

Translated by Greg Gorsuch
Part 3

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

OF THE

PENINSULA WAR,

FROM 1807 TO 1814,

SERVING AS AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JOURNALS OF THE SIEGES MADE
OR SUSTAINED BY THE FRENCH IN THIS WAR.

CAMPAIGN OF 1807 AND 1808

I.

The Treaty of Tilsit was signed on 8 July 1807. Napoleon was at the height of his power and glory; he set his sights on Spain.

This Kingdom was linked to France by the Treaty of San Ildefonso, and for ten years had made very great sacrifices for her. It paid a subsidy of 50 million francs each year to help with the costs of the war; its navy had been destroyed with ours at Trafalgar, fighting against the English; and its army, barely a hundred thousand men strong, had had to provide an auxiliary corps of sixteen thousand veterans, under the orders of the Marquis de la Romana, who, first sent to Italy, had then been directed to the distant shores of the Baltic. The country was, moreover, poorly administered, and found itself without commerce, without industry. It had hardly any other resources than the galleons which were sent to it from Mexico; but the English, masters of the seas, had long prevented these rich convoys from arriving.

Charles IV, a weak and indolent old man, reigned only in name; his favorite, Manuel Godoy, created Prince of the Peace for having concluded the treaty which subjected his country to France, had seized the conduct of affairs. No step had been spared to secure his power; he was abhorred by the whole nation. The Prince of Asturias, heir to the throne and old enough to govern, was the rallying point of the discontented and the object of the minister's hatred. Godoy feared his domination after the death of the King and sought every means to destroy him. He even succeeded in having him arrested, under the pretext of a conspiracy; but, fearing public animosity and the consequences of such a bold claim, he then set about having him set free.

Such a state of affairs could not last. The Spaniards desired a change of government, and even already regarded as imminent a forced abdication of the King in favor of his son. Napoleon could hasten this revolution; the wishes of Spain were therefore turned towards him, and the splendor of his victories, joined to the desire for his powerful intervention, had made him the object of an affection carried to the point of enthusiasm. These dispositions favored his projects of conquest and offered him the means of removing from the house of Bourbon the only throne that it still possessed. He had not forgotten the threatening proclamation that the Prince of Peace had published in the month of October 1806, eight days before the battle of Jena¹; and he always had to fear a diversion on the side of the Pyrenees at the moment

¹ See supporting documents, no. 1.

when he would be engaged against the powers of the North. He wanted to fix the irresolution of Spain before the English took advantage of it to dominate the whole Peninsula, which would have caused his whole continental system to collapse.

To ensure the success of his enterprise, Napoleon first wanted to occupy Portugal, as a means of driving away the English, who already exercised a very great influence there. To this end, he pretended to be reconciled with the Prince of Peace, and led him to conclude a secret treaty, which was signed at Fontainebleau on 27 October 1807. By this treaty, the family of Braganza was to be dispossessed of Portugal and the country divided into three principalities; one, given in sovereignty to Godoy; another to the King of Etruria, son-in-law of Charles IV, in compensation for the cession made by him to the Emperor of Tuscany and the Duchy of Parma, which were to be united with the Kingdom of Italy; the third was to remain in deposit until general peace. Provisionally, the whole country was to be occupied by French and Spanish troops.²

In accordance with this treaty, and even before it was signed, General Junot crossed the Bidasoa on 18 October, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, heading for Salamanca, to enter Portugal from there. At the same time, twenty thousand Spanish troops, formed into three corps under the command of Generals Taranco, Caraffa and Solano, went to Tui, Alcántara and Badajoz, to form part of the expedition, and thus found themselves directed in the direction opposite to that where the real dangers of Spain lay. Junot had orders to advance by forced marches, so as not to be prevented at Lisbon by the English. He left Salamanca on 12 November; and, taking the shortest route, he headed, by Ciudad-Rodrigo and Perales del Puerto, for Alcántara, where he joined up on the 17th with the Spanish corps of General Caraffa. The French army was already greatly weakened and without provisions. It had just covered fifty leagues in five days, across uncultivated mountains which offered only a vast desert. The weather was dreadful, and the rain fell in torrents. But Junot, knowing that to march was to conquer, left Alcántara on the 19th, and entered Portugal by Zarza la Mayor, Segura and Castelo Branco, heading for Abrantès. He proclaimed that he had no other aim than to free the government of Portugal from the yoke of England, and to put the country in a position to support its independence.

Already the Regent, in the hope of warding off the storm, had, on 20 October, ordered the seizure of English merchandise and forbidden the vessels of that nation to enter the ports of Portugal. But, informed of the imminent arrival of the French army and of Napoleon's plans, he embarked on 27 November, with the royal family and the entire court, to take refuge in Brazil. Junot hastened his march with a few advance-guard battalions, and on the 30th he entered Lisbon without striking a blow. The rest of the army, exhausted by eighteen days of forced marches across arid mountains, had remained ten or fifteen leagues behind, and offered nothing more than a confused mass of men exasperated by misery. The Portuguese were dismayed by the approach of the French. They expected to see heroes of a superior species, and had resigned themselves to submission; but, at the sight of our weak soldiers exhausted by fatigue, and most of whom had only been enlisted for a few months, they felt only the annoyance of having been deceived by fame and their imagination, and put under the yoke of a handful of foreigners; this feeling left in the minds of the people a germ of revolt that events were not slow to develop. Nevertheless Junot, having sent part of the Portuguese troops to Bayonne and disbanded the others, soon found himself master of the whole country.³

At the same time that Junot entered Portugal, General Dupont, under the pretext of supporting the expedition, crossed the Bidasoa with a corps of twenty-four thousand men and went to Valladolid, thus isolating Madrid from the northern provinces. A corps of twenty-five thousand men followed under the orders of Marshal Moncey, and advanced on Burgos, to secure the main road to Bayonne. Prince Murat

² See supporting documents, Nos. 2 and 3.

³ See supporting documents, nos. 4 and 5.

took command of these troops, which, in the month of March 1808, were reinforced by a fourth corps of twenty-five thousand men, including six thousand from the Imperial Guard, under the orders of Marshal Bessières. Other troops, largely Italian and Neapolitan, were assembled at Perpignan, under the orders of General Duhesme, and formed a corps of about twelve thousand men, which entered Catalonia on 2 February⁴. General Duhesme passed through Figueres where he left a battalion, which, lodged in the fort under the pretext of the lack of barracks, did not delay in expelling the garrison. He crossed Girona, and arrived on the 13th at Barcelona, where he was received without suspicion, on the assurance that he was only passing through to go to Cadiz, where, he said, an expedition against Gibraltar was being prepared. First, he occupied the city; then, on 28 February, taking advantage of a review which was taking place on the Esplanade, he seized the citadel by surprise; and, through the influence of an officer loyal to the Prince of Peace, he had the gates of the fort of Montjoui opened the next day, which Governor Alvarez refused to hand over to him.

By almost similar means, General D'Armagnac, who had left Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port with three battalions, occupied the city of Pamplona, and took possession of the citadel on 16 February. Finally, General Thouvenot occupied the place of Saint-Sébastien on 3 March, under the pretext of placing hospitals there. The governor had at first refused to open his gates; but an order from the Prince of the Peace removed this difficulty.

Thus, the French army found itself simultaneously in control, beyond the Pyrenees, of four places to support its operations; and, as there was no fortified point on the road from Bayonne to Madrid, the old castles of Pancorbo and Burgos began to be put into a state of defense. Immense supplies were collected on the frontier; the work on the arsenals, in the places of Bayonne, Perpignan and Pamplona, took on an extraordinary development. From the Bidasoa to the Douro, the roads were covered with soldiers, convoys of food and munitions, officers running the post to explore the country. The mask was thrown off; one could judge Napoleon's plans.

However, the entry of French troops into Spain and the fraudulent occupation of four of the principal fortresses of the Kingdom had changed the benevolent dispositions of the Spaniards towards them. The hatred they bore the Prince of Peace increased still further by the treason of which they accused him for having introduced foreign troops into the heart of the Kingdom. This Prince himself, worried by the rapid march of the French, and still uncertain of the intentions of the Emperor towards him, began to apprehend the consequences of his intrigues and his blind confidence. To escape, he came to take refuge in Aranjuez with the royal family; he had the line of the Tagus fortified and gathered there the Royal Guard and some troops remaining in the interior, wanting to dispute this obstacle, in order to have time to flee with the court to Mexico. A part of the Spanish troops who occupied the south of Portugal headed at the same time for Seville and Cadiz, to protect the embarkation of the King.

The news of the departure of the royal family for Seville became the electric spark that caused a sudden and terrible explosion. The people of Madrid, immediately conjecturing what could be the purpose of this journey, became furious at seeing themselves abandoned after having been betrayed. They went in crowds to Aranjuez, on the night of 17-18 March, demanding the head of Godoy. The palace of this Prince was invaded and ransacked, his guards were dispersed, and he himself found his safety only by hiding in an attic. The Prince of Asturias, who had many friends among the instigators of the riot, succeeded by his presence and by his speeches in calming the spirits. But the troubles began again on the morning of the 19th, when Godoy, pressed by hunger, came out of his retreat. The people threw themselves on him, and would have massacred him if not for the bodyguards who surrounded him. The Prince of Asturias only managed to save him by having him put in prison, and promising the populace, docile to his voice, that he would be handed over to justice. The malcontents, taking advantage of the

⁴ See supporting documents, no. 6.

general exasperation and the fears that Charles IV showed for his favorite Godoy, pressed this monarch to abdicate in favor of his son⁵; and, that very day, the Prince of Asturias was proclaimed king under the name of Ferdinand VII. But, two days later, the old king protested against his abdication, which he claimed had been forced, and placed himself under the protection of the French army.⁶

At the first news of the events at Aranjuez, Murat, impatient to sit on a throne that he believed was intended for him, had marched with thirty thousand men on Madrid. He entered on 23 March; and, by equivocal language, he kept the two parties in suspense. Napoleon, who was impatiently awaiting notice of the departure of the royal family for America, was for a moment disconcerted by the serious and so unexpected events of Aranjuez. Judging from then on his presence on the spot necessary, he left for Bayonne on 3 April, and announced that he was going to Madrid, where he dispatched General Savary, one of his aides-de-camp. Ferdinand, impatient to have himself recognized as king by the Emperor, advanced to meet him, and arrived on the 12th at Burgos without having met him. Learning that Napoleon had not left Bayonne, he wrote to him immediately; and, three days later, he received a reply which should have dissuaded him from going further⁷. But, yielding to the entreaties of General Savary who accompanied him, he allowed himself to be drawn to Bayonne. Godoy, taken from his prison by Murat, also arrived in this city, and, soon after, the old king and the royal family. Charles IV was furious with his son, whom he accused of having thrown him from the throne. He was received by the Emperor as legitimate king; but, finding himself quite happy to find his friend Godoy again and wanting to live in peace, he signed, on 5 May, a treaty of renunciation of his crown in favor of Napoleon. He received in exchange the castle of Chambord and the enjoyment of that of Compiègne, with a civil list of thirty million reals. Ferdinand, treated as a rebel by his father, degraded by his mother, and having no more hope of being recognized, also resigned his rights to the crown. The other members of the royal family adhered successively to the act of renunciation. Napoleon sanctioned this act, summoned an assembly of notables to discuss the bases of a constitution, and designated his brother Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain.

Although the Spaniards were ignorant of these new events, they were already indignant at the conduct of the French: the journey of Ferdinand, the deliverance of Godoy, the flight of Charles, the nomination of Murat as a member of the government junta, and the movements of the French troops which were advancing from all sides on Madrid, excited the most lively alarms; a general fermentation agitated minds.

On 2 May, discontent exploded in Madrid. At the moment when the Queen of Etruria, daughter of King Charles IV, and the Infante D. Francisco de Paula, second brother of Ferdinand, were preparing to leave to join the royal family in France, the people could not contain their indignation. They surrounded the traveling carriages, insulted the French officer commanding the escort, and would have massacred him if a patrol had come to his aid. Fire broke out on both sides; and in a moment the whole city was in insurrection. Murat, obliged to fight, had several bodies of troops advance at a fast pace into the city, which dispersed all the gatherings. That very evening order was restored, but not without bloodshed. The French troops lost few men in the fighting, but a large number of their officers were assassinated individually. On the Spanish side there were one hundred and twenty dead; about forty individuals, surprised arms in hand, were shot the next day, and about the same number of prisoners were, in reprisal, massacred in the camps by the soldiers.

These executions curtailed for a time the efforts of the capital; but the repercussions were felt in all parts of the monarchy; and when the proclamation of 20 May appeared, which formally announced that Charles

⁵ See supporting documents, no. 7.

⁶ See supporting documents, nos. 8 and 9.

⁷ See supporting documents, no. 10.

and Ferdinand had abdicated in favor of Napoleon⁸, the general indignation knew no bounds. The civil and military leaders, and all those who had something to lose, still trembled at the very idea of fighting against the colossal power of France; but the monks and priests everywhere preached revolt, and excited the people. A single cry then resounded throughout all Spain: *Long live Ferdinand VII! murder the French!*

The principality of Asturias rose first and made the first requests for help to the English, who began to lend their support to the Spaniards. Galicia, the province of Santander, and a part of the Kingdom of Leon, were not slow to follow this example. At Valencia, three hundred Frenchmen who were in the city were massacred. At Cadiz, Captain General Solano, sent by Murat to command the place, was assassinated by the populace; and General Morla, having taken command, had the batteries of the port fired on five French vessels and a frigate, which, having escaped from the battle of Trafalgar, had taken refuge in the harbor of Cadiz. Vice-Admiral Rosily, who commanded them, was forced to surrender. In Seville, the people pillaged the houses of all those who were designated as partisans of Godoy and the French and formed a central junta which took the reins of government.

Scenes of disorder almost similar also took place in Saragossa, Badajoz, Valladolid. From the month of June, the uprising was general, everywhere people ran to arms; new levies reinforced the regular troops; armies were organized in all the provinces, frightening by their indiscipline and excesses all those who, by age, infirmity or their carelessness, still kept in their homes. It was through this terrible fire that Joseph Bonaparte, the new king, advanced towards Madrid.

The different corps of the French army which had entered Spain since 1 January 1808, had a force of eighty thousand men, but composed of young men of eighteen years of age, taken in advance in the last conscription and assembled only a few months ago; seen too closely by the Spaniards, such men had not been able to inspire them with a high opinion of the French troops. At the first symptoms of the uprising, all these corps set out to stop its progress.

Marshal Bessières, who was guarding the main road to Burgos with his troops, detached General Verdier from Vitoria with two thousand men against a band of insurgents gathered at Logroño. This general had orders to then march on Saragossa, a city important for its population and for the influence it could have on the main road to France. On the other hand, General Lefebvre-Desnouettes went directly from Pamplona to this city with four thousand men and began the first attacks to reduce it (*see the account of this siege, Volume II*). On another point, General Frère seized Segovia and took thirty pieces of cannon there. General Lasalle defeated the Spaniards at Torquemada and entered Palencia where there was a large arms factory. Having then joined General Merle, he defeated, at Cabezón, a Spanish corps under the command of General Cuesta, captain general of old Castile; Valladolid submitted. Marshal Bessières, seeing himself master of the plain, directed Generals Merle and Ducos to Santander, where the bishop had placed himself at the head of the rebels. This city was occupied on 23 June.

The other army corps moved at the same time. General Dupont had left Toledo on 24 May with twelve thousand men, including three thousand cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of cannon, to go to Cadiz and protect the French squadron which was there; he was to be joined at Seville by a brigade of three thousand men detached from the army of Portugal. This weak corps crossed the province of La Mancha and the mountains of the Sierra-Morena without obstacle. On 7 June, he forced the passage of the Guadalquivir at the bridge of Alcolea, which General Echávarri was defending with six thousand men, and took Cordoba; but, fearing to venture further, he stopped ten days in that city, and thus gave Castaños time to advance with thirty thousand men of regular troops, both from the camp of San Roque under Gibraltar, and from the division of Solano returned from Portugal, from the garrisons of Cadiz, Granada,

⁸ See supporting documents, no. 11.

and other cities of Andalusia: forty to fifty thousand peasants joined this army. On hearing of such a gathering, Dupont, fearing to be surrounded at Cordoba, retreated, on 19 June, to Andújar, where he took up position on the right bank of the Guadalquivir, and fortified himself while awaiting reinforcements. General Vedel came to join him on July 16th with six thousand men, leaving behind him at Baylen (Bailén) General Gobert with three thousand men. Castaños led a corps of fifteen thousand Spaniards to this point, under the command of General Reding, who forced the passage of the Guadalquivir at the ford of Mengíbar, located six leagues above Andújar. General Vedel then retraced his steps, crossed Baylen which the enemy had abandoned to threaten the mountain gorges, and went back in pursuit to La Carolina, where he joined General Gobert who had been wounded fighting Reding. But, after his passage, the enemy having reoccupied Baylen, General Dupont decided to fall back on this same point, in order to reopen his communications. On the 18th, at nightfall, he set out with ten thousand men, abandoning Andújar which Castaños was quick to occupy. At midnight, Dupont met Reding's vanguard, which was coming towards him; he drove it back as far as Baylen, where the Spaniards took up position on the heights bordering the left bank of the Rumber, in front of the town. The fighting began at four in the morning and continued fiercely until half past twelve. All attacks to open a passage being fruitless, Dupont put himself and his generals at the head of the columns, which all at once made a desperate charge to break the enemy's center. This effort was useless. Our soldiers were exhausted by fifteen hours of marching and eight hours of fighting; it was terribly hot; we had two thousand men killed and more than two thousand wounded; and Castaños appeared in our rear with the rest of his army. It was then that Dupont, losing all hope of breaking through, asked for and obtained a suspension of arms to negotiate a capitulation.

At the sound of the cannon, General Vedel had left La Carolina to come to Dupont's aid; but, having stopped five hours at Guarromán, two leagues from Baylen, to let his troops rest, he did not arrive on the battlefield until the afternoon, when the capitulation was already being discussed. He nevertheless attacked the Spaniards, routed a battalion, and took a large number of prisoners; but an order from Dupont made him suspend his attack. From then on Vedel thought only of making his retreat, which he began at night, thus breaking the truce. The Spaniards, noticing his departure, informed Dupont that the negotiations would be broken off, and that all his divisions would be passed by arms, if Vedel did not resume his position. Dupont, intimidated by this threat, sent the order to this general to stop. The divisions of Vedel and Gobert, and all the detachments which were echeloned in the mountain, were included in the capitulation which was signed on 22 July; in total, seventeen thousand six hundred and thirty-five men laid down their arms. According to the conventions, these troops were to be embarked to be taken to France at the port of Rochefort; but only the generals and a few officers enjoyed this right. In defiance of the capitulation, the rest of the troops were kept prisoners, and thrown into the pontoons of Cadiz and on the desert island of Cabrera, where they perished of misery. This disastrous catastrophe diminished in the opinion of Europe the prestige which surrounded our troops. It ruined our affairs in the Peninsula for a long time and aroused the enthusiasm of the Spaniards to the point of frenzy.

Marshal Moncey, whose troops were stationed in the environs of Madrid, had also received orders, on 5 June, to advance, with eight thousand men, through Cuenca, on Valencia, where General Caro, brother of the Marquis de la Romana, had taken command of the insurrection, and was at the head of fifteen to twenty thousand men. Marshal Moncey defeated the Spaniards at the bridge of Pajazo on the Cabriel, and at the village of Siete Aguas. He arrived under Valencia, on 27 June, and seized the suburbs. But the city, surrounded by a wall, was safe from a surprise attack. Not having the means to lay siege to it and finding himself threatened in his rear by the Spanish troops of Murcia, he raised his camp on the 29th, and returned by Almanza and San-Clemente to Madrid, bringing back the division of Frère which had advanced to reinforce him.

In Catalonia, General Duhesme also had to fight the numerous bands which had formed in this warlike province. On 4 June, he detached General Chabran with four thousand men, to occupy Tarragona and

Tortosa, and effect his junction with Marshal Moncey on Valencia. General Chabran entered Tarragona without obstacles, on 8 June. Another column of three thousand men, under the orders of General Schwartz, was to search the Monserrat, pacify Manresa, occupy Lerida, and penetrate into Aragon to link up with General Lefebvre before Saragossa; but this second column having experienced a setback, on 6 June, at the village of Bruch, General Chabran, commanding the first, had to retrace his steps. He abandoned, without striking a blow, Tarragona, the siege of which was later to cost so much blood; and, making his way, arms in hand, through the bands which already surrounded him, he returned to Barcelona. He was charged, on 14 June, with leading a second attack against the Monserrat with his entire division. This attempt was no more successful than the first, and only served to exalt the courage of the Catalans. General Duhesme, after having defeated the insurgents on the Llobregat, wanted to take control of Girona which intercepted his communications with France. He had crossed this place without difficulty four months previously; but, instead of leaving a garrison there, as he had done at Figueres, he had passed beyond it. Eager to repair this fault, he headed, on 17 June, for this place by Mataró and Arenys de Mar, with the Lechi Division and a cavalry reserve. On 20 June, he arrived in sight of Girona, and attempted the same day a strong attack against the Mercadal and the Porte del Carmen; but having failed, he returned to Barcelona to disperse the bands that had approached it.

On the side of Figueres, gatherings of peasants intercepted the communications of this place with France. General Reille went there from Bellegarde, on 5 July, with a division, dispersed the insurgents and supplied the place. He then attempted a raid on Roses, a maritime place from where the English were fanning the flames of the revolt, by supplying the Spaniards with arms and munitions; but he was repulsed.

On his return to Barcelona, General Duhesme had made preparations to besiege Girona. On 16 July, he again marched on this place, with the Chabran Division, about six thousand men strong, and a small siege crew. He followed, as the first time, the Marine road, in order to avoid the fort of Hostalrich which defends the old road. He forced the passage at Arenys de Mar and Calella where there were enormous cuts on the road defended, on the seaside, by several gunboats and a frigate, and came to camp, on 22 July, in sight of Girona. He was joined, two days later, by General Reille with artillery, and found himself at the head of twelve thousand men. He seized the advanced redoubts of Saint-Louis, Saint-Narcissus and Saint-Daniel, which the enemy did not defend. He began advances against the fort of Montjoui and in the suburb of Pedret, to attack the city⁹. But, after fifteen days of work and continuous fighting, the catastrophe of Baylen and the events which followed it forced him to raise the siege, on 16 August, after having destroyed his artillery and his munitions. General Reille returned to Figueres. General Duhesme returned to Barcelona by the Marine road¹⁰; but, stopped by enormous cuts, continually harassed by the cannon of several English frigates, he was obliged to abandon his baggage, and the little field artillery which remained to him, to make his way through the mountains. He finally arrived, on 20 August, at Barcelona, where, shortly after, he was blocked by the army that General Vives formed from the Spanish troops that were in Catalonia and the Balearic Islands, from a Spanish division drawn from Lisbon and landed by the English at Tarragona, and from a large number of armed peasants.

To the north, fortune was less favorable to the Spaniards. General Cuesta, little frightened by his defeat at Cabezón, had assembled, in July, an army at Benavente. General Blake had also assembled, under the support of Astorga, the Spanish troops of Galicia, those that had come from Oporto, the garrisons of Corunna and Ferrol. These two armies offered a total of thirty thousand men, and threatened to advance, by Valladolid, on the great communication of Madrid with France. Marshal Bessières, whose troops were scattered in mobile columns, received the order from the Emperor to assemble at Palencia all his available forces, and to march against Cuesta and Blake. General Savary, who had replaced Murat at Madrid, was

⁹ See supporting documents, no. 12.

¹⁰ See supporting documents, no. 13.

to support Marshal Bessières with a dozen thousand men forming his reserve; but he had already disposed of some to assist Dupont and Moncey¹¹. Marshal Bessières having assembled fifteen thousand men set out on the march towards Benavente. The Spaniards were advancing in three columns, when the central one was encountered by the French army, on 14 July, in a strong position, in front of Medina de Rioseco. It was overthrown by a bayonet charge made by the divisions of Merle and Mouton and cut to pieces by the cavalry of General Lasalle. The other two columns, finding themselves isolated, disbanded without seeing the French. The loss of the Spaniards was estimated at six thousand men killed or wounded, three thousand six hundred prisoners, and eighteen pieces of cannon. This brilliant victory cost us only seventy men killed and three hundred wounded. The remains of the Spanish army reached Benavente where Blake and Cuesta separated, accusing each other of the disaster they had just experienced. The cities of Zamora, Mayorga and Leon submitted successively¹².

However, King Joseph had crossed the Pyrenees to come and sit on his tottering throne. The victory won by Marshal Bessières.

Medina de Rioseco, had cleared the way for him to his capital; he entered it, on 20 July, with the greatest pomp. This triumph was short-lived; the news of the disaster at Baylen reached Madrid on the 27th, and, the following day, it was learned that the army of General Castaños had already arrived on the borders of the La Mancha. From then on, Joseph, no longer believing himself safe in Madrid, left that city, on 1 August, after a residence of ten days, and came to establish his court in Vitoria. At the same time the French army, still forty-five thousand strong, fell back on the Ebro and began to fortify itself there.¹³ The cry of victory of the Spaniards resounded throughout Europe.

General Junot's corps was even more unfortunate in Portugal. On hearing of the events, the Spanish troops who were in Oporto under the command of General Belestá, took the French garrison prisoner and went to Galicia. Those who were in Lisbon were disarmed; but the insurrection broke out in Oporto among the inhabitants and spread throughout the country. Loison's division, sent to the Alentejo to subdue Évora where seven or eight thousand armed militiamen had gathered, ransacked the city from top to bottom and massacred most of the defenders. This bloody execution gave General Loison a sad celebrity in those regions and became a motive for reprisals and vengeance in the irascible hearts of the Portuguese. The help of the English was not long in coming: nine thousand men, under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, landed on 1 August at the mouth of the Mondego; they marched on Leiria where they were joined by some Portuguese. General Delaborde, who had advanced to Roliça with his division of only two thousand two hundred men, was attacked on 17 August by all the enemy forces, and was forced to withdraw, after suffering a loss of six hundred men killed or wounded. The English took up position on the coast of Vimeiro, to link up with their fleet which landed new troops. General Junot having been joined by Loison's division, left General Travot with five thousand men to maintain the population of Lisbon, guard the citadel and the forts of the Tagus, and advanced with fourteen thousand men against the English who already had eighteen thousand. He attacked them in their positions on the 21st of August but was beaten. He lost eighteen hundred men, thirteen pieces of cannon, and was obliged to retire to Mafra. Lisbon was in the greatest agitation. Junot assembled a council of war and sent General Kellermann as a parliamentarian to the English headquarters, to offer a suspension of arms, and to negotiate for the evacuation of Portugal. Sir Hew Dalrymple, Governor of Gibraltar, had just landed with fresh reinforcements, and had been named the command in chief of the English army. He accepted the proposals which were made to him; and, on 30 August, the famous Convention of Sintra was signed, by which twenty-five thousand seven hundred and forty-seven

¹¹ See supporting documents, nos. 14 and 15.

¹² See supporting documents, no. 16.

¹³ See supporting documents, no. 17.

French troops were embarked, with arms and baggage, on the English fleet, and brought back to Rochefort without further conditions.¹⁴

Thus the French were obliged to evacuate Portugal and the interior of Spain almost at the same time, retaining on the Pyrenean frontier only the country on this side of the Ebro, a very small part of Catalonia, and the places which they had seized by surprise.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS



No. 1

Proclamation of the Prince of Peace.

In less dangerous circumstances than those in which we find ourselves today, good and loyal subjects have hastened to help their sovereigns by voluntary donations and aid proportionate to the needs of the State. It is therefore in the current situation that it is urgent to show oneself generous towards the fatherland. Would the Kingdom of Andalusia, favored by nature in the reproduction of horses suitable for light cavalry, and the province of Extremadura, which rendered such important services in this kind to King Philip V, see with indifference the cavalry of the King of Spain reduced and incomplete, for lack of horses? No, I do not think so; I hope, on the contrary, that following the example of the illustrious ancestors of the present generation, who served the grandfather of our present king by levies of men and horses, the grandchildren of these brave men will also hasten to provide regiments or companies of men skilled in the handling of horses, to be employed in the service and defense of the fatherland, as long as the present danger lasts. Once past, they will return full of glory to their families. Each will dispute the honor of victory; one will attribute to his arm the salvation of his family; the other, that of his chief, his relative or his friend; all finally will attribute to themselves the salvation of the fatherland. Come, my dear companions, come and range yourselves under the banners of the best of sovereigns; come, I will welcome you with gratitude; I offer you, from today, the homage, if the God of victories grants us a happy and lasting peace, the sole object of our wishes. No, you will not yield to fear or perfidy; your hearts will close themselves to all kinds of foreign seduction. Come; and if we are not forced to cross our arms with those of our enemies, you will not incur the danger of being noted as suspect, and of having given a false idea of your loyalty, of your honor, by refusing to respond to the call that I make to you.

But if my voice cannot awaken in you the feelings of your glory, be your own instigators; become the fathers of the people in whose name I speak; let what you owe them remind you of what you owe to yourselves, to your honor and to the holy religion that you profess.

At the Royal Palace of Saint-Laurent, 5 October 1806.

Signed: THE PRINCE OF PEACE.

¹⁴ See supporting documents, no. 18.

No. 2

Secret treaty between His Majesty the Emperor of the French and His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain.

Napoleon, by, by the grace of God, etc., etc., having read and examined the treaty concluded and signed at Fontainebleau, on 27 October, by General of Division Michel Duroc, Grand Marshal of the Palace, etc., etc., by virtue of the full powers that we have given him for this purpose, with Don Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaún, Honorary Councilor of State of His Majesty the King of Spain, also provided with full powers from his sovereign, which treaty is conceived as follows:

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, etc., etc., and His Majesty the Catholic King of Spain, desiring, of their own accord, to regulate the interests of the two States, and to determine the future condition of Portugal, in a manner consistent with the policy of the two nations, have appointed, as their plenipotentiary ministers, namely: His Majesty the Emperor of the French, General of Division Michel Duroc, Grand Marshal of the palaces, etc.; and His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, Don Eugene Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaún, his honorary councilor of state, etc.; who, having exchanged their full powers, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE Ist. The province of Entre-Minho e Duero, with the city of Oporto, will be given in full ownership and sovereignty to His Majesty the King of Etruria, under the title of Northern Lusitania.

ART. II. The Kingdom of Alentejo and the Kingdom of the Algarve will be given in full ownership and sovereignty to the Prince of Peace, to enjoy them under the title of Prince of the Algarve.

ART. III. The provinces of Beira, Trás-os-Montes, and Portuguese Estremadura, shall remain in deposit until the general peace, when they shall be disposed of in accordance with the circumstances, and in the manner which shall then be determined by the high contracting parties.

ART. IV. The kingdom of northern Lusitania shall be possessed by the hereditary descendants of His Majesty the King of Etruria, in accordance with the laws of succession adopted by the reigning family of His Majesty the King of Spain.

ART. V. The principality of the Algarve shall be hereditary in the line of descent of the Prince of Peace, in accordance with the laws of succession adopted by the reigning family of His Majesty the King of Spain.

ART. VI. In the absence of a legitimate descendant or heir of the King of Northern Lusitania, or of the Prince of the Algarve, these countries will be given by way of investiture to His Majesty the King of Spain, on condition that they will never be united on one head, nor united to the Crown of Spain.

ART. VII. The Kingdom of Northern Lusitania and the Principality of the Algarve also recognize as protector His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, and the sovereigns of these countries will not, in any case, be able to make war or peace without his consent.

ART. VIII. In the event that the provinces of Beira, Trás-os-Montes and Portuguese Estremadura, held under sequestration, should be at the general peace restored to the house of Braganza, in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and other colonies which the English have conquered from the Spaniards and their allies, the new sovereign of these provinces would be bound towards His Majesty the King of Spain, to

the same obligations which bound towards him the King of Northern Lusitania and the Prince of the Algarve.

ART. IX. His Majesty the King of Etruria cedes in full ownership and sovereignty the kingdom of Etruria to His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy.

ART. X. When the definitive occupation of the provinces of Portugal has been effected, the respective princes who shall be put in possession of them, shall jointly appoint commissioners to fix the suitable limits.

ART. XI. His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, guarantees to His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, the possession of his States on the continent of Europe to the south of the Pyrenees.

ART. XII. His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, consents to recognize His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain as Emperor of the two Americas, at the time which will have been determined by His Catholic Majesty to take this title, which will take place at the general peace or at the latest in three years.

ART. XIII. It is understood between the two high contracting parties that they will share equally the islands, colonies and other maritime possessions of Portugal.

ART. XIV. The present treaty will be kept secret. It will be ratified, and the ratifications will be exchanged at Madrid, twenty days at the latest after the date of signature.

Done at Fontainebleau, 27 October 1807.

Signed: DUROC, IZQUIERDO.

No. 3

Secret Convention for the Occupation of Portugal.

Napoleon, by the grace of God, etc., etc., having seen and examined the convention concluded, drawn up and signed at Fontainebleau, 27 October 1807, by General of Division Michel Duroc, etc., etc., on the one hand, and on the other, by Don Eugenio Izquierdo, etc., which convention is of the following tenor:

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, etc., etc., and His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, desiring to settle the bases of an arrangement relative to the occupation and conquest of Portugal, in consequence of the stipulations of the treaty signed this day, have appointed, etc., etc., who, after having exchanged their full powers, have agreed on the following articles:

ARTICLE 1st. A body of twenty-five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry of the troops of His Majesty will enter Spain to go directly to Lisbon; it will be joined by a body of eight thousand Spanish infantry and three thousand cavalry, with thirty pieces of artillery.

ART. II. At the same time a division of twelve thousand Spanish troops will take possession of the province of Entre-Minho e Duero, and of the city of Oporto, and another division of six thousand Spanish troops will take possession of the Alentejo and the kingdom of the Algarve.

ART. III. The French troops shall be fed and maintained by Spain, and their pay shall be furnished by France during the time of their march through Spain.

ART. IV. From the moment the combined troops shall have made their entry into Portugal, the government and administration of the provinces of Beira, Trás-os-Montes and Portuguese Estremadura (which shall remain in a state of sequestration), shall be placed at the disposal of the general commanding the French troops, and the contributions which shall come from them shall be levied for the benefit of France. The provinces which shall form the kingdom of northern Lusitania and the principality of the Algarve, shall be administered and governed by the Spanish divisions which shall take possession of them, and the contributions there shall be levied for the benefit of Spain.

ART. V. The central corps shall be under the orders of the commander of the French troops, to whom likewise the Spanish troops, attached to this army, shall be bound to obey. Nevertheless, in the event that the King of Spain or the Prince of Peace should deem it appropriate to join this body, the French troops, as well as the general who will command them, will be subject to his orders.

ART. VI. Another body of forty thousand men of French troops will be assembled at Bayonne on the 20th of November next at the latest, to be ready to enter Spain, for the purpose of going to Portugal, in the event that the English should send reinforcements there or threaten it with an attack. Nevertheless, this new body will not enter Spain until the two high contracting parties have mutually agreed on this point.

ART. VII. The present convention will be ratified, and the ratifications will be exchanged at the same time as those of the treaty of this day.

Done at Fontainebleau, the 27th of October 1807.

Signed: DUROC, IZQUIERDO.

We have approved and do approve by these presents, etc., etc., as above.

Signed: NAPOLEON.

No. 4

Imperial Decree

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, we have decreed and decree the following:

ARTICLE Ist. An extraordinary war contribution of one hundred million francs will be placed on the Kingdom of Portugal, to serve as a redemption for the properties of individuals, under whatever denomination it may be.

ART. II. This contribution will be distributed by province and by city, according to the means of each, by the care of the general in chief of our army, who will take the necessary measures to have it returned promptly.

ART. III. All property belonging to the Queen of Portugal, the Prince Regent and the appanage princes, will be sequestered.

All property belonging to those who accompanied the Prince Regent when he left the country, and who will not have returned to the kingdom by 15 February 1808, will also be sequestered.

Done at the Royal Palace of Milan, 23 December 1807.

Signed: NAPOLEON.

No. 5

Proclamation of General Junot

Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Portugal,

Your interests have fixed the attention of His Majesty the Emperor, our august master; all irresolution must cease; the fate of Portugal is decided, and its future happiness is assured, since Napoleon the Great takes it under his all-powerful protection.

The Prince of Brazil, in abandoning Portugal, has renounced all his rights to the sovereignty of this kingdom. The House of Braganza has ceased to reign over Portugal. The Emperor Napoleon wants this beautiful country to be administered and governed entirely in his name, and by the commander-in-chief of his army.

The task that this mark of the kindness and confidence of my master imposes on me is difficult to fulfill; but I hope to succeed, aided by the work of the most educated men of the kingdom and the good will of all the inhabitants.

I have established a council of government to enlighten me on the good to be done; administrators will be sent to the provinces to ensure the means of improving the administration, and of establishing order and economy there. I order that roads be opened and canals dug, to facilitate communications and to make agriculture and national industry flourish, these two branches so necessary to the prosperity of a country, and which it will be easy to raise with a spiritual, patient and brave people. The Portuguese troops, commanded by their most recommendable leaders, will soon be one family with the soldiers of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, and will compete with them only in courage and discipline. Well-administered finances will assure each employee the price of his work; public education, this mother of the civilization of peoples, will spread in each province, and the provinces of the Algarve and Beira-Alta will perhaps also one day have their Camoëns. The religion of your fathers, that which we all profess, will be protected and aided by the same will which knew how to re-establish it in the vast French empire, but delivered from the superstitions which dishonor it; justice will be rendered with equity, and freed from the lengths and arbitrariness which hindered it. Public tranquility will no longer be disturbed by a dreadful brigandage, the result of idleness, and, if there are incorrigible scoundrels, a good police force will deliver society from them: hideous mendicancy will no longer drag its rags in the superb capital nor in the interior of the kingdom; houses of repression will be established for that; the poor cripple will find asylum there; and the idler will be employed there in a work necessary even for his preservation.

Inhabitants of the kingdom of Portugal, be reassured and calm; reject the instigations of those who would lead you to some revolt, and to whom it matters little to shed blood, provided that it is continental blood: devote yourself with confidence to your work, you will reap the fruits; if you must make some sacrifices in the first moments, it is to enable the government to improve your lot; they are moreover indispensable for the maintenance of a large army, necessary for the vast projects of the great Napoleon: his vigilant eye has fixed you, and your future happiness is assured; you will be as dear to him as his French subjects; but deserve his benefits by your respect and your submission to his wishes.

Given at the palace of the headquarters in Lisbon, 1 February 1808. *Signed:* JUNOT.

No. 6

Special instruction from Prince Berthier, Major General, to General Duhesme, for him alone.

Paris, 28 January 1808.

General, immediately after receiving this, you will set out to go straight to Perpignan. It is essential that you arrive there on 4 February at the latest; the intention of His Majesty the Emperor is that you leave Perpignan from the 6th to the 8th, with the division that you command; and that you enter Spain on the 9th of the same month. You will head for Barcelona. You will inform the Spanish governor of this place that you have orders to go to Cadiz, that you are awaiting the decision of the Spanish court on this subject in Barcelona, and that the stages are prepared. You will inform me of the situation of the places and the depots that form the garrison, without doing anything that could give rise to suspicion of dispositions unfavorable to the Spaniards. You will have the first Italian who fails to observe discipline shot, in order to set a salutary example in time, and which prevents any kind of disorder, politics being in agreement, on this point, with the necessity of living well with the Spaniards, who must not be alarmed. You will have a military commission formed to judge the guilty, which you will compose in such a way that discipline is rigorously observed by its means. General Pacthod receives the order to go without delay to Perpignan, to be employed under your orders, and to the division which must obey you.

The attached statement will inform you, general, of the composition of the troops that you will have under your orders.

You will write to me every day, as soon as you have entered Spain, in order to make me well aware of the disposition of minds, the situation of the strongholds, and what there will be before you as far as Barcelona and as far as the Ebro.

You will correspond in a safe and frequent manner with His Excellency Marshal Moncey, to whom I send the order to move his headquarters to Burgos, but who will leave his third division at Vitoria, until further orders.

Such are, general, the instructions that His Majesty the Emperor has charged me to give you at the time of your departure. The choice that His Majesty has made of you, for the important object that he entrusts to you, is a sure pledge of success.

Signed: ALEXANDER.

No. 7
Royal Decree

As my habitual infirmities do not allow me to bear any longer the heavy burden of the government of my kingdom, and needing, in order to restore my health, to enjoy a more temperate climate in private life, I have decided, after the most mature deliberation, to abdicate my crown in favor of my heir, my very beloved son the Prince of Asturias.

Consequently, my royal will is that he be recognized and obeyed as king and natural lord of all my kingdoms and sovereignties; and so that this royal decree of my free and spontaneous abdication may be exactly and duly accomplished, you will communicate it to the council and to any other to whom it may pertain.

Given at Aranjuez, 19 March 1808.

Signed: I, THE KING.

No. 8
Protestation of King Charles IV

Aranjuez, 21 March 1808.

I protest and declare that my decree of 19 March, by which I abdicate the crown in favor of my son, is an act to which I was forced, to prevent the greatest misfortunes and the shedding of blood of my beloved subjects. It must, consequently, be regarded as of no value.

Signed: I, THE KING.

No. 9
Letter from King Charles IV to the Emperor Napoleon.

Aranjuez, 21 March 1808.

Sir my brother, Your Majesty will learn with pain the events of Aranjuez and their result; it will not be without some interest to see a king who, forced to abdicate the crown, comes to throw himself into the arms of a great monarch his ally, placing himself in everything at his disposal, being able alone to make his happiness, that of his entire family and of his faithful and beloved subjects. I only declared that I would resign in favor of my son by force of circumstances, and when the noise of arms and the clamor of an insurgent guard made me well aware that I had to choose between life and death, which would have been followed by that of the queen. I was forced to abdicate; but, reassured today and full of confidence in the magnanimity and genius of the great man who has always shown himself to be my friend, I have taken the resolution to place myself in whatever he wishes to dispose of us, of my fate, that of the queen and that of the Prince of Peace. I address to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty a protest against the events

of Aranjuez and against my abdication. I place myself in and confide entirely in the heart and friendship of Your Majesty. On this, I pray to God that he has you in his holy and worthy keeping.

Signed: CHARLES.

No. 10

Letter from Napoleon to Prince Ferdinand.

Bayonne, 14 April 1808.

My brother, I have received the letter from Your Royal Highness: he must have acquired proof, in the papers he received from the king his father, of the interest I have always had for him; he will allow me, in the present circumstances, to speak to him with frankness and loyalty. On arriving in Madrid, I hoped to bring my illustrious friend to some necessary reforms in his States, and to give some satisfaction to public opinion; the dismissal of the Prince of the Peace seemed to me necessary for his happiness and that of his subjects; the affairs of the North have delayed my journey. The events of Aranjuez have taken place; I am not the judge of what happened, and of the conduct of the Prince of the Peace; but what I know well is that it is dangerous for kings to accustom the people to shed blood and to take justice into their own hands: I pray to God that Your Royal Highness does not one day experience this yourself. It is not in the interest of Spain to harm a prince who has married a princess of the blood royal, and who has ruled the kingdom for so long: he has no more friends; Your Royal Highness will have no more, if ever she is unhappy. The people willingly take revenge on the homage they pay us. How, moreover, could one put the Prince of Peace on trial, without putting it on trial to the Queen and the King, your father? The trial will fuel hatred and factious passions, the result will be disastrous for your crown; Your Royal Highness has no rights there except those transmitted to him by his mother. If the trial dishonors him, Your Royal Highness thereby tears up his rights. Let him then close his ears to weak and perfidious advice!

He has no right to judge the Prince of Peace: his crimes, if he is reproached for them, are lost in the rights of the throne. I have often expressed the desire that the Prince of Peace be removed from affairs; the friendship of King Charles has often led me to keep quiet and turn my eyes away from the weaknesses of his attachment. Miserable men that we are! Weakness and error, that is our motto!!

But all this can be reconciled; let the Prince of Peace be exiled from Spain, and I offer him refuge in France. As for the abdication of Charles IV, it took place at a time when my armies covered Spain, and, in the eyes of Europe and posterity, I would appear to have sent so many troops only to precipitate from the throne my ally and my friend. As a neighboring sovereign, I am permitted to want to know before recognizing this abdication. I say to Your Royal Highness, to Spain, to the whole world: if the abdication of King Charles is a pure impulse, if he was not forced into it by the insurrection and riot of Aranjuez, I have no difficulty in admitting it, and I recognize Your Royal Highness as King of Spain; I therefore wish to speak with you on this subject. The circumspection that I have been showing for a month in these affairs, must be a guarantee for you of the support that you will find in me, if, in your turn, factions, of whatever nature they may be, come to disturb you on your throne. When King Charles informed me of the event of last October, I was painfully affected by it, and I think that I contributed, by the insinuations that I have made, to the good outcome of the affair of the Escorial. Your Royal Highness was very wrong, I want as proof only the letter that you wrote me, and that I have constantly wanted to ignore king, in your turn, you will know how sacred the rights of the throne are; any approach to a foreign sovereign on the part of a hereditary prince is criminal. Your Royal Highness must be wary of deviations, of popular emotions. A few murders may be committed on my isolated soldiers, but the ruin of Spain

would be the result. I have already seen with pain that in Madrid they have spread letters from the captain general of Catalonia, and done everything that could give movement to heads. Your Royal Highness knows my entire thought; you see that I waver between several ideas that need to be fixed. You can be certain that, in all cases, I will behave towards you as towards the king your father. Let you believe in my desire to reconcile everything and to find opportunities to give you proof of my affection and my perfect esteem. On this, I pray God, my brother, that he has you in his holy and worthy keeping.

Signed: NAPOLEON.

No. 11

Proclamation of Napoleon to the Spaniards.

Your princes have ceded to me all their rights to the crown of Spain: I do not wish to reign over your provinces, but I wish to acquire eternal titles to the love and gratitude of your posterity.

Your monarchy is old, my mission is to rejuvenate it; I will improve all your institutions, and I will make you enjoy, if you support me, the benefits of a reform without friction, without disorder, without convulsions.

Spaniards, I have called a general assembly of the deputations of the provinces and cities. I wish to assure myself of your desires and your needs.

I will then lay down all my rights, and I will place your glorious crown on the head of another self, guaranteeing you a constitution that reconciles the holy and salutary authority of the sovereign with the liberties and privileges of the people.

Spaniards, remember what your fathers were, see what you have become: the fault is not yours, but the bad administration that has governed you. Be full of hope and confidence in the current circumstances; for I want your last nephews to preserve my memory and say: *He is the regenerator of our country!*

No. 12

Letter from General Duhesme to Prince Berthier, Major General.

At the camp under Girona, 3 August 1808.

Monseigneur,

Despite the desire we had to make a raid on Girona, it is impossible to undertake it. We have prowled all around the city, and we have not found any point where we can make a rapid breach: those that I had noticed and on which I had undertaken the last time, have been reinforced with artillery and works. We are therefore obliged to make a small regular siege of Fort Montjoui; and, while the work is being prepared, we are making a second convoy to Figueres to bring some pieces and reinforce our supply of cannonballs. Our incendiary batteries are almost finished; so, in two or three days, I will have Girona summoned, and if it refuses to surrender I will begin by throwing into this city five to six hundred bombs or incendiary shells; during this time the batteries that we are making to extinguish the fire of Montjoui, will be unmasked, and we will prepare closer ones to breach it. All this requires patience and time; which

hardly agrees with the circumstances, because I have the certain opinion that General Lechi is already confined to Barcelona, and that even desertion is manifest among the Neapolitans. However, as he has with him nearly three thousand six hundred men present under arms, not counting many employees and people in the hospitals, that the Italians are loyal and seasoned, I must count that he will at least maintain himself in the city, all the more so since I have left him resources to live for three months in any event, he has his forts. However, the safest thing is not to leave him isolated for long. Consequently, if this siege must drag on, I propose to promptly send a second division to General Reille, who would continue the operations on Girona; and I, I would leave with the Chabran division, to go to Barcelona, and crush what would be around it. Having cleared this city, I would come to take up a position from where I can if necessary support the siege of Girona, and occupy Vic and Hostalrich; for it is no longer by raids that this province will be subdued, but by successively seizing all the places and towns, and especially by maintaining communications with France.

Of all the provinces in revolt in Spain, I think that Catalonia will be the most difficult to subdue, because of the invincible obstinacy of the inhabitants, the number of strongholds, the mountains and the miquelets. I dare to beg Your Highness to remember that, when I took it upon myself to throw a battalion into Figueres, I had proposed to throw eighteen hundred men of garrison into Roses, Girona and Hostalrich. Now these places will cost us soldiers and time, and will greatly delay the submission of Catalonia. I beg Your Excellency to take into consideration the request I am making for the prompt arrival of General Chabot's division, reinforced with good troops, so that I can engage in the operations that the enemy columns, which will be sent from Valencia, Tarragona and Lerida, will require. I will observe that it is certain that a large part of the garrisons of Majorca and Minorca have been disembarked at Tarragona, and that they now form a cordon on the Llobregat with the peasants. Other troops from these garrisons have been thrown into Roses and into Girona itself, because we see there some troops that we had not seen at the beginning of the siege.

Please accept, Monseigneur, etc.

Signed: DUHESME.

No. 13

*Report of General Duhesme to Prince Berthier, Major
General, on the retreat from Girona.*

Barcelona, 23 August 1808.

Monseigneur, I raised the siege of Girona on the night of the 16th to the 17th, and I arrived in Barcelona on the 20th. I brought back all my sick and wounded; and, although harassed the last three days by clouds of peasant miquelets, I lost only about forty stragglers. But I was forced to sacrifice my artillery at Calella; because the cuts in the road were so great and numerous that it would have been impossible for me to repair them in eight days: they were, in addition to that, defended by a frigate and three English corvettes. I therefore decided to burn the caissons and the effects, and to throw the pieces into the ravines or into the sea. The roads were similarly spoiled under Hostalrich, and more than ten thousand men had come from the cordon of Llobregat and from different other parts of Catalonia, to wait for me there. I had, since Calella, terrible roads between the high mountains and the sea, the edges of which I could not hold, because of the enemy fleet. Fatigue made me lose more than a hundred cavalry horses.

Finally, on the 19th, I arrived near the heights of Montgat, where General Lechi, whom one of my spies had fortunately warned, was waiting for me. This general perfectly maintained the city and the forts, and did very good service.

I found in the forts a three-month supply for three thousand men, and in addition a reserve of six thousand quintals of wheat in our stores.

I hope to find in the city and the surrounding area enough wheat for three or four months; but we will be short of other provisions, especially meat, which is completely lacking. The mountains that surround us prevent us from spreading out, and the fanaticism of the peasants, which makes them flee and carry everything away as we approach, makes our expeditions fruitless. We will be very embarrassed for pay and other army services, because money is hidden here and is getting tight: all the rich people, who have not yet fled, are trying to escape from the city; the bishop and the first nobility have gone over to the insurgents; more than sixty officers have done the same; finally everything is turned against us, and we have no one left: Spain is believed to be lost to France.

Salt and meat are especially necessary to us; and they cannot be too hasty in sending us some by some ships; but, to make their arrival safe, it would be necessary to possess Roses, have a post at Palamós, and destroy the nest of pirates which is at San-Feliu.

The cordon of the Spaniards on the Llobregat, somewhat thinned by the departure of four thousand men of regular troops who had marched to meet me, has just been reinforced by fifteen hundred men, who came from the garrison of Cartagena, and landed at Tarragona where the provincial junta is located. The troops who had marched on Girona are returning to Barcelona, where it is claimed that I will be very closely guarded in ten or twelve days. In any case, I ask Your Highness to assure the Emperor that I will do my duty, and that the instructions of your letter of 2 August will be fulfilled.

Please accept, etc.

Signed: DUHESME.

No. 14

Letter from Prince Berthier, Major General, to General Savary, commander in Madrid.

Bayonne, 12 July 1808.

I have reported to the Emperor, General, your letter of the 8th. His Majesty finds that you have stripped yourself of too many men in Madrid; that you have sent too many troops to the aid of General Dupont; that we should not act offensively until the affairs of Galicia are clarified. Of all the points of the army, General, the most important is Galicia, because it is the only province which has really concluded a treaty with England; that the division of the line of the Spanish troops, which was at Oporto, has joined that which was in Galicia; and that finally, by its position, this province is extremely close to England. Independently of these considerations, its position makes it even more interesting; for the communications of the army would be compromised, if Marshal Bessières did not have complete success; and it would then be necessary to withdraw all your troops, and march in isolation to the aid of Marshal Bessières. Once again, General, you have stripped yourself of Madrid; and if a good regiment of cuirassiers, a few pieces of artillery, and a thousand to twelve hundred infantrymen had been able to

arrive to support Marshal Bessières on the 14th, that would have been of eminent assistance to him. What does it matter that Valencia is subdued? What does it matter that Saragossa is subdued? But, General, the slightest success of the enemy on the side of Galicia would have immense disadvantages. Informed, as you were, of the forces of General Cuesta, of the desertion of the troops of Oporto, etc. His Majesty finds that, in order to maneuver well, you would have had to arrange yourself in such a way as to have, from the 12th to the 15th, eight thousand men to reinforce Marshal Bessières. Once our rear is cleared, and this army of Galicia destroyed, all the rest falls and submits of its own accord, etc.....

Signed: ALEXANDRE.

No. 15

Notes of Napoleon on the affairs of Spain.

13 July 1808.

First observation. --The affairs of the French in Spain would be in an excellent position, if the Gobert Division had marched on Valladolid, and if the Frère Division had occupied San-Clemente, having a mobile column three or four days on the road from General Dupont.

General Gobert having been directed towards General Dupont, and General Frère being with Marshal Moncey, harassed and weakened by marches and counter-marches, the position of the French army has become less beautiful.

Second observation. --Marshal Bessières is today at Medina del Rioseco with fifteen thousand men, infantry, cavalry, artillery. On the 15th or 16th, he will attack Benavente, establish communication with Portugal, throw the rebels into Galicia, and seize Leon. If all the operations succeed in this way, and in a brilliant manner, the position of the French army will return to what it was.

If General Cuesta leaves Benavente without fighting, he will withdraw to Zamora and Salamanca, to come and gain Avila and Segovia, certain that then Marshal Bessières could not pursue him, since, in this supposition, he would be threatened by the army of Galicia, whose vanguard is gathered at Leon.

Then, it is necessary that the general who commands in Madrid can promptly gather six to seven thousand men to march on General Cuesta; the citadel of Segovia must be occupied by a few pieces of cannon, three to four hundred convalescents, with six weeks of biscuit.

It is a great mistake not to have occupied this citadel when the Major General ordered it. Of all the possible positions, Segovia is the most dangerous for the army. Capital of a province, located between two roads, it would deprive the army of all its communications; and, the enemy once posted in this citadel, the French army would no longer be able to dislodge it. Three or four hundred convalescents, a good battalion commander and an artillery squadron will make the castle of Segovia impregnable for a long time, and will assure the army the important position of Segovia.

If General Cuesta throws himself into Galicia without fighting, without suffering defeat, the position of the army becomes always better; all the more so if he is thrown into Galicia after having suffered a heavy defeat.

Third observation. --If Marshal Bessières, having arrived before Benavente, remains in the presence without attacking General Cuesta, or if he is pushed back, his aim will always be to cover Burgos, while holding the enemy in check as much as possible. He can be reinforced by three thousand regular troops who accompany the King; but then there is no need to hesitate. If Marshal Bessières has made a retrograde march without a battle, he must be immediately sent six thousand reinforcements. If he has made his move after a battle in which he has suffered great losses, great measures will have to be taken: recall by forced marches to Madrid General Frère, General Caulaincourt, General Gobert, General Vedel; and leave General Dupont on the mountains of the Sierra-Morena, or even bring him closer to Madrid, while always keeping him seven or eight marches away, in order to be able to crush General Cuesta and the entire army of Galicia, while General Dupont will serve as an advance guard to hold the army of Andalusia in check.

Fourth observation. --If General Dupont were to experience a check, it would be of little consequence: there would be no other result than to make him recross the mountains; but the blow that would be dealt to Marshal Bessières would be a blow to the heart of the army, which would give *tetanus*, and which would be felt at all the extreme points of the army. This is why it is very unfortunate that all the measures ordered have not been followed. Marshal Bessières' army should have at least eight thousand more men, so that there would be no chance against Marshal Bessières' army.

The true way to reinforce General Dupont is not to send him troops, but to send troops to Marshal Bessières. General Dupont and General Vedel are sufficient to maintain themselves in the positions they have entrenched; and if Marshal Bessières were reinforced, and the army of Galicia crushed, General Dupont, immediately afterwards, would find himself in the best position, not only by the forces that could then be sent to him, but also by the morale situation of affairs. There is not an inhabitant of Madrid, not a peasant of the valleys, who does not feel that all the affairs of Spain today are in the affair of Marshal Bessières. How unfortunate it is that in this great affair we have voluntarily given ourselves twenty chances against us!

Fifth observation. --The affair of Valence was never of any consideration: Marshal Moncey alone was sufficient; it was even madness to think of helping him. If Marshal Moncey could not take Valence, twenty thousand more men would not have made him take it, because then it was a matter of artillery, and not a matter of men: for one does not take with a fresh effort a city of eighty to one hundred thousand souls, which has barricaded its streets, put artillery at all the doors and in all the houses. Now, in this hypothesis, Marshal Moncey was sufficient to form a mobile column, to face the army of Valence, and to make felt in all their force the horrors of war.

General Frère could therefore do nothing to take Valencia, while he could do a lot, posted at San Clemente, either he had to return to Madrid, or he had to take up an intermediate position to help General Dupont.

It was another mistake to think of sending Marshal Moncey to Valencia, to then have him march to Murcia and Granada: it was wanting to melt this army corps in detail and without fruit. As General Dupont says very well, it was better to send him a regiment directly than to send him three in that direction.

In civil wars, these are the important points that must be kept: one must not go everywhere. If, however, Marshal Moncey was sent to Valencia, it was at a time when the situation of affairs was not the same: it was when the army of Valencia could send to Catalonia or to Saragossa, as it threatened to do.

Sixth observation. --The aim of all the efforts of the army must be to retain Madrid: that is where everything is. Madrid can only be threatened by the army of Galicia; it can also be threatened by the

army of Andalusia, but in a much less dangerous way, because it is simple and direct, and because, by all the marches he makes on his rear, General Dupont is reinforced. Generals Dupont and Vedel were sufficient, having more than twenty thousand men; Marshal Bessières is not so proportionally, seeing that his position is more dangerous. A check that General Dupont would receive would be little; a check that Marshal Bessières would receive would be more considerable and would be felt at the extremity of the line.

Summary. --To rest and bring closer to Madrid General Frère, General Caulaincourt, General Gobert, so that they can arrive in Madrid before General Cuesta, if the latter defeats Marshal Bessières. Immediately after the event that will take place on the 15th or 16th, take a position according to the events that will have taken place, and with the aim of crushing the enemy army in Galicia.

If Marshal Bessières has had a great success without suffering great losses, all will be well in the current direction. If he has a success after suffering many losses, it is necessary to put himself in a position to reinforce him. If he is standing observation without attacking, it is necessary to reinforce him. If he has been defeated and well beaten, it is necessary to concentrate and gather all his troops in the circle of seven or eight days of Madrid, and study the dispositions in the different directions, to know where to place the vanguards, in order to profit from the advantage that one has of being in the middle, to crush successively with all his forces the various corps of the enemy. If one does not immediately order General Dupont to recross the mountains, it is because one hopes that, despite the error made, Marshal Bessières has the confidence (which one shares) that in a pinch he is sufficient to crush the enemy. Marshal Bessières had the good sense to gather all his forces so much, that he did not even leave a single man at Santander. Whatever advantage there was in leaving a thousand men there, he felt that a thousand men could decide his victory.

As for General Verdier's division in front of Saragossa, it fulfilled three-quarters of its goal: it disorganized all the Aragonese, brought discouragement among them, reduced them to defending the houses of their capital, subdued all the surroundings, blockaded the city, and gathered all the means to seize it without it becoming too costly.

This is the spirit of the Spanish war.

No. 16

Notes of Napoleon on the affairs of Spain.

Bayonne, 21 July 1808.

First observation. --The battle of Medina del Rioseco has put the affairs of the army in the best situation. Marshal Bessières no longer gives any inquiet, and all solitudes must turn to the side of General Dupont.

Second observation. --In the present position of affairs, the French army occupies the center; the enemy, a large number of points of the circumference.

Third observation. --In a war of this nature, coolness, patience and calculation are necessary; and the troops must not be exhausted by false marches and countermarches. It must not be believed, when one has made a false march of three or four days, that it has been repaired by a countermarch: this is usually committing two errors instead of one.

Fourth observation. --All the operations of the army have succeeded up to this hour, as much as they should have succeeded. General Dupont has maintained himself beyond the mountains, and in the basin of Andalusia; three times he has defeated the insurgents. Marshal Moncey defeated the insurgents at Valencia; but he was not able to take the city, which is not an extraordinary thing.

Perhaps one could have wished that he could have camped a day's journey from the city, as General Dupont did; but, finally, whether he is a day's journey or five, as at San-Clemente, the difference is not very great. In Aragon, the enemy has been beaten at all points and in all circumstances and has been discouraged everywhere. Saragossa has not been taken; this city is today surrounded; and a city of forty to fifty thousand souls, defended by a popular movement, can only be taken with time and patience. The histories of wars are full of the most considerable catastrophes for having rushed, and having stuck in the narrow streets of cities. The example of Buenos Aires, and of the twelve thousand English elite who perished there, is proof of this.

Fifth observation. --Thus, the position of the army is good, Marshal Moncey being at San-Clemente or in the surroundings, and Generals Gobert and Vedel united with General Dupont in Andalusia. It would be a mistake, unless events occur, and an immediate employment to be given to these troops in another point, to concentrate all the troops too close to Madrid. The uncertainty of the events of Marshal Bessières, and the chances that he had against him of twenty-five out of a hundred, could determine to stop the march of all the troops that were moving away from the capital, in order that the columns could be recalled to Madrid, if Marshal Bessières were beaten, and could arrive in that city before the enemy; but it would be a mistake if these columns had been made to retrograde, and if they had acted as if Marshal Bessières had been beaten, when, a few days before, they had acted as if the army of Galicia did not exist. Five hundred horse and eighteen hundred infantry, directed towards Valladolid, were all that was needed. If this column had started three days earlier, it would have arrived there on the 15th. Marshal Bessières was the victor, and had, to be the victor, seventy-five chances against twenty-five; but the fatigue that has been given to the army, and the retrograde movements that have been ordered uselessly, since even with Marshal Bessières defeated, we had eight to ten days to reunite the army, have done moral and physical harm. It is to be hoped that the news of the victory arriving in time will have enabled the general staff to stop all movement on Madrid, and that each column will be closer to the point where it should be.

Sixth observation. --In the current situation of affairs, the most important of all is General Dupont; the rest of the division must be sent to him. Gobert, and other troops must be used to maintain communication. The head of Marshal Moncey's division must be held on San-Clemente, and the province of Valencia must always be threatened. If Marshal Bessières has been beaten, without effort and with few losses, the army of Galicia, and has had less than eight thousand men engaged, there is no doubt that with twenty thousand men General Dupont will overthrow all that he has before him.

Seventh observation. --General Rey's brigade gives back to the army more than it lost by the detachment that was made on Valladolid. All human probabilities are that Marshal Bessières no longer needs any reinforcements, at least to be master of all Castile and the kingdom of Leon. It is only when news has been received of what he has done at Benavente and Leon that it will be possible to decide whether he should attack Galicia.

Eighth observation. --General Verdier, in Aragon, has surrounded Saragossa; the Fourteenth and Forty-fourth Line Regiments leave tomorrow to go there. The French parties go as far as halfway to Lerida, Barbastro and Jaca. In ten days, all the artillery will have arrived. This fine and good brigade of line troops brings the army of General Verdier to nearly fifteen thousand men. It is probable that Saragossa will soon fall, and that two-thirds of these fifteen thousand men will become available.

Ninth observation. --Thus, the corps of Marshal Bessières has taken the offensive. It has been, since its victory, reinforced by the Lefebvre brigade and the Gaulois brigade: it is therefore in a position to maintain the offensive. The corps of General Verdier, in Aragon, has beaten the insurgents everywhere, and surrounded the city with much smaller forces. It has just been considerably reinforced, so it can give new activity to the operations of the siege, and maintain its offensive activity on both banks of the Ebro. The corps of Catalonia has acted nicely, having Barcelona as its support point; the junction will be made today or tomorrow in front of Girona with General Reille.

Tenth observation. --So much for the three army corps located on the French side. The communication of Madrid with France is important from all points of view: it is therefore necessary that the columns which have just been organized at Burgos and Vitoria, and which will be daily reinforced and increased, be left in these stations.

Attached is the note of the formation of these columns. They are almost all composed of third battalions and conscripts, but with good cadres; fifteen to twenty days of station at Burgos and Vitoria will put them more or less at the battalion school. It would be a very great error to recall these troops too soon to reinforce their main cadres; we must wait until we have been able to replace them, at Vitoria and Burgos, with new troops.

Eleventh observation. --There is therefore nothing to fear on the side of Marshal Bessières, neither in the north of Castile, nor in the kingdom of Leon.

There is nothing to fear in Aragon: Saragossa will fall a day sooner or a day later.

There is nothing to fear in Catalonia.

There is nothing to fear for the communications from Burgos to Bayonne, by means of the two columns organized in these two cities, and which will be reinforced. If there were events in Biscay, the force that is meeting in Bayonne, forming a reserve, would be sufficient to put everything in order.

If something happens in Burgos that is too considerable for the mobile column that is in this city to be able to put things in order, Marshal Bessières will not be far enough away to be unable to make a detachment.

General Monthion has the surveillance of all of Biscay. General Bonet, in Burgos, is charged with maintaining the communication of Vitoria with Marshal Bessières, and with Madrid. It is necessary that these two generals correspond every day with each other and with General Drouet, who is left in reserve at Bayonne, just as General Verdier of Saragossa, and General d'Agoult of Pamplona, must correspond every day with General Drouet at Bayonne, and with Madrid, by way of Bayonne and Vitoria. Until direct communications are re-established, a courier, leaving Madrid, can go, by Vitoria, Tolosa, Pamplona, to Saragossa. The only important point today is therefore General Dupont. If the enemy ever succeeded in seizing the passes of the Sierra-Morena, it would be difficult to drive them out: General Dupont must therefore be reinforced, so that he has twenty-five thousand men, including what will be needed to guard the mountain passes and part of the road to the La Mancha. He will be able to arrange the troops in such a way that, on the day he wishes to attack, the brigade of two to three thousand men destined to guard the mountains arrives at General Dupont's camp by forced marches, and is successively replaced by the columns which would be in the rear, so that General Dupont has, for the day of the battle, more than twenty-three thousand men to put in line.

Once the enemy has been well beaten, part of the troops will disperse; and, according to whether the victory is more or less decided, the movement will be able to continue with other troops on General Dupont.

Twelfth observation. --It would be important to choose two intermediate points between Andújar and Madrid, to be able to leave there a permanent garrison, a commander, a depot of cartridges, munitions, biscuit stores, ovens, flour, and a hospital, so that three to four hundred men defend the store and the hospital against an entire insurrection. It is difficult to believe that there is not some castle or keep that can be promptly entrenched, and suitable for that. It is by this means alone that one can shorten the line of operations, and be sure to have, every three or four large marches, a handling and a resting point.

Thirteenth observation. --In summary, the division of the army seems to have to be this:

Corps of Catalonia, as it exists approximately.....	20,000	m.
Corps of Aragon, as it exists, about fifteen thousand men, until Saragossa is taken.....	15,000	
Corps of Marshal Bessières, that he has about.....	17,000	
Column of Burgos.....	2,000	
Column of Vitoria.....	2,000	
Garrison of San Sebastian.....	1,500	
Corps of Aranda.....	1,000	
Total of the corps of Marshal Bessières.....	23,5000	m.

After the taking of Saragossa, when the affairs of Catalonia will be somewhat calmed, one will be able, according to the circumstances, either to reinforce Marshal Bessières, or reinforce General Dupont, or to undertake the operation of Valencia.

Today, the only point which threatens, where one must have a prompt success, is on the side of General Dupont. With twenty-five thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery included, he has much more than is necessary to have great results; and, at a pinch, with twenty-one thousand men present on the battlefield, he can boldly take the offensive: he will not be beaten, and he will have more than eighty chances on his side.

No. 17

Notes of Napoleon on the affairs of Spain.

Saint-Cloud, 30 August 1808.

First observation. --In the position of the army of Spain, one has to fear being attacked on the right by the army of Galicia, on the center by the army coming from Madrid, on the left by the army coming from Saragossa and Valencia. It would be a great mistake to let the army of Saragossa and Valencia take up position at Tudela.

Tudela must be occupied, because it is an honorable position, and Milagro an obscure position.

Tudela is on the communications of Pamplona, has a beautiful stone bridge, is the end of a canal on Saragossa. It is an offensive position on Saragossa, such that the enemy cannot neglect it: this position alone covers Navarre. By keeping Tudela, we keep a large quantity of ships, which will soon be necessary for the siege of Saragossa.

If the enemy were master of Tudela, all Navarre would rise up, and the enemy could arrive at Estella, neglecting the position of Milagro, and cutting off communication with Pamplona.

From Estella, he would be on Tolosa; he would be there without giving time to make suitable arrangements. There is no fear, on the contrary, that the enemy will make any operation on Pamplona; as long as we have Tudela, he would himself be cut off on Saragossa.

The general who commands at Tudela can cover the heights with redoubts; if it is an army of insurgents, approach it and beat it, and keep it constantly on the defensive by his reconnaissances and his movements on Saragossa.

If, instead of this, a part of the Spanish regular army marched on Tudela, the French general would recross the Ebro, dispute the ground on Pamplona, if he is forced to do so, and give time to the commander-in-chief of the French army to take his measures. This observation corps would then fulfill its purpose, and no prompt operation on Tolosa or Estella is to be feared; whereas, by occupying the position of Milagro, the enemy will be at Estella the same day that it is learned at headquarters. If Tudela is occupied, it is necessary to use redoubts there, and to establish oneself there, not to preserve any kind of embarrassment there, and to hold them all in Pamplona. If the enemy occupies it, it is necessary to drive him out, and to establish oneself there; for, in the defensive order, this would be a great error, which would lead to unfortunate consequences.

Second observation. --The position of Burgos was also important to hold, as a city of high reputation, as a center of communication and reports.

From there, parties not only of cavalry, but also of two or three thousand men of infantry, and even four or five thousand men in echelons, can carry the first patrols of hussars in all directions, up to two marches, and, perfectly informed of all that is done, inform the headquarters; so that, if the enemy presents himself in force on Burgos, the different divisions can in time go there to support him, and give battle; or, if this is not considered suitable, to enlighten the movements of the enemy, to let him believe that we want to go on Burgos, and to be able then to make his retreat to go elsewhere.

Does not a body of twelve to fifteen thousand men take twenty positions in the day, at the sole command of an adjutant-major? and would our troops have become levies en masse, which would have to be placed fifteen days in advance in the positions where they were wanted to fight?

If it had been judged thus, the corps of Marshal Bessières would have taken the position of Miranda or Briviesca; but, when the enemy is still in Madrid, when one does not know where the army of Galicia is, and when one suspects that the rebels could use part of their efforts against Portugal, to take, instead of a threatening, offensive, honorable position like Burgos, a shameful, one-eyed position like Trevino, is to say to the enemy: *"You have nothing to fear; go elsewhere. We have made our arrangements to go further, or else we have chosen a battlefield to fight; come here: you do not fear being disturbed."* But what will the French general do, if they march tomorrow on Burgos? Will he allow the citadel of this city to be taken by six thousand insurgents? or, if the French have left the garrison in the castle (for the position and situation of the army are unknown), how will a garrison of four, six or eight hundred men withdraw into such a vast plain? And, from then on, it is as if there were nothing: the enemy master of this citadel, it will not be retaken.

If, on the contrary, one wants to keep the citadel, one wants to give battle to the enemy: because this citadel cannot hold more than three days; and, if one wants to give battle to the enemy, why does Marshal Bessières abandon the ground where one wants to give battle?

These provisions seem ill-reasoned; and, when the enemy marches, one will make the army suffer an affront which will demoralize the troops, even if there were only light corps or insurgents who marched.

In summary, the position of Burgos had to be kept. Every day, at three o'clock in the morning, one had to be under arms; and, at one o'clock in the morning, reconnaissances had to set out in all directions. One had to collect news eight or ten leagues around, so that one could then take the course that circumstances would indicate.

This is the first time that an army has ever abandoned all offensive positions to put itself in bad defensive positions, to appear to choose battlefields, when the distance of the enemy, the thousand and one different combinations that can take place, do not allow the probability of predicting whether the battle will take place at Tudela, between Tudela and Pamplona, between Soria and the Ebro, or between Burgos and Miranda.

The position of Burgos, held in force and in an offensive manner, threatens Palencia, Valladolid, Aranda, Madrid itself. One must have fought a long time in order to understand it; one must have undertaken a great number of offensive operations to know how the slightest event or indication encourages or discourages, decides one operation or another.

In two words, if fifteen thousand insurgents enter Burgos, entrench themselves in the city, and occupy the castle, it is necessary to calculate a march of several days, to be able to position themselves there and retake the city: which will not be without some inconvenience. If, during that time, the real attack is on Logroño or Pamplona, useless countermarches will have been made, which will have tired the army; and, finally, if the enemy occupies Logroño, Tudela and Burgos, the French army would be in a sad and bad position.

When one holds cavalry at Burgos without infantry, is it not telling the enemy that one does not want to hold there? is it not encouraging him to come? Burgos has a great influence in the world by its name; in Castile, because it is the capital; in operations, because it gives direct communication with Santander. It is not permitted, at three hundred leagues, and not even having a state of the situation of the army, to prescribe what must be done; but it must be said that, if no major force prevents it, Burgos and Tudela must be occupied.

The detached body of Tudela has its movement assured on Pamplona, has the role of guarding Navarre, has its enemies to hold in check, Saragossa and all the insurgents; it was more than sufficient to watch Tudela, the Ebro and Pamplona, to disperse the gatherings if there were only insurgents, to contain the enemy, to give information, and to delay the march on Pamplona. If, instead of the insurgents, it is the enemy army that marches in this direction, it is still enough to give time to the army of Burgos, to that of Miranda, to march united with thirty-six thousand men, either to take the offensive, or to take in flank the enemy who marches on Pamplona, or to fall back and return to Navarre, if the whole enemy army had taken this direction.

If these observations seem good, and are adopted, that the enemy has not yet shown any plan, it is necessary that the general who commands the corps of Saragossa build some redoubts around Tudela, to favor his battlefield; gather provisions from all sides, and be there in an offensive position on Saragossa, maintaining his communication with Logroño on his right, but at least by the left bank of the Ebro. Marshal Bessières, with his whole corps, reinforced by light cavalry, must be camped in the wood near Burgos, the citadel well occupied; all the hospitals, depots, and embarrassments must be beyond the Ebro; he must be there in a position to maneuver every day, at three o'clock in the morning, under arms, until the return of all the reconnaissances, and lighting up the country in the greatest extent; finally, Marshal Moncey's corps, having all its embarrassments and hospitals behind Vitoria, must be at Miranda and

Briviesca always in battle before daybreak, and send reconnaissances on Soria and the other directions of the enemy. It must not be forgotten that, since the corps of Marshals Bessières and Moncey must be united, it is necessary to liaise as little as possible with Logroño, and yet to consider the corps of General Lefebvre as a detached corps, which has a particular line of operations on Pamplona, and a separate role. To wish to contain Tudela as a contiguous part of the line, is to spread out a lot. In a word, it is necessary to wage war, that is to say, to have news from the curates, the alcaldes, the heads of convents, the principal landowners, the posts: one will then be perfectly informed.

The reconnaissances, which will head every day towards Soria, Burgos, Palencia and towards Aranda, can form every day three interception posts, three reports of arrested men, who will be treated well, and who will be released when they have given the information that one desires. One will then see the enemy coming, one will be able to gather all his forces, steal marches from him, and fall on his flanks at the moment when he is meditating an offensive project.

Third observation. --The Spanish army of Andalusia was small in number. All the English gazettes, and the reports of the English officer who was in the camp, prove it to us. Eighteen thousand men have laid down their arms; only six thousand fought; and, again, these six thousand men, whom General Dupont had defeated at daybreak, after having made them march all night, were one against three. Despite all this, the enemy fought so badly that he did not take a prisoner, capture a piece of cannon, or gain an inch of ground; and Dupont's army remained intact in its position; which was doubtless a misfortune: for it would have been better if this division had been routed, scattered and destroyed, since the divisions Vedel and Dufour, instead of surrendering by capitulation, would have retreated. How could these two divisions have been included in the capitulation?

What has just been said proves that the Spaniards are not to be feared, not all Spanish forces are capable of overthrowing twenty-five thousand Frenchmen in a reasonable position.

A river, even if it is as wide as the Vistula, as rapid as the Danube at its mouth, is nothing, if it does not have outlets on the other bank, and a head ready to resume the offensive. As for the Ebro, it is less than nothing: it is only regarded as a trace.

In all these observations, we have spoken of the position in which the army was from the 20th to the 26th, when it had no news of the enemy anywhere.

If we continue to take no measures to have news, we will not learn that the Spanish army of the line has arrived at Tudela and Pamplona, that it is on the communications, at Tolosa, until it has already arrived there. It was made known in the previous note how the war was waged in order to have news. If the position of Tudela is occupied by the enemy, it is not seen that the Ebro is tenable. How was Tudela evacuated, when it had been ordered in the previous notes that it was necessary to keep this point, and that the opinion even of the generals who came from Saragossa was to occupy this important position?

No. 18

Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army.

The generals-in-chief of the English and French armies in Portugal, having determined, in accordance with the provisions of the suspension of arms of 22 August, to negotiate and conclude a treaty for the evacuation of this kingdom by the French army, have chosen to treat on their behalf, namely:

M. the Duke of Abrantès, general-in-chief of the French army, of M. the general of division Kellermann.

Sir Hew Dalrymple, General-in-Chief of the English Army, of Colonel Murray, Quartermaster-General;

To whom they have given power to, for themselves and in their name, negotiate and conclude, under their mutual ratification and that of the Admiral commanding the British fleet at the entrance to the Tagus, a definitive convention to this effect.

Which General and Colonel, after having exchanged their full powers, have agreed on the following articles:

ARTICLE Ist. The places and forts occupied by the French army in the Kingdom of Portugal will be handed over to the English army in the state in which they are at the time of the signature of the present convention.

ART. II. The French army will withdraw with arms and baggage; it will not be as prisoner of war, and, returned to France, it will be free to fight.

ART. III. The English government will provide it with transport, to be embarked and taken to one of the western ports, between Rochefort and Lorient inclusive.

ART. IV. The French army will take all the artillery of French caliber harnessed, and the caissons equipped with sixty shots per piece. All other artillery, arms or munitions of war, as well as the arsenals of land and sea, will be handed over to the English army, in the state in which they are found at the time of ratification.

ART. V. The French army will take all its equipment, and everything that is called army property, that is to say, its pay chests, its crew and ambulance caissons. Anything that the commander-in-chief does not deem appropriate to embark will be sold for its own profit. The same shall apply to individuals, who shall have full freedom to dispose of their property as they see fit, with full security for the rest of their acquisitions.

ART. VI. The cavalry shall embark its horses, as well as the general officers and others of all ranks. But, since the means of transport of this kind at the disposal of the English commanders are very limited, additional ones may be chartered in the port of Lisbon. The number of troop horses to be embarked shall not exceed six hundred, that of staff or officer horses shall not exceed two hundred. The army shall, moreover, be granted every facility to dispose of the horses which are not embarked.

ART. VII. For the ease of embarkation, it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which shall be particularly composed of the garrisons of the places, the cavalry, the artillery, the sick, and the crews. The first division will embark in seven days from the date of the exchange of ratifications, and even sooner if possible.

ART. VIII. The garrisons of Elvas and its forts, of Peniche and Palmela, will be embarked at Lisbon; that of Almeida at Oporto, or at the nearest port. They will be accompanied, in their march, by English commissioners, charged with ensuring their provisions, their lodgings, etc., etc.

ART. IX. All the sick and wounded who cannot be embarked with the army, will be entrusted to the English army, and, during their stay in this country, treated at the expense of the English government, on condition that its expenses will be reimbursed to it at the final evacuation. They will be successively sent

back to France in convoys of one hundred and fifty to two hundred men, and a sufficient number of French doctors and surgeons will be left to treat them.

ART. X. As soon as the transports have landed the troops in the agreed ports of France, or in any other ports of France where bad weather would force them to put in and land, they will be granted all facilities to return to England without delay, without being disturbed by any warship on their return.

ART. XI. The French army will concentrate at Lisbon, and within a radius of about two leagues in circumference of this capital. The English army will be able to approach it to within three leagues, so that there will be a league's interval between the two armies.

ART. XII. The forts of Saint-Julien, Bugio and Cascais, will be occupied by the English troops after the exchange of ratifications. The city of Lisbon, the castle, the forts and batteries, up to the Lazaret or Trafaria on the one hand, and up to the fort Saint-Joseph on the other, inclusive; the port, as well as all the armed vessels of any kind which are there, with their rigging and munitions, will be handed over to the embarkation of the second division.

The surrender of the forts of Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, Palmela, will take place as soon as the garrisons are relieved by the English troops. In the meantime, the General-in-Chief of the English army will notify them, as well as any troops who are in their presence, of this convention, in order to stop all further hostilities.

ART. XIII. Commissioners will be appointed on both sides to regulate and decide on all details of execution.

ART. XIV. If there were any doubtful article, it would be explained in favor of the French army.

ART. XV. From the date of the ratification of the present convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions or claims of the French government as a result of the occupation of this kingdom, on 1 December 1807, on the subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing there, who have not been acquitted, will not be collected, and any sequestration placed on their movable and immovable property will be lifted, and free disposal returned to the owners.

ART. XVI. All French subjects, or those of powers friendly and allied to France, domiciled in the kingdom of Portugal, or occasionally there, will be protected, their properties of all kinds, movable and immovable, respected. They will be free to follow the French army, or to continue to remain in Portugal; and, in either case, their said properties will be guaranteed to them, with the option of retaining them or selling them, and of sending the proceeds to France or to such place as they shall have chosen for their domicile, and this, within the period of one year. Of course, merchant vessels are excepted from this provision, but only as to their departure from the port, and that the above stipulations cannot serve as pretexts for commercial speculations.

ART. XVII. No Portuguese may be investigated for the political conduct he has held during the occupation of Portugal by the French army; and all those who have continued to exercise employment, or who have received employment from the French government, are placed under the special protection of the English army, which undertakes that no harm shall be done to them, by anyone whatsoever, in their persons or in their property. These individuals having been unable to dispense with obeying the orders of the French government, they shall also enjoy the provisions of Article XVI.

ART. XVIII. The Spanish troops detained on board the ships in the harbor will be taken to France, or handed over to the General-in-Chief of the English army, at his choice, who, in the latter case, will

undertake to obtain from the Spaniards the release of all Frenchmen, civilians or military, detained in Spain without having been taken in the fighting or as a result of fighting, but as a consequence of the events of May 29th last and the following days.

ART. XIX. Prisoners of all ranks, taken by the two armies since the opening of hostilities, will be exchanged immediately.

ART. XX. Hostages of lower rank will be provided by the English land and sea armies, and by the French armies, for the reciprocal guarantee of this convention. That of the English land army will be returned after the execution of the articles which concern it; that of the naval army after the total disembarkation of the troops in the ports of France. The same will apply to the French army.

ART. XXI. The general-in-chief of the French army will have the power to send an officer to France to carry an expedition of the treaty. The English squadron will provide him with a aviso or other light vessel to land him at Rochefort or Bordeaux.

ART. XXII. The English admiral will be invited to provide warships or frigates for the transport of His Excellency the general-in-chief of the French army, the general and senior officers, and the first authorities of the army.

Done and decreed in duplicate between us, the undersigned, provided with powers.

Lisbon, 30 August 1808.

Major General, *Signed*: KELLERMANN.

Signed: GEORGES MURRAY,
Quartermaster-General.

Ratified the above articles of the convention, 31 August 1808. *Signed*: HEW DALRYMPLE,
Commander-in-Chief of the English Forces in Portugal.

Additional Articles to the Convention of 30 August 1808.

ARTICLE Ist. Non-combatants of the army, taken, either by the English or by the Portuguese troops, throughout the whole extent of Portugal, shall be returned without exchange, as is customary.

ART. II. The army shall live on its stores until the day of embarkation, and the garrisons until the day of the surrender of the places. The remainder of the stores will be delivered in the forms accustomed to the English army, which, from that moment, will take charge of the subsistence of the men and horses until their disembarkation in France, on condition of being reimbursed, by the French government, for the expense which would exceed the estimate which will be made contradictorily of the aforementioned stores. The supply of the armed vessels will be taken into account by the English army, as well as that of the places of war, as is decided for the aforementioned places.

ART. III. Immediately after the exchange of ratifications, Mr. the general in chief of the English army will make all the necessary arrangements to reestablish the free circulation of the necessary provisions for the capital.

Done and decreed in duplicate between us, the undersigned, provided with powers.

At Lisbon, 30 August 1808.

The general of division,

Signed: KELLERMANN.

Signed: GEORGES MURRAY,
Quartermaster-General.

Ratified the above Additional Articles of the Convention, 31 August 1808.

Signed: HEW DALRYMPLE,

Commanding the English Forces in Portugal