
By Dana William Ashdown

Abstract

In the autumn of 1813, the American military was poised to invade Canada in a two-pronged manoeuvre reminiscent of Jeffery Amherst’s 1760 assault on Montréal. This time, the division from Lake Champlain under Wade Hampton would journey by land. But the Lake Ontario army under James Wilkinson would move in a flotilla of boats numbering in the hundreds. After bypassing Kingston, Upper Canada, Wilkinson’s flotilla continued down the St. Lawrence River intent upon taking Montréal. However, after setbacks at Châteauguay, Lower Canada, and Crysler’s Farm, Upper Canada, when smaller British forces defeated the stronger Americans, the flotilla passed into Lake St. Francis and turned into the Salmon River for the safety of French Mills (Fort Covington), New York. Three months later, the American flotilla was burned and scuttled when the army withdrew to Plattsburgh and Sackett’s Harbour.

This paper reviews the types of oared craft assembled for the flotilla and their deployment, while posing the question: Has anything survived of Wilkinson’s flotilla?

Editor’s Note: Other than the usage in direct quotes from period documents, the modern spellings of several communities, including Sacket’s Harbor and Ogdensburg, appear in the text.

INTRODUCTION

In the autumn of 1813, the American’s launched a two pronged attack against Montréal. One army, under General Wade Hampton of South Carolina, advanced from Plattsburgh on Lake Champlain; whilst the other, under General James Wilkinson of Kentucky, descended the St. Lawrence River in a flotilla of gunboats, scows, Durham boats and bateaux, supported by a few small schooners and sloops. This flawed plan was devised by U.S. Secretary of War General John Armstrong, and in its final guise required that the two armies rendezvous at St. Regis, on the south shore of Lake St. Francis, before proceeding to Montréal.

Hampton’s force advanced into Lower Canada only as far as the Châteauguay River, where he was defeated by a much smaller British force — largely composed of French-Canadian militia and native warriors — on 25 October 1813. This caused Hampton to retreat to the safety of Plattsburgh and abandon the Montréal adventure. Hampton was the nominal subordinate to James Wilkinson, and his unilateral last-minute withdrawal from Canada angered Wilkinson no end, though it may be safely said that there was never any love lost between the two generals.

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less embittered were Hampton’s own officers, many of whom accused the general of incompetence and drunkenness. Hampton, a wealthy veteran of the American Revolution, later justified himself by claiming that the action at Châteauguay was merely a diversionary tactic favouring Wilkinson’s advance. He resigned before the close of the war and never faced a court martial.

James Wilkinson was a career officer in the United States Army and a veteran of the American Revolution. Just before his assignment to the northern frontier, he held a command in the south. During the campaign of 1813, his health probably suffered from what was often called the “lake fever,” causing him to take to his bed for extended periods, although his enemies blamed the illness on drunkenness. He was a controversial figure who seemed to attract scandal, the most recent and memorable perhaps being that involving his command at New Orleans between 1806 and his removal in 1809, and the accusations subsequently levied against him in the House of Representatives. Aaron Burr was especially hostile, though it was Burr who appears to have been involved in an alleged conspiracy to take Baton Rouge from the Mexicans, implicating Wilkinson in the process. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with Wilkinson’s general character, beyond saying that his conduct in these and subsequent affairs have not placed him in the best of lights. In defending his reputation in the Baton Rouge or “Spanish” scandal, Wilkinson published his first memoir — *Burr’s Conspiracy Exposed; and General Wilkinson Vindicated against the Slanders of his Enemies on that Important Occasion* — in 1811. In justification for this he wrote:

“Persecuted to the verge of destruction, without a dawn of relief, his humble fortune ruined and his domestic happiness blasted, for his fidelity to his country; general Wilkinson has to struggle against power and wealth and talents and influence; and upheld by an approving conscience and a righteous God, he will continue to defend his aspersed honor to the last ebb of life.”

This tactic of publishing a self-serving defence was apparently successful because he retained his position in the army. In fact, it is because of Wilkinson’s second memoir — *Memoirs of My Own Times* — published in three volumes (plus a small volume of maps) in 1816, that so much is known about the campaign against Canada in the autumn of 1813. Wilkinson’s conduct and alleged drunkenness lead to the general’s court martial in 1815, which largely acquitted him of any wrong doing. *Memoirs* was actually begun around the time of the “Spanish” business, when it was promised as a final volume to the *Burr Conspiracy*. In its final form released in 1816, the third of three volumes was largely a defence of his actions against Canada in 1813 and 1814, using much of the testimony and other documents presented during his 1815 court martial.

Because Wilkinson’s *Memoirs* were intended to justify the his conduct in the Canadian campaigns, significant bias favouring the general is to be expected. Nevertheless, much of the material is still highly useful, particularly in the context of this paper. Archival documents from the National Archives in Washington, D.C., might be more useful for anyone doing an exhaustive study of the flotilla and its craft.

As this military campaign would be the largest mounted on the Great Lakes since Jeffery Amherst’s 1760 descent on Montréal, thousands of American militia and regular troops were involved. Exact numbers of troops attached to the flotilla are not available, but range from a high
of around eight thousand, to an effective strength of perhaps five or six thousand. Wilkinson’s army encompassed most of the troop strength available on Lake Ontario, and so the posts at Niagara were chiefly left in the hands of the local militia, whilst Sackett’s was reduced to a small garrison of defenders.

To transport and protect the required thousands of troops and their accompanying supplies and artillery down the St. Lawrence River, Wilkinson ordered that a large flotilla of boats be assembled. This was to include: twelve armed slip-keeled gunboats to protect the flotilla; twelve scows to carry the artillery, all of which were to remain mounted on travelling carriages; and well over three hundred bateaux and Durham boats. The precise number of bateaux and Durham boats employed during the campaign is still a matter for conjecture, owing to significant but unspecified numbers being wrecked in transit on Lake Ontario between the Niagara River, Oswego and Grenadier Island. This is especially true of the bateaux, for the number of Durham boats which took part must have been comparatively small and most probably left with the division from Sacket’s Harbor.

What does seem clear is that only 328 boats were left when the flotilla entered the Salmon River at the close of the campaign in November 1813, which was likely the number that Wilkinson took with him from the first general rendezvous at Grenadier Island. This final figure included twelve gunboats, one of which was a captured British gun bateaux; ten artillery scows, having lost two on the way to Grenadier Island; and 306 bateaux and Durham boats, including perhaps one or two ships’ boats. When the American army evacuated their winter quarters at French Mills, on the Salmon River, the boats — which had been locked in the ice almost since their arrival — were either burned or scuttled.

This begs the question: Does anything survive from the flotilla? It is certainly true that much did survive intact in the months that followed. Colonel Hercules Scott of the 103rd Regiment believed as much following his raids on the Salmon River outposts in February 1814. He subsequently proposed a return visit in the spring to recover the boats, and while this received the sanction of Sir George Prevost, the attempt was thwarted when Scott and much of the British Army stationed along the St. Lawrence at Prescott, Cornwall and Coteau du Lac was transferred to the Niagara Peninsula.

A century later, historian Frederick J. Seaver, in his book *Historical Sketches of Franklin County*, wrote that:

“… below Fort Covington [modern French Mills, New York], may still be found part of wrecks of the barges that were thus destroyed. A number were sunk near the mouth of Salmon river, and silt lodging against the wrecks formed an island in the course of years. It goes by the name of ‘Gunboat Island.’”

If Seaver was right, the implication that most of the flotilla is still to be found on the bottom of the river is significant, for this would represent one of the largest concentrations of small military craft in North America. More importantly, Wilkinson’s gunboats may be the only ones of their kind to survive the War of 1812 — excluding, of course, the naval galley *Allen* on Lake

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Champlain and a possible second similar galley near Sacket’s Harbor, both of which followed a draught devised for the United States Navy’s Chesapeake Bay flotilla. The only comparable site is Lake George, where a large cache of bateaux and a radeaux dating back to the Seven Years War was discovered in the 1960s.

This paper will briefly examine the how the flotilla was organised and employed, and attempt to describe the boats that formed it.

ASSEMBLY & PREPARATION OF THE FLOTILLA

The organisation of the Lake Ontario expeditionary force on Lake Ontario was carried out under the overall direction of Major-General James Wilkinson, who assumed command at Sackett’s Harbour around the 20th of August 1813. However, the minutiae of preparing the men and their equipment were left to his several commanders. Thus, the arrangement of transport and supplies fell to Brigadier-General Robert Swartwout, the Quartermaster-General of the United States Army, who had only taken his post at Sacket’s a month earlier. Swartwout obtained his position through political means and ultimately proved to be incapable of the duty. On 25 August, Wilkinson issued these written instructions to Swartwout respecting the task at hand:

“Sir,

“I beg leave to reiterate, the verbal orders given you some days since, for mounting the whole of the dragoons, with the utmost despatch. An officer or officers of that corps, must attend your agents, to superintend these purchases; and you will be pleased to apply to Major Luckett on the subject.

“To my order of the 22d inst. respecting the providing of water transport, suitable to navigate shoal and rapid streams; I will now add my desire, that it should be made, amply sufficient to bear 7000 men with their camp equipage, baggage, clothing, &c. two months provisions, about 20 battering cannon, and 40 field pieces with equipments, and 300 rounds of ammunition each together with the stores and attiral of the ordnance, quarter-master's, medical and other departments, essential to the accommodation and comfort of an armament, destined to invade a hostile country; of this transport, a sufficient quantity to receive five thousand men, and the appendages and appurtenances herein enumerated, should be held in readiness at Niagara, the 10th of next month; and the residue at this place [Sackett’s Harbour], by the 15th, at furthest.

“With much consideration and respect,

“I am. Sir, your obedient servant,

“JAMES WILKINSON,

“Major-general, commanding.”

To be sure, Swartwout’s job was not an easy one, for at that time his department possessed a meagre array of transports at Sacket’s Harbor, consisting of the following:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Carrying Capacity (troops)</th>
<th>Total Capacity (troops)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Gold Hunter</em>, small schooner (not in port)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Neptune</em>, small schooner (not in port)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Union</em>, sloop</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham boats, large</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham boats, small</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batteaux, large</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batteaux, small</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for Vessels</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>845</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public horses, one-fourth unserviceable</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wagons, good</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harness, sets of</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


The rest of the department’s transport on the lake, mostly in the form of bateaux and Durham boats, was lying derelict on the beach at Fort George. Swartwout seemed incapable of readying the boats there, and so most of that work was done by Wilkinson and the regimental commanders. Later testimony by Brigadier-General Daniel Bissell described the state of the craft at Fort George as “miserable. The boats were much out of repair, and repairs made after he arrived. As late as the 25th September, they were in such bad order, I remonstrated on the subject, in a letter to General Wilkinson. I had to prepare, both the boats and oars, by the assistance of the men of my regiment, and materials for this, were, with much difficulty, procured.” Even the deputy quartermaster-general at the fort, Major John G. Camp, thought the transport there “Very Bad; most of the boats wanting considerable repairs, before it was safe, to embark on board of them.” Brigadier-General Moses Porter, commanding the light artillery, spoke of the deficiency of transport available, stating: “The boats furnished, were not calculated for the expedition; and one schooner carrying ordnance, was found unfit for that service, and unloaded.”

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The American naval squadron on Lake Ontario provided the army with some assistance in moving troops and supplies from Fort George to Sacket’s Harbor, but it was largely on the bateaux and Durham boats that the majority of the corps travelled. The army’s departure from the Niagara River was delayed by bad weather, and the passage itself was made no easier by continuing gales. In relating conditions encountered en route, Major Willoughby Morgan of the 12th Infantry Regiment stated that: “The boats were in readiness, towards the close of September, and the troops in readiness to embark. The sailing was retarded by contrary winds.” One attempt to put out had to be aborted because of the weather. When the army finally did leave Fort George, the boats were crowded and the winds still strong. As Morgan later stated:

“The weather was generally tempestuous, or the winds a-head. The flotilla was greatly dispersed. It was not possible even for regiments to keep together. I do not think, that any one officer, could superintend such a movement. I did not see General Wilkinson on the passage. It was scarcely possible, with a tolerable fresh head wind, even with the aid of poles, to get the heavy boats along.”

Morgan considered the safest method of travel using the boats furnished was “By detachments; the smaller the better.” Wilkinson, who was fast running out of time for the launch of the campaign, chose to move en masse with unfortunate results. When asked about when the flotilla arrived at Henderson’s Bay, just outside of Sacket’s Harbor, Morgan replied:

“I cannot recollect, what day the rear of the boats arrived at Henderson's Bay. Some boats were lost, and many damaged. A great part of the 15th infantry, were obliged to march, from near Eighteen Mile Creek, in consequence of the loss of their boats.”

As to the condition of the men and their boats and equipment at Henderson’s Bay, Morgan said:

“Winter clothing was much wanted. The guns and accoutrements, out of order, being much exposed on the passage. The corps were generally out of provisions, and were obliged to send to the Harbour for a supply… Repairs of boats, were necessary, and were made there, to a considerable extent. I know not what number of boats were furnished at that place. Provisions were to be supplied, as I have stated.”

In spite of the repairs, many of the boats were still defective when they left the bay for the general rendezvous at Grenadier Island, near the entrance to the St. Lawrence River.

Before leaving Sacket’s Harbor for Niagara at the first of September, Wilkinson left these instructions for Brigadier-General Jacob Brown who had command of the post there:

“1st.—To have the troops trained for action, agreeably to the order of the 23d instant, with redoubled industry.

“2d.—To have the men, arms, accoutrements, camp equipage and baggage in prime order, fully ammunitioned and compactly arranged for embarkation on a day's notice, by the 22d of the ensuing month.

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“3d.—To have the light artillery, with its attire complete, and one hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition per gun assorted, ready for embarkation at the same time.

“4th.—To have all the battering guns on travelling carriages, with their equipments and 300 rounds of ammunition per gun assorted, ready for embarkation at the same time.

“5th. —To have all the small arms and equipments fit for service, and the fixed ammunition in store for those arms, with flints, drums, fifes, bugles and other military instruments and stores, in readiness for embarkation at the same time.

“6th.—To have a due proportion of the axes and entrenching tools helved; and with the other tools, the stores and implements of the quarter-master's department, duly arranged, and in readiness for embarkation at the same time.

“7th. —To have a sufficient quantity of medicine, hospital stores and furniture for 10,000 men, during the months of October, November and December, ready for embarkation at the same time.

“8th.—To have the wagons and teams in complete order to move by land at the same time.

“9th.—To have the whole of the winter clothing, hats, shoes, shirts and stockings, packed and ready for embarkation at the same time.

“10th.—To have the whole of the camp equipage, in store, arranged, packed, and in readiness for embarkation at the same time.

“11th.—To engage 3 or 400 pilots and watermen for the St. Lawrence, to be ready for service at the same period.

“12th.—To have 12 suitable boats, armed and equipped with a 4, 6, or 12 pounder each, to row 30 oars, and to be manned by 50 men; and

“13th.—To have all the biscuit and the bulk of the contractor's provisions and stores brought to this place from Oswego.

“The utmost punctuality is indispensable in the fulfillment of these orders because a failure in any particular department, may produce ruinous delays.

“Transport has been required from the quarter-master general, for the whole embarkation; and he stands pledged to furnish it in season; you will press him on this point, and on the equipment of his craft with an abundance of spare oars, scoops, sails and tarpaulins, boat-hooks, &c.

“All surplus articles on this ground, not herein enumerated, must be deposited in a place of safety, in charge of some officer of the department to which they may appertain.”

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The second-last paragraph respecting the quartermaster-general is a direct indication of Wilkinson’s growing distrust of Swartwout. Swartwout did eventually send additional boats to Fort George, but they were never more than adequate. On 17 September, after receiving a letter from Swartwout at Oswego, Wilkinson wrote to complain:

“We have as yet no boats from Oswego; those from Genesee arrived last evening, and are engaged. In defect of transport, we must forage upon the enemy… Do all you have been ordered to do, and as much more as you may deem useful and necessary, to the public service.”

To this missive, the general penned these two post scripts:

“When the army of the lake is embodied, your station becomes adjunct to head quarters—for your government.

“The inclosed will convey some idea, of the derangement and distractions, in the transport service. The same vessels, employed to bring the public clothing here from Oswego, must be directly engaged to carry it back.”

Back at Sacket’s Harbour, Swartwout and his deputy, Major Samuel Brown, continued to make arrangements for the expedition with varying degrees of success or incompetency. To their credit, they managed to assemble a sufficiency of boats, though barely so it would seem. Some boats may have been put together at Sacket’s Harbor by the same carpenters employed building the gunboats. The naval yard may also have contributed a share. Others, perhaps the majority of boats allocated to the army congregating at Sacket’s, were probably brought up from Albany and Schenectady with the supplies on board. This is suggested by an interesting, if questionable, memoir of Israel Adams of Liverpool, New York, published in 1848. Recounting his return to Liverpool in 1813 after three years at sea, he wrote:

“I had not been home one hour before I was pressed as pilot to run boats down the Oswego River. There were rising of three hundred boats, which were fitting in the Cayuga, Seneca, Onondaga and Oneida Lakes, for Wilkinson’s expedition down the St. Lawrence, which was then contemplated by the authorities. After getting these boats safe into Lake Ontario, I was appointed to the command of a slip-keel schooner, to run on Lake Ontario and the river St. Lawrence. After the fleet of boats had arrived at Sackets Harbor, the army embarked in them for Grenadier Island, Basin Harbor, where they awaited the arrive of the 2d division from Niagara.”

To be sure, Adams’ memory seems to have been befuddled, for in the War of 1812 lakes Cayuga, Seneca and Onondaga had no real connection with the Oswego River — this would come later with the Erie and Oswego canals. But he does touch upon one source of boats. This is further supported by a later statement in Austin Yates’ history of Schenectady, New York — a traditional source of bateaux — to wit: “The boats that conveyed the army of General Wilkinson down the St. Lawrence river were all built at this place….”
Many complaints were still received on the want of boats. As Brigadier-General Alexander Macomb later recalled: “The boats were much crowded with provisions, stores, &c.; there was a sufficient transport, but it was hastily distributed, and badly arranged.”

The quartermaster-generals’ way of dealing with provisions and medical supplies proved to be particularly problematic. Swartwout took receipt of all provisions that arrived at the harbour on behalf of the army and prepared a full inventory. But when he turned those supplies over to the contractor, who was to act as issuing commissary for the expedition, Swartwout did not obtain a receipt from the contractor. Nor was an account made “for each particular boat, to [Swartwout’s] knowledge. Nor was any person on board of each boat, furnished with distinct inventories. No application was made to General Wilkinson on the subject.” To further confuse matters, instructions on the subject were also given by the American secretary of war, General John Armstrong, who had come up from Washington. As we learn from James Thorne, the contractor’s agent:

“He was at Sacket’s Harbour, in the months of September and October, before, and at the time the expedition sailed. That on the 22d September, he received orders from the secretary of war, to put on board of such boats as the quarter-master-general should indicate, 1,275 barrels of pork, 255,000 lbs. hard bread, 10,625 gallons whiskey, 13,600 lbs. soap, 3400 gallons vinegar, 5,100 lbs. candles, 40 barrels of salt, 5 bushels in a barrel, amounting in the aggregate, to nearly 340,000 rations. Of this order, the following quantities were put on board, and receipted for, by the quarter-master-general, 1391 barrels pork, 10195 gallons whiskey, 2915-1/2 gallons vinegar, 335,392 lbs. hard bread, 14,000 lbs. soap, 5,100 lbs. candles, and 35 barrels of salt. The reason why there was a greater quantity of pork, than was specified, was in consequence of some alterations in the arrangement, relating to the gun-boats. They were put on board, and the quarter-master-general thought, they might as well continue there. He had no other official order, on the subject of provisions, and the amount of provisions, called for, by the preceding order, was all at Sacket’s Harbor, by the 25th September. It could all have been put on board in five days; they commenced doing it on the 22d September, or the day following, and it was continued at intervals, until the 10th October, or perhaps longer, before it was all on board. The embarkation was performed, under the direction of the quarter-master's department, but no particular boats were assigned for that exclusive purpose; those which contained the provisions, were floored, and carried troops.”

Major-General Alexander Macomb, 3rd Regiment of Artillery, who commanded the post at Sacket’s Harbor until the arrival of Major-General Morgan Lewis, believed that Lewis’s division there was ready to embark by 4 October. “The troops were prepared,” he later said, “to go on an expedition; none were embarked, of those under my command, nor were the boats assigned them: a great many boats, however, were collected at the Harbour, and a few pieces of ordnance, I think, were put in the scows.” As to provisions and stores, Macomb recalled that “some boats were loaded, exclusively with beef; others with bread; others with hospital stores.” As a consequence, the loss of these boats on the outward passage contributed to subsequent shortages.
The gunboats were prepared by Major Brown, who packed them with hospital stores and other goods, much to their detriment. Major Abraham Eustis, the artillery commander responsible for the gunboats, tried to correct the problem, but to no avail:

“On taking charge of the gun-boats, at Sackett’s Harbour, I found them deeply laden, with hospital stores, intrenching tools, and other quarter-masters’ stores. I went to Major Brown, Deputy Quarter-master-general, remonstrated on the subject of those articles, being left in the boats, and told him, that in case of an attack, I should be under the necessity, of throwing them over-board. The amount of his reply was, ‘that he had put them there, and having no other transportation, he could not take them out, or do any better. He was indifferent what became of them.’ The stores were not under any particular person’s charge; and I know they were used by the men, as it was impossible to keep the guard sober. It was very difficult to row, or manage the boats, on account of their being so much lumbered.”

Being exposed to the depredations of the elements and the crews, shortages of food and medicine would plague the army later on when they went into winter quarters at French Mills.

DESCENDING THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER

Notwithstanding that Wilkinson’s force of some six thousand men was ready to move from Sacket’s Harbor as early 4 or 5 October, discussions and disagreements between Wilkinson and Secretary of War John Armstrong over the army’s target (Kingston or Montréal) delayed the planned departure until 10 October. These arrangements were outlined in the general order issued by Wilkinson on the 9th:

“The army is formed into four brigades, and a reserve. The first composed of the 5th, 13th, and 12th regiments, under Brigadier-general Boyd; the second of the 6th, 22d, and 15th regiments, under Brigadier-general Brown; the third of the 9th, 25th, and 16th regiments, under Brigadier-general Covington; and the fourth of the 11th, 21st, and 14th regiments, under Brigadier-general Swartwout. The reserve, under Colonel Macomb, is composed of his own regiment, and the detachments ordered to join him. This corps, the dragoons, and rifle corps, will be disposed of as circumstances may render necessary, under the especial orders of the General. The artillery has been distributed, and will be posted by Brigadier-general Porter. In the formation of the brigades, all the regiments have not their proper stations, but gentlemen must excuse the irregularity, as it was unavoidable, from the disparity in the strength of corps. Major Herkimer, with his volunteers, will join Colonel Macomb, and receive his orders.”

By now the weather was turning foul. Consequently, the initial contingent of forty boats under Brigadier-General Jacob Brown did not embark for the first general rendezvous at Grenadier Island until 16 October. The rest of the flotilla from Sacket’s Harbor and Niagara collected at the island over the next few days while the storms continued to batter the boats in transit.

Arriving at Grenadier Island, Major-General Morgan Lewis, who commanded the division from Sacket’s Harbor, assumed charge of the encampment on the 23rd, pending General Wilkinson’s arrival. Lewis’ general orders of that day show a degree of optimism that would not be borne out
by events, for in spite of the difficulties experienced on the passage, he appeared to confident
that they would soon be ready to re-embark:

“The contractor is immediately to report the quantity and condition of provision on hand; the
quarter-master general, the quantity and condition of the articles in his department; and all
alterations in those departments are to be reported daily. These reports are to be sealed and
transmitted to the General, or to such officer as he may hereafter think proper to direct, and no
communication is to be made to any other person. The attention of every gentleman in
commission, from the highest to the lowest ranks, must be assiduously and incessantly given to
the health of the men, the state of the army, ammunition and accoutrements, and the preservation
and repair of the boats and their equipment, which ought to be held in constant fitness for the
embarkation of the troops. The boats are to be arranged by regiments, in order of battle, and the
commanding officers will be held strictly responsible for their safety and good condition; they
are of course authorised to establish distinct boat guards.

“This army is destined within a very few days, that is, the moment the stragglers and lost corps
can be collected and organized, to seek the enemy in a situation and under circumstances which
admit of no idea of retreat; the General therefore flatters himself, the industry, attention, and
exertions of every officer he commands will be correspondent; in their zeal and valour he has
every confidence, and, under Heaven, he will give them such a direction, as will ensure their
triumph, if they execute his orders with promptitude and decision.

“The provisions must be embarked and secured in the best possible manner: the same attention is
to be paid to the quarter-master's stores, tools and implements; also to those of the ordnance and
hospital departments.

“Major-general Lewis will be pleased to have the immediate charge of the encampment until the
commander in chief can land, and will see that the preceding orders are carried into immediate
execution. He will be pleased to reduce the guards and police to the lowest number, which may
consist with the good of the service in all its branches; and if the contractors and quarter-masters
have been so negligent of their duty, as not to have representatives on the ground, he will
immediately employ and appoint suitable persons to supply the defect, at the expense of the
heads of those departments.”

When the situation at Grenadier Island proved to be far more serious than first thought, General
Wilkinson was obliged to warn General Armstrong of the setback, writing from the island on the
28th:

“The extent of the injuries to our craft, the clothing and arms of the men, and to our provisions
on the passage from Sackett’s Harbor to this place, greatly exceeded our apprehensions, and has
subjected us to the necessity of furnishing a supply of clothing, and of making repairs and
equipments to our flotilla generally. In fact, all our hopes have been very nearly blasted; but
thanks to the same Providence which placed us in jeopardy, we are surmounting our
difficulties...
“The inexorable winds and rains continue to oppose and embarrass our movements; but I am seizing on every moment’s interval to slip into the St. Lawrence corps and detachments, as they can be got ready. Our rendezvous will be in Bush creek, about twenty miles below, and nearly opposite to Gananoqui, which position menaces a descent on the opposite shore...

“We have had such a fluctuation of sick and well, between this place and Sackett’s Harbor, that it is impossible to say in what force we shall move; but I calculate on 6000 combatants, exclusive of Scott and Randolph, neither of whom will, I fear, be up in season, notwithstanding all my arrangements and exertions to accelerate their march: they are both under provisional orders from Ogdensburg.”

They remained there for a number of days to complete repairs before proceeding on 30 October, and even then met with delays. Reporting on 1 November, Wilkinson informed Armstrong:

“You will perceive from the duplicate under cover (letter of the 28th of October) what were my calculations four days since: but the winds, and waves, and rains, still prevail, and we have made several fruitless attempts to turn Stony Point, one of them at great peril to 3,000 men, whom I seasonably remanded to the harbor, without loss of life. Our sick, one hundred and ninety-six in number, have not fared as well: they were embarked in stout, comfortable vessels, and sailed, before yesterday morning, for Sackett’s Harbor, but they were driven on shore by a storm, which continued with unremitting violence all night; and as no exertion could relieve them, I anticipated the loss of the whole; but the tempest having abated, and the wind shifting from south-west to north-east, boats were sent out yesterday morning, and doctor Bull reports the loss of three men only. Other means of transport will be provided to-morrow, and these unfortunate men will be sent to the hospital at Sackett’s Harbor.

“Brigadier Brown, with his brigade, the light artillery, the riflemen, the volunteers, the gunboats, Bissel’s regiment, and a part of M’Comb’s, are, I expect, safe at French creek, with the artillery and ordnance stores. These corps have made the traverse of the arms of the lake under circumstances of great danger, though fortunately without the loss of a life, but at the expense of some boats.

“I shall wait one day longer, and if the passage should still continue impracticable to the troops, I will land them on the opposite shore, march them across the country to the St. Lawrence, and send the empty boats round to a given rendezvous.”

It appears that Wilkinson and the last of the army’s boats did not clear Grenadier Island until 3 November.

By this time the decision had been taken to proceed to Montréal, owing to news that Kingston had been reinforced; and so the next point of collection was the shelter of French Creek (Clayton, New York), on the south shore of the St. Lawrence in the Thousand Islands. It was here, on 1 November, that Captain William Mulcaster and a force of four small Royal Navy warships and a few gunboats, caught up with the Brown’s brigade. Owing to the confined waters of French Creek, Mulcaster could only engage the American position with three of his ships. To
counter the threat, Brown landed two 18-pounders (subsequently adding a third) and opened fire from above with particular effect. Mulcaster withdrew for the night before reengaging the enemy early the next morning, hoping to destroy their boats. This time, the Americans fired hotshot from a makeshift oven, forcing Mulcaster’s temporary withdrawal to Kingston.

The British had been waiting for Wilkinson since early October. Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo initially planned to blockade the channel with his gunboats, once they could all be got up from Prescott. In the meantime, some of the ships of the Lake Ontario squadron, “as can act in the River,” were to go down to the east end of Wolfe Island. However, being uncertain of the American’s target, Yeo decided to keep his squadron together and instead relied upon a chain of signal posts between Wolfe Island and Kingston. Hence, Mulcaster’s quick action on November 1st. 21

Wilkinson’s flotilla resumed its advance down the St. Lawrence on the morning of 5 November, and halted six miles above Ogdensburg around midnight whilst preparations were made for passing Prescott under the cover of darkness on the night of the 6th. “The artificers, during this day, were also employed in making large oars, for steering the boats through the rapids.” To avoid needlessly exposing the men to British cannon fire from Prescott, the boats were guided through the rapids by as few men as possible, leaving the rest to march by land. The overland trek began around 9 o’clock on the night of the 5th; the boats did not start out until around 2 o’clock on the morning of the 6th. 22
Figure 1: Order of Movement, from James Wilkinson, Memoirs of My Times, Volume III, Philadelphia, 1816: following p. 138.
The following general order, dictated by Wilkinson on the afternoon of the 6th, was to govern the descent of the boats (see Figure 1):

“GENERAL ORDER.

“[Private.] Head Quarters, 6th Nov. 1813.

“The boats will pass Prescott this night, after the setting of the moon, in the following order. The, gun boats to cover the front, and exposed flank. The boat of the general in chief will lead, followed by the whole of the ordnance boats and scows; then the corps of Colonel Macomb, the riflemen and Colonel Randolph, who are to be followed, by brigades and regiments, as directed for the flotilla, at French Creek. The hospital vessel, and contractor's boats, will take the station heretofore prescribed. To save all unnecessary hazard, the powder and ammunition has been landed, and will pass the enemy's batteries, in wheel carriages; and to save the men from unnecessary exposure, the boats are to be manned strongly, and the rest of the troops are to be marched, by land, under cover of the night, to such point below Ogdensburgh, as the General may hereafter direct. But it is to be clearly understood, that every boat is to be conducted, by a commissioned officer, or sergeant of unquestionable fidelity. Brigadier-general Brown, general officer of the day, will see this order carried into rigorous effect.

“By command.

“J. B, WALBACH, Adj, Gen.”

Major Abraham Eustis of the light artillery was particularly inspired by the conduct of this passage (see also Figure 1: Order of Movement. Note that the armament of the eight gunboats leading the flotilla was not stated. Also, aside from the twelve gunboats, only 148 other boats shown in the diagram):

“That of the flotilla, was the finest military movement, I ever witnessed; conducted with the greatest regularity, precision, and silence. The boats moved in line, and nearly half had passed, before they were discovered. Eight gun-boats under my command, were stationed in the mid-channel, opposite to Prescott, to protect our left flank, should the enemy's gun-boats come out; and to cause the remainder of the flotilla, to pass between my position and the American shore. Four other gun-boats, under command of Captain Fanning, were ordered to bring up our rear. The squadron of gun-boats, at this time, consisted of twelve in number. One captured from the enemy, having been added to my command.”

Strangely, Major Eustis does not mention that the British shore batteries actually fired on the flotilla, because at least one craft, a sutler’s boat named *Nighthawk*, was sunk by a well-directed shot from Prescott. This is revealed in a December 1817 New York Supreme Court judgement against Robert Swartwout that awarded the sutler $2,117 for the value of the boat and stores on board plus costs, for a total of $2,500. In March 1820, Swartwout asked for Congressional indemnity for the money.
The next day, the 7th, the flotilla arrived at the White House, just west of Hamilton, New York, where the river narrowed considerably. From here, Wilkinson despatched mounted dragoons and light artillery to the Canadian side near Matilda, to clear the shoreline of the British down to Cornwall, and stop the British from harassing his boats with musketry and cannon fire. For this manoeuvre, the scows carrying the artillery were temporarily unloaded and pressed into service as ferries. More troops were sent across on the following day in boats, in all representing detachments from the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Brigades under the overall command of Brigadier-General John P. Boyd. The American flotilla and the troops on the Canadian shore moved down river in unison as far as Cook’s Point, on the north shore near the head of the Long Sault Rapids, but were soon under threat again from Captain Mulcaster.

Mulcaster left Kingston on the 6th with the schooners General Beresford and Sir Sidney Smith, several Royal Navy gunboats, numerous bateaux, and an army contingent under Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph W. Morrison of the 89th with 870 men and two field pieces — this being designated by Prevost a “Corps of Observation.” Upon reaching Prescott on the 9th, Morrison added the better part the local garrison to his numbers, and the whole continued down river in bateaux under the escort of the gunboats — the schooners, being unable to pass the rapids below, were left behind. Mulcaster and Morrison reached the farm of John Crysler the next day, where the army encamped. Crysler’s was located just a few miles above the Long Sault, and so Mulcaster and his gunboats were soon within range of Wilkinson’s flotilla at Cook’s Point.

The morning of 11 November found Wilkinson with a comparatively small British force close on his rear, leaving him with two choices. The first was simply to proceed as planned down the rapids towards Cornwall, with the bulk of the army moving by road. Given the strength of the British force, this could have been done without too much worry of harassment. The second option was to turn and fight. The British force was considerably smaller than Wilkinson’s, and dealing with them at this juncture would negate any further interference. However, the American strength was not as effective as their total number might suggest. They were green troops in the main, and inadequate food and disease had taken their toll, and their fighting ability was thereby compromised. Wilkinson was himself ailing with a chronic condition that had plagued him since he first arrived on Lake Ontario, and his ability to reason was sometimes open to question. Thinking that the British would retreat if challenged, Wilkinson decided to fight, and placed a detached force of about 2,400 men, including infantry, cavalry and artillery, under General John Boyd with a view to dispersing Morrison’s men.

The ensuing battle that afternoon proved to be a particularly costly one. Supported by the gunboats, Colonel Morrison used his small, but highly trained and experienced troops to advantage against the invaders. Both armies were fully engaged by two o’clock, with the climax occurring sometime around 4 p.m., when the Americans rallied to stop a British advance. But rather than hold, the American line collapsed and their men ran in panic to their boats. Total losses numbered in the hundreds, amounting to 102 Americans killed and 137 wounded; and 24 British killed and 145 wounded. Since the British were in no position to pursue Boyd, they instead encamped for the night on the battlefield, whilst Boyd’s beleaguered land force marched to Cornwall. Wilkinson’s flotilla
moved downriver four miles to the American shore for the evening, before descending the Long Sault on the 12th to rejoin Boyd’s detachments, landing in part on Barnhart’s Island near Cornwall, and in part near the town itself. It was here at Barnhart’s that Wilkinson learned that Wade Hampton’s army would not be at the rendezvous at St. Regis, the Hampton having retreated the safety of Plattsburgh, New York. At a hastily convened council of war, an enraged Wilkinson and his general’s decided that an attack on Montréal was no longer possible, and so they instead opted to go into winter quarters up the Salmon River at French Mills (modern Fort Covington, New York). The afternoon and evening of the 12th were occupied ferrying the dragoon and artillery horses back to the New York side of the river, this time using the larger boats rather than the artillery scows, although many horses were left behind. The main army re-embarked for French Mills during the late morning of the 13th, this time moving along the safer south shore. The last unit to put out was the 15th Infantry attached to Brigadier-General Jacob Brown’s Second Brigade. The Canadian militia, who had doubtless been watching the Americans, broke cover to watch the rear guard’s departure down the river.

As darkness fell, some of Wilkinson’s boats manned by disaffected militia apparently steered for the Canadian shore, perhaps preferring a British prison to a winter in the wilderness. However, the majority followed Wilkinson into the Salmon River that evening, and so it was dark and bitterly cold by the time they disembarked in the relative safety of French Mills and its lone blockhouse late that night. The order had apparently been given to scuttle the boats and prepare winter quarters, but it was not put into immediate effect. As a result, the boats became frozen-in whilst the men — already short of blankets and winter clothes — made due with tents until huts could be erected. General Wilkinson soon moved his headquarters to more comfortable lodgings at Malone. Given that food and hospital stores were of bad quality and in short supply, the health of the men — already of concern — grew increasingly worse over the ensuing weeks.

WINTER QUARTERS AND THE BRITISH RESPONSE

British military forces were no strangers to the Salmon River. On 23 October 1812, an American raiding party from French Mills (Major Guilford D. Young of Troy, New York, commanding) attacked the nearby Mohawk village of St. Regis, which was then held by a small company of the Corps of Canadian Voyageurs under Lieutenant Pierre Rototte Sr. Rototte and his sergeant were killed in the battle, and St. Regis was occupied. One month later, on 23 November, a British force of nearly 150 regulars, militia and Mohawks retook St. Regis and then moved on to French Mills. There, the American garrison of 44 officers and men withdrew to an unfinished blockhouse for safety but were soon obliged to surrender. A stand of 57 arms, ammunition and four bateaux were also taken and sunk in the river. The prisoners were brought back to Canada. We might add that this expedition refrained from advancing upon French Mills by bateau only because Captain Andrew Gray, the acting deputy quarter-master general, persuaded them otherwise. As Gray explained: “had we gone by the River, we would have been shamefully beaten, as they expected us in that direction, and had a Piquet of 20 men on the River banks, that might have killed the whole party.”

In November 1813, the British response to the American army at French Mills was mixed. Following the Battle of Crysler’s Farm, Colonel Morrison marched the bulk of his men to

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Cornwall on the 13th, whilst his artillery and remaining troops followed in bateaux on the 15th, accompanied by William Mulcaster and his gunboats. Wilkinson’s rapid withdrawal from the scene made it impossible for Morrison to engage the enemy before they reached the Salmon River. However, like most senior officers, Morrison and Mulcaster expected Sir George Prevost to order an attack at the earliest possible date to prevent a future incursion by the Americans. Prevost, ever the cautious commander-in-chief, considered Wilkinson’s army at French Mills a spent force, and therefore refused to act. Captain H.G. Jackson, who commanded the artillery at Crysler’s Farm, may have inadvertently contributed to Prevost’s conclusion. He had examined the entrance to the Salmon by boat on the 15th and concluded that the river was “little more than twenty yards wide, so that their boats must come down singly.” Well placed artillery could thus “prevent their coming out.” Likewise, Lieutenant-Colonel John Harvey, one of Prevost’s deputy adjutant-general’s, was of the view that whatever the American’s may say, their campaign was all but finished. However, he still favoured an attack on French Mills as a deterrent against future invasion plots.29

William Mulcaster was not deterred by Sir George Prevost’s caution, and took the earliest opportunity to strike at the heart of the enemy’s encampment. As he explained to Sir James Lucas Yeo from his temporary base at Coteau du Lac on 20 December 1813, a partial thaw in the ice caused him to act quickly:

“Sir,—You are aware that after the enemy's sudden flight to the Salmon River they were inclosed with ice, but a partial thaw gave us an opportunity of trying to burn them. The American flotilla, six miles up a narrow river, or rather creek, were protected by three encampments of 1,500 men back within half musket shot of the boats, and a blockhouse directly over them with about 50 pieces of cannon around it. It was impossible for the gunboats to proceed up the river and I therefore determined to have their destruction attempted by means of carcasses conveyed in a canoe. Mr. John Harvey (mid-shipman), immediately volunteered his services with George Barnet (seaman), proceeded up the river, passed the several posts and having placed a carcass in one of the gunboats was on the point of firing it when the ice breaking about the boat unfortunately discovered them to the sentinel, and the alarm being given they were compelled to relinquish the attempt.

“A few days after several deserters came over and from their information I was induced to believe the enemy's magazine, situated in the middle of their encampment, might be blown up. Messrs. Harvey and Hawkesworth (midshipmen) and George Barnet (seaman) directly offered to proceed on this desperate service, were supplied with combustible matter and landed on the American shore. After remaining for several days watching an opportunity (in the woods) to effect their purpose they found the magazine more strongly guarded than had been supposed, but Mr. Harvey, unwilling to relinquish the enterprise, went into the American camp in disguise, where he remained two days undiscovered, obtained correct information and would infallibly have succeeded had not his conduct betrayed him to General Brown, who would certainly have executed him but for the adroit manner in which he effected his escape, which can only be equalled by his previous determined resolution.”
“On the whole Mr. Harvey's conduct justly claims my warmest praise and I beg leave to recommend him to your notice and protection.”

British forces took no further direct action against French Mills whilst the Americans remained ensconced there. However, British spies frequently posted notices within the encampments encouraging American soldiers to desert to the British side in return for five month’s back-wages owed. “No man shall be required to serve against his own country,” they promised. Contrary to American claims, many of their soldiers crossed the ice to Cornwall.

General Wilkinson’s efforts to supply his troops were constantly hampered by the shortage of food and medicines in the region, and by the difficulty of transporting such supplies over rough wilderness roads from Sacket’s Harbor and westward. Indolence was also a worry, as “I am desirous the troops under my command, should not eat the bread of idleness.” And so in early January he proposed several wide-ranging plans to attack British positions south of Montréal as well as Cornwall, Prescott and Kingston. By mid-month, Wilkinson had modified his plans, believing that a surprise assault on Prescott and Kingston would secure proper quarters for his men. As he informed Washington on the 16th:

“Should the President sanction the plan now proposed, I shall remove the sick, the convalescent and every article of useless baggage, together with the artillery, and munitions of war, for which I shall have no occasion, to Plattsburgh; shall destroy our boats and break up the cantonments at the French Mills and Chateau gay; and whilst I keep the enemy in expectation that these precautions are preparatory to the attack of their posts and cantonments in my vicinity, I shall detach a thousand selected men, to steal a march and take Prescott by surprise or storm, whither I shall follow that detachment, with the main body, a few hours after it marches, and having every thing in readiness for the movement, by its rapidity, and the feints of some light parties, I shall prevent the enemy from penetrating my real design, until I have gained my first point….

“The blow which I desire to give warrants great sufferings, much hardship and continual hazard; because if successful we shall destroy the squadron of the enemy at Kingston, kill and capture eventually four thousand of his best troops, recover what we have lost, save much blood and treasure to the nation, and conquer a province.”

To many, Wilkinson’s ideas must have bordered onto lunacy, and so his request for a quick reply (lest the season for travel by sled slip by) was granted. Writing from Washington on 20 January, Secretary of War John Armstrong passed along the president’s instructions in no uncertain terms:

“Sir.—I have the orders of the President to inform you, that under a full consideration of your present position on Salmon river, in relation as well to present safety as to future operations, it is his direction, that you abandon that position, and that after detaching General Brown with two thousand men and a competent proportion of your field and battering cannon, to Sackett's Harbour, you will fall back with the residue of your force, stores and baggage, &c. to Plattsburgh. Means should be immediately taken, to cover the men in huts or barracks; and to promote this object, orders will be directly sent from this office to the officers commanding at Plattsburgh and Sacket's Harbor, to put into activity, by hired labour and fatigue duty, all the
resources within their respective commands. This will not, however, supercede [sic] any auxiliary measures or orders, going to the same object, which your judgment and experience may suggest.

“The sick and wounded of the army should be sent to Burlington.”

Wilkinson may have been in the process of launching his grand plan against Canada when the receipt of General Armstrong’s letter arrived, for it seems to have created quite a state of confusion within the camp at French Mills.

The British had been monitoring activity at French Mills from the start and so, as January drew to a close, it was becoming obvious that something was afoot in the American camp. The first indicators came by way of escaped British prisoners passing through Sackett’s Harbour. These reports were soon confirmed by other reliable informants, as can be seen in the following passage from Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond’s letter to Sir George Prevost, dated Kingston, 25 January 1814:

“I beg leave to communicate the substance of other intelligence I received this day, viz. That Sleighs are collecting at Sackett's Harbour, to the number of 200; and were to rendezvous there on Saturday morning last, at an early hour; for the purpose of loading Provisions for the Army at Salmon River; at least such was the report in circulation. But better informed persons believe, that they were collected for some Military Movement; and think it more than probable, that the evacuation of the Position at French Mills is in contemplation; and that the Troops, and Stores, will be sent from thence to Sackett's Harbour, to secure the Ships, to be built there.

“The effective Force at the former place is said to be about 2000; at the latter it does not exceed 600 men.”

More tangible intelligence was obtained after a British spy infiltrated French Mills. As he disclosed in a message dated 7 February:

“From the 3d to the present instant very considerable confusion has been in camp. On Sunday, the 6th instant, the 25th and 9th Regiments, (who were encamped west of the bridge near Mr. Jones's farm,) marched. Their place of destination has evidently appeared since to be Sackett's Harbor, from having sent on a quartermaster who had, as is understood, contracted for forage for about fifty miles on that route, and also from the circumstances of the officers on the moment of their march having left directions to the postmaster to forward on all letters to that place, also the last news from them, they were about 22 miles distance in that direction. A few minutes previous to their march some soldiers were cutting the masts of their flotilla, others setting fire to the barracks they were about to evacuate. This movement appeared, however, soon to be countermanded, and the cutting of masts and burning of barracks stopped. Three barracks only were consumed. On Saturday last a General Order was read on parade, stating that General Wilkinson had resumed command and that the place would soon be reinforced by 800 men, that this was a place the enemy were grappling for and that the troops must be prepared to defend it with spirit. Since which to this morning three other regiments were placed under marching orders.
to be ready at a moment’s notice, A considerable body of troops, say 500, marched from Plattsburg destined for French Mills, but on their arrival at Chateauguay were ordered to continue their march in the direction of Sackett's Harbor. A few soldiers, however, had arrived at French Mills but were immediately ordered on in the direction of the harbor. The army still continuing to press all the sleighs they can obtain.

“What is done with the artillery and small arms forwarded to Chateauguay not as yet ascertained. It is the general opinion among the officers and citizens that the army will evacuate the French Mills and march to Sackett's Harbor and Plattsburg.”

As the British informant had suspected, Wilkinson could not delay the inevitable, and on 9 February the general finally issued orders to evacuate French Mills and the neighbouring encampments at Chateauguay (Four Corners) and Malone (an exception being the hospital at Malone). The retreat was well organised, though it was several days before all the troops had marched. Brown’s division was about the last to leave French Mills, on 13 February 1814, at which time the remaining boats (at least those that had not been scuttled) and buildings were set aflame. Large quantities of provisions that had arrived earlier at French Mills were sent back to Plattsburgh and Sacket’s Harbor, but 60 tons of condemned hard biscuit were sunk into the river, and another 10 tons distributed to local residents.

The British view of the withdrawal was probably well expressed in George Platt’s comments from Montréal, written shortly after on 21 February:

“You will have heard no doubt of the fate of Wilkinson's Invincibles at the French Mills, where, after building barracks, &c., they found it would not be safe for them to remain, and therefore burned the most of their boats and spiked the cannon they did not take away and hide, and set fire to the huts and marched off, some to Sackett's and some to Plattsburg. So ended the Great Southern General's expedition to Montreal. Report says Col. Morrison has some orders at the present moment which is in operation in the neighborhood of Prescott, particulars not yet known.”

THE SALMON RIVER RAIDS, FEBRUARY 1814

Suspictions of the impending withdrawal of American troops may have contributed to a raid on the town of Madrid, New York, in early February 1814, under the leadership of the Quartermaster-General Department’s Captain Reuben Sherwood. Crossing over to the American shore late in the evening of the 6th with a small party of twenty-three Royal Marines and eleven men of the Incorporated Militia, Sherwood marched through Hamilton, New York, before turning fourteen miles inland to Madrid. There, he recovered property belonging to Kingston merchants which had been illegally seized when their seven bateaux were captured near Cornwall in late October by privateers from Hamilton. Having impressed all the sleighs that could be found along their route, Sherwood’s men loaded up as much as could be carried and returned to the river in the afternoon of the 7th, being met by boats manned by the Dundas Militia for their return to Cornwall. About twenty sleigh loads of lower value items were left behind for want of transport.
The real response had to wait, however, until confirmation of the American withdrawal. Only then, as Platt’s letter intimated, did the British begin taking serious measures, as this passage from General Gordon Drummond’s letter to Sir George Prevost of 14 February infers:

“I have the honor to acquaint Your Excellency that in consequence of former intelligence, (February 7th, 1814,) which has already been communicated to you, relative to movements on the line from Plattsburg towards Sackett’s Harbor, as also of that beneath enclosed, I have deemed it right to authorize the detention of the detachment of the Canadian Regiment by Lieut. Colonel Morrison commanding at Cornwall to be employed by that officer as circumstances may for the present require.”

Unbeknownst to Drummond, Morrison was on the move when he penned his letter. Having learned of the withdrawal from French Mills, Morrison and Lieutenant-Colonel Hercules Scott of the 103rd, crossed over on the 14th with a large body of regulars and militia to seize whatever enemy property might be left along the Salmon River. As Scott later explained:

“… the whole of the Property was taken on that day, but as I had not then the means of bringing over the property, I ordered next morning (the 15th) Major [Francis] Cockburn [Canadian Fencibles] with about one half of the same Detachment which had gone over under my own Command on the 14th provided with Sleighs; he then brought over the Provisions.”

It was clear that the quantity of provisions found at French Mills was only a portion of what actually remained amongst the evacuated outposts, and so Scott and Morrison returned with an even larger force of 1200 men, made up of Morrison’s 2nd Battalion of the 89th and Scott’s 103rd regiments; the Royal Artillery; the 19th Light Dragoons; Cockburn’s Canadian Fencibles; Glengarry and Stormont militia (Upper Canada); Select Embodied Militia (Lower Canada); and a party of native warriors. Travel was hastened by one hundred “double sleighs” hired or impressed from the farms of Dundas and Glengarry counties, for which the teamsters in charge received four dollars for their services.

Secondary sources offer two candidates for the staging point for this large undertaking. One is Edwardsburgh, in Leeds County, Upper Canada, located on the St. Lawrence River eight miles east of Prescott and 37 miles west of Cornwall. The other is southwest of Montréal at Edwardstown, in what was then Huntingdon County in Lower Canada, close to the American border. Both are plausible, although Edwardsburgh seems the more likely place owing its proximity to the military posts at Prescott and Cornwall. Moreover, on the 18th Colonel Pearson assigned 500 regulars at Prescott to the raid, making the provision of sleighs there of some import. However, putting the entire force through a 37 mile trek even before crossing over to the Salmon River would seem counterproductive, when Cornwall was more conveniently located to Dundas and Glengarry counties. It is therefore probable that only those troops from Prescott came by way of Edwardsburgh, and the whole rendezvoused at or near Cornwall.

Scott and Morrison’s corps set out on the morning of Saturday 19 February 1814, and made good time over the frozen terrain, arriving at French Mills at around one in the afternoon.
organising fresh horses for the sleighs and posting a small guard on the Salmon River, the army continued southward along the road to Malone, New York. At a fork in the road, eleven miles distant, a small detachment (possibly under Captain Reuben Sherwood) was split-off from the main body and sent eastward to the Four Corners (Chateauguay, New York), whilst the bulk continued on to Malone.

The main army under Scott and Morrison pulled into Malone during the evening of the 19th and proceeded to search the neighbourhood for arms and provisions left behind by Wilkinson’s forces. This took one or two days to complete, during which some public buildings were destroyed, although there appears to have been a considerable degree of leniency shown to the local inhabitants. They then withdrew to French Mills before leaving for Canada.

The detachment for the Four Corners pulled into that village early on the morning of the 20th, and soon discovered a large cache of provisions, amounting to 150 to 200 barrels of flour, beef, pork, and whiskey. Moreover, thirty-two civilian teamsters with their sleds and teams were arrested at the local tavern and impressed to haul the freight back to Canada. These unfortunate men had been hired by the American army back in January to carry 300 barrels of flour from Sackett’s Harbour to French Mills when, at the end of the month, they were ordered to leave their cargo under a small guard at Hopkinton (now Lawrence), several miles west of the Salmon River in St. Lawrence County, New York, and go directly to French Mills in order to remove army property to Plattsburgh. They were waiting to remove the stores from the Four Corners (Chateauguay) when they were captured. The detachment and their captured property set out for the main column that day, burning the bridges behind them. It may be noted that elements of this unit reached as far as the Marble River to prevent a messenger from delivering news of the raid to Plattsburgh.  

When Colonel Scott learned of the flour at Hopkinton, he delayed plans to leave French Mills until the flour there could be secured. This was done by another small detachment. Unfortunately, they only had the means to transport half the flour and a small stand of muskets. Consequently a portion of the other 150 barrels were distributed to the townspeople and the rest were destroyed. 

Having stripped the countryside of all the American army’s stores and provisions that could be found, Scott and Morrison likely headed back to the Canadian shore on the 23rd with their prizes in tow. According to James Croil, the raiders reached Summerstown, east of Cornwall, at dusk, having lost only one sleigh with its team and cargo to the river when it broke through the ice. Rather than continue in the dark, orders were given to leave the sleighs offshore on the ice — supposedly a precaution to stop any of the goods being diverted to other purposes! The sleighs delivered up their cargo to the government storehouse at Cornwall the next morning, presumably the 24th. It may be added that seventy soldiers deserted during the two expeditions, mostly from Scott’s 103rd.

The distribution of prize money for Morrison and Scott’s February raids was announced in a General Order of 29 May 1814, to wit:

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“A Distribution has been directed to be made of the proceeds of the public property captured from the Enemy at the Salmon River on the 14th & 15th February 1814 by the Detachment under the Command of Major Cockburn of the Canadian Fencibles — to each Private thirteen Shillings.—

“And also the proceeds of the Booty captured from the Enemy at the Salmon River, Malone & the Four Corners between the 19th & 24th February 1814 by the Troops under the Command of Colonel Scott 103rd Regt. to each Private Five Shillings & Six pence Currency.—”

However, Colonel Scott took quick exception to the distribution for the first raid, for it ignored many of those who participated. As he informed Sir George Prevost from Niagara on 7 June:

“… the Detachment which went over to Salmon River on the 14th February 1814, was not Commanded by Major Cockburn there being two Senior Officers to him present namely Lieutenant Colonel Morrison and myself, the whole of the Property was taken on that day, but as I had not then the means of bringing over the property, I ordered next morning (the 15th) Major Cockburn with about one half of the same Detachment which had gone over under my own Command on the 14th provided with Sleighs; he then brought over the Provisions. The Prize lists were sent in from the Three Corps concerned for the whole of the Detachment which went over on the 14th those lists were signed by me and forwarded to the Prize Agent your Excellency has been pleased to appoint.

“I consider it my duty in justice to all concerned to make the present representation direct to your Excellency, and hope that no part of the Officers or Men entitled to Share for the Capture may be excluded; by the present order, I cannot find out to what extent the exclusion may be intended by the enclosed order I can only ascertain that Lieut Colonel Morrison & myself are intended to be excluded.”

The February raids on the American army’s abandoned northern encampments were an unquestionable success, but Hercules Scott believed that more could be done. He must have seen the sunken hulls just below the ice at French Mills, many of which were still intact despite attempts to destroy them. Moreover, a number of guns may also have been secreted about the place. Scott recognised the potential and requested permission from General Drummond to recover them later in March. Drummond passed the request along to Sir George Prevost in a letter dated on the 29th, to which he replied on 2 April: “… I propose sanctioning an attempt being made to recover the boats and craft on the Salmon River alluded to by Colonel Scott, and also of some ordnance which I am informed were buried by the enemy.”

The positive support from the highest levels for Colonel Scott’s salvage operation remains significant, even though no further action was taken. The reason for this may be twofold.

First, the American threat to Montréal was greatly reduced by Wilkinson’s complete withdrawal from the frontier in February; and it was further negated by his defeat at the Battle of La Colle Mills on 30 March, when Wilkinson made a final attempt on Lower Canada from his winter base at Plattsburgh. American offers of an armistice in March gave further cause to suspend plans,
and as Drummond noted to Prevost: “although I admit, the communication between Coteau du Lac, and Kingston, may be liable to occasional interruption; yet I do not consider it so much so, as to cause any serious apprehension…”\(^{52}\)

Second, the more serious menace from American forces along the Niagara frontier resulted in a number of units being transferred west to reinforce the Right Division. The 103rd was amongst them, the grenadier company having left Kingston for Niagara on 14 April. Consequently, colonels Pearson and Scott and their respective units saw action in the Battle of Chippawa on 5 July, and later with Morrison and the 89th, were present at the Battle of Lundy’s Lane on 25 July. It was before Fort Erie, in Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond’s costly night assault on 15/16 August, that Scott was mortally wounded.

Since 1814, the remains of Wilkinson’s flotilla have rested along the bottom of the Salmon River, largely forgotten and unmolested. Local histories of the area written in the nineteenth century do not mention of any wreckage in the river; but then in his book, Frederick J. Seaver offers this comment:

“When French Mills was evacuated by General Brown, the boats that had served to transport General Wilkinson's army from Sacket Harbor were scuttled and burned to the ice. They numbered three hundred and twenty-eight, and here and there along the Salmon river, below Fort Covington, may still be found part of wrecks of the barges that were thus destroyed. A number were sunk near the mouth of Salmon river, and silt lodging against the wrecks formed an island in the course of years. It goes by the name of ‘Gunboat Island.’”\(^{53}\)

This brief account is the only reference found regarding either “Gunboat Island,” or the sinking of the boats near the mouth of the river.

Indirect evidence provided in Captain Mulcaster’s account of the December 1813 exploits of midshipman John Harvey and seaman George Barnet, to the river being “protected by three encampments of 1,500 men back within half musket shot of the boats, and a blockhouse directly over them with about 50 pieces of cannon around it,” suggests that the flotilla was concentrated in the area immediately around and just downriver of French Mills. There is also mention of passing “several posts” along the river before reaching “one of the gunboats,” the firing of which by an artillery carcass failed “when the ice breaking about the boat unfortunately discovered them to the sentinel, and the alarm being given they were compelled to relinquish the attempt.”\(^{54}\)

Nowhere in Mulcaster’s letter is there any mention boats being sunk near the mouth of the river. However, given that the river had partially thawed, and that he was travelling at night, it is possible that Harvey’s canoe might have skimmed over the hulls without the pair detecting them in the darkness.

Unfortunately, as Seaver’s account seems to be the only known reference to Gunboat Island, the question arises: Was Seaver correct in his assertion, or was he simply passing along local folklore?
Modern maps of the Salmon River show only one island in the river: that belonging to the St. Regis Akwesasne Reserve in the Province of Québec. Situated at a bend in the river roughly a kilometre or so inland from the St. Lawrence (Grid Reference 388860), the island is about 250 metres in length and much elongated. Although this might be Gunboat Island, maps examined so far do not identify it by name, even though there are no other significant islands in the Salmon River below Fort Covington, New York. The shape of the island could be the natural result of silt deposition or normal river meanderings, so caution should be taken before affixing a name to it.

Much of the territory surrounding the lower course of the Salmon River consists of marsh and swamp land. The Marais Bouchette stretches west from the left bank of the river towards Point Hopkins and Succor Creek, whilst the Marais Casinet takes in part of the right bank south and east of the river, part of which is opposite the island.

The Canadian Wildlife Service’s Lac Saint-François National Wildlife Area encompasses large sections of marsh, especially east of the river. Amelie Delisle of Les amis de la Réserve nationale de la faune du lac Saint-François, a volunteer group responsible for maintaining public access to the Wildlife Area, is not aware of a Gunboat Island in the Salmon River, but that the island near the mouth is called Impatient Island on one of the charts she has. Stéphan Landry, the director of the Township of Dundee, could find nothing amongst the municipality’s maps and records relating to Gunboat Island.

It should also be noted that the Salmon River experienced considerable activity after the War of 1812 in the form of bateaux and Durham boats, which plied between Montréal and Dundee (about a kilometre-and-a-half below French Mills in western Huntingdon County, Lower Canada, just north of the American border) and Fort Covington (as French Mills became after the war). Together with the legal trade in timber and potash between Dundee and Montréal, there was appreciable smuggling of potato whiskey, tobacco and tea between Fort Covington and Canada. Dundee was the apparent centre of this illicit trade. Small, shallow-hulled steamers began to appear on the river in the mid-1830s, with the last operating into the 1860s. These vessels travelled as far inland as Fort Covington, although the larger steamers went only as far as Dundee.

Because a variety of vessels plied the river in the post-war era, it is to be expected that a number of bateau and Durham boat wrecks may be found that are not associated with Wilkinson’s flotilla. These may be nearly indistinguishable from the wartime wrecks, and so subtle differences in construction and associated artefacts may be the only distinguishing factors.

Since they would be contemporaneous with Seaver’s history, late nineteenth century or early twentieth century topographic maps of Dundee Township could establish the exact site of Gunboat Island, however, any map from the turn of the twentieth century with sufficient detail of the river could be useful, either in defining the position of Gunboat Island, or in showing the shape and size of the present island as it was then.

EVIDENCE FOR THE BOATS ATTACHED TO WILKINSON'S EXPEDITION

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So far, no proper, official inventory of boats for Wilkinson’s expedition has been discovered. However, Wilkinson’s own Memoirs and a few other documentary sources indicate that the actual number of boats could have been substantially more or less than Seaver suggests.

A handful of named vessels certainly did participate in the expedition. These ranged in size from boats to small sloops and schooners, though not all made it to the dubious safety of French Mills.

The American privateers Fox (reportedly about 6 tons) and Neptune — which had taken the British gun bateau Spitfire and her convoy of fifteen bateau in July 1813 — may have been with the flotilla. Although they were previously outfitted with either a small carronade or long gun, effectively making them little gunboats, they were almost certainly disarmed when they joined the expedition. Two other boats — Seagull and Snow Bird — were requisitioned on 4 November 1813 to transport part of the 12th Regiment down the St. Lawrence. All four of these boats may have reached the Salmon River. Others didn’t. The sutler’s boat Nighthawk was sunk by British batteries whilst descending the river near Ogdensburg. An 1817 legal claim against Quartermaster General Robert Swartwout found him liable for the value of the boat and cargo to the extent of $2,500, including court costs.\(^{58}\)

There may have been as many as five sailing ships with the expedition, attached to the loosely organised Army Transport Service. Two of these, the schooners Syren and Henderson did not go past Ogdensburg. Syren was scuttled near Prescott and later raised by the Royal Navy and rebuilt as the gunboat Buffalo. She was retaken by the Americans at Sandy Creek at the end of May 1813 and transferred to the Army Transport Service. The 40-ton merchant schooner Henderson was impressed into the service, and was burned at Ogdensburg in February 1814.\(^{59}\)

Three British transports that had been taken by Chauncey’s squadron in October 1813 — the 46-ton schooner Lady Gore, and the sloops Drummond of 37 tons, and Mary Ann of 36 tons — were quickly bought for the Army Transport Service for $2,500, $600, $1,500, respectively, and sent to Grenadier Island to join Wilkinson’s expedition. It is assumed that these three were destroyed at French Mills with the rest of the flotilla because a June 1814 letter from Isaac Chauncey to Robert Swartwout, in which the commodore complains about the navy not receiving its prize money for the trio, states directly that they were taken “to Grenadier Island last Fall and... were lost.”\(^{60}\)

Evidence for the above is extremely limited, and we may never know for certain whether any will be found at French Mills.

Numerically, there were four principal types of boat employed by Wilkinson — gunboat, scow, bateau and Durham boat — the evidence for which is reviewed below.

a) Gunboats

The American flotilla was escorted by twelve gunboats armed with light guns. In Wilkinson’s Memoirs, these are referred to variously as “gun-boats,” “gun barges” and “armed barges.”
Specific orders for the gunboats were issued by Wilkinson at his headquarters to Brigadier-General Jacob Brown, then commanding the post at Sackett’s Harbour, on 29 August 1813, to wit:

“To have 12 suitable boats, armed and equipped with a 4, 6, or 12 pounder each, to row 30 oars, and to be manned by 50 men.”

In a letter to the Secretary of War, dated 20 September 1813, Wilkinson advised that:

“… Before I left Sackett’s Harbor, I ordered a dozen slip keel boats to carry 50 men each, and to row 30 oars, to be armed with a light cannon in their bow.

“This armament is to sweep the St. Lawrence of the enemy’s gun boats, and to take post in advance when and wherever it may be advisable. I beg you, if necessary on your part, to give effect to this order.”

These boats were not heavily constructed. When asked about them during Wilkinson’s court-martial, Major-General Morgan Lewis replied: “They were generally, small slip-keeled boats, slightly built; such as are common on the lake: there were one or two, of a larger size.” He further stated that a three or four pound shot “could have gone through one of them” easily. In form, they must have been similar to the mercantile slip-keeled boats introduced to the area before the war. According to the memoirs of Captain James Van Cleve, the first vessel on the lakes to be fitted with dagger-boards was a skiff brought to Oswego from Niagara in 1808. Jacob Brown himself saw the potential in arming these craft a year earlier, which he pointed out to the New York governor:

“… we have a number of slip keel boats, of from 10 to 12 tons burthen, and many other boats of from 6 to 8 tons burthen. These boats should be armed with swivels and light guns, of from 4 to 6 pound calibre. Let this be done, and we will soon see these waters ours, and then Upper Canada would not be of so difficult acquirement. Any thing like a respectable army will then be enabled to look down all opposition.”

Brown’s enlightened proposal to create a flotilla of gunboats may have come to naught in the summer of 1812, but perhaps those supplied at Sackett’s Harbour for Wilkinson’s army reflected his original idea. Given this, one may wonder if the gunboats delivered over to Wilkinson represented new construction based on existing models, or conversions of requisitioned commercial craft.

The Americans previously equipped one or two rudimentary gunboats on the St. Lawrence, mostly it would seem on an ad hoc basis. For instance, on 16 September 1812, a five hundred strong force from Ogdensburg under Adjutant D.W. Church did arm a boat or bateau and a Durham boat as part of a plan to intercept a convoy of British bateaux under Major Roland Heathcote (Royal Newfoundland Regiment) at Toussaint Island, below Prescott. However, they were outclassed by the British, who were soon reinforced, and the Americans escaped after taking numerous casualties, leaving the Durham boat behind.
It is interesting to note that the Americans made a distinction between the British oared gunboats under Captain Mulcaster that harassed Wilkinson’s flotilla from the rear. The Americans called the British gun bateaux — large bateaux armed with either a 24-pounder carronade or long 6- or 9-pounder in the bow — gunboats. However, the new heavy gunboats launched at Kingston in 1813 were called “gallies” by Wilkinson’s men. These “gallies,” designed for a long 24-pounder in the bow and a carronade in the stern, were perceived as a clear threat to the American flotilla.

Major Abraham Eustis (Regiment of Light Artillery), who commanded their gunboats and artillery scows, remembered that on 11 November 1813, Mulcaster approached the flotilla with “one galley, but several gun-boats.” Rather than risk their “gun barges” in direct combat with the British, the Americans defended their flotilla by landing two 18-pounders on shore from the artillery scows.65

Essentially, the American gunboats were built like bateaux and Durham boats, and similar to the British gun bateaux.

The actual number of American gunboats built or converted at Sackett’s Harbour appears to have been eleven. Major-General Lewis could not recall whether all the gunboats were ready to embark on 4 October 1813, but he believed “There were a sufficient number of gun boats prepared, as he thought, to answer the purposes of covering his division…”66

The gunboats were “equipped and prepared” under the direction of Major Samuel Brown, Deputy Quarter-Master General of the 9th Military District. Brown was evidently responsible for overloading the gunboats with military stores and supplies. As Major Eustis testified:

“Oh taking charge of the gun-boats, at Sackett's Harbour, I found them deeply laden, with hospital stores, intrenching tools, and other quarter-masters' stores. I went to Major Brown, Deputy Quarter-master-general, remonstrated on the subject of those articles, being left in the boats, and told him, that in case of an attack, I should be under the necessity, of throwing them over-board. The amount of his reply was, "that he had put them there, and having no other transportation, he could not take them out, or do any better. He was indifferent what became of them. The stores were not under any particular person's charge; and I know they were used by the men, as it was impossible to keep the guard sober. It was very difficult to row, or manage the boats, on account of their being so much lumbered.”

Answering further on the subject of the abuse of stores by the men, Eustis stated:

“...I did all in my power to prevent that, but found it impossible. Several punishments were inflicted on the men, but without effect. The boats had no decks, and the stores in consequence, were exposed under the feet of the men. At Grenadier Island, where the waste principally occurred, I mentioned it to Major Brown, and I think, to General Swartwout. The reply was, they had no transportation — there was no remedy for it, and the thing must take its course…”

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Major Eustis says he left Sacket’s with eleven gunboats and twelve artillery scows, destined for the general rendezvous at Grenadier Island. Owing to the weather and the inexperienced pilots hired, one of the gunboats and five scows stranded on Point Peninsula, causing the loss of two of the scows.67

By the time Wilkinson’s flotilla passed Prescott, on the night of 6 November, the Americans had twelve gunboats, including “One captured from the enemy, having been added to my command,” as Eustis recalled. Eustis commanded the eight gunboats forming the vanguard, whilst Captain A.C.W. Fanning (3rd Regiment of Artillery) commanded the four in the rear. The latter mounted two 12-pounders and two 4-pounders.68 (See also Figure 1)

The captured gunboat was not named, nor is there any further description of it in the records examined. There are, however, two distinct possibilities.

Firstly, there is the gun bateau Spitfire, taken at Simmond’s Landing in the Thousand Islands on 19 July 1813, along with her charge of fifteen heavily laden bateaux. The Americans scuttled the Spitfire and several bateaux in Cranberry Creek, where they had withdrawn in the face of a British counterattack.

Second, there is an unidentified gun bateau purportedly commanded by Lieutenant Lamont of the Royal Scots. According to Cruikshank, Lamont had landed at Gravelly Point (Cape Vincent, New York) on 11 October 1813, where he was captured in an ambush by a party of American riflemen.69

This makes some sense because a British picket had been established on an island opposite Gravelly Point to observe Wilkinson’s movements. A letter from Major-General Duncan Darroch to Noah Freer, dated Kingston, 9 October 1813, states: “We have established a picket with a naval and military officer on the island, opposite Gravelly Point. A gun has been landed on this side of the island to communicate by means of signals with the fleet, [which is] in readiness should any craft pass down the river to follow them, and I understand he can get as far as Prescott.”70

In either case, even if the captured British gun bateau was similar in size to the American gunboats, it would probably be distinct from the others in not having a slip keel inserted through the bottom of its hull.

b) Artillery Scows

Rather than break down his field artillery into its constituent components for transport in bateaux, as Amherst had done during the Seven Years War, General Wilkinson planned to move all his field artillery mounted on travelling carriages aboard specially built artillery scows. These scows would also serve to ferry cavalry and potentially act as bridge pontoons. To understand the size of this undertaking, it is important to know the actual composition of the artillery trains.
By his order to the Quarter-Master-General of the Army, Brigadier-General Robert Swartwout, of 25 August 1813, Wilkinson initially proposed to equip an artillery train of “about twenty battering cannon, and forty field pieces, with their carriages, equipments, and 300 rounds of ammunition each; together with the stores and attirail of the ordnance.”\(^{71}\) From a subsequent order to Swartwout of 2 September, it appears that this was modified to “fifteen battering cannon (say 18 pounders)…, and 300 rounds of ammunition each, [and] thirty pieces of field artillery, with 150 rounds of ammunition each.”\(^{72}\)

An unspecified number guns and ordnance stores were transported from Niagara where the greater part of the army was stationed. These were carried to Sacket’s Harbor on board ships of the American naval squadron owing to the deficiency of transport provided by the Quarter-Master-General’s Department. Major John G. Camp, the deputy quarter-master-general at Fort George, confirmed that the squadron took “a large quantity of ordnance stores, cannon, &c.” However, of 122 barrels of powder ordered to be shipped, only 52 barrels were actually loaded for want of space.\(^{73}\)

Brigadier-General Moses Porter, of the light artillery, confirmed that difficulties were met at Niagara, but contradicted the quarter-master when he stated:

“Seventy barrels of powder were left [at Niagara], and a large quantity of shot, put on board the squadron, but no ordnance. The boats furnished, were not calculated for the expedition; and one schooner carrying ordnance, was found unfit for that service, and unloaded.”\(^{74}\)

Porter was subsequently given command of the artillery scows at Sackett’s Harbour, following which, as he recalled, “Two 5-1/2 inch howitzers, and, I think, four long eighteen pounders, were mounted, put in scows, and in readiness for landing.” This occurred after Porter arrived at Sacket’s on 4 October.\(^{75}\)

When asked about the four 18-pounders, Major Eustis replied: “I mounted two eighteens, which, to the best of my recollection, came from Fort George. Two others were taken from Fort Volunteer [erected at Sacket’s Harbor in 1812]. These four we carried with us down the St. Lawrence.”\(^{76}\) It may be noted that, according to General Lewis, all of the artillery was embarked by 4 October with the exception of “one piece, which had no carriage to suit it.”\(^{77}\)

Besides the mounted artillery carried in the scows, the accompanying schooner Syren also had a 24-pounder and an 18-pounder in the hold when she was scuttled near Prescott, owing to the fact that she drew too much water to pass the rapids below Prescott. The guns were left on board “for want of transportation.”\(^{78}\) (Syren was subsequently recovered by the Royal Navy and converted into the gunboat Buffalo at Kingston.)

By this, it is certain that the artillery carried by Wilkinson’s flotilla ranged from small 5½-inch mortars to long 24-pounders, though the exact number and proportions are still unknown. However, the 18-pounders may have been the largest mounted guns carried in the scows. Sixty mounted guns distributed evenly about the scows would equal five guns per artillery scow. This, presumably, would be the maximum each scow was intended to carry.
The construction of the scows is open to question. They may have been of a form resembling an oversized bateau, with heavier frames and planking. During the Seven Years War, a scow of this description was launched by Jeffery Amherst’s forces for Lake George in 1759. Named *Snow Shoe*, she could embark seventy horses at one go, and continued working on the lake for several years.\(^79\)

The American “gundalows” or gondolas devised in 1775 and 1776 for Lake Champlain and the St. Lawrence River were probably similar in construction. Benedict Arnold’s 1776 proposal featured a hull with a keel of forty-eight feet, with a sixteen-foot beam, a depth of three-and-a-half feet, and six-inch square floor timbers spaced every eighteen inches; but in execution the fourteen by nine-inch keel was deleted to produce a completely flat bottom.\(^80\) Wilkinson would have been somewhat familiar with the gundalows, having served on the Lake Champlain frontier before the Battle of Valcour Island in 1776, although this may not have had any influence on those constructed at Sacket’s Harbor in 1813.

Significantly, we do know a lot about the gundalows. Two — *Jersey* (ex-*New Jersey*) of 1776 and the larger *Royal Convert* (ex-*Trumbull*) of 1775 — were captured by British forces in 1776, and so are documented in the lists of the British Lake Champlain squadron. The gundalow *Philadelphia* was raised from Lake Champlain in 1935, and placed on display at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Museum of American History in Washington, D.C. in 1965. It has therefore received more attention. A sister to the *Philadelphia*, the *Spitfire*, was located in 1997 and has been studied using a combination of unmanned ROV and human divers.\(^81\)

Another form that the artillery scows might have taken was that of a flat-bottomed barge, or a barge-like hull. In other words, something boxier, with perhaps a squarish bow and stern. This type of vessel would have been difficult to navigate on Lake Ontario, but easier to handle once in the confined waters of the St. Lawrence River. English and European sailing barges used leeboards when navigating open waters, but there is nothing to suggest that Wilkinson’s scows were so fitted, even though they were likely rigged with some sort of mast and sail. They could not have been deep, otherwise it would have been difficult to pull them into shore to roll the artillery on and off. A wreck that might be similar to this requirement is that of a scow found in Lake Champlain off Mount Independence in 1983 (Vermont site reference: VT-AD-1151). This hull measures 52 feet long, 23 feet wide and 3 feet deep; and thought to date to the late eighteenth century or early nineteenth century.\(^82\)

According to Major Eustis, Wilkinson’s army departed Sacket’s Harbor with “twelve scows, each containing artillery, one hundred rounds of ammunition, for each gun, with the men, and every necessary apparatus, for immediate use.”\(^83\) General Swartwout recounted that on the passage across Lake Ontario to Grenadier Island, “four or five scows with heavy artillery, were stranded, one or two of which were lost… [causing] a delay of two days… in which the stranded scows were refitted.”\(^84\)

Major Eustis was more specific about the loss:

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“On arriving off Point Peninsula, the wind freshened, and during the night, owing to this, and the ignorance of our pilots, one gun boat and five scows, stranded on the point. Two of the scows were lost. My own pilot ran the boat ashore twice; and owing to their dispersion, several days elapsed, before the whole of my command arrived at Grenadier Island.”\textsuperscript{85}

It is therefore evident that only ten artillery scows actually made it into the St. Lawrence River.

This wisdom of keeping the artillery mounted and ready for action was proven on several occasions. The first instance occurred after General Brown arrived at French Creek, where Captain Mulcaster first attacked the flotilla on 1 November. As Major Eustis recalled:

“French Creek emptied into a small bay, containing depth of water sufficient, to admit a vessel of four hundred tons, very near the shore. The boats of General Brown's command, the gun boats and scows with the artillery, were drawn into the creek; the latter near its mouth. The artillery were encamped near the shore, the infantry farther in the woods, but within supporting distance of the artillery. On the morning of the day the attack was made, Brigadier-general Porter, ordered me to land two eighteen pounders, on a flat rock, which formed a very advantageous position….”\textsuperscript{86}

On 8 November, at the place called the White House, twenty miles below Ogdensburgh, the scows were off-loaded and used to ferry the dragoons and light artillery across to the Canadian shore. The artillery was then re-embarked and the flotilla proceeded down the river. This would be the last time the scows were put to this use. When the army evacuated the artillery and dragoons from Cornwall on the 12th, only the larger boats were employed. However, if plans for the taking of Montréal had gone as planned, the army would have remained on the Canadian shore and Wilkinson would have used the scows as a bridge to cross over to the city. This point was outlined in a letter Wilkinson sent to Wade Hampton from Ogdensburg on 6 November:

“To assist you in forming the soundest determination, and to take the most prompt and effectual measures, I can only inform you of my intentions and situation in one or two respects of first importance. I shall then press forward and break down every obstruction to the confluence of this river [St. Lawrence] with Grand [Ottawa] river, there to cross to the Isle Perot, and with my scows to bridge the narrow inner channel, and thus obtain foothold on Montreal Island, at about 20 miles from the city; after which our artillery, bayonets, and swords, must secure our triumph, or provide us honourable graves.”\textsuperscript{87}

This appears to be the first reference to the use of the scows as floating bridge pontoons. It should be noted that when Secretary of War John Armstrong proposed the attack on Montréal to the President on 23 July, he supposed the crossing to be fordable:

“This gained and fortified, our fleet continuing to command the water line, from the head of the river to Ogdensburgh, and Lake St. Francis occupied with a few gun boats and barges, the army may march against Montreal, in concert with General Hampton. The only natural difficulty to the execution of this plan, would be presented by a branch of the Grand river, which must be crossed; but at this season, though deep, it is believed to be fordable.”\textsuperscript{88}
Wilkinson considered Armstrong’s supposition to be “another misrepresentation, as the river is not ‘fordable’.” But whether Wilkinson knew this when he planned the expedition in August is not known.

When the flotilla withdrew into the Salmon River, the artillery scows were off-loaded at French Mills and later scuttled or burned.

c) Bateaux & Durham Boats

Three difficulties arise when trying to interpret the number and types of boat employed in Wilkinson’s flotilla. First, the sources consulted seldom discriminate between bateaux and Durham boats, and so it is necessary to consider these two similar, yet different, types of small craft together. Second, no actual inventory of boats attached to Wilkinson seems to exist, and so some assumptions must be made based upon known quantities. Third, one or more ship’s boats may have been taken from the larger transports for the use of the senior officers. It is therefore possible that the boat used by Wilkinson came from the schooner Syren, which was scuttled at Ogdensburg.

Like the British Army in Canada, the United States Army relied upon bateaux to transport its men and stores to and from the Great Lakes. Access to Lake Ontario was through the traditional outlet at Oswego, from whence convoys of bateaux travelled west to Fort Niagara and, more especially, northeast to Sacket’s Harbor. More capacious Durham boats, introduced by mercantile interests in the years leading up to the War of 1812, for use in the St. Lawrence River trade between Oswego and Ogdensburg, were also taken up by the American military at the start of the war. Bateaux and Durham boats belonging to area traders may well have been made locally at places like Oswego and Ogdensburg to suit local conditions. However, many of those in the trade, and especially bateaux built for the American army, appear to have come from Schenectady where the business of building bateaux had been carried on since the Seven Years War. As author Austin Yates recorded in 1902:

“Nearly all the boats used on the Mohawk and western waters, were built at this place. The boat yards were located on what is termed the Strand Street on the river, then much wider than now, owing to encroachments and other causes. It was no uncommon sight in the War of 1812, to see from twenty-five to 100 boats on the stocks at the boat yards, extending from near the Mohawk bridge to North street. The boats that conveyed the army of General Wilkinson down the St. Lawrence River were all built at this place; the oak forests of our common lands furnished the requisite materials in great supply. The principal boat-builders were the Van Slycks, Marselis', Veeders and Peeks, although there were others. The boat-builders were generally residents of Front and Green streets.”

Unfortunately, there is no clear description of how the American bateaux were constructed during this period. The British Army and most of the Montréal and Kingston merchants had adopted the sturdier French or Canadian bateau about a decade or so before the war. This, it seems, was not the case in New York State, where the common bateau and the larger
Schenectady boat continued to find favour — these two variants probably match the small 25-man and large 50-man bateaux, respectively, in the August 1813 inventory given below.

Durham boats were much larger and stronger than the bateaux, which they were gradually replacing. Yates’ description, though brief, is generally accurate:

“The Durham boat, constructed something in shape like a modern canal boat, with flat bottom, and carrying from eight to twenty tons, took the place of the clumsy little bateau which had for more than fifty years superseded the Indian bark canoe. These Durham boats were not decked except at the front and stern; but along the sides were heavy planks partially covering the vessel, with cleats nailed on them, to give foothold to the boatmen using poles. Many of the boats fitted for use on the lakes and St. Lawrence had a mast, with one large sail, like an Albany sloop. The usual crew was from six to eight men.”

Many of the Durham boats operating on Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence probably had slip keels to improve their stability under sail. And so when, in September 1812, Jacob Brown wrote that “we have a number of slip keel boats, of from 10 to 12 tons burthen, and many other boats of from 6 to 8 tons burthen,” he was probably referring to Durham boats or something very similar. The two categories of slip keel boats given by Brown may therefore correspond to the large 75-man and small 60-man Durham boats in the August 1813 inventory below.

The precise dimensions of the American Durham boats is uncertain, but may have been similar to the contract specifications for British military boats ordered very late in the war. These boats were eleven feet broad and three feet deep, and either fifty or fifty-eight feet in length along the bottom. The bottom planks were of oak and the upper planks were pine. The shorter fifty-foot boats had tamarack knees, but the longer versions had iron knees. According to the contracts, each boat was supplied with “one mast, a boom & a Gaff and Bowsprit, with one Steering Oar & Eight rowing Oars.”

During the American army’s preparations for the 1813 spring campaign against York and Niagara, Secretary of War John Armstrong informed Major-General Henry Dearborn on 10 March that there were forty bateaux at Oswego, each able to carry thirty-five or forty men. By April, Armstrong claimed that there were enough boats at Sacket’s Harbor and Oswego to transport 5,000 men. At that time, Armstrong was urging Dearborn to use the largest army possible in the attack on York, believing that such a force might be towed across Lake Ontario in bateaux by the navy. Dearborn had more sense than to risk men’s lives on the open lake. Instead, he took a smaller invasion force — perhaps 1,800 men — which could be accommodated on board the ships of the squadron. The only bateaux towed by the ships were those required to land the troops.

The bulk of the army’s boats left at Oswego and Sacket’s Harbor would soon see duty in support of Dearborn’s successful 27 May amphibious assault on Fort George. At that time they had in their possession “no less than 134 boats and scows, each containing from thirty to fifty men, formed in three compact divisions, one behind the other.” From this, we can therefore assume that over one hundred boats may have still been available to the army later that autumn. The
majority of these were certainly bateaux; the scows mentioned by Cruikshank might have been oversized bateaux for the landing of artillery or horses, or perhaps Durham boats.

The only available inventory of boats belonging to the American army on Lake Ontario at this time is a return of the quartermaster’s vessels at Sacket’s Harbor from August 1813. Although prepared at Washington, it is probably an accurate reflection of the state of affairs at the beginning of the month. As outlined earlier in this paper, and repeated in table below, there were only twelve boats at Sacket’s at that time, consisting of four Durham boats and eight bateaux:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Capacity (Men)</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Total Capacity (Men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durham Boat</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham Boat</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bateau</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bateau</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>12                545</td>
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Wilkinson’s expedition of course required transport for up to seven thousand men, together with their arms, artillery and stores. Twelve boats would not do. To assure a supply at Niagara, Wilkinson initially told Swartwout to “be prepared... to lay hold of all the small craft along the coast, to be expedited to Niagara.” Wilkinson’s subsequent instructions were more specific, stipulating that “a sufficient quantity to receive five thousand men, and the appendages and appurtenances herein enumerated, should be held in readiness at Niagara, the 10th of next month [September], and the residue at this place [Sackett’s Harbour], by the 15th at farthest.”

That Wilkinson doubted Swartwout’s competence is obvious from his writings. For instance, in instructions to Jacob Brown, commanding at Sacket’s Harbor, the general made this particular point regarding the quarter-master general:

“Transport has been required from the quarter-master general, for the whole embarkation; and he stands pledged to furnish it in season; you will press him on this point, and on the equipment of his craft with an abundance of spare oars, scoops, sails and tarpaulins, boat-hooks, &c.”

Wilkinson’s doubts were not unfounded, but the blame for shortages in the necessary transport was not entirely Swartwout’s doing. Most of the army’s bateaux — that is those not engaged in transport duties between Schenectady and Lake Ontario — were to be found lying derelict on the beach at Fort George, where the Americans had left them in May. As the French and British
armies in North America knew from experience, wooden bateaux didn’t fare well when left out of the water and exposed to the sun’s rays. The wood dries, seams open, and the nails and caulking become loose or fall out completely. Their solution was to submerge the hulls in the water for long-term preservation. Perhaps believing that the majority of boats were no longer needed, the American forces at Fort George did not do this. Consequently, when these boats were needed to carry the troops east from Fort George, they were almost useless. As the fort’s assistant adjutant-general, Major Robert G. Hite, later described:

“A number of boats, had been the whole summer on the beach, and wanted caulking and repairing, before they could be used. They were incompetent, for the transportation of the troops, small, inconvenient, and unsafe.”

Efforts to return the boats at Fort George to service were slow, and so on 10 September a general order was issued to focus all attention onto the boats: “All general fatigues are to cease, and if practicable, ten-fold exertions are to be used in repairing the boats.”

That order had only limited effect because within days Wilkinson was urging Swartwout to bolster the supply of small craft at Fort George, for it appears that a number of boats engaged in transport duties between Schenectady and Lake Ontario were brought up from Oswego. A letter from Wilkinson to Swartwout, dated 17 September, seems to suggest this: “We have as yet no boats from Oswego; those from Geneseе arrived last evening, and are engaged. In defect of transport, we must forage upon the enemy.”

As the anticipated day of departure came and went, preparations at Fort George were finalised. A general order was issued on 22 September respecting the equipping of boats:

“Preparatory to the impending expedition, each boat is to be furnished with a scoop, two spare oars, a small mast and truck, to receive a sail in proportion to the boat; and each company must be furnished with a mallet, a caulking iron, oakum and pitch, a hand hammer, a gimblet, two or three pounds of nails, and a hand-saw. The assistant deputy quarter-master will supply those articles as far as may be in his power, to the requisitions of the commanding officers of corps and detachments. The gentlemen commanding corps are requested to give any assistance in their power, for the equipment of the boats.”

To relieve the overworked artificers of some of their labour, commanding officers were again instructed to see to the equipment themselves. Furthermore, all officers were asked to reduce their baggage to a minimum:

“The gentlemen commanding corps, must equip their batteaux with masts and yards, as the artificers lack time to perform this service.

“The General most earnestly exhorts the gentlemen of the army to retrench their baggage and camp furniture to the narrowest possible compass, as the service to which they may soon be exposed, will subject them to great privations for the want of transport.”

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The equipage of the bateaux went far slower than expected, and on the 24th another, more pointed, general order was given out regarding the slowness:

“The General regrets, that he should find cause of dissatisfaction, with the conduct of any gentleman he commands, but the tardy manner, in which the clothing has been drawn, and the slow progress made in the equipment of the bateaux, cannot but produce the effect. This day and to-morrow, only, can be allowed for the completion of those objects, and for the return into the public stores, of all the surplus regimental property. This order must be punctually obeyed, or consequences will certainly ensue, as painful to the General, as to the delinquent officer.”

Wilkinson relates that in a second order of that date, all officers were “exhorted to use their utmost industry, and exertions, to train their men, so as to give full effect to their muscular force, and natural valour, &c.”

Colonel Daniel Bissell of the 5th Infantry Regiment was equally alarmed by the condition of the bateaux, and in later testimony characterised them as “miserable”:

“The boats were much out of repair, and repairs made after he arrived. As late as the 25th September, they were in such bad order, I remonstrated on the subject, in a letter to General Wilkinson. I had to prepare, both the boats and oars, by the assistance of the men of my regiment, and materials for this, were, with much difficulty, procured.”

It seems that the desired effect was achieved and the division was ready to move by the 30th, pending favourable weather.

The boats that left Fort George on or about the 4th day of October were therefore repaired, but by no means entirely adequate either in capacity or in fitness. Owing to the bad weather, numerous bateaux were lost on the passage between Niagara and Oswego. Many of those were wrecked about a day or so out from Fort George, within nine miles east and west of Eighteen Mile Creek, because of which more bateaux had to be brought down from the fort. A large portion of the 15th Infantry Regiment was forced to continue their journey on foot as a consequence. Further losses along the way were replaced at Oswego, only to see more damaged or lost on the leg to Henderson’s Bay, outside Sackett’s Harbor. Here artificers from Sackett’s repaired what they could, and replaced what they could not. Still, the shortage of boats was not eased, and more would again be lost or damaged before they reached the general rendezvous at Grenadier Island. Needless to say, every boat wrecked or damaged, resulted in a loss of provisions and stores that had to be made up out of the expedition’s allotment.

The boats belonging to the division from Sackett’s Harbor fared far better than those from Fort George, although even they suffered on the passage to Grenadier Island. Although the presence of Durham boats within the division from Fort George cannot be ruled out, it may be more logical to conclude that most, if not all, of the Durham boats were linked to the division from Sackett’s. However, the proportion of Durham boats to bateaux may have been comparatively small — perhaps no more than ten or fifteen per cent of the total.
After Wilkinson’s flotilla left Grenadier Island, the only notable alterations made to the boats was the provision of long steering oars for descending the St. Lawrence rapids below Prescott and Ogdensburg. Apparently, these were ordered to be made whilst the flotilla was still on the island, and again at the rendezvous at French Creek. Instead, not until the flotilla halted a few miles below Prescott were the artificers actually “employed in making large oars, for steering the boats through the rapids.”

By all accounts, only 306 boats (excluding gunboats and artillery scows) made it to the Salmon River. The majority of these were bateaux, a few dozen might have been Durham boats, and two or three could have been boats acquired from the transports for the use of General Wilkinson and his staff or “family.” These were all either scuttled or burned prior to the withdrawal of American forces from French Mills in February 1814.

ARCHAEOLOGICAL POTENTIAL FOR THE BOATS OF WILKINSON’S EXPEDITION

To summarise: on the evening of 13 November 1813, 328 oared vessels belonging to General James Wilkinson’s army entered the Salmon River and proceeded to French Mills (modern day Fort Covington, New York), where the flotilla became frozen-in. The majority of Wilkinson’s troops went into winter quarters there, only to be withdrawn to Plattsburgh and Sackett’s Harbour in February 1813. At that time, those boats still showing above the surface of the ice were either burned or scuttled in the river. British colonel Hercules Scott believed so strongly that much of the flotilla was still salvageable, that he was prepared to lead a recovery party back to the Salmon during the spring of 1814.

Given this, It shouldn’t be too surprising to read this observation in Frederick J. Seaver’s 1918 book Historical Sketches of Franklin County: “… here and there along the Salmon river, below Fort Covington, may still be found part of wrecks of the barges that were thus destroyed.” More intriguing still was the following line: “A number were sunk near the mouth of the Salmon River, and silt lodging against the wrecks formed an island in the course of years. It goes by the name of ‘Gunboat Island.’”

Seaver was quite emphatic about the existence of Gunboat Island, even if we today cannot positively locate it; and he says that all the wrecks are to be found below Fort Covington. That means that some may even be found north of the border in Canadian waters, perhaps as far as Dundee, Québec. Moreover, the long island (Grid Reference 388860) about a kilometre or so inland from the St. Lawrence River, belonging to the St. Regis Akwesasne Reserve, may yet prove to be Gunboat Island.

But could Seaver be wrong? It goes without saying, other explanations might be offered for the wrecks claimed by Seaver. For instance, we know that in the decades following the War of 1812, numerous bateaux and Durham boats plied the waters of the Salmon River, and so it is quite possible that any number of these were left derelict in the river after their working lives ended. A portion might be found around Fort Covington, but the majority are more likely to found near
Dundee which was more the centre of the river trade. There are even four bateaux sunk by the British at French Mills in November 1812, whose remains might still be present.

Gunboat Island is a conundrum, not only because it is not marked on the maps (least ways those maps seen by the author), but because no sunken boats were seen by Royal Navy midshipman John Harvey during his attempted incendiary attack on the flotilla in December 1813. However, given that Harvey and a seaman proceeded at night in a canoe, any sunken vessels near the mouth of the river could have been hidden from view by water and ice. Moreover, given the shallow draught of a canoe, Harvey could have passed over them without knowing they were there. And if the island derives its name from the sunken gunboats, we can be assured that not every American gunboat was scuttled at that position, since Harvey himself managed to place a carcass on board one of the gunboats at French Mills.

Assuming Gunboat Island was formed by the deliberate sinking of boats in the river, we might even wonder if any gunboats were even expended. It is possible that some other, less valued boats like bateaux or scows were used.

In fact, Wilkinson does not even mention sinking boats near the mouth of the Salmon. But then, he says very little about the encampment at French Mills since he soon left for more comfortable quarters at Malone. If there is logic in the act of sinking boats in the river, it is that such an action would bar the passage to British gunboats in the event of a follow-on attack. This was entirely possible in November 1813, as Captain William Mulcaster and Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph W. Morrison were eager to pursue the Americans, but were restrained by the more defensively-minded Sir George Prevost.

Curiously, the position of the current island does not wholly support the idea that boats were deliberately sunk there to block the passage. It is too close to the left bank to do that. However, small alterations in the course of the river might have occurred over the years, changing the relative position of the island — or even washing it away! A topographic or similar map from the late nineteenth century or early twentieth century would be invaluable in trying to locate the actual Gunboat Island. The only certain means to know if any hulls lie beneath the present land surface is to survey of the island using probes and/or geophysical survey equipment, followed by the digging of test trenches. Any such work would require permission and co-operation from the St. Regis Akwesasne Reserve Council.

One final point should be added. In 1975, Parks Canada undertook an underwater survey of the St. Lawrence shoreline around the mouth of the Salmon River and over two miles upstream from it. Nothing of any consequence was found.109

The river bed between Fort Covington and Dundee should be more accessible, and could be surveyed by divers. Side-scan sonar or other electronic sensors might also prove useful if there is sufficient depth of water to accommodate them. The stretch of river by Fort Covington should contain the greatest concentration of wrecks and would offer the best place to test for remains.
To show how rare the boats of Wilkinson’s flotilla would be, if found, consider the following points.

Only one boat of the oared gunboat class has been found from the War of 1812. This is the United States Navy row galley *Allen*, one of six built at Vergennes, Vermont, for Lake Champlain during the winter and spring of 1814. These 75-foot galleys followed a design created for Chesapeake Bay, and after the war were laid up at Whitehall, New York. *Allen* was recommissioned in 1817 and sold in 1826. She was subsequently moved to the Poultney River, near Whitehall, where her upper works were removed. The rest was left to rot. The galley’s remains were rediscovered in 1981 and initially surveyed a year later. However, it was not until 1995 when the *Allen* was surveyed in detail as part of the Whitehall Project sponsored by the Lake Champlain Maritime Museum, Texas A&M University and the Institute for Nautical Archaeology, and the University of Vermont. The principal report on the *Allen* was prepared by student Eric B. Emery as his Texas A&M Master’s thesis.

A similar row galley is believed to lie at the mouth of the Black River off Whitefish Point, near Sackett’s Harbour. This boat was one of fifteen built in 1814 for Lake Ontario and the upper St. Lawrence River, presumably to the same plan as the Chesapeake Bay galleys. This particular galley had broken from its moorings in November 1818, and drifted onto the bar, the damaged hull being subsequently abandoned. Dr. Ben Ford of the Anthropology Department, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, has been searching for this wreck for several years, as part of his Lake Ontario Maritime Cultural Landscape Project. Magnetometer readings had suggested that something was present under the sand, but further survey work conducted in June 2011 proved that the anomaly consisted of a group of rocks.

These two row galleys are similar in principle, but different in concept to those prepared for Wilkinson’s expedition. Eleven of Wilkinson’s gunboats had slip keels and were lightly built and armed, suggesting that they may have had more in common with the Durham boats and similar slip-keeled boats introduced to the lake by merchants before the War of 1812. The twelfth gunboat was a captured British gun bateau, which was different again, and may have resembled a large Canadian bateau of the period in its construction. No British oared gunboats or gun bateau from the War of 1812 have been found.

Nothing is known about the artillery scows which accompanied Wilkinson. Presumably they were large and barge-like, but possibly built along the lines of a bateau. Likely comparisons could be made with other wrecks. For example, comparisons could be made with other known vessels, such as the gundalows deployed on Lake Champlain during the American Revolution.

Bateaux of the types used on the St. Lawrence River, Great Lakes, and lakes George and Champlain have been found in four different places in Canada and the United States, representing two major conflicts — the Seven Years War and the War of 1812.

The Seven Years War is represented by two large collections, the smaller found at Québec City (French bateaux plats) and the larger in Lake George (English or common bateaux), and these have received considerable attention.
By contrast, and in spite of the hundreds built by both sides, only two wrecks have been located from the War of 1812 (so far as the author knows). One is a French or Canadian bateau discovered in Navy Bay, Kingston. The other was raised in 1964 at Fort St. Joseph on St. Joseph’s Island, Lake Huron.

The Navy Bay bateau (Parks Canada site reference 66M14A8) at Kingston, Ontario, is probably typical of the Canadian bateaux built around Montréal at the close of the eighteenth century and during the first decades the nineteenth century. Given its location, it may have belonged to the military, perhaps being one of hundreds employed during the War of 1812, though this is by no means certain and it may yet prove to be of mercantile origin. This wreck has been monitored by Parks Canada’s Underwater Archaeological Services (UAS) for a number of years, but pillaging by amateur divers has had a detrimental impact. As a result, the determination of the wreck’s original dimensions is difficult. From a recent non-invasive survey conducted in 2009 and 2010, the UAS has determined that it was at least 11 metres (36 feet) in length, while the breadth across the bottom of the hull is about 135cm, suggesting a maximum breadth of about 196cm (6 feet 5 inches). The floor timbers were more substantial than those of common bateaux; wood samples from the hull reveal that the bottom was planked with white pine and white oak, and that the knees were made from tamarack. Underwater archaeologist Charles Dagneau believes the construction to be comparable to the French bateaux unearthed at Québec City several years ago, a subject about which he is especially expert.

Some of the bateaux attached to Wilkinson’s flotilla may have been of this form, especially any that had been captured in the weeks or months prior to departure. The captured British gun bateau that made up the twelfth gunboat of the flotilla was probably similar in construction to an enlarged Canadian bateau. In this case, size, construction and the lack of a slip keel will be factors in determining its identity.

The Fort St. Joseph bateau is a small example of what is probably a merchant’s bateau, being about 23 feet long and 4 feet wide. Consisting mainly of the bottom section, it was recovered from beside the canoe dock at St. Joseph’s Island, Ontario, in 1964, and conserved on site before being sent down to Fort Malden National Historic Site in Amherstburg, Ontario, for study. Little if anything appears to have been accomplished at Fort Malden, and so the hull was later returned to Fort St. Joseph National Historic Site for display in the interpretation centre there. Unfortunately, in the process of being disassembled and transported, some of the timbers may have been incorrectly replaced when put on view.

The Fort St. Joseph bateau had been deliberately sunk using rocks to weigh it down, possibly in the summer of 1812, when Captain Charles Roberts captured the American fort at Mackinac, to which place the garrison at Fort St. Joseph garrison relocated. This action preserved it from destruction when American forces burned the abandoned fort in July 1814. It is not known if the bateau was built at the island or some other location, although given that the construction of Fort St. Joseph did not really begin in earnest until 1797, we know that the bateau cannot have arrived before 1796, and was likely considerably younger than that. The North West Company maintained a bateaux yard at Sault Ste. Marie, and this may well be the source for the Fort St.
Joseph bateau. As this bateau has been the recent subject for a Master thesis by Mathieu Mercier Gingras of Québec, we may soon learn considerably more about its construction and origins.

No confirmed wrecks of Durham boats from the War of 1812 are known. However, the Deadman Bay III Wreck (Parks Canada site reference 66M15A3) in Deadman Bay, Kingston, may be a possible Durham boat from the end of the war or the decades immediately following. The flat-bottomed hull is at least 11.4 metres (37.4 feet) in length and measures about 3.4 metres (11.15 feet) in breadth. There is no keelson. A lighter is one possible identity offered for this wreck, but the size closely matches twenty Durham boats ordered by the British military in December 1814. Ten of these boats were to measure 50 feet on the bottom, 11 feet broad, and 3 feet deep, with cedar or tamarack knees; the other ten were to be 58 feet in length, with iron knees. The military continued to employ Durham boats until the 1840s, latterly through the Rideau Canal.

Clearly, there is significant potential for finding remains from Wilkinson’s flotilla. More importantly, the variety of vessel types to be found in one location may be unique. Not only are they easily dated to a critical juncture in the War of 1812, it is entirely possible that the wrecks are largely undisturbed.
1 Frederick J. Seaver, *Historical Sketches of Franklin County*, Albany, 1918: 612.
25 U. S. 16th Congress, 1st Session, Claim No. 526. Thanks to Gary Gibson, Sackets Harbor, New York, for this information.
26 For a detailed account of the Battle of Crysler’s Farm, see Donald Graves, *Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler’s Farm, 1813*, Robin Brass Studio, Toronto, 1999.


31 From London, Bathurst encouraged Prevost to attack Wilkinson’s position, writing: “I trust you have not delayed collecting your force, for the purpose of making an attack before the Enemy could have had time to entrench themselves or to open a Communication with General Hampton.” Of course, by the time the letter reached Canada, the Americans were already evacuating their camp. Bathurst to Prevost, Downing Street, London, 27 December 1813. LAC, RG8, C, 681: 304.


40 Gordon Drummond to Sir George Prevost, York, 14 February 1814. LAC, RG8, C, 682: 117.


42 James Croil, *Dundas, or A Sketch of Canadian History*, Montreal, 1861: 103.


44 Robert Sellar, *The History of the County of Huntingdon... to the Year 1838*, Huntingdon, Quebec, 1888: 128.


46 Frederick J. Seaver, *Historical Sketches of Franklin County*, Albany, 1918: 611-2. Note that Seaver seems to be in error when he writes that this operation took place two or three weeks after the raids on French Mills, Malone and the Four Corners.
47 James Croil, *Dundas, or A Sketch of Canadian History*, Montreal, 1861: 102.
57 Robert Sellar, *The History of the County of Huntingdon... to the Year 1838*, Huntingdon, Quebec, 1888: 179-82.
58 Thanks to Gary Gibson of Sackets Harbor, New York, for this information.
59 Thanks to Gary Gibson of Sackets Harbor, New York, for this information.
60 Isaac Chauncey to Robert Swartwout, Sackets Harbor, 18 June 1814. New York Historical Society, Manuscript Department, Isaac Chauncey Letterbook 5. Thanks to Gary Gibson, Sackets Harbor, New York, for this information.
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80 The most authoritative study of the Philadelphia published so far is John R. Bratten’s *The Gondola Philadelphia and the Battle of Lake Champlain*, College Station, Texas, 2002.
92 Henry Griffin, Notary Public, No. 717, 3 December 1814; Henry Griffin, Notary Public, No. 723, 6 December 1814. Archives Nationales du Québec, Montréal, CN1-187.


