

Translated by Greg Gorsuch
Part 6

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

OF THE

PENINSULA WAR,

FROM 1807 TO 1814,

SERVING AS AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JOURNALS OF THE SIEGES MADE
OR SUSTAINED BY THE FRENCH IN THIS WAR.

CAMPAIGN OF 1809

The campaign opened under the most favorable auspices. The cause of the Spaniards seemed lost. The French had not only triumphed over the armies that had been opposed to them, but they had also cast into the hearts of their adversaries an impression of terror that made them look upon them as invincible. The southern provinces were the only ones that had not been invaded. But Portugal still remained to the English, as a point of support, to act in Spain. The efforts of the French armies were directed in that direction.

Marshal Soult was still at Ferrol, when he received the order from the Emperor to march, by the north, on Oporto and Lisbon. His army, reinforced by the troops of the Eighth Corps, which had been dissolved, was composed of four divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry, presenting a total of twenty-three thousand five hundred men present under arms. Marshal Ney was charged with securing the rear in Galicia, with two infantry divisions and four cavalry regiments, forming in all twelve thousand men. He received special instructions for his operations¹. Other troops, under the orders of Marshal Bessières, remained in echelon in the Kingdom of Leon, in the provinces of Valladolid and Burgos. Marshal Victor was to advance with the First Corps, through Estremadura, into Alentejo, to create a diversion in favor of Marshal Soult, and then invade Andalusia. The division of General Lapisse, and the cavalry brigade of General Maupetit, which were in Salamanca, were to march through Ciudad-Rodrigo on Abrantès, in order to support Marshal Soult, and then join up with Marshal Victor. The Fourth Corps, under the command of General Sebastiani, who had replaced Marshal Lefebvre, was to be stationed in the vicinity of Toledo and Aranjuez, to cover the rear of the First Corps. Finally, King Joseph was to guard Madrid with a reserve of twelve thousand infantry, eighteen hundred cavalry and his Guard.

For his part, the enemy was preparing his means of defense. The defeat of General Moore had first thrown terror into Portugal, and the English were even preparing to leave Lisbon. However,

¹ See supporting documents, No. 24.

the steps they took with the Junta of Seville to occupy Cadiz, which they preferred as a place of arms, having been fruitless, they redoubled their efforts to maintain themselves in Portugal. They obtained from the regency the execution of an ancient military constitution of the kingdom, which, in great perils, called the whole population to arms. Marshal Beresford was placed at the head of the national forces and organized an army at Abrantès. Twenty thousand Portuguese were taken into the pay of England; the English troops of Lisbon, commanded by General Cradock, were increased to fifteen thousand men. Sir Robert Wilson, who had raised a Lusitanian Legion of three thousand men, at Oporto, took up post on the Águeda, near Ciudad-Rodrigo. Generals Freire and Silveira united two armies, one at Chavès and the other at Braga, covering Oporto, where the bishop prepared for the most vigorous defense with a fanatical population.

Although beaten on all points, the Spaniards had regained new hope on learning of the declaration of war by Austria, the departure of Napoleon and some thirty thousand men, including twelve thousand from the Imperial Guard, that imposing reserve of the army. United more closely with the English by a new treaty, they redoubled their efforts to fight the French. The Junta of Seville and the Marquis of La Romana spread incendiary proclamations to exalt spirits and organize bands of Guerrillas²; a convoy of money, coming from Mexico, arrived at Cadiz; and one saw reappear, for the second time, in the southern provinces, a new army of Estremadura under the command of Cuesta, and a new army of La Mancha under the command of the Count of Cartoajal.

However, Marshal Soult having gathered his troops at Vigo in the first days of February, went on the 10th to Tui, to cross the Minho (Miño). This river, rapid and very deep, was swollen by the rains, and flooded part of the countryside bordering its banks. The difficulties of crossing it under the cannon of Valença, a Portuguese fortress opposite Tui, determined the Marshal to make an attempt below the place, at Campo-Saucos, where the river was narrowed, and where there was, on the left bank, a dense wood, suitable for covering the first landing troops. The army had no pontoon equipment, and the Portuguese had gathered, on the left bank, all the boats of the river. Nevertheless, the engineer Colonel Garbé managed to gather a fairly large number of fishing boats at La Guardia, a small town located on the seashore, a quarter of a league from the mouth of the Minho, from which it is separated by the point of Santa-Tecla. He had them transported by land, for a league, to a lake from which flows the Tamuxa, a small river which falls into the Minho, a little above Campo-Saucos. There, he organized a flotilla that some French sailors, taken from the prisons of La Coruña, were charged with leading. From the fort of La Guardia two twenty-four iron pieces were taken, which were placed in battery at Campo-Saucos, to protect the passage, and a road was opened along the river to communicate with Tui.

During the night of 15-16 February, at high tide, the flotilla descended the Tamuxa in good order and entered the Minho. The current of the river was so rapid that the boats separated. Some, better equipped, nevertheless reached the left bank, and there disembarked thirty-five men; but this detachment could not be reinforced by other troops. At daybreak, it was attacked by several thousand armed peasants and forced to surrender. The failure of this attempt determined Marshal Soult to go up the Minho as far as Ourense, where there was a bridge over the Minho. He hoped to resume his line of operations later by the main road which runs along the coast. He

² See supporting documents, no. 25.

left at Tui his heavy artillery, his baggage, and nine hundred sick men under the guard of General La Martillière, who was charged with defending this place, half ruined, with five hundred men, and what stragglers he could muster. The army set out on the 17th of February, going up the river by terrible roads, and driving back the peasants who had been raised en masse, who tried to defend several positions. The vanguard arrived on the 20th at Ourense, in time to prevent the enemy from cutting the bridge. The troops rested for a few days in this city, and the artillery repaired its equipment which had suffered greatly from the poor state of the roads.

On the 4th of March, Marshal Soult left Ourense, heading for Chavès, a stronghold located in the valley of the Tâmega. At Monterey he met the Marquis de la Romana, who, after having abandoned the main road to Galicia to the English, so that they could have retreated to Corunna, had thrown himself, by a flank movement, into the mountains on the left bank of the Sil, to elude the pursuit of Marshal Ney, and there to organize the insurrection of the Galicians. La Romana was at the head of an army of twenty thousand men, both the remains of his first troops and the inhabitants who had risen up; he was to oppose, with Silveira, in the Trás-os-Montes, a first obstacle to the march of the French army. Marshal Soult dispersed this army near Monterey, killed more than a thousand men, and took two thousand prisoners. La Romana, instead of retiring to Chavès, to reunite with Silveira, threw himself towards Braganza, from where he returned, by Puebla de Sanabria, into the valley of the Sil. A body of four thousand Portuguese, which had emerged from the defile of Verin to support the retreat of the Spaniards, was overthrown; and, on 7 March, the French army came to bivouac in sight of Vila Real, on the frontier of Portugal. Chavès was invested on the 10th. This stronghold defends the road to Oporto, the along the Tâmega. Its fortifications were in poor condition, and still preserved the breaches made in the war of 1762. It had a garrison of four thousand men, and fifty pieces of cannon were in battery on its ramparts. It surrendered on 13 March, after several summons. It was a valuable support point for the French army, which left its sick, its wounded, and a post of four hundred men there. General Silveira had only ten thousand men left; seeing himself abandoned by the Marquis de la Romana, he decided himself to throw himself into the mountains, on the right, to avoid total destruction. Marshal Soult could follow the road to Oporto which runs along the Tâmega; but General Freire, commander-in-chief of the province of Entre-Minho and Duero, occupied a strong position in front of Braga, with the mass of the Portuguese troops and the militia of the country, forming an army of more than twenty-five thousand men. Marshal Soult, unable to leave this army on his right, and wishing to resume his line of operation by the coast, decided to cross the chain of the Sierras of Cabrera, Jerez and Santa Catalina, which separate the valley of the Tâmega from the watercourses which flow directly into the Ocean.

On 15 March, the French army set out on the march through difficult gorges. General Freire had withdrawn part of the troops defending them, to concentrate on Braga. Not believing he could even remain in this city; he prepared his retreat; but the angry people stopped him in a neighboring village and brought him back to Braga where he was massacred. His second, the English Major Eben, took up position in front of the city. On 20 March, Marshal Soult put this army into a complete rout, leaving four thousand men on the battlefield. He made it suffer new losses at Guimarães, forced the passage of the Ave, and arrived on the 27th in sight of Oporto. The bishop of this city had gathered sixty thousand men, both regular troops and militia. He had built a vast entrenched camp in front of the enclosure, the right of which leaned on the Douro

and the left on the forts which bordered the sea; two hundred guns were in battery there. The exasperation of the inhabitants was at its height; General Foy, sent to the city as a parliamentarian, nearly got massacred, and was only saved by being put in prison. On 29 March, the French army attacked the city and took it by storm after six hours of the most stubborn combat. The carnage was terrible; eight thousand Portuguese remained on the battlefield; and an incalculable number of inhabitants drowned in the Douro while trying to flee to the left bank by the pontoon bridge which broke under the weight of the crowd. Twenty flags, all the artillery, twenty English ships loaded with wine, and immense stores were taken.

Marshal Soult hastened to stop the pillaging, to re-establish order, and understand how to win the affection of the inhabitants. He sent an advance guard to the Vouga; he had the bridge of the Douro re-established and fortified as a bridgehead the convent of Serra near the suburb of Villanova on the left bank. He remained in these positions to await news from Marshal Victor and General Lapisse. He was still more than sixty leagues from Lisbon and felt too weak to continue his march in a rebellious country. His communication with Galicia was already very compromised: General Silveira had come down from the mountains; and, reinforced by a large number of insurgents, he had seized Chavès after a siege of eight days, and had successively occupied Braga and Guimarães, as the French army had moved away from these towns. This general was already with fifteen thousand men at Amarante on the Tâmega. General Morillo, with a division of the Spanish army of Galicia, blockaded Vigo; and General de la Carrera occupied Ourense. Finally, a body of twelve thousand men, both Galicians and Portuguese, besieged Tui, where the great park and the army depots were located. To contain these attacks, Marshal Soult detached General Loison on the Tâmega with a brigade of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, and then Delaborde's division, against the Portuguese troops of Silveira. He sent General Heudelet with his division and four regiments of dragoons to the aid of General La Martillière, who commanded at Tui, and who valiantly defended this place with three thousand five hundred men that he had managed to assemble. General Heudelet defeated the insurgents, and arrived on 10 April before Valença, who surrendered at the first summons. The next day, he crossed the Minho and unblocked the city of Tui; but he could not save Vigo which, on 28 March, had capitulated. The garrison, twelve hundred men strong, had shut itself up in the fort del Castro serving as a redoubt, and had resisted there, despite the lack of provisions, until the moment when the enemy broke down the gate with axes. The enemy took the army's payroll, estimated at two million, and sixty carts of baggage. General Heudelet, not having the means to supply Valença, received the order from Marshal Soult to blow up the fortifications of this place. He returned at the end of April to reinforce General Loison on the Tâmega, where he replaced General Delaborde who had gone to Oporto.

In the meantime, in the month of March, Marshal Victor, with the First Corps, an infantry division of the Fourth, and twelve cavalry regiments, forming a total of twenty-five thousand men, had gone to Almaraz on the Tagus. There he encountered the Spanish army of Estremadura commanded by Cuesta, who had seized the Almaraz bridge, had blown up one of the arches, and was defending the left bank. The reconstruction of this bridge was impracticable under enemy fire; the broken arch was one hundred and fifty feet wide, and one hundred and thirty-four feet high. Marshal Victor flanked this position on 15 March; by sending several infantry and cavalry corps to the left bank by the bridges of Arzobispo and Talavera, whose roads were then impassable to artillery. These corps forced the enemy to withdraw and thus facilitated the

construction of a flying bridge at Almaraz, over which the French army completed its passage on 19 March.

The Spaniards retreated to the Guadiana, which they crossed at the bridge of Medellin on 22 March, to occupy, on the left bank, a position that General Cuesta had reconnoitered in advance. There, this general was joined, on the 27th, by reinforcements drawn from the armies of La Mancha and Andalusia and found himself at the head of thirty thousand men. Marshal Victor, after having fortified the bridge of Almaraz, and having put in order an old citadel which was located at Trujillo, left some troops there to ensure his communications and his depots. He sent his cavalry to seize the bridge of Mérida on the Guadiana, and to reconnoiter the roads to Badajoz, Seville, and Medellin, while he himself advanced directly on the latter city with about fifteen thousand men, forced the passage of the bridge, and came, on 28 March, to give battle to Cuesta. The Spanish infantry had a moment of success on our right wing; but our cavalry overwhelmed it and made a frightful carnage. Never was a rout more complete. The Spaniards lost more than ten thousand men killed on the field of battle, four thousand prisoners, twenty-five pieces of cannon, and six flags. The cavalry owed its salvation only to the speed of its horses, and Cuesta remained several days without being able to rally a single battalion³. This victory was all the more remarkable because it cost the French army only three hundred and forty men killed or wounded.

That very day, General Sebastiani gained a no less signal advantage over the Army of La Mancha commanded by the Count of Cartoajal, and posted on the Guadiana, in front of Ciudad-Real. Not having wanted to give the enemy general time to increase his forces, and to adopt a more threatening attitude, he had advanced on him, and, on 27 March, had forced the passage of the Guadiana. The Spaniards, intimidated by this movement, were soon overwhelmed and put to flight, with a loss of two thousand men killed on the battlefield, two thousand prisoners, five pieces of cannon, three flags, and part of the baggage. The Spanish army, reinforced by troops who were in the rear, and still seventeen thousand strong, wanted to try the fate of a new battle at Santa-Crux the next day; it was overthrown a second time, and lost six thousand men, including a thousand prisoners, and the rest of its artillery and baggage. The French vanguard pursued the fugitives to the foot of the Sierra Morena mountains.

These events brought terror to the gates of Seville and Badajoz. Marshal Victor could take advantage of this to advance into Portugal by the valley of the Tagus; but, charged more especially with invading Andalusia, having moreover no news of Marshal Soult, and fearing to lose his communications with Madrid by the bridge of Almaraz, he remained in observation on the Guadiana, and thus lost the fruit of his successes.

General Lapisse, who was at Salamanca with ten thousand men, did not move until March; and although he had before him only the Lusitanian legion of Sir Robert Wilson and the weak garrisons of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida, he allowed his communications to be cut off at the Baños Pass with Marshal Victor. He also made no effort to clear his front and to have news of Marshal Soult, with whom he was to seek more particularly to form links, in order to march in time on Abrantès. He presented himself on 25 March before Ciudad-Rodrigo. After having summoned this place to surrender in vain, he remained under observation at San Muñoz until the

³ See supporting documents, No. 26.

7th of April, when he received the order from King Joseph to abandon his movement on Abrantès, since he could not penetrate alone into Portugal, and to head for Alcántara, in order to link up with the First Corps which was to go there. General Lapisse forced the passage of the Tagus at the bridge of Alcántara; but, instead of holding this important outlet, he withdrew to Mérida, which Marshal Victor had not yet left and joined him there on the 19th of April.

Such was the situation of affairs, when Sir Arthur Wellesley came to take for the second time the command of the English army in Portugal. He landed at Lisbon on the 22nd of April with numerous reinforcements. Hostilities had just begun between France and Austria, and the English government had decided to make a powerful diversion in the Peninsula. General Wellesley, well informed of the retrograde march of Lapisse's division, and of the inaction of the First Corps on the Guadiana, was content to leave at Abrantès an English division and ten thousand Portuguese, to observe the movements of Marshal Victor. He left Coimbra on the 9th of May, with sixteen thousand English and ten thousand Portuguese, and advanced against Marshal Soult at Oporto. At the same time, Marshal Beresford, with some English battalions, eight thousand Portuguese troops and as many militia, marched from Viseu to cross the Douro at Lamego, in order to join up with Silveira's corps towards Amarante, and to attack General Loison. As the English approached, the French vanguard, posted on the Vouga, fell back on the right bank of the Douro.

Marshal Soult was not without anxiety about the result of a conspiracy fomented in his army by a secret society called the Philadelphes, whose object was to overthrow the imperial dynasty and reestablish a republican government in France. He had arrested an adjutant-major who had gone clandestinely to Coimbra to confer with the English, and he had recognized that several senior officers were not strangers to the conspiracy. Uncertain about the spirit of his army, he judged it prudent to remain on the defensive. He therefore had the bridge of Oporto destroyed and all the boats safely gathered under the city. On 11 May, the two armies found themselves facing each other, separated by a river about three hundred meters wide and very fast. Marshal Soult intended, sheltered from this obstacle, to prepare his retreat to Mirandela and Braganza, to return to the Kingdom of Leon by Zamora. To this end, and as early as 2 May, General Loison, by a most remarkable stroke of audacity by the engineer captain Bouchard, had become master of the bridge of Amarante, and had driven back the troops of Silveira a long way⁴. Unfortunately, on the very night of the 11th to the 12th, Lord Wellington surprised the passage of the Douro opposite Oporto. A poor barber, who had escaped from the city in a small boat, having landed on the left bank, an English officer used this boat to go to the opposite bank, from where he brought back three large boats with which three companies were transported to the right bank. These troops landed without being seen above the city, and lodged in the enclosure of the seminary. General Mermet, who commanded on the line, had neglected to guard this part of the river; and it was not until half past ten in the morning that General Foy, while walking, noticed the enemy passing. He immediately gave the alarm; the French troops took up arms, and moved rapidly towards the suburb of Valongo which the enemy was already threatening. But another English column, under the orders of General Murray, had also crossed the Douro at the Avintas ferry, a league higher up, and was arriving from the same side to cut the main road, while the passage continued in front of Oporto with new boats and under the protection of twenty pieces of artillery established on the heights of the left bank. The French troops, surprised, had only time

⁴ See supporting documents, No. 27.

to evacuate the town and withdraw to Penafiel, where they arrived during the night of 12-13 May.

Marshal Soult, still believing General Loison to be at Amarante, thought he had escaped the danger of being cut off by the enemy. But, since the 10th, Beresford had joined Silveira on the left bank of the Tâmega; and General Loison, attacked in his positions by superior forces, had abandoned the bridge at Amarante without informing Marshal Soult. On the 13th, he was in full retreat to Guimarães. One can imagine Marshal Soult's embarrassment on learning of this terrible event, which deprived him of his only route of retreat. But, conserving all his energy in this critical moment, he immediately destroyed the artillery, the carriages and all the baggage; he went up the valley of the Sousa by a narrow path almost impassable to horses, joined General Loison at Guimarães, then, leaving Braga on his left, he regained the main road beyond this city, at San-João del Rey. This bold determination saved the army. General Wellesley had set out on the 14th of May to occupy Braga, hoping to cut off the French army's retreat on the Minho. He did not arrive there until the evening of the 15th, when Marshal Soult, having gained a day's march on him, had already reached the village of Salamonde. But Marshal Beresford went up the Tâmega to cut off the French army's road to Chavès, and General Silveira had gone into the gorges of the Sierra de Cabrera. After destroying the bridge of Ruivães on the Cávado, he had left a post of twelve hundred men and some cannon there. Another post was at Puente-Nuovo, where the little road to Montalegre passes over the same torrent: the enemy had been working since the morning of the 15th to destroy this bridge. Marshal Soult, wishing to avoid Chavès, which he knew was occupied by the Portuguese army, immediately sent Major Dulong, with a company of grenadiers and sappers, to seize Puente-Nuovo. This detachment, taking advantage of terrible weather and a very dark night, crossed two beams which had not yet been removed, surprised the Portuguese troops and routed them. The sappers re-established the passage, and on the 16th of May, at eight o'clock in the morning, the French army continued its march by a narrow path in the middle of terrible precipices. The bridge of Saltador, over the Mizarela, which was defended by the peasants, offered a new obstacle; it was crossed at the moment when the English reached the rearguard, which was obliged to turn back to fight.

Finally, after an extremely difficult march, the French army, reduced to the most deplorable state, but still strong with nineteen thousand seven hundred men, including three thousand five hundred men that General Heudelet had brought back from Tui, reached Montalegre on 17 May. The next day, it left Portugal to return to Galicia and arrived on 20 May at Ourense. It left on the 21st, heading for Lugo, where it freed General Fournier, who, with three battalions and two squadrons, found himself strongly pressed by a body of fifteen to twenty thousand Galicians under the command of General Mahy. As soon as General Wellesley had driven Marshal Soult out of Portugal, he abandoned his pursuit and came in all haste to Abrantès with the greater part of his troops, to oppose the attempts of Marshal Victor.

However, in the last days of April, King Joseph, dissatisfied with the false movement of General Lapisse, and wishing to favor the march of Marshal Soult, had given the order to Marshal Victor to retake Alcántara, and to push as far as possible towards Lisbon⁵. A division, drawn from Valladolid, was to at the same time go under the walls of Ciudad-Rodrigo, to lay siege to this place. But already Cuesta, who had reformed a new army in Andalusia, had advanced to the

⁵ See supporting documents, no. 28.

front of the defiles of the Sierra-Morena; and General Venegas, at the head of the army of La Mancha, contained the troops of General Sebastiani. Marshal Victor's army found itself greatly weakened by the losses it had suffered during its stay on the unhealthy banks of the Guadiana. It advanced, however, towards the Tagus. General Lapisse, whose division formed the vanguard, seized, on 14 May, the bridge of Alcántara, defended by a body of two thousand Portuguese, and pushed reconnaissance as far as Castelo Branco; but he stopped when he learned that an Anglo-Portuguese body was at Abrantès. At the same time, Spanish parties threatened the bridge of Almaraz; the news of Marshal Soult's retreat spread; Cuesta advanced on the Guadiana and attacked Mérida. Marshal Victor, then fearing to uncover Madrid, took up an intermediate position at Torre Mocha, between Trujillo, Mérida and Alcántara. He remained there under observation until 10 June. The arrival of General Wellesley at Abrantès, with reinforcements, and that of Marshal Beresford at Castelo Branco, having given him the alarm, he blew up the bridge of Alcántara, and withdrew, by that of Almaraz, behind the Tagus.

Thus, for the second time, the French troops were expelled from Portugal, by a lack of unity of the corps too far from each other to concert their operations, and too weak to act in isolation.

In Galicia, the insurrection had taken on a new activity, from the departure of Marshal Soult for Portugal. The Marquis de la Romana, after his failure at Monterey, had gone to Ponferrada on the main road to Castile. Having found in a hermitage a twelve-pounder, and some ammunition which had been hidden, he used them to attack Villafranca, where a battalion of the Sixth Light was defending the castle, an ancient building, whose solid walls were flanked by four bastions armed with iron pieces. The garrison surrendered on 17 March, after a few days of siege. This success, exaggerated by the fame, brought more than thirty thousand well-armed Galicians running under the flags of La Romana, who soon found himself master of the whole country between the Douro and the sources of the Minho. Marshal Ney marched against him. He left garrisons at Corunna, Ferrol, Santiago, and went to Lugo, an important strategic point situated at the junction of several major roads. La Romana, then leaving part of his troops to General Mahy, abruptly left Galicia on 20 April, and went to Asturias to organize the defense of this province.

It was then that King Joseph decided to order an expedition into the Asturias, in order to clear the rear of the French army in Galicia. Marshal Ney left General Fournier at Lugo for the defense of this post, surrounded by an ancient wall, and, on 13 May, with almost the whole of his forces, he headed towards Oviedo, across the mountains, by Navia de Suarna and Tineo. On the other hand, General Kellermann, who since 15 March had replaced Marshal Bessières in the superior command of the provinces of Upper Spain, left Leon with nine thousand men, crossed the Asturias chain by the Pajares pass, on 19 May, and, having put to flight a body of two thousand Spaniards, descended to Pola. A third column, under the command of General Bonet, who had remained with a division in the province of Santander, advanced from San Vicente, forced, on 22 May, the passage of the Deba, defeated a body of ten thousand Spaniards under the command of Ballesteros, who was defending this river, and marched on Oviedo, following the coast. Marshal Mortier had left Aragon with the Fifth Corps, and had been, since 3 May, at Valladolid. He supported the expedition and provided troops to Generals Kellermann and Bonet.

Marshal Ney arrived on 28 May on the Nora; he forced the passage of the bridges of Peñaflores and Gallegos, which three thousand Spaniards wanted to dispute with him; and, on the 19th, he seized Oviedo. The Marquis de la Romana, satisfied with having made Marshal Ney lose sight of the Portuguese expedition, and of having removed him from his communications with Marshal Soult, left the command of the Asturias to Ballesteros, and embarked on 20 May at Gijón, on a Spanish corvette which landed him at Ribadeo; from there he joined the troops of General Mahy towards Mondoñedo, then, skirting the Asturias chain, he reappeared again in the valley of the Sil. Marshal Ney left Generals Kellermann and Bonet in the Asturias, to finish defeating the insurgents, and, on 22 May, he set out with his troops on Mondoñedo, to reestablish his communications with Corunna. Having learned on the way that Marshal Soult had entered Lugo, he went to that place on 19 May, with a weak escort, leaving his troops at Betanzos to observe General la Carrera who, on the 23rd, had seized Santiago.

The two marshals coordinated their operations. Marshal Soult left Lugo on 1 June, with the aim of pursuing the Marquis de la Romana in the direction of Monforte, Viana, and Puebla de Sanabria, in order to isolate him from Castile, and from a body of partisans who, under the orders of General Echávarri, were maneuvering in the Siero-Porto. In fact, the latter was obliged to take refuge in Ciudad-Rodrigo, and la Romana, whom a part of his men had abandoned, withdrew on 21 June to Ourense.

Marshal Ney having returned to the head of his troops at Betanzos, marched on June 3rd on Vigo, where Generals Morillo and La Carrera commanded a corps of twelve thousand men. According to the plan agreed upon with Marshal Soult, he was to head from Vigo to Ourense, and complete, by this maneuver, the rout of La Romana. This project could not be executed. The enemy had strongly entrenched himself on the Oitaven, in the valley of Sotomayor, and had cut the bridge of Sampayo, where the main road to Vigo crosses this river. The heights of the left bank were furnished with redoubts armed with large-caliber pieces; and, at the mouth of the Oitaven, were three embattled frigates, and several gunboats which were scouring the passage. Marshal Ney, not hoping to force this position, and learning that the English, who had a squadron at Vigo, were fortifying themselves there, withdrew to Santiago, in the hope that the enemy would come to him, and that he would then be able to defeat him. At the same time, he informed Marshal Soult that he was giving up heading for Ourense.

After three weeks of useless expeditions in the mountains, Marshal Soult, at a time when his army was in such need of rest, did not want to begin new maneuvers. Galicia offered him no resources; he found himself without artillery; his soldiers lacked everything and had not been paid for six months; he judged it more useful to approach Madrid, which the English were already threatening from the valley of the Tagus. He therefore went, on 23 June, to Puebla de Sanabria, a small fortified town that the Spaniards had evacuated. He left on the 27th, heading towards Benavente and Zamora, where he placed his troops in cantonments behind the Esla, in order to reorganize them.

Marshal Ney, seeing himself isolated in the depths of Galicia, decided to abandon this province. On 22 July, he withdrew his troops from Corunna and Ferrol, where the Spanish navy remained at the disposal of the English. He retreated without being disturbed and arrived on 30 July at

Astorga. Thus, it was that La Romana, by only waging a partisan war, found herself master of all Galicia⁶.

Asturias had already been evacuated. Generals Kellermann and Bonet, having made their junction in this province, had set out in pursuit of Ballesteros, who had withdrawn with eight thousand men into the mountains west of Oviedo, where he occupied the deep cave of N.-S. de Covadonga, which had served as an asylum for the companions of King Pelagius, after the famous battle of Jerez against the Moors. Driven from this stronghold on 24 May, and lacking provisions, he managed, after the most difficult march in the mountains, to reach Potes, where he was joined by Porlier, nephew of La Romana, who was at the head of a band of three to four thousand men. Taking advantage of the distance of General Bonet, he attacked Santander on 10 June, and seizing the garrison, eleven hundred strong, managed to open a passage, leaving only two hundred prisoners. But, the very next day, General Bonet hastened, recaptured the city, and created such disorder among the Spaniards that most of them fled in disarray. Ballesteros hastily embarked in a boat. Porlier escaped at the head of some soldiers, making his way through with weapons in hand. Meanwhile King Joseph, with the intention of carrying a division of the Fifth Corps to Salamanca, in replacement of the Lapisse Division, in order to cover Madrid from that side, and to undertake the siege of Ciudad-Rodrigo, had, as early as May, already withdrawn part of General Kellermann's troops. This general was ordered to make his own retreat from Asturias and returned to Valladolid on 20 June.

In Aragon, the fall of Saragossa, which took place on 19 February, brought about the pacification of the whole province. The citadel of Jaca surrendered at the first summons; and, under the support of this important point, a direct communication was opened with France by the valley of Canfran. The two brothers of Palafox, D. Francisco and the Marquis of Lazan, who had gathered around Lerida and Mequinenza an army of fifteen thousand men to relieve Saragossa, withdrew to Tortosa, abandoning the fort of Monzón, which defended a bridge of the Cinca. The First Division of the Third Corps went to Alcañiz to monitor the movements of the enemy on the frontiers of the Kingdom of Valencia. Marshal Mortier advanced to Fraga with the Fifth Corps and took up position on the Cinca and on the Segre to support the operations of the Seventh Corps in Catalonia, and to reconnoiter the towns of Lerida and Mequinenza. He remained in these positions without undertaking anything until 6 April, when he received the order to go to Valladolid to support the expedition of Asturias, to form a reserve in the north of Spain, and to be ready to return to France if circumstances required it. A column of 1200 men that he had detached on 16 March, under the orders of Colonel Briche, to communicate via Montblanc with General Gouvion Saint-Cyr towards Reus, having been unable to retrace its steps, only managed to join him six months later, by going around the Pyrenees chain via Perpignan and Bayonne.

The Third Corps had suffered greatly from fatigue and illness during the siege of Saragossa. The marching regiments which formed part of it had been dissolved, and the soldiers sent back to their corps; a large number of officers, the greater part of the artillery and engineering troops, and the material, had returned to France and had been sent to Germany; the One hundred and Sixteenth Regiment and the One hundred and Seventeenth, which had been detached to conduct the prisoners of Saragossa to Bayonne, had been sent from there to Valladolid and Astorga to contribute to the expedition to Asturias. For all these reasons, the Third Corps had barely ten

⁶ See supporting documents, no. 29.

thousand men present under arms. The coffers were empty, the pay was in arrears, the subsistence barely assured, and the army had neither stores nor establishments in the midst of a country entirely exhausted by war. This situation did not escape the inhabitants, who, full of hope at the departure of the Fifth Corps and at the news of the Austrian uprising, thought of shaking off the yoke. The bands of Miquelets and Catalan peasants began to show themselves in arms, excited and supported by Reding. The Spaniards reinforced the garrisons of Lerida and Mequinenza, retook the fort of Monzón, held the countryside, came daily to fire rifles with our posts on the Segre, and burned the only three boats that had been assembled there. The whole country was in revolution, when in the month of May General Suchet received the order to take command of the Third Corps in replacement of General Junot.

General Suchet tried to raise the morale of his troops, to reestablish order and discipline, to administer the country well, and to reassure the frightened inhabitants. This is how he managed to create means of success for all his operations. As early as June, General Blake had assembled a fine army at Valencia. Taking advantage of the retreat of the Seventh Corps on Girona and the dispersal of part of the Third Corps, he advanced to the borders of Aragon to try to reconquer Saragossa, and from there threaten the main road from Bayonne to Madrid, combining this movement with those of Cuesta and the English on the Tagus. But, on 15 and 18 June, General Suchet dispersed this army at Maria and Belechite, took four flags, thirty-four pieces of cannon, four thousand five hundred men, and saved Aragon a second time, by forcing Blake to withdraw⁷. The remnants of the Spanish army formed bands which worried the country for a long time to come.

In Catalonia, and from the opening of the campaign, General Reding had recruited and reorganized, under the support of Tarragona, with the help of the English, an army of forty thousand men, by means of which he intended to resume the offensive in the first days of February. He hoped that after success against the Seventh Corps quartered in the environs of Villafranca, he would be able to fly to the aid of Saragossa which was still defending itself. Already, the Marquis of Lazan and D. Francisco Palafox had gone with a body of fifteen thousand men to Lerida and to Mequinenza on the Segre, to be more within reach of marching to the aid of the capital of Aragon. But this project was foiled by General Gouvion Saint-Cyr who, after several successes against the wings of Reding's army, finished at Valls, on 25 February, putting it in a complete rout. Reding, himself wounded, threw himself into Tarragona, where he remained blockaded with the remains of his army. Reus opened its gates. This city, opulent in its workshops and its manufactures, numbered twenty-five thousand souls. Contrary to the general custom in Catalonia, the inhabitants had remained in their houses, not wishing to lose in a few hours the wealth accumulated over several years. They paid a contribution of twenty-five thousand piastres and provided the army with sixteen thousand pairs of shoes or espadrilles. The French troops spread out over the whole plain as far as the gates of Tortosa. At the same time, Marshal Mortier, who had advanced with the Fifth Corps of Saragossa on the Segre, to reconnoiter the places of Lerida and Mequinenza, supported the operations of General Gouvion Saint-Cyr. Everything therefore seemed to foretell the imminent submission of Catalonia; and the Emperor had even hoped that the Seventh Corps could lay siege to Girona, Tarragona and Tortosa, and advance on the Ebro to combine with the Third Corps an attack on Valencia. But General Gouvion Saint-Cyr was without communication with France, the Spaniards being

⁷ See supporting documents, no. 30.

masters of Girona and Hostalrich on the main road to Perpignan. The stores of Barcelona were exhausted; and, since its entry into the campaign, the Seventh Corps had had the greatest difficulty in obtaining provisions⁸. The lack of provisions was always an obstacle to its operations: Catalonia is a mountainous country where little wheat is harvested; and the inhabitants, on the approach of the French troops, fled into the mountains taking with them all their provisions. General Gouvion Saint-Cyr was therefore unable to undertake anything before he had reopened his communication with France to draw from it all his means of war. He remained nearly a month under Tarragona. A contagious typhus had broken out in this place and was wreaking terrible havoc there. The mere presence of the French army was extremely disastrous for the Spaniards, keeping them crowded together in a city infected by the epidemic. But the resources found in the plain of Tarragona having been exhausted, General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, pressed in his turn by famine, raised his camp on 20 March, and came to Barcelona, which, soon after, received from France, by a squadron coming from Toulon, two hundred thousand pounds of powder, a million infantry cartridges, and thirty thousand quintals of wheat or flour. Calm, then, about the fate of Barcelona, General Gouvion Saint-Cyr approached Girona to cover the siege that General Verdier was to undertake. (*See the report of this siege volume II.*)

Reding having died of his wounds, Blake was given command of all the Spanish troops in Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon. Defeated at Maria and Belechite by General Suchet, he immediately reformed a new army at Tarragona, and advanced to the aid of Girona. He succeeded, on 1 September, in getting a convoy into it by deceiving the observation army of General Gouvion Saint-Cyr. However, not daring to compromise himself in a general affair to unblock the place, he contented himself with harassing the convoys of the siege division.

⁸ See supporting documents, no. 31.

No. 24.

*Letter from Prince Berthier, Major General, to Marshal
Ney, Duke of Elchingen, Commander of the Sixth Corps.*

Paris, 18 February 1809.

I have placed before the Emperor, Sir Duke, your letters of 29 and 30 January. His Majesty does not approve of the plan to place three thousand men in garrison at Corunna and Ferrol. This is how the Emperor views your position:

Galicia is a peninsula of more than a hundred leagues of coast. If you cannot guard everything, you can watch everything; and, if you do not occupy the batteries, to prevent the English from communicating with the land, you must charge the inhabitants of the country with it. By making incursions with mobile columns, you will punish those inhabitants of the coast who have behaved badly: in general, Mr. Duke, it is necessary to have few troops on station and many mobile forces. To fulfill the intentions of the Emperor, the first thing to do is to choose your center of operations, which must be on the road from Ferrol to Astorga. You must take a small town which, by its position, can be sheltered from a surprise attack. Supposing, for example, that it is Lugo, you must concentrate there your stores, your hospitals, those of convalescents, your artillery park, your military transports, so that the observation columns that you will have on the coasts can return to concentrate on Lugo, without losing any man, any hospital, or even any cart; so that the province being all insurgent, you have nothing to lose, and that all that you possess is concentrated at your depot, point of general operations. You will take care that there are at this depot two hundred thousand rations of biscuit in reserve and well-stocked stores: this once agreed, Mr. Duke, you can have Ferrol occupied by an infantry regiment, two squadrons and four pieces of cannon, and leave there, to command, a brigadier general. At Corunna, you will place a colonel who will have at his command a battalion, a squadron and two pieces of cannon. You will place at Betanzos a brigadier general, the other two battalions of the regiment, a hundred horses with two pieces of cannon: this will ensure communication with your general depot. By these arrangements the two points of Ferrol and Corunna will be occupied. You will order the commanders of these places to obtain a redoubt where, in case of an incident, they can wait for you to come to their aid. Ferrol and Corunna must therefore be occupied as an advance guard, and it will not be necessary to leave in each of these cities more than a hundred sick: all that will be beyond this number will be sent to the general depot. Finally, it is necessary to be ready to evacuate everything to withdraw to the central point of operations twenty-four hours after having received the order.

A mobile column, composed of an infantry regiment, two pieces of cannon and a few hundred horses, can be charged with watching Vigo and Tui, and to combine its marches so as to often present itself at the important points of the coast, to make examples there without settling anywhere. The commander of this mobile column will take care not to keep any embarrassment with him and to direct everything to the general depot. This column can even act to maintain

tranquility on the side of Santiago. By this means, Mr. Marshal, you will find yourself having five infantry regiments united at the central point of operations, to go wherever it would be necessary, and even to the aid of the Duke of Dalmatia, if extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances required it.

The first operation that you have to do, Mr. Duke, is to choose your central point of operations to gather there your stores, parks, hospitals, military transports, etc., etc.

The second is to disarm the inhabitants of Ferrol and Corunna, especially to have their fusils removed, to have the main mutineers arrested and to take about thirty hostages whom you will send to Valladolid, then you will leave the police to the Spanish authorities.

The third is to subdue all who may be under arms on the Orense side.

Finally, the fourth is to take advantage of the months of March and April, when you will have nothing to fear on the coasts of Galicia, to subdue the Asturias.

The marching battalions intended for your army corps will guard Benavente, Astorga and Villafranca, will rest there and will be renewed as they pass through.

This in general, Mr. Duke, is the way in which you must arrange your operations. Do not count on any reinforcements. Believe rather that it could be necessary to take one of your divisions elsewhere. Organize the province. Make examples: these examples well applied have more effect than garrisons. Finally, Mr. Duke, until Mr. Duke of Dalmatia has arrived in Lisbon, and his communication with Madrid is opened, support him, that is to say, keep an eye on what is happening on this side.

Signed: ALEXANDRE.

No. 25.

Instruction of the Supreme Junta of Seville addressed to the Spaniards against the French troops.

At the Royal Castle of Seville, 17 April 1809.

Spaniards,

The tyrant of Europe, having recognized an invincible obstacle to seizing your territory, destroying your religion and corrupting your morals, since you all armed yourselves to repel his cruel and bloodthirsty soldiers, avails himself today more than ever of the means of terror and perfidy that he has already employed; he orders his troops to slaughter the peasants taken with arms in hand, and tries to persuade the people that those who are not soldiers must in no case defend the just cause in which the nation finds itself engaged, to repress the revolting and repeated attacks of the tyrant. The means he uses are the same that, from the beginning, were

successfully employed, the same that served as a pretext for slaughtering the innocent victims of 2 May in Madrid, finally those that contributed to extending his conquests. Who will be able at this moment not to recognize his perverse designs? Who will be able to listen with indifference to the story of so many assassinations that are committed under this dreadful pretext? and what Spaniard will not be filled with ardor and will not oppose with all his efforts that his compatriots, who try to deliver their king, to defend their religion, their goods and their own life, be put to death like wild beasts?

Such is however the system adopted by the French in Aragon and in Extremadura. Some weak villages, unworthy of the Spanish name, frightened of their not only have cowardly hidden their weapons, have furnished the requisitions struck, but have also hastened to testify their submission and obedience. Fools! the sad experience of their countrymen has not yet taught them that ingratitude fills the hearts of these soldiers! They are ignorant of the manner in which Talavera and several other cities in Spain have been rewarded for similar services. The French receive all kinds of homage; but considering them as the effect of fear and cowardice, this conduct redoubles their fury and leads them to pillage even those from whom they have received services, as soon as a favorable opportunity presents itself.

It is necessary to persuade ourselves of this truth. The French armies which, to our misfortune, occupy a large part of the Peninsula, practice no act of religion and appreciate no kind of virtue. The lives of men are as indifferent to them as that of the most abject animal. The point of honor, which formerly distinguished the French soldier, has entirely disappeared from his heart, and, like the monsters of the desert, he knows no other law and has no other impulse than that of his sordid avarice and his insatiable cruelty.

If they were not as we have just painted them, how could they disregard the right that every Spaniard has to arm himself for the defense of his King and his independence so openly violated? Napoleon, having succeeded by the lowest and most vile intrigues, in disorganizing and destroying the military state of Spain, in making himself master of its principal fortresses and of the person of its King, is it not of the utmost evidence that it is necessary that peasants unite to fight his troops? If time and circumstances have not permitted the Spanish troops to be clothed in uniform, to be regimented in a stable manner; and if yet the general wish of the nation is to maintain its dynasty and its liberty, is it not also evident that it is an act worthy of savages to assassinate every armed Spaniard, and to avail oneself of an unjust means, unknown to civilized nations, to deprive Spain of its defenders and subjugate it?

This is the goal, Spaniards, that the Emperor of the French has always proposed to himself, without stopping at the choice of means, however infamous they may be. He wants to subjugate us, to seize the riches of our temples and our soil. It is with these riches taken everywhere his troops have penetrated that he bribes them.

Everyone knows that he had struck at the Madrid mint several thousand marks of church silver, to pay with this money his cohorts of slaves. It is also notorious that he has had all the precious objects he has found brought to France, amounting to the sum of one hundred and twenty million reals, in wool, cotton and other colonial goods, seizing all these objects as conquest, as he has acted in other States, and causing the ruin of a multitude of innocent families, and depriving our

manufactures of these raw materials. In this way he also facilitates the execution of the views of his interested policy; he leaves many workers without work, and under this pretext forces them to leave and take service in the armies destined for the conquests of the kingdoms of the North⁹. He thus increases his military force, without proportionally diminishing the arms of French agriculture and industry. He gives the latter the greatest encouragement, to replace the consumption of ours, nullifies our means and claims to make us doubly slaves.

This is the happiness that we have experienced since Napoleon began to exercise his tyrannical power over some provinces of Spain. Knowing well that the greater part of the people are incapable of reflecting with discernment on their actions, nor of verifying and deepening what is happening far from them, they try to hide their evil designs from them, supports them with false promises and by the assurance of their protection; makes them envisage tranquility, displays before them his power and his victories; and, misleading public opinion by his false and deceptive writings, he hopes by terror to discourage some and feed others with the most mendacious hopes. It is by such intrigues, unknown to good and honorable people, that he has conquered more countries than by his arms.

But these intrigues have been put into practice so often that they can no longer deceive anyone. The Galicians, surprised by them and by the unexpected entry of a powerful army, remained calm and received it without making the least resistance. What resulted? the most obvious theft of their properties, the most sacrilegious sack of their churches, the most ferocious assassinations of good people and peaceful priests, all taken defenseless. The patience of this people having been pushed to the limit and its patriotism exalted, it has taken up arms to drive out the French army which occupies its country, and to destroy it entirely, as one may hope from the happy success it has obtained from its first efforts.

But these very efforts would become very costly to Spain, and the fight would be long indecisive, if the most effective and powerful measures were not taken to prevent the arrival of supplies to the French troops, to make all means of existence in the country very difficult for them, to oppose the passage of effects which are useful to them in the marches, to withdraw the cattle or take them away from them, to act in the same way with regard to the couriers, to observe the various movements of the armies, to seek to guess the plans of the enemy, to keep him in a state of continual fatigue and alarm, finally to defend oneself with the utmost obstinacy, or, which is the same thing, to do him as much harm as possible; this is how the Don Cossacks maneuvered on the banks of the Vistula, who succeeded in making themselves so formidable. Bonaparte, for some years now, under the vain pretext that the English are exclusively seizing maritime commerce, has sought to persuade all the sovereigns of Europe to act in the same way against England, and lulls them with his favorite system of continental blockade. But we, founded on the most just cause, we who must not increase the number of the victims of his ambition, forced to defend our independence, we must use against a man who attacked us in our

⁹ Towards the middle of January, the French, under the pretext of collecting soldiers taken prisoner in Madrid who had not presented themselves, went through the little market of El Rastro and the inns in Mira el Rio and the street of Toledo. By this operation, they raised more than three hundred men, who the next day were sent towards France under the greatest secrecy. They left one of these unfortunates, mortally wounded, very near Madrid, because he had not been able to follow the others.

own homes after having remained there as a friend and ally, we must use the same weapons that he put into use against a wise and generous nation, which he could deceive only for a few moments. We will therefore adopt a system of corsair towards the French troops, with the design of destroying them and driving them from our territory which as allies they occupied without resistance and which they have since outraged in so many ways. If our example is imitated by the other states of Europe, we will soon see the French armies which desolate their countryside, utterly annihilated; and perhaps the French nation which, under the reign of the Bourbons, always showed itself noble and generous, returning then to more human feelings, will blush to have been the blind instrument of the atrocities of its emperor.

Spaniards, the supreme junta of the Kingdom, which has always considered and observed with sorrow the unjust and barbarous conduct of Bonaparte's satellites; which from the beginning penetrated his sinister projects; which has sworn to defend the liberty of its king and the independence of the nation at the very expense of its existence; and which sees itself obliged by such sacred motives to repel force with force, and to oppose intrigue to intrigue, knowing that in all kinds of combat one becomes the plaything of he who, against all received principles, avails himself of the means that society rejects, if one does not present oneself to this enemy with equal weapons; after having maturely reflected on the facts and considerations which have just been exposed, has judged it appropriate to order and publish the following measures:

ARTICLE 1st. All inhabitants of the provinces occupied by French troops, who are able to bear arms, are authorized to arm themselves, even with forbidden weapons, to attack and plunder, whenever the opportunity presents itself, the French soldiers, either individually or en masse, to seize the provisions and effects intended for them; in a word, to do them all the harm and cause all possible damage. These actions will be considered as services rendered to the nation and rewarded according to their merit and the consequences that result from them.

ART. II. If, to render this service to the Fatherland, detachments of infantry or cavalry are formed, the leaders who will be chosen to command them will be rewarded by the government, for the manner in which they will fulfill their duty in a post as useful as it is perilous.

ART. III. The generals in chief of the Spanish armies will immediately reward the leaders of these detachments, or simple individuals, who give them important advice or news on the marches of the French troops, their strength, their positions, their views and their projects.

ART. IV. As soon as these detachments have acquired titles to rewards, either by their actions, their activity or their patriotism, the generals in chief will inform the supreme junta, in order to make them obtain the reward of their services.

ART. V. If, unfortunately, the individuals composing armed detachments were to be surprised by the enemy, or killed while fighting for the defense of the King and the Fatherland, the State will assign a pension to the widows and children of these individuals.

ART. VI. The inhabitants, whatever their condition, who occupy the bordering provinces or neighboring countries of those occupied by the French army, are also authorized to take up arms, provided that they have obtained permission from their respective justice, which will note their

good conduct, and will give them passports, so that they can transport themselves without being disturbed to the places where the enemy is found.

ART. VII. As soon as the armed detachments leave their respective villages, the authorities will inform the provincial juntas of this, as well as of their number and direction, so that these juntas can report to the supreme junta of the kingdom.

ART. VIII. If any rich landowner in the provinces not occupied by French troops, excited by his love for religion and for the fatherland, wanted to serve it in this type of war, by raising at his own expense or in partnership one of these detachments or companies, composed of people having his full confidence, he must apply to the junta of his province, to obtain permission which will be granted to him by the same junta, which will also issue him a special authorization so that this detachment can go without hindrance to all the places where the good of the service requires it, always taking care to take the orders of the government and of the general in chief.

ART. IX. The booty which these detachments seize will belong to them, and will be distributed, according to the measures decided, between all those who are part of it, this type of warfare to be assimilated to that which the corsairs make at sea. The supreme junta, desiring that these profits be as considerable as possible, at the same time enjoins the quartermasters of the armies and the provinces, that the provisions and other effects brought by these companies be immediately paid to them according to their value.

ART. X. According to these advantages, the national detachments must apply themselves carefully to intercepting the provisions and other objects intended for the French troops, whether or not coming from the requisitions struck, and seizing them, even if they have to attack and massacre the soldiers who escort them.

ART. XI. They will also take care of intercepting the enemy's couriers; all letters falling into their hands will be paid to them at the rate of half a real, and those which are of some importance at four reals, without prejudice to the extraordinary gratuity which will be granted to them by the general-in-chief to whom all letters and packages must be delivered. This gratuity will be proportionate to the action and the importance of the dispatches.

ART. XII. Carriages, horses, clothes, or any other kind of effects coming from the French, will also be part of these captures; but we must not include the effects belonging to the Spaniards, because it must be believed that force alone could have forced them to serve with the French.

ART. XIII. The authorities of the towns and villages occupied by the French troops will take the greatest precautions to give the leaders of the detachments the news and information they may have on the situation and strength of the enemy, to indicate to them the places from where he draws food, the roads by which he has it transported, and finally all the means he uses to obtain it.

ART. XIV. These same authorities are also obliged to provide the leaders of these parties (quadrillas) with the food and aid they may need, for a fair price and always with the greatest precautions.

ART. XV. The authorities who do not fulfill any of the provisions contained in the two preceding articles, will be punished according to the importance and gravity of their offenses.

ART. XVI. The courts and municipalities will henceforth be jointly and severally liable for the reimbursement of provisions or other objects which will be provided for the French troops, unless they are compelled to do so by armed force.

ART. XVII. The same penalties will be inflicted on the courts and municipalities which do not have the weapons and horses removed which, on the approach of the superior forces of the enemy, could fall into their power, as well as on the authorities which do not remove, in order to then take them to the headquarters, the fusils or other objects of war which will be abandoned by the troops.

ART. XVIII. In order that these provisions may come to the knowledge of all, and that each person may comply with them in what concerns him, they will be published and disseminated by all established means, and by all those which will be judged appropriate.

By approval of the supreme junta of the
government of the kingdom.

Signed: MARTIN DE GARAY.

No. 26.

*Letter from Marshal Victor, Duke of Bellune, commander
of the First Corps, to King Joseph.*

Mérida, 2 April 1809.

Sire,

The remains of the army defeated at Medellin are fleeing with such haste, and by so many routes, that it is no longer possible for us to reach them or to have news of them. It is presumed that they are trying to reunite on the side of Llerena to cover Seville, or rather to warn the junta of the moment when we will march there; for they must no longer think of holding the campaign before us. The loss they have suffered is irreparable, it is so great that one must have seen it to believe it. I have gone over the battlefield to be sure. All the Spanish battalions that Cuesta had arrayed there to fight us, either in lines or in columns, are there in the same order. All their members, officers and soldiers, have been killed. I announced to Your Majesty that there were ten to twelve thousand men on the battlefield; I believe I was mistaken, and I think today that there are more. All the officers who saw it think as I do. This spectacle is truly dreadful. One must only deduce from this massacre that it was carried out mercilessly on prisoners. These dead men defended themselves to the last extremity, shouting themselves: No quarter! in very good French. Cuesta had doubtless taught them to pronounce this sentence which ended their lives; it is, moreover, only the continuation of the principle proclaimed by the junta of Seville, on 10

February last. A decree which it issued that day condemns to death the entire French army without exception. It is to be hoped that we will put it in a position to execute it. Our successes at Medellin have already seriously damaged it; they would be followed by the total annihilation of the insurgents, if the troops which I need were near me, if I had had to cross the Tagus the army which is destined to march on Andalusia; but I do not have half of it, and despite the great advantages that this half has obtained, it is too weak to take Badajoz, Seville, Cordoba, etc. Badajoz is the place that must most fix our attention at this moment. We cannot go further without seizing this important place, the possession of which, by offering us abundant resources of all kinds to complete the conquest of Spain, would link our operations with those of Portugal, and would reestablish between the first corps and that of the Duke of Dalmatia the unity of action that we have been seeking in vain for two months.....

I have the honor to be, etc.

Signed: Marshal DUKE OF BELLUNE.

No. 27.

Report on the attack on the Amarante bridge in 1809, extracted from the memoirs of le Noble, chief commander of the Second Corps.

Shortly after the arrival of Marshal Soult at Oporto, General Silveira took up position on the Tâmega, with twelve thousand Portuguese, thus threatening the left flank of the French army. He blew up all the bridges on this river, except that of Amarante, which he wanted to defend, and occupied the town of Amarante itself, situated at the head of the bridge on the right bank. Marshal Soult, wishing to rid himself of this dangerous vicinity, and to open the road to Mirandela and Braganza by Amarante, detached against Silveira Generals Delaborde and Loison, with three brigades of infantry, a division of dragoons, two detachments of sappers and ten pieces of cannon. On 18 April, our troops drove the enemy from Amarante, and the next day pushed him back across the river, after having seized a large convent situated at the entrance to the bridge, and defended by six hundred Portuguese. The cannon on the left bank and the barricades of the bridge prevented us from pushing beyond.

The Tâmega is very rapid, and deeply entrenched among the rocks. The bridge of Amarante, built of cut stone, is of great solidity. It is thirty-five fathoms long, five wide, and is composed of four arches. On the right bank, where the town is located, the entrance to the bridge is partly hidden by the church of a large convent, so that one can only reach it from the right. On the left bank is the suburb of Villarreal, whose road follows on the left the foot of the mountain to the east of the river. This road is bordered by two lines of houses, the one on the right, backed by the mountain, extending in front of the bridge parallel to the river, leaves in front a quay ten fathoms wide and forty long. Behind this row of houses, the mountain is steep, and cannot be approached head-on, but easily from the left and right; it rises gradually by projections to a great height, and its summit is crowned with woods and brushwood.

The enemy had taken very good advantage of the advantages of his position. At the head of the bridge was a first barrier; in the middle of the bridge there was a line of palisades and a timber barrier, and on the abutment on the left bank there was an entrenchment composed of strong pieces of wood, behind which were piled large cut stones, forming a mass nine to ten feet high. The abutment itself was mined, and to the furnace was fitted a gun barrel filled with powder, which was to communicate the fire by means of a rope attached to the battery. In the suburbs, the road was barricaded as well as the two passages which led to the right onto the mountain. All the houses in the suburb which had a view of the bridge were themselves barricaded and crenellated; and between the ledges of the mountain, the Portuguese had built three batteries which fired on the entrance to the bridge and on the main street of the town. Finally, on the summit of the mountain sat the camp of the Portuguese army.

On 20 April, the work at the head of the bridge was seized by sappers' work, and a boom was built which ran from the middle of the convent church to the corner of the first house on the right of the bridge. It was not possible to go any further; such was the advantage of the enemy's situation that all those who tried to approach the bridge to reconnoiter it were killed or wounded. We had already lost several officers, among others, General Loison's aide-de-camp, a captain of engineers and a lieutenant of sappers.

General Delaborde, thinking that the passage over the Amarante bridge was too difficult and too perilous, ordered a trestle bridge to be built three hundred toises below the town. The captains of engineers Bouchard and André were charged with this operation, which took place on the night of the 23rd to the 24th; but it failed completely. The best swimmers could not reach the opposite bank, nor touch the bottom in the middle of the river, so fast was the current; they were carried far away. All the efforts that were made proved that the establishment of a bridge in this place was impracticable because of the speed of the waters and their depth. Other reconnaissances were made on other points, but without finding any suitable location.

However, the captain of the engineers Bouchard having carefully examined the position of the enemy from the top of the bell tower of the church which was near the bridge, saw the string in front, according to him, communicating with a fougasse placed in the abutment of the left bank. The result of his reconnaissance was that the passage on the bridge was the only practicable one, and that it had to be attempted. He thought that the bridge could be cleared by cutting or burning the palisades and the middle barrier, and by blowing up the entrenchment on the left bank with barrels of powder, the explosion of which would destroy the apparatus arranged to set fire to the fougasse prepared by the enemy in the abutment; that then, the space to be crossed being only thirty-five fathoms, the troops who would be ready, making their movement immediately after the explosion, would not leave time for the Portuguese to recognize each other, who would be all the more surprised since, being able to cut the bridge at will by playing their mine, they believed themselves in perfect safety.

General Delaborde, to whom this project was communicated, made many objections to it. Nevertheless, he summoned all the general officers under his orders to discuss it. Captain of the engineers Bouchard was called to this council to develop his ideas, but he encountered much opposition. Several generals were not in favor of crossing the Tâmega, and among them was General Loison: others maintained that the proposed plan was unworkable, and claimed that

assuming that barrels of powder could be placed at the foot of the entrenchment without being seen by the post guarding it, this powder thus placed in the open air would not be sufficient to overthrow the entrenchment. Captain Bouchard had to fight especially on this point against General Foy, whose opinion was all the more influential because he had served in the artillery. This general refused to believe that the abutment on the left bank was mined. Captain Bouchard took him to the bell tower and dispelled his doubts; but this was one more argument against his plan.

On the 26th, General Delaborde, accompanied by the officers of his staff and a few generals, made a new reconnaissance of the bridge; but it had no other result than to kill or wound several brave men to no purpose: among the first was the captain of engineers André, a distinguished officer who was much regretted. Captain Bouchard received the order to make an attempt against the barricade in the middle of the bridge. The sappers who were charged with it behaved with zeal and intelligence: one of them was killed, two others were wounded, and the order to suspend work arrived before the passage was sufficiently open. Captain Bouchard asked for and obtained to burn during the night what remained of the palisades. This operation was completely successful; but they did not dare to do more.

In the meantime, Marshal Soult strongly urged Generals Delaborde and Loison to make the crossing, making them feel how important it was to beat Silveira to ensure subsequent operations. He offered to send them large-caliber guns, and to reinforce them with the Heudelet Division, which was available. Soon after, he received, through Colonel Garbé, commander of the engineers in the army corps, Captain Bouchard's plan. He seemed satisfied with it, and sent Colonel Hulot, his first aide-de-camp, to examine it on the spot and have it executed in the event that it offered some chance of success. The Marshal sent to Amarante two twelve-pounder guns and five barrels of powder of two hundredweight each; he wrote to General Delaborde to promise the decoration of the Legion of Honor to the twelve soldiers who would be the first to cross. Colonel Hulot, having recognized the enemy's position and its preparations for defense, judged Captain Bouchard's plan to be good, and supported it with General Delaborde, who gave orders to execute it on the night of 1 to 2 May. A twelve-pounder and a howitzer were placed in battery on the first floor of the convent, in a room from which the bridge and all the houses on the quay could be seen. On the evening of 1 May, the sappers were assembled in the convent at the entrance to the bridge. Sarrut's brigade came to take up position in the town, where Arnaud's and Foy's brigades were already there; General Delaborde formed a battalion of grenadiers from the Second, Thirty-sixth, Seventieth, and Eighty-sixth Regiments, command of which he gave to Colonel Saint-Clair. This battalion was to be ready to rush to the bridge as soon as the explosion and the sappers had overthrown the entrenchment and the barricades. It was to be followed by all the other troops. But everything depended on the success of the preparations of the engineer officer Bouchard; also, during the whole night, all the French felt that emotion which is occasioned by the expectation of a great event.

Several sappers offered themselves for the execution of the last preparations, which were begun at eight o'clock in the evening. The night was fine, and the moonlight seemed likely to thwart the measures. However, the shadow of the parapet of the bridge formed a dark band on the passage, of which Captain Bouchard took advantage by directing the march on it. To impose on the Portuguese who were guarding the entrenchment, and to prevent them from watching what

was happening on the bridge, by forcing them to take cover, he had about twenty tirailleurs placed to fire on the entrenchment, taking the bridge as a slant, so as not to harm the sappers who had to drag themselves against the parapet.

Four barrels of powder were carefully wrapped, each in a gray greatcoat, to hide their movements from the eyes and ears. A sapper, also dressed in a gray greatcoat, lay down with his belly on the ground behind a barrel, which he pushed with his head to make it roll in front of him. He had orders to go slowly and to stop at the slightest movement. A string, attached to his foot, and which unrolled behind him, served to make his progress known and to communicate to the rear, according to the instructions he had received. Having placed the barrel, and discovered the apparatus for communicating fire to it, he withdrew in the same manner as he had advanced.

The four barrels of powder were thus placed one after the other; but the fourth sapper, after having placed his, instead of withdrawing according to the order, got up and began to run to the middle of the bridge. He was seen, they fired on him from the entrenchment, and he received a bullet in the thigh.

The enemy's shooting became more intense and was directed towards the entrance to the bridge. It was midnight, and it remained to place the explosive which was to communicate the fire to the barrels of powder.

To silence the fire, Mr. Bouchard had the number of tirailleurs increased, and he had the workers worried who were seen moving the earth halfway up the slope to establish a new battery. In less than half an hour, the Portuguese no longer fired from the entrenchment, and it was judged that they suspected nothing of our preparations.

Finally, at one o'clock, a fifth sapper set off like the previous ones, dragging after him the explosive that had been tied to his body. He placed it without accident and returned without being seen. It was two o'clock, and all the preparations were finished. General Delaborde was informed. Captain Bouchard had the skirmishers withdraw, and gave the order to the various posts to no longer respond to the enemy's fire, which died down imperceptibly.

Around three-thirty, a thick fog rose from the river and filled the bottom of the valley. The houses on the other bank could barely be seen. This circumstance was favorable, all the troops were ready, and they impatiently awaited the general's orders, which arrived around four o'clock.

The explosive was set on fire, the explosion was made with a crash; the entrenchment was swept away as well as the communication apparatus of the fougasse. At the same moment the artillery of the convent fired a few shots against the suburb. The charge was beaten: Captain Bouchard rushed forward with his sappers; some threw water on the mine, others went to the barricades of the suburb; they broke, cut, and opened the passage to the battalion of grenadiers, who, followed by the other troops, knocked down with the bayonet the enemies who resisted, and shot those who moved away. All were in flight; Silveira himself fled almost naked into the countryside, through the garden of the house where he lived and which was situated on a street that the French were already traveling, so prompt and rapid were their movements.

The enemy gunners had time only to fire five or six cannon shots that the fog did not allow them to direct well. The surprised Portuguese army could not get into battle formation. It fled in the greatest disorder across the mountains.

General Delaborde took up position on the heights; General Loison pursued the main body of the enemy with the cavalry to the heights of Villarreal. He collected a few hundred prisoners, and seized a bread convoy that was arriving for the Portuguese army. The army lost all its artillery, all its baggage and five flags.

This brilliant coup de main cost us only two men killed and seven wounded; while in the operations which preceded the passage we had had twenty-five men killed and one hundred and fifty wounded.

No. 28.

Letter from Marshal Jourdan, Major General of His Catholic Majesty, to Marshal Victor, Duke of Bellune, commander of the First Corps.

Madrid, 26 April 1809.

I have received the letter that you did me the honor of writing to me on the 20th of this month; I have placed it before the King. His Majesty charges me with having the honor of telling you that he would have wished you to have remained at Alcántara, because from there you would have threatened Portugal, and that you could have made a useful diversion in favor of the Duke of Dalmatia.

The Asturias expedition is coming to an end; the French troops entered Oviedo on the 19th.

It appears that La Romana has withdrawn to Gijon; he was hotly pursued, and His Majesty hopes that he will be forced to embark or lay down his arms. The expedition to the Asturias having been completed, it is the King's intention to do everything in his power to find out positively the situation in which the Duke of Dalmatia finds himself, and he even intends to have him supported by new troops, if necessary. His Majesty is still of the opinion that Andalusia should not be entered before Portugal has been subdued. I am therefore writing to the Duke of Elchingen that, when the corps of La Romana is destroyed and the inhabitants of the Asturias are disarmed, he should recall the troops that were employed in this expedition; and that, while he continues to hold Galicia with his main forces, he must throw a body of at least twelve battalions on the Miño, to disperse the assemblies that may have formed there, communicate with Tui, where Mr. the Duke of Dalmatia has left part of his artillery, and have positive news of this marshal.

I also write to Mr. the Duke of Trévisé that immediately after the expedition to Asturias he must recall the troops that participated in this expedition, reunite his army corps, and move to Ciudad-Rodrigo, from where he will send one of his divisions into Portugal to disperse the assemblies that are on the border of Portugal, and try to have news of Mr. the Duke of Dalmatia.

The King desires, Marshal, that on your side you should advance to Alcántara, from where you will direct one of your divisions to Castelo Branco, both to disperse the gatherings that might exist on that side, and to make a useful diversion in favor of the Duke of Dalmatia, if he is still on the Duero, by threatening to advance to Lisbon. The King desires that you leave a garrison in the castle of Mérida, and one in the castle of Medellín. Trujillo will also be occupied, and the rest of the German division will be employed in maintaining your communications. A battalion from Baden left Madrid yesterday to go to Talavera de la Reyna. This battalion is six hundred and some men strong: it will form part of General Leval's division; but he must remain provisionally at the disposal of Mr. Adjutant Commander Bagnairs, to maintain your communications between Almaraz and Talavera, and to defend, if necessary, the bridge of Almaraz. His Majesty thinks that if you would send three or four hundred men more to the Adjutant Commander, that would suffice for the present, and that all the rest of the German division could remain on the left bank of the Tagus. If, while you are at Alcántara, General Cuesta's army advances and threatens to move upon you, then His Majesty desires that you recall the troops that you have pushed on Castelo Branco, and that you march on General Cuesta to fight him. The King thinks that it would be very fortunate if your movement on Alcántara could induce General Cuesta to move forward, because it would offer you the opportunity to beat him, which would be very advantageous.

When, through the various movements that the King will have carried out on the Portuguese border, the situation of Mr. the Duke of Dalmatia will be known, then His Majesty will take a decisive step to have this marshal supported, if necessary, either by Mr. the Marshal Duke of Elchingen, or by Mr. the Marshal Duke of Trévise, or by you.

Such, Marshal, are the King's orders, which His Majesty has charged me to transmit to you.

Signed: JOURDAN.

No. 29.

*Letter from General Kellermann, Commander-in-Chief
of the provinces of Upper Spain.*

Valladolid, 29 June 1809.

My General,

I learned at the same time two pieces of news as extraordinary as they were unexpected; one, the arrival of Marshal Soult at Zamora, the other, that of Marshal Ney at Astorga.

It seems that these two marshals were unable to come to an agreement.

I expected that Marshal Soult would descend to Zamora, linking his right to Galicia; but I could not conceive of the return of Marshal Ney, except the annoyance of being reduced to vegetating, without resources and without communications, in this country, and of being continually battling without result to have a piece of bread. What I find unfortunate in this retreat, as in the evacuation of the Asturias, is the *what will people say about it?* for, moreover, I see in it only a greater point of tranquility for the army, provided that anxiety does not get involved, and that it does not cause new retrograde steps to be taken. This point in Galicia on one side, at Mérida on the other, brigands continually in the rear, no news, unless it is brought by several battalions, all these circumstances made the position precarious and above all tiring. Today forty-five thousand men well counted, of the Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps, present a mass on a central point, against which no insurgent army is in a position to clash. May Heaven grant, however, that it had this presumption! it is the happiest thing that could happen to us. A good battle would deliver several provinces to us, while a war of detail undermines us and produces no other result than to prove our impotence and to harden our enemies.

I have the honor, etc.

Signed: KELLERMANN.

No. 30.

Order of the day of General Count Suchet, commander of the Third Corps.

At the headquarters of Alcañiz, 19 June 1809.

Soldiers!

The Emperor has ordered me to come and replace the Duke of Abrantès, who so many times led you victoriously into the trenches of Saragossa. On the first day of my arrival, I gathered a part of you, I led you to the enemy, I attacked him to reconnoiter him: his superiority in numbers determined me not to renew the attack and to maneuver to make him leave his positions. We got rid of our baggage; we worked on the construction of redoubts; we armed the fort of Saragossa, chased and flushed out from their positions the bands of the enemy who were walking on the left

bank of the Ebro. Soon an army of thirty thousand men, with a large artillery, came to cut our line, take our convoys and undertake to surround us.

It was on this occasion that you proved, soldiers, what the French can do when led by confidence. You triumphed at the battle of Saragossa; you took twenty-five guns, caissons, three flags, killed or captured a large number of men. On this day the Second Vistula showed much firmness, the Hundred and Fifteenth of the line and the First Vistula much vigor, the battalion of the Fifth Light and the Fourteenth an assurance and an impetuosity beyond praise. The Fourth Hussars covered itself with glory; the cuirassiers of the Thirteenth proved that they were worthy of taking rank among the old regiments of the grand Army; the Polish lancers rivaled them.

You pursued the enemy at great marches; you attacked the fortified camp of Belechite with lightning speed; the One hundred and fourteenth, the First Vistula and the light artillery were particularly conspicuous; you broke through, dispersed this army, crossed the city with it, sowing terror and death everywhere. Nine pieces of cannon, the last of the enemy, remained in our power; forty-two caissons, two or three hundred mules, two or three hundred mules, stores of clothing, rice, biscuits, six thousand rifles, thousands of prisoners, a great number of dead, have completed the triumphs of your campaign. The enemy has already crossed the borders of Aragon.

Soldiers, may such fine results, obtained in four days by your courage, teach you to judge your strength; when self-confidence and discipline guide you, you will always be invincible. We will live in camps, we will train there, we will train the young men who arrive in our ranks, and we will preserve this manly energy which constitutes the French armies. I will watch over your well-being, the country will provide for your subsistence, and you, by your discipline, will restore security to the inhabitants, you will bring back to submission and peace the misguided men, victims of a few ambitious leaders and English intrigues. You will make the government of the worthy brother of our great Emperor loved by your conduct.

I express my satisfaction to the surgeons of the army and the corps, for their zeal in following the marches and helping the wounded.

The generals in chief of the corps will inform me immediately of all the brave officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers who have deserved rewards in the two days of Saragossa and Belechite.

Signed: COUNT SUCHET.

No. 31.

*Letter from General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, commander of the
Seventh Corps, to Prince Berthier, Major General.*

Valls, 6 March 1809.

Monseigneur, despite all the means at your disposal, you have not been able to succeed, for three months, in sending me a letter; no officer carrying your dispatches has reached me: I have been more fortunate. I am certain that three or four of my letters have passed into your hands or into those of His Majesty the Emperor; and recently one of my emissaries, sent to General Reille, and fortunate enough to return without accident, brought me back the translation in ciphers of two of your letters, notably that of 5 February; the date of the other is omitted.

According to these letters, Your Majesty orders an army corps that lacks everything to take, at the same time, three strongholds that have withstood memorable sieges when they were defended only by troops; and today, by the nature of this war, the troops are of one mind with the inhabitants, who see their houses fall without regret, when the cause they have embraced demands it; that this spirit is unfortunately only too well demonstrated by the resistance that Saragossa, an open city, has long opposed to two army corps that are besieging it, and which are equipped with formidable artillery; it is in this circumstance that you order the taking of three strongholds, in one of which (Tarragona) an army commanded by a good and courageous general (Theodore Reding) has withdrawn, a place which, among the advantages of its position, counts that of not being able to be blockaded without the assistance of a squadron.

The distance from Barcelona is twenty hours; when approaching Tarragona, the artillery convoys and others must pass, for a league and a half, under the grapeshot of the English frigates or ships, and the loss suffered recently in the Mataró expedition, for the return of a few grains to Barcelona, gives the measure of what would happen here.

Besides, Barcelona has only one hundred and sixty thousand of powder; our monthly consumption is thirty thousand; it therefore has only enough to supply a few months for the consumption of the army, and then, this place, which does not have today a quarter of what it needs, if unfortunate events forced it to withstand a siege, would have nothing left for itself or for the army.

On the road to Barcelona and in the villages surrounding it, as far as Tarragona, there is no longer any food for men or horses, and the country around this last place (which, moreover, produces only wine and olives) is also devoid of all food; which forces me to keep at some distance from this place, and I will even have great difficulty in procuring food for a few days. The Spanish army is bringing everything, even straw, from the kingdoms of Valencia, Murcia and Aragon.

Your Highness tells me that there is nothing around us that can resist six thousand men.

I beg your pardon for not being of your opinion. Souham's division was alone for some time on the 25th, and we saw that it was time for the other division to arrive; however, Mr. Reding's army had been beaten in detail in the eight days preceding this last battle. It is very unfortunate for the Seventh Corps that Your Highness was not able to learn more closely the situation and circumstances in which this army corps finds itself in Catalonia: you would have convinced yourself that you had done everything that was possible to do.

I sent from Figueres to His Majesty the state of the Spanish army; I assumed that it would pass before Your Highness's eyes; you would have seen what the seventh corps fought. To these must be added the regiments of Palma, of Estremadura, the chasseurs of Antequera, of Santa-Fe, and the Swiss Regiment of Betchard; the first two having not been included in the state, and the last having come as reinforcements recently. I must divert a part of the garrison of Girona, led by M. de Lazan in front of Lerida, namely: the Regiment of Ferdinand VII, the battalion of Daroca, and the same ones that he had led from Aragon to Girona.

With the best will in the world, we cannot carry out what you order; here is what we will try to do:

Contain the enemy army as far as possible from Girona, while we try to lay siege to it; I say try, because I foresee great difficulties. First, if no powder has been sent from France to Figueres, this place does not offer enough; it is, according to the report of the artillery officers, of poor quality and can only be used for hollow projectiles. The difficulty of supplies and fodder will be great, as well as that of transport; and then General Reille's division does not seem to me strong enough for a place of such great development. If he was able to take advantage of the absence of the garrison to make the investment, it will be a great advantage; the garrison will be weak, part of the miquelets being in front of Barcelona and Gualala.

If I made a movement at this moment to get closer to this city, everything that is in the vicinity of Barcelona would throw itself into Girona, and the army that I have in front of me would follow me. However, I will get closer to it, when the siege has begun, to prevent the enemy, who has great means of landing with the help of the English, from trying to relieve the place and destroy the works of the siege.

I have already informed His Majesty that forty thousand men have been raised in Catalonia to complete the line regiments, who are being dressed and trained in the towns. Within a month, Mr. Reding will present us, by means of this levy, with an army stronger than he has ever had; and we, who receive no recruits and who weaken ourselves every day, even by our successes, will be very embarrassed to resist him.

It cannot be denied that the Spanish troops are winning every day, and we are forced to give them credit for the battle of Valls, they fought very well; it is true that they are extremely favored by the positions and the nature of the country; but this is an advantage that, at no time, can be taken away from them. They are then commanded by a good soldier, encouraged by the confidence of the governors of his country, from whom he has received brilliant testimonies. His army is almost entirely national, well fed, well paid and well dressed. The French army, on the contrary, is composed of different nations, almost always on a diet, eating the worst bread,

without pay, without shoes, and a large part without clothes, etc., which causes a great desertion in the foreign corps, especially the Neapolitans: I am certain that more than a thousand have just been embarked to be thrown back on the coasts of Sicily or Italy.

Signed: GOUVION SAINT-CYR.