Introduction
The
Situation
The
Opponents
The
Action
Conclusions
French
Order-of-Battle
Russian
Order-of-Battle
Sources
Notes
Action at Sochocin, 24 December 1806
By Robert
Goetz
As with the other actions in the French army's 24 December crossing
of the Wkra, English language accounts of the action at Sochocin are
vague and lacking in detail. Given the strategic significance of the
action in exposing the Russian right, it is important to understand
the action at Sochocin in order to understand fully the operations on
the Narew and Wkra in December 1806. The action at Sochocin, described
as a French victory in a number of accounts, was in fact a French failure
that was transformed into a victory by the French success at Kolozab
to the south. Because the French forces at both Kolozab and Sochocin
were under the overall command of Marshal Augereau and forces from Kolozab
were diverted to Sochocin after the successful seizure of the Kolozab
bridge, the two actions have been typically described together as two
parts of a single action. However, as separate forces were involved
in the two actions, it is appropriate to examine the action at Sochocin
on its own merits and as distinct from its "twin action to the south.
In the fourth week of December 1806, the bridge at Sochocin played
a crucial role in the plans of both the Russian and French commanders.
For Field Marshal Mikhail Fedorovich Graf Kamenskii, overall commander
of the Russian forces in Poland since 21 December, Sochocin was the
point where the right column of his army would cross the Wkra when he
launched his offensive to drive the French back across the Vistula.
Major General Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly had commanded the
Advance Guard on the Russian right at Kolozab and Sochocin since about
5 December. On 22 December, Kamenski shifted two battalions under the
command of Colonel Iakov Iakovlevich Davydovskii from Borkowo and placed
them under Barclay's command at Sochocin to strengthen the position.
The plank bridge, which had been destroyed by the Russians previously,
was rebuilt in preparation for Kamenskii's offensive.
For Napoleon, Sochocin was the key to his planned "maneuver sur les
derrieres in which he would turn the Russian right flank. Napoleon
ordered the VII Corps of Marshal Pierre Francois Charles Augereau to
march from Plonsk to clear the Wkra opposite Kolozab and at Sochocin,
seize or restore the bridges and advance on the Russians at Nowemiasto
to pressure the Russian right. Seizure of the bridge at Sochocin would
allow the French IV Corps of Marshal Jean de Dieu Soult to march rapidly
on Ciechanow and then turn and fall on the Russian right and rear.
While Napoleon's plan did not take into consideration the thick mud
and abysmal roads that made rapid movement impossible, Sochocin remained
central to his plans. Soult's forces, however, still crossing the Vistula
on 22 December, were assigned an impossible task.
Sochocin occupies a strategic position at the point where the road
from Plonsk to Ciechanow crosses the Wkra. This road reaches the Wkra
approximately 200 meters southwest of Sochocin and runs parallel to
it along the right bank before crossing the river and entering the town.
From Plonsk to Sochocin, about 8 kilometers to the northeast, the road runs
generally downhill. From Sochocin to Ciechanow, about 20 kilometers beyond
Sochocin, the ground trends generally upward to a point midway between
the two towns and then levels off as it approaches Ciechanow. Two minor
roads east of the Wkra also played a significant role in the action
of 24 December. The river road that follows the left bank of the Wkra
for most of its length connected Sochocin with Barclay's position on
the Plonsk-Nowemiasto road opposite Kolozab. A road also travels east
from Sochocin for about 6 kilometers before angling southeast for another 4
kilometers to Nowemiasto, passing over rolling terrain, allowing the forces
from Sochocin to reunite with the forces from Kolozab at Nowemiasto
should they be forced to retreat.
Davydovskii's position at Sochocin was a strong one. The bridge at
Sochocin crosses the river just above the point where the river turns
to the southwest, placing it inside the angle formed by the river.
This provided a clear field of fire on the approach to the bridge from
the left bank for a considerable distance on either side of the bridge.
The absence of any nearby fords secured the position from any turning
maneuver, and the level ground on both sides provided no advantage for
an attacker. Scrub growing along the banks of the river afforded excellent
cover for defenders lining the riverbank while woods, at the time apparently
extending right up to the riverbank south of the town, provided depth
of cover, which the Russians would use to their best advantage. North
and south of Sochocin the right bank of the river is quite steep, although
on either side at Sochocin it is fairly level. The Wkra is unfordable
for at least 9 kilometers above Sochocin, although above that point
the river is considerably narrower. Between Sochocin and Kolozab (about
4-5 kilometers downstream) the river is also unfordable.
|
|
|
Map of the Sochocin
Area
|
The Opponents
The Russian forces at Sochocin were under the overall command of Barclay
de Tolly. Barclay was himself with the forces at Kolozab, leaving command
of the forces at Sochocin to Colonel Davydovskii, shef of the 1st
Jger regiment. Details of the composition of Davydovskii's force are
not clear, but his force arrived at Sochocin on 22 December, having
marched from Borkowo to strengthen the extreme right of the Russian
positions on the Wkra.[1] This may have been prompted by
Kamenskii's offensive plans, by the French build-up north of the Vistula-Narew
line or both. Davydovskii's force consisted of two battalions of 1st
Jger, an excellent unit that had been trained in the woods of Karelia
and specialized in fighting in woods and broken terrain. These two
battalions amounted to about 1100 men. Supporting the infantry were
three squadrons of Isoum hussars, amounting to about 375 men, and a
half battery (6 guns) of horse artillery.[2] A small detachment
of Efromov-V Cossacks may have also been attached to Davydovskii's force,
although these would have been distributed as patrols and not have played
a very significant role in the action. In all, Davydovskii had about
1525 men and 6 guns at Sochocin. As of 23 December, Davydovskii had
positioned a squadron of cavalry and up to a battalion of jger on the
right bank of the Wkra covering the bridgehead. To the south in the
woods on the left bank between Sochocin and Kolozab stood Barclay's
reserve, three battalions of Tenguinsk Musketeers under Colonel Petr
Ivanovich Ershov. Ershov's regiment, amounting to about
1600 men, was under Barclay's direct command but would play an important
role in the action at Sochocin.
The French forces attacking Sochocin were drawn from Augereau's VII
Corps. Augereau divided his corps to march on both Sochocin and Kolozab.
Against the first point he sent the 2nd Division of Gnral
de Division Etienne Heudelet de Bierre, supported by the light cavalry
brigade of Gnral de Brigade Antoine Jean Auguste Henri Durosnel.
Heudelet's division was composed of two brigades. The first, commanded
by Gnral de Brigade Francois Pierre Joseph Amey, include the three
battalions of 7th Lgre and formed the advance guard. The
second brigade of Gnral de Brigade Jacques Thomas Sarrut, composed
of 24th Ligne (3 battalions) and 63rd Ligne (2
battalions), along with Durosnel's 7th and 20th
Chasseurs, formed Heudelet's reserve. Supporting the force were a battery
of horse artillery and a battery of foot artillery.
Heudelet's column was supported on its left by General Watier's cavalry
brigade, which screened the French left by covering the road to Raciaz
to the north. On the right was the 1st Division of VII Corps under
General Desjardin, supported by General Milhaud's light cavalry brigade.
Desjardin's second brigade, under the command of Gnral de Brigade
Jacques Lefranc, stood in reserve at Kolozab and would later play a
crucial role in the action at Sochocin. Lefranc's brigade consisted
of 44th Ligne and 105th Ligne, each regiment with
two battalions.
Napoleon's orders had been issued to Augereau on 22 December, placing
Milhaud and Watier under his command and directing him to seize the
bridges at Kolozab and Sochocin and clear the way to Nowemiasto and
Ciechanow. Durosnel's cavalry and Heudelet's division had marched from
the bridgehead at Zakrocym on the 22nd and 23rd
of December, and were concentrated at Skarzyn and Radzymin, southwest
of Plonsk, by the evening of the 23rd.
Colonel Sicard, aide-de-camp to Augereau, had conducted a reconnaissance
in force of Sochocin on the morning of 23 December. Sicard's force
consisted of two battalions of infantry (one from 16th Lgre
and one from 14th Ligne) and 100 chasseurs from Milhaud's
brigade, along with two 4-pounders. At the approach of the French the
Russian cavalry outposts withdrew to the bridgehead, alerting the force
on the right bank. French reports give the strength of the Russian
force on the right bank as about 300 men (perhaps as much as one battalion),
a squadron of cavalry (hussars or Cossacks) and two guns. The remainder
of the Russian force on the left bank went unnoticed by the French.
The approach of Sicard's party provoked an exchange of fire in which
four voltigeurs of 16th Lgre were wounded and a handful
of Russians also fell. Sicard, having determined that the Russians
were present in force at Sochocin, withdrew and returned to Plonsk after
pressing close enough to the bridge to determine that it had been recently
rebuilt and was intact. Russian accounts claimed to have repulsed the
French attempt to force a crossing, but this seems an exaggeration as
the French were only conducting a reconnaissance.
The report of the French activity at Sochocin combined with the French
reconnaissance at Kolozab prompted Barclay to order all forces to the
left bank and both bridges dismantled. Davydovskii used the woods,
hills and hollows on the left bank to his best advantage, deploying
a battalion (perhaps two) of jger in open order along the river bank
and positioning the remainder of his force out of site behind a patch
of woods.
The following morning around 4:00 a.m., Heudelet's division, with Durosnel's
cavalry brigade attached, had advanced from its position southwest of
Plonsk to Plonsk itself. By 8:00 a.m., Heudelet had begun his march
on Sochocin, arriving in the vicinity of Sochocin around 11:00 a.m..
Amey with the three battalions of 7th Lgre pressed on to
the river while Sarrut remained in reserve with the five battalions
of the 24th and 63rd Ligne. Observing the strength
of the Russian position and the difficult approach to the bridge, Heudelet
first attempted to find an alternative crossing. Heudelet's scouts
were unable to locate a nearby ford, however, and the general detached
a party of infantry and cavalry under the command of Chef d'Escadron
Massy to press further downstream in search of a crossing. Having failed
to locate a means to turn the Russian position at the bridge, Heudelet
sent a party forward to attempt to repair the bridge, but it was driven
off by enemy fire.
By around 12:30 p.m., Heudelet decided to try forcing the bridge.
Selecting the bravest officer of his staff, Commandant Martin, Heudelet
assembled the carabineers of 7th Lgre to form a storming
party, accompanied by a party of engineers who were to repair the bridge.
A half battery was advanced to support Martin's force and two battalions
of 7th Lgre were advanced to the banks of the river on
either side of the bridge to provide fire support. A single 8-pounder
loaded with grapeshot was assigned to the storming party to sweep away
any Russian attempt to approach the far side of the bridge. Heudelet
ordered the force to repair the bridge at all costs. Martin's party
dutifully advanced to the near end of the bridge and was met by a withering
crossfire from the opposite bank. In the first few minutes under fire,
Commandant Martin, the captain of engineers, the artillery officer commanding
the 8-pounder and 20 carabineers were killed or wounded and the remnants
of the force withdrew in disorder.
The firing on both sides of the river remained intense. Davydovskii,
in the process of writing a report to Barclay, took a bullet in the
leg and later received an apparently superficial wound in the head.
By around 1:30 p.m. Davydovskii received word of the French crossing at
Kolozab and Barclay's withdrawal. With this news came the order to
withdraw on Nowemiasto, presumably after holding his position as long
as he could safely do so. Ershov, his three battalions in the woods
covering Davydovskii's left, began falling back towards Sochocin shortly
after 1:30, having lost contact with Barclay.
Heudelet had received word of the French crossing at Kolozab at about
the same time as Davydovskii. With the seizure of the bridge at Kolozab,
Augereau ordered Desjardin's first brigade (Lapisse) in pursuit of Barclay
towards Nowemiasto while the second brigade (Lefranc) crossed the river
and turned north to clear the Russian forces from Sochocin. Augereau
sent orders for Sarrut's brigade to cross at Kolozab behind Lefranc.
Around the same time Massy reported that he had succeeded in getting
two companies of infantry across the river at Gromadzyn, presumably
as Ershov's men withdrew to the north. Heudelet sent Sarrut off to
Kolozab while Amey remained opposite Sochocin to maintain pressure on
Davydovskii.
With Amey's forces reduced to firing futilely across the river, the
focus of the action shifted to the woods south of Sochocin where Ershov's
Tenguinsk Musketeers were deployed to cover Davydovskii's left. The
details of Ershov's deployment are unclear, but it seems he positioned
skirmishers in woods near the northern edge with the remainder of the
regiment formed up just beyond the woods. Lefranc, advancing north
through the woods with Colonel Habert's 105th Ligne in the
lead, made contact with the Russian infantry around 3:00 p.m., and intense
skirmishing broke out. The French pressed the Russian skirmishers back
out of the woods and ran directly into the main body of Tenguinsk Musketeers.
Habert formed his regiment and advanced against Ershov, but the French
faltered under the fire of the Russians. Seizing the moment, Ershov
ordered a counterattack that drove the French back into the woods in
disorder. Habert's men reformed under cover of the woods and managed
to hold firm against the Russian advance.
By around 3:30 p.m. the 44th Ligne had joined Habert's 105th
and Lefranc made a second attempt to dislodge Ershov's men. The second
French attack made better progress and forced the Russians to give ground.
The numbers now favoring the French, Ershov and Davydovskii determined
that the time had come to withdraw. As the sun set, Ershov and Davydovskii
withdrew towards Nowemiasto, joining Barclay there and then marching
on Strzegoczin where Kamenskii had ordered the concentration of the
Russian forces. Lefranc pursued the Russians a short distance until
darkness forced him to break off the pursuit. With the withdrawal of
Davydovskii's forces, the remaining French forces opposite Sochocin
were able to conduct their repairs of the bridge and cross to the left
bank. Durosnel's cavalry, 7th Lgre and Lefranc's brigade
bivouacked near Sochocin while Sarrut's brigade seems to have bivouacked
near Kolozab having followed Lefranc's regiments across the Wkra at
that point.
Conclusions
The action at Sochocin differs from the actions at Kolozab and Borkowo
in that the crossing of the Wkra at that point was essentially unsuccessful.
The Russian forces at Sochocin were only forced to withdraw after the
seizure of the position at Kolozab exposed their left flank. The success
of the Russians in holding this position is due to the natural strength
of the position, particularly the location of the bridge, and the absence
of any fords by which the position could be turned. Under the circumstances,
the attempt to repair the bridge under fire does not seem to have been
well thought out, but rather an act of frustration and desperation for
lack of more positive action to take. Martin's doomed attempt resulted
only in unnecessary loss of life, and is similar in that regard to Colonel
Savary's storming of the bridge at Kolozab on the same day. Baron Marcellis
de Marbot, then a colonel and aide-de-camp to Augereau, harshly condemns
Heudelet's attempt to storm the bridge, declaring that "I have always
felt disgusted by this contempt of human life, which at times leads
generals to sacrifice their men to their desire of seeing themselves
mentioned in dispatches.[3] Commandant Lechatier
is also severely critical of Heudelet in his history of the campaign,
although unlike Marbot he is equally critical of Savary. However, in
defense of Heudelet it should be pointed out that his orders were to
take the bridge. There were few options open to him beyond a direct
assault and the extent of the Russian forces opposed to him was largely
concealed from view. Further, he did not know the situation at Kolozab
until after the attempt had been made, a point that Marbot, with the
benefit of hindsight, overlooks. The French losses were considerable
given small force engaged and the short duration of the fighting. Heudelet
reported 33 dead and 229 wounded, apparently all from 7th
Lgre and the artillery. These casualty figures are slightly more
than those of 1st Division, which had suffered 33 dead and
223 wounded with all four regiments engaged at either Kolozab or Sochocin.
For the Russians, there is little to criticize. Davydovskii made the
most of the position, concealing his troops skillfully and beating off
all attempts to cross the river. In maintaining the position, he was
ably assisted by Ershov who conducted a capable rearguard action against
Lefranc, safeguarding Davydovskii's flank until near dusk. Russian
casualties are not stated, although they included Davydovskii himself,
but were certainly much lighter than those incurred by 7th
Lgre and probably no heavier proportionally than those suffered by
Lefranc's battalions. The overall strategic significance of the action
for the Russians, however, was bad. With the bridge at Sochocin in
French hands, the main road from Plonsk to Ciechanow was now open, exposing
the Russian right to a flanking movement by the French as Napoleon had
envisioned.
2nd Division - Gnral de Division Etienne Heudelet de
Bierre
|
Regiment
|
Colonel
|
Strength
(as of 15 December)
|
|
Gnral de Brigade
Francois Pierre Joseph Amey
|
|
7th Lgre (3 battalions)
|
Colonel Boyet
|
2110
|
|
Gnral de BrigadeJacques
Thomas Sarrut
|
|
24th Ligne (3 battalions)
|
Colonel Semell
|
2267
|
|
63rd Ligne (2 battalions)
|
Colonel Lacue
|
1687
|
|
|
|
3954
|
|
3rd Co. 3rd Foot Artillery
|
|
330
|
|
2nd Co. 6th Horse Artillery
|
|
|
Total
|
|
6675
Light Cavalry Brigade - Gnral de Brigade Antoine Jean Auguste
Henri Durosnel
|
Regiment
|
Colonel
|
Strength
(as of 15 December)
|
|
7th Chasseurs
|
Colonel Lagrange
|
379
|
|
20th Chasseurs
|
Colonel Castex
|
515
|
|
Total
|
|
922
2nd Brigade, 1st Division - Gnral de Brigade
Jacques Lefranc
|
Regiment
|
Colonel
|
Strength
(as of 15 December)
|
|
44th Ligne (2 battalions)
|
Colonel Sandeur
|
1513
|
|
105th Ligne (2 battalions)
|
Colonel Habert
|
1545
|
|
Total
|
|
3073
Detachment - Major General Barclay de Tolly (not present)
|
Regiment
|
Division
|
Strength (estimated)
|
|
Forces at Sochocin
Colonel Iakov Iakovlevich Davydovskii
|
|
1st Jaeger (2 Battalions)
|
2nd Division
|
1100
|
|
Isoum Hussars (3 Squadrons)
|
2nd Division
|
375
|
|
Battery Horse Artillery
|
4th Division
|
50
|
|
Total
|
|
1525
|
|
Reserve between Kolozab
and Sochocin Colonel Petr Ivanovich Ershov
|
|
Tenguinsk Musketeers (3 Battalions)
|
Advance Guard
|
1600
|
|
Total
|
|
1600
Primary Sources:
"Le Gnral Milhaud au Gnral Belliard, Aux
avant-postes de Pomichowo, 22 dcembre 1806, 2 heures der demie du matin
in Foucart (see below), p. 370-71.
"Le Major Gnral au Marchal Augereau, Varsovie, 22 dcembre 1806
in Foucart (see below), p. 377.
"Le Marchal Augereau au Major Gnral, Plonsk, 23 dcembre 1806 in
Foucart (see below), p. 405-8.
"Rapport du Gnral Desjardins sur L'Affaire du 24 Dcembre in Foucart
(see below), p. 430-31.
"Extrait du Journal des Oprations du 7e Corps in Foucart (see below),
p. 431-33.
Supplementary Sources:
Bennigsen, Leonty Leontyevich, count von.
Mmoires du Gnral Bennigsen Vol. 1 (1908)
Foucart, Paul Jean. Campagne de Pologne
Vol. 1 (1882)
Hpfner, Eduard von. Der Krieg von 1806
und 1807 Vol. 3 (1851)
Lechartier, G. La Manoeuvre de Pultusk
(1911).
Lettow-Vorbeck, Oscar von. Der Krieg
von 1806 und 1807 Vol. 3 (1893)
Marbot, Baptiste Antoine Marcelin, Baron
de. The Memoirs of Baron de Marbot translated by John Butler,
Vol. 1 (1892)
Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, Aleksandr Ivanovich.
Opisanie vtoroi voiny imperatora Aleksandra s Napoleonom v 1806 i
1807 godakh (1846). Excerpts translated by Boris Megorsky
(unpublished).
Petre, F. Loraine. Napoleon's Campaign
in Poland, 1806-1807 (1989)
Plotho, Carl von. Tagebuch wahrend des
Krieges Zwischen Russland und Preussen (1811)
Six, Georges. Dictionnaire Biographique
des Gnraux et Amiraux Français de la Rvolution et de L'Empire, 1792-1814
(1934)
Smith, Digby. Napoleon's Regiments:
Battle Histories of the Regiments of the French Army, 1792-1815
(2000)
Smith, Steven H., "Russian Army, Dec. 1806
- Jan. 1807 (unpublished)
Wilson, Sir Robert. Brief remarks on
the character and composition of the Russian army, and a sketch of the
campaigns in Poland in the years 1806 and 1807 (1810)
Notes
Placed on the Napoleon Series: May 2002
[ Military Index | Battles Index ]
|
|
|
|
© Copyright 1995-2004,
The Napoleon Series, All Rights Reserved.
| | | | |