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Charles Mozin's Capture of the Dutch Fleet
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A study of J.C. de Jonge's Geschiedenis van het
Nederlandse zeewezen (History of Dutch
MaritimeMatters) sheds a somewhat different light on the
matter. De Jonge describes the popular version as a myth and
a slur on the Dutch nation and character perpetrated by
invidious foreigners. After a period of near civil war
between Orangists (supporters of the hereditary Prince
Stadhouders), Regents (the commercial oligarchy) and
Patriots (French-inspired progressives), the Stadhouder,
Prince William V, fled the country to Britain on 18 January
1795 when military resistance to the advancing French forces
under General Pichegru crumbled. General de Brigade Johan
Willem de Winter (a former Dutch naval officer, since 1787
in French service, and subsequently to command the Dutch
fleet in the battle of Camperduin) was sent by Pichegru at
the head of a regiment of French hussars
- To prevent the strongpoint of den Helder
falling into British hands
- To prevent the ships in the nearby Nieuwediep (15
in number, of which 11 were manned and seaworthy) from
escaping to Britain or to the Dutch province of Zeeland,
still in Orangist hands.
His forces arrived in den Helder in the night of 23
January. The next morning (as, apparently uniquely, recorded
in the log of the "Dolfijn", one of the Dutch ships), a
number of French hussars rode across the ice to the ship of
the line "Admiraal Piet Heyn", the captain of which, H.
Reyntjes, was the oldest, and thus most senior, serving
Dutch officer in the fleet. Ahlé, surgeon on the
"Snelheid" wrote later to de Jonge:
"on Saturday morning, my servant informed me
that a French hussar stood near our ship. I looked out my
porthole, and indeed, there stood an hussar."
These hussars are assumed by de Jonge to have formed the
core of the later myth. There is no record (for example from
Reyntjes) what was discussed with the hussars, but it is
presumed to have been an oral agreement to maintain the
status quo until clear orders arrived. Five days later the
officers and men of the fleet swore an oath (similar to that
already sworn by the men of other ships in the port of
Hellevoetsluis) to comply with French orders, not to sail
the ships (which remained under the Dutch flag) without
French authority, and to maintain naval discipline. This
oath was taken in the presence of de Winter, who seems to
have arrived in den Helder a couple of days after his
troops. On 21 January, two days before the arrival of the
first French forces, Reyntjes had received, via
Luitenant-Admiraal van Kinsbergen, the Dutch naval
Commander-in-Chief, an order from the Council of State of
Holland and Westfriesland to all military forces not to
attack or resist the French forces. This was followed up a
couple of days later by a resolution of the States-General,
the parliament of the United Provinces, dated the 21st, to
the same effect.
In February 1846, the French Lieutenant-General Baron
Lahure published a letter in the newspaper "Echo de la
Frontière" in response to the first edition of de
Jonge's book. He claims that, being at the head of advancing
French forces, he heard, in Alkmaar, that the Dutch fleet
was icebound off Texel (the Friesian island opposite den
Helder):
"I departed immediately with a company of
tirailleurs in wagons and a squadron of light cavalry;
before dawn I had taken position in the dunes. When the
ships saw us, they prepared their defences. I sent some
tirailleurs ahead, and followed with the rest of my
forces. The fleet was taken. The sailors received us 'de
bonne grace' on board... This is the true story of the
capture of the Dutch fleet, devised and executed by a 23
year old Chef de Bataillion".
De Jonge considers that, allowing for some overestimation
by Lahure of his own role (he also claims, in variance with
the record, to have taken the town of Haarlem
single-handed), this version is not really in conflict with
his own. Lahure does not actually state that fighting took
place, and the fact that his men were received 'de bonne
grace' does not suggest hostile intent on the part of the
Dutch.
Conclusion
De Jonge concludes:
- that there are no authentic primary
references to hostilities or to the presence of
artillery,
- that the winter, although severe, was not so
severe as to allow massed troops to cross the ice,
- that the other authors derived the story from
Jomini, and
- that his source is unknown, but probably an
intentionally or unintentionally exaggerated account by
one of the hussars involved.
He quotes correspondence with three Dutch officers
present in the fleet during or soon after the surrender as
evidence that no hostilities were needed or took place.
Bibliography
Alison, Sir Archibald. History of Europe during the
French Revolution Edinburgh : William Blackwood;
1833-42.
Jomini, Antoine Henri. Histoire critique et militaire
des guerres de la Revolution Paris : Chez Anselin et
Pochard; 1819.
Jonge, Johannes Cornelius de. Geschiedenis van het
Nederlandse zeewezen" (History of Dutch Maritime
Matters) 3rd Edition; Zwolle : Hoogstraten & Gorter;
1869.
Lacretelle, Charles. Histoire de la Convention
Nationale Paris : Treuttel et Würtz; 1825.
Macdonell, Archibald G. Napoleon and his Marshals
New York : Macmillan; 1934.
Mignet, François Auguste Marie. L'Histoire de
la Révolution française Paris : Didot;
1824.
Thiers, Adolphe. L'Histoire de la Révolution
française Paris : Lecointe; 1823-27.
Placed on the Napoleon Series: June 2000
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