parts of the army will be ruined directly by the rout of the cavalry. The horse artillery is able, as will be shown further on, prevent such an occasion by its presence.

Everything that until now has been said about the cavalry and the horse artillery is convincing the necessary combination of both arms: from this, one should however not conclude that the horse artillery only, or totally would be there for the cavalry, and that it is only an expedient to make their victory easier to achieve. The use of this weapon is versatile, as will be shown further on.

In addition the horse artillery is there when it is necessary to disorder troops which cannot be approached, or to keep these disordered; or when it is necessary to hamper the advance of troops, or when the only can be reached from a distance, or when one is forced to fight before the frontline and wants to prevent any disorder. More effective then the cavalry, which will need to approach to sword-length. Instead, the horse artillery is able to speed forward as quick as the cavalry, and from a safe distance of the enemy weapons able to send death and disorder in the enemy ranks.

It has already been said, that the advantages which the horse artillery has over the foot artillery, are its speed and adroitness. Therefore, its use really begins there, were the powers of the foot artillery do not suffice anymore, i.e. when special speed and adroitness is demanded from the artillery 1). Preferable, the horse artillery should be kept ‘at hand’, to be deployed at once there were artillery is necessary, and fighting there, were a special adroitness of the artillery is necessary. How the horse artillery could be utilised most effectively beside the foot artillery, taking in regard their powers and organisation, will be shown here, for each arm separately.

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3 If during the battle of Kolin [18. June 1757] Nadasdy’s [Austrian] Cavalry not was hunted from the field by the Prussian cavalry lead by General von Ziethen, or had the Prussian cavalry experienced such disaster, probably the whole attack of the Prussian army would not have taken place. In any case, the retreat afterwards of the Prussian army would not have taken place so well.
I. Use of the horse artillery with the infantry

Translated by Geert van Uythoven

The infantry not only fights from a distance by using its firearm, but also close combat with the bayonet: therefore, she is decisive, not only in the attack, but also during defence. In addition, she fights in all kinds of terrain with about the same advantage. As an expedient to make their victory easier to achieve, support by artillery is necessary. The movement of the infantry is in such a way that the foot artillery is able to follow, and can achieve everything necessary; therefore its use is much more efficient in an infantry line, as the horse artillery. These could disorder the infantry easily by its impetuosity and the amount of horses present, and need more space. Especially, the infantry would lose a much more efficient kind of support this way.

a. In position

If the infantry has to defend a position, it is efficient to deploy the foot artillery in the line, to keep the horse artillery however ‘at hand’. The former will accomplish everything that will be expected from artillery, while the latter is at hand to support the attacked or overwhelmed parts of the line, or to debouch and to attack the advancing or retreating enemy unexpectedly.

Example

During the battle of Torgau [3 November 1760], the Prussian infantry attacked six subsequent times, not covered by the cavalry which was still far behind. That she was able to do so, decided the battle in favour of the Prussian army. It would however not having been able to do this, when the Austrian army would have had good horse artillery ‘at hand’ on its right wing. This would have debouched after the first attack, throwing itself from all sides on the retreating Prussian battalions; having dispersed these, and disordered the new lines before these even could start the attack again. They would have been able to fight in front of the infantry without any danger. The infantry would have stayed in position, while the cavalry would engage the Prussian cavalry when it would arrive on the battlefield during the course of the battle.

b. When attacking

When the infantry attacks, the attack will be executed in closed order, or ‘en debandade’ [dispersed]. The foot artillery will always be able to follow, and support the attack with an effective fire, as far as possible for artillery. It is also able to negotiate every obstacle in the terrain, for example steep heights, deep ditches, marsh, brushwood, etc. much easier as the horse artillery, while the artillerymen are immediately available with the guns in great numbers. The horse artillery however, even when using the prolonge, will not fight more advantageously as the foot artillery, and in addition cease to be horse artillery at all. In addition, as already told the huge amount of horses that are with it can easily disorder the infantry and need more space. Therefore, in this case the foot artillery is much more efficient to use then the horse artillery. The latter has to be kept ‘at hand’ during the attack, to exploit any vulnerability of the enemy, and to make victory easier to achieve for the infantry by preparatory fire, for which it is very useful because of its speed and adroitness. When the attack would fail, the horse artillery will be able to delay the pursuing enemy, and to prevent defeat.

LG Monhaupt (1836), Über den Gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie, Berlin, pp. 19-28
Example

If during the battle of Kolin (18 June 1757), the Prussian army would have had horse artillery ‘at hand’ attached to its attacking left wing, it could have engaged the enemy positions immediately after the advance of the infantry, and deployed at an effective range in such a way, that it would make the advance of the left wing easier. Or, when it would be beaten back (i.e. the left wing), it could have covered its retreat, and its reforming. At this occasion, it would have chosen its terrain in such a way that it could achieve this goals by manoeuvring, on its left covered by Hülsen’s attack, on the right by the following wing of the army. If the attack of the infantry would have been beaten back, they would only take back its left wing, and by this being able, to take the Saxon and Austrian cavalry which advanced in pursuit in the right flank. Such a manoeuvre of the horse artillery would have supported the attack enormously. Possibly, the attack of the Saxon cavalry would also have been prevented by this. The latter [i.e. the horse artillery] would not have decided the battle in favour of the Prussian army, but it would have prevented the defeat of the Regiments on the left wing.

c. During the retreat

When the infantry retreats, the retreat will be executed in closed order, or ‘en débandade’ [dispersed]. Of the utmost importance is that order is maintained. So the artillery, in such a way that the infantry does not have to turn and form front and fire too often, through which cohesion is lost, must prevent any pursuit of the enemy, especially by their cavalry, and disorder is caused. At such occasions, the artillery is from distance to distance divided behind the infantry line. Alternatively, is with the square’s if the retreat takes place in this formation, to keep the enemy at bay with their fire. In this occasion, the use of foot artillery is to prefer over the horse artillery for the same reasons as pointed out with the attack, especially in broken terrain. In this situation, the horse artillery has again to be held ‘at hand’, to support the points that are pressed hardest, to cover the flanks and the back, and to occupy the dominating points of the terrain as long as possible to facilitate the retreat.

Example

Fouquet’s corps was defeated at Landsbut because of its bad situation and the superiority of the enemy. In fact, it was defeated because the enemy cavalry reached the defile of Landsbut partly before, partly together with the defeated Prussian troops. However, this defeat could maybe have been prevented, if General Fouquet would have had horse artillery. When it, immediately after all hope on victory had to be abandoned, would have speeded back through the defile, occupying the heights behind Landsbut and moving in all directions, it would have been able to prevent the advance of the enemy. By this, and anyway under their protection, the infantry would have gained time to pass the defile and to reach these heights also, reform again there, and then to continue the retreat to Schneidnitz. Probably all troops would have reached this place, especially when the horse artillery and cavalry would have held their position for some time.

1) For what reason would one use the horse artillery anyway, when the powers of the foot artillery suffice, or are even more effective as those of the horse artillery? Especially because raising and maintaining it is, related to other arms, very considerable, as their provision in the field is also much more considerable. An army burdened with it, would feel its presence soon, as will the State. Therefore, not so few horse artillery should be present with the army that half of it would go down by having to be everywhere, while on the other hand so much is dragged along that it is not understood for what it is there, while one by using foot artillery would be able to reach the same results.
The strength of the cavalry lays in the attack; only when attacking will it be decisive. While it never fights at a distance, although being supplied with firearms, she always approaches to sword-length distance as fast as possible. Its attack is never so decisive as that of the infantry, while they are not able to exploit their victory immediately. After every charge, the cavalry has to reform again, giving the enemy the time to take measures. Finally, when the enemy charges, a decision will have to be reached fast, as loss of time will have disadvantageous results; therefore, the use of horse artillery with the cavalry is different from that of the foot artillery with the infantry. In general, it will act in two ways: whether it will advance in front of the cavalry, to shaken the steadfastness of the infantry with its fire, and to weaken him; or it will follow, to advance immediately after the shock, to keep the enemy routing, and to engage possible supports, or to delay the enemy when the cavalry lost the attack, to prevent its retreat changing into rout, and to enable it to reform. It should however be prevented, that the horse artillery would advance inside the cavalry lines, especially during combats from cavalry against cavalry because although it has enough speed to keep up with the cavalry line, it is not quick enough to fire in this case, as the foot artillery would be able to with the infantry. Because of this fact, it is of no use to the cavalry, but instead could hamper these when it would be positioned between the squadrons. If the cavalry would be defeated, the horse artillery would in any case be lost.

a. At cavalry
When cavalry attacks cavalry, a decision will have to be reached fast. Therefore, it will have to charge immediately, even when it is weaker as the enemy, to chase it off the field. Only if the enemy tries to hold off the charge, and therefore artillery or even infantry deploys in front or between its cavalry, the horse artillery will have to fight in front of the cavalry. In this case, the horse artillery debouches in various sections several hundred paces in front of the cavalry, and dispel the enemy infantry and artillery, or at least weaken these enough to enable the cavalry to attack. In any other case, it will follow the cavalry during the charge at such a distance that it can support the cavalry, but is safe at the same time. It is situated on the wings, or when there are objects behind the line, which the cavalry has to go round during a possible retreat, such as a small wood or a lone height, also behind these. Its presence on the wings however is to prefer, as it will give both arms more freedom of movement. When the cavalry is victorious, the horse artillery speeds forward, and during the period of time the cavalry needs to rally and reform, it will hamper the enemy by its fire to do the same, and tries to disorder the supports. After which the cavalry, reformed by now, will be able to execute a second attack on the enemy and have an easy task to chase it off the field completely.

Example
During the battle of Kolin [18 June 1757], General Ziethen with the Prussian cavalry, had to attack Nadasdy’s [Austrian] cavalry three times, before it was completely beaten from the field. This delayed the attack on Krzeczor [Krzeczhorz], and because of this the march of the army to its point of support [‘point d’appui’] was delayed, because the king halted is army for a considerable time to wait for the results of Hülken’s attack. Because of this, Field Marshal Daun gained time, to assess the situation and to reinforce his right wing, so that the chance on victory disappeared. If General von Ziethen would have had numerous horse artillery with him, and used it the way described, maybe much time would have been spared, leading to a different outcome of the battle.
If the cavalry is defeated, the horse artillery will deploy, let the retreating cavalry pass, and receive the enemy cavalry, as well as its supports, with an effective fire.

Example

During the affair of Kriwitz in 1806, three enemy cavalry regiments were chased by the Hussar Regiment 'Von Rudorf'. The French would have been devastated, even more while the Dragoon Regiment 'Von Herzberg' also arrived at the scene, when the French cavalry did not have support of horse artillery behind its left wing, which by its fire forced the Prussian cavalry to retreat.

b. When the cavalry is retreating, against cavalry

When the cavalry is retreating for cavalry, this could be the result of facing a superior enemy cavalry, or because the cavalry has been beaten, or while it is made necessary because of a general retreat. Retreating by itself, or covering the retreat, it is always necessary that an enemy attack be prevented, because such an event could have disastrous results for the whole situation. To prevent this, the horse artillery is to prefer above everything else. Divided in divisions, it occupies the front of the whole cavalry. Behind both wings, more [horse artillery] is placed ‘at hand’ for the eventuality that the enemy will attack the wings, or will break through in the centre. When the retreat is started, the horse artillery retreats ‘crosswise’ ['en échiquier'], covered by small cavalry detachments, while the cavalry retreats in line or also crosswise, but always stays at least a few hundred paces distant from the horse artillery. In this way, the cavalry will stay out of most of the effect of the enemy artillery fire, retains it freedom of movement and is able to support the horse artillery with the whole line when made necessary by an enemy attack with cold steel. In addition, they are able to weaken the centre and to reinforce the wings, which is important as well for attack as for defence.

On the day of the battle of Pirmasens, the cavalry regiments of Von Borstell and Von Botz covered the change of front of the army. When these regiments after that retreated to Pirmasens, they were pressured by three enemy cavalry regiments, and a heavy artillery fire. The fatality, which part of this cavalry showed at the foot of the wall of Pirmasens, is commonly known. The whole corps would have been cut to pieces, or taken prisoner, if the Brigade Courbiere, which arrived on the scene by chance, would not have saved it. This unpleasant event could not have been taken place if both horse artillery batteries present with the army would have been in camp near Pirmasens, not divided in many small detachments, and if the above event was observed.

It has to be pointed out that the crosswise movement of the horse artillery should not be linked up with the crosswise movement of the cavalry, as is the case with foot artillery when the infantry is retreating. Then the infantry has the foot artillery at their side, so that its fire is not hampered by them; by this, the attacking enemy encounters a double resistance, and when the infantry has the steadfastness it should have, close combat would be avoided. The cavalry however is not able to defend himself at a standstill, and has to advance to meet the enemy, going into close combat. Therefore, it cannot resist together with the horse artillery, but when the latter fights, it will merely protect its flanks and back, which will suffice, as the front defends itself.

In addition, the effect of enemy fire on the order of infantry is not as great as on the order of cavalry. The effect is in any way not as destructive [on the infantry as on the cavalry], as the former will keep its ability to defend itself much longer as the latter. If the enemy breaks into the infantry, the line will divide and form squares (if the retreat is not already taken place in squares), creating separate independent parts, which can defend themselves independently. However, if the enemy breaks into the cavalry, general close combat ensues, or a rout. The horse artillery would have been caught in the middle, and lost if it would not be exceptionally experienced.
If the retreat however takes place as described above, the horse artillery defends itself, covering the cavalry as long as possible. If this is not possible anymore, the cavalry advances and attacks, while at the same time the horse artillery retreats, to deploy further back and to support the cavalry again.

c. At infantry
If the cavalry would attack infantry, which in addition is supported by artillery and covered by cavalry, horse artillery is necessary to make victory easier to achieve (as has been noted before). In this case, the latter [i.e. the horse artillery] advances on the enemy from different angles, and directs its fire mainly against the enemy artillery and infantry, this terrible support, as well as against the cavalry, in order to deprive it [i.e. the infantry] of its cover, making it defenceless. The attack however is directed against that part of the infantry were one wants to achieve the breakthrough. Prepared this way, the cavalry attack will succeed.

d. At artillery
Among the most outstanding executed attacks by cavalry on artillery is the attack of the Prussian cavalry, led by General von Seidlitz, against the Russian batteries on the Spitzberg at Kunersdorf [12 August 1759]. In the meanwhile, of course, the attack failed. Because it is difficult to eliminate a battery, especially when it is positioned, commanded, and covered well. In such a case, the greatest bravery of the cavalry will not be enough. If however, in open terrain and open enemy positions, the cavalry is qualified best to capture the artillery, then it has to execute the attack, but in cooperation with the horse artillery. This advances before the attack of the cavalry, and directs its fire against the artillery as well as its cover. At the former to attract its fire and to weaken it; at the latter to demoralise it or to chase it away. In addition, it is [the horse artillery] allowed to try to dislodge the enemy on its own, attacking it with canister. If the goal has been reached in this way, the cavalry charges to capture or destroy [the enemy artillery].

If the cavalry is covering the march, or the advance or retreat, or the change of front of an army, or covering certain terrain; it always will have to avoid combat and maintain itself. To reach this goal, the presence of horse artillery is necessary. It deploys immediately in such occasions, occupying the dominating positions with detachments in such a way, that the whole position is covered, its fire can cover the whole terrain in front, and that the detachments are able to support each other.

The cavalry is positioned backwards as far away as possible in order to be protected against most of the enemy fire, but in such a way that it will be in time to support the horse artillery at the right time, in case an enemy attack with the cold steel would make this necessary. It detaches only small parties with the horse artillery, to protect it against advancing enemy skirmishers or Schützen. Mounted Jäger or Schützen would be of the best service in such a case.
III. Use of the horse artillery with the foot artillery

Translated by Geert van Uythoven

When the foot artillery is fighting on its own, it is whether defending a position or a post, or it is shelling a retrenchment or a solitary entrenchment, or it will attack a well positioned and well covered numerous artillery in the open. In the first case, the horse artillery should be held close ‘at hand’, in order to support a part that is weakened, or attacked with superior force, or overwhelmed. In the second case, it should not enter the fighting, because she would be ruined the same way as the foot artillery, or at least being unusable for some time, without being able to gain more. The horse artillery is with the supports of the troops destined to execute the attack that will follow. In the third case however, as soon as the foot artillery has drawn all attention and fire of the enemy artillery, the horse artillery will advance boldly, and attack the enemy artillery and its cover, to hit them hard with canister. In the so called cannonades, the horse artillery will waste its power, as was the case at Valmy.

Source: “Ueber den Gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie” (Berlin, 1836) pp. 42-62
IV. Use of artillery with combined arms, i.e. with the army
Translated by Geert van Uythoven

When the army is on the march, the horse artillery belongs to the mass [main army]: on one hand, that it will not be fatigued by unnecessary movements, on the other hand and especially because, that it will be there were its presence will be necessary, in detachments or as a mass [as a whole]. Because, when the marching army is attacked unexpectedly, the attacker is in such a disadvantageous position against the defender that the outcome is certain; or he has approached under cover with a so numerous force that he is convinced to be able to crush the marching enemy (the first case took to some extent place at Auerstädt, the latter at Roßbach). Therefore, the army that is attacked, should even when superior numbers are on his side, immediately break off the engagement at the point that is attacked, and not add reinforcements to the combat. Because this would serve only that, the arriving units would be defeated in detail, or would be infected by the units that are already routing, resulting in a general rout. Instead, the part of the army, which is not engaged, and in good order should deploy, without even regarding the terrain. While at such an occasion, not taking in account the terrain, but the deployment of the troops is important. To make this possible an arm is needed which combines adroitness and speed with the ability to ranged combat, and this is the horse artillery. If it is, as has been pointed out, ‘at hand’ in mass with the main army, it will speed towards the enemy, and while part of it occupies the dominating terrain, to cover the approach of the army and to cover the defeated troops, the other part engages the enemy, to hamper his advance and to create disorder, during which it does not matter if a few hundred of our own people will be killed in the process. In this way, it will be possible to continue the combat, or when a bad outcome is expected, to retreat without great loss.

a. With the advance guard

When the army marches against the enemy, a horse artillery detachment belongs to the advance guard; because it is often necessary to capture terrain, or a post, speedily, or to attack an enemy advance post quickly.

When in 1806, the Prussian army marched from Weimar to Nauburg, (probably unexpected) in Hassenhausen the enemy was encountered. The situation was assessed wrongly and it was believed that the main army was still far away; because of the heavy fog nothing could be discovered. And before the main army would arrive, one wanted to capture the terrain around Hassenhausen. To reach this goal, a horse artillery battery and ten dragoon squadrons of the advance guard were quickly dispatched forward, to dispel the enemy and to maintain position on the far side of the place. This was, in accordance to what is described above, the right way to use the horse artillery, and illustrates the advantage of it with the advance guard. That the fore mentioned combat however was unlucky, and that the horse artillery battery was destroyed, was not caused by the way it was used, but by the way, it was led in battle.
b. With the rear guard

When the army is withdrawing from the enemy, horse artillery is necessary with the rear guard, and on every plain or broken terrain, this arm will perform as a whole, in a way the horse artillery is able to do during rear guard fighting.

Example 1

When during the end of the 1793 campaign, the Prussian army retreated from the Alsace and Lorraine borders to Mainz, the great road which leads over Kron-Weissenburg, Neustadt, and Grünstadt, to Mainz, was covered by General von Dermann with three fusilier battalions, some Jäger companies, 15 hussar squadrons, and a horse artillery battery. This rear corps had arrived at Neustadt on 31 December at noon, after having fought several lucky engagements. As it appeared that the enemy had given up the pursuit and had retreated, the troops were billeted in and around Neustadt. Not two hours had passed, when at once the enemy appeared. After the alarm the troops collected, except for two fusilier battalions which had been quartered in Mosbach, somewhat at the heights behind Winzig, about 1,500 paces left of Neustadt. The concentration point of the corps was the only place where troops could be deployed, because the vineyards made all surrounding terrain, up to Wachenheim, military impassable.

The troops had just been collected when the enemy started the fighting with his artillery on the opposite heights, at the same time pushing through Neustadt against the chaussée. I had received orders to cover this [the chaussée], and to prevent the enemy from debouching through the gates of Neustadt, with two cannon of the horse artillery battery 'Langen'. Initially, because of the lack of troops, I had only received an NCO and 12 hussars as cover; later on, this cover was reinforced with an officer and 30 hussars, and soon after with a fusilier company. While however the enemy at the same time penetrated left of Neustadt, along the hills, the cover left me to hamper the advance there.

General Hermann realized that the movement of the enemy threatened his retreat, and so be retreated to Deidesheim. I received however the order to maintain my position as long as possible, until the whole corps behind me had left, and then to act as the rear guard.

The terrain in front of me favoured my defence (vineyards surrounded with high walls, between which the chaussée climbs up to my position, hampering the advance and the fire of the enemy infantry, and his cavalry could only advance on my front, in column [along the chaussée]). After the corps had retreated a long distance along the chaussée, which continuously ran between vineyards, making every advance, even that from the infantry, impossible, the order to retreat was yelled at me from a distance. I was strongly pushed by then. In addition, one of the twelve hussars which I had dispatched to General Dermann to ask for reinforcements (a request which was not complied with), had spread the rumour that the enemy cavalry had been between my cannon. This was not the case. The enemy cavalry made three charges, but only because they had deceived me, they managed to come at 200 paces of my position during the first charge.

I had only just began my retreat, when enemy horse artillery deployed on the open spot near Winzig, and started shelling me without effect. His cavalry also started advancing. The latter forced me to dismount during the retreat and to beat off the attack. The chaussée now ran over hilly terrain, and this enabled the enemy cavalry to stay in my vicinity all the time, while his artillery fire still annoyed me. Therefore, from now on I retreated 'en échiquier' [alternately, one gun after the other], and in this way I succeeded in keeping the enemy cavalry at a safe distance.

After having retreated this way for about half an hour, I received the order to halt, to cover the corps, which had to defile along a hollow road, the vineyards preventing any other way. I also managed to get away luckily this time. However, if I had not received the order to retreat in time I would have been captured, because several enemy infantrymen had arrived, and made their way through the vineyards against my flank and back. From here, I continued my retreat more quickly.
to Mosbach village, were I found two fusilier companies, with which I covered the advance of the corps behind Mosbach, and after that united with the battery again.

From Mosbach on, the retreat was continued to Deidesheim during continuous fighting, in which the horse artillery, now commanded by the present-day Major Lange, almost continuously fought alone because of the fact that the more open terrain still was intersected with vineyards. The same could not have been achieved by any other arm.

Example 2

While General Blücher was marching from Strelitz to Lübeck, I was ordered to the rear guard with two cannon of the horse artillery battery ‘Hahn’, and attached to the ‘Blücher’ Hussar Regiment. On 12 November [1806] in the morning, before eight, this regiment moved at the same time as the remaining troops of the rear guard commanded by General Winning, through the Wahren pass. The rear guard of Winning, commanded by General von Plötz, moved through Wahren itself on the road to Schwerin. The Regiment ‘Blücher’ however moved along a secondary road right of this town.

During the last night, the enemy had closed in by forced march, and arrived at this moment before the town with his whole cavalry, and heavy fighting ensued between the head of the enemy [column] and five squadrons of the ‘Köhler’ Hussars.

If one follows the road from Wahren to Schwerin, it leads through a fir-wood a short while after the Wahren town, at about 400 paces. Behind this forest is a wide plain, which the road crosses for 2,000 to 2,500 paces on level ground, after which it passes as a small road between two huge lakes, after which there are a number of level hills.

The enemy cavalry followed Winning’s rear guard through Wahren, crossed the fir-wood that was mentioned, and deployed in front of it.

The ‘Blücher’ Regiment had followed its own [secondary] road, and found itself at this time level with the enemy cavalry, maybe at 800 paces distance, masked by a row of heights.

While I had remained before Wahren in person for some time, observing the advance of the enemy, and convinced that he was completely unaware about the march of the ‘Blücher’ Regiment, I proposed to stay in cover, to attack the enemy cavalry, which was indeed very strong but without any support of infantry and artillery, in the back, to cut it off from the forest and to place it between two fires. This proposal was however turned down, and the regiment formed up and advanced against the right flank of the enemy. While General von Plötz at the same time was charging in front with 15 squadrons, the enemy was defeated and driven back through the forest, without any loss to ourselves. I was with the [Blücher] Regiment, to be able to support it when an emergency would occur, and had followed it to the forest. Now I moved to the road, to cover the same [cavalry] reforming. While I expected much the enemy cavalry to be much disordered, I rode into the forest to see if I could reach the other side covered by the trees, to decide if I could do some more harm to them. I found out that this was impossible to pass the forest itself because of the thicket, but was assured at the same time that because of this the enemy cavalry could only advance on the road itself again. I also observed that the enemy cavalry had reformed already for the greater part, and that numerous infantry and artillery columns were present between the forest and the town. I rode back, to cover the further retreat of the cavalry. At my arrival, the ‘Blücher’ Regiment had already turned back over the heights, and from there had already retreated further before the fire of an enemy battery, which had moved left around the forest, and had deployed on a height there, that we were already separated from each other by a wooded height. The cavalry of General von Plötz had just resumed its retreat.

I expected that the enemy cavalry, supported by artillery and infantry, would advance again soon, which would be very disadvantageous to the Plötz’s cavalry. And even when they would not be chased into the lakes, the victory which just had been won, and the self-confidence that had been
gained by this would have been lost. Therefore I decided to mask the exit of the forest as long as possible until the cavalry had retreated long enough to be out of danger. To hide my weakness for the enemy and to surprise him— the only means I had to reach my goal and to protect myself—I gathered, with the aid of the present-day Major Eisenhart and another, unknown officer, 15-20 hussars which were still wandering about in the vicinity, and placed these in one rank in front of my cannon, to mask them.

After this arrangement had been made, a while later the enemy advanced again, but halted and formed up when noticing the hussars. While I was told by a hussar, whom I had dispatched forward to the edge of the forest that the enemy was moving up artillery I unmasked my artillery and opened fire, with such effect that in a few seconds the road was empty again.

After having scared away the enemy this way, I remained in position for some time until I observed that Plötz's infantry and horse artillery had reached the heights behind the lakes and deployed. The cavalry however had reached the lakes, after which I retreated slowly. Without being hampered further by the enemy, beside the fire of a few cannon of the battery already mentioned above which had advanced further, but which had no effect.

After I also had arrived at Plötz's positions, I noticed that the 'Blücher' Regiment stood to the left of these, at a distance of about 2,000 paces. The enemy had extended all his troops between both roads, and advance everywhere. I moved along the enemy front, to reach the 'Blücher' Regiment again, and with this I continued the retreat on terrain that was raising all the time. When we reached the top, we found a deep defile behind us, in which a causeway of about 500 paces long was situated, nearly parallel with the height mentioned, leading to a wide plain. On the other side, the causeway was enclosed by a great lake.

In this defile, at the beginning of the causeway, an important height is situated—which however can be completely overseen from the height in front of it—on which General Oswald, which commanded our rear guard proper, had deployed three grenadier battalions and the remaining part of his fusilier brigade. While I believed that these troops were able to retreat through a village situated behind this height, I followed the 'Blücher' Regiment on the causeway, and dispatched an officer who I came across, with the message that the enemy followed us closely, with horse artillery at the front.

When the 'Blücher' Regiment arrived on the plain, it deployed against the defile. But because I noticed that the infantry, which was just leaving its positions, was not able to retreat through the village but had to follow on the causeway, and they enemy already had arrived on the heights, I returned into the defile and deployed on a high sand hill. From here, I was able to cover the whole terrain between the causeway and the heights, already occupied by the enemy, as well as the heights itself. In this way I was able to hamper the attack of the enemy against the marching infantry column.

The enemy artillery fire disordered the queue ('tail') of the column, and then a column of enemy cavalry appeared behind a great farmstead, to descend into the valley and to attack our infantry unnoticed by these. At this decisive moment, I opened fire at them with both cannon, after which they (the cavalry) immediately retreated behind the farmstead again. When the infantry had passed the defile safely, I followed them, and united again with the Hussar Regiment 'Blücher'.

Both examples suffice to prove, what has been stated, that when with the rear guard no arm will be able to accomplish what the horse artillery is able too. When a marching army needs flank cover, it should receive, like the advance and rear guards, horse artillery.
c. In positions

In positions and in camp, the horse artillery always should be ‘at hand’, to enable its use according to the circumstances. But it may never, except when in great peril, deployed there, because this way it will be restricted to its position, and its strength, i.e. its speed and adroitness, will be lost and the army deprived from the support it could receive when the horse artillery would be held ‘at hand’.

Example

In 1794, Marshal Kalkreuth decided to take up positions with his army corps on the Ruchsbergen, near Bingen. The horse artillery was ordered to stay ‘at hand’. Finally together with ten dragoon squadrons it had to take post behind the positions of the remaining troops. Shortly afterwards, the same disposition could be observed in position near Ingelheim.

When, on the contrary, the Fürst von Hohenlohe in 1793 took up positions near Ramstein with his army corps (consisting of 13 battalions, 30 squadrons, and beside the regimental artillery, 3 foot and 2 horse artillery batteries), part of the horse artillery was assigned to take up position to cover the road coming from Ramstein and leading to Vogelwehe. Another part stood left of Ramstein village, also in position, and finally the remainder in the entrenched post at Hitschenhausen.

Despite the fact that the position at Ramstein was not to be defended, while it was only taken up to be able to observe the movement of the enemy more clearly; while this position was only taken up with the intention to deceive the enemy: it still was a mistake to deploy the horse artillery as described, because in this way wrong dispositions became common good within the army. And all that while this arm could be used with much more advantage. That this was not the case, and that the advantages of horse artillery were not known, is proved by the way it was utilised regularly, and is especially illustrated by the position this corps took up at Lauterecken later on, a position which had to be defended. The Fürst von Hohenlohe took up this position only a few days before the capture of Mayence [Mainz], after having been forced to abandon his position near Ramstein by the movement of the enemy.

The position at Lauterecken was a strong one by nature. The right wing rested on very mountainous terrain, which raised very steep between the Glan and the Odenbach. Its front was covered by the Glan, as well as the left wing by the Lauter and Lauterecken itself. The complete horse artillery, except for a half battery, was deployed in positions behind and to the right of Lauterecken. The half battery was assigned to deploy on a high slope on a projected part of the high terrain, on which the right wing rested. Because of the steep slope, it was not possible to move the guns to their assigned position from the front. Therefore, they had to move far behind the whole position, to climb up from behind, and to descend again, lowering the guns into their positions with ropes.

At that time (during the siege of Mayence [Mainz]), the Fürst von Hohenlohe mainly received assignments during which his corps was usually divided and exposed. In addition, he could not count on any support. Therefore, it was even more necessary to form a support element within his own army corps, to which purpose especially the 30 [cavalry] squadrons and both horse artillery batteries would have served best – the corps was sufficiently provided with artillery. Taking this in account, the use this general made from the horse artillery was a mistake twice.

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d. In entrenchments

After what already has been said about the use of horse artillery in positions, it is really not necessary to say something about its use in entrenchments. It remains only to be pointed out that the situation could make it necessary that the horse artillery, for its own protection, would be placed behind a parapet. Because the goal of entrenchments is not compatible with the characteristics of horse artillery. It may be obvious that pointing out this would not be necessary. However, experience has learned that in many instances such mistakes were made. During the campaign of 1793 on the Rhine, in the ‘Hohenlohe’ Corps near Käshofen in the vicinity of Zweibrücken, part of the [horse] artillery was deployed in closed entrenchments. The same happened with another part of the same on the post near Hitschenhausen.

However, it is not always the commanding general who is to blame, when the artillery is utilised in an inefficient way in some cases. In many cases, cause are the wrong opinions with the artillery itself, by which wrong dispositions are produced. The post at Hitschenhausen for example which just has been mentioned, was an advanced post from the positions at Ramstein, where the main army was deployed, with the purpose of hampering the advance of the enemy through the defiles of the Schwarzbach and the Scheidenburger Bruchs. But properly, to fulfil the intention because of which the army stood near Ramstein (to observe the movements of the enemy) to the utmost. In any case, a speedy retreat from Hitschenhausen to Ramstein would have to be executed (which really took place when the enemy advanced). While the terrain that had to be covered in such a case was much broken, and the distance between two places was two hours, it was rightly decided to occupy this post with light guns. And while the foot artillery at this time was armed with heavy 6-pdr and 12-pdr guns, one was obliged to utilise horse artillery because of the lack of light guns.

Such inconveniences, which in the above examples are of a minor importance, in many cases could have a disadvantageous influence on the outcome of the battle. They arise when all matters regarding the artillery are left to unmilitary persons, or persons without any battle experience. If one would have been convinced of the truth of this statement, or would have known his men better, in 1806 not the whole foot artillery would have been equipped with 12-pdr cannon, and would not have appeared in the field armed as such in general, to the astonishment of the complete military world. How is it possible that one believed to be able to abstract the armament from the field artillery out of the results of the experiments at Neuenhagen in 1796, from which was ascertained that the grapeshot of a 12-pdr exceeded that of a 6-pdr? The effect of single grapeshot of various calibres has been ascertained, in case it was not known before. And of course knowing this is important to know when using artillery in the open. However, when ascertaining the armament of the field artillery, which especially in the Prussian army should be calculated for offensive action, totally other aspects beside the effect of grapeshot have also to be considered. If this effect would be the only aspect, one would be wrong in not utilising ‘faule Grethe’ or ‘großen Christoph’ again; these would have even better results.

In battle, an artilleryman obviously cannot fire at longer ranges as within a certain effect is assured. This is, according to the terrain 800 – 1,500 paces. Only on level terrain, with solid ground, range with a certain effect is 300 – 500 paces more, because the roundshot will not be fixed when hitting the ground. However, experience learns that in regard to the effect, at such distances the 12-pdr cannon have no advantage over the 6-pdr’s: because the fact that a roundshot of a 12-pdr cannon has deeper penetration is insignificant, because in battle on does not want to smash, only to disable for the day of battle. The advantage of a smaller deviation of its line of fire of a 12-pdr roundshot is insignificant, and when firing at a specific target is totally removed by the fact that a 6-pdr is easier to load and aim because of its lesser weight, and therefore is able to fire more roundshot at the enemy in the same period of time. That a 12-pdr is able to fire its roundshot 600 – 800 paces further then a 6-pdr has no influence on the outcome of the battle, and has no influence on the situation in which one finds itself; then a hit at such distance is purely accidental, and a soldier of the army which has campaigned 20 years or more, will not run for the whistle and the striking of such roundshot. What in any case is the
result of artillery fire at a greater ranges, has learned the cannonade of Valmy. There, two of the best trained artilleries fought, firing for several hours thousands of roundshot at each other. Despite that, the situation was not altered, and total loss of the French army was only 500 men, despite being placed in six columns behind each other, and while the Prussian artillery was mostly armed with 12-pdr’s.

When discussing the use of grapeshot by both calibres in battle, first it has to be laid down that grapeshot should only be used when its effect will double that of roundshot; this is 800 paces for both calibres. To use grapeshot at longer ranges, especially when the enemy will make great use of it and would remain in place at such range to draw fire, would deplete stock for the –for grapeshot important– range of 300 – 500 paces. This would especially be ineffective, while the calibre balls would have had a more effective effect on 1,000 – 1,200 paces against enemy artillery, and a better effect against other arms. When the 6-pdr roundshot is compared with the 12-pdr grapeshot, the order of battle of the artillery has great spaces in between, which are at least in the proportion of 3 : 1 in the most restricted terrain against the targets in line to be hit. It has however several lines behind each other: in the first [line] the guns with their crew; in the second [line] the limbers; and in the third [line] the ammunition wagons with the heavy artillery, the riding horses with the horse artillery. And all these lines have great depth. Therefore, in combat against artillery it has to be preferred to aim for an effect in depth. From experiments, it has been ascertained that the grapeshot of a 12-pdr cannon at 1,000 – 1,200 paces gives 7 to 4 balls that hit on a closed line. However, because a grapeshot has no effect in depth at such distances, one even cannot count, because of the spaces in between, on only a third of the effect, i.e. one or two balls that hit. The 6-pdr roundshot however keeps its full power on this range, bursting through all three artillery lines, as well as through the troops behind them, smashing everything on its path, at the same time disabling the enemy guns and as such diminishing the fighting force of the enemy in a way that cannot be compared at all with a 12-pdr grapeshot. In addition, when assuming that at distances of 1,000 – 1,200 paces those seven – four balls of the 12-pdr grapeshot manage to hit the line of the other kind of troops, the 6-pdr roundshot will take away a whole squad, i.e. three men with the infantry, and two with the cavalry. When additional lines are standing behind each other, one will reach a double or even threefold effect, spreading fear evenly through all lines. When one is enfilading the enemy, or when firing at columns, the roundshot of a 6-pdr has an effect that cannot be compared at all with a 12-pdr grapeshot.

At a distance of 800 paces, on which both calibres use grapeshot, indeed the 12-pdr grapeshot has nearly double the effect compared with a 6-pdr. However, a 6-pdr cannon can be loaded and aimed quicker than a 12-pdr, on solid ground and at straight direction with a proportion of 3:2. This proportion becomes more favourable to the 6-pdr, as soon as the ground becomes more difficult or sandy, when the 12-pdr sinks in deeper compared with the 6-pdr, and is not to compare anymore at all when the artillery has to move.

While during the experiments before mentioned the best effect of the 12-pdr grapeshot has been assumed, an effect however that is totally lost in unlevelled, especially mountainous terrain at the assumed distance. While further the grapeshot fire of the foot artillery as a rule only takes place during defence, and therefore is totally out of the question during the offensive; while there is not at single example that a 6-pdr battery with its grapeshot was not able to achieve as much as a 12-pdr [battery], an equality which is caused by the higher rate of fire of the first. And finally while the foot artillery seldom fires grapeshot, --most of the foot [artillery] batteries returned from the campaigns at the Rhine without having fired a single grapeshot, although one can say that they ‘fired themselves through’ all three campaigns—so it is perfectly clear, that a 12-pdr cannon has no advantage to a 6-pdr during battle.

After the above it is however very clear, that two 6-pdr cannon have a much greater effect as one 12-pdr. One is able to find a passage in Scharnhorst’s manual, where he proves that the cost of equipping and maintaining a 12-pdr cannon is double that of a 6-pdr; therefore, one would reach
a much greater effect by arming the field artillery with 6-pdr cannon, at the same cost, or if this is not desired, be able to make great savings. However, when also taking in account the mobility of both calibres, and the efficient arrangement for battle of the 6-pdr cannon, the latter has to be preferred much more.

The 12-pdr cannon has also the following disadvantages compared with the 6-pdr. The 12-pdr has less ammunition on its limber, and therefore, and also because of the heavier weight (of its ammunition), a 12-pdr battery needs the double amount of ammunition wagons, a necessity of which the influence is shown during marches, as illustrated during manoeuvres. It makes the guns dependable from its wagons, and provides the enemy with a greater amount of targets. Further mentioning should be made of the inconvenience with the 12-pdr cannon during movement and manhandling, driving, movement, lifting, limbering and unlimbering, loading and aiming. Which all has to take place on untracked or bad roads, sandy or difficult ground, especially during bad seasons. Accumulating disproportional, because of which all movement becomes slower and unsure. With the 12-pdr cannon, the axles are burdened very disproportional; because of this the wheels cut deeper into the soil, and the horse team has to overcome much more resistance, also because of the bigger width between both wheels, as compared with a 6-pdr cannon where the burden is better divided over both axles.

Because of the horse-team of a 12-pdr which has two horses more, without getting this way the same proportion between power and burden — because while the accumulation of power this way is disproportional, as 8 horses in one team are unable to pull the eight folded burden as one horse is able to (deriving from how power is divided, and the way how it works on the burden, of which besides the concentration of burden on one axle derives that the 12-pdr is often stuck), and while the 12-pdr is limbered directly on the centre of the axle of the limber — because of the necessity of a longer span, which hampers strategic, especially however tactical movements, or movement in front or under fire of the enemy. In this way, speed compared with the 6-pdr cannon is disproportional slower.

When also taking in account the manhandling of the 12-pdr cannon during marches when an accident should occur, limbering and unlimbering, bringing in and out of position, moving to the sides in front and under fire of the enemy manhandled, which with double burden and no twice as strong crew is very exhausting labour; one should prefer arming the foot artillery with 6-pdr cannon. It is however without doubt, that a good organised army should take a certain amount of 12-pdr cannon with it, to be able to use them in specific instances.

Form old times, the Prussian artillerymen are big friends of heavy guns, or guns of heavy calibre; the disadvantage of this has been illustrated in all wars. The slowness and the delays during column marches, and even worse, the outcome of battles such as Kunersdorf, where one was not able to bring the guns across the Mühlen- and Beckergrund to the Windmühlenberg, are clear proof. Admittedly, the worse quality of the artillery was also the cause, and the more speedily strategic and tactical movements in our times, and the speed and restlessness with which the artillery has to act nowadays, balances the relation of the previous and nowadays situation of the artillery more or less.
e. In battle

On the day of battle the horse artillery should be held ‘at hand’, if one would attack or expect to be attacked, with the part [of the army] that would have to do the initial fighting; to cover the attack; to support the cavalry; or to proceed the attack.

Example

During the battle of Leuthen [5 December 1757], it would have been of no use to the Austrian army to deploy their horse artillery (assuming that they had horse artillery at that date) to reinforce their left wing. As it would have been of no use to the Fürst of Hohenlobe, when he would have given both his horse batteries the same assignment during the battle of Jena; then they would have been upset the same as the other troops, and having been rolled up the same way. When however one would have held them ‘at hand’ [at Leuthen], they could have hampered the outstripping and pushing back of the left wing that was attacked, and better still could have attacked the victorious right wing of the Prussians unexpectedly themselves. This probably would have led to different results in this situation; in any case, not such a severe defeat would have been suffered. In the meanwhile, they [i.e. the horse artillery] would have been used even more effectively, when with it the Prussian left wing would have been attacked unexpectedly; these would have been defeated without doubt, because of the condition it was in (according to Retzow), and then the advance of the right would halt automatically.

According to French sources, Emperor Napoleon made the same manoeuvre with his horse artillery at Wagram. The result of this great idea is known. From the proclamation of the Archduke Carl to his army after that battle, which had fought bravely, in which he rebukes the behaviour of the left wing, the dreadfulness of this weapon can be recognised. Resist this, who can!

Assuming that the Prussian army already had horse artillery during the battle of Kunersdorf [12 August 1759], when assigned at the start of the battle to fire at the Russian troops from the Windmühlenbergen it would have fired all its ammo, being fatigued, and weakened by the losses suffered. When held ‘at hand’, it would be able to act with all its strength after the initial victory. Part of it would pass the ground speedily, having thrown itself on the disordered retreating Russian battalions impetuously, and having dispersed these. While the other part would advance with the cavalry on the plain between Kunersdorf, the Reppener Horst, and the Spitzen Berge. Taking in regard the state the Russian army was in, it would not have been difficult to throw the Russian battery down from the Spitzen Berge, when it would have been attacked in front and in flank by the whole horse artillery. After that, the right wing of the horse artillery could have attacked Loudon’s [Austrian] Corps from the Spitzen Berge, while the left wing would have done the same along the Reppener Heide. These troops, contained within the limited space between the Reppener Forst, the Laudonsgrunde, and the Spitzen Berge, could not have made use of their numbers, and having been chased back into their hiding place. Because such manoeuvre could have been executed by the horse artillery with the utmost speed, and would have been supported by the whole fresh cavalry force of General Seydlitz, in such a way the disorder which the Russians found themselves in could never have been remedied. By the advance of this part of the Prussian army however, the former were thrown into the Laudensgrund and the low ground, and completely having been cut down.

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7 Source: “Ueber den Gebrauch der reitenden Artillerie” (Berlin, 1836) pp. 82-93
f. When the army is retreating from battle
The horse artillery covers the retreat, together with the troops assigned to this task, and is used the way as has already been described when its use with the rear-guard was discussed.

g. When pursuing the enemy after the battle
Being the quickest fire-arm, the horse artillery does great service here. By utilising it [i.e. the horse artillery] one is able to keep the enemy retreating; the cavalry is supported while breaking into the enemy; [enemy] troops which cover the retreat are broken and scattered; debouching and defiling of its own troops is supported; it hampers the enemy, to give its own following troops time to close in; and finally it advances together with the cavalry to cut off the enemy.

h. At river crossings
The enemy is either present or not. In the latter case, one is able to cross at leisure, in the former situation the crossing has to be forced, or achieved by demonstrating.

When a crossing is forced, the horse artillery cannot be utilised before suitable terrain has been occupied on the other side of the river. Therefore, in such case it will be held in reserve, until it is able to cross, as a whole or in detachments, according to the circumstances.

Are for example the enemy weak, and the terrain behind them unfavourable, because of which it will only think about a quick retreat as soon as it will be forced to leave the riverbank, the horse artillery will cross early, to be utilised as has been described when pursuing the enemy.

Is however, the proportion the contrary, and will they [i.e. the enemy] only leave the riverbank because of its disadvantageous nature; the horse artillery will attack during the crossing. In this situation the infantry and foot artillery should have a firm hold on the opposite river bank, before the horse artillery crosses. In addition, the crossing of the army may never be hampered by the crossing of arms that because of their nature could create disorder and increase the difficulty of that crossing easily; that is the cavalry and the horse artillery. Therefore, the horse artillery crosses with the reserve.

When a crossing is achieved by demonstrating, the horse artillery will cross in detachments or as a whole right at the start, to secure the crossing and advance of the army.

Example
Such conduct was observed when the Prussian army crossed the Rhine near Bacharach during March 1793. The opposite river bank was hardly occupied by some battalions when the horse artillery battery of the present-day Major Lange crossed together with the ‘Leibhusarenregiment’, continuing the march to Argenthal immediately, to capture this post (entrance to the Saoner forest).
Arrived there, there was a rest for some hours, after which, during the night, the march to Schöneberg (exit of the Saoner forest to Kreuznach) was resumed to ensure occupation.

i. When retreating across a river
When an army retreats across a river in full view of the enemy, the horse artillery will cover the retreat until the last position, together with other forces assigned to this task. From here, the crossing will have to be executed immediately; it [i.e. the horse artillery] will cross first together with the cavalry. Such conduct was observed when Field Marshal Graf Kalkreuth retreated across the Rhine at the end of the 1794 campaign.
**k. When defending a river**

The horse artillery is held ‘at hand’, when one wants to prevent the enemy advancing any further. If the crossing place is known, and if the enemy will be opposed, the horse artillery also will be utilised here. If on the contrary the crossing place is unsure, the horse artillery will enable one to engage the enemy during its crossing speedily, or to occupy advantageous parts of the terrain first and prevent the enemy advance any further.

**Examples**

*When General Custine would have had other thoughts while the Prussian army was still crossing near Babarach, or if he would have changed his system, his cavalry and horse artillery would have been quicker than the Prussians, and coming from Hungrigen Wolf and Wlad-Agisheim would have been able to occupy the posts at Argenthal and Rheinbellen before the Prussians which only arrived at 5 o'clock in the evening. They would have been able to maintain their positions long enough for sufficient infantry to arrive, and being able to withstand the Prussians for the whole day. During the night, the whole army could have been concentrated. And at dawn the Prussian army could have been attacked from the Saoner forest, while they were turned along the road from Simmern to Bacharach and forced back across the Rhine, with the advantage of the terrain in favour of the French.*

On 6 November 1806, the horse artillery battery of Captain von Lahn was assigned to observe the Trave between Lübeck and Travemünde, together with the cavalry regiments ‘Von Beeren’ and ‘Heikink’. When they enemy would try to cross at any place, it would have to engage them. Especially under such circumstances, the horse artillery will be very efficient.
The use of horse artillery with detachments at outposts

Translated by Geert van Uythoven

These posts are: observation posts, supporting posts, and ‘standing’ posts.

a. With observation and supporting posts

The observation posts have the task to observe the area between the own and enemy army, and to discover movement of the latter. These posts would not have to be defended, but often they would have to be maintained for some time.

The supporting posts have to support and cover the observation posts, as well as the advanced pickets or other detachments, or to receive these during their retreat. Both kinds of posts have to move quickly, especially during retreat. So when artillery is necessary, it should be horse artillery.

Example

During the 1794 campaign at the Rhine, Field Marshal Graf von Kalkreuth took up positions on the Kuhberg near Neukirchen. The greatest part of the troops, especially cavalry, was in cantonments in order to spare them. To receive message in time of any enemy approach advanced posts, consisting of two hussar squadrons of the Regiment ‘Von Köbler’, commanded by the then Major von Prittwitz, were placed on the road to Saarlouis. These posts had to observe this road, and keep the enemy occupied during a possible advance, for which task, two cannon of the Horse Artillery Battery ‘Von Lange’ had been assigned.

Later, this army corps took up position near Martinsböhle and the Rosenköpfchen. An advanced post was positioned at Hitzchenhausen, consisting of two squadrons of the Dragoon Regiment ‘Von Anspach-Baireuth’, commanded by the then Major von Schäffer, reinforced with two cannon of the battery mentioned above. Its task was to observe the area from Schwarzbach and the Scheidenburger Bruch, through which the road from Homburg over Ramstein to Kaiserlautern led.

When in the month May 1793, General Houchard advanced with a superior force from St. Imbert and Röhrbach against the Corps of Fürst Hohenlohe standing on the Carlsberg near Homburg; forcing it from there with his superior numbers and manoeuvres, during the night before the retreat of the Corps to Kaiserlautern posts were advanced against Homburg and Erbach. To support these, a strong detachment of Hessian troops was placed at the foot of the Carlsberg, reinforced with a cannon of the battery mentioned above, commanded by myself [i.e. Monhaupt].

The posts first mentioned received the task to hamper the enemy advance for a considerable distance. Therefore, they had to advance [to the enemy] with great speed, keeping him busy in the covered terrain and in this way slowing him down. When this goal had been reached they had to retreat to Wibelskirchen quickly, where an infantry battalion was positioned. Obviously, to reach the goal mentioned, beside the cavalry a fire arm was needed, and this could only be the horse artillery, because of its speed and adroitness under all circumstances, and because these troops were not to engage in any serious fighting.

The case mentioned took place at the post of Hitzchenhausen. One wanted to hamper the enemies’ defile across the Schwarzbach and the Scheidenburger Bruch; after that, a speedily retreat would
have to be executed, which would become especially dangerous when the enemy would force its way at Schöneberg at the same time.

With the posts at the foot of the Carlsberg one wanted to support the posts that had been advanced to Homburg and Erbach, and to cover their retreat, as well as masking the march of the army corps. These supporting posts therefore needed artillery, and because of the crowding it would find itself in during a retreat (when discovered by the enemy early), this should be horse artillery.

b. ‘Standing’ posts

‘Standing’ posts are troop detachments, with which certain points of the terrain are occupied, which in fact are part of the position of the army; because with these posts one is able to continue the offensive, or to hold its position, as was the case with the posts near Kettrich when the Duke of Brunswick was in position near Pirmasens in August 1793. In addition, with the posts at the Kreuzberg near Zweibrücken, while Hohenlohe’s Corps was in position near Homburg. Or such as with which communications are maintained, as the posts at Ronnenbuscher Hof, while Hohenlohe’s Corps was in position near Homburg. The posts mentioned first gave the Duke of Brunswick the freedom to push into the Vosges; in the second case, Hohenlohe’s Corps was enabled to hold its position near Homburg. In the latter case, communications between the posts on the Kreuzberg and the troops near Homburg was maintained.

Such posts must be held. Therefore, the necessary measures must be taken to enable this. They must be occupied with a sufficient force and be supported quickly.

In no case, horse artillery may be utilised to occupy such a post itself, but it should be held ‘at hand’ at the most effective location, especially when more of such posts are maintained, or when the whole position consists of such posts. To occupy such posts one should utilise foot artillery, because this is more suited to defend positions. The speed of the horse artillery enables one to support these posts quickly, or to attack an enemy which already has broken through the line and to throw it back. An example will illustrate this even more.

During the middle of August 1793, the French army of the Rhine had retreated to the borders of Lorraine and Alsace, taking up positions to cover these provinces. Were these positions were, as well as the Prussian positions at that time, one can find in the description of the battle of Pirmasens by Lieutenant-General von Grawert, and in the appendix to this description, were the position of Hohenlohe’s Corps is described by the then Major von Massenbach.

The latter Corps –which headquarters was in Homburg-- had to defend a large frontage. To the right, it stretched to Altstadt and Limbach; to the left to Zweibrücken and Nieder-Auerbach.

The roads from Zweibrücken over Martinshöhe and Landstuhl; as well as the road from Homburg over Hauptstuhl, and the road from Homburg over Jägersburg and Schöneberg, had to be covered. For that purpose, posts were placed on the Kreuzberg near Zweibrücken, Ronnenbuscher Hof, on the Klosterkopf, Kaninchenberge and Weberberge, and near Altstadt and Limbach. The post on the Kreuzberg covered the main road from Zweibrücken over Martinshöhe to Kaiserslautern, and secured at the same time the positions near Homburg. When the enemy would be able to dislodge this post quickly and advance to Martinshöhe speedily, the whole position near Homburg would be turned. And when the enemy would act cunningly, the forces of Kaiserslautern would also be cut off. In this way, the Prussian army would have been separated, and the result of all this would be devastating when the French army would be strong enough and ably led. How the attack would have to take place is described above. It remains to be noted that the enemy occupied the Bubenhauser heights, and indeed all heights forming the valleys of the Erbach (on the left bank) and the Blies (on the right bank), having positioned

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9 During this time, the Duke of Brunswick stood near Pirmasens.
advanced posts here. These advanced posts were at cannon shot from the posts on the Kreuzberg and Ronnenbuscher Hof, separated of them by the valley of the Erbach.

With its posts, the enemy possessed the Schmalscheides (a forest between Neu-Hornbach and Zweibrücken), and it was impossible for the posts on the Kreuzberg and Ronnenbuscher Hof to acquire information about what happened on the other side of the Erbach. If therefore the enemy would struck camps near Hornbach and Blieskastel at nightfall, they could be at Einöde village and the Ronnenbuscher Hof, in front of Zweibrücken and the Kreuzberg before daybreak, ready for the attack at a cannon shot distance, to undertake it at daybreak before anyone on the Kreuzberg and Ronnenbuscher Hof knew what was happening. Therefore, it was a big mistake to occupy the posts on the Kreuzberg and Ronnenbuscher Hof with three infantry battalions, five hussar squadrons, and a horse artillery battery, and to regard them as advanced posts for about six weeks. Then quite some time after the battle of Pirmasens, and only then after the enemy at a certain morning at daybreak (when on the Kreuzberg and Ronnenbuscher Hof still everyone was quiet in their tents) attacked Zweibrücken and Einöde village, these posts were occupied permanently with five battalions and two infantry companies, and a half 12-pdr and a 6-pdr heavy artillery battery. In this way, with the weakness of Hohenlohe’s Corps, the posts were occupied with a sufficient force. However, the whole position of this Corps (properly consisting now of posts only) was divided in two main parts; the one near Homburg and the one near Zweibrücken. The former consisted of the posts on the Weberberg and the Kaninchenberg, the Klosterkopf, near Benden and near Altstadt and Limbach; the latter consisted of posts on the Kreuzberg and at Ronnenbuscher Hof and near Nieder-Auerbach.

Both main parts were separated from each other by a strong defile, which began near Schwarzacker, and which ran into the Martinshöhe area. As such, they were only connected directly to each other by the chaussée from Homburg over Schwarzacker to Zweibrücken, and by a side road which crossed the defile near Kirchberg. The chaussée however, which ran over Schwarzacker and through the Erbach valley, was covered even by small arms fire of the enemy on the heights on the other side, and therefore not useful as a line of communications. So the only road left was the one over Kirchberg; a detour of two hours when one wanted to give mutual support.

As such, it was especially necessary not to use the horse artillery of this Corps, which consisted of two batteries, to occupy posts of these positions, deploying them for their defence, but to keep them ‘at hand’ together with the cavalry, in order to have them ready to support those posts.

After the changes of position had taken place as described, these horse artillery was distributed the following way. One battery camped with the Dragoon Regiments ‘Von Schmettau’ and ‘Von Katt’ near Benden, to have them at hand when the enemy would try to break through between

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10 From these troops, the Grenadier Battalion von Romberg, the Fusilier Battalion von Ernst, and the half Horse Artillery Battery von Lange stood on the Kreuzberg; the Fusilier Battalion von Thadden however, beside the other half of the Horse Artillery Battery von Lange, stood near Ronnenbuscher Hof. Both posts were only separated by a small stretch of ground. The hussars cantoned in Kirchberg.

11 An not as is in the description: “Initially, only the half Horse Artillery Battery ‘Von Lange’ stood on the Kreuzberg. Because the enemy brought heavy cannon on the Bubenhauser heights from time to time, firing with these not only at Zweibrücken city, but also at the Kreuzberg, the hereditary prince not only placed the half Foot Battery ‘Von Berneck’ on the Kreuzberg near Zweibrücken at the brick-yard [Ziegelei], but also requested to the Graf von Kalkreuth three Brummer [i.e. 12-pdr cannon], which also were posted there.” Further: “initially greater part of the corps, being three battalions of the [Infantry] Regiment ‘Von Hohenlohe’, the Grenadier battalion ‘Von Schladen’, the 2nd battalion [of the Infantry Regiment] ‘Graf von Herzberg’, and the 1st and 2nd battalion [of the Infantry Regiment] ‘Von Romberg’ stood on the Weberberg in front of Homburg. To maintain communications with this camp and the camp on the Kreuzberg, on the heights near Ronnenbuscher Hof stood the Fusilier Battalion ‘Von Thadden’, and the second half of the [Foot Artillery] Battery ‘Von Berneck’. Later some minor changes took place; the 2nd battalion [of the Infantry Regiment] ‘Graf von Herzberg’, and the two musketeer battalions [of the Infantry Regiment] ‘Von Romberg’ moved from the camp on the Weberberg to the heights near Ronnenbuscher Hof, to the remaining both companies of the Fusilier Battalion ‘Von Thadden’.”
Altstadt and Klein-Ottweiler. Of the other battery, one half stood near Altstadt and Limbach, the other half in posts near Nieder-Auerbach.

The intention which one had with the horse artillery near Benden, made its presence necessary there. That was not the case with the other battery. Near Altstadt stood three battalions, which had to defend their posts, together with a heavy 6-pdr [foot] battery in a position on the heights, with the Blies in front—a river which by itself, and because of the over 300 paces wide and very wet pastures on both river banks was not practicable to cross-- to defend the causeway from Altstadt to Limbach and its bridge across the Blies. The half horse artillery battery could therefore be spared, especially while the one at Benden was in the vicinity. The other half [horse artillery battery] however stood in position near Nieder-Auerbach, a duty which could have been better done by a half foot battery of heavy 6-pdr’s. These could have been taken from the post on the Kreuzberg and the Ronnenbuscher Hof, their place taken by the eight battalion guns which were present there. Maybe they could also have been spared near Altstadt, because this post could be supported easily by the vicinity of the main corps, and the one of Graf von Kalkreuth.

The second horse artillery battery, together with the five squadrons of the Hussar Regiment ‘Von Eben’, should be held ‘at hand’ in Kirchberg, or somewhat more forward near Zweibrücken; in this way, they would be at hand to be able to support the posts of Kreuzberg and Ronnenbuscher Hof, and near Nieder-Auerbach. Or be able to concentrate both [horse artillery] batteries and the whole cavalry in a matter of 45 minutes, to be used as a whole on a certain spot to give a strong punch.

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**VI. The use of horse artillery at winter posts.** Translated by Geert van Uythoven

At winter postings, the use of horse artillery is the same as in positions. It is held ‘at hand’, to be able to support the troops at the posts as quick as possible.

**Example**

Winter 1794, the Prussian army stood on both banks of the Mainz, on posts along the Rhine. The Corps of the then Major General von Rüchel stood near Bieberich, and in the direction of Kassel. The foot artillery had its guns in position near Bieberich; men and horses were partially in Bieberich, partially in other neighbouring villages.

The horse artillery however, which was with this Corps, was placed in and around Wallau, together with the cavalry. It had orders to be saddled every morning at 4 o’clock, and to march to the heights near Hochheim at the first alarm, to stay ‘at hand’ there.

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SOJ-07(09)

VII. The use of horse artillery with sieges
Translated by Geert van Uythoven

a. Inside fortresses
One needs the horse artillery before the siege is commenced, to keep the enemy away from the fortress, and during the siege with the sorties.

b. In front of fortresses
One covers the labour with it, and throw back sorties.

Never should one use the horse artillery on the walls or inside entrenchments; because by this it will be ruined, and in no state to be used in the open field when the fortress has been relieved, or when the besieging force should be used in any other way. While the artillerymen find themselves on the walls or inside the entrenchments, the horses lose there care and will suffer; without good horses, horse artillery is only as good as no horse artillery at all. The artillerymen are being shot, or at least exhausted. One would have to educate the horse artillerymen in siege craft and fortress service during peacetime; they would also have to be taught in three kinds of service, would be badly trained in all three and remain bunglers ['Stümper']. As such, they would not be able to meet the standards of their service, which deserve so much practice.

SOJ-07(10)

VIII. The use of horse artillery while undertaking the little war
Translated by Geert van Uythoven

The horse artillery is in this role also an outstanding arm in all cases (while marching behind the enemy, to destroy a magazine, to capture convoys, or to disperse, etc.), because such undertakings demand great speed while the enemy always will try overtake and to cut off such detachments. The horse artillery is also needed at every undertaking of this kind, for which the execution demands great speed, and in which cases it always will be able to fulfil the task in cooperation with cavalry alone; for example to disperse a convoy, or to defeat a wagon fort. Indeed, with every big undertaking belongs horse artillery, to become master of something quickly, to cover the retreat, or to be used to break through the enemy lines.
He was born on 11 April 1775 to a regimental surgeon of IR41 von Lossau that garrisoned Minden in Westphalia. After his father’s death, he moved to Potsdam and joined Major von Anhalt Horse Artillery Company on 1 May 1790.

After the ill-fated 1792 campaign in Champagne, he was promoted to bombardier and then served in Captain von Lange Horse Artillery Company that was part of the advance guard during the Rhine Campaign of 1793. He took part in the engagements of Waldalgesheim, Flörsheim, and Karlsberg. With von Hohenlohe Corps, he was present at Limbach, Eschweiler, Klembach, and Scheerhöle. At the end of the campaign, he became a cadet at the Artillery Academy.

In 1794, he was assigned to the Graf Kalckreuth Corps. His battery was in the first line at the battle of Kaiserslautern, and finally participated in the rear-guard at Kreutz. Monhaupt had been promoted to NCO and his exceptional behaviour brought him to the attention of the Chef of the horse artillery, who recommended him to General von Tempelhof to follow education at the Artillery Academy. On 1 June 1796 he was promoted 2nd Lieutenant.

Monhaupt served in the horse artillery battery of Captain von Hahn when the Prussian army entered war again ten years later. Part of the Corps of Fürst von Hohenlohe the battery fought in the battle of Jena 1806. Acting in two parts, Monhaupt commanded four guns attached to the detachments of General von Holzendorf. He followed the general retreat, and arriving at Magdeburg became part of the rear guard commanded by General von Blücher. Participating in all combats in Mecklenburg, he met the fate of the complete corps at Lübeck (Capitulation of Ratkau). Monhaupt left for Memel trough Denmark.

In 1808, Monhaupt was promoted 1st lieutenant, and assigned to the 4th (Guard) Horse Artillery Battery.

**Russian Service (1812-14)**

In 1812, like many other Prussian officers that objected to the alliance with France, he departed for Russia and was appointed Captain and Chef of the 1st Horse Artillery Battery of the Russo-German Legion (RGL). He also commanded the Artillery Brigade. His experience, knowledge and organisational talents were put to good use in the difficult task of organising the Russo-German Legion Artillery. He raised two serviceable horse artillery batteries with gunners drawn from prisoners of war from the Confederation of the Rhine contingents serving in Napoleon’s Grande Armée during his Russian campaign. These were mostly infantrymen volunteering for service, and had to be trained in serving the guns and tending the horses. Monhaupt’s batteries made such a good impression during the inspections and were even drawn to the attention of the Russian Tsar. Monhaupt was soon promoted to Oberst-Lieutenant.

During the campaign of 1813, the RGL was part of Count Wallmoden’s Corps fighting along the lower Elbe River who were blockading Davout’s forces in Hamburg. He participated at the actions at Vellahn (21 Aug) and Göhrde (16 Sept) where Monhaupt distinguished himself in cut off the French retreat with his artillery. As a result he was promoted to Oberst in the first months of 1814.
Prussian service (1815 – 1834)
In mid 1814, a treaty between Russia and Prussia transferred the Russo-German Legion to Prussian service so Oberst Monhaupt was able to rejoin Prussian service.

During the Hundred days, Monhaupt held command of the artillery of the Prussian III Corps. He was distinguished at Ligny (16 June 1815), and at Wavre (18-19 June). A number of influential officers proposed to King Friedrich Wilhelm III that Monhaupt should receive command of the Guard Artillery but was turned down by the king. Instead, Monhaupt was given command of the 3rd Artillery Brigade, a post he held for thirteen years. He also put much energy in promoting his the various tactical uses that could be made of the artillery arm and wished to make the artillery able to act on an equal level as the infantry and cavalry. He also championed the offensive power of the horse artillery in close cooperation with the cavalry. His ideas were modern and well-thought. His work greatly influenced the development of the artillery arm, and not only the horse artillery.

In 1829, Monhaupt was promoted General-Major and appointed commander of the fortress-city Wesel. During the Revolution of July 1830, he worked tirelessly. Plagued by sickness, mainly caused by the exhausting efforts during the winter of 1812, he finally retired in 1834, after nearly forty-four years of service. His request was granted and was promoted General-Lieutenant. He died only months on 19 February 1835 aged 59 years old.

Published work:
As was the habit that time, many of his works were published anomalously and so he probably wrote even more:

- Anonymous (1818), *Die reitende Artillerie, was sie ist, sein sollte und sein konnte*, Berlin.
- Anonymous (1823) System der reitende Artillerie, Berlin
- Anonymous (1825) *System der Feld-Artillerie zu Fuss*, Berlin

Published posthumously:

- Monhaupt, (1838) *Die reitende Artillerie im Cavalleriegefecht*, Berlin.

References