The Campaign of 1814: Chapter 8, Part III
By: Maurice Weil
__________________
THE CAMPAIGN of 1814
(after the Imperial and Royal War Archives at Vienna)
________________
CAVALRY OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814.
__________
CHAPTER VIII.
OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY SILESIA IN THE VALLEY OF THE MARNE,
3 TO 16 February
1814.
___________
LA CHAUSÉE, MONTMIRAIL, VAUCHAMPS, CHAMPAUBERT.
Deployment
of the corps of Sacken. --Battle of Montmirail. --At 11 o'clock in
the morning, the skirmishers engaged. Sacken, notwithstanding the entreaties
of his generals who had begged to take a position north of the road from La Ferté
and reconcile the front combat troops with those of Yorck and the road from Château-Thierry,
on the contrary, held to deploying his troops south of the road and ordered the
6th Russian infantry corps (General Lieutenant Scherbatov) to move right
on Marchais-en-Brie and to support the advanced troops. A battery of 36 pieces
took position behind the ravine of Rut-Choisel, which covered the position of L'Épine-au-Bois,
the center of Russian lines. Another battery stood at the center of the Russian
line, north of L'Épine-aux-Bois. To the left of the main road north of La
Haute- Épine, the cavalry of Vasilchikov and Karpov was to support a battery charged
with holding under its fire the woods in front of the Plénois Farm and to seek
to link its left with the Prussian cavalry of General von Jürgass. The IIIrd Infantry Corps (General Lieven) was in reserve behind the L'Épine-aux-Bois.
Sacken, deciding to take Marchais that the French had come to occupy and to
debouch on Montmirail by the valley of Petit-Morin, entrusted the attack on the
village to General Heidenreich, whom he had given four battalions from the
Pskov, Vladimir, Tambov and Kostroma Regiments, two companies of eiger, the
Cossack regiment of Lukovkin and six guns. This column, having on its left its
battery, which had stopped at the edge of the ravine, on its right the Cossacks,
marched briskly on Marchais[1],
under the protection of Russian batteries to which the French artillery, too
weak, responded feebly, and managed to get beyond Courmont. The Emperor, who
was waiting for the entry in the line of Mortier, had planned with his right
hand movement by which he hoped to cut communications between Sacken and Yorck
and to engage the troops that he still had in reserve, charged General Ricard
at noon, who he had sent temporarily to be under the command of Ney, to move
from Tremblay on Marchais, while General Friant, made available by the arrival
of Mortier, would occupy Le Tremblay, while the rest of the 1st Division of the Old Guard and Reserve Cavalry of Nansouty maneuvered on the
left of the Russians.
"No undulation in terrain," General Ricard said in his report to Marmont,[2] "was
even found on this part of the plateau in the interval between Le Tremblay and Marchais
which made the scene of battle very long, very obstinate and very deadly. This
point, which formed the extreme left of the French army, was very important
because it was used to pivot and masked the great movement that the Emperor was
preparing with his right. They attacked and took the village up to five times;
we had officers who fought hand to hand with Russian officers, but we could
never maintain our hold there because of the enormous superiority of the enemy
forces, that were continually reinforced with fresh troops, while we
successively engaged all of the bodies of my division. Even the village of
Tremblay was being compromised, when the Emperor, at my request, sent me a
battalion of the Old Guard. Upon arrival, I tried a last effort which was no
more successful than the others. One of my brigade generals was wounded, the
other dismounted, all the chiefs killed or wounded, more than 60 officers were
out of action and the ranks exhausted. However, this last movement was, like
the others, remarkable for the spirit and intrepidity of the troops."
He was then nearly two o'clock. The Emperor, alarmed at the progress of the right
of Sacken had ordered Marshal Ney, to the right covered by the cavalry of Nansouty
and reinforced by a part of the Friant Division and seven squadrons of Guards
of Honor of General de France, to move just in front of La Meulière, falling
back against L'Épine-aux-Bois and to shake up the first two lines of Sacken. The
Prince of Moskowa, taking advantage of the terrain and enjoying the
overextension of the front of Sacken who had weakened his left to strengthen
the attack on Marchais, stove in and broke the first line of the Russians,
forcing the Russian batteries to cease fire and forced Sacken to send to L'Épine-aux-Bois
the corps, hitherto held in reserve, of Lieven, whose arrival momentarily
restored the fight.
North of the road, the cavalry of Vasilchikov had managed to stop the progress
of the horsemen of Nansouty and connect its left with the Prussian cavalry. But
General Guyot, at that time sent by the Emperor, charged with four service squadrons
of, debouching from La Haute-l'Épine and crushing the battalions who tried to
cross the road to La Ferté, while General Friant took La Haute-l'Épine which Sacken
had had the imprudence to strip. At this time, the Russian center was already
shaken; but to the right, Marchais was still under the control of generals Bernodossov
and Heidenreich.
Schack made Yorck aware of the reasons for which Sacken had continued to engage
and the dispositions for he had taken. Foreseeing the unfavorable outcome from
having a battle fought under such conditions, the commander of the Ist Corps had immediately turned back his heavy batteries that could not take the
rutted roads and had returned with the brigade of Prince William of Prussia, to
Château-Thierry. Always cautious and methodical, he was all the more so in
assuring possession of this only line of retreat, he feared to see on one hand Macdonald
coming silently behind him and on the other hand on his right, the French
troops sorties from Soissons preventing crossing back to the right bank of the
Marne. As for his other two brigades (Pirch II and Horn), they were directed from
Viffort on Fontenelle. But the roads were so bumpy that the head of his column
(Pirch Brigade) did not debouch at the level of Fontenelle until 3:30, where
Ney made his movement and began his attack on L'Épine-aux-Bois and where the
French cavalry, extending to his right, was trying to win the road to
Château-Thierry. Katzler's cavalry had already deployed between Rozoy-Bellevalle
and Fontenelle-en-Brie, and the cavalry reserve did the same between Fontenelle
and Les Tourneux.
When Yorck arrived at Fontenelle, Sacken had engaged everyone he had and lost
all La Haute-l'Épine. His left was in disarray; his shaken center still
opposing with a desperate but useless resistance. It was no longer to restore
an irremediably compromised situation, but to disengage the Russian corps while
there was still time. Orders were therefore given to the Pirch Brigade to take
position at Les Tourneux; to the Horn Brigade to form to the right, from Les
Tourneux to Fontenelle; to the artillery (12 pieces) to be placed in battery between
these brigades.[3] It was all the more urgent to act and act quickly as the heroic impassibility and
unshakeable strength of the exposed Russian troops was to be completely exposed
by the French.
While the left of Sacken, driven from their positions, were trying to reach Yorck,
while the cavalry of General Guyot charged, the right continued to hold fast to
Marchais and support the fight without worrying about what was going on with the
rest of the battlefield.
To facilitate the retreat of the Russian troops that the French cavalry had handled
roughly, ultimately to disengage the defenders of Marchais, who had been too
slow to get the order to fall back, Yorck brought the brigade of Pirch ahead of
Les Tourneux and prescribed it to stop and throw back if it could the division of
Michel that Mortier had established on the side of Plénois. On his part,
Napoleon decided to end the resistance of Marchais, sending to the division of
Ricard a reinforcement of four battalions of the Guard led by Marshal Lefebvre
and General Bertrand. "The debris of my division having an hour's rest,
were united in a column;" said General Ricard, "everything went to
the village to cries of: Vive l'Empereur! without firing a shot. The
enemy was thrown out and tumbled into ravines and woods that were behind; killing
a lot of people, we proceeded with bayonets in the kidneys; taking over 500 to
600 prisoners." General Ricard forgot to say that the Guards of Honor of
General de France, debouching to the rear of the Russians had cut off their
retreat and had stove in their squares. It is true as Scherbatov claims, on
the contrary, in his Journal that the defenders of Marchais succeeded,
for the most part, to emerge and owed their salvation to two squadrons of Akhtyrka
Hussars who charged the Guards of Honor , stopped them and prevented them from
worrying the retreating Russian squares. The Pirch Brigade was therefore
unnecessarily dedicated to advancing from Les Tourneux to Plénois and Bailly to
save Marchais. After a brisk engagement, Michel's infantry, supported by some
squadrons of Nansouty, flowed over the left of the Prussians, and drove them
from the wood of Blanchet, despite the entry into the line of the Horn Brigade,
throwing them back on Fontenelle. The night ended the battle.
The intervention of the Prussian brigades had nevertheless saved the remnants
of Sacken and allowed the Russians to win the road from Château-Thierry; but
this fight, however short it had been, had cost the Ist Corps 31
officers and 854 men that the 1st Brigade had to leave on the field.
The Russians had lost in the day six flags, 13 cannons and 2,800 men,
including 800 prisoners.[4]
The French, whose losses amounted to 2,000 men, exhausted by the efforts of two
consecutive battles and spent by marches whose speed and difficulty were unheard
of, bivouacked at 8 o'clock at night on the conquered positions and renounced pursuit.
Positions of the corps of Sacken and Yorck on the night of February 11th to 12th. --The debris of Sacken's corps, covered by the cavalry
Vasilchikov, marched all night through rain and arrived in the day at Viffort. Despite
all the efforts of men and although it was hitched up to 50 horses from the
cavalry of Vasilchikov to each piece, it had, however, to leave 8 in the
potholes of the road.[5]
The cavalry of General Katzler stood during the night of the 11th to
12th between Les Tourneux and Fontenelle; the 1st and the
7th Brigades, under the command of Horn,[6] retreated
at midnight on Viffort to attempt to collect the reserve cavalry of General von
Jürgass. This cavalry, after resting part of the night in the presence of the
French outposts, took a side road that joins the road from Château-Thierry
behind Viffort and arrived at Les Noues at 12 in the morning. Prince William
of Prussia, established with his brigade at Château-Thierry, guarded the
debouchments from the roads of Soissons and of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. His artillery
and the reserve artillery were in battery on the right bank, the bulk of his
infantry in position on the left bank, in front of the city, scouting in all
directions with the 2nd Hussar Regiment (regiment the corps).
Order of Blücher. --It was in an isolated house on the road between
Fontenelle and Viffort where Yorck, concerned about the probable consequences
of the combat at Montmirail, had spent the night in order to be closer to his
rear, that Count Brandenburg joined him.
After leaving the headquarters of Blücher, he had found the French on the road from
Montmirail to Vertus and had
had to remove himself to a side road leading to Orbais to bring the order in
which the Field Marshal joined the corps of Sacken and Yorck, to recross the
Marne to the right bank and retreat hastily on Reims, the rallying point of the
Army of Silesia.[7] Such an order arriving at such a time, should have had an affect easy to
predict from a man of Yorck's character. Sacken not only refused to withdraw
to the right bank, while it was still possible to avoid a fight, but instead
deploying north of the highway of Montmirail, he was too far from the Ist Corps to attempt a movement with his right. His obstinacy forced him to
commit Yorck, and when this intervention had forced upon him a cost of nearly a
thousand men, the Prussian general was ordered to try to perform an operation
the next day he wanted to do the day before and then could have done without
difficulty, even by the left bank of the Marne, on Épernay, if the Russian
general had agreed to answer his observations and his prayers. These
complaints were too numerous and too serious for a man of the caliber of Yorck to
forget and forgive.
Macdonald at Meaux. --Forced, by the natural depletion of forces which,
for several days, he had asked so much effort, to give up the immediate and
active pursuit which would have brought significant results, the Emperor had halted,
however this time without too many regrets. He hoped, indeed, that the
immediate arrival of a reinforcement and especially the appearance of Marshal
Macdonald in the rear and on the sides of the corps he had to fight, would
complete the rout and destruction.
Unaware that earlier as a precaution, the Duke of Tarente[8] blew up the
bridge at Trilport, the Emperor, during the battle of Montmirail, had sent to him,
at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, to march with everyone he could find at Meaux to
join him. The Marshal, compelled to admit that the destruction of the bridge
prevented him from debouching at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre announced that, given
the lack of roads, he would march by the morning of the 12th by Coulommiers
and La Ferté-Gaucher on Montmirail.[9] Sick and bedridden, Macdonald had also relinquished on the 11th,
the command of his troops to General Sebastiani, who had concentrated on La Ferté-sous-Jouarre
instead of going to La Ferté-Gaucher.
The Emperor, however, was joined on the 11th, at 11 o'clock at night,
by the Young Guard of General Curial. The cavalry brought him by General
Saint-Germain (about 2,400 horses), during the day had skirmishes with the
Cossacks of the extreme rearguard of Sacken, had followed and only arrived in
the evening of the 11th near La Ferté-sous-Jouarre where that
General awaited orders.
Blücher, with the corps of Kleist and Kapsewitch remains motionless at
Bergères. --The 11th in the morning, Blücher was at Bergères. The
corps of Kleist and Kapsewitch, recalled from Fère-Champenoise, having arrived
early in the morning after a painful and unnecessary night march, had remained
there since. The 1st Silesian Hussars, East Prussian Cuirassiers
and the 7th Landwehr Cavalry provided outposts on the side of the
Étoges occupied by Marmont. A party of Prussian cavalry, stationed at
Morains-le-Petit, sent patrols to the side of Broussy-le-Grand and Fère-Champenoise.
But, although he had heard from Bergères the cannons from Montmirail, Blücher
remained motionless and did not attempt any demonstration against the troops of
the Duke of Raguse.[10] The Emperor was so astonished by this immobility, so opposite to the character
of Blücher, that he only believed him no longer at Vertus and thought he had
retired on Épernay or Châlons.[11] The inaction of Blücher had also worried Marmont who, to determine for himself
the exact force of troops of the Field Marshal, had charged the evening of the 11th evening, an officer to reconnoiter the position of the Field Marshal. This
officer had managed to advance enough to see a steady line of fires and
followed, extending from Vertus to beyond Bergères forward and covered by other
lights that revealed to him the location of the outposts. The report confirmed
the information that the cavalry had already given to the Duke of Raguse and
which signaled the presence of the Prussian cavalry with cannon on the main
road in front of Bergères. Marmont, who still did not know at this time the
outcome of the combat at Montmirail, since his dispatch is the 12th,
at 1:30 in the morning, but who knew that the enemy was in force two and a half
leagues from Étoges, added: "It is urgent that His Majesty provides for
circumstances where we would be attacked and or we would need to be
supported."[12]
12 February 1814. --Blücher continues to remain at Bergères. --Prussian
reconnaissance towards Montmort-Lucy. --But Blücher had not yet considered attacking
the Duke of Raguse. He only had news except from Yorck through a note written
before the battle of Montmirail, was a hint: the cannon rumble during the day of the 11th, then the morning of the 12th;
but he hoped that Napoleon, happy with some success against the corps of the Army
of Silesia, would immediately turn against the Great Army and he expected to see
the troops stationed in Étoges mimic his movement and withdraw. A rather
insignificant fact seemed to confirm the assumptions of Field Marshal. As
outposts had reported a movement executed by some French troops from Étoges on Montmirail,
Major von Watzdorf, aide-de-camp of Kleist, was sent from Bergères, with 50
hussars followed by two companies. The major was ordered to see if the enemy
made a movement towards Épernay, to occupy, if practicable Montmort and to
ascertain whether the enemy was not looking on extending its left through the
woods of Vertus to outflank the position of the Field Marshal. But the
reconnaissance came at Loisy-en-Brie against the French outposts whose chain
extended to Chaltrait-aux-Bois. Knowing now that the French monitored the
route of Épernay Watzdorf contented himself with sending a few scouts to Avize
and to Épernay to get news and communicate with the flying corps of Colomb and Lützow
which should have pushed to Épernay. Another reconnaissance made by Count
Nostitz with a cavalry regiment of Silesian landwehr on the entire line of
French outposts did, however, allow Blücher to see that he only had before him
the small corps of Marmont.[13]
Having with him only three weak regiments of cavalry, Blücher,
devoured by anxiety, had to resign himself to immobility, to an inaction which
he could only depart from in knowing the reason, that as soon as he received positive
news of his lieutenants, as soon as he was informed of the results of their
operations and the direction they had taken their corps.
Battles of Les Caquerets and Château-Thierry. --The
12th in the morning, the corps of Sacken continued its retreat on
Château-Thierry. The 1st and 7th Prussian Brigades,
formed by two lines of battalions in mass, away from the deployment, to the right
and to the left of the road, on the height of Noues, covered before their front
with their skirmishers and flanked by their cavalry were charged to cover the
movement. They were supported by the cavalry reserve in battle formation not
far behind. A brigade of Russian infantry and the cavalry of Sacken were not
slow to take a stand at some distance from the cavalry of General von Jürgass.
From daybreak, the French outposts had begun to push
Katzler, who retreated slowly and going beyond Viffort came to form on the
height of Les Caquerets while his skirmishers were still at Viffort.
At 9 o'clock in the morning, the French army had resumed
its two columns: one headed by Mortier (Colbert and Christiani Divisions), marched
through Fontenelle on Château-Thierry, following the column of General von
Katzler; the other, under the orders of the Emperor himself, advanced first by
road from La Ferté, to fall back on the right, between La Haute Épine and
Viels-Maisons, by Rozoy on Montfaucon and Essises. Ricard's division, greatly
reduced by the losses sustained in Marchais, was left at Montmirail; General
Friant and the cavalry of Saint-Germain, who had just joined, remained at Viels-Maisons.
Katzler always held his positions of Les Caquerets well, containing
the skirmishers of column of Mortier which, moreover, did not seek to gain
ground in front. It seemed obvious that the French wanted to distract and
occupy their opponent on his front to outflank its wings. As soon as the
Prussian general saw the French columns, he withdrew behind the heights
occupied by the Horn Brigade and then on the order of Yorck, Château-Thierry
and the right bank of the Marne.
Still, at that time, a fight could have been avoided whose
outcome was not in doubt. The French infantry was just beginning to deploy and
the cavalry had not yet set off on its movement against the flanks. This is
what Yorck wanted to do; but, even though Sacken had recognized the need for forcefully
recrossing onto the right bank, he could not resign himself to sacrifice
luggage and convoys, and ultimately Yorck decided to hold onto the plateau. The
bulk of the Russian force had gone to Château-Thierry to relieve the brigade of
Prince William, to enable him to take position on the heights of the road to
Soissons and serve to support the Prussian brigades during the final retreat;
the Russian cavalry was responsible for covering the left flank of the Ist Corps.
But during this time, the two columns, that the French had
directed against the wings of the Ist Corps had gained ground; their
skirmishers had found a way to move forward to cover, thus facilitating the
deployment and progress of the main body, and had obliged Yorck, to force his
two brigades back to a second position behind the ravine and the farm of the
Trinité, where the buildings, strongly occupied by the infantry, served as a
fulcrum to his left; to his right rested a small wood. The Prussian cavalry of
Jürgass held behind the infantry was deployed on the right before Nesles; the
Russian cavalry, supported by a few battalions of jäger, was formed at roughly the
same level, to the left of the farm of Petit-Balloy.
The Prussian brigades were to take a position, when there
quickly appeared on the left, a large mass of French cavalry (the divisions of Colbert,
de France, Laferrière, Lefebvre-Desnouettes, led by Marshal Ney), maneuvering
to outflank the position and cut off the troops stationed on the plateau from the
road from Château-Thierry in passing behind the farm of Grand-Balloy. "I
noticed this movement," said General von Jürgass[14] "directing, the cavalry of the landwehr to this side and
placing the brigade of dragoons platoons to left, when I received strict
orders to stay put, because our left was sufficiently protected by the Russian
cavalry. The enemy was already on the heights in front of us, crushing with its
fire the retreating troops of General von Horn. I had just set in motion to
return to my earlier position when Major von Brandenburg brought me the orders
to move without delay to the left wing that was increasingly threatened by the
enemy cavalry."
The Russian cavalry, with the exception of Smolensk
regiment of dragoons, had indeed fallen back, exposing the left wing that only
had coverage from the cavalry attached to the brigade of Horn, the Brandenburg
Hussars, of Lieutenant-Colonel von Sohr. Before the Prussian dragoons had time
to deploy, the 10th Hussars, which preceded the French cavalry,
threw itself on the landwehr cavalry and was on the verge of overrunning them
when the timely intervention of Brandenburg Hussars forced it to retreat to the
mass of the French cavalry that was coming now at a trot, the Guard Dragoons in
the front line, the cuirassiers and horse grenadiers in the second.
Although the Lithuanian Dragoons had for a moment managed
to control the French first line, all the Prussian cavalry could not constrain
the withdraw of the Russian cavalry. But this cavalry, which had taken
position, made a half turn and leaving the plateau without a fight, descended
into the valley. The French cavalry, after having mauled the Smolensk Dragoons
and pushed a new general charge of all the Prussian cavalry, was master of the
plateau overlooking the valley of the Marne,[15] and from the top of which it saw at its feet crammed into the
valley and hurrying to the city, the disordered debris of both the Sacken and
Yorck corps. Abandoned by the cavalry, overwhelmed on their left, driven on
their front by the French infantry, threatened on their right by the French
squadrons coming from Nogentel, having only the Brandenburg Hussars to support
whose leader had refused to separate from the brigade to which he was attached,
the remains of two Prussian brigades seemed lost. The good provisions of Horn
and the dedication of Sohr[16] would however allow the left of
this troop to get to Château-Thierry despite incessant charges of the French
cavalry. Prussian troops of the right wing and General Heidenreich. with the
Tambov (Тамбов) and Kostroma Regiments, were less happy. Outflanked by the
service squadrons led by Belliard, exposed by their skirmishers by searching in
the brush and bushes, the squares were broken, slashed and crushed. The battalions
that Yorck had sent out from Château-Thierry were forced to retreat before the
French infantry, and General Heidenreich, now judging further resistance
useless, was forced to lay down their arms with the few people who remained.
The debris of the corps of Yorck and Sacken were thrown
back into Château-Thierry and the rear guard was followed so quickly on the
side of Nogentel by the cavalry, on the side of Étampes by the infantry, whose
skirmishers filled the houses and the left bank, that in order to ensure the
breaking up of the bridges and to prevent the French from extinguishing the
fire lit at the last moment on the arch to summarily repaired the stone bridge,
the battery of 12 that had been established the heights of the right bank had
to open fire and continue to fire while the troops of the Ist Corps
quickly continued their retreat in the direction of Soissons.
The Prussians lost in battles of the 12th, 22 officers, 1229 men, 6 cannons
and some of their baggage; the Russians, 1500 men, 3 cannons and almost all of
their equipment. The day had hardly cost the French 500 to 600 men. Nothing
would have escaped if, as the Emperor had hoped and as he had ordered,
Macdonald could have debouched in time at Château-Thierry, while the French
cavalry crushed the Russians and Prussians on the plateau of Nesles.
Retirement of Yorck and Sacken towards Soissons. --Yorck[17] did not
pause long on the heights of the right bank of the Marne. Expecting to be
pursued by the Emperor, he immediately had Prince William of Prussia[18] who had
arrived at midnight in Oulchy-le-Château with the 8th Brigade and
the artillery reserve, to file off followed at a few hours interval by the
corps of Yorck and Sacken. A part of the 2nd Hussars of the corps
was still in Montreuil-aux-Lions, watching La Ferté-sous-Jouarre; the rest of
the regiment flanked the march and established themselves in the evening at
Vaux-sous-Coulombs, with vedettes in Crouy-sur-Ourcq. The Cossacks of Karpov
remained alone near the right bank of the Marne, at Château-Thierry, while the
French cavalry scouts pushed to Dormans.
13 February 1814. --Yorck and Sacken continue their retreat. --Yorck
and Sacken had continued their retreat almost without stopping.
Prince William of Prussia noticed at Oulchy-le-Château, that a cross-road,
practicable even for artillery, led by Mareuil-en-Dole to Fismes, where it
joined the main road from Mézières to Reims, considerably shortening the march
executed, first of Soissons and from there on Reims. He immediately informed Yorck
and went on to Mareuil as soon as he received the requested authorization. Yorck
followed the same route, and passing through Cramaille and Saponay, Mareuil and
Mont-Saint-Martin, he established in the evening of the 13th, his
headquarters in Fismes. General von Jürgass, with two regiments of dragoons and
some battalions of the brigade of Prince William of Prussia, covered his left
to Soissons, pushed up to Hartennes-et-Taux and joined in the evening the main
body established at Ville-Savoye. Some parties of cavalry were sent to the
right in the direction of Épernay.
The corps of Sacken, after following one of the columns of Yorck to Saponay,
reached Fère-en-Tardenois, where it was joined by the Cossacks of Karpov. These
horsemen had abandoned the right bank of the Marne at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon, when the French troops had succeeded in crossing the river, and they
informed Sacken they had heard cannons in the direction of Montmirail .
Each of these movements was reported to Emperor.[19] The
prestige attached to his person, the ascendancy that his presence exercised
over the masses was such that the population of Château-Thierry, forgetting the
violence that it had been the victim, received a liberator, pressed around him
and acclaimed. Everyone worked to restore the bridge and graced by boats
brought by residents even under fire by last Allied troops, they succeeded, after
ferrying all night and all morning to cross a few companies that swept the
right bank and threw Karpov onto the extreme Russian rearguard established at
Chesneaux.
Marshal Mortier follows the retreating corps. --Despite the zeal of the
people, despite their dedicated support and the feverish activity deployed by
the soldiers, the bridge was only restored in the afternoon.
Marshal Mortier, could only cross the bridge with the cavalry of generals de
France and Colbert and Christiani's division at 4 o'clock, stopping in the
evening at Rocourt-Saint-Martin, six kilometers from Oulchy-le-Château.[20]
Orders of the Emperor. --The 13th in the morning, the
Emperor still ignoring the movements of the Great Army of Bohemia, believing
Nogent still held and Blücher had retired on Épernay or on Châlons, ordered at
10 o'clock, General Ricard to turn to join Marshal Marmont. Marshal Macdonald
was to gather as one, under the title 11th Corps, the troops of the
5th and 11th Corps, and stand ready to march with the corps,
reinforced by the division of National Guards forming at Meaux.[21]
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the Emperor received the news from the Seine and
the Yonne. The movement of the great Allied army forced him to abandon his
first projects. Dealing with all at once, sending orders to Soissons, to Montereau
and to Paris, he prescribed Macdonald to concentrate at Montereau, where he
wanted to gather on the 15th, an army of 27,000 men and 10,000
horses;[22] to Saint-Germain, directed by Coulommiers on Nangis; to the Duke of Trévise, to
pursue the enemy and call the people to arms. The Guard alone remained in
place. But serious events would prevent the Emperor to move in person, from the
13th to save Marshals Oudinot and Victor, as he planned.
The Battle of Étoges. --Marmont at Fromentières. --The 13th in the morning, a dispatch from Marmont (sent from Étoges at 4 o'clock in the
morning) made known the reasons for the Duke of Raguse, having with him 2,500
men and 1,800 horses, lacking ammunition for the infantry, decided to stay at Étoges
and believed it foolhardy to throw a handful of men on the superior forces of
his opponent whose concentration at Bergères had been reported by his outposts.
The immobility of the marshal had increasingly led Blücher to believe and that
the lack of cavalry made it impossible to confirm, that the Duke of Raguse was
tasked to mask the march of the Emperor towards Sézanne and his movement to the
Seine. The news he received from Yorck and which informed him of the events of
Montmirail and the resolution taken by the two generals to withdraw on Château-Thierry,
also convinced him in his assumptions and his resolution to attack Marmont, a
resolution he had taken the evening of the 12th. Blücher still
hoped to fall on the rear of Napoleon debouching at Montmirail.
Joined around 7 o'clock in the morning at Bergères by the cavalry brigade of
Colonel Count von Haack (Silesian Cuirassiers and the 8th Silesian Landwehr
Cavalry and two horse batteries) that was destined to form his rear guard, the
advanced guard of General von Zieten left at 9 o'clock. Colonel von Blücher
(son of the Field Marshal) formed the tip with the 1st Silesian Hussar
Regiment, the Cossacks, a battalion of fusiliers and 4 pieces. The bulk of
this vanguard, under the orders of Zieten, consisted of the East Prussian
Cuirassiers, a 160 horses of the 7th Landwehr Cavalry, the 11th Infantry Brigade and 4 pieces, in all 2,000 men and 700 horses who had for
support 3,000 men of Russian infantry. Behind them came the corps of Kleist
and Kapsewitch marching one by the main road, the other by Soulières. The
debris of Olsufiev's corps, about 1800 men, under General Udom, remained
temporarily at Bergères.
Near 12:30, Marmont, posted on the plateau Étoges and having extended his left
for better observation, saw the head of the column of Blücher. The advanced guard
of the Field Marshal tried to outflank the left of the marshal and came against
the post he had established at La Charmoye, while the tip of the Prussian vanguard
continued to bear right on Étoges. Once the deployment was completed, Marmont,
who was able to recognize the numerical superiority of his opponent, who had
already prepared everything for his retrograde movement, made his retreat in
good order, but not without having exchanged a few shots with the advanced
guard. After a few insignificant engagements between the cavalry and infantry of
the extreme rear guard, he withdrew, first on Champaubert, then Fromentières. The
arrival at Vauchamps of the weak division of General Ricard[23] (800 men),
brought his total to 3,300 men. From 7 o'clock in the evening, he informed the
Chief of Staff of these events and warned that if, according to information he had
gotten, the Field Marshal took a position with the bulk of his forces before
Étoges he would go on the 14th, early, to establish at Montmirail.[24]
The 13th in the evening, while Marmont's troops had been established
between Fromentières and Janvilliers with General Ricard behind at Vauchamps
and General Leval announced the arrival of his division at Viels-Maisons and
asked for orders from the Chief of Staff,[25] the vanguard of Zieten settled in camp ahead of Champaubert. It had sent
parties to the left towards Sézanne to meet the horsemen of Diebitsch, with
detachments of Major von Watzdorf covering the right at La
Chapelle-sous-Orbais. The corps of Kleist and Kapsewitch had stopped behind
Champaubert in the evening where Blücher moved his headquarters.
Notes:
[1] Journal of Prince
Scherbatov, Role
of his corps at Montmirail. (Topographical Archives, binder no 50, no 47353.)
[2] Report of General Ricard to
Marshal Marmont, Montmirail, 13 February. (Archives of the War.)
[3] The brigade had barely
execute the orders of Yorck, when the General learned from an officer prisoner
he would have to deal with the Emperor and the corps that came from Champaubert
where they had crushed Olsufiev.
A
few moments later, Yorck received a dispatch from Blücher (Vertus, 10 February,
3 o'clock in the afternoon) telling him the movement of the Emperor on Sézanne
and requiring him to be rejoin him the 11th at Étoges.
[4] The total of prisoners
taken from the Russians and Prussians at Champaubert and Montmirail was tabulated
by Berthier as 75 officers and 2,470 men, in total 2,545, including 708 taken at
Montmirail and 1837 at Champaubert. (Archives of the War.)
[5] Journal of Operations of
General Nikitin and Journal of Operations of Sacken. (Topographical Archives, no 16643.)
[6] General von Pirch II was
seriously injured on 11 February at Les Tourneux.
[7] Major Mareschal writing to
Schwarzenberg, from Bergères, 11 February at 10 o'clock in the morning, says
about this: "General Sacken was yesterday at La Ferté. Yorck at Château-Thierry.
They had orders to go to Montmirail. We had ordered just to seek to find a
crossing, if possible without fighting, on the right bank of the
Marne." (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., II, 281).
[8] The Marshal tried in vain
to pretend he had not given the order to destroy the bridge at Trilport.
[9] Macdonald to the Chief of
Staff and King Joseph, 11 February, 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and 12 February,
4 o'clock in the morning. (Archives of the War.)
[10] We read of this in the
biography of General Grolmann (Militär-Wochenblatt. Beiheft, 1843) that this
officer, then Colonel and Chief of Staff of the corps of Kleist, had, in the
presence of the impossibility of concentrating the Army of Silesia at Champaubert,
advised in vain to withdraw to Reims. It is curious that Blücher specifically
directed the corps of Sacken and Yorck to this city at the moment they were
engaged at Montmirail.
According
to the Journal of Count Nostitz, Blücher had perfectly heard the cannon
and volleys from Montmirail. Should he stay quietly at Bergères and Vertus, or push
aside Marmont to try to take part in the battle being delivered by Sacken? Blücher
opined for the latter course, but ceded to the presentations of Gneisenau and
Müffling. It was too far from Montmirail to still get there in time. Knowing
too incompletely the forces that were ahead to be sure of success and,
moreover, there was every reason to believe that Yorck and Sacken were strong
enough to make headway against the French.
For the same reason the idea of marching on Épernay was rejected because Gneisenau
and Müffling only admitted in the same way that corps of Yorck and Sacken might
be thrown back on the right bank of the Marne.
Nostitz also adds: "We remained, so to speak,
impassive spectators of a fight that lasted until the night and ended with the complete
defeat of Sacken left to himself."
[11] Chief
of Staff to Marmont, 11 February, 8 o'clock at night. (Archives of the War).
[12] Marmont
to the Chief of Staff, Étoges, 12 February, 2:30 in the morning. (Archives
of the War.)
[13] Kriegsgeschichtliche
Einzelschriften, Heft, V, 1889: Tagebuch des Generals der
Kavallerie Grafen von Nostitz.
Nostitz
says a French parliamentarian responsible for personally delivering to Blücher himself
decorations belonging to the Field Marshal and taken by the French at Étoges,
presented himself at the front. Complying with the formal orders of the Field
Marshal who had defended leaving to bring the parliamentarian to him. Nostitz
sent back the French officer, who refused to turn over the objects of which he was
the bearer. Nostitz added that Marshal Marmont seized on this pretext having to
know the precise whereabouts of Blücher.
[14] Report
of General von Jürgass dated 17 February on the battles of Montmirail and
Château-Thierry.
[15] Report
of General von Jürgass dated 17 February on the battles of Montmirail and
Château-Thierry.
[16] 'The
biography of Lieutenant General von Sohr furnishes us details that seem strange
to the eyes of the reader, on the subject of the episode that marked the last
moments of retreat on Château-Thierry.
"The rear-guard of Katzler," Beitzke says in his Life of Lieutenant General von Sohr, "the Horn Brigade and the
cavalry reserve were charged to cover the crossing of the rest of the army. The
rear-guard of Katzler was posted for this reason on the heights of Montfaucon; behind
it the Horn Brigade took a position with its cavalry on its left. The reserve
cavalry and the brigade of von Steinmetz (a) closest to Château-Thierry,
were also still on the left bank of the Marne."
(a)
Steinmetz had replaced General von Pirch wounded the day before.
"The advanced troops of Katzler were soon to be thrown
back; the Horn Brigade, attacked and outflanked on its right, ran the risk of
being cut off from the bridge. It only remained to withdraw quickly, and as it
was crossing a clay soil, heavy and wet, the retirement was carried out in
disorder."
"At this moment, Sohr was ordered to move forward
with his regiment; he was to cover the left and try to gain ground in front. We
soon saw that almost all the enemy cavalry was on this side. Therefore the
reserve cavalry was advanced, which came without mounting to form behind the
hussars of Sohr. Finally, the Russian cavalry took position in a second line behind
the reserve cavalry. Sohr was at that time, and just for this battle, under
the command of the cavalry reserve, General von Jürgass. A large column of cavalry
was advancing against him; but forced to file between the different farm
buildings (b), the cavalry had to remain in the column and could not be
deployed until after passing this defile. Sohr realized this fact and asked
permission to charge. He was forbidden and ordered to confine himself to watch
its movements. When this cavalry was deployed en masse in two lines, the Allied
cavalry marched in front of it, taking with it the regiment of Sohr and followed
by the second line of Russian cavalry. The French cavalry continued to advance
on its side. The Brandenburg Hussars came against the 10th Hussars,
broke it and threw it back on the second line. During this charge, an enraged
French hussar came against Sohr and had already graced him with several saber blows
absorbed by the fur of his dolman, when Captain von Schulz and Lieutenant Count
Arnim came to his rescue and disentangled the slashing hussar. The 1st West Prussian Dragoons who charged to the right of Sohr, did not fare as
happily and was brushed aside by the French cavalry. Its retirement had uncovered
the right of Sohr who had to withdraw. Several other regiments were also
forced to withdraw. The Russian cavalry which formed the second line, instead
of continuing its march forward and rescuing the Prussian squadrons, turned
around and retreated in a pretty big mess. But the state of the road prevented
the enemy, whose big horses could not cover the broken ground, to push them back
further. The enemy cavalry had also followed without taking the time to reform
its squadrons. Arriving on the hills covered with vineyards on the banks of
Marne, it discovered ravines and other obstacles that forced it to stop."
(b)
He means here the Pétré farm and that of Grand-Balloy.
"Sohr
took the opportunity to quickly rally his regiment and deploy them in the
valley. He came this way to observe the movements and noticed the Prussian
troops on his right trying to reach Château-Thierry. Determined to save the
infantry, he sent half a squadron to get an accurate account of the situation. But
this half-squadron almost immediately recoiled from the enemy which had resumed
its advance. Sohr joining at this time his half-squadron saw the fusilier battalion
of the corps, the last Prussian troops still on the left bank, harassed and
exhausted, trying to reach the city. Moving at a gallop toward this battalion,
raising the spirits of the men whom he promised not to abandon, he managed to
stop them and make them form a square. Then, as the French cuirassiers had to break
through in column to cross a hollow road, it charged before it had time to
deploy again. Obliged to yield to the numbers, he withdrew into the fusiliers,
who, having taken courage, withdrew in good order under the protection of his
hussars. The French cavalry had not yet given up the pursuit and tried several
times to again break the square. But each of its attacks, the battalion
halted, received the charge with volleys, and immediately after the execution
of these shots, Sohr charged again, while the battalion continued its retreat. The
French cavalry unsuccessfully renewed its attempts four times. Thus the
battalion reached, finally, the main avenue of chestnut trees leading to
Château-Thierry. The French cavalry gave up its attacks and then Sohr, having
nothing to do on this side, quickly traversed Château-Thierry to cross last of
all to the right bank of the Marne."
[17] Before evacuating
Château-Thierry, the Allies, and especially the Prussians, gave themselves up
to the most unbridled looting and acts of incredible barbarism.
See FLEURY, The Invasion of the Country in the Northeast, pages 101 to
107, and the Minutes of the City Council of Paris, meeting on 26 February 1814, the Minutes of Reception of the Deputation of the Council of
Château-Thierry.
[18]Prince William of Prussia
distinguished himself particularly in the sacking of Château-Thierry. "He
was taking dinner with me," wrote the postmaster, Mr. Soulière, to M. de
La Valette, "when he was forced to retreat. Not being able to eat with me,
he took everything that was available. He took one of my old postilions named
Lejeune, to show him the way to Reims by the traverse. My wife had asked not
to take this postilion who was not able to keep up: he responded to this that,
on his word of honor, he would take him half a league or so and he would return
him. The barbarians had him executed after Bézu-Saint-Germain." (FLEURY,
page 108.)
FLEURY also demonstrated the fact that neither the French soldiers, or the
inhabitants of Château-Thierry had retaliated against the sick and wounded
Russians and Prussians.
[19] A resident of Château-Thierry,
taken as a guide by Sacken was back saying that the Russians had taken a right
from Oulchy, heading for Reims by Cramaille and Fismes; that the Russian corps,
marching in the greatest disorder, had abandoned en route a large number of
ammunition wagons; artillery consisted of 18 pieces; having to leave in the
road a cannon which had a broken gun carriage, and the commanding general of
the corps, repeated if he could not reach Châlons, he would blow his brains out
rather than fall into the hands of the French. (Archives of the War.)
This
information would be confirmed later by Marshal Mortier.
[20] Marshal Mortier to the
Chief of Staff. (Archives of the War.)
[21] Chief of Staff to General
Ricard and Marshal Macdonald, 13 February, 10 o'clock in the morning. (Archives
of the War.)
[22] Correspondence, no21243.
[23] General Ricard to General Curial,
Vauchamps, 13 February. (Archives of the War.)
[24] Marmont to the Chief of
Staff, 13 February, 7 o'clock at night. (Ibid.)
[25] General Leval to the Chief
of Staff, Viels-Maisons, 13 February, 6 o'clock at night (Ibid.)
Placed on the Napoleon Series: January 2013
[ Military Index | Battles Index ]
|