The War of 1812 Magazine

Issue 9: May 2008



“Red Sticks” and Stones May Break My Bones: The Massacre at Fort Mims

By Morgan D. Shields

The Massacre

It was the morning of August 30, 1813.  Life seemed normal inside Fort Mims.  Once the home to Samuel Mims, the fort had become the asylum for 400 settlers and 70 Militia.  The day had started much the same as every other day as the settler’s went about their normal business, ignoring earlier warnings of a potential Indian attack. As the men, women, children and slaves were getting ready for the midday meal, young militia men were dancing with young ladies and laughing, while drinks were being served and cards were being shuffled.  The sound of drums announced the noonday call to mess – heard not only by the unassuming dwellers inside the fort but also by the 726 “Red Stick” Creeks hiding behind cane growth in a ravine 400 yards from the fort.  When the drum sounded, the banquet began.  Soon, war cries could be heard as the Red Sticks rushed the fort. Entry into the fort was easy, as the gate was jammed open from piled up sand, allowing the “bullet-proof” braves rushed through unhindered.  They proceeded to take the whole fort – burning buildings, mutilating women and children along with the men and some slaves.  They took hostage around 100 people, mostly slaves, and only 30 settlers (mostly women and children) escaped that horrific massacre; all others were left dead amid the fort.  The screams could be heard over 3 miles away at Fort Pierce where 40 soldiers and about 150 settlers listened throughout the day with horror.  By 5 p.m. the battle was over, leaving behind the bodies of 472 men, women, children, half-breeds, White Creeks and slaves.[1]

Theories and Hypothesis

What led to the bloody, tragic day in 1813 at Fort Mims?  Did the overwhelming number of the Red Sticks stifle any effort by the settlers to hold out?  Was there ever any chance of survival in the fort?  Were the Red Sticks more unified with a common cause, allowing them to fight with purpose?  What made them so unified?  What was their common cause? Was it because of geography?  Did terrain play a role in the battle’s outcome?  Had the fort gate had been closed would the outcome have been different?  These are questions that need to be answered.  

Troop Preponderance

The first theory is the theory that troop preponderance dictated the outcome.  To test this theory the following hypothesis has been derived: the side with the most troops is more likely to win the battle.  History shows many indications where this is the case, in discussing Native American conflicts, the Battle of Little Bighorn is a good example.  In this battle, Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer led a group of 210 men into what today is known as “Custer’s Last Stand” but should have been known as the Massacre at Little Bighorn.  All of the men in Custer’s battalion were killed after the almost two hour battle with 1,500 Lakota Sioux and Cheyenne Indians.  In this battle there was nearly a 7:1 ratio of Indians to cavalry.  This is an extraordinary preponderance in favor of the Lakota and Cheyenne, but even when ratios are not that high, it appears that those with even a slight advantage in numbers are still more likely to walk away from the battle as victors.[2]

Frederick Lanchester was an engineer living in England who developed a simple mathematical equation that is still in use today by the Department of Defense and Defense Analysts in general.  Lanchester developed several “laws” during the First World War that dealt with quantity versus quality and the “Laws of Combat.”  One of the “laws” that he invented is called the square law.  “Crudely put, the square law states that the measure of combat power is a force’s effectiveness times the square of its numerical size.”[3]  The definition of effectiveness used in the square law is “the rate of fire times the probability of kill of each shot...”[4] From this definition of Lanchester’s law we can assume “…that two forces are equal when the products of the square of their force levels and their effectiveness are equal.  Equal in this sense means that both forces will be completely destroyed if the battle is allowed to continue until completion.”[5]  Thus are the basics of Lanchester’s square law. 

Some of Lanchester’s observations of warfare led him to theorize

“…the larger force can concentrate its fire on the smaller force, if the larger force adds more numbers, its losses will decline because it can destroy the enemy more rapidly.  The more the winning force outnumbers the losing force, the greater will be the loss rate of the losing force, while the winner’s loss rate will stay the same.  The battle will therefore last a shorter period of time, and the winner will suffer fewer casualties….it is always preferable to outnumber an opponent by as much as possible…”[6] 

These observations of Lanchester can be applied to the Battle of the Little Bighorn; Custer divided his force and thus was heavily outnumbered.  Also, the effectiveness of the weapons that the Natives had was much greater than those that the cavalry had.  The Native Americans had Henry repeating rifles; evidence showing up to 220 of these guns, along with several hundred other types of guns, while the Cavalry’s main weapon was the single shot Springfield rifle.  “…The hapless troopers were, in fact, outgunned by a factor of four to one and outnumbered by about seven to one.”[7]  This case supports Lanchester’s theory that battle outcome is greatly affected by numbers and the effectiveness of those troops. 

There have been many critics of the Lanchester “laws” of combat both the less known linear law and the square law; however “…Lanchester in several places emphasized that the equations demonstrate with simple mathematics long recognized principles of war.”[8]  The formula that Lanchester put forth is one that has been long recognized by military analysts and the general public at large: that the troops with the greatest preponderance in size are more likely to win.  


Terrain has also been cited as a significant factor in determining the outcome of battles.  This observation has lead to the theory that the type of terrain dictates the outcome of the battle.  Specifically, the terrain is only helpful to those who take advantage of it.  From this theory is derived the hypothesis that troops that take advantage of the natural conditions and terrain are more likely to win.  Here, natural conditions are defined as natural cover (such as brush and forest), along with those conditions aiding the defense (i.e., a manmade structure such as a fort and the battlefield in general). 

Manmade structures are only helpful if they are correctly built to withstand the elements and the warfare of the time.  Over history the design of fortifications has changed as warfare has changed – if the fortification has not been updated to match the times, then the fortification will in fact be a hindrance and not help.  “Remember the Alamo” in the war of Texas Independence?  Trapped inside a small fortress that was never really intended to be a fort at all, the men died tragic deaths   The Alamo, a ramshackle church mission turned garrison, was defended by roughly 150 men under the command of Jim Bowie and William Travis; it fell to Santa Anna after a 13 day battle in 1836 in the war of Texas Independence, leaving most of the inhabitants of the Alamo dead.[9] 

Lorraine White, in her article, Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy’s Failure to Recover Portugal, 1640-1668, explains that

“In a war lasting almost twenty-eight years (1640-68), Spanish forces endeavored to recover Portugal from the Spanish Habsburg monarchy…Drawing comparisons with Alba’s successful 1580 campaign to annex Portugal, it shows how geographic and climatic factors influenced the conduct of the 1640-68 war in terms of strategy, tactics, and logistics.  It also reveals how these factors contributed to the outcome of the war and to Spain’s military failure against its smaller neighbor.”[10] 

White explains the importance of geography in helping predict battle outcomes.  The frontier between Portugal and Spain is contiguous.  Both forces were comfortable and aware of the terrain; however, one side (Portugal) did a better job utilizing the terrain.  While the Spaniards garrisoned themselves in fortifications (specifically in this discussion, Badajoz), the Portuguese continuously moved about, carefully placing themselves in strategic places for attack.  They would “choose their place of ambush well and remain hidden in wait overnight to better avoid detection.”[11]  One of the surprise attacks by the Portuguese in 1643 was at Badajoz; which was located along a river (Guadiana) and had a hilltop castle.  The Spanish had some natural defense, due to the natural conditions, but the fortification was more of a hindrance then help according to White because; “…while the town was walled, its fortifications were of medieval construction and could not provide adequate defense…”[12]

Another important aspect of the terrain is distance.  If the terrain is an open continuous territory without many settlements, then the chance for aid goes down, thus aiding in offense, while hindering defense.  “…The distances between settlements and strongholds rendered mutual support almost impossible.  For minor engagements, this invariably favored attack over defense…The dispatch of troops and even cavalry in response to requests for assistance, or at times to the sound of an attack taking place on a neighboring settlement, was usually a futile and costly exercise as the relief force generally arrived after the raid was completed and the attackers withdrawn.”[13] This was the case with the Portuguese surprise attack against the Spanish at Badajoz in 1643.  Here we see that isolation of terrain is an important factor in battle outcome.  If there is no possibility or a low possibility for aid of the defense, then the attacker is more likely to win. 

Unity of Troops

Another theory that plays an important role in victory is the unity of the troops, which is often cited as a key predictor in the outcome of a battle.  The hypothesis states that troops unified in a cause are more likely to win.  Here, a cause is defined as one of idealistic origins - to fight for something bigger than oneself, to fight for those fallen before you, to fight to right a wrong.  Idealism suggests that one would fight for principles.  The Crusades were idealistic battles fought to save and promote Christianity, (which seems contradictory due to the fact that Christianity would promote peace, love and praying for your enemies).  Although idealists are typically cited as those who are unwilling to go to war, idealists who are united for a cause and believe strongly enough to go to war are daunting foes.  Examples throughout history suggest such a view.    

One of those historic examples took place on April 21, 1836 when Sam Houston led 783 men against 1,500 men commanded by Santa Anna.  While the Mexican forces took a siesta that afternoon around 4 o’clock, Houston and his men made preparations to attack; they were nearly outnumbered 2 to 1, how was there any hope of victory?  “…It was first heard: what has become one of the most famous battle cries in history.  From the left of the line, Colonel Sidney Sherman bellowed at the top of his lungs, “Remember the Alamo!”  How could any Texan ever forget? ...Then the Texians threw themselves upon their disorganized enemies – literally with a vengeance.”[14]  The actual battle of San Jacinto was over in 18 minutes and the results were breathtaking.  The Mexican forces had lost 630 dead, 208 wounded and 730 were taken prisoner while the Texans had lost only nine dead and 23 wounded. Thus were the results of the Battle of San Jacinto and the famous battle cry “Remember the Alamo.”[15]

What caused these men who were so outnumbered to have such amazing results?  In his article Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976, Zeev Maoz conducted an empirical study between two models of battle prediction.  The first model is the “Capability Model” which suggests that battle outcome is predicted by the strongest; those who are the numerically stronger will prevail.  The second theory is the “Resolve Model” which argues that the side having the most resolve and motivation is more likely to win.  Maoz starts out his article by stating “Initiators in subwar international conflicts, as well as initiators of interstate wars, have enjoyed a disproportionately high probability of winning.”[16]  The Resolve Model has its origins in“…the literature on conflict-related motivations, especially those studies that focus on national frustration as a source of ignition, and strategic studies of conflict management.”[17] 

To test his theory Maoz’s operational hypothesis was:

“The probability of victory for the initiator in a serious interstate dispute varies positively with the ratio between: (a) the highest level of hostility reached by the initiator during a dispute to the highest level of hostility reached by the target; (b) the average level of hostility reached by the initiator during a dispute to the average level of hostility reached by the target; (c) the number of incidents committed by the initiator of the dispute related to the number of incidents committed by the target.”[18]  For the purpose of his study a dispute initiator was defined as, “…[the] state which has first committed a military confrontation action against another state…”[19]

And target was defined as “… [The] state towards which the first military confrontation was directed.”[20]  It was tested upon a random sample of 164 disputes chosen from the period1816 – 1976.  What were the findings?  Maoz states that “Initiators of serious interstate disputes tend to disproportionately emerge as victors not because they are stronger than targets but because they are able to demonstrate that the stakes of the dispute are more important to them than to their opponents.”[21]  His findings reinforce the initial empirical observations that the higher the resolve of the troops the more likely to be victorious they are in the battle. 

Looking at other conflicts we can see similar results.  The Revolutionary War was very much an idealist war – the ideals being prominently displayed and preserved in the Declaration of Independence which states that “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”[22]  The regular army of the American Colonies was much smaller and less equipped than the British forces, but resolve played a large role, alongside other factors, in the outcome. 

Nationalism and identity is another factor that plays into the resolve of troops to fight.  “Nationalism is often the basis for a group’s feelings that it is being wronged or that it has a grievance.  Other types of grievances may also provide issues for wars: violations of territory or national honor, for example.”[23]  The American Revolution is a good example of nationalism.  Those supporting the war wanted an America for Americans, self-determination with no interference from outside sources.  Many independence movements throughout history have a nationalist backbone.  Nationalism has also been cited as the initiator of the Second World War in Europe. 

Nationalism has its roots in idealism, which tends to dismiss practicalities and reality.  Idealism is fighting for something above oneself, fighting for an ideal.  Words such as freedom, independence, revenge, and “Remember the Alamo” all evoke emotions that allow men to fight beyond their ability and against the odds.  Thus, no matter where the resolve has its origins and no matter why the idealists choose to fight, “With respect to the determinants of conflict outcomes, the resolve model argues essentially that the outcome is a function of the balance of motivation among the protagonists rather than the balance of capabilities.”[24]

Theory and Hypothesis Review

The theories discussed above: troop preponderance, geography and terrain, and troop unity have all been discussed.  We see from historical evidence that the side with the greatest preponderance is more likely to win.  It has also been deduced that troops who best utilize the terrain, geography and natural conditions are more likely to win.  Troop unity can also be an important factor in predicting the side that is more likely to win the battle, leading to the hypothesis that troops united for a common cause are more likely to win the battle.  These are what we have seen to be likely predictors of battle outcome. 

In the next section these hypotheses will be tested on the Massacre of Fort Mims, by applying evidence from the battlefield and historical analysis.  Through careful observation and reasoning we will be able to test these hypotheses on the battlefield and hopefully be able to deduce some of the likely factors that played a role in the fall of Fort Mims.  This is what we want to know: why did a massacre occur at Fort Mims that day? 

Hypothesis Test Results

All of the above paragraphs deal with different theories that explore the role that troop numbers, terrain and the unity of troops influence the outcome of battles.  All of these theories have been explored in depth and testable hypotheses have been derived.  In the following paragraphs, these hypotheses will be tested on the actual battle of Fort Mims using historical evidence and information from experts on the massacre, eyewitness accounts, and other historical documents and research. 

It was the morning of August 30, 1813. In a ravine 400 yards away from the hastily erected Fort Mims, were William Weatherford and the prophet Paddy Walsh along with 726 Red Stick warriors all tensely waiting the signal to attack: the drums announcing the noonday meal.  When the drums rolled, 4 prophets, their faces painted black, and believing themselves to be bulletproof, led the whooping and hollering Red Sticks into battle.  The black-faced braves rushed the east gate of the fort that had been blocked open.  They were followed by more than 700 hundred other warriors.  A scene of chaos quickly erupted within the fort as the men, women, and children were slaughtered.  Within the first few seconds, the clubs of the warriors felled Major Daniel Beasley, commanding the fort, as he tried to close the gate.  The battle that day would end in a devastating defeat for Fort Mims with the ground being soaked by the blood of over 472 men, women, children, half-breeds, White Creeks, and slaves.  Their blood would call out for revenge – eventually leading to the defeat of the Creek Indians under the leadership of Major General Andrew Jackson at Horseshoe Bend. 

Troop Preponderance Test

The first theory I analyzed was that troop preponderance dictates battle outcome.  To test this theory the following hypothesis was derived: the side with the most troops is more likely to win the battle.  On the morning of August 30, 1813 the Red Sticks outnumbered the inhabitants of Fort Mims.  If we compare the number of inhabitants, which is speculated to be around 600 men, women, children, slaves, Half-breeds and White Sticks then the ratio of warriors to fort inhabitants is 1.2:1 (726 warriors / 600 inhabitants).  If on the other hand we control for all those in the fort except those who were there to defend it, we see that there were only 70 militiamen on the day of the attack.  Although General Claiborne had sent 120 men to defend the stockade, 50 of the militiamen were sent to Mount Vernon, Alabama, sometime around August 13th by order of General Claiborne, leaving the fort with a garrison of 70 militiamen.  This makes the ratio of warriors to military troops in the fort 10.4:1 (726 warriors / 70 militia men).  There is no record stating how many men were in the fort that day.  Either way the number is calculated (whether just counting militia men or counting all the inhabitants of the fort), the Red Sticks had somewhere between a little better than 1.2 to as great as a 10.4 to one ratio.[25] 

Terrain Test

The next theory that was discussed was how terrain dictates the outcome of the battle.  Specifically, the terrain is only helpful to those who take advantage of it.  From this theory was derived the hypothesis that troops that take advantage of the natural conditions and terrain are more likely to win.  I defined natural conditions as natural cover (such as brush and forest) and also included the condition of the defense (i.e., a manmade structure such as a fort and the battlefield in general). 

The fort was hastily built around the house of Samuel Mims, which stood in the very center, after fears arose from the Red Stick uprisings and the Prophetic movement (assessed in the next section).  In his book Amateurs, To Arms! A Military History Of The War Of 1812, John Elting states “The fort was an improvised affair, a stockade enclosing Samuel Mims’ large fortified house and several smaller buildings…. The garrison commander was a Major Daniel Beasley, who must have been an incompetent lout.  Though ordered to build one or two blockhouses to provide flanking fire along the outer faces of the stockade and serve as strong points if the stockade were breached, he did nothing, not even bothering to complete the one blockhouse that he had begun.  No sentries were posted, the gates stood open.  Eventually, drifting sand banked up against the eastern gate.”[26]  General Claiborne was in charge of the region and divided his forces (the Mississippi militia) among garrisons along the frontier.  To Fort Mims he sent Major Daniel Beasley and 170 men.  Of those men, 120 stayed with Beasley at Fort Mims while the remainder went to nearby Fort Pierce.  Thus was the beginning of this hastily built and hastily manned “fort.”[27] 

Shortly before the massacre occurred, on August 7, General Claiborne came to inspect Fort Mims and is reported to have told Beasley “to strengthen the pickets and build additional blockhouses.”[28]  His warnings were ignored by Beasley, however, and after the massacre had taken place, General Claiborne was reported to say of Beasley that “…‘although often warned he turned a deaf ear to all idea of danger.’  He refused to keep the gates of the fort closed and allowed the inhabitants to wander unrestrained along the bank of the lake.”[29]

The fort had several important terrain factors that played a decisive role in the outcome of the battle on August 30. One of these was the eastern gate, which is where the Red Sticks entered.  It is reported that it had been left or rather jammed open by sand drifts.  Not only was the east gate the largest entryway into the fort, (the other being the smaller western gate which several people were able to escape through), its being stuck open made the entry of the warriors much easier.  The terrain outside of the fort was useful for the Red Sticks to use on their approach. 

On the night of August 29, the Red Sticks, under the shadow of darkness, crept near the fort and waited hidden until noon the next day.  The warriors “…lay poised for attack, obscured by a thick growth of cane, in a ravine four hundred yards from the east gate.”[30]  That evening as the warriors lay in the ditch tensely waiting the next day, Weatherford (known as Red Eagle to his warriors) and two warriors, approached Fort Mims for reconnoitering.  In his book McIntosh and Weatherford, Creek Indian Leaders, Benjamin Griffith states that when Weatherford and his two men approached the fort that evening they were,

“…able to approach the wooden pickets without detection, even getting close enough to look through the portholes….There were very few lights inside the fort, and Red Eagle and his two scouts saw little of the interior, but they could hear the people inside moving carelessly about and [conversing]…”[31] 

The fort was hastily built and poorly maintained as seen from historical reports, and thus the Red Sticks were able to rush the gate and easily enter the fort with little resistance. 

Unity of Troops Test

The last theory was that unity of troops plays a decisive role in battle outcome.  The hypothesis stated that troops unified for a cause are more likely to win.  “A cause” has been defined as one of idealistic origins.  In short, to fight for something bigger then yourself, to fight for those fallen before you, to fight to right a previous wrong, etc.

There were several unifying causes for the Red Sticks that led to the attack on Fort Mims.  The first unifying movement was a prophetic movement among the Creek Indians that began in 1811.  This movement began with the Shawnee war chief Tecumseh who addressed the regular meeting of the Creek National Council in the fall of 1811.  Kathryn Braund stated in her book, Deerskins & Duffels that Tecumseh was warmly welcomed, “… since his mother was of Creek extraction.”[32]  Tecumseh came to encourage mass Indian resistance – an alliance among all Indians to fight off all Americans.  “The Red Sticks, those who sided with Tecumseh, attracted adherents in part because of the appeal of the prophetic movement, but also because of white encroachments on Creek land.”[33]  Tecumseh was also a gifted speaker.  According to The Stiggins Narrative written by George Stiggins, a Creek Indian Agent during 1830, “…the result of Tecumseh’s oratory upon the Indians was profound, that his personal magnetism, his air of independence, his prophetic manner, his inference that the “Great Spirit” was speaking through him, deeply moved most of those who heard him.”[34]  Of those who chose to follow Tecumseh, several became prophets the most famous of whom are Josiah Francis, Paddy Walsh and High-head Jim.  Paddy Walsh would be one of the main prophets that would take part in the Fort Mims Massacre.  He was involved in the planning of the assault, instructing the warriors in strategy and was responsible for choosing four of the braves to be “bulletproof”.[35]

A sense of unity was already developing among the Creek Indians, but the movement thus far was by nature a war – Red Sticks against the White Creeks.  Eager to act against America, the Spanish took advantage of the Red Stick militant movement sparked by Tecumseh and offered the Red Sticks, under the leadership of Peter McQueen, weapons and ammunition.  The American settler’s reaction to this was, according to Borneman, congruent with a security dilemma, “When American settlers along the Tombigbee heard of this, [McQueen and the Red Sticks receiving weapons from the Spanish in Pensacola,] they responded by raising 180 militia under Colonel James Caller and a frontiersman named Sam Dale.”[36]  James Caller and Sam Dale joined Captain Dixon Bailey, from the Tensaw community, and his small contingent of half-breed warriors.  Together, on July 27, 1813 (a little over a month before the Fort Mims Massacre) Caller, Dale and Bailey attacked McQueen and his warriors:

“At Burnt Corn Creek…In a brief and clumsy skirmish, Bailey’s men initially scattered the Red Sticks and set out in pursuit of the fleeing warriors, leaving Caller’s men to loot the pack train.  Meanwhile, the Red Stick warriors under Peter McQueen and High-Headed Jim doubled back attacked the Mississippi militiamen, killing five and wounding 10.  Although the battle appeared inconclusive, the Red Sticks claimed victory, and both sides grew more incensed with one another.  As further retaliation, Bailey took a smaller contingent of warriors north into the Creek heartland and sacked the homesteads of several Red Stick leaders, including the powerful McQueen.  Bailey returned to Fort Mims a victorious hero in the eyes of the fort’s residents…Caller knew the Red Sticks from Burnt Corn would want revenge, and they would know where to find Bailey.”[37] 

In a preemptive strike, the American militia and Tensaw community changed the nature of the war and movement from a civil war between warring Creek factions to an international dispute between the Red Sticks (the Creek Nation) and America.  The aftermath of the Battle of Burnt Corn was significant, since “the Red Sticks now were confident that they could hold their own in battle against the American militia, and the ambush and attack by the whites gave them a unifying cause.”[38]

The attack on Fort Mims held great symbolism, much of which was derived from the Battle of Burnt Corn; Griffith remarked “the Red Sticks, remembering that the unprovoked attack at Burnt Corn Creek had surprised their people as they sat down to eat, chose the noon drumbeat as their signal for attack.”[39]  Pam Jones in her article William Weatherford And The Road To The Holy Ground noted the exact same reasoning for the assault beginning at noon and she also noted that the attack “…became the deadliest Indian attack against Americans in the country’s history.”[40]  Not only was there symbolism in the time of attack, but in the very place that was attacked.  Davis remarked that “A closer look at the Tensaw residents who sought refuge at Fort Mims…suggests that the Red Sticks chose their target carefully…”[41] James Caller was right: the Red Sticks would know where to find Dixon Bailey and they did find him on August 30, 1813.  He was mortally wounded and was later found dead in a nearby swamp.  Davis also records that the Red Stick leaders, such as Weatherford, wished to send a political message to errant Creeks who challenged the Creek authority by siding with and supporting U.S. interests. 


Evidence shows that some of the important factors that played a role in the battle at Fort Mims and the resulting victory by the Red Sticks were: their superior numbers, their better utilization of the terrain and the unity of their cause and miscalculation by Fort Mims’ commander.  Perhaps if Major Beasley had taken more seriously the warnings he received he could have better prepared the fort and averted the massacre.  As the old adage goes, “Those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat it.”  The lessons that are clearly shown by Fort Mims on August 30, 1813 are still very relevant today.   


[1] Griffith, Benjamin W. Jr. McIntosh and Weatherford, Creek Indian Leaders. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1988.

[2] Wason, David. "The Battle of the Little Bighorn." Battlefield Detectives (2003).

[3] Lepingwell, John W.R. "The Laws of Combat? Lanchester Reexamined." International Security 12.1 (1987), 92

[4] Ibid. 94.

[5] Ibid, 96.

[6] Ibid, 96-97.

[7] Wason, David. "The Battle of the Little Bighorn." Battlefield Detectives (2003), 200.

[8] Lepingwell, John W.R. "The Laws of Combat? Lanchester Reexamined." International Security 12.1 (1987), 124.

[9] Downey, Fairfax. Texas and the War With Mexico. New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1961.

[10] White, Lorraine. "Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy's Failure to Recover Portugal, 1640-1668." The Journal of Military History 27 (2007), 373.

[11] Ibid, 391.

[12] Ibid, 383.

[13] White, “Strategic Geography,” 397. 

[14] Davis, Paul K. 100 Decisive Battles from Ancient Times to The Present. New York: Oxford Press, 1999, 308.

[15] Ibid; Downey, Fairfax. Texas and the War With Mexico. New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1961. Johnson, Williams. Sam Houston The Tallest Texan. New York: Random House, 1953.

[16] Maoz, Zeev. "Resolve, Capabilities, and the OUtcome of Interstate Disputes, 1816 - 1976." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 27.2 (1983), 195.

[17] Ibid, 199.

[18] Ibid, 202.

[19] Ibid, 203.

[20] Ibid, 203.

[21] Ibid, 221.

[22] Marrin, Albert. The War for Independence: The Story of the American Revolution. New York: Antheneum, 1988, 88.

[23] Zeigler, David W. War, Peace, and International Conflict. 2nd. Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2000, 134.

[24] Maoz, Zeev. "Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcome of Interstate Disputes, 1816 - 1976." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 27.2 (1983), 199.

[25] Griffith, Benjamin W. Jr. McIntosh and Weatherford, Creek Indian Leaders. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1988;

[26] Elting, John R. Amateurs to Arms! A Military Hisotry of the War of 1812. Chapel Hill, NC: Da Capo Press, n.d., 164.


[28] Griffith, Benjamin W. Jr. McIntosh and Weatherford, Creek Indian Leaders. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1988, 102.

[29] Ibid, 102.

[30] Ibid, 104.

[31] Ibid, 101.

[32] Braund, Kathryn. Deerskins & Duffels: Creek Indian Tradfe with Anglo-America, 1685 - 1815. Lincoln, NE and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1993, 186.

[33] Davis, Karl. ""Remember Fort Mims:" Reinterpreting the origins of the Creek War." Journal of the Early Republic 22.4 (2002), 628.

[34] Nunez Jr., Theron A. "Creek Nativism And The Creek War Of 1813-14." Ethnohistory 5.1 (1958), 7.

[35] Davis, Karl. ""Remember Fort Mims:" Reinterpreting the origins of the Creek War." Journal of the Early Republic 22.4 (2002). Nunez Jr., Theron A. "Creek Nativism And The Creek War Of 1813-14." Ethnohistory 5.1 (1958).

[36] Borneman, Walter R. 1812: The War That Forged A Nation. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004, 144-145.

[37] Davis, Karl. ""Remember Fort Mims:" Reinterpreting the origins of the Creek War." Journal of the Early Republic 22.4 (2002), 629-630.

[38] Griffith, Benjamin W. Jr. McIntosh and Weatherford, Creek Indian Leaders. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1988, 97.

[39] Ibid, 104.

[40] Jones, Pam. "William Weatherford And The Road To The Holy Ground." Alabama Heritage 74 (2004), 20-28.

[41] Davis, Karl. ""Remember Fort Mims:" Reinterpreting the origins of the Creek War." Journal of the Early Republic 22.4 (2002), 611.

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