The committee proposed that henceforth the field army should be armed
with 6 and 12 pounder guns, and a 5.6inch howitzer; for mountain campaigns
a short 6 pounder, and a light 5 inch howitzer. New caissons, new carriages,
and new field forges were put into production.� Article 4 of the report
details changes to the siege and garrison artillery. New 24 pounder,
12 pounder� and 6 pounder� were to be introduced along with� new 324
mm, 216 mm and 152 mm mortars; and 405 mm perriers. Gassendi was critical
of these new weapons and complained that the new 24 pounder was not
as good as the old one.
Napoleon, was in favour of these changes, as he believed
that Gribeauval was at error:
�The 10-inch mortar has been suppressed, and the 8-inch and 12-in
Preserved. The 8-in., which throws a 40� pound . shell, is an excellent
mortar: it is the true siege mortar. The 6-inch mortars appear necessary,
both for the attack and defence of places. These mortars, which do
not weigh 100 pounds., have the greatest effect in trenches and covered
ways. A field artillery park should have twenty of these which can
be used with 5�-inch shell, and may be useful against redoubts and
villages and thus save the howitzers, the fire of which is very destructive
to their carriages. The question of the 12-inch and 10-inch mortars
is not yet decided. The 12-inch throws a 150� pound . shell, the 10-inch
only 100� pound . In this respect the 12-inch is to be preferred.
Since we have an 8-inch it is useful to have one with far more power,
but M. de Gribeauval had abolished the 12-inch and adopted the 10-in.,
because he thought that the calibre of 8 or 9 inches was the best
for long ranges. The mortars which were cast at Cadiz had less than
9 inches. More experiments are still required, and if they confirm
the old ones, to the effect that the longest ranges are obtainable
between 8 and 9 inches, we should then abolish the 8-inch and substitute
for them the new calibre. Of course the mortar should have a cylindrical
Gomer chamber and the lightest possible for short ranges and beds
for long ones.� We should have thus 3 mortars: the 5�-in., the new
model between 8-in. and 9-in., and the 12-in.� A mortar shell of the
new model would not weigh more than 60 pounds. That is not a sufficient
weight and would cause one to feel the want of the effect of a 12-inch
shell. Long-ranging mortars are only useful at particular points of
the coast or in places destined to defend a particular point, for
the fire is so uncertain, long and difficult that it can be of no
use at ordinary times. It was on the occasion of the bombardment of
Cadiz that mortars were cast at Seville with a range of 3000 fathoms.
The coasts of Flushing, Ile d�Aix and Hy�res were armed with these.
These mortars, joined to the special carriages which were given to
the coast guns to enable them to fire at 45o, were a sufficient defence
to drive off the English whenever they attempted to cast anchor in
Hy�res roads.�
Gassendi was not the only critical voice, but his was the dominant
voice.� Thus he has coloured our view of this system, especially the
6 pound� carriage, listed under article 16. Gassendi noted in 1819 that:
�The carriages made by M. Gribeauval have been reduced
in weight and therefore strength�
This point has been stressed further by modern historians,
(e.g. Chartrand) that on campaign that the carriages broke up, and could
not stand the rigours of campaign. However, I have found no contemporary
source for this assumption. Indeed, the new carriages were lighter,
but had more reinforcements. Gribeauval's carriages tended to break
between the two trunion positions, and the same place on the howitzer
carriage, as it took most force, and was reinforced under the new system
with iron strapping at this point. Indeed, Gassendi has always been
seen to oppose An XI, but Eugene Hennebert writing in 1887 qoutes Gassendi
as saying that the reduction of calibres from 8 to 6, was a logical
step, and batteries were easier to organise and supply with munitions.
Gassendi also supported the reduction of guns per battery from 8 to
6, a view shared by Napoleon, who wanted only four gun batteries.
�The unit of artillery is the division
(battery): for horse artillery 6 guns; for field 8. The officers, N.C.O.'s
and gunners of a company are sufficient for its service. It would be
better, were it not determined otherwise by the details of artillery,
to form a unit of 4 guns, because a battery of 8 guns is already too
numerous not to be often divided; but what forces the adoption of the
larger unit is on account of artificers, spare stores, forges, &c.
In taking a unit of 4 guns all that would be doubled; the extra expense
involved would not be compensated by the advantage attaching to the
4-gun unit.�
In Spain, 3 divisions of Guard Artillery were attached to the Guard
Infantry, each regiment having a 4 gun battery of� 6 pounders.� However,
if one compares the committee's drawings for the new 6 pound� carriage,
and that for the Gribeauval 4 pound� carriage, one finds that the carriage
from the front to the aiming curve is the same size, the only difference
being in the diminuation of the trail towards pintle plate. At this
point the Gribeauval gun measures 8.5 inches and An XI 7.5 inches. The
rear skids are more rounded and shorter. One can not see how the loss
of 1 inch off the depth of the carriage can make it fundamentally weaker.
Again the new 12 pound� carriage was as robust, if not more so than
Gribeauval. Gribeauval's carriages had a very marked aiming curve on
the top line, whilst in AN XI this was virtually eliminated. Also, the
wood work on An XI is thicker in parts than Gribeauval. The overall
shape of the carriage changed, which enabled the 12 pound� to have great
elevation than before, the trunion positions were moved closer together,
and the metal axel had a wooden �shock absorber� around it. This lack
of elevation was another of Napoleon's complaints with Gribeauval. The
shape of the rear skids also changed. This new more rounded shape meant,
that rather than having to have two men on hand spikes at the rear of
the gun to lift the carriage for advance or retreat, it could simply
be dragged, the rear skid acting like a ski. The old Gribeauval rear
skids did work to an extent, but often dug into the ground. Practical
tests carried out by Assocation Britannique de la Garde Imperiale for
a U.K. TV documentary clearly demonstrated this. It was found that the
An XI carriage was superior when being dragged. Lifting the carriage
seriously fatigues the gun crew, eliminating this was a practical step
forward in man management.�
Napoleon however, appears to have been fundamentally
in favour of the new carriage and 5.6howizter:
�The 6-inch howitzer is too wasteful: it consumes as much
powder as a 24 pounder shot. They have rightly replaced it by a howitzer
of 5 inches 6 lines; this slight difference of 6 lines gives a great
advantage. The waggon holds 75 rounds, whilst that of the 6-inch only
holds 50, and in supposing that the 5� -inch shell be inferior to
the 6-inch the question comes to this: which would you rather have,
one 6-inch howitzer or two 5�-inch ones. But the 5�-inch shell is
already preferable to the 6-inch one. Gribeauval's carriage was altogether
faulty. It has been altered, and rightly so, for there has been a
gain of 100 per cent. in transport, and lightness given to both the
carriage and the howitzer. But the latter still requires improvement:
it should have a greater range, which might be obtained by lengthening
it. There should be two sorts of howitzers, one to combine with the
6 pounders, the other with the 12 pounders. The latter must have the
inconvenience of greater weight, so as to obtain the greatest possible
range from the form of the chamber, length, thickness of metal, &c.
All these drawbacks are amply compensated in a reserve howitzer by
the range being increased to the utmost. The field howitzers of the
Boulogne Camp had that advantage.� It is equally necessary that the
existing 12 pounders. should have an increased range, not that changes
in the gun are necessary, but in the carriage, which should admit
of greater elevation being given to the gun. Parks should also have
12 pr. Grenades� which would weigh . . . . to be used with the 12
pounders. Every waggon should contain some of these grenades in place
of common shell. This is contrary to Gribeauval's principle, which
however is false. There are a thousand circumstances in war where
it is requisite to open fire at a very long range, whether from one
bank to the other of a wide river, or to hinder the enemy from encamping
and occupying a position which can only be attacked from a distance.
Finally it is a real disadvantage not to reply to an enemy's fire.
We look however to artillery officers not to fire uselessly, for we
pretend in no way to attack the fundamental principle that to open
fire at a long range under ordinary circumstances is to burn ammunition
and to destroy its effect.� Guns of higher calibre than 12 pounders.
are very useless. We have acted wisely in suppressing the 16 pounder
which the Prussians and Austrians still drag about.�
An XI 12 Pound Carriage.
The Old Gribeauval Barrel Was Retained under the New System.
Gassendi was also critical of the moving of the ammunition
chest (Gargoussier or Coffret depending on which manual you read). Under
An XI, the chest was moved to the limber (avant train), where the driver
was seated. The chest was also larger, so more rounds could be carried.
However, Gassendi saw this as a disadvantage to the gun crew. Again,
one wonders if this was a legitimate complaint. According to the 1786,
1791, 1799, and 1809/10 drill manuals, when the gun was cleared for
action (Approvizonez le Batterie), the chest was taken from the carriage
and carried 20 paces behind the gun and placed on the limber. If the
chest is already on the limber, 20 paces behind the gun, would not this
make getting the gun into action quicker?
Auguste de Lespinasse writing in 1800 stressed the
need for pack mules to carry ammunition. This view was also supported
by Napoleon:
�A limber, containing but 15 rounds of 6 pounder and 6 rounds of
shell, is a very slight provision. It is thought that the waggons
of a battery should follow the guns, to obviate the inconvenience
of successive fire on issuing from a defile. Two pack-mules, carrying
2 boxes of 12 pounder ammunition or 15 rounds of 6 pounder each, or
. . . of shells, could follow a gun without being in the way or retarding
the movement of the other guns. Every 6 pounder would thus find itself
with 60 rounds including the contents of its limber, before the arrival
of the waggon. The advantages of two pack-mules per gun or howitzer
are numerous. The supply of the 6 pounder can thus be carried to 200
rounds, and that with a single waggon. The waggon might keep out of
fire, lessen the number of accidents which throw disorder into a battery,
and save the lives of many men and horses. As every mule carries 24
rounds these would be the first source of supply, and the limber would
remain untouched, as it should be, for the moment of retreat or as
a last resource. The fireworker would take the ammunition from a mule
within reach of the gun, but out of the line of fire; the other mule
would be further in rear. These mules might pass to and fro, deposit
their boxes and go to the waggon for new ones, an arrangement which
would require that the shells should be carried ready fuzed in the
waggons. It would be an advantage for the artillery and for the army
to keep the waggons far from the enemy's fire, in ditches, ravines
or defiles, which would cause an army to be much lighter in its movements
and upon the field of battle. The disadvantage would be inappreciable
in retreat, since as soon as its boxes were empty the waggon might
commence its retreat 4 or 5 hours before the end of the day. Every
division (battery) should also have 4 pack-horses or mules loaded
with infantry ammunition, so as to be able to supply the skirmishers
without having recourse to the waggons. The places where the most
infantry ammunition will be consumed will be woods, and hillocks where
waggons could not get and where pack-animals are of very great service.
Often even on plains the waggon meets with many difficulties: it cannot
move because the ground is too soft, and when after much effort the
gunners get their pieces into action, it is advantageous not to tire
the waggon horses. The more one sees of war the more one understands
the utility of having a fourth of the ammunition supply carried on
a mule's back.�
Given Gassendi's and other senior generals concern's over the new system,
Napoleon ordered the cessation of constructing guns to the new system
on 9 November 1805. A second committee was formed to discuss the situation.
A report was presented to Napoleon on 10 January 1809. They
reported that the innovations of the An XI System had not lived up to
their expectation and had created a logistical nightmare in having both
the new system and Gribeauval in use concurrently in the same army and
in some cases the same battery (see French Artillery in 1807
for clarification of this). The committee suggested that the production
of the new system should cease and return to the Gribeauval system.
However, nothing was done until a third committee was formed, in January
1810, nominally headed by General Nicholas Songis (1761-1810). Songis
had been an officer in the Corps Royal d’Artillerie (1779), Capitiane
(1787), Chef-de-bataillon Armee du Nord (1793) Chef-de-brigade Armee
d�Italie, fought at Castiglione, made commander of the Artillery Park
of the Armee d�Oreint, commanded at the siege of Saint-Jean-d�Arce,
and was nominated by Napoleon as General-de-Brigade (May 1799), commander
in chief of the artillery of the Armee l�Orient (July 1799), made General-de-Division
(January 1800), and returned to France at the end of 1801. He was made
First Inspector General of Artillery on 1 February 1805,
commander in chief of the artillery of the Grande Armee and the Armee
d�Allemagne in 1809. He retired from the army on 15 �June
1809 and died on 27 December 1810. Songis, as one of Napoleon's
oldest comrades, felt that he had been overlooked by Napoleon. As Songis
had retired, the committee was in fact headed by General Lariboissiere,
who was in the Regiment de la Fere at the same time as Napoleon, and
was one of his oldest friends, succeeded Songis as First Inspector General
in February 1811. The committee, however, did not vote to totally abolish
the new system, and retained the 6 pounder, hardly surprising given
Napoleon's view on this matter:
�The 4 pounders and the 8 pounders have been rightly suppressed.
Gribeanval simplified and experience has proved the necessity of further
simplification. We have progressed in that direction. The 8 pounders
and the 4 pounders� were often employed in the wrong place: the ammunition
of 8 pounders was expended where that of 4 pounders would have sufficed.
It was a very considerable loss if transport is considered, it was
2 rounds instead of 1. Often there were only 4 pounders when 8 pounders
were required. There is no line officer, nor even artillery officer,
who can well grasp the opportune moment and determine if 8 or 4 pounders
should be employed, and even if he could, he is obliged to utilize
what he has at hand. A single calibre is therefore sufficient for
field work, then there can be no uncertainty. The 12 pounder in either
system remains in reserve to be employed with premeditation by general
officers, either of the line or of the guard artillery.�
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