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General Melas was reached, while being in march order, by Suvorov’s
order around midday. In that dispatch the commander-in-chief told the
Austrians to drive to Serravalle and to surround the French Right Wing.
This was exactly what Mélas had intention to do and, to avoid
confusion in the march order, he kept the Mittrowsky Brigade at the
head of his third column, reducing the columns from three to two. With
another Austrain Corps approaching, General
Suvorov had nothing other to do than to wait his new left wing
entering the battle and then attack. However, inexplicably and strangely,
he ordered a second Russian attack (and the third one to the poor tired
Kray). Generals Kray and Derfelden, who, because of the absolute lack
of water have had no rest or refreshments for the soldiers, remained
completely stunned with those orders. Moreover the pause of the battle
had allowed the French to deploy the artillery by the best way and
to reinforce the skirmishers’ screen too. Nevertheless, punctually,
Kray and Derfelden launched their attacks at the same time, together,
at 3:00 p.m..
The Afternoon Attacks and Mélas's Initiative
At 3:00 p.m., together with the described last attack, the Russians
attacked, Derfelden against the Belvedere position and Bagration against
the eastern sike dof the town of Novi. There were three attempts to
seize the French positions, but all the attacks were repulsed. At least,
the intervention of the French cavalry bBrigade Calvin forced the Russians
to regain the Pozzolo lines. In the meanwhile the bulk of Mélas
Corps had reached the village of Bettole and was preparing its attack.
The Mélas attack was arranged to start by 16:00 p.m. with
the task to attack Novi directly from the east side. The great losses
of the Austrian right wing and those of Russians, however, did raise
a lot of doubts in the Austrian Fieldmarshal’s mind. He summoned
a war council and, mainly, agreed with one of the most reliable among
his subordinates, the Chief of Pioneers, Graf Joseph Radetzky (the
future marshal, nightmare of Lombardy). Leaving apart Nobili,
of which there were no news upon his march to Serravalle, [vi] they decided to employ Mittrowsky
and Loudon to attack the French right and to send Lusignan with the
Prince Liechtenstein Cavalry to follow what Suvorov had ordered them
to do.
Having noted some movements at the edge of the plateau, east of Novi,
General Lusignan formed a line with the grenadier Battalions
Pértussy and Schiaffinati at the right, and a Fürstenberg
Battalion at the left. Then ordered a bayonet charge against the French
line marching (running) at the head of the Schiaffinati grenadiers.
This battalion was the first to reach the plateau (also known as the
Castel Dragone position) and first to engage the French; it was repulsed
and made a second charge in direction of the post of Cavana. After
it followed the Battalion Pertussy, which assaulted the hill instead
of driving toward Novi and so did also the fusiliers of the 36th Regiment.
There was a hard fight in the middle of the vineyards and between the
little wooden farms (cascine), which were burning. The Cisalpine infantry [vii] seemed not able to resist to
the violent clash and began to retreat, forcing Watrin to close the
gap with other troops. The Calvin brigade retreated in disorder with
many soldiers taking the road toward Gavi and forcing St. Cyr to risk
his life in an useless attempt to stop the fugitives. General Watrin,
after having observed the gathering of Mittrowsky and Loudon (behind
Cavana), had previously decided to regroup his troops behind a small
mound, just seized by the 106th Demi-Brigade with 4 pieces of artillery.
It was this last French unit which absorbed all the grenadiers charges
and, while the 106th resisted, the shocked Watrin’s troops withdrew
to Fornova (Fornace Nuova?), on the road to Gavi. And this was the
first time the French definitively lost one of the initial positions.
Mélas’s Decisive Maneuver
During the Grenadiers attacks, Mittrowsky and Loudon advanced toward
the Val Alfiera and went uphill on the monte Rotondo slope, immediately
crossing the Braghena valley with the two Fürstenberg Battalions,
leaving back four of their companies under the Regiment’s commander
Graf von Auersperg, with a Flügel (squadron) of Levenehr Dragoons,
free to advance on the Gavi road against the French rear. Loudon advanced
in a wide formation on the right bank of the Braghena Creek (having
the grenadiers Weissenwolf on the right, then the grenadiers Görschen
and those of Hohenfeld as the left wing. A second rank was formed with
the Weber grenadiers and some guns, those they succeeded in pushing
uphill).
General St.Cyr realized immediately the extreme danger of that movement
and sent against them all detachments he could gather among the shocked
Watrin troops, while Laboissière had orders to change facing
eastward against Lusignan, repositioning also the artillery (4 guns
shot directly against the new Lusignan attack).
In fact, on that moment (between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m.) Major General
Fröhlich launched part of the Lusignan second line uphill
(Morzin grenadiers). It followed an chaotic melée with the French
attacked from many sides, forming squares and trying to resist to the
charges. General Lusignan, at the head of the column, fell on the ground
wounded and was taken prisoner. The moment was very important. General
Fröhlich ordered the Weber grenadiers to attack in the area between
Lusignan and Loudon, while Mélas himself threw into the struggle
the reserve Battalion: Paar grenadiers. They assaulted Novi by the
southern heights and approached its gates. The path of the Paar grenadiers
was followed also by the Liechtenstein cavalry, which erupted in Novi’s
rear. All the hills curtain edge was taken and the encirclement left
St. Cyr with no hopes. Many of his unit were actually routing or withdrawing
in great disorder.
With these occurrences, St. Cyr decided it was the moment to withdraw
in order to not fall into Austrian hands as prisoners. [viii] He tried to gather the 3rd
Line infantry to cover the retreat, but the Demi-Brigade was already
been employed by Moreau on the left. So he ordered to the 19th Dragoons
to form a screen and to secure the flank of the retreating column and
began to dismantle the artillery positions on the Belvedere, moving
the column of carriages toward the Braghena bridge. Otherwise he was
totally unaware the Austrains now controlled the Gavi road.
Moreau’s Complete Defeat [ix]
St. Cyr’s situation had become desperate. Serravalle taken by
the Nobili Brigade was in Austrian hands. Gavi was under direct hazard
as the Poles had been repulsed toward La Bocchetta pass. The French
right wing was almost isolated from the main army. But the wing’s
defeat was soon to became a general rout. Joubert’s corpse had
left palazzo Doria at Novi onto a carriage, sent by Suchet to Genoa
before the Austrian irruption.
When the Paar grenadiers reached the southern gate of Novi, the Russians
moved forward. General Shvejkowsky from east and Derfelden from north
attacked the walls. The French defenders (Gardanne brigade), after
a 10 hours resistance, at 4:00 p.m., left the town through the only
gate passable in the west side, harassed by two Russian Battalions
and patrols of the Karacsaj Dragoons (2½ squadrons.). This mixed
vanguard, which had moved at 5:00 p.m., reinforced by 3 squadrons of
the 5th Hussars, cleared the heights in front of Novi taking the direction
of Pasturana. The Derfelden advance finished also to rescue the isolated
Vukassovich infantry of the Ott’s left wing. Laboissière
also ordered the retreat by the fields, prolonging his right wing till
Castelletto. Of his division, was left behind only a Battalion of the
68th Demi-Brigade, directly led by General Colli, who under attack
was forced to drive left in order to try to link with Lemoine. This
determined the successive described events.
On the Austrian right wing, General Kray, observing the chaotic
movements of the French rear areas, ordered a general attack
at 5:00 p.m. . Lemoine was pushed back till Pasturana, Grouchy, threatened
by a potentially surrounding column (Gottesheim) and directly attacked
through his front, broke the lines and ordered a retreat, which was
rather a run, on and down the valleys. During these dramatic moments,
the three generals of Pasturana were taken prisoners of war; but the
way they were caught was referred as very bizarre and originated a
gossip: the Tale of the three “smart”
generals.
Let see what Thiebault said in his memoirs:
“… from the moment the left wing was in full rout,
the Generals Pérignon, Grouchy, and Colli (Piedmontese)
had realized the whole army was lost. Pérignon had commanded
the left in a very feeble way, and Grouchy had supported him still
more weakly, and these three generals, thought it was always preferable,
for not being badly dealt, to become the first, who had less chances
to be caught prisoners into a village, than in the open ground,
or in daylight instead of night, three at the time instead of being
alone, during the battle instead of the last moments of the struggle;
these three Generals, so, obeying this ill-fated inspiration, which
was harmful for themselves, agreed together to remain at Pasturana,
that important strongpoint, which the French were ready to abandon,
after having entrenched it, and let their troops to withdraw while
they recovered into a corner formed by two parts of an inn. They
would await there for surrender to the first enemy general or
Austrian officer, who would have come there<. In
the meantime, a voltigeur officer, having
perceived them there, when their withdrawal was still possible
and believing that he had to devote himself to facilitate it, blocked
the main street of the village with his company.
This heroic resistance did not go into the plans of the three
generals, who ordered the captain to put away his) sword. Useless
shame; at this same moment a large patrol of Austrian hussars,
arose, exterminated the company and arrested the officer; then
these same hussars, pursuing their way, the first of them arriving
at the corner of the inn perceived suddenly the generals, together
with one or two officers, and gave them the honour to be takes
as in an ambush.
They handled them with sabre shots; General Pérignon
had the head opened, General Grouchy also had it, and furthermore
was slashed (this mark today is even the most beautiful ornament
of his marshal's staff). He wrote upon Novi to his sister " I
have, three dangerous wounds but nobody will spike me. Pérignon
will be preserved. "
And so continued the violent polemic:
“During that struggle, all would have remained unknown,
because nobody in the group would have been a traitor; however,
a captain, returned in France after his prisoner’s exchange,
told the story and a lieutenant of the 26th Demi-Brigade, called
Deney, become the secretary of General Delmas, having been
witness of the event, very upset reported all to General Moreau,
who recommended him a complete silence…”
Delmas at least told the complete version and was invited to bring
other witnesses. Thiebault said also that no more witnesses were needed
for a self confirmed cat, as:
…these three generals were taken together; so no one of
them was in his position, which nobody can leave during a battle.
They were caught far from their troops, so having abandoned them.
At least they were taken prisoners in a strange way, without a
circumstance which could as a minimum be comprehensible rather
than justifiable…. Without remembering the comedy of sabre
shots, which if better inflicted, maybe would have avoided greater
calamities to France..”
This was, instead, the official account of the retreat. At 6:00 p.m. Watrin
had definitely ordered the retreat while Suvorov, Kray and Mélas
were making their final efforts. The retreat orders by St. Cyr to Watrin
were to raise the Monte Cucco slope to cover the flank of Laboissière,
who had to reach Tassarolo and San Cristoforo, in the valley. Otherwise
the unending attacks of the Austrian grenadiers and the raids of Liechtenstein’s
cavalry created a sort of panic; soon the troops of Watrin and Laboissière
began to run away in a complete rout. Guerin and Colli tried to rescue
the guns left in the Belvedere and Collinetta positions, but their
actions were useless. With the withdrawal of the Laboissière
units, only the center continued the fight (Gardanne and Lemoine).
Moreau had left Calvin and Colli between Lemoine and Grouchy and had
ordered to the last named general to cover Grouchy’s
withdrawal. Lemoine, pushed back by the Ott’s troops suddenly
lost his battle order and was forced to abandon the cover task, because
his troops began to disband and fled away. General Karacsaj, having
taken the command of his squadrons, stroke Colli in a flank and forced
the Piedmontese to recover into Pasturana with the 1st Battalion of
the 68th Line infantry.
Before being captured, Grouchy, at 6:00 p.m. , had also ordered a
retreat, “par echelons”, covered by the brigade Colli and
with Pasturana finally defended by the Battalion of the 68th Demi-Brigade.[x]
All the left wing artillery, which served till the last minute as
support, abandoned its positions along the Basaluzzo road, directed
to the gather point fixede by General Debelle. The head of the
column went up again the slope of Pasturana, it bordered the swamp
and it crossed the road of Francavilla, going southward and crossing
a road curve around the “cascina Decchi”. Here the road
became steep, descending toward Tassarolo, and here the first battery
jammed across the way, blocking the movements. The right French wing
artillery, galloping down from the Belvedere, hit the flank of the
Perignon park column near a church. A complete chaos occurred with
the shout of the Russians and the Austrians advancing, delayed by Colli
at the cemetery of Pasturana. The crew abandoned the pieces, cut the
ropes freeing the train horses in order to mount them for a faster
escape. At this moment, Kray’s troops (one Sztaray
Battalion), pursuing Pèrignon, intercepted the large artillery
park of the French left wing, cut the road and took all the retreating
column prisoners\. Some killed horses and some carriages, crushed,
blocked the passage in a sunken causeway. As a consequence, the French
column was pinned and forced to stop in front of this obstacle.
Before the Austrian infantry could line and attack the village, the
squadrons of the 5th Hussars (Révay) and the Dragoons Karacsay
under Nimptsch erupted among the houses. On Pasturana converged also
the archduke Joseph Hussars, coming from the wes tside, under the command
of Rittmeister Rakowsky. Pasturana was totally surrounded. As for the
aforementioned Pèrignon and Grouchy, the first had seven sabre
wounds, the second six (officially while trying to rescue the guns
in Pasturana). Colli, also wounded, was taken prisoner with the 68th
Demi-Brigade Battalion. [xi]
At least only the Grandjean brigade was able to do a good order retreat.
Suvorov said that only dusk saved the French army from the total annihilation.
So ended a ruthless battle which had lasted for 16 hours and which
was remembered for this record. The Coalition pursuit was not so effective
because all soldiers were deadly tired “bis zur Kraftlosigkeit
erschöpft” as the Austrians said.
Around the 11:00 p.m. the last French units, escaped through
the Austro-Russian pinchers, rallied at Gavi. Suvorov rode slowly across
the battlefield and, seeing the heaps of corpses, stacked waiting for
the evacuation, said the renowned phrase: “God gave me a great
amount of benefits, but punished me when I had to come to Italy.”
Death’s Stench
Only the uncoming night was able to put an end to the hideous butcher
in the Pasturana ravine. Irritated by the heavy losses, they had undergone
in the battle, the Russians granted quarter only to superior officers
and generals. The Austro-Russian medical corps, received appropriate
orders, from the Commaner-in-Chief so they soon installed the necessary
field hospitals, and it was in that evening sad occasion that the whole
place of the former abbey Santa Maria (del Fossato), with the church
and the near buildings, was converted in so many ranks of straw beds,
above which the wounded poor men were laid down. While sanitary units
did that compassionate job, the zealous priest Don Pacchiarotti and
some of the clergymen of Basaluzzo went there, where the spiritual
needs asked for them, comforting and acquitting the dying poor soldiers.
Later, growing the number of the wounded, other hospitals were established
at Novi, in the church of S. Nicolò, in Fresonara, Bosco and
Frugarolo.
This was in effect a very bloody battle. In some moderate reports
(as in Jomini) the French suffered 1500 dead, 5000 wounded, 3000 prisoners –
three generals and the Adjudant Partounneaux. They lost 4 flags, 37
guns, and 28 caissons, while the counterpart had 1800 dead, 5200 wounded,
1200 men and 3 caissons prisoners. Gachot told the French lost: 4500
dead, wounded, missing and prisoners in the left wing (Grouchy’s
Chief-of-Staff Daoust’s report), the 106th Line lost one chef-de-Battalion,
24 officers and 328 men; the 34th Line lost 16 officers and 460 men;
Watrin’s division lost (Watrin’s report) 1000 men and the
same number was lost by Laboissière; the artillery lost 63 men,
the cavalry 100; were lost also 4 flags, 18 guns and 21 caissons.
Suvorov, in his report from Asti on August 25, maybe exaggerated,
spoke about 12268 prisoners or wounded and 6000 French dead (plus the
three generals prisoners, with Partonneaux, 84 staff and superior Officers).
The Coalition troops took also 39 guns, 54 caissons, 4 flags. Mélas,
also probably overestimating the numbers, told about 3000 French dead,
4000 wounded, 4000 prisoners.
The Russian Fieldmarshal wrote to the Kaiser Franz the Russian losses
were 1584 men (dead: 1 Staff officer, 10 superior officers, 337 men;
2 generals, 5 colonels, 3 Staff officers, 47 superior officers and
1179 men wounded); the number of missing and prisoners was not given.
So did Miliutin, without giving the missing and prisoners numbers,
who counted 348 Russians dead and 1538 wounded (a total of 1886 men).
Mélas said the Russian lost 2700 men (included 198 officers).
The Austrian list had higher numbers. Kray lost 5173 men (on a base
of 15000), Mélas lost 736 men (on a base of 8000 men), the Staff
and the Reserve artillery lost 32 men. The total number of Austrian
losses was 5951 men (6050 for Mélas and 6002 for a viennese
magazine) .
The burning sun accelerated the putrefaction of the dead bodies, and
the burials were made difficult by the hardened ground, meanwhile the
air was becoming infected more and more, and the horrible stench lasted
for quite a lot time. Three large common graves were dug (in front
of Pasturana, left of Bettole and the last south of Novi) but they
were not enough to bury all the dead. Then it was decided to cremate
the corpses. On the hill and on the lowland, on the height Sant’Antonino
of Basaluzzo and on the plain of Pasturana were prepared piles of firewood
and, after having gathered the dead bodies, high fires enlighted the
nights. The stench of the death lasted till August 18, causing an heavy,
hot and pestilential air.
Along for the putrid stenchse, marker of the horrific and bloody battle,
or for the great famine which followed, in Basaluzzo developed a fatal
pestilence, that, in the few following months, that is from August
1799 to January 1800, made over 110 victims. Similar memory also happened
in that time to Fresonara, as it could be seen in the parish records
of both villages.
A great number of French wounded soldier were transferred to Novi
and the lack of carriages forced Mélas to commit the citizens
for their transport.
Austrian losses at Novi – report of August 19
Regiments and Gren. Battalions.
| Dead
| Wounded
| Missing
| Totals
| Horses (or)
| Name
| strength
| Officers
| Men
| Off
| Men
| Off
| Men
| Off
| Men
| Per Cent
| Right Wing – FZM Kray
| K.K. 39 Nádasdy
| 1559
| 1
| 45
| 11
| 183
| -
| 209
| 12
| 468
| 30.8 %
| K.K. 40 Mittrowsky
| 1758
| 1
| 32
| 8
| 239
| 1
| 76
| 10
| 347
| 20.3 %
| K.K. 33 Sztaray
| 2623
| -
| 59
| 15
| 443
| 2
| 103
| 17
| 605
| 23.7 %
| K.K. 16 Terzy
| 1256
| 3
| 70
| 7
| 176
| 9
| 111
| 19
| 347
| 29.1 %
| K.K. 4 Deutschmeister [xii]
| 2325
| 2
| 171
| 18
| 616
| 3
| 21
| 23
| 808
| 35.7 %
| K.K. 8 Huff
| 1665
| 2
| 39
| 16
| 328
| 1
| 133
| 19
| 500
| 31.1 %
| K.K. 15 Oranien
| 1761
| -
| 1
| -
| 4
| -
| 1
| -
| 6
| 0.3 %
| K.K. 48 Vukassovich
| 1733
| 3
| 54
| 11
| 118
| 2
| 102
| 16
| 271
| 16.5 %
| K.K. 10 Kheul
| 1669
| 1
| 32
| 12
| 215
| -
| 74
| 13
| 321
| 20 %
| K.K. 45 Lattermann
| 1148
| 2
| 91
| 6
| 192
| 2
| 174
| 10
| 157
| 14.5 %
| K.K. 32 Gyulai
| 1361
| -
| 36
| 14
| 240
| -
| 69
| 14
| 345
| 26.4 %
| Grenz Regiment Carlstädt Szluiner
| 614
| 1
| 19
| 3
| 97
| -
| 23
| 4
| 139
| 23.3 %
Only one Battalion
| GrenzRegiment Carlstädt Oguliner
| 1330
| -
| 58
| 12
| 231
| 2
| 66
| 14
| 355
| 27.7 %
| Kaiser Dragoons
| 995
| -
| 1
| -
| 15
| -
| -
| -
| 16
| 47
| Arch. Johann Dragoons
| 983
| -
| 1
| 2
| 20
| -
| 1
| 2
| 22
| 31
| Arch. Joseph Hussars
| 1169
| -
| 5
| 3
| 15
| -
| 5
| 3
| 25
| 68
| Right wing totals
|
| 16
| 694
| 138
| 3132
| 22
| 1169
| 176
| 1995
| 116
| Left Wing Gen. d.Kav. Mélas
| Name
| strength
| Officers
| Men
| Off
| Men
| Off
| Men
| Off
| Men
| Horses
| Grenadier Pértussy
| 528
| -
| 5
| -
| 22
| -
| 15
| -
| 45
| 8.5 %
| Grenadier Görschen
| 724
| -
| 18
| 1
| 49
| 1
| 10
| 2
| 77
| 10.9 %
| Grenadier Weissenwolf
| 729
| 1
| 15
| 5
| 53
| 0
| 21
| 6
| 89
| 13 %
| Grenadier Morzin
| 556
| -
| 7
| 2
| 57
| -
| 22
| 2
| 86
| 15.8 %
| Grenadier Schiaffinati
| 661
| 1
| 4
| 4
| 62
| -
| 27
| 5
| 93
| 14.8 %
| Grenadier Paar
| 487
| -
| 4
| 1
| 26
| -
| -
| 1
| 30
| 6.4 %
| Grenadier Weber
| 591
| -
| 2
| -
| 15
| -
| 3
| -
| 20
| 3.4 %
| Grenadier Hohenfeld
| 428
| -
| 1
| -
| -
| -
| -
| -
| 1
| NN
| K.K. 36 Fürstenberg
| 2184
| -
| 9
| 3
| 69
| -
| 30
| 3
| 108
| 5.1 %
| K.K. 18 Stuart
| 2441
| -
| 7
| 2
| 46
| -
| 12
| 2
| 65
| 2.7 %
| Dragoons Lobkowitz
| 763
| -
| 1
| 1
| 15
| -
| 2
| 1
| 18
| 27
| Dragoons Levenehr
| 779
| -
| 4
| 1
| 14
| -
| 5
| 1
| 23
| 58
| Dragoons Karacsaj
| 882
| -
| 4
| -
| 30
| -
| 2
| -
| 36
| 69
| K.K. 5th Hussar
| 800 ??
| -
| 6
| 1
| 12
| 1
| 2
| 2
| 20
| 28
| GHQ Staff
|
| -
| -
| 3
| -
| -
| -
| 3
| -
|
| Reserve artillery
| -
| -
| 8
| -
| 31
| -
| -
| -
| 39
| 29
| Left wing totals
|
| 18
| 889
| 162
| 3636
| 24
| 1320
| 204
| 5745
| 211
The heaviest losses were those of the Deutschmeister, which was at
the first battle after its reorganization. Some other units finished
the battle so battered, that they were retired from the army. The Oguliner
i.e. were escorted to Bologna for a lomg period of rest and reorganization.
Comments about the Battle
Jomini was often very generous with Suvorov, otherwise …:
“Encore que l’avantage de cette journée, dit-il,
soit resté aux Austro-Russes, la gloire en est incontestablement
partagée par les Français, qui combattirent pendant
huit heures, à chances égales, avec 36 000 hommes
contre 45 000 ( car, dans l’armée Austro-Russe, il
ne faut comprendre le corps de Rosemberg, qui n’arrivât
de Tortone à Pozzolo-Formigaro que dans la nuit et ne prit
par conséquent aucune part à l’affaire). Cette
journée prouvât, au reste, que la bonté des
troupes et une volonté bien déterminé de leur
général, peuvent, quelquefois, suppléer à une
vice de combinaison. Il n’y pas eut, à
Novi, du côté des Austro-Russes, de véritables
manoeuvres que celle opérée vers la fin du jour par
la réserve de Mêlas. Le reste de leurs attaques ne fut
qu’une série de chocs meurtriers, exécutés
sans simultanéité.”
Only a succession of frontal, deadly and unuseful attacks was the
Suvorov’s glory, with the outnumbered French well defending the
heights. Jomini criticized the delayed employment of the Mélas
left wing and a bad use of reserves.
“On ne saurait compter, cette victoire, au nombre des plus
beaux fait d’armes de Souvorov. Sa droite, engagée
trois heures avant son centre et huit heures avant sa gauche, aurait
eu tout le temps d’être écrasée; et il
faut dire que si elle ne le fut pas, la mort de Joubert en fut
la cause. Les gens de l’art s’étonnèrent
avec raison qu’un général aussi expérimenté que
Souvorov eut laissé, dans une circonstance semblable, 6000
hommes inactif à Spinetta [xiii] et 10 000 devant Tortone,
cela afin de contenir une garnison de 1200 Français.”
And these last words of Jomini were the same comments of Clausewitz.
In his report to the War Minister, Moreau, so justified the defeat.
First: the outnumbering enemy:
“Beaucoup de motifs ont déterminé la perte
de cette bataille ; d'abord la disproportion des forces ennemies,
qui excédaient les nôtres d'un tiers en infanterie
et de trois quarts en cavalerie.”
Second: the bad Joubert deployment:
“Nous occupions un champ de bataille d'où
nous devions marcher à l'ennemi, et où nous ne devions
pas recevoir le combat. Son immense étendue, qui cependant
ne nous donnait que deux défilés pour nous retirer,
et son appui de droite, qui était le fort de Serravalle, occupé par
l'ennemi; le général en chef avait parfaitement senti
tous ces inconvéniens, et je ne doute pas qu'il n'eut fait
reprendre dés le soir même les anciennes positions,
si l'ennemi lui en avait donné le temps.”
Third: the impossibility to make use of the French defensive successes.
“Nous avions encore un désavantage sensible en combattant,
c'était de ne pas pouvoir profiter de nos succés.
L'ennemi repoussé
ne pouvait ètre rompu; il courait se reformer dans la plaine,
où nous ne pouvions le poursuivre à l'abri de sa cavalerie,
et recommençait ses attaques dès qu’il était
reformé.”
And, least: the “comprehensible” fatigue of the own troops,
which caused also the use of Austrian prisoners to carry the wounded
to Genoa:
“Il a fallu de la part de nos troupes un courage plus qu’humain
pour soutenir dans cette position plus de douze heures de combat,
sans avoir eu le temps de manger. Je suis persuadé que si
la fatigue ne les avait pas empechés de se porter derrière
notre droite avec la rapidité que la marche de l'ennemi
exigeait, on aurait pu arrêter ses progres; mais les soldats
et officiers tombaient de lassitude. Nous avons remporté tous
nos blessés à Gênes, quoique sans moyens de
transports. Les prisonniers nous ont été pour cela
d'une grande utilité.”
Notes:
[i] Gachot, at this point, criticized Grouchy for not
having had the courage to advance with his artillery, destroying the
enemy blocked battalions and, then, attacking the Suvorov’s right
flank, then when Watrin was assaulting the Russian left side. Gachot
said this could have granted a complete French victory, with the Russian
closed in a pincher manoeuver. Maybe he forgot the 2nd Kray line was
deployed with the Reserve batteries, between Grouchy and Suvorov.
[ii] What happened to Partounneaux was exactly what
Suvorov had in mind. Probably the Russain Chief delayed the Russian
Central attack, hoping the pushes of GGeneral Kray could force the
French to descend into the plains and fight under the crossed fire
of the Austro-Russian batteries and under the Coalition cavalry attacks.
[iii] As Stutterheim told, Mélas moved away
from his camp at 11:00 a.m. Without orders. It is a reliable hypothesis
as, like said by Miliutin, Suvorov sent his orders around midday. In
this case, having waited for Suvorov’s orders, Mélas could
not have reached Novi between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m.. Russian sources claimed
Mélas received the 12.00 noon. order of the Commander-in-Chief
but the report of general Nobili said they moved away from Rivalta
at 9:00 a.m. and General Lusignan said they reached the Novi battlefield
at 2.00 p.m. So there is a complete confusion about what were the orders
for Mélas and about when he received the march order from the
Headquarters. It is sure only that the Austrian general began to move
after having received an order to do so.
[iv] Wounded during the clash, Count Morzin was promoted
to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Later he will die at Turin for the
wounds suffered.
[v] Baron von Wrede listed only Grenadier Battalions
Wouwermanns, Soudain and Neny as participating at a Novi battle (it
was probably the 2nd Novi which occurred later). Many Austrian grenadiers
battalions distinguished themselves in the August battle. Battalion
Schiaffinati charged a slope uphill and seized the crest with the bayonets;
Battalions Weber, Paar, and Pértussy attacked successfully the
position of Castel Dragone in front of Novi.
[vi] Actually Nobili had repulsed the weak French outposts
of Cassano Spinola and Stazzano, forcing Dąbrowsky to retreat
toward Gavi. This event opened a large gap at the French right, where
Mélas sent his grenadiers.
[vii] Some French sources (not Gachot) said the
1st Cisalpine entered the battle with the Poles but in the afternoon
was sent at front to fill the gap between Laboissière and Watrin,
having the originally deployed French units marched westward to support
the defense against Bagration. So “à Paris” the
rout of the Cisalpines was the cause of the first breach (in the French
right wing). Alessandro Zanoli (see bibliography), an actual witness,
negates the direct intervention of the 1st Cisalpine in the battle,
telling it was with Dąbrowsky at the Serravalle blockade (where
they had some wounded men among whom was Captain Carlo Vandoni, shot
in the mouth), and that it participated only at some small clash during
the August retreat at Voltaggio, Rossiglione and Campofreddo. As for
the Cisalpine historian Zanoli the single Cisalpine, who took part
in the battle, was the adjudant-général Giuseppe Fantuzzi,
attache to the Joubert’s Staff. Unfortunately the best italian
reference book upon the Cisalpine troops (Ilari-Crociani-Paoletti),
prudently, makes a brilliant jump over Novi and doesn’t speak
at all about that bloody battle. Interesting puzzle.
[viii] In effect being made prisoners by the Austrians
was the lesser evil. Many sources concorded the Russians did not take
prisoners at all, like, the Austrians correctly did.
[ix] Thiebault did not great
criticism against Moreau, but was very harsh with Pèrignon and
Grouchy. He said also: “La bataille de Novi était perdue.
Je passe sur les fautes qui en déterminèrent l'issue
et notamment sur cette incroyable impéritie d'un commandant
de la gauche qui engouffra son artillerie (vingt pièces environ)
dans un ravin, au lieu de lui faire suivre les hauteurs; de sorte qu'il
suffit à un seul tirailleur autrichien de tuer les chevaux de
la première de ces pièces pour qu'elles fussent toutes
arrêtées, dans l'impossibilité de se sauver et
fatalement prises”. Et voilà, 20 guns lost
for a stupid march order … a Guinness record. But only if the
Thiebault account could be considered totally reliable.
[x] The “tale” of
the three
“smart” generals is also denied from the acts of the 68th
Line Demi-Brigade. An excerpt from the “Etat de Service” of
chef Boutrouë told: “At the Novi battle, 28 thermidor
an VII, le chef-de-brigade, chargé de soutenir la retraite avec
son 1er bataillon, fut enveloppé de toutes partes et séparé du
reste de l’armée. Il ne cessa de donner l’exemple
de courage le plus intrépide, comme celui du dévouement
le plus héroique”. In the letters of the chef-de-brigade
it is said that Colli was taken prisoner with Boutrouë and that
the French 68th fought at Pasturana till the 21 PM.(et s'y maintint
jusqu'à
neuf heures), when Bagration fell on their back and Colli was
severely wounded.
[xi] As for Gachot, at Pasturana was also a Battalion
of the 74th Demi-Brigade and some (40) artillerymen (artillerie à cheval).
The two infantry Battalions, at 21 PM, remained with only 30 men (each
Battalion) the others being dead, wounded or escaped. With general
Colli, was taken prisoner also another Piedmontese republican officer,
adjudant-chef-de-brigade Francesco Federico Campana.
[xii] The Regimental history of the Regiment of Vienna
(IR 4th Line) gave these losses: dead 122 (among these were the Fähnrich
Josef Andrée and Ferdinand von Führer); wounded 427 men,
missing and prisoners 210 men. This meant a total of 579 men, a number
higher than the official report. They gave also the losses of the grenadiers
in the ranks of Hohenfeld Battalion, which had only a support task:
7 dead, 23 wounded. These heavy losses occurred mainly during the 9
AM attacks.
[xiii] Spinetto Scrivia
(noA).
Placed on the Napoleon Series: March 2009
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