


BATTLE OF BLAAUWBERG 1806

SOUTH AFRICA ENTERS THE NAPOLEONIC WARS

By Dave Honour



THE BATTLE OF BLUEBERG.


8th January 1806.

The Battle previous to the Surrender of The Cape of Good Hope to Sir Home Popham and Sir David Baird.

Panel from an Engraving, published 4th June 1806, by Edward Orme, Printseller to His Majesty.

BACKGROUND

When talking about battles in the Napoleonic wars most people would immediately think of the big events. Waterloo, Trafalgar, Austerlitz all spring to mind, but nobody would ever mention Blaauwberg. To even think that the Southern tip of Africa was involved in the wars would seem ridiculous, after all this was a European conflict. Where is this unknown place, and how did it get involved in the wars of the northern hemisphere? The easiest answer to the question of why Africa became embroiled in the war is with a single word – commerce!



The Southern tip of the African continent was a strategic stronghold of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (*Dutch East India Company VOC*) and had been since the mid-1600s. Britain had been watching the area closely in the 1790s when it became apparent that Napoleon's alliance with the Dutch could result in a French fleet commanding the seas around the Cape. This would cause a big problem on trade with the East Indies, and following the loss of the American market, Britain desperately needed this route kept open.

Taking the Cape would require a lot of planning and strategy: the route south was not familiar to a lot of Captains as this was by-passed to achieve the favourable winds up to the East Indies. A number of attempts were made to land north of Cape Town at Saldanha Bay, which although unsuccessful, did provide much needed experience. Britain finally managed to land in August 1795, this time on the Eastern side of the Cape, at Simons Town. The 78th regiment were disembarked and headed along the sandy shores towards Cape Town. They were met along the way by the defending troops of the VOC at Muizenberg and a battle took place. Four Royal Navy ships supported the advance of the 78th who pushed the defending forces back towards the town, leaving deserted artillery pieces. The retreating VOC troops dug in on the route back to Cape Town, where a second advance by the British troops was repulsed giving the area today the name “*Retreat*”. Eventually, the power of the British soldiers overcame the bravery of the defenders, and they advanced all the way to the Dutch fortress under the slopes of Table Mountain.

The aftermath of the battle of Muizenberg gave Britain control of the Cape and the port in Table Bay provided security of the Southern Ocean from the French navy. Unfortunately for Britain, this was to be short-lived, in 1802 the Treaty of Amiens gave back the Cape to Holland which by now was known as the Batavian Republic. However, Britain was not going to give this up so easily, especially as the Batavians were under French control. It would be another year before Britain finally moved out of Cape Town and handed back control to the Dutch.

BATAVIAN BUILD UP

On 21 February 1803: Lieutenant-General Jan Willem Janssens and Commissioner General Jacob Abraham (Uitenhage) de Mist arrived in Cape Town from Europe, to take back the control of the Cape. Janssens was tasked with the security, and straight away understood that the weak treaty would not hold, and that Britain would be planning to return. His defence of the town and port was not an issue, due to the well protected castle, plus many gun batteries around the bay. The bigger problem was ground troops, for which he was limited to local militia and a regiment of descendants of indigenous people known as the Hottentot Light Infantry. Janssens immediately started to requisition from Amsterdam additional forces and was sent two regiments of Batavian soldiers for protection. Unfortunately: one of these, the 23rd Batavian, were sent on to the Dutch East Indies leaving Janssens with just the 22nd, amounting to 764 men in nine companies.

Further assistance arrived in the form of the 5th Waldeck Battalion, a mercenary troop from the Principality of Waldeck. These men, amounting to 584 in seven companies, gave Janssens a combined army of just over 3000, including the mobile 5th Horse Artillery Battalion of 23 field guns, manned by Javanese and Malay gunners from the batteries.


	Born 12 October 1762 in Nijmegen, Lieutenant-General Jan Willem Janssens was the Governor General of the Cape and Commander in Chief of the Batavian colony of the Cape of Good Hope. Returning to Batavia in June 1806 he was promoted to Secretary General of the Dept of War by Napoleon's brother Louis. Jan Willem Janssens died on 9th January 1838 aged 75 having attained the prestigious title Chancellor of the Orde van de Nederlandse Leeuw.
	Born 20th April 1749 in Zaltbommel, Netherlands, Jacob Abraham (Uitenhage) de Mist was an influential statesman in the formation of the Batavian Republic and appointed Head of State of the National Assembly on 17th April 1797. Following the Treaty of Amiens, in 1802, de Mist was appointed to journey to the Cape as Commissioner-General with General Janssens to take back control from the British General Dundas. With no military background and expecting a return of the British forces due to the unstable treaty agreement, de Mist relinquished control of the Cape to Janssens to allow him greater freedom for bolstering defences. He returned to his homeland in 1804 where he continued his career as a respected statesman.

BRITISH BUILD UP


Following the breakdown of the Treaty of Amiens and the return of the Cape to the Batavians, the British government decided that a task force would need to be sent south to recapture the strategic port at Cape Town. Napoleon was gaining power, and with the addition of the Spanish and Dutch fleets could soon be in a commanding position to control the vital East Indies route.

As with the Batavians, Britain called on two men to undertake the task of regaining Cape Town. Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird was appointed to command the army, with Captain Sir Home Riggs Popham in charge of the fleet.

Baird had knowledge of the Cape having been in Cape Town during the late 1790s on his return from India. He assessed his opposition as being able to amass an army of about 5000 men and requested that his attacking force would need to be of a strength about 6000. With Napoleon's forces in Europe increasing and an expected attempt to cross the channel, Baird was limited to an army of about 4500. This was made up of seven regiments of foot, a small squadron of dragoons and a small amount of artillery. With such a long journey ahead of them, certain necessities had to be planned for collection on the way, this included horses for the dragoons and artillery.



To take such a large contingent halfway around the world also required a lot of ships suited for the journey. Popham, a very influential naval career man and MP, was provided with nine ships of the line, including three 64 gun third raters and two gun-brigs as protection for the planned landings. To transport the men and provisions 54 transport ships were acquired from private companies and fitted out for the various requirements. In total Popham would be in command of a fleet numbering 63 ships.



Paramount to the success of the venture would be secrecy, although this would be difficult with so many ships and soldiers being combined in one place. French spies and sympathisers were known to exist in many ports, so detail of any destination was only provided to a few people. Officers and captains were not advised, although some were noting that many chosen had experience in South Africa.

THE VOYAGE SOUTH

In September 1805 the main fleet set sail from Cork in Ireland, with instructions to other faster ships leaving other English ports later that they were to unite in Madeira. Here the fleet combined with another flotilla heading for the West Indies, and the captains given sealed letters with the instruction that they were to open them a few days out of port. At the time and date, the letters were opened, and the captains discovered that they were splitting from the West Indies ships and their destination was now Cape Town, via South America.

The journey south would take three months with stops in San Salvador for purchasing horses for the dragoons. When leaving South America, they were still short of horses and had lost three ships in the process. However, on the 4 January 1806 the fleet was finally seen by the lookouts on Signal Hill above Cape Town and Lt-Gen Janssens knew he was soon to be under attack. He immediately set off signal cannons to inform the militia inland that they were to prepare and head for the town as soon as possible.



Just before Christmas 1805, two French ships, *Atlanta* and *Napoleon*, sailed into Table Bay and docked at the Castle. The news they had for Janssens was not good, they had passed a large British fleet sailing south which was obviously heading to the Cape. Janssens thanked the captains for the information and was pleased to have a further boost to his defence with the marines and sailors from the French ships. His feeling was that the British would probably attack, as they had previously, from the eastern side of the Cape, so he had been drilling his troops for a battle near Muizenberg. This he felt was confirmed by the fact that one British ship, HMS *Diamede* had been seen south of Cape Town and when the fleet arrived another, HMS *L'Espoir*, headed off towards Hout Bay. Unbeknown to Janssens: *Diamede* had been sent to obtain intelligence from ships in the area and *L'Espoir* was a decoy manoeuvre by Popham to look like the attack would be to the south of Cape Town.

THE LANDING

On the evening of the 4 January 1806 the British fleet anchored in the straits between Robben Island and the South African coast near the hill known to the Dutch as Blaauwberg (Blue Mountain). On his flagship, HMS *Diadem*, Popham entertained Baird and his officers to discuss the planned attack. From intelligence gained, Baird had identified three locations for a seaborne landing. First were the shores of Paarden Eiland, which had clear open sandy beaches and was very close to the town but was liable to being easy to defend by the Batavians. Next was Groot Baai (Big Bay), which was further away from the defending forces and provided a sheltered landing between rock formations. Lastly, was Losperds Baai (lost horses bay), which was even further out of the town, but did have a good, sheltered stretch of beach and was close to the main wagon road into town. It was decided that Big Bay was the closest to the ships and the men should start embarking the landing boats at 1:00am for a landing before daybreak.

In darkness and with a south easterly wind whipping up the surf, the dragoons and the 59th regiment were ordered to start the operation of a landing from the ships. Sailors lowered the large flat bottomed rowing boats down the sides of the ships and men climbed down to take up positions. Each landing boat accounted for 14 sailors plus a bosun, with 36 standing soldiers fully kitted out ready to leap off the bows when they hit the beach. Other boats were loaded with the few horses using slings to lower them in. Gradually the boats rowed in to position in the darkness about a mile from the shore. With the swell of the sea getting heavier and the wind now picking up, it was beginning to get light before the first landing boat attempted to make for the shore. At this point, it was now evident that the rock formations either side of the bay would limit the landing to one boat at a time. This, and the fact that defending soldiers and artillery could be seen forming on the sand dunes, the decision was made to abort and return to the ships.

Another meeting was held on board HMS *Diadem*, to assess the situation and work out how they were to land the troops, especially now that the Batavians knew where this was going to happen. Baird had hoped that his dragoons would be the first ashore to enable him to have a fast and mobile spearhead on shore. Getting them on shore appeared to be a problem, so he ordered the dragoons to sail north where there was a more sheltered landing bay at Saldhana. For protection they would have the 38th regiment of foot, under the command of Brigadier-General William Carr Beresford. They were to leave immediately. Should the conditions near to where the fleet were anchored not improve, then they would also sail north to join Beresford and prepare for a long march back to the Cape.

On the morning of the 6 January 1806, the conditions were perfect for a landing. Baird again ordered the men to prepare for a landing and this time identified Losperds Baai as the location. To protect the men the gun-brigs HMS *Encounter* and HMS *Protector* were ordered to anchor close to the beach and provide covering fire from their cannons. As before, the men climbed into the rowing boats, and standing between the oarsmen were taken in past the spit of land towards the sandy cove of the bay.

This time Baird had ordered his three Highland regiments to make the first landings, these comprised of the 93rd, 71st and 72nd of Foot. First ashore were the 93rd, although not without problems. One landing boat, was drawn too close to the rocks on the seaward side of the spit and overturned. The first casualties of the battle were 36 soldiers, a drummer boy and half of the sailors, all drowned just a hundred metres from the beach.



Detail from map by Henry Smart showing the landing of the Highland Brigade at Losperds Bay 6 January 1806.



Detail from 1870 Cape map showing location of Losperds Bay (now Melkbosstrand) in relation to Cape Town.

The first landing boats were met by Batavian troops from the Swellendam Dragoons under the command of Ritmeester (Captain) Jacobus Linde. These men were protected by the sand dunes at the top of the beach and gave heavy fire on the landing men. As more and more boats arrived though, the defenders retreated, before riding back to Cape Town with vital intelligence for Janssens. Some men remained in the hills above Losperds Baai to provide updates on the troop numbers arriving and the type of army that was being compiled.

BATAVIAN PREPARATION

With the information received, Janssens realised he would need to move fast if he was to stop the British from entering Cape Town. To bolster his troops his first action on the 4 January was to send out a cannon signal from the Castle. This immediately notified local militia that they would need to prepare to defend the town. As with the notification of ships arriving for trade, the outer areas of the Cape fired their cannons, and with the help of outriders, communities in the interior knew the British had arrived. Within a few hours of the first cannon being fired, the farming men of Stellenbosch and Paarl were aware, and after only eight the Swellendam Dragoons were preparing to move.

With limited numbers Janssens was now aware that he would need to keep the British trapped on the landing ground where he hoped to besiege them, and maybe starve them into submission. The French captains had informed him that a fleet of ships were due to sail south from France to provide support; however, neither side in this conflict were aware of the battle at Trafalgar had destroyed the French naval capacity. It was not long before more news arrived advising of Baresford's landing in Saldhana who were now looking to move south.

Janssens moved his available men, along with 16 field cannons of the 5th Horse Artillery under the command of Lt L J A Pelligrini, out of Cape Town on the 6 January and camped at Rietvlei. He left behind a garrison of 1000 men under the command of Lt-Col H C von Prothalow, with instructions to defend the town should he not return. On the 7 January, Janssens moved his men further north to the outspan, owned by Justinus Keer, at Blaauwbergsvallei. Here Janssens ordered his men to rest while he took his commanders up to the top of Ronde Kop (round hill) to assess the British encampment on the beaches of Losperds Baai below. Here he made the decision that the following morning they would advance to the high ground they were now on, with the artillery, so that they could stop the British from moving out of their encampment.

At 4:00am on the morning of the 8 January 1806 the Batavian army of 2061 men mustered ready to advance. The troops were made up of several different nations speaking differing languages which was to prove a problem to the commanders later that morning.

5th Waldeck Battalion

584 Men (7 Companies, German speaking)

22nd Batavian Regiment

764 Men (9 Companies)

9th Jagers

420 Men (Mixed European volunteers)

Swellendam Dragoons

183 Men (Mounted skilled marksmen)

Burgher Malitia

224 Men (Mounted skilled marksmen)

Hottentot Light Infantry

305 Men (Mainly indigenous men from mixed backgrounds)

French Sailors and Marines

240 Men (Volunteers from *Napoleon* and *Atlanta*)

5th Battalion of Artillery

402 Men Mixed nationalities including European (160) Javanese/Malays (54) plus Mozambique slaves (104).

Janssens was immediately stopped in his tracks as in the distance he could hear his pickets on the foothills of Blaauwberg firing. Soon the men rode into camp to advise that the British were already advancing. Janssens had no option but to call an emergency meeting of his commanders to set out new plans.

BRITISH PREPARATIONS

Baird and Popham had both come ashore around midday of the 6 January to check on the preparations at Losperds Baai. Over the next two days men, horses, artillery pieces and provisions were landed on the beach ready for advance towards Cape Town. In total nearly 5000 men were landed, and the regiments set out to form a protected line in case they were attacked. Knowing this would be a short stay the troops would bivouac rather than camp. First requirements would be to find fresh water which required digging into the sand to the aquifers close to the surface. Having sent the Dragoons to Saldhana with the few horses they had purchased in South America, only the officers had the luxury of mounts for the next part of the invasion. This would mean if the artillery was to be used it would need to be man-hauled. Sailors were brought ashore and put into teams for the task of dragging the two howitzers and six field cannons through the sand.

Baird planned to advance in two columns out of camp. In the absence of Brig-Gen Beresford the First Brigade command was given to Baird's brother, Joseph. This was made up of three regiments of foot: the 59th, the 83rd and the 24th. The Second Brigade, commanded by Brig-Gen Sir Ronald Fergusson, was made up of all Highland regiments: the 71st, the 72nd and the 93rd. Both Brigades had about 2,200 men each, and with the artillery, this gave Baird a force of almost 5,000 men.

To avoid delay and to avoid marching in the heat of the day, the British forces broke camp at 1:00am on the morning of the 8 January. The two Brigades followed different paths with the Highlanders taking a long route around the back of Ronde Kop to get on to the main wagon trail down in to Blaauwbergsvallei. The First Brigade, with the artillery in tow, advanced along the shorter track between the main Blaauwberg Hill and Ronde Kop.

THE BATTLE OF BLAAUWBERG


Moving out of their beach encampment both British Brigades headed inland before splitting on the northern side of Ronde Kop hill. The First Brigade moved south to the saddle between Ronde Kop and the main hill of Blaauwberg. The Highlanders continued inland to reach the main wagon road at Mostert's Farm which would be the direct route into Cape Town. This route would take them past Ronde Kop on the eastern side, which split the two advancing forces.

In the half light of dawn, the First Brigade reached the slopes of Blaauwberg where they encountered the Batavian pickets who fired a couple of volleys, before mounting their horses and retreating to their camp. At this point Baird knew the enemy had moved up to meet him and a battle was about to be fought on the flat ground of Blaauwbergsvallei. Baird rode to the top of Ronde Kop with his commanders to view the valley below. With the visibility poor, Baird could just make out the Batavian lines, but his concern was what lay behind the dark shadow of Kleinberg (small mountain) on the right.

Baird assessed his troop formation which by this time had both Brigades moving either side of the hill. The First Brigade to his right was slightly behind the Highlanders who were now making good progress on the wagon road.

Baird sent instructions to the 24th regiment for the Grenadiers to break from the First Brigade and to advance towards Kleinberg taking with them a field gun. The plan was to climb the slopes of the hill and secure the top, then report back on what was beyond. As they advanced, they were met with tough opposition from the Hottentot Light Infantry snipers located in the sand dunes, along with cannon fire from one of the Batavian field guns. To overcome the defensive fire Baird had the light company of the 71st Highlanders assist. Eventually the 24th Grenadiers pushed through to the top of Kleinberg only this time to be met by the Dragoons of the Swellendam Militia. The encounter that ensued became the first major conflict of the Battle of Blaauwberg and was witnessed by the ships at anchor in the seas to the west. This skirmish led to the first casualties, including Captain Andrew Foster of the 24th regiment.

With his First Brigade bogged down in the sand dunes and conflict for Kleinberg, Baird had the artillery howitzers hauled up in to position on a small rise just below his vantage position. He then ordered Gen Fergusson, who was leading his regiments along the wagon track to his left, bring the Highlanders in to their ranks in front of the guns. With the sun now just above the mountain tops to his left, Baird was arranging for a full-scale attack on the Batavian lines.



After a quick discussion with his commanders, Janssens formed his men into a defensive line and moved out of his overnight camp and towards the advancing British. The flat ground they were on was criss-crossed with several wagon tracks forming a major crossroads from various farms and villages leading towards the town. Janssens knew it was imperative that he defend these to stop his attackers marching straight to the castle. The main wagon track had to be defended at all costs and so Janssens centred his line on this track using the Waldeck Battalion as the centre pin. In front were two artillery positions, and to the left was dragoons and Jager companies with the Hottentot Light Infantry guarding the flank and the sand dune field. To the right were French and Dutch regiments with the right flank guarded by Dragoons and the main guns of the 5th Artillery positioned on a slight rise to provide extra distance to their firing power. Knowing he was out-manned Janssens had given orders that the forward guns horses would remain shackled and close to enable a quick fire and retreat manoeuvre back through the lines.

Almost as soon as the men were in position, the advance by the 24th regiment light company could be seen, requiring the Swellendam Dragoons to be ordered off and defend Kleinberg. As that skirmish was proceeding Janssens re-aligned the defence to better control a frontal attack.

As the sun lit up the battlefield the two British howitzers started to fire their shells, aiming as expected at the centre of the Batavian line and into the Waldeck soldiers. The first shots were well targeted and the Waldeckers began to take casualties, causing confusion and concerns. As they regrouped, they could see before them the advancing Highlanders who were now closing ranks due to the dunes and consolidated line of the Batavians.

Janssens rode up the lines of the defenders' shouting commands and words of encouragement to his men. Seeing the Highlanders now getting closer the command to return fire was given and the Batavians opened up from the artillery positions. By now the Highlanders were within 100 metres of the Batavians and they too were beginning to take casualties from the cannister shot being fired at them. They were now in a column formation as the environment had constricted them so much, and they like the Waldeckers were now

becoming confused and agitated by the events. Fergusson knew he had to raise morale of the men and the front ranks were ordered to fire a volley. The men of the 93rd regiment responded with a volley of lead, although at the distance they were at, it was more for effect than damage. Now creating a smoke screen from their Brown Bess muskets, the Highlanders charged.

With the smoke and sound of the advancing Highlanders, Janssens ordered the forward artillery to fire and retreat through the lines. This would be followed by the Batavian soldiers firing a volley and also retreating back while the artillery reloaded. This had been Janssens' plan relayed to his commanders in the early morning meeting, but the commanding officer of the Waldeckers had not been at the meeting and was unaware of the plan. Taking heavy casualties from the British artillery, seeing their own guns fire and retreat, and not knowing that the plan was for them to also fall back; it is not surprising that the Waldeckers decided that they needed to escape as soon as they saw the Highlanders charging towards them. Trying to get the men back in position was impossible for Janssens and he had no choice but to move the lines back to close the centre opening. As the line closed so the Highlanders hit the defenders with their bayonets.

Despite a short rally from the French and Dutch it was evident that the Highlanders had the upper hand and Janssens ordered a full retreat, back to Blaauwbergsvallei. As the men withdrew Janssens heard artillery fire and rode over to the right flank where Pelligrini's cannons were still firing across the lines of Scottish soldiers. Janssens promoted Pelligrini on the spot for his bravery, then ordered him to leave the battlefield immediately.

Having been marching since 2:00am on soft sand and through thick vegetation, the Highlanders were totally exhausted by the time the Batavians had left the battlefield. The men dropped down where they had fought without any intention of pursuing the defeated forces. A short time later Baird and his officers arrived, and the men advanced a short way further to the now deserted Blaauwbergsvallei outspan and here a field hospital was set up for the wounded to be treated.

It had taken under an hour for the battle of Blaauwberg to be won, and with very few casualties on the British side, something that Baird would make a point of in his reports back to England. Staying just a short time at the outspan to recover, the British troops were ordered off in pursuit of the Batavians. The day was to be completed with most of the British arriving at the Batavian's previous camp at Rietvlei with others scattered nearby in defensive positions.

AFTERMATH

The following days saw the British march towards Cape Town: Lt-Col Prophalow had no option but to allow the troops in, and on the 10 January 1806 the capitulation of Cape Town was signed. The formalities of the capitulation not being agreed to at first by Popham. Beresford finally arrived on the same day with a few of his dragoons after a gruelling 150-mile trek from Saldhana. He was tasked with tracking down Gen Janssens, who had retreated to the Hottentot Holland mountains to the east. Beresford met with Janssens on the 17 January 1806 and the next day, in a secluded farmhouse, the two men signed the final capitulation of the Cape. The Cape was now fully in the hands of the British.

The battle on 8 January 1806 accounted for about 230 men killed: 15 British, the remainder mostly French and Waldeckers. As with most battles of the era, many more men were to die in the weeks to come of their wounds. The day after the battle, 337 Batavians failed to attend roll call for their regiments, and from accounts of the 93rd regimental reports it is estimated that as many as 500 men could have died as a result of the battle.

ARCHAEOLOGICAL WORK

Extensive archaeological work on the battlefield has happened over the past 10 years and identified the exact location of the action. The land had been bought by a local developer, with the plan to build housing estates as part of the City of Cape Town expansion. At the time of the 200th anniversary of the battle a number of enthusiasts contacted the City Archaeologist to complain about the proposed building plans. The City advised

that if the site of the battle can be confirmed they would rezone the area as a heritage site. Evidence was soon provided, and the City purchased the land and incorporated in to the neighbouring Blaauwberg Nature Reserve.

Since the initial rezoning, several master's degrees have been achieved on the battlefield including extensive research into battlefield archaeology. Finds have managed to position the two forces of the battle and the exact location of the field hospital. The one item that has not been achieved though is the location of the graves of the fallen. The location of Captain Andrew Foster is thought to have been located but not officially confirmed.

Today the battlefield can be entered under control of the Blaauwberg Nature Reserve and guided tours undertaken by the Friends of Blaauwberg Conservation Area. Overnight accommodation in converted WW2 building on the hilltop can also be booked through the reserve.



Battlefield looking north in the position of the old wagon route from Cape Town. The Highland Brigade would have marched down this road.



Battlefield looking from the position of the Highlanders towards the Batavian defenders just beyond the line of the trees today.



Aerial view of the battlefield looking south towards Cape Town.



Plaque commemorating the location where the Capitulation of Cape Town was signed on 10 January 1806.

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Historical Records of the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders: Stirling Museum Archives

Life of Henry Martyn, Missionary to India and Persia, 1781 to 1812: Sarah J. Rhea (Project Gutenberg)

Links

Friends of Blaauwberg Conservation Area: <https://bca.org.za/>

Nitida Cannon Station: <https://www.nitidacannonstation.co.za/>

Honour Guided Tours: <https://honourguidedtours.co.za/>

YouTube viewing of cannon firing at Blaauwberg NR: <https://youtu.be/6RwZBDm0Gnc>

Blaauwberg Nature Reserve: <https://www.capetown.gov.za/>

Memorable Order of Tin Hats: <https://www.moth.org.za/about-us/>