


A study of the

93^e *Régiment de ligne*

Organisation, Uniforms and Equipment 1814 – 1815

by

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The lieutenant *port-aigle* of the 93^e *de ligne* flanked by two sergeant-majors.

By Patrice Courcelle – Editions de la Belle Alliance.

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93^e Régiment de Ligne 1814 – 1815

This article came about from research undertaken while writing the forthcoming ‘NAPOLEON 1815 - An Analysis of the Organization and Composition of the French Imperial Armies of the Hundred Days’ by Scott Bowden and Peter Cross. Within our reservoir of 41,000 documents from the *Service Historique de la Défense* (SHD) and the *Archives Nationales*, there are several contemporary sources that mention the 93^e Régiment de ligne in the 1815 campaign, presenting the Napoleonic student with some very interesting material that would suggest the typical situation faced by many of the French infantry units before the opening of the 1815 campaign. It is therefore the intention of this work not to present an exhaustive regimental history of the 93^e de ligne, but rather concentrate on a few areas of interest from the consequences of the 1814 *amalgam*, to the return of the Emperor Napoleon and the subsequent preparation for hostilities from March to June 1815.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Dr Geoff Tully, Mr Scott Bowden and Mr Alain Pigéard for their invaluable advice and support while undertaking this side-project and to also thank Mr Patrice Courcelle for his kind permission for the use of his excellent illustrations.

* * *

On 22 April 1814, the 93^e régiment de ligne numbered only 14 officers and 191 men present and under arms¹. These survivors represented a regiment that had continuously served throughout the Napoleonic epoch. In 1803-1806, naval service and present at Trafalgar, 1807 with the *Grande Armée* at the siege of Colberg, 1808 *Armée d’Espagne*, 1809 in Maréchal Massena’s 4^e Corps; Eckmühl, Essling and Wagram, 1810 part of the *Corps d’Observation de la Hollande*, 1811 with the *Armée de Catalogne*, 1812 with Maréchal Ney’s 3^e Corps; Smolensk, Moskowa, Krasnoe, Berezina and in 1813-1814, with Marshal Victor’s 2^e Corps d’armée; Dresden, Leipzig, Magdebourg.²

As a consequence of the 12 May 1814³ *amalgam*, in which the newly-installed Bourbon regime would institute sweeping changes to the old Imperial forces, the 93^e régiment de ligne would

¹ Archives du service Historique de l’état-major de la Défense (SHD), Carton C² 555.

² Emir Bukhari, *French Napoleonic Line Infantry 1796-1815* (Almark Publishing, London 1973) pp. 47-48; Philip Haythornthwaite, *Napoleon’s Line Infantry* (Osprey Publishing, London 1983) p 30; Scott Bowden, *Napoleon’s Grande Armée of 1813*, (The Emperor’s Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1990), various Appendices. *The End of Empire, Napoleon’s 1814 Campaign*, George Nafziger, various appendices.

³ *Ordonnance du 12 mai 1814*. The Royal Army being reduced to 90 regiments of *ligne* and 15 regiments of *légère* infantry. Each regiment consisted of 3 battalions of six companies (1 grenadier/carabinier, 1 voltigeur and 4 fusilier/chasseur). Each company had a strength of 3 officers and 72 men giving a regimental strength of 1,379 including staff.

become the renumbered 77^e *de ligne*⁴ in the Royal Army. The 77^e *régiment de ligne* had at its cadre the existing elements of the 93^e *ligne* to which were added the personnel of other units, namely the 3^e battalion of the 116^e *de ligne* and 3^e battalion of the 8^e *Tirailleurs* of the Imperial Guard. Colonel Nicolas Marchal of the old 93^e *de ligne* now commanded the renumbered (77^e) regiment. Sergent-major Larréguy de Civrieux of the 116^e *de ligne* recalls : ‘I arrived in Besançon in the first days of August (1814), my battalion was incorporated into the former 93^e *de ligne* reformed under N°77 with the remnants of I don’t know how many regiments. They were merged together to create a kind of unity out of so many different elements.’⁵

Stationed in the 6^e *division militaire* at Besançon where the 93^e had its long-standing regimental depot, the newly instituted Royal 77^e *de ligne* was part of the garrison that included the following units: the 60^e (64^e)⁶ *de ligne*, 15^e *légère*, 5^e (7^e) ‘*Angoulême*’ *dragons*, 7^e *artillerie à pied* (10 companies), 15^e, and the 20^e *compagnie de vétérans-fusiliers*. Other units in the 6^e *division militaire* included the 8^e ‘*de Bourbon*’ *chasseurs à cheval* (depot at Gray), 3^e ‘*du Dauphin*’ *hussards* (depot at Dôle), 6^e ‘*de Berri*’ *hussards* (depot at Vesoul), and the 7^e *artillerie à pied* (11 companies at Auxonne).

The 77^e *de ligne* settled into garrison life within the confines of Besançon with the harsh reality of soldiering in the Bourbon Royal Army being recalled in the memoirs of Sergent-major Larréguy de Civrieux ⁷:

‘My non-commissioned officers and I were imprisoned for four days; a general order was imposed on our grenadiers. Ah! how then the Bourbons appeared to us as the consecration of our defeat!

It was a rather sad time for us, the eight months garrisoned in the capital of Franche-Comté. We successively occupied all the forts, all the barracks, and more often the citadel which dominates the course of the Doubs. There was little hope of advancement, so overloaded were the army cadres with officers and unemployed officers. At that time the barracks for the troops, singularly neglected at the time of the Empire, whose eagles were almost always planted on foreign soil, was in a

⁴ Digby Smith, *Napoleon's Regiments, Battle Histories of the Regiments of the French Army, 1792-1815*, (Greenhill Books, , London, 2000), p. 314.

⁵ Larreguy de Civrieux, *Souvenirs d'un Cadet (1812-1823)*, Librairie Hachette et C^{le}, Paris 1912, p. 143.

⁶ Old Imperial regimental numbers in brackets. NB. The 64^e was garrisoned with the 93^e in Besançon through May 1814 to June 1815.

⁷ Larreguy de Civrieux, *Souvenirs d'un Cadet (1812-1823)*, Librairie Hachette et C^{le}, Paris 1912, pp. 145-146

terrible state. No thought had been given to the improvements made, during the years of peace, on the lot of the soldiers.

We were crammed into large, poorly laundered, lying two by two in beds and in an atmosphere that more than once our old bivouacs more than once. The discipline of the 77^e de Ligne was unheard of. The slightest infraction in dress or hierarchical etiquette was rigorously punished. Under arms you had to be a block of marble, a mechanical automaton; a flick of the eyelash sent you to the police room. At any moment the drum called, with its different batteries, the sergeants-majors, sergeants and sergeants-in-arms. At the last of the drumstick, if one had not returned to the circle in full dress, you were sent to prison; a repeat offence landed us in the casemated dungeons of the citadel.

The visit of the Comte d'Artois was announced. It aroused a few rare ambitions in our ranks but most of us were impatient and displeased. Our hearts still vibrated at the mere name of the Emperor, whose by a sort of sympathetic instinct we hoped for, we awaited his return. The presence of the Prince did little to change these feelings. We greeted him with coldness and we were not flattered by the decoration of the Lys which, by the most the most bizarre aberration, was given indiscriminately all the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and soldiers, and with which they were forced to adorn their chests. It was an extra button on their uniform!

Sergent-major Larréguy de Civrieux, along with the officers and men of his regiment, would have to endure for another eight months of rigorous discipline under the *ancien regime* of the First Restoration before enthusiastically receiving the news that the Emperor had landed along the coast of Provence in the early days of March 1815. By 1 January 1815, the 77^e de ligne had a strength, at least on paper, of some 86 officers and 1,565 men.⁸

IMPERIAL REGIMENTAL NUMBERS

On 25 April, the Emperor reinstalled the old Imperial regimental numbers throughout the army. However, the process to revert back to the former identifying number was not immediate, as seen in the correspondence of numerous officers and ministers. For example, throughout April,

⁸ Henri C. de Saint Chamant, *Napoléon, ses dernières armées*, Pièces Justifications, p. 444.

Napoleon's own correspondence⁹ refers to many of the regiments by their 1814 Bourbon titles, as evidence in the references to the 3^e and 9^e Dragoons, as well as the 73^e, 74^e, 78^e and 83^e *ligne*.¹⁰ The situation had obviously become problematic for Napoleon as he wrote to Marshal Davout on 12 May 1815, requesting the Minister of War to rectify the details of the army units to include the new Imperial regimental numbers. 'As Napoleon pointed out: "the result is a confusion which does not allow me to do any work."¹¹ In the consequence of the Emperor's need for clarity, the 77^e resumed the Imperial number 93^e *Régiment de ligne* during the latter part of May 1815, barely a month before the opening of the campaign in Belgium.

PREPARING FOR THE 100 DAYS CAMPAIGN

Shortly after Napoleon's return with the inevitability of war looming, and in order to prepare the army's *ligne* and *légère* infantry regiments for future operations, the Emperor decreed¹² on 28 March 1815, in part reads:

Article 5. In each regiment of infantry, the first two battalions will be supplemented by the 3^e; . . . The 3^e battalions . . . will then be completed by the men recalled under articles 1 and 2 of this decree. The excess of these men will be used successively to form the 4^e battalion (whose cadre of officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers will be completed without delay) in each regiment . . . Article 6. A cadre of officers of a 5^e battalion will be created. This cadre will be supplemented with non-commissioned and soldiers, when our Minister of War so orders. The 3^e, 4^e and 5^e battalions will remain at the depot until further notice. The 1^{er} and 2^e battalions alone will be put into service.

By the end of March 1815, the 93^e *de ligne* were ordered to direct its two 'war battalions' (1^{re} & 2^e) from the regimental depot at Besançon to the general depot of Reims as part of a "*Project of distribution of the soldiers called to the flags in seven general depots where they would be armed, dressed and instructed. End of March 1815.*"¹³ The future *Armée du Nord* began to form around this and six other general depots as determined by the Emperor.

⁹ Napoléon I^{er}, *Correspondance de Napoléon 1^{er}*, 32 volumes (Paris, 1858-1870), vol. 28, No. 21765, pp. 68-71; and No. 21841, p. 130.

¹⁰ These regiments didn't exist in the 1813 French order of battle, as in the case of the dragoons, they were converted to 1^{er} and 2^e lancers in 1811 and the infantry regiments had remained vacant until reinstalled by the Bourbons on 12 May 1814. Therefore, Napoleon is referring to the '1814 *Amalgam*' royal regimental titles.

¹¹ Napoléon I^{er}, *Correspondance de Napoléon 1^{er}*, vol. 28, No. 21897, pp. 163-166.

¹² Napoléon I^{er}, *Correspondance de Napoléon 1^{er}*, vol. 28, No. 21737, pp. 46-48.

¹³ Arthur Chuquet, *Inédits napoléoniens*, 2 volumes (Paris, 1914-1919) vol. 2, letter #2972, p. 365.

THE 4^e BATAILLON (?)

There have been numerous books written about the 1815 campaign, many of which include detailed orders of battle. It is often assumed that the 93^e *de ligne* undertook the Waterloo campaign with three field battalions. However, as we shall examine, the regiment actually fielded four battalions. Now under the command of Colonel Charles Louis Gaillard, the 93^e *de ligne* was assigned to *Lieutenant général* Honoré Charles Comte Reille's 2^e *Corps d'armée* and placed in the 9^e Division under the command of *Lieutenant général* Maximilien Sébastien Comte Foy. The 93^e along with the 92^e *de ligne* were brigaded together in the 1^{er} Brigade under *Maréchal du camp* Baron Gauthier.¹⁴

9^e l'Infanterie Division¹⁵: *Lieutenant Général* Comte Foy

1^{er} Brigade: *Maréchal de camp* Baron Gauthier (severely wounded at Quatre Bras)

92^e *Régiment de ligne* – Colonel Tissot (assumes command of the brigade)

Régiment d'état - 5 officiers et 15 hommes

1^{er} bataillon - 17 officiers et 536 hommes

2^e bataillon - 18 officiers et 447 hommes

93^e *Régiment de ligne* – Chef de bataillon Massot

Régiment d'état - 7 officiers et 18 hommes

1^{er} bataillon - 16 officiers et 455 hommes

2^e bataillon - 18 officiers et 454 hommes

3^e bataillon – 18 officiers et 500 hommes

4^e bataillon – (imp) 500 officiers et hommes¹⁶

¹⁴ In 1793, the Revolutionary government had abolished the grade of *maréchal de camp*, which was the intermediate grade in the old Royal army between the ranks of *colonel* and *lieutenant-général*. This intermediate grade was restored by Napoleon under the Empire in the form of *général de brigade*. However, with the Bourbons desiring to obliterate as many vestiges of the Revolution, Consulate and Empire as possible, the Royal Ordinance (*l'ordonnance royale*) of 16 May 1814 did away with the Imperial rank of *général de brigade*, bringing back in its place the old Royalist rank of *maréchal de camp*. Similarly, the Revolutionary government had, in 1793, eliminated the Royalist designation of *lieutenant-général*, replacing it with the rank known as *général de division*. Napoleon kept this grade during the periods of the Consulate and Empire. However, the Royal Ordinance of 16 May 1814 abolished the Revolutionary-Consulate-Imperial rank of *général de division*, bringing back in its place the *Ancien Régime* designation of *lieutenant-général*. See: *Bulletin des lois 1814, No. 111, l'Ordonnance Royale du 16 mai 1814* ; *Bulletin des lois 1815, No. 31, Décret du 22 mars 1815* ; *Bulletin des lois 1814, No. 115, Ordonnance du 16 mai 1814* ; and Alain Pigéard, *Nouveau Dictionnaire de la Grande Armée 1805-1815* (Saint-Martin-des-Entrées, 2019), pp. 313, 422 and 439.

¹⁵ With the exception of the 3^e & 4^e battalions of the 93^e, strengths are for 10 June 1815. Henri Couderc de Saint Chamant, *Napoléon, ses dernières armées* (Éd. 1902), Situation des troupes composant les armées appelées à assister à Waterloo (10 juin 1815), Pièces justification. N° 28, p 539.

¹⁶ The 93^e *ligne* 4^e battalion was on duty with the 2^e *Corps* artillery park during the Battle of Waterloo. The battalion does not appear on any order of battle, though it is clear that it arrived with the 3^e battalion. Both

On 20 May 1815, *Maréchal* Soult informed the Minister of War, *Maréchal* Davout of the movements involving the 93^e *de ligne*.

I am writing to the Minister of War that the Emperor has instructed me to inform you that his intention is that the third and fourth battalions of the 93^e *ligne* regiment who are at Besançon, leave there twenty-hour hours after the order he will address to them, to go to Avesnes¹⁷ where they will join, to the 2^e *Corps*, the first two battalions of the same regiment.

The major who will command these two battalions, will complete, before his departure, the cadre of the sixth battalion¹⁸ in officers and non-commissioned officers, so that this battalion is able to receive the men who will present themselves.

The Emperor's intention is also that the Minister of War issue orders to dispatch, either from Lyons or from any other general depot, the clothing and equipment necessary for the third and fourth battalions of the 93^e Regiment at the rate of 1,000 full effects or until required. These objects will be distributed to them on the way, at the point where they can join the battalions, according to the orders that the minister will give.

But His Majesty expects these two battalions to go without delay and that the major even makes them execute a force march. The Emperor attaches great importance to their joining the army on 8 June. I beg you, Marshal, independently of the emergency orders that Your Excellency will send for the objects, to make known the Emperor's orders by telegraph.¹⁹

The 3^e and 4^e bataillons certainly arrived at 2^e *Corps* on or about 8 or 9 June. Reille's 9 June 1815 letter from Avesnes, addressed to the commander of 3^e *Corps*, *Lieutenant général*

Lieutenant Puvis and Sergeant-major Lerréguy de Civrieux mention the 4^e *bataillon* in their memoirs. IMP = Inherent Military Probability.

¹⁷ The distance between Avesnes and Besançon is about 528 kilometres, or, a walking time of more than 100 hours.

¹⁸ As more battalions of the regiment(s) became ready for field operations, the 6^e Battalion had been designated as the depot battalion.

¹⁹ Chuquet, *Inédits napoléoniens*, vol. 2, letter #3269, p. 465.

Vandamme, confirms the two battalions' arrival, as well as a supply column intended for the 64^e de ligne.²⁰

...There were clothing effects here whose destination was not well known because the address was only at 3^e and 4^e Battalions. I was having them distributed to the 93^e when one of your officers came to claim them with a letter from the *Intendant général*, the two battalions of the 93^e having arrived absolutely naked, we were going to share them when the *Cour des guerres* from the Minister which bears the destination of these effects for the 93^e and enclosing them announcing to the Court tells him what he must give to this regiment and instructs him to send the excess to the 64^e. Despite all my desire to do something for your Corps, I could not deprive this Regiment of the effects which are intended for him and which are quite naked.

Please accept the expression of my highest consideration

Comte Reille²¹

There is an interesting point arising from Reille's letter mentions to Vandamme that the 3^e and 4^e bataillons of the 93^e have arrived 'naked'. This rather dramatic terminology presumably means that the men formed on parade without wearing complete uniforms and equipment. It was a common problem throughout the French Military during this period especially during the 1814 campaign where newly raised conscripts generally wore a greatcoat over their civilian clothing.

On 5 May, Davout wrote to generals Rapp, Gérard and Vandamme concerning the equipping of the 3^e and 4^e bataillons of the regiments within their respective corps, and although this does not directly mention the 93^e, it best illustrates the urgency to clothe and equip the infantry's 3^e and 4^e bataillons.²²

'I refer to my last circular for the country to make advances in cloth, etc. The depots of the regiments should receive a large quantity of soldiers every day who join the

²⁰ SHD Carton C¹⁵ 4. The document in this carton lists the date of the correspondence as 10 June 1815. As mentioned, both the 64^e and the 93^e de ligne were stationed together at Besançon. The 64^e was originally part of 2^e Corps, 8^e Division, but was transferred after 1 June. This may explain the supply issue that Reille encountered in the above letter to Vandamme, and considering the hectic pace of how Napoleon's army was concentrating, there is little surprise that supply problems would occur.

²¹ Stephen M. Beckett II, *Operations of the Armée du Nord: 1815*, Volume III, The Concentration, (Mapleflower House, LLC, 2018), p. 467.

²² Davout's Correspondence N° 1667, Stephen M. Beckett II, *Operations of the Armée du Nord: 1815*, Volume I, *The Registries*, (Mapleflower House, LLC, 2018), pp. 150-151.

army. See to it that they are armed, and at least that they are supplied with *capotes* (greatcoats), *pantalons* (trousers) and *souliers* (shoes), while awaiting their complete clothing, which will be taken care of successively. In this way, they will be immediately available. The Emperor wants them to be ready by 15 May, in order to be prepared for any eventuality. Take all the means for this, to form and organize the 3rd and 4th battalions, and to put them in line.’

From the time Napoleon began preparations for war, the progress of clothing and equipping the army was of great concern. Among the voluminous number of letters he wrote on the subject, his correspondence to Marshal Davout dated 9 May 1815 is of particular interest:

“Cousin, complaints come to me from all sides, either from the 5^e division (*militaire*), or from the 19^e (*division militaire*), in fact from everywhere, that the regiments have no money and that the numerous detachments which arrive at the corps cannot be dressed. Take steps to get them to pass your *ordonnances*. The treasury assures me that all those within the limit of the May distribution²³ will be paid in cash.”²⁴

On the same day the Emperor sent the following to Comte Francois-Nicholas Mollien, Minister of the Public Treasury;

It is in the greatest interest that all the funds that you must give to the corps for clothing be paid to them within a week. I have 100,000 men whom I cannot make any use due to the lack of funds to clothe and equip them. The destinies of France are there; attend to them day and night, and arrange for these funds to be secured immediately.²⁵

As the *Armée du Nord* began to concentrate in the 1^e, 2^e, 14^e, 15^e and 16^e *divisions militaires*, of which the 93^e *ligne* was a part, the ongoing anxiety regarding equipping the army for the impending campaign is assertively conveyed in Napoleon’s correspondence to one of his aide-de-camps, General Marie-François comte Caffarelli, on 11 May 1815.²⁶

²³ Napoleon granted 13 million for the clothing in the May distribution. Napoléon I^{er}, *Correspondance de Napoléon 1^{er}*, vol. 28, No. 21938, pp. 208-209.

²⁴ Napoléon I^{er}, *Correspondance de Napoléon 1^{er}*, vol. 28, No. 21885, p. 170.

²⁵ Napoléon I^{er}, *Correspondance de Napoléon 1^{er}*, vol. 28, No. 21886, p. 170.

²⁶ Napoléon I^{er}, *Correspondance de Napoléon 1^{er}*, vol. 28, No. 21893, p. 174.

Your report does not at all respond to the mission with which I have entrusted you; You do give me a statement of the 2 million sent to the various *divisions militaires*, but these 2 million do not make it to the 15^e or 16^e (*divisions militaires*) that I granted for clothing. You must therefore return to the bureaux to bring me the statement of the distribution of the funds for clothing for 1815, indicating all the credits that have been granted since January up to and including the distribution for May. You will give me the statement of credits both by corps and by *division militaire*, so that measures can be taken at the treasury to settle them without delay.

You tell me about some complaints that have been received for non-payments: there are as many complaints as there are corps [meaning, the number of regiments within the army].

I am no more satisfied with your report of your visit to the workshops. This report does not say why we make such bad jackets. If we don't have cloth for the clothes, we have some for the jackets and for the pants.

Finally, this mission is too important not to be fulfilled.'

Napoléon

As per the 28 March decree requesting that the 1^{er} and 2^e bataillons of the *de ligne* and *légère* regiments be filled with those personnel from their 3^e bataillon, there was some degree of confidence that each regiment would be satisfactorily fit for duty, and that the major problems for obtaining clothing and equipping due to the financial crisis gripping the country was developed into an ongoing issue for the 3^e, 4^e and 5^e bataillons.

1815 UNIFORM DETAILS

Whether the 1^{er} and 2^e bataillons of 93^e *de ligne* entered the 1815 campaign dressed in a variety of uniforms, i.e. still wearing the uniforms of their parent regiments of the 116^e and 8^e Tirailleurs, is uncertain. Sergeant-major Larréguy de Civrieux in his memoirs relates of how his new regiment appeared on parade in late 1814: "At the ceremonial review, because of the difference in uniforms, the old battalions were reassembled for the parade."²⁷ De Civrieux goes onto to relate:

²⁷ Larreguy de Civrieux, *Souvenirs d'un Cadet (1812-1823)*, Librairie Hachette et C^{le}, Paris 1912, p. 143.

‘On 13 March (1815), the sergeant-majors, called in at dawn, were ordered to report to their officers and companies to warn them that an hour later all the troops were to be assembled in full dress.’²⁸

It seems that the regimental depots had been stripped of almost all available equipment by the 1^{er} and 2^e battalions of each regiment as they left for the field, and that very little remained for the subsequent pass throughs of the depots by the 3^e and 4^e battalions.

At some point, the 93^e received orders to remove all evidence connected to the Bourbons from their uniforms and one can guess at what lengths the men went to carry out the edict.

It must be assumed that the regiment should have been issued Royal shako plates bearing the number 77, so removing the oval and crown emblem with the *fleur-de-lys* would have been sufficient for the time being. The question is; did the men ‘find’ sufficient 93^e shako plates and tricolour cockades to replace the Bourbon emblems on their headgear? Its clear that at least the white Bourbon cockades were replaced as Sergent-major Larréguy de Civrieux recalls ²⁹:

‘All the haversacks had been spontaneously opened, and every soldier, with very few exceptions, had taken out this tricolour cockade that had been carefully hidden for a year. The white flag and the Bourbon cockade were trampled underfoot.’

It must be remembered that only some of the men were from the old Imperial 93^e *de ligne*, while others came from different units. Therefore, that would not be unreasonable to suggest that some men from the 93^e recovered their old shako plates and tricolour cockades (as recalled by de Civrieux), while there may have been ‘spares’ within the regimental stores and new ones made or found. As for buttons, the regiment may have been issued ones of Royal pattern in 1814 or the men still had not replaced the original buttons from the 93^e, as well as the 116^e and the 8^e *Tirailleurs*. This is quite reasonable, as buttons from 112^e, 117^e, 142^e, 151^e and 153^{e30} were found on the battlefield of Waterloo, while a button from the 116^e *de ligne*³¹ was excavated from Quatre Bras, thus suggesting the 93^e either were not issued Royal buttons or if they were issued, the men replaced them with what they had on hand, i.e. their old original regimental ones.

²⁸ Larreguy de Civrieux, *Souvenirs d'un Cadet (1812-1823)*, Librairie Hachette et C^{le}, Paris 1912, p. 149.

²⁹ Larreguy de Civrieux, *Souvenirs d'un Cadet (1812-1823)*, Librairie Hachette et C^{le}, Paris 1912, pp. 151-152.

³⁰ Giles Bernard and Gérard Lachaux, *Waterloo Relics*, (Paris 2005), p. 120.

³¹ Bernard and Lachaux, *Waterloo Relics*, p. 38. Sergent-major Larreguy de Civrieux old regiment (116^e).

Concurrently, in a matter raised regarding the uniforms of the 93^e ligne, *Lieutenant-général* Reille wrote to the Minister of War referencing to the existence of the *fleur-de-lys* remaining on their uniforms, despite orders to the contrary.³²

Avesnes, 7 June 1815

To The Marshal, Prince of Eckmühl, Minister of War

Monsieur le Maréchal:

I have received the letter that Your Excellency did me the honour of writing to me concerning a notice which You received and according to which it would appear that there are still in 93^e ligne some *fleurs de lys*.³³ I cannot believe that the indictment made to the colonel of this corps could have the slightest foundation; it is the Marshal who was called about 15 days ago to go and command a regiment of the young guard and whose successor I do not yet know; I have known for a long time the good principles of this estimable superior officer, who is the brother-in-law of General (Marne) Governor of the (pages). I have however written to the General under whose orders the 93^e is to see if there would not have remained some *fleurs* at the (Caëssure) of this corps, in spite of the orders given on this subject. I undertake to make a report of it to myself, and I shall have the honour of reporting it to Your Excellency.

I beg Your Excellency to accept the homage of my respect

Le général commandant en chef le 2^e corps

Comte Reille³⁴

Two days later and five days before the planned opening of the campaign on the 14 June 1815, Reille sent the following report assuring Davout that the matter regarding the removal of the offending *fleurs-de-lys* had been attended to, addressed, and satisfactorily resolved:

Avesnes, 9 June 1815

³² Bulletin of Laws, 9 March 1815, 'Imperial Decree abolishing the white Cockade and the Lily Decoration, and ordering to raise the National Cockade and the Tricolour Flag.' Please refer to Appendix A of this article.

³³ *Bulletin des lois 1815*, See the single volume containing the Laws issued during the second quarter for the army, Numbers 1 to 42. Number 3: Imperial decree abolishing the White Cockade and the Lily Decoration and ordering to raise the National Cockade and the Tri-colour Flag. Grenoble, 9 March 1815.

³⁴ Beckett, *Operations of the Armée du Nord: 1815*, Volume III, The Concentration, p. 286.

To His Excellency, Marshal, Prince of Eckmühl, Minister of War
Monsieur Le Maréchal:

By my letter of 7 June, I had the honour to inform your Excellency that he had given orders to review the 93^e *Régiment de Ligne*, where it was supposed to exist a few more *fleur-de-lys*; I entrust this care to General Gauthier in whose Brigade this regiment belongs; This General informs me that he has very carefully reviewed the four battalions of this corps and that not one officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier has retained these sorts of marks on any part of his clothing or equipment.

I beg Your Excellency to accept my respectful tribute,

General, Commander-
in-Chief, 2^e Corps
Comte Reille³⁵

NO CAMPAIGN EQUIPMENT (?)

As the matter of Royal emblems and their removal was being resolved, all four battalions of the 93^e *ligne* were present and available for future operations in Foy's 9^e division. However, there is an inference that the entire 2^e Corps d'Armée was bereft of any basic campaign equipment especially within the 93^e regiment:³⁶

In his detailed *Napoleon's Waterloo Army, Uniforms and Equipment*, Paul Dawson states: On 10 June, the chief of staff of the 2nd Corps, *Général de division*³⁷ Baron Pamphile Lacroix recorded that:

‘Clothing. The items of clothing for the 93rd and 61st Regiments of the Line Infantry have arrived, but these are not able to be distributed to those corps.³⁸ Campaign equipment. What exists has been issued, but overall, most of the corps is missing these items and it is far from complete. SHDDT: C¹⁵ 35 Situation reports, Armée du Nord 10 Juin.’

Mr Dawson concludes that:

³⁵ Beckett, *Operations of the Armée du Nord: 1815*, Volume III, The Concentration, p. 466.

³⁶ Paul L. Dawson, *Napoleon's Waterloo Army- Uniforms and Equipment* (Barnsley, 2019), p. 581.

³⁷ The correct rank is *Lieutenant-général* as per Royal Decree of 16 May 1814. Please see details in earlier footnote.

³⁸ In this case the wording “corps” refers to the regiments and not the higher formation that consisted of multiple divisions.

‘The 2nd Corps entered the campaign with no campaign equipment, such as the water bottle, cook pot, water can; and seemingly men from the 93rd and 61st went to war wearing a motley collection of whatever clothing was in the depot, as the men had marched out before the items were delivered. SHDDT: C¹⁵ 35 Situation reports Armée du Nord 10 Juin.’³⁹

This is an astounding claim that, the entire 2^e Corps was devoid of campaign equipment and the men had no personal water bottles. This requires further and respectful examination as it could imply, by extension, that there may have been a major problem with a lack of campaign equipment and uniforms throughout the entire infantry component of the French Army.

While there could be argued a plausible case for the 3^e and 4^e battalions of a regiment ‘arriving naked’ and therefore being ill-equipped for the 1815 campaign, the possibility seems remote that any 1^{er} and 2^e battalions were poorly dressed and lacked the most basic of personal equipment such as personal water bottles.

In his 10 June report, 2^e Corps *chef d’état-major* Lieutenant général Lacroix does not state that the entire 2^e Corps was devoid of all types of campaign equipment. His report reflects that there were certainly items missing.

However, there certainly was an issue with lack of scythes (*faulx*) and hatchets (*hachettes*), as in Reille’s 8 June report to Soult⁴⁰:

...The camp effects such as scythes and hatchets which were announced have not arrived and the troops do not have any yet the soldier has bread in advance and his rice as well as his 50 cartridges. The shoes are in fairly good condition, however the regiments could not have all three pairs of shoes as ordered yet, but the (sic) soldiers have both good pairs.

While Reille only refers to equipment for cutting grain and chopping wood in his report, he does not mention a deficit of other essential campaign equipment, as the commander of 2^e Corps or his chief of staff would have mentioned their soldiers lack of the more essential water bottles. This most basic and easily obtained item could have taken the form of a wine bottle,

³⁹ Note that the current, correct source listing should read ; *Archives du service Historique de l’état-major de la Defense* (SHD), Carton C¹⁵ 35.

⁴⁰ Stephen M. Beckett II, *Operations of the Armée du Nord: 1815*, Volume I, The Registries, (Maplehouse Publishing, 2019), p. 482.

gourd or metal flask and would have been a priority for the individual soldier or indeed insisted upon by their immediate superiors.

Every infantry regiment would have had within their companies⁴¹ the *marmite* cooking vessel for eight to 16 men, smaller cauldrons for boiling water, *gamelles* the communal mess pan, *grand bidon* a long cylindrical water can and every eight men were issued a *pioche* (pick), *pelle* (shovel), *serpe* (billhook), *hachette* (hatchet) and *faulx* (scythe).

It seems inconceivable that none of the 16 regiments in 2^e Corps, had *any* of this basic campaign equipment existing in their stores, and/or the officers and NCO's failed to acquire these necessary items for the 23,500 infantry in 2^e Corps as they prepared for operations in 1815. It is not unreasonable to consider that the army had not been campaigning for nearly a year, except for the Royal Army's preparations to stop Napoleon's advance through France upon his return from Elba, where the commanders may have relied on feeding the battalions in situ within the garrisons and local towns, but this does not explain the *total* absence of any campaign equipment, especially the easily obtained personal water bottles/flasks/gourds. Were the losses of equipment from the previous campaigns so severe, that this had become an army wide problem and not just confined to 2^e Corps?

The following letter was sent from Massé to Douradon *Ordonnateur en chef* of 3^e Corps *d'armée* regarding the destination and supply of 7,088 petit bidons⁴²:

Mézières, le 3 juin 1815

Monsieur l'ordonnateur

Although I don't have time to identify myself, still because of the effects of (harnessing), I must nevertheless have the honour of informing you that I have just received 7088 small cans (petit bidons), according to the invoice, as I have not had the boxes containing them opened. The consignment note showed 6 boxes, I don't know why; but the invoice only shows 5.

I beg you, Mr. Authorising Officer, to kindly let me know the destination you deem appropriate for these cans.

⁴¹ T.E. Crowdy, *Napoleon's Infantry Handbook*, (Barnsley, 2015), pp. 91-92.

⁴² Stephen M. Beckett II, *Operations of the Armée du Nord: 1815*, Volume II, The Organisation May 9 – June 4 (Maplehouse Publishing, 2019) p. 408. SHD C¹⁵/4.

Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my deepest respect.

Your most humble and obedient servant,

Massé

There are obviously amounts of equipment available for units within the *Armée du Nord*, though it seems there may have been problems within the internal supply system, as opposed to there being a total lack of campaign equipment as the letter from Massé suggests.

We have a series of letters addressing the deficiency of camp equipment within the Army. On 3 June 1815, Jean-Pierre-Paulin-Hector Daure, the Army's *Intendant général, Administration Général* reports to Maréchal Soult on the different problems encountered by the *Armée du Nord*. It covers *Équipages auxiliaries, Postes, Trésor* (Treasury), *Hôpitaux, Ambulances, Habillement* (Clothing), *Campement* (Camp equipment), *Subsistances* (Food supply) and *Approvisionnement de siege*. In part, the reports reads⁴³:

Laon le 3 juin, 1815.

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency the following details of the services of the Northern Army.

Habillement

I have asked the Minister to provide the quarter general with 25,000 pairs of shoes. I am told that the principle has been adopted; but I have not yet received official notification of their dispatch. However, this reserve is indispensable; the Minister, who is aware that we have nothing available in store, writes to me today to have shoes delivered to the mobilised national guards as they pass through Laon.

Campement

The camping equipment announced by the Minister will arrive on the 6th (June). They will be immediately distributed to the corps entitled to them.

Please accept, Your Excellency,

the assurances of my highest esteem

⁴³ Stephen M. Beckett II, *Operations of the Armée du Nord: 1815*, Volume II, The Organisation May 9 – June 4 (Maplehouse Publishing, 2019) p. 365. SHD C¹⁵/4.

l'Indendant général

Daure

On the same day, Daure writes to M^r. Douradon, Ordonnateur en chef du 3^e corps at Rocroi⁴⁴, regarding the debilitating financial mire that Napoleon and his ministers faced, that resonated through the army's supply chain.

Quartier-général à Laon, le 3 juin 1815.

Sir and dear comrade. I received with the letter that you addressed to me last 28 May, the statement of the expenses made and those presumed to be made for the service of the clothing store and the army corps that you administer, during the 2nd quarter of this year.

I will provide for the needs of this service as soon as H.E. the Minister of War had made available to me the funds necessary for the payment of expenses of this nature.

Accept, Sir and dear comrade, the assurance of a distinguished consideration and sincere attachment.

L'Indendant général

Daure

Daure once again writes to Maréchal Soult confirming that Reille's 2^e Corps had equipment shortages and offers the surplus campaign equipment of Vandammme's 3^e Corps be sent to Reille's units⁴⁵:

Letter to Monseig. Le Maréchal d'Empire Duc de Dalmatie Major général

Laon le 8 juin 1815.

Monseigneur,

M^r. l'ordonnateur (Douradon) of the 3^e corps d'armée, rendered account to me that there existed in the shops of Rocroy, after having satisfied the needs for the troops of this corps, the camping effects of which the detail follows.

⁴⁴ Stephen M. Beckett II, *Operations of the Armée du Nord: 1815*, Volume II, The Organisation May 9 – June 4 (Maplehouse Publishing, 2019) p. 368. SHD C¹⁵/4.

⁴⁵ Stephen M. Beckett II, *Operations of the Armée du Nord: 1815*, Vol. III, The Concentration, (Maplehouse Publishing, 2019), p 375

Marmites	158
Grande bidons	171
Petit bidons	1435

I have proposed, Monseigneur, to His Excellency the Minister of War, that these objects be transferred to Avesnes, where the needs are urgent, for the service of the troops in this place; I have the honour to ask Your Excellency to approve this measure.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest esteem.

L'Intendant général

Daure

Although not directly relating to 2^e Corps, this letter, to M^r. Douradon, *Ordonnateur en chef du* 3^e Corps at Rocroy, addresses a supply of sickles from Strasbourg⁴⁶.

Quartier-Général à Laon le 8 juin 1815.

My dear comrade,

I received a letter dated the 6th to tell me that H.E. the Minister informed you on 27 May that he ordered 500 sickles to be sent from the Strasbourg shop for the 3^e corps which you administer. It is advisable to receive them from this shop, in accordance with H.E.'s orders.

Please accept, my dear comrade, the assurance of my highest consideration and affection.

L'Intendant général

Daure

Obviously 3^e Corps had equipment shortages in certain items. The following 10 June report⁴⁷ from *Lieutenant général* Lacroix relates to *hacettes* (hatchets) being issued to 2^e Corps:

Hachette's will be distributed to the divisions of the army corps to the number of 60 per division the 5^e and 6^e divisions will receive them at la Belle Hôtesse on the

⁴⁶ Stephen M. Beckett II, *Operations of the Armée du Nord: 1815*, Vol. III, The Concentration, (Maplehouse Publishing, 2019), p 374

⁴⁷ To *Lieutenant général* Rottembourg, N°51, °446, Expédié 11 juin. Beckett, *Operations of the Armée du Nord: 1815*, Volume III The Concentration, p. 564.

road to Maubeuge, the 7^e and 9^e divisions will receive them at Savatte, and the *lieutenant généraux* will give a good total of them, and will distribute them to the regiments under their command and will take a good partial of them from the colonels. If each division do not find enough in the place indicated, it would send to take in the other.⁴⁸

This distribution could be interpreted as a supplement to existing camp equipment. In any case, the 1^e and 2^e battalions must have had sufficient campaign equipment, though lacking some minor camping items, as to have no negative impact on their short-term operational capability.

Therefore, in the leading time *before* the start of the Belgium campaign, various amounts and types of camp equipment had been sent to 2^e Corps to address the shortages faced by the regiments. Whether it was in sufficient numbers to *fully* equip the battalions cannot be confirmed, but it is certain the 2^e Corps was not devoid of *any* campaign equipment for the opening of the operations on 14 June 1815.

93^e DE LIGNE IN ACTION

As with the rest of Reille's corps on the morning of 16 June 1815, the 93^e *régiment de ligne* was under arms early, however the ensuing battle of Quatre Bras did not get under way until midday as Lieutenant Puvis comments⁴⁹:

‘On the 16th, whilst the distribution of rations was taking place in the division and whilst we prepared to move, the corps artillery and the cavalry passed us to take position in front of the Brussels Road. At midday we started our march. We had hardly been marching an hour when, to our right, we heard a cannonade which seemed quite close to us.’

The regiment remained in divisional reserve for most of the day being deployed to the left of the main Brussels Road and facing the Bossu Woods. At 15:00 Prince Jerome's division began come into the line thus releasing Maréchal de camp Gauthier's brigade of the 92^e and 93^e *de*

⁴⁸ Lacroix must have been confident of obtaining sufficient hatchets from the places indicted. At 60 hatchets per division that calculates to be; 5^e Division 1:68 men; 6^e Division 1:130 men; 7^e Division 1:75 men; 9^e Division 1:85 men, obviously not the regulation per every eight men.

⁴⁹ Andrew W. Field, *Prelude to Waterloo, The French Perspective* (Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley 2014) pp. 84-85. Recommended reading.

ligne to advance against the Allied position held by the Brunswickers. Lieutenant Puvis describes the following events⁵⁰:

‘At 3 o’clock we deployed our masses and our whole line moved off, covered by our skirmishers. We marched thus into the middle of some rye which, because of its height, hid us from the enemy that was in front of us, but whose balls did not slacken, just as ours did not let up firing back.’

After some lively action, the 93^e suffered only minor losses. Quatre Bras was not the resounding victory Napoleon had hoped for. Instead, it was a strategic failure and much of the blame fell upon Maréchal Ney as Lieutenant Puvis recounts⁵¹:

‘It has seemed to us that with the spirit which animated our army, it would have been possible, without too much resistance to fear, to have seized the enemy position. Why was this not done? . . . The old soldiers blamed the hesitation that Marshal Ney displayed before the position of Quatre Bras. Instead, if he had taken the place the same day we would have gained a march on the enemy.’

Two days later the regiment was engaged during the Battle of Waterloo in the struggle around Hougoumont. In a post-action report, sous-lieutenant Théobald Puvis of the 93^e *de ligne* recalled the significant number of losses his regiment suffered:

... on the morning of the 18th, we had a strength of more than two thousand men⁵² for our four battalions, we found ourselves barely twelve hundred men and the strongest portion still came from our fourth battalion, which had suffered the least while being on duty near the artillery park...⁵³

If sous-lieutenant Puvis’ numbers are correct, the 1^{er} 2^e and 3^e battalions lost a staggering 50% casualties, however 499 men are recorded as killed wounded and missing.

The following account by 19-year-old *sergeant-major* Lerréguy de Civrieux of the 93^e *de ligne* describes his regiment under fire near Hougoumont:

⁵⁰ Andrew W. Field, *Prelude to Waterloo, The French Perspective* (Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley 2014) p. 111

⁵¹ Andrew W. Field, *Prelude to Waterloo, The French Perspective* (Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley 2014) p. 179

⁵² Records indicate that the 93^e *ligne* had on the morning of the 18 June 1815, 1,744 officers and men present. The regiment suffered the following losses at Waterloo: 46 men killed, 205 wounded and 248 recorded as missing.

⁵³ *Extract des Souvenirs historiques Théobald Puvis*, published in the *Revue historiques des Armées*, 1997, N°3.

My regiment remained in a critical position for a long time; though out of range of the fusillade, it came under fire from enemy guns. The balls came to us after a ricochet caused by a fold in the terrain that allowed us to distinguish by sight, the curve that the projectiles described before decimating our ranks.

Our self-sacrificing courage was put to a severe test; and it was too desperate to wait for death in this inaction the more complete, surrounded by horribly dying and mutilated corpses.⁵⁴

Colonel Jean-Marie Tissot's brigade⁵⁵ suffered significant casualties fighting in and around the eastern approaches of Hougomont in support of Prince Jérôme's 6^e Division. *Lieutenant* Puvis of the 93^e *de ligne* gives an account of the regiment's attack:

The cannon fire got even heavier. 'We are going to attack the English lines "à la baïonnette" ', our senior officers came to tell us, 'warning everyone'. It was two o'clock when we marched forward; the enemy appeared to be no longer before us.

We set out in skirmish order in to a tall wood that was to our left; we approached a large building (the farm of Hougomont) fortified at all points and protected by very high hedges, with deep ditches. We crossed some ditches, which were rather less wide, and arrived at the hedge that was vigorously defended by the enemy. We tried to get through this hedge in vain. We suffered enormous casualties; the lieutenant of my company was killed close to me. A ball struck the visor of my shako and knocked me onto my backside, The shock was such that I thought I had been wounded; but there was no blood. I recovered my senses immediately. At this moment, I was to the right of the company, the captain followed the movement more to the left.⁵⁶

The 93^e *de ligne* retreated with the rest of the French army from the field of Waterloo after many hours of combat. *Lieutenant* Puvis recalls how his regiment got caught up in the general rout:

We received orders to retreat, to be executed *en échiquier*. We had not marched for a quarter of an hour, when no sooner had some cuirassiers rushed up to us and

⁵⁴ Bernard Coppens and Patrice Courcelle, *Hououmont Waterloo 1815, Les Carnets de la Campagne - n°1*, (Editions de la Belle Allaince, 1999), pp.56-57.

⁵⁵ Maréchal du camp Jean-Joseph Gauthier was serverly wounded at Quatre-Bras, 16 June 1815.

⁵⁶ Andrew Field, *Waterloo, The French Perspective* (Barnsley 2012), p.124. Recommended reading.

advised us to form square, than some English cavalry fell on us. Exhausted and considerably reduced by our losses, the square that our three battalions were able to form did not appear very solid, but the English cavalry passed close to us without attacking and carried on to fall upon the Imperial Guard. Immediately that it had passed us we pushed on to reach the point that we expected to find our reserves.

The ranks then broke up to get there quicker. There was a terrible disorder. However, we still thought that it was only our left wing that had suffered a check; we could see over to our right deep masses marching ahead. We arrived to link up with the road that we had left in the morning and where we had our artillery reserve; the same area where our fourth battalion had remained to protect it. Instead of the security that we expected, we were received by a volley from the Prussian army that arrived on our rear, and this changed the outcome of the battle.

From this moment the ranks broke up and we threw ourselves in disorder across the countryside, where we fell into each other in our desperation. It was 8 o'clock and we saw by the light of the fire of the Guard artillery that on this side the struggle continued. But we were pursued relentlessly and rallying even a few men was impossible to try and meet these attacks.⁵⁷



The attack on Hougomont orchard by troops of General Foy, ©2001-Patrice Courcelle

⁵⁷ Andrew Field, *Waterloo, The French Perspective*, (Barnsley 2012), pp. 220-221.

At Waterloo, the 93^e *de ligne* suffered 205 men wounded (evacuated to the Genappe field hospital), 46 men killed, and 248 noted as prisoners or missing (British prisons held 68 men, of which ten died before they could be repatriated to France). Total losses for the regiment numbered 499 officers and men.⁵⁸ Officer casualties were: 1 officer killed and 1 wounded on the 16 June; 6 officers killed and 11 wounded at Waterloo.⁵⁹

The week after the Waterloo, between 23 to 26 June 1815, the army took parade-states and the regiment's strength at that time, depleted by casualties and strategic consumption, numbered 32 officers and 442 men present and under arms.⁶⁰

The 93^e *Régiment de ligne* had a long and distinguished career from 17 February 1796 to 1815⁶¹ gaining three battle honours Eckmühl, Essling and Wagram⁶². During the Second Restoration, one of the first acts of the government was to disband the imperial army. The regiments of infantry and light infantry were abolished and replaced by 86 legions, each bearing the name of a department.⁶³

⁵⁸ *The Art of Keith Rocco: Waterloo – Napoleon's Last Army* (Oakland, 2021), p.108.

⁵⁹ Scott Bowden, *Armies at Waterloo*, (Arlington, 1983), p. 102. Recommended reading.

⁶⁰ Bowden, *Armies at Waterloo*, p. 102; Appendix M., p. 333. Archives of the Historical Service of the French Army at the Château of Vincennes (formerly abbreviated as SHAT and currently abbreviated as SHD).

⁶¹ Digby Smith, *Napoleon's Regiments, battle Histories of the Regiments of the French Army, 1792-1815* (Greenhill Books, London 2000) p. 143.

⁶² In 1815, the eagle and flag were destroyed at Bourges. Ludovic Letrun, *French Infantry Flags, From 1786 to the End of the First Empire* (Histoire & Collections, Paris 2009) p 164.

⁶³ L. Rousselot, *L'Armée Française, Légions Départementales 1815-1820*, Paris 1965. Planche N°12



Ligne grenadier



Ligne fusilier



Ligne voltigeur



Ligne voltigeur cornet



Légère carabinier



Ligne fusiliers

Typical French *ligne* and *légère* infantry of the 1815 period. [www.1789-1815](http://www.1789-1815.com) by Bernard Coppens

Appendix A⁶⁴

BULLETIN OF LAWS

6th Series

Single volume,

containing Laws Issued During the Second Quarter for the 1815 army.

Numbers 1 to 42.

In Paris,

from the Royal Printing Office.

August 1815

(6)

(Number 3) Imperial Decree abolishing the white Cockade and the Lily Decoration, and ordering to raise the National Cockade and the Tricolour Flag.

Grenoble, 9 March 1815

Napoleon, by the grace of God and the constitutions of the Empire, Emperor of the French, &c. &vs.

& vs. We have decreed and are Decree the following:

Art. 1. The white cockade and the decoration of the lily are deleted.

2. The national three-colour cockade shall be immediately displayed by land and sea troops, national guards and citizens of all classes.

3. The tricolour flag will be hoisted at the town hall and on the steeples of the countryside.

4. The Grand Marshal, acting as Major General of the *Grande Armée*, is charged with the execution of this decree.

Napoleon

signed by the Emperor:

The Grand Marshal, acting as Major General of the Grand Army; signed by Count Bertrand.

⁶⁴ A copy of the original document was supplied by Mr. Alain Pigéard.

Appendix B

Below is a letter to Davout from Colonel Plaige informing the Minister of War of elements *de ligne* forming part of the garrison of Landrecies that include a contingent from the 93^e *Régiment de ligne*.⁶⁵

Landrecies⁶⁶ le 17 June 1815.

To His Highness, Monseigneur le Prince D'Eckmühl, Minister of War,

Monseigneur,

I have the honor to address to your Highness the daily report of the troops which compose the garrison, with the notes on the progress which is made fortifications of the place; And to report to him that Mr. Lieutenant General Foy, Commander of the 9^e Division of the 2^e Corps, has just sent to this place, The small depots of the 92^e, 93^e and 100^e regiments, these Depots are made up.

To know:

That of the 92^e of 1 Lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 4 fusiliers and 1 drummer.

From the 93^e of 1 Lieutenant, 1 coporal, and 20 fusiliers.

From the 100^e of 1 Lieutenant, 1 coporal, and 4 fusiliers.

I have the honor to be with deep respect, Monsignor, from Your Highness,

The most humble

And very obedient Servant.

Colonel Plaige

⁶⁵ From the Colonel Plaige 16^e *division militaire*. *Operations of the Armée du Nord*: 1815, Vol. IV, The Invasion, Stephen M. Beckett II, p470

⁶⁶ Landrecies is in the Nord Department, canton of Avesnes-sur-Helpe and 106.8 kms from Charleroi.