

Translated by Greg Gorsuch
Part 14

HISTORICAL SUMMARY
OF THE
PENINSULA WAR,
FROM 1807 TO 1814,

SERVING AS AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JOURNALS OF THE SIEGES MADE
OR SUSTAINED BY THE FRENCH IN THIS WAR.

CAMPAIGN OF 1813

I

The disasters of the retreat from Moscow, the defection of Prussia, and the ambiguous dispositions of Austria and the German states also raised fears of a catastrophe in Spain. All eyes were on Marshal Soult, whose skill could still halt the British advance; but this Marshal received orders from the Emperor to go to Germany. King Joseph remained Commander-in-chief of the French troops in Spain, with Marshal Jourdan as his Chief-of-staff. Several infantry and cavalry corps successively crossed the border to advance to Germany. The total strength of the French troops in the Peninsula was reduced to one hundred ninety-seven thousand men under arms.

The Army of the South, commanded by General Gazan, occupied Madrid, Arévalo, Salamanca, Toro, and Zamora, where it supported its right wing. This army, headquartered in Arévalo, consisted of four infantry divisions, two dragoon divisions, and one light cavalry division: a total of twenty-eight thousand infantry and forty-five hundred cavalry.

Behind this army, in the second line, in New Castile, was the Army of the Center, which occupied Segovia and Valladolid. This army, commanded by General Drouet, consisted of three infantry divisions, including one Spanish, under the command of the Marquis of Casa Palacio, a dragoon division, and a light cavalry brigade: a total of ten thousand infantry and fourteen hundred cavalry.

The Army of Portugal, under the command of General Reille, and composed of six infantry divisions, one dragoon division, and one light cavalry division, a total of thirty thousand infantry and two thousand six hundred cavalry, covered the right in the province of Burgos, occupying the country between the Douro, the Carrion, and the Esla, a region devastated by war, where it could barely survive¹.

¹ See supporting documents, no. 108.

The Anglo-Portuguese army, stationed on the Portuguese borders and augmented by numerous reinforcements, numbered sixty-five thousand men, including six thousand cavalry; and the Spanish forces, estimated at fifty thousand men, divided into three corps, acted in concert with it in Galicia, the Kingdom of Leon, and on the borders of the new Castile.

The two parties remained all winter observing each other without taking any action. In February, the Spanish army of Galicia having moved up the Órbigo and the lower Esla, General Reille detached General Sarrut against it, who drove the enemy back beyond Astorga, a stronghold that had been dismantled by the Spanish. In March, General Clauzel came to take command of the Army of the North, which numbered barely more than ten thousand men. Biscay, Navarre and part of Aragon were on fire due to the exasperation of the inhabitants, the activity of the bands, and the relief that the English, masters of the coast, were sending there². As soon as he arrived in Bilbao on 15 March, General Clauzel felt the need to seize Castro-Urdiales, which served as a stronghold for the Spanish on the coast, and put them in direct communication with the English. On the 22nd, he advanced with the Palombini Division to this town to reconnoiter it. He communicated via Laredo with the garrison of Santoña. He returned to Bilbao on the 26th, where he gave orders to gather some large-caliber guns, ammunition and food for the siege of Castro-Urdiales: he then went to Navarre. To control communications on the main road to Bayonne, which the bands constantly disturbed, he had each bridge closed with barriers defended by a blockhouse. New works were also undertaken to reinforce the Ebro line³.

King Joseph had left Madrid on March 17th, with three thousand French or Spanish troops, who made up his guard, and had moved his headquarters to Valladolid. On the 28th, he detached the divisions of Foy, Barbot, Taupin, and Sarrut from the Army of Portugal to Vitoria, to be placed at the disposal of General Clauzel, who was too weak to purge Biscay and Navarre of the bands that infested them. This expedition, which would have been very useful in January, became a mistake, since it weakened the main army by fifteen to twenty thousand men, at a time when the enemy was preparing to resume the offensive. On April 24th, General Clauzel left Pamplona with four divisions to pursue Mina's bands. General Foy arrived the same day in Bilbao with his division and that of General Sarrut, to operate in Biscay. He rallied the Palombini Division, left the Aussenac Brigade on the Rio Deba to contain the del Pastor bands in Gipuzkoa, and advanced on Castro-Urdiales to besiege the city. (*See the account of this siege, Volume IV.*)

At the end of May, Lord Wellington took the offensive. Having nothing to fear on his right, he detached four divisions to his left, which made a major flanking movement through the province of Trás-os-Montes to turn the French army on the Douro. These divisions crossed the river on 20 May between Lamego and the Spanish border. Lord Wellington advanced in person on Salamanca, which he occupied on 26 May; soon after, the entire Anglo-Portuguese army was assembled at Toro on the right bank of the Douro.

King Joseph successively evacuated Madrid and Valladolid, to concentrate his troops on the main road to Burgos, and took up position, on 9 June, in front of that city. Lord Wellington made a demonstration of attack on the 12th; but, continuing to maneuver to the north, he crossed

² See supporting documents, no. 109.

³ See supporting documents, no. 110.

the Carrion at Palencia, and advanced on the Pisuerga, from where he threatened to cut the communications of the French army. King Joseph was thus forced to retreat to the Ebro. He evacuated Burgos on 13 June. The castle had not been restored to a state of defense; the sappers blew up six thousand bombs that were there at the time of the retreat and the stone fragments killed or wounded one hundred and twenty men of the rearguard. King Joseph expected to be attacked from the front; but, on 15 June, the left wing and part of the center of the Anglo-Portuguese army crossed the Ebro at the bridges of San-Martino and Fuente de Arenas and took the road to Bilbao. King Joseph, having learned of this movement, detached, on 18 June, General Reille with the Sarrut Division, which had joined him on the Ebro, the Lamartillière Division and three cavalry regiments, to prevent the enemy from Bilbao and rally the troops of General Foy. General Reille advanced on the road to Orduña; but, near Osma, he encountered three English infantry divisions and a cavalry division, which forced him to fall back. He withdrew to Espeja, where he was reinforced by the Maucune Division. King Joseph, seeing himself surrounded, abandoned the line of the Ebro and continued his retreat. General Reille maneuvered to the right, to cover the main road; and, after having disputed the ground inch by inch, he fell back on the Zadora, from where he rejoined the army on 19th.

King Joseph, instead of withdrawing to the heights of Salinas and Mondragon, to defend the passes and preserve the freedom of his communications with Bayonne, preferred to stop on 20 June in the small plain of Vitoria a league in front of this city. He arranged his army in echelons on three lines, in the positions of Aríñez, Gomecha and Zuheros, on the road to Madrid, supporting his right at the Zadora, whose course is roughly parallel to the direction of the main road. The baggage and parks were gathered behind Vitoria under the guard of three battalions. The enemy numbered ninety thousand men, including forty thousand English, twenty-three thousand Portuguese and twenty-five thousand Spaniards, not including the bands of the country. The French army was reduced to fifty-five thousand men, both by the losses it had suffered in its retreat and by the two detachments of Generals Foy and Clauzel, which had been unable to rejoin it. General Reille had left Sarrut's division ahead of Aranjuez to scout the road to Bilbao and cover Vitoria from that direction; he also had to send Maucune's division to escort a convoy headed for Bayonne. This left him with only Lamartillière's division and the cavalry.

On 21 June, Lord Wellington attacked the French line. King Joseph had made the mistake of not cutting the bridges across the Zadora, which he relied on, and which was fordable at only a few points. In the morning, an Anglo-Spanish corps of twenty-five thousand men, under the command of General Graham, went up this river by the right bank, and went to Aranjuez on the road to Bilbao, to turn the right of the French army, and intercept the road to Bayonne behind Vitoria. At eleven o'clock in the morning, this corps found itself in the presence of General Sarrut, who withdrew behind the Zadora. General Reille came to join him there with what remained of his troops; he occupied the bridges of Arriaga, Gamarra-Mayor and Durana, and sustained the fight with determination. General Sarrut was killed; the enemy succeeded in taking control of the bridge of Durana and came to position himself on the road to Bayonne, which he intercepted. At the same time, Lord Wellington attacked the French army in front on the road to Madrid. General Gazan, who, with the Army of the South, formed the first line, was threatened on his left, which forced him to withdraw his right and bring troops there. General Drouet, placed in the second line with the Army of the Center, also directed forces there. Then the enemy, who had moved the greater part of his army to the right bank of the Zadora, was easily

able to force the crossing of this river at the bridges of Villodas, Trespuentes, and Momario, from where he attacked the troops of the Army of the Center. General Drouet held out for a long time at Margarita. Forced to abandon this point, he took up a new position to the rear extending from Zuazo to Crispijina, and there stopped the enemy under the fire of a battery of forty cannons. But General Gazan, turned on his right by the enemy's movement, and threatened with being surrounded, was forced to retreat to Vitoria. He reached with his artillery to within half a league of this city: the congestion of the road did not allow him to go any further. The large reserve park, where eighty pieces of cannon were located, had remained behind Vitoria with the baggage; and around four o'clock in the afternoon, the order having come to set it in motion, a cart overturned on the road in such a way as to prevent the convoy from advancing. In vain they tried to get the carriages of the King and the court to pass; a few shells and the approach of two squadrons of English hussars threw the soldiers of the escort, the drivers and a multitude of employees and women who were returning to France with the army into panic. Disorder was at its height. General Gazan's troops, forced to leave the road to Vitoria, fled across the fields towards Salvatierra, to reach the road to Pamplona; a terrain cut by ditches and hedges did not allow them to bring their artillery. General Drouet followed this movement. General Reille, taken by behind, was also forced to withdraw; he stopped for a time at Salvatierra, to gather the fugitives. Night came and the confusion increased still further; all the corps marched pell-mell, heading for Pamplona. Arriving at Irurtzun, General Reille advanced via San Esteban to Irun, to rally General Foy's division and cover the bridge over the Bidasoa. Such was the deplorable battle of Vitoria. The French army lost only four thousand men, including eight hundred prisoners; however, it found itself disorganized, and lost all its equipment. One hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, four hundred caissons, fifteen hundred baggage cars, the army's treasury and the equipages of King Joseph, fell into power of the victor. The enemy had 5,000 men put out of action⁴.

General Clauzel, who was near Logroño on June 17th with fourteen thousand men, had marched on Vitoria. He arrived near the city on the very day of the battle, but when the enemy had already occupied it. Fearing then that he would be cut off, he hastily retreated to Zaragoza, where he left all his artillery under the protection of the castle and the weak corps of General Paris, who occupied the city. From there, he headed via Jaca on Oléron to rejoin the remnants of the French army.

Upon hearing the news of the loss of the battle, General Foy, for his part, moved on to Tolosa, where he arrived at the same time as the first English troops. He defended the passes behind the city for several days, and then withdrew to Irun, where he established communication with General Reille.

After a brief halt in Pamplona, the French army continued its retreat towards the Pyrenees. It occupied the Roncesvalles Gorge and the Baztan Valley, where the Bidasoa River flows. General Foy left Irun and returned to French territory. Pamplona was invested on 26 June. The fort of Pancorbo, attacked by the Spanish reserve, fell on 1 July. San Sebastian was blockaded by a corps of fifteen thousand men under the command of General Graham. This fortress could have been very useful to the Anglo-Portuguese army, supporting its left and communicating with

⁴ See supporting documents, no. 111.

the sea; Lord Wellington immediately began the siege. (*See the account of the defense, Volume IV.*)

During these events, Marshal Suchet had to fight, in the Kingdom of Valencia, the Anglo-Sicilian Army, then commanded by General Murray, and the Spanish army of General Elio, which were located near Alicante. A few engagements took place around the middle of April at Villena and Castella, on the Murcian border. On 31 May, the English re-embarked at Alicante and landed on the coast of Catalonia with fourteen thousand men. Supported by a Spanish corps of eight thousand men from General Lacy's army, they seized Fort Saint-Philippe at the Balaguer Pass on 2 June and began the siege of Tarragona. Marshal Suchet came to the aid of this place, and, by a combined movement with General Maurice Mathieu, governor of Barcelona, he forced the English to re-embark in all haste. In retreating, the enemy blew up Fort Saint-Philippe and abandoned 30 cannons and immense supplies.

Marshal Suchet was still near Tarragona when the Duke of Parque came from Andalusia with eighteen thousand Spaniards to replace General Murray in his camp at Castalla and acted in concert with General Elio against Valencia. This attempt was vigorously repelled by General Harispe's division and General Delort's cavalry. Returning to Valencia on 24 June, Marshal Suchet attacked the Duke of Parque's Spanish army. Having driven it back to its camp at Castalla, he then advanced against General Elio, who had posted himself with nine thousand men on the road from Cuenca to Valencia, to threaten his right. He encountered him near the fort of Requena, forced him to retreat, and captured the fort, which offered no resistance. The English, making renewed efforts to cut Marshal Suchet's long line of operations along the coast, appeared on June 23rd before Palamós, near Girona, with a squadron of fifteen ships of the line, including eight three-deckers, and several transports; while a force of five thousand Spaniards, under the command of Baron de Eroles, created a diversion at Banyoles to facilitate their landing. General Lamarque drove out the Spanish, and the English withdrew. Meanwhile, Lord Bentinck, with new reinforcements drawn from Sicily, landed at Alicante and replaced General Murray.

Marshal Suchet, informed of the rout at Vitoria, evacuated Valencia on July 4th, heading for Barcelona. He left ten thousand men in the various fortresses of Dénia, Sagunto, Peníscola, Morella, Tortosa, Tarragona, Lleida, Mequinenza, and Monzón, which were left to their own devices: the castles of Teruel and Alcañiz were dismantled. Marshal Suchet stopped for a few days on the Ebro to give General Paris, who was occupying Zaragoza with a brigade, time to join him. But this general, attacked by superior forces, was stopped in his tracks and forced to retreat to France via Jaca, after suffering considerable losses and abandoning all his baggage. Zaragoza was occupied by Mina's troops, and the castle garrison surrendered on 2 August.

No. 108

*Letter from General Reille, Commander of the Army of
Portugal, to the Duke of Feltre, Minister of War.*

Valladolid, 27 December 1812.

Monseigneur,

I believe I should present to Your Excellency the status of the pay owed to the Army of Portugal as of 1 November last, noting that since this army has lost many men, the deduction sheets will reduce the amount to be paid to approximately thirteen million francs.

The soldiers are reduced to their two rations to survive; and with the supplies exhausted, the corps cannot provide them with the linen and footwear they need, nor can they provide for repairs to their clothing. The officers are in an even more unfortunate state; they cannot obtain basic necessities, such as clothing and footwear. Often forced to live off what the soldiers take, discipline slackens, and it is almost impossible for good order to accommodate such a state of need.

The Army of Portugal has almost always been on the move, and, consequently, without territory from which to procure resources. The territory it currently occupies has been largely devastated in the campaign that has just ended, and what I can extract from it will barely be enough to feed the army and cover the costs of the meat that must be purchased at many points, hospitals, artillery, etc. However, Your Excellency has ordered that, from the country's tax funds, 3,600,000 francs, which Marshal Duke of Ragusa had forcibly taken from the paymaster to meet the army's needs, be reintegrated into the French funds. It is also owed for horses required by the Duke of Ragusa, to remount the cavalry and artillery, and the payment of which has been ordered by Your Excellency from the funds of Spain.

On the other hand, contributions are burdened by approximately 500,000 francs from delegations given to the provinces in payment for supplies to the army. In addition, considerable sums are owed to suppliers who supported it last year. The country's civil administrations have been without pay for two or three years and are in dire straits; the civilian pensioners, as well as the country's military, are in the same situation.

Based on this statement, I must ask Y. Exc. to send funds immediately to cover at least four months' pay; without this assistance, it will be impossible to prepare for the campaign, and I am obliged to request it with great insistence.

Since the attached statement is as of 1 November, an additional three million francs will be due by 1 January 1813; that is, approximately sixteen million.

I ask Your Excellency to agree, etc.

Signed: Count REILLE.

No. 109

*Letter from General Buquet, Commander of the Gendarmerie
of the Spanish Army, to Prince Berthier, Major General.*

Vitoria, 5 February 1813.

My Prince,

Yesterday, General Dumoustier left Bilbao with all that remained of the Imperial Guard, and marched on Zeberio, where Artola was stationed. As soon as he heard the charge, he fled with his troops to Otxandio as fast as he could. During an expedition to Orozko, Colonel Cambrone had surprised a large number of sick people; he left them free to seek treatment elsewhere; he only rescued from prison a few unfortunate victims of the barbarity of the gangs. The police commissioner of Toro was paraded from dungeon to dungeon for nearly five months, receiving only enough to eat to prolong his torment. The gangs forbade the peasants to take anything to Bilbao; they enforce their orders with the utmost rigor.

In the incident involving the battalion of the Fortieth Regiment, which took place the day before yesterday on the Descarga, the bands suffered ten men killed, including two officers, and twenty-one wounded. General Duvernet's column, which returned yesterday from the vicinity of Pancorbo, has just headed for Bergara. I doubt the bands are waiting for him, as all my reports confirm their activity in transporting the large and valuable convoy they came to the coast to Navarre. Their work on the roads they had to travel is a measure of the importance they attach to ensuring the convoy arrives safely at its destination. There is no doubt they received several large-caliber guns. It is said that Mina plans to test them on Tafalla, which he is due to attack very soon. If reinforcements do not arrive soon in Navarre, I would not be surprised if some catastrophes occurred there. The insolence of the brigands proves their confidence in their operations. I am assured that it has never been greater. The organization of their battalions and the administration of the country is complete: it is difficult to believe the advantages they derive from it. If, from the borders of Portugal, our armies had sent a few divisions to live on the left of the Ebro, the winter would not have passed without us having purged this beautiful country of the bands that infest it, and, at the season of operations, these divisions, perfectly rebuilt, would have returned to the eternal enemy of the continent. We have already lost precious time, and I fear that in the spring the strength of the bands will force us to do what we could have completed in winter. The brigands are so bold as to dare to strike requisitions in the communes we occupy. My prince, the evil is great; powerful remedies are needed to cure it. These will only be found at present in the deployment of a large military apparatus.

Please accept, my Prince, the homage of my deepest and most respectful devotion.

Signed: Baron BUQUET.

No. 110

*Letter from General Thouvenot, Commander of the Fourth
Government, to the Minister of War.*

Vitoria, 23 March 1813.

.....Mr. de Saint-George, captain of engineers, who has just traveled the route to activate the construction of the blockhouses, to make a new reconnaissance of the positions where they are to be established, and to rectify or increase, if necessary, the defenses of the posts we occupy, informs me that they are busy everywhere cutting wood and gathering the necessary materials for the constructions. I will have this officer leave on the 24th, with the plans, sections and profiles of the blockhouses in three dimensions, and orders for the commanders of the place and the local authorities who must contribute to the execution of these works. I believe that it would also be very important to make an exact reconnaissance of the Ebro, from its source to Tudela, and to have towers and blockhouses built on selected positions of this river, so as to form a strong line which would assure us the course of the Ebro in all probable or possible cases. But an engineering officer specifically charged with this operation would be needed, and there are none available in the Army of the North.

Since the coasts are well fortified from Bayonne to Santander, with towers, blockhouses, and batteries closed at the gorge; communication from Bayonne to Burgos is firmly established by the garrisons of the fortresses and the blockhouses; and since the course of the Ebro is well defended by a line of works which, while supporting the troops, would also give us control of the main crossings of this river, we could, with all these provisions, maintain our position in the northwestern provinces of Spain, whatever events might occur. If circumstances forced the withdrawal of the Emperor's armies to the left bank of the Ebro, the enemy would find in the population of the rest of Spain and Portugal ample resources to organize large armies that could force the line of the Ebro, if no defenses had been prepared against them; but, with the defensive preparations I have just submitted to Your Excellency, I believe that the line of the Ebro could be held under all possible assumptions, and with the fewest possible troops.

I am, with respect, etc.

Signed: THOUVENOT.

No. 111

*Report of the Duke of Wellington to the Earl of Bathurst,
on the Battle of Vitoria.*

Salvatierra, 22 June 1813.

My Lord,

The enemy army, commanded by Joseph Bonaparte, with Marshal Jourdan as Major General, took up, on the night of the 19th, a position in front of Vitoria, whose left was supported by the heights ending at La Puebla, and extended from there across the Zadora Valley, in front of the village of Aranjuez. The enemy occupied, with the right of the center, a height overlooking the Zadora Valley. They had a reserve, behind their left, at the village of Gomecha. The nature of the country on the Ebro had forced us to extend our columns. We halted on the 20th to close in on them, and I advanced the left to Murgia, where it appeared likely it would be needed. That day, I reconnoitered the enemy's position, with a view to attacking them the next morning if they remained there. Consequently, we attacked the enemy yesterday, and I am pleased to inform Your Lordship that the allied army, under my command, has won a complete victory; having driven the enemy from all their positions, captured one hundred and fifty-one cannons, four hundred and fifteen caissons of ammunition, all their baggage, provisions, livestock, payrolls, etc., and a considerable number of prisoners.

Lieutenant General Sir Rowland Hill began the day's operation by seizing the heights of La Puebla, on which the enemy rested their left wing, and which they did not occupy in great force.

He detached for this service a brigade of the Spanish Division under the command of General Murillo, the other brigade being employed in maintaining communication between the main body of the army on the main road from Miranda to Vitoria, and the troops detached towards the heights. The enemy soon saw the importance of the heights, and he reinforced his troops so much that Lieutenant General Sir R. Hill was obliged to detach to the same point the Seventy-first Regiment, the light infantry battalion of Major General Walker's brigade, and successively other troops. The allies seized these important heights, and maintained themselves there during all their operations, in spite of all the efforts that the enemy made to retake them. The fight there was very stubborn, and the loss considerable. General Murillo was wounded, but he remained on the field of battle. I regret to have to report that Lieutenant Colonel Cadogan died of a wound he received. His Majesty lost in him a very zealous officer of proven bravery, who had already earned the respect and esteem of the entire army. Taking advantage of the heights, Sir R. Hill crossed the Zadora River at La Puebla, and the defile that runs alongside the river. He attacked and captured the village of Subijana de Alava, which the enemy attempted to retake several times.

The difficult nature of the country long delayed communication between our various columns, which advanced to the Bayas River to attack the enemy, and it was late before I learned that the column, composed of the Third and Seventh Divisions, under the command of the Count of Dalhousie, had arrived at the post indicated to it.

However, the Fourth Division and the Light Division crossed the Zadora River as soon as Sir R. Hill captured Subijana de Alava; the former at the bridge of Nanclares, and the latter at the bridge of Trespuentes. Almost simultaneously, the column under the command of the Earl of Dalhousie arrived at Mendoza; and the Third Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton, crossed the bridge higher up, followed by the Seventh Division, under the Earl of Dalhousie.

These four divisions, forming the center of the army, were intended to attack the heights on which the enemy's right wing was positioned, while Lieutenant-General Sir R. Hill advanced ahead of Subijana de Alava to attack the left. But the enemy, having weakened his line to reinforce his detachment on the heights, abandoned his position in the valley as soon as he saw that we were preparing to attack him, and began his orderly retreat towards Vitoria.

Our troops continued to advance in admirable order, despite the difficult terrain.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Sir T. Graham, who commanded the left wing of the army, composed of the First and Fifth Divisions, the infantry brigades of Generals Pack and Bradford, and the cavalry brigades of Generals Bock and Anson, and who had been sent to Murgia on the 20th, advanced on Vitoria via the main road to Bilbao. He also had with him the Spanish division of General Girón and Colonel Longa, which, having arrived at Orduña on the 20th, had left the same day, in order to be on the battlefield, ready to support Lieutenant General Sir T. Graham if necessary.

The enemy had an infantry division and some cavalry ahead of Aranjuez, on the main road from Vitoria to Bilbao, supporting their right on strong heights covering the village of Gamarra-Mayor. To the rear, they strongly occupied the bridges of Abetxuko and Gamarra over the Zadora. General Pack's Portuguese brigade and Colonel Longa's Spanish division were ordered to turn and take the heights, supported by Major General Anson's Light Dragoon Brigade and the Fifth Infantry Division under Major General Oswald, who was ordered to take command of all troops.

Lieutenant General Graham reports that, in carrying out this attack, the Portuguese and Spanish troops performed admirably, particularly the Fourth and Eighth Portuguese Chasseurs. As soon as the heights were within our control, the village of Gamarra-Mayor was very bravely stormed by General Robinson's brigade of the Fifth Division, which advanced in column by battalion under very heavy artillery and musketry fire, without firing a shot, supported by two guns from General Anson's artillery brigade. The enemy suffered heavily and lost three cannons.

Lieutenant General Graham then proceeded, with the First Division, to attack the village of Abetxuko, against which he stationed a strong battery composed of Captain Dubourdieu's brigade and Captain Ramsay's horse artillery company. Under the protection of this fire, Colonel Halkett's brigade attacked the village, which was taken; the light battalion charged, capturing three cannons and a howitzer on the bridge. This attack was supported by General Bradford's Portuguese infantry brigade.

During the attack on Abetxuko, the enemy made the greatest efforts to retake the village of Gamarra-Mayor; but he was valiantly repulsed by the troops of the Fifth Division, under the command of Major General Oswald. The enemy having two infantry divisions in reserve on the heights of the left bank of the Zadora, it was impossible for us to cross these bridges, until the troops who had marched by the main road from Vitoria, had driven him beyond this town.

All troops then took part in the pursuit, which continued until nightfall. Following the movement of Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Graham's corps and the capture of the bridges at Gamarra and Abetxuko, the enemy's retreat on the main road to Bayonne was cut off. He was therefore forced to take the road to Pamplona, abandoning all his artillery and baggage near Vitoria. I have reason to believe that he took with him only one cannon and one howitzer.

Joseph Bonaparte's army consisted of the entire Armies of the South and Center, four divisions and all the cavalry of the Army of Portugal, and a few troops from the Army of the North. General Foy's division of the Army of Portugal was near Bilbao, and General Clauzel, who commands the Army of the North, was near Logroño with Taupin's division of the Army of Portugal and General Vandermaesen's division of the Army of the North. The Sixth Division of the Allied Army was also absent, having been detained for three days at Medina and Pomar to protect the transport of our stores and munitions... *(The following is a list of the corps that distinguished themselves)....*

I have the honor to be, etc.

Signed: WELLINGTON.

I enclose here a report of the men killed or wounded in the various operations, and a statement of the artillery and munitions captured from the enemy in the action of the 21st.

SUMMARY.

English.....	501	Men killed	2,616	Men wounded.
Portuguese.....	210	...id...	989	id.
Spanish.....	<u>89</u>	...id...	<u>464</u>	id.

TOTAL: 800 killed, and 4,069 wounded.

The following were captured from the enemy:

One hundred and fifty-one field guns on field carriages.

Four hundred and fifteen caissons.

Fourteen thousand two hundred and forty-one cannon or howitzer charges.

One million nine hundred and seventy-three thousand four hundred infantry cartridges.

Forty thousand four hundred and sixty-eight pounds of powder.

Fifty-six fodder carts.

Forty-four field forges.