Situation of the French Republican Armies
(January - February 1799) in Europe
| Arme de Batavie Gen. Brune
| 27,000
| Netherlands
| Arme de Mayence Gen. Bernadotte
|
|
| 58,000
| Northern Italy
| Arme de Naples Gen. MacDonald
| Total
| 212,000
|
| Source: table in T. Sheviakov,
V. Dzuis "Italianski I Shveizarski Pachody Suvarova 1799,
Moskow 2002 ed. Astrel AST.
Introducing the Revolutionary
Wars Orders of Battle
The military art knew an important improvement with the French Revolution
wars. After Rvolution had allowed France to reorganize the army on
principles of Egalit, concurring in a mutual sharing of military
honours and services also with whom was not born noble, the strategy
and the tactics evolved, almost logically, in a parallel way with
the new thought and the new leaderships, military Officers enclosed,
redesigning the ways to fight of XVIII century. Someone, indeed, was
very slow to modernize his military institutions. Austria, as an example,
succeeded only in few occasions to disengage from the Maria-Theresia's
military model; Napoleon in person recognized that Vienna was always
in delay of a year, an army and... an idea; therefore it was condemned
to lose. In the Revolutionary decade, however, the border between
the old way to fight and the new was still much thin one.
In the "Enlightened Century", monarchs mobilized theei
Armies splitting them (by divisions) between the Lieutenants to whom
the campaign orders were entrusted. However the fundamental unit of
that period was the Regiment, the personal property, organized, maintained
and paid by its Colonel (the Owner). Not so rare were the possible
occurrences when a regiment turned its "back to the battlefield because
its Colonel did not appreciate orders that could put in danger his
subordinates. To resolve the problem someone tried to create intermediate
units between divisions and regiments, by grouping two or more regiments,
that could limit the free initiative of colonels and that could better
extend the chain of command to the advanced units: so born the Brigades.
The system evolution showed also bizarre episodes. One could have
been witness of the proliferation of so many brigades, that often
ended in brigades formed only by a single regiment, of course commanded
by the same colonel chief of the barely present single regiment. The
French Revolution also wanted strongly to render visible symbols of
a rupture with the past, as happened with the symbolic change of common
words, from My Gentleman (Monsieur) that became Citoyen (Citizen),
to the numeration of years and the change of the calendar months along
with the days of the week. Also the Arme was been involved in the
terminologies reform, even if the result was more ideological that
practical.
With the practical impossibility to quickly reorganize all military
schools of war and their courses, arrived only the change of the military
terminology. The regiment, detested symbol of the colonel's feudal
power, became Half-brigade (Demi brigade) and the colonel simply was
a Chief (Chef-de-brigade). In effects, considering the terminology,
someone could think that, having created the half-brigades, the French
wanted to give back new dignity to the unit called brigade; however
this did not happen. The greatest French military unit remained the
Arme (which deserved all needed geographic variant names suggested
by the conflict situation), but the fundamental manoeuvre unit was
the army (sub)division, equipped with all logistic services and all
the materials useful to turn it into an independent group during operations.
The division had its General Staff, its support branches (Sappers,
Bridging units, Artillery, something similar to a Medical service,
Supplies, etc). The division was under command of a Gnral-de-division
(he could, during emergencies, have a provisional nomination that
is " titre provisoire", a temporary assignment, "in
evaluation"). The Division staff had Quartermasters (paying
and administration) adjudants-gnraux, and a reserved squad of couriers,
aides-de-camp, body guards and military- civil employed personnel.
The denomination of the Divisions could have been fixed (and obviously
numerical; i.e. 2e division of the X army) or could have assumed temporary
names from the particular geographic situations (Division du Tyrol)
or from tactic deployments (Division de droit, right wing; Division
of avantgarde - vanguard). Often they took directly the name of the
general commander (Division Massna etc). The division General, before
the battle (campaign), joined up his Staff in the war council, distributed
the subordinate commands assigning battalions and demi-brigades, gave
dispositions for cavalry and artillery and often all remained in a
merely verbal form. It is apparent that:[i]
1. the
Brigades were volatile military entities, they possessed only a tactical
dimension and they were able to change from different formations and
commanders (also one for every day of a battle)..
2. Only
after the historical events, could have been written summary tables
- today commonly (but incorrectly) defined Orders of battle and that
it would be more appropriate to call lists of armed forces or army
lists. Commonly they were made by the same Gnral-de-division in
his Army Report or by some concerned Officer, reporter of the event.
The Army Lists documentation, that is commonly possible to consult
in national archives, can roughly be synthesized in two categories:
the situations and the reports. The first (Situations) are often detailed
documents that list the presences of the effectives, the sanitary
state and the pay situation of a day (month for a campaign). They
tell which and how many units were ready to the fight or had stood
on the battlefield, but they never bring back the chain of command
(in every case even if the chain is listed is not totally sure that
chain of command was alike during the clash with the enemy). According
to the other kind of documents (Report, Prcis etc.), they were produced
after the event and often are more reliable revealing details (but
the in-depth description also depended on the descriptive ability
of the author). In these last relations
could appear the true Army Lists and also the orders of battle, not
a simple inventory of men and units but the true Ordre de Bataille
listing the formations and how they deployed on field.
Also in this case, however, an historical truth, difficult to
search, could not be reached. Even if the battle Report referred the
Chain of commands, it often omitted to delineate some important details
about the cited demi-brigade:
A - the grenadiers (or chasseurs) companies had been removed, merged
in an independent battalion under the command of another brigadier;
B - all three of its battalions were not in the same brigade. Often
they were one or two in a brigade, while the third (or the other two)
was in reserve under another general.
Finally, considering that Situations were produced on several occasions
at regular intervals, while after-battle Reports were only single
pieces (or more than one but all describing the same event) evident
appear the worries that investigators and historians met (and still
they meet) on the reconstruction about who was in the battle and
how many were those really participating. Even "consecrated fathers"
of military history, Clausewitz and Jomini, err in summing up the
presences. While passing the years, tactical conditions of chain of
the command changed continually as France proceeded with its Empire
and improved the archival documentations.
The analysis of the Austrian sources is different because, along
many years, several publications described, often in detail, what
had happened on the battlefields. The same imperial tactical organization,
remarkably more rigid and schematic than the French one, facilitated
the reconstruction of the army lists. The Austrians used the formations
of Columns (Kolonnen) which followed the roads pattern of the age
to manoeuvre. These columns would differed in size and sometimes they
were more like divisions, for the force deployed, than brigades. They
always retained the same vertical system: at the head were one or
two light guns together with an avantguard of elite troops or scouts
(they could not be defined light infantry, as by the French, because
they did not perform specialized training), one cavalry squadron for
the linkage and the protection of the column flanks, the mass of the
column (Hauptgruppe) with the other cavalry squadrons and the heavy
batteries of reserve artillery. The brigades (Feldbrigaden) were mixed
groups of battalions led by a brigadier (Generalmajor) not always
performing as that rank had required (few promotions by merits or
good service, more were granted in accordance with the genealogic
tree to the lesser nobility even with support of some robust money
transfer or political blessing). In fact sometimes it happened that
the columns in which were inserted the brigades were led by Officers
of a rank inferior to whom led the Brigade. The possible occurrence
of provisional commands was normal in case of physical illness (mental
too) of the superior officers, entrusting the command to Colonels
(Oberst or Obristen) commanders of a regiment and sometimes also to
lieutenants colonels.
The Army Lists, in this research work, therefore, are the sum of
a significant mass of cross matches among different sources, some
of the kind of quoted documents, publications, biographies, burial-writings
and awards. All the uncertain data have been marked with question
marks.
Notes:
[1] The rule, of course, had its greatest exception
in Bonaparte. Napoleon almost always was tempted to override chains
of command, sometimes directly distributing the charges and brigade
commands. See for example:
Ordre de marche et de bataille Au gnral
Massna
Quartier gnral, Lesegno, 3 floral an IV (22 avril 1796)
Le gnral Massna partira avec sa division, son artillerie et
sa cavalerie, demain, six heures du matin, pour prendre position
le long de la rivire du Pesio, appuyant sa droite sur le Tanaro,
et prolongeant sa gauche autant que sa ligne pourra s'tendre. Il
se mettra en bataille sur deux lignes en observant la distance ncessaire,
de manire que l'espace puisse servir former en colonne serre la
moiti de sa division. Ses troupes cheval seront sa gauche. Il
aura une avant-garde d'infanterie lgre et de cavalerie qui partira
une demi-heure avant, et qui se portera sur Carr ds l'instant qu'il
aura clair sa gauche, et que le reste de sa division le suivra
une demi-heure de distance. Il restera dans cette position et dans
cet ordre de bataille.
Il prendra du biscuit pour le 4 et pour le 5.
Par ordre du gnral en chef"
Placed on the Napoleon Series: November 2006 - September 2009
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