

The Napoleon Series

The Loyal Lusitanian Legion

By [Richard Tennant](#)

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The quotes are extracted from:

An Astonishing Fellow, The Life of General Sir Robert Wilson, Chapters 7&8, by Ian Samuel, published by The Kensal Press, 1985.

A Narrative of Campaigns of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion during the years 1809, 1810 & 1881 by Lt-Col William Mayne and Capt Lillie, originally published in 1812, published in facsimile by Ken Trotman Publishing in 2005.

A History of the Peninsular War, vols II & III, by Sir Charles Oman.
The Portuguese Army of the Napoleonic Wars (2), by René Chartrand.

Most of the Portuguese gathering in London at the end of 1807 and early 1808 had either fled from their homes when the French marched in or had deserted from the French forces. The Portuguese Minister, the Chevalier de Sousa succeeded in persuading the British Government to give the help that was essential for building his country's armed forces and on 4th August 1808, the Secretary of State for War, Lord Castlereagh, appointed General Sir Robert Wilson¹ to raise a Portuguese corps of some 3,000 men, horse, foot and artillery. Most, but not all, of the officers were to be British² and the cost of the force was to be borne by the British government until it landed in Portugal, and thereafter, it was hoped, by the Portuguese. Wilson was given the rank of Brigadier-General in the Portuguese service.

Two weeks later Wilson arrived in the Peninsula in enthusiastic command of a body of men in green uniforms³, grandiloquently styled the Loyal Lusitanian Legion. Having started being bound to two masters, one British and one Portuguese, in Oporto he soon found a potential third master, the local Bishop, who regarded the Legion as his own private army. He got on well with

¹ Born on 17th August 1777, the fourth child of Benjamin Wilson.

² These British officers were Colonels Mayne, Baron Eben, Baron Perponger, Lieut-Colonel Grant, Captain Charles, aide de camp to Sir Robert, Captains Lillie, Ruman and Western, Drs Millengen and Bolman. There is a letter in the PRO, WO1/232, dated January 1809, from a Capt James Morgan LLL.

³ It is interesting to note that the Chevalier de Sousa, who represented Portugal's interest in the raising of the Legion, could not be persuaded 'to adopt the red clothing. He says that with that uniform every man would refuse to enlist.' (WO 6/164) per Rene Chartrand.

the Bishop whom he described as ‘an amiable old woman’ who overwhelmed him with kindness. Later he had reason to doubt the Bishop’s good intentions.

Wilson set about the task of recruiting his Legion up to full strength and obtaining supplies and clothing for it.⁴ The difficulties were great, for he was no longer entitled to draw equipment from the British and the Portuguese administration had completely broken down. He soon found himself with many more recruits than he could clothe and some of the officers sent out from England proved ‘rebellious’ and had to be removed. The Legion had to be drilled and trained, and Wilson felt – and he was certainly right – that he had to supervise everything himself.

His labours were interrupted in October by several days of serious rioting. Fourteen hundred French troops were being embarked at Oporto under the terms of the Convention of Cintra, when the rumour spread that they had plundered churches and convents and were taking their loot away with them. The dangerous combination of patriotism, religious fanaticism and a desire to get their own hands on any treasure that there might be, inflamed the mob. The Portuguese troops in the town, themselves disgruntled by a pay cut, were not only useless but inclined to join the rioters. Wilson ordered out the Legion and was supported by a few British⁵ and, subsequently, Spanish troops⁶. With these and by his personal courage in facing the mob and the steadiness of his men, he averted a massacre. His conduct was officially commended to Castlereagh, and many years later it was remembered to his credit by the French.

As the autumn of 1808 faded into winter, Wilson felt that his troops needed action. In October he wrote that such a corps was best in the face of the enemy. Though the conditions which prevailed in the Peninsula were anything but favourable to the Allied cause, Wilson thought that it was by no means as desperate, and indeed his appreciation of the part that his own

⁴ Staff 38, three battalions of light infantry (8 companies each, 97 officers and men per company) and a brigade of artillery (one company of 86 officers & men) with four six pounders and two howitzers. (The cavalry, in theory 4 squadrons of 2 companies each at 65 each would be difficult to raise) The entire consisting of about two thousand effective men, well disciplined, clothed and appointed; the uniform of the infantry was green, that of the cavalry green with white facings and the artillery green with black facings. August 1808 (Loyal Lusitanian Legion) “Arms requested for 3 battalions of Chasseurs & a company of artillery —

Swords — 316

Muskets with bayonets — 2070

Rifles with bayonets — 120

Pistols — 64

Bugles — 24

4 light guns 4 pounders and two light howitzers with tumbrils & harness complete. Ammunition for arms in proportion & if possible some Shrapnell spherical shot with a British artillery sergeant.

24 drums — 12 axes — 12 saws

Corporals in the Portuguese service carry swords as well as a musket.

(PRO, FO 63/67) provided by Rene Chartrand

⁵ A detachment of the 6th Regiment.

⁶ A corps of Spaniards under the command of the Marquis of Valladaris.

corps could play was far-sighted and sound. 'A handful of men' he wrote 'may be of great service, and the enemy may not easily ascertain their numbers.' He was increasingly harassed by conditions in Oporto, where complete anarchy often seemed imminent.

On 4th November Sir Robert wrote to Sir Harry Burrard, Commander in Chief of British Forces Lisbon⁷ that

Major General Beresford has inspected the Legion under my command and I trust that his report will satisfy your Excellency, but the drilling of the men has not been so much our first object, as the establishment of an interior economy ... discipline ... has been completely attained.... form the men according to the British regulations ... putting into the Portuguese language the necessary instructions. . . about 5 feet 3 inches should be the lowest standard of the recruits. The artillery company is now complete and well disciplined in gunnery, the greater part being old soldiers ... from England. Till the infantry were completed, I had no idea of forming cavalry, except a few men required after orderly and other necessary duty, whom we could superintend and instruct... since the state of the Portuguese cavalry is so bad as to require a thorough new system, which can only be introduced gradually . . . Major Gen. Beresford has ordered me to complete the 1st battalion as soon as possible.

In December, Wilson at last got away from Oporto, profiting by the fact that no one could really prevent him, and General Cradock, now the commanding officer in Lisbon, gave him the opportunity that he wanted by 'recommending' that he should move to Vila Real, east of Oporto. Before they left Cradock inspected the Legion and reported favourably to Castlereagh, adding, 'Sir Robert Wilson certainly is entitled to much approbation for his exertions.' Even so, only part of the force was well enough equipped to move, the rest being left behind under Baron Eben to await the clothing Wilson still could not get from either the Portuguese or the British.

The winter weather which so battered Sir John Moore's men as they struggled westward towards Corunna, was no kinder to Wilson's Portuguese advancing to Almeida on the Spanish frontier, which was indeed east of Oporto but well beyond Vila Real.⁸ Young Captain Lillie, one of the Legion's British officers, wrote of the rain that came down in torrents for days on end, of swollen rivers across which the cavalry had to swim their horses and the gunners manhandle their guns, often up to their shoulders in water. Wilson was in the water with his men, refusing to ride while they faced such conditions on foot. Hardship exhilarated him, particularly when he faced it in

⁷ PRO, WO 1/417

⁸ The line of march was through Penifiel and Amaranthe, along the right bank of the river Douro, through Mezon Frio to Passa de Regoa, across the Douro and proceeding via Lamago to Pinhel.

company with soldiers. Wilson's ability to inspire men by his own spirit and by his respect and care for them was amply proved in the next few weeks.

In fifteen days they covered two hundred miles and reached Almeida on the last day of the year, 1808. Wilson was quite clear what he wanted to do – probably the only British commander in the Peninsula, apart from the retreating Moore, who was. His plan was to act so aggressively in the area to his immediate front that no French attack could be mounted on northern Portugal from that direction. To accomplish this he had under command just 700 men.

On New Year's Day 1809 he wrote, 'We have only to play on and play high',⁹ and though this may look like just another example of his over-optimism, he had in fact perceived that the situation was ideal for guerrilla or partisan operations. Napoleon's plan of campaign at this stage, that is after Marshal Soult has chased Moore's army on to their ships, was for Soult to come down from the North, taking Oporto on the way, with Victor supporting him by advancing towards Lisbon along the valley of the Guadiana. Between the corps of Soult and Victor, General Lapisse was to occupy the area between Zamora and Salamanca, covering the left flank of Soult's advance through Galicia. When Soult had reached Oporto, Lapisse's division was to become part of Victor's corps, to take Ciudad Rodrigo and advance into Portugal towards Abrantes.

This plan was set out in an order from Napoleon to King Joseph in Madrid dated from Valladolid on 17th January 1809. So far as Lapisse's movements were concerned, the order is not a model of precision, and its successful execution depended on reliable and quick communications between the French corps. The responsibility for ensuring such communications would have rested on Lapisse in the centre. It was in any case a difficult task, as the population was hostile, and the mountain ranges and rivers ran roughly east-west, thereby imposing successive barriers against north-south communications. Wilson spent the rest of the winter making the task impossible.

He began at once at Almeida. Warned by Cradock that the British garrison of two battalions of the 45th and 97th Regiments was being withdrawn, and also that the British might have to evacuate Portugal altogether, Wilson installed Colonel Mayne, his second-in-command, as Governor, with a few troops of the Legion, and assumed command of the local Portuguese levies. Then he set off for Ciudad Rodrigo, across the Spanish frontier, in complete disregard of Cradock's wish that he should not go beyond the limits of Portugal. He explained cheerfully that he really could not be expected to act on an opinion given without any knowledge of the local situation. Like Almeida, Ciudad

⁹ Reminiscent of the later SAS motto 'Who Dares Wins'.

Rodrigo had recently been evacuated by British troops and the inhabitants were expecting the French. Wilson's reception was tumultuous and some two thousand Spanish levies were placed under his command by the local authorities. Within a few days, by his enthusiasm, determination and willingness to lead where others were dithering, he increased his force to some three thousand, though many of them were raw levies. With this not very formidable force he completely dominated the 9,000 troops under Lapisse. The French knew that Moore was in full retreat and that the Spanish armies in the area had disintegrated, and they assumed that the British would be evacuating Portugal. Suddenly they found themselves faced by troops in green uniforms like those of British riflemen, and under British officers.¹⁰

They had no idea how many there were as the peasantry put it about that the countryside was swarming with them and Wilson's energy emphasized the deception. His detachments raided up to Ladesma, north-west of Salamanca, threatening such of Lapisse's communications with Soult as still existed, beat up any French post within reach, seizing their supplies and their money. The spirits of the Spanish rose with each small success, and Wilson made the fullest of their goodwill and hatred of the French. He practiced all the techniques of partisan warfare, even to the extent of distributing handbills in the appropriate language in order to induce the foreign troops in the French service to desert, which many of them did. The French prisoners he took, many of whom were surprised in their quarters, provided almost the only intelligence that was to be had of what was going on. 'For God's sake,' wrote Frere, the British envoy in Seville, where the Supreme Junta was established, 'tell us everything you know and take it for granted that otherwise we shall know nothing.'

He took great pains with the morale of his own men. On one occasion he wrote to a Portuguese woman to praise the conduct of her husband and son who were serving with him. She replied that if other leaders would write such letters of appreciation, there would be no difficulty in getting more officers and defending the country.

Such actions were very much a part of his character. At this time a passage in his Journal tells how incensed he was when a British officer died of wounds and brother officer had not bothered to write to the widow or send her a lock of hair or other memorial: 'There is a manly sympathy for affliction,' he wrote, 'which I hope will never abandon me.' As a partisan leader he knew that he had to be ruthless too, when the safety of his band was at stake: when a sergeant deserted and took thirty men with him, Wilson had no hesitation in having the man shot when he was recaptured.

¹⁰ The Legion had been joined by a good many British soldiers, cavalry and infantry, stragglers, sick and prisoners who escaped from Sir John Moore's army. They were also joined by Colonel Wilson, Colonel D'Urban and Major L'Estrange of the 71st Regiment (later Lt-Col of the 31st Regiment).

So completely were the French confined that Wilson was eventually able to establish a permanent post with two battalions of the corps, under Colonel Mayne, in the Pass of Bãnos (*south of Béjar, on the Salamanca to Plasencia road*), thus cutting Lapisse's communications with Victor's in the south. With the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida in front of him, garrisoned and protected, as he believed, by a powerful force, and without direct communications with Victor, Lapisse must have felt that Napoleon's plan for him to take Ciudad Rodrigo and advance on Abrantes was no longer feasible. He had no idea where Soult was, since the Galician insurgents had by now severed such communications that had survived the attentions of Wilson's men, and he decided that his best move was to fight his way south and join Victor. To do this he needed to seize the Roman bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara.¹¹ He achieved this with great skill by concentrating a considerable force before Ciudad Rodrigo as if he were about to do what he should have done weeks before. Wilson failed to recognise this as a feint and brought in his scattered posts to parry the thrust. Whereupon Lapisse struck suddenly southwards in the night. Wilson, who was joined by Mayne and the garrison of Bãnos, pursued closely, but was unable to prevent Lapisse from occupying Alcantara. There he was safe for the time being, and was again in communication with Victor. Tactically successful though Lapisse's southward march was, Napier may have been right in saying that 'this false movement greatly injured the French cause' for when Soult in Oporto extended his left wing to feel for the troops of the central prong which should have supported his further advance, they were far away massacring and mutilating the inhabitants of Alcantara before moving off to join Victor at Merida in mid-April. Lapisse never marched on Abrantes, Soult did not get beyond Oporto, and Victor hardly moved at all.

It was well for the Allied cause that someone in those first months of 1809 was willing to try and frustrate Napoleon's plans. Indeed there was very little else in the Emperor's way. Moore was dead and his army sailing home; the Portuguese army, in Cradock's words, scarcely deserved the name of a military force; the British troops under Cradock's command could hardly have defended Lisbon, let alone Portugal, not least because their Commander was timid and pessimistic, and fully accepted Moore's view that Portugal could not be defended against a superior force coming from Spain. So Cradock was obliged to make preparations to evacuate the country. He could not issue direct orders to Wilson to retreat because Wilson was nominally in the Portuguese service, but he did 'suggest' that Wilson's British officers should rejoin their countrymen round Lisbon. 'The situation of yourself and the English gentlemen attached to the Legion,' wrote Cradock's secretary,

¹¹ A detailed study about the Bridge at Alcantara can be found at [River Crossings in the Peninsular War: the Bridge at Alcantara](#)

'appears to be very embarrassing and it would be difficult for his Excellency to hazard with any chance of being right, a suggestion upon the line of Conduct they should pursue. The determination is of a nature so exclusively personal that it would seem to rest solely with the Breasts of the individual concerned.' Wilson did not find the situation in the least embarrassing and replied that as he had not heard of any intention on the part of the British government to abandon Spain, he had no intention of doing so either; he was acquainted with the situation of the enemy in front of him and would maintain his ground with the Spaniards until he had orders to withdraw. He was conscious of the serious damage to the Spaniard's morale that a retreat would cause and he proposed to stay where he was until the last moment. He asked that his decision should be attributed not to obstinacy, but to 'a sober reflecting perseverance.'

'When retreat is necessary', he went on 'and when honour sanctions the measure, I must conform, but I certainly prefer to defend the last ruin and therefore am inclined in such a misfortune to make for Andalusia.' He evidently had no thought at all of quitting the Peninsula. His officers, to whom he left the decision whether to stay with him, agreed with his view and decided, as one of them put it, that it would be 'disgraceful ... and inconsistent with the honour of a British soldier to desert their comrade.' This exchange took place towards the end of January, and Cradock repeated his 'suggestions' on several subsequent occasions, but he bore no resentment over Wilson's rejection of his advice. Indeed he praised his 'indefatigable exertions' and spoke warmly of him in his despatches.

General Beresford was appointed to post of commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army in February 1809, only a month after he had returned from the Corunna expedition. He at once set sail for Lisbon and took up the command ere three weeks had expired since his appointment. At last Wilson had a master, for Beresford became his direct superior. He lost no time in setting up a Portuguese army headquarters at Thomar and on 24 March ordered Wilson to hand over the command of the Legion and report to him. Wilson was shattered; he had expected to have been allowed to continue his detached activities supporting the Spanish General Cuesta.

Now he was summoned like a junior officer to attend the headquarters of a man whom he knew to be a capable but rather orthodox and ordinary soldier. In the event his services and those of the Legion were needed and appreciated in the advance against Soult at Oporto. As Oman explains, it was first necessary to provide a 'containing force, to hold back Victor, in case he should make an unexpected move down the Tagus or the Guadina. For this purpose Wellesley told off the 2nd Brigade of Mackenzie together with two regiments of heavy cavalry and an extra one of infantry to take post at Abrantes. As an outlying post on this front Wellesley ordered Colonel Mayne

with the Lusitanian Legion and a militia regiment to occupy Alcantara; he was to break its bridge if forced out of position.

Wilson, who had been removed from command of the Legion by Beresford, was to take a force of Portuguese from Almeida, amounting, apparently, to two battalions and cover join Beresford's advance of the right wing.

As Wellesley had surmised, Marshal Victor, in Estremadura, had been ordered to execute a diversion in favour of Soult when he should hear that 2nd Corps was on its way to Lisbon. However the Portuguese and Galician insurgents had succeeded in maintaining a complete blockade of Soult, so that the French command in Spain was completely in the dark as to the moment when Victor might be called upon to advance. Victor was only stirred up into spasmodic activity at the beginning of May by the news that a Portuguese force had crossed the frontier and occupied Alcantara, where the great Roman bridge¹² across the Tagus provided a line of communication between north-western and central Estremadura. This little force not exceeding 2,000 men consisted of the 1st Battalion of the Legion, which had been brought down from the passes of the Sierra de Gata, a single regiment of the newly-raised militia – that of the frontier district of Idanha, together with the six guns of the battery of the Legion and a solitary squadron of the 11th Regiment of Cavalry. But rumour magnified its strength and Victor jumped to the conclusion that it formed the vanguard of a Portuguese army which was intending to concert a combined operation with Cuesta, by threatening the communications of the 1st Corps while the Spaniards attacked its front.

Labouring under this delusion, Victor took the division of Lapisse and a brigade of dragoons and marched against Alcantara on the 11th May, the same day that Wellesley's army arrived before Oporto. At 8 o'clock of the 14th, as he approached the river from Brozas, he was met by Mayne's vedettes under Lt-Col Grant¹³, whom he soon drove in to the gates of the little town. Alcantara being situated on the south side of the Tagus, it is impossible to defend it; but Mayne had barricaded and mined the bridge, planted his guns so as to command the passage and constructed trenches for his infantry along the northern bank. After seizing the town, Victor opened a heavy fire of artillery with 8 and 12 pounders and musketry against the Portuguese detachment.

It was met by a vigorous return from the further bank which lasted for more than three hours before the defence began to flag. (*possibly from a shortage of ammunition?*) The Marshal very properly refused to send forward his

¹² Dedicated to Trajan (Augustus Caesar).

¹³ In a letter dated 25th April from Col D'Urban, Quarter-Master General, to Col Mayne he states 'Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, who was on his way to Sir R Wilson, has been directed by the Marshal to join you, as I am aware of the great assistance you will derive from his commanding your cavalry and out-posts.'

infantry to attempt to storm the bridge till his artillery should have silenced that of the defenders.

At about midday the 1,200 Idanha militia¹⁴ deserted their trenches and fled. At one o'clock Mayne fired his mine in the bridge, but unhappily for him the tough Roman cement defied even the power of gunpowder¹⁵; only one side of the arch was shattered; the crown of the vault held firm and the passage was still possible. The Legion (*now down to 500 men*) still kept its ground, though it had lost many men.

Mayne described what happened next in his despatch to Major-General Mackenzie:

I had only one resort, which was to give Lieutenant-Colonel Grant the command of the main battery, as the only means of preventing the enemy immediately pressing upon me while I effected a retreat. The cavalry of Almeida being reduced by fatigue from 50 to 20 were no cover to me, I therefore thought it advisable to sacrifice one field-piece for the security of the three others and the two howitzers; finding Lieutenant-Colonel Grant very ready to undertake the fighting of the main battery with this one piece, I moved away the other five¹⁶, and he did this from two o'clock to three; and I should be doing little justice to his magnanimity to say that he met with my most grateful approbation. Alcantara can never be named but he with it must be remembered.

Our ammunition being nearly wasted, and our killed and wounded surrounding us, it was absolutely necessary to adopt this mode of retreat with the few brave Lusitanians that were left; and to secure my artillery, the remaining gun was spiked and rendered of no use to the enemy on Lieutenant-Colonel Grant's leaving it to its fate – after he had continued to fire it for one hour to the great deception of the enemy, giving me time enough to pass the plain country, before the enemy's cavalry appeared on the Alcantara side of the Bridge of Seguro.'

The Bridge of Seguro (another Roman bridge) is only two leagues distant to the rear, over the Rio Erges. The movement was covered by a rearguard with the cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel Grant.

After the action at Alcantara, the Prior of the Military Order of Alcantara insisted on taking the Cross of the Order from his own breast and affixing it to Colonel Mayne's. In a General Order dated 27th May 1809, Marshal Beresford praised the action:

¹⁴ Oman states that they 'had already suffered not inconsiderable losses' whilst Mayne lists 3 officers and 40 men killed, 1 officer and 17 men wounded with 4 officers and 1150 men missing.

¹⁵ Even with modern explosives, Roman bridges are still very difficult to destroy.

¹⁶ Oman states that one of the guns was dismantled and the rest silenced by French artillery.

The army will see, that although troops are sometimes obliged to retreat, at the same time they may cover themselves with glory, and merit the greatest praise. This battalion, and their brave commandant, made a noble defence, and then a firm retreat in the greatest order.

The Portuguese officers of the Legion later present Colonel Mayne with a commemorative sword.

Oman continues that when Victor hurled the leading brigade of Lapisse's division at the bridge he succeeded in forcing it. Mayne drew off his legionaries in good order and retreated to the Pass of Salvaterra, leaving behind him a gun and more than 250 killed and wounded – a heavy loss from the 1,000 men of the single battalion which bore the whole brunt of the fighting.¹⁷

Victor went no further than Alcantara, having satisfied himself that the Portuguese force which had made such a creditable resistance consisted of a single weak brigade, and did not form the vanguard of an army bent on invading Estremadura. After remaining for no more than three days at Alcantara, and trying in vain to obtain news of the whereabouts of Soult – who was at that moment being hunted past Guimaraens and Braga in the far north – the Marshal drew back his troops to Torremocha near Caceres. In a letter which was later intercepted, Victor declared that, in the course of his service, he had never witnessed more intrepidity than was evinced by these young Portuguese soldiers at the battle of Alcantara.

At this stage¹⁸ the second battalion made its belated appearance at last, having been detained in Oporto first by lack of clothing, then by the Bishop and finally by their involvement in Soult's rout of the Portuguese defensive screen which had tried to prevent his capture of the city in the spring.¹⁹

The overall commander of the Portuguese in that disastrous action had been Baron Eben, Wilson's original second-in-command, but he did not now rejoin his old chief. Perhaps he had heard that the first battalion were referring to his men as 'Eben's Runaways.' This unfortunate and scattered division directed their course to Lisbon and Captain Lille was detached from the first division to that city for the purpose of reassembling them and marching them to join

¹⁷ Rank & File, 103 killed, 143 wounded & 15 missing.

Officers killed : Capt Vallente, Lieutenants Jose Louis de Brito; wounded : Lieut Col Grant, slightly, Capts Jeronimo Pereira & Felix Mendoxa, badly, Joachim de Costa, slightly, Lieut Beltron, badly.

¹⁸ The precise time that the second battalion joined is a bit unclear. Mayne & Lillie describe it before the Combat of Alcantara, however Beresford's General Order specifically mentions the first battalion. It is possible that Lillie set off for Lisbon before it all started.

¹⁹ Letter from Wilson to Castlereagh, Thomar, 18th April 1809 "the Bishop of Oporto, now Patriarch of Lisbon, had given a positive order for its (the LLL's) clothing ... would not permit any article of the Legion's clothing to be forwarded to me – it has since fallen in the enemy's hands" PRO, FO 63/81.

Colonel Mayne when completed with arms, appointments, etc, which, after a little time, was effected and when they joined the first division they amounted to 800 rank and file.

In the meantime, Wilson's small independent brigade under Beresford seems to have done more marching than fighting and in the following weeks Wilson became rather despondent about his future with the Legion and on 23rd May offered to resign. Wilson then learnt that plans were being made which included a satisfactory role for him and the Legion so on 2nd June he wrote a gracious letter acknowledging Beresford's kindness and agreeing to continue to serve.

Wellesley planned to strike boldly at Victor towards Madrid, and Wilson, with the Legion and the 5th Regiment of Portuguese Caçadores under command, was to form the northern flank guard of his army. 'The appointment,' he wrote 'heals all my woes and reconciles me to service in the Peninsula.' He threw himself with great gusto into the work of preparing the Legion for its exacting task. His presence was very necessary, for Mayne had absented himself without explanation and the force seems to have gone to pieces. The men were dirty, ragged and unpaid, and that had indeed been officially reported as unfit for service. Within a few days Wilson had had '800 pr of trowsers made, 300 pr gaiters, all the jackets mended, the Hairs Cut, the bodies purified and then decked with 600 new shirts and the Feet consoled with as many pr of Shoes.' He exercised the men night and morning. With the prospect of action all was forgotten and Wilson was able to write, 'I noticed my *old* Legion worthy of itself. The jackets covered with leather suited well the soldier-like countenance and Veteran hue of the men. Their white trowsers and gaiters gave them an air of Lightness and Gaiety which was more congenial to the smiling Fortunes of the time and the commencing Spring Season.'

He marched on 4th July, promising to do more mischief to the French with the Legion alone than the whole British army was then doing. In the first two days he covered sixty-eight miles. On the 10th he had a gratifying interview with Wellesley who told him that Cuesta had spoken highly of him and was sending two Spanish battalions to join the Legion. Wilson was delighted with his new Spanish battalions, the Merida and Sevilla, except that they were reluctant to ford rivers – a serious handicap in such a campaign. He got over the difficulty by issuing a proclamation suggesting that the ladies of Merida and Seville might be surprised to learn that mere water could deter those whom the bullets of the enemy could not – a typical Wilson alternative to the lash. He reached Escalona on 23rd July, but here again the temptation to push on and to disobey orders proved irresistible.

On 26th he entered Navalcarnero to the great alarm of the French; they were already facing the joint force of Wellesley and Cuesta at Talavera and a

potential threat from a Spanish force under Venegas coming up from the south; now they found Wilson behind their right rear with a corps which they estimated at 8-10,000. Though troops which should have gone to Talavera were sent to contain him, he resolved to press on. To the now continuous cheers of the crowds by the way, he marched down from Navalcarnero on the almost defenceless capital – almost defenceless because King Joseph had marched out to join Victor at Talavera – and reached Mostoles, only fifteen miles from its gates. His dream had nearly come true. But before he could summon the city to surrender, as he intended to do, he was ordered by Wellesley to bring his corps back to Escalona and to go in person to meet Wellesley and Cuesta at Talavera. The great battle had taken place and resulted in a victory for the allied armies; and Wellesley, so far from reproaching Wilson for exceeding his instructions, received him cordially and reported to Castlereagh that he had made himself very useful.

The difficulty was that Wellesley's communications were threatened. In striking eastwards from Portugal towards Madrid he was aware that Soult in the north was a potential threat, but he believed that Soult's army had been so badly mauled at Oporto and in the subsequent retreat that he would be incapable of moving fast enough and with sufficient force to constitute a serious danger to the British communications. He now learnt that Soult was threatening Bãnos and he was reluctant to press on to Madrid, or allow Wilson to do so, until he knew the exact nature of Soult's threat. However he sent Wilson back to Escalona and added that he might go nearer to the capital if circumstances permitted. No sooner had Wilson left than serious news began to come in; first that Soult had actually got through the pass at Bãnos and was nearing Plasencia, and then that he had been joined by Ney, whom Wellesley believed to be far away in Galicia, and he had 40,000 men under command. A retreat through Plasencia, by which Wellesley had come, was no longer practicable, though the more southerly road through Badajoz was unlikely to be seriously threatened provided that Wellesley moved fast.

So Wilson went off gaily to maintain his position above Madrid, while the rest of the allied army prepared to retreat. He captured a courier on 3rd August, from whom he learnt that Soult was at Bãnos, but he had no idea that Ney was with him. It was some days before he found out the true state of affairs, and then his position was critical. The French had sent a division under General Villatte to attack him from the east, and Soult and Ney lay across his line of retreat. But Wilson was a true partisan leader; finding that Talavera had already been evacuated by the allies, he struck westwards in the hope of overtaking Wellesley on the march. But Villatte caught him up and he turned towards the mountains, with the aim of escaping along the northern bank of the Tietar. Here (Aldea Nueva de la Vera) he learned from Spanish peasants that Soult had detached General Foy from Plasencia to look for him, and that the Governor of Avila had marched down to block his escape northwards.

Although almost completely hemmed in, he kept his nerve and struck north into the Sierra de Gredos, snow-capped, rugged and generally thought to be impassable to armies.²⁰ He had to fight his way through several French posts in the mountain villages,²¹ but on 11th August he emerged at the pass of Bãnos and continued south-west along the main road to Aldea Nueva del C, before branching west, taking the direction of Portugal.

As Mayne described it 'We were proceeding on the road to Grenadilha from the Puerte de Baines on the morning of the 12th of August, when a column of the enemy was discovered to be on the march, taking the direction of Baines from Placentia.' Here his talents as a partisan were overborne by his thirst for glory. It was Marshal Ney with 10-12,000 men returning from Soult's army at Plasencia and heading north for Salamanca. There was no valid reason why Wilson should try to stop them; they were marching away from the British further south, they greatly outnumbered his own force and he was without artillery. But it would be too much to expect a man of Wilson's temperament to stand aside; and after all, one of the objects of war is to damage and destroy the enemy. So Wilson gave battle.

Mayne continues his graphic narrative

leaving his advance under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant at Aldea Nueva, about a league in front of Baines, with two companies of Spanish infantry(Wilson reported these as two hundred men) placed in ambush, who suddenly made their appearance on the arrival of the enemy's advanced cavalry, and saluted them with a well directed volley of musketry, which did such considerable execution that they were obliged to return briskly on the main body again; however, they afterwards pushed on in considerable force and by extending round the flanks of our advance, obliged them to retire on Baines, which they did in a very regular manner, keeping up a brisk and destructive fire on the advancing enemy from behind the rocks, walls, etc, until they joined the main body in their rear, when the action became general.

Whilst the main road continued over the Pass of Bãnos the position could be turned by the road of Monte Major to the west and by a minor road to the east. Wilson's official report, written on the following day, continues

At this time Don Carlos Marquis de Espaine came up with his battalion of light infantry, and in a most gallant manner took post along the

²⁰ Samuel states that he was forced to abandon his guns, but Mayne states that Wilson had received orders to leave his artillery with the British army previous to their movement from Talavera).

²¹ Mayne describes how they attacked through the town of Viranda (possibly Jarandilla de la Vera), attained the Sierra Llana and ascended the high passes. They then proceeded via Boyoyo & Barco d'Avila to Bejar and Baines. Oman states that they turned up into the Sierra de Gredos by a mule path that leads from Aldea Nueva to the upper valley of the Alagon in the direction of Bejar.

heights commanding the road of Baines, which enabled me to send some of the Merida battalion on the mountains on our left, commanding the main road, and which the enemy had tried to ascend.

This battalion of light infantry, and the detachment of the Legion on its right, continued, notwithstanding the enemy's fire of artillery and musketry, to maintain their ground; but, at six o'clock in the evening, three columns of the enemy mounted the heights on our left, gained it, and poured such a fire on the troops below, that longer defence was impracticable, and the whole was obliged to retire on the mountains on our left, leaving open the main road, along which a considerable column of cavalry immediately poured.

The battalion of Seville had been left at Bejar with orders to follow me next day; but when I was obliged to return and the action commenced, I ordered it to Puerte de Baines to watch the Monte Major road and the heights in the rear of our left.

They did not rally until the next day, but Ney admitted to the loss of thirty-five killed and a hundred and fifty wounded, and it was generally believed by the British that the French were in the habit of putting their losses at about one third of the true figure.

Wilson lost under 400 killed, wounded or missing. After rallying his men Wilson resumed his westward march by Miranda del Castanas, through the Pass of Peralis and rejoined the allied armies at Castello Branco on 24th August.

He duly reported to Wellesley on his affair with Ney, and Wellesley sent his report to Castlereagh under cover of one of his own. Wellesley's despatch ends with the following paragraphs:

I enclose Sir Robert Wilson's account of the action. He as well as the other British officers of his corps, have been very active, intelligent and useful in command of the Portuguese and Spanish corps with which they were detached from the army.

Before the battle of 28th July (Talavera) he had pushed his party almost to the gates of Madrid, with which city he was in communication; and he would have been in Madrid, if I had not thought it proper to call him in, in expectation of that general action which took place on 28th July. He afterwards alarmed the enemy on the right of his army; and throughout the service showed himself an active and intelligent partisan, well acquainted with the country in which he was acting, and possessing the confidence of the troops which he commanded.

Being persuaded that his retreat was not open by Arzobispo, he acted right in taking the road he did, with which he was well acquainted; and though unsuccessful in the action which he fought (which may well be accounted for by the numbers and description on the enemy's troops) the action, in my opinion, does him great credit.

Wilson in his despatch reported that he had been 'obliged to retire on the mountains' and laments that he could no longer arrest the progress of the enemy, but he did not say – and it appears to have been the case – that his men, after a creditable resistance, simply took to their heels and disappeared into the mountains, accompanied, of course, by their commander. According to Lord Londonderry, this had been previously arranged, and as the men rallied again the next day and marched westward on good order, this seems probable. It was no doubt a good guerrilla tactic for a parade-ground withdrawal in the circumstances would have almost certainly have resulted in much heavier losses, particularly from the enemy's cavalry and guns.

Wilson's force was not the only group to have been isolated by the retreat of the main British army after Talavera. Mayne and Lillie's account describes that 'On Marshal Soult's unexpected entrance into Placentia, about five hundred of the Legion who had been detached in the neighbourhood of that place, under the command of Captain

Lillie, were near being cut off, together with a British detachment of about an equal number, under Captain Tuckett of the 3rd Foot. Some few British soldiers and officers fell into the enemy's hands in Placentia and some stores. However these detachments, amounting to nearly one thousand men, were of considerable service in protecting other British stores. Whilst the British detachment moved out at night, the detachment of the Legion escorted a large convoy of stores under the charge of Mr James, purveyor to the forces, back to Marshal Beresford's forces. After spending some further time deployed in advance of Marshal Beresford's Portuguese army they later rejoined the main body of the Legion at Castello Branco.

The affair at Puerto de Baños was Wilson's last service in the Peninsula War. For twelve months he had worked and fought without rest. He had raised, trained and equipped his Legion in the face of enormous difficulties, political, administrative and personal. His officers were not of high quality, and the inspiration, the infectious enthusiasm, came from Wilson. When he was away the Legion deteriorated.

After the training came months of guerrilla warfare in the mud and rain of the Sierras, followed by the shock and disappointment at finding himself marching and counter-marching at Beresford's command, just another

subordinate officer with no freedom of action. From the near despair of this period he was back in the clouds again when he was restored to the Legion with an important part to play. Though the Talavera campaign temporarily restored his spirits, by the time he reached the Portuguese frontier depression had set in again.

There could well have been an element of mental exhaustion, of battle-fatigue, in his condition, mingled with professional frustration, for under Beresford's supervision there was no prospect of his spending the coming winter as he had spent the last, beating up French convoys and insulating their outposts. Both Oman and Fortescue maintain that there was a bitter quarrel with Beresford concerning the status of 'his Lusitanian Legion' in the Portuguese army.

He probably was also aware that under Wellesley there would be no scope for his particular talents or his insubordination. Even so, later in 1809, Wellington wrote, 'I should like to have Sir Robert Wilson on this side of the Tagus in our front. We must have somebody within the Spanish frontier; and we ought to have with this army some troops belonging to the country. Sir Robert is much liked here, and I should prefer him to anybody else.' But he had left in October and never returned to Portugal.

Capt Lillie continues with the narrative:

Sir Robert Wilson and Colonel Mayne had both obtained a short leave of absence for the purpose of going to England to make a satisfactory arrangement, if possible, respecting the Loyal Lusitanian Legion in Portugal, that corps having hitherto been paid, clothed and appointed by the British Government exclusively, and not like the other part of the Portuguese army, to which it had been attached. As it was not perfectly understood on what establishment it was to be considered, Sir Robert Wilson proceeded to England for a decision on this important point.

In the meantime, the Portuguese were continuing to be organised under Marshal Beresford and the British officers, it was the fate of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion to experience the severe effects of their uncertain establishment²²; and in the absence of Sir Robert Wilson, the privations resulting there from, which might also have proceeded from a little jealousy in a certain powerful quarter (*Beresford*). Surely the Legion did not deserve to be left neglected in the neighbourhood of Castello Branco, which country was exhausted in point of provisions by the different large armies which had lately moved in that direction, or to be deprived of the other advantages which the rest of the Portuguese army were then enjoying with respect to their comforts,

²² In late 1809 the 1st battalion mustered 877 men and the 2nd had 749.

Lieutenant-Colonel Grant commanding the 1st Battalion was now senior officer. per Rene Chartrand

clothing, appointments, etc. From these circumstances it is easily to be imagined in what state the Legion naturally appeared after a few months, being badly provided with rations, and in perfect want of all kinds of necessaries, clothing and appointments. Their drilling and discipline on the British system was likewise at this time much neglected.

Marshal Beresford having declined to acknowledge or confirm the appointments of the British officers of the corps who had served with it ever since its organisation, and prevented their pay being issued for their services, notwithstanding that the pay of the Portuguese officer and soldiers who belonged to the corps was at this period issued from the Portuguese treasury.

In the month of December following, some information officially arrived, that Sir Robert Wilson had effected an arrangement with the British government by which the Loyal Lusitanian Legion was to be placed on the British establishment. Consequently a communication was made to Lord Wellington by the government at home, requiring a report from his Lordship, with his opinion of the appearance, discipline and utility of the corps previous to the conclusion of the arrangements that were at this time promised to Sir Robert Wilson. It was conceived his Lordship had some reason for not wishing to interfere on this occasion, and that, from judicious regard to the feelings of the Portuguese army in general, he chose to avoid making any distinction in favour of the Legion, and he referred the communications to Marshal Beresford, desiring him, as more immediately connected with the Portuguese army, to make and forward the report of the state of the Legion at that period, for the satisfaction of the British government. Thus the Marshal was afforded an opportunity of satisfying any desire or wishes he might have entertained with respect to the corps.

The report his Excellency Marshal Sir William Beresford under such circumstances thought proper to make (*does one detect a note of irony here?*) of the Legion after General Hamilton's return from Castello Branco may easily be imagined. Though the selection could not have fallen on a more able, active or intelligent officer, yet it was impossible that the Legion could appear in an effective state after having been so long neglected in every respect²³. Such, however, was the report transmitted by Marshal Beresford that the project of placing the Legion on the British establishment was frustrated and, in consequence of this result, Sir Robert Wilson and Colonel Mayne did not return.

²³ By January 1810 when inspected the 1st battalion had 792 officers and men and the 2nd had increased to significantly to 1,146. 'I had expected a much more respectable Corps. The first is tolerable, the second bad – tho' dressed as light troops they have not practiced the movements, indeed I think they are much behind in discipline' The officers and men were considered good material, but until they could be properly trained in light infantry manoeuvres they were really troops of the line. The emphasis was thus placed on training. Per Rene Chartrand

After this the corps was brought further into the interior of Portugal, with the few British officers that at the time remained, who were considerably disheartened and dissatisfied after their active services to find themselves so little attended to. Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, a very deserving and promising officer, was employed by Lord Wellington in obtaining information of the enemy's movements, etc²⁴, and the others (who were neither permitted by the Marshal hitherto to hold their respective ranks in the Legion or to join their British regiments) were detached about the country, not well knowing what to do with themselves under this extraordinary and undeserved neglect. After some time had elapsed they were gazetted in their respective ranks and ordered to march with the corps to Thomar where it received the clothing and appointments which had some time before been sent from England. Here each battalion was recruited and completed to 1,000 strong and an addition number of British officers attached to them²⁵. Lieutenant-Colonel Hawkshaw commanded the corps at Thomar for some time until Baron Eben was again appointed in Sir Robert Wilson's place. The Legion now formed part of a division (*the 5th Division*) which was formed at Thomar under Major-General Leith, covering central Portugal.

On 7th June 1810 a disgruntled Wellington wrote to Lord Liverpool "...Lusitanian Legion never could have been completed in Portugal ... by volunteers or upon bounty ... the whole army in Portugal is raised by requisition, and in point of fact, the battalions of the Lusitanian Legion have been kept up by requisition ... This fact is decisive upon the question referred for consideration ... the mode of recruiting the corps subsequently adopted would ... have transferred it to the service of Portugal." He considers that Beresford should organise as he wishes, approves his measures regarding Sir Robert Wilson's unreasonable requests, considers Major Mayne "very objectionable" and that "I consider Mr Mayne to be a deserter from the services of the Prince Regent (*of Portugal*) and a debtor to the state for a considerable amount ..." "Sir Robert Wilson has been for some time absent from this Army without leave ...has pay should be discontinued..."²⁶

²⁴ There were two Grants who operated in this role – Lieut-Col John Grant, LLL and Capt Colquhoun Grant 11th.

In *Dispatches* John Grant is usually referred to as Lieut-Col Grant. He was captured near Plasencia in Sept 1811 but was released by Temprano's guerrillos a few weeks later and probably returned to England then. Colquhoun Grant, promoted Brevet-major 30 May 1811 may safely be identified if his rank is mentioned. He was captured in April 1812 but after many vicissitudes succeeded in reaching the Peninsula again before February 1814, when he was appointed to the QMG's Department, *vice* Surgeon, killed.

From *Wellington's Headquarters* by SGP Ward.

²⁵ They were now to be incorporated into Beresford's Portuguese army and reorganised as standard battalions of ten companies – simply two light infantry battalions. Per Rene Chartrand.

²⁶ PRO, WO 1/244

Marshal Massena united the different corps of his army for the purpose of entering Portugal, while the allies made corresponding movements for form a junction for his opposition, which junction was effected conformable to the judicious arrangements of the commander in chief Lord Wellington where the detached divisions of the allied army under Generals Hill and Leith united to the main body on its arriving at that formidable position²⁷.

The French attacked on the morning of this junction (*27th September 1810 at Bussaco*), the allied forces, with what was stiled the Army of Portugal; and on this occasion the allies obtained a most brilliant and glorious victory. General Leith's division particularly distinguished itself in the engagement by a gallant charge of the bayonet on a column of the enemy which had succeeded in gaining the heights on the right, but was instantly routed from it by the gallantry of General Leith and his division. The conduct of the Portuguese troops here was eminently conspicuous; the Loyal Lusitanian Legion and the 8th Portuguese Regiment, which had never before been engaged, joined in the charge of the bayonet under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas and Major Birmingham as gallantly as if they had been veterans.²⁸

(After retreating to the Lines of Torres Vedras the Legion formed part of General Campbell's 6th Division.)

Lord Wellington saw the Legion and inspected it himself for the first time when attached to the 6th Division at Alemquer, in February 1811. After a most minute inspection and seeing them go through some evolutions, march past, etc, his Lordship expressed his surprise at the fine appearance of the corps, stating that he had hitherto been led to entertain quite a different idea with respect to it from the reports that had been made to him. He particularly admires their fine soldier-like appearance and observed to Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, who happened to have temporary command of the Legion on that day "that they carried their arms like soldiers and in their '*tout ensemble*' looked like veterans."

²⁷ Oman follows Leith in his report (*Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, vi. 636*) giving the following brigading, although the number of LLL battalions is incorrectly stated as three :

Barnes's Brigade :

1 st Foot, 3 rd battalion, Major Gordon	768
9 th Foot, 1 st battalion, Lt-Col Cameron	615
38 th Foot, 2 nd battalion, Lt-Col Nugent	496

Spry's Portuguese Brigade :

3 rd Line (two battalions)	1134
15 th Line (two battalions)	905
Thomar Militia (attached)	508
8 th Line (two battalions) Colonel Douglas	1161

Loyal Lusitanian Legion (two battalions) 1646

²⁸ Whilst Lillie gives the impression that the Legion took part in the bayonet charge with the 8th Portuguese Regiment. However Lt-Col GL Chambers includes Leith's report in which he states 'the Lusitanian Legion to remain in column behind that part of the ridge which concealed its movements and ... be ready to support, near the road, the Portuguese Artillery ... and the 8th and 9th Portuguese Regiments.'

During the active pursuit of Marshal Massena's army (*the Spring of 1811*) the battalions of the Legion were separated; the 1st joined the 4th Division on its being ordered from the British army to reinforce the troops under Marshal Beresford in the Alentejo; The 2nd Battalion joined the 5th Division (*Major-General Sir William Erskin*) and remained with Lord Wellington which afterwards distinguished itself in the engagement at Fuentes d'Honor, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Offley, who was appointed to it from the 23rd Fusileers. This 2nd battalion (*formerly called Baron Eben's Runaways*)²⁹ when a column on the enemy manifest an intention of getting round the left of the allied army, engaged at Fuentes d'Honor, by crossing the river Duas Casas at Aldea de Bispo on the 6th of May, was ordered to ford the river under enemy's fire and dislodge him from a height he had taken possession of on the opposite side of the river, which service was executed in a most gallant and satisfactory manner.

The 1st Battalion under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hawkshaw signalled itself most particularly in the south. It sustained a great loss in the sieges of Olivenza and Badajos; and its loss at the hard contested Battle of Albuera (*16 May*) exceeded considerably that of the entire of the Portuguese troops on that memorable day.

This battalion was called forward (previous to the important advance of the 4th Division) and attached to the gallant Fusileer Brigade. The Fusileer Brigade advanced in line, having its right flank covered from the enemy's cavalry by a Portuguese brigade (*the line regiments of Harvey's Brigade*). The Lusitanian Legion fought on the left wing for some time. The enemy maintained his ground on the heights flanked by artillery which kept up a tremendous fire on us, and, as we advanced, did considerable execution; but at length on our coming within a few yards of the columns they gave way with the greatest precipitation, notwithstanding the exertions of their officers to prevent it. The Fusileer Brigade and Loyal Lusitanian Legion which did not exceed three thousand men when they advanced to the charge could only muster one thousand effective men when they formed on the rising grounds from which they had driven the enemy.³⁰

Thus ended the services of the patriotic and brave officers and soldiers who composed the Loyal Lusitanian Legion who were shortly afterwards formed

²⁹ Note that in Oman this 2nd Battalion is described as already being the 8th Caçadores (one battalion) with a strength of 484 officers and men. Whilst technically this is correct as the decree disbanding the Legion was dated 11th April, from Lillie's account it would appear that the regiment was not actually broken up until after the Battles of Fuentes de Onoro and Albuera

³⁰ Meyer's Brigade	Present	Killed	%
1/7 th Fusileers	714	357	50
2/7 th Fusileers	568	349	61
1/23 rd RW Fusileers	733	339	46
1 st Loyal Lusitanian Legion	572	171	30

into Caçadores battalions and their name and uniforms so changed that the existence of the corps can hardly be traced in the present Portuguese army.

In his final paragraph, Captain Lillie³¹ presents a fitting eulogy:

The corps retained its military character to the last; and as its final spark was extinguished so soon after the Battle of Albuera, it may be justly said that it gloriously died there, regaining the trophies of that uncertain day and maintaining to the last its character and renown in its untimely end.

Both battalions were by now very much below strength. Beresford felt that more battalions of light troops were needed in the Portuguese army and Wellington agreed. To fill this need, Beresford called on the Loyal Lusitanian Legion for a final service. On 20th April 1811 the raising of six new Caçadores battalions had been authorised. By the same decree the Loyal Lusitanian Legion was disbanded so that its officers and men could be used to form the 7th, 8th and 9th Caçadores battalions.

Epilogue

In his *Present State of Portugal*, published in 1812, Halliday describes these regiments as follows :

The Seventh Battalion of Caçadores was formerly the First Battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion. It was organised in 1811 and has behaved most gallantly on several occasions; and it has been commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hawkshaw (commissioned 12th March 1810), late of the Thirty-first Regiment, since its formation.

The Eighth Battalion was also formed from the Lusitanian Legion, but was by no means so respectable a corps in the first instance, as the last mentioned. It was commanded on its first formation by the late Major Offley, of the Twenty-third Fusiliers, who was indefatigable in his exertions to bring it to perfection, and who left it as a fine battalion as any in the service. At present it is commanded by Major Hill, under whom it behaved in a most gallant manner at the battle of Salamanca.

The Ninth Battalion was partly formed from the Lusitanian Legion and partly recruited at Lamego. It is commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel George Brown, complete in every respect and in excellent order. This battalion is brigaded with the Eighth and Twelfth Regiments of Infantry.

³¹ Even though *The Narrative*, written by Mayne & Lillie, was published in 1812 and was openly critical of Marshal Beresford's generalship at the Battle of Albuera, Lillie apparently managed to survive any backlash of bad feeling from the Marshal.

Halliday also lists the British officers who are serving with the rank of Captain in the Portuguese Army :

7 th Caçadores	Dates of Commissions
John Scott Lillie	17 th December 1808 ³²
R.W. Torrens	11 th February 1811
____ O'Hara	6 th June 1811
8 th Caçadores	
Charles Western	27 th December 1808 ³³
Baron Daubraw	28 th January 1809 ³⁴
9 th Caçadores	
John Leitch	26 th July 1811

The Portuguese Officers who had subscribed to the commemorative sword for Colonel Mayne were as follows:

Tenente Coronel	Joao Paes de Sande de Castro
Capitao Mandate	Filippe Jacob Velosa Horta
Capitao Ajudante	Elias da Costa e Almeida
Capitao	Jose Pinto Sa Vedra e Nevile
	Francisco de Paula Razado
	Joao Pinto da Orunha Sa Vedra
	Francisco Joaquim Pereira Valente
	Thomaz Joaquim Pereira Valente
	Pedro Celestino de Barros
	Joao Jose Gomes da Silva
Capitao Quartel Mestre	Jose Estanislao d'Almeida Rolin
Tenente	Carlos Jose Francozi
	Joaquim Pinto e Souza
	Antonio Carlos Pereira da Silva
	Federico Cezar de Freitas
	Jorge da Fonseca
	Andre Camacho Jorge Barboza
	Jose Bernardino de Sousa Castro
Alferes	Jose Cazimiro Pereira da Rocha
	Jose Ribeiro Pinto de Moura
Brigade de Artilheria	

³² This is the earliest date of commission by a British officer still in Portuguese service. He became Major of the 7th Caçadores and remained with them until the end of the war in 1814.

³³ Another of the original LLL group of founding officers – see above.

³⁴ Not among those of the first group, but the third earliest British officer commissioned into the Portuguese Army.

Major Commandante
1° Tenente
2° Tenente

Alferes

Duclesiano Cabreira
Manoel Jose Ribeiro
Cento Marques
Thome Madeira
Joao Manoel d'Almeida

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