

Translated by Greg Gorsuch
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JOURNALS OF THE SIEGES

MADE OR SUSTAINED BY THE FRENCH

IN THE PENINSULA,

FROM 1807 TO 1814.

General Verdier, no longer hoping to take control of the city by a strong attack, decided to concentrate his resources for a regular attack on a few points of the wall. Judging that the failure of the first two attempts could cause an uprising in Aragon and the neighboring provinces, he requested reinforcements, both to ensure his communication with Pamplona and to form a mobile column of at least a couple of thousand men, in order to scour the countryside and disperse the gatherings that were forming around his camps. The next day, 3 July, he reconnoitered the city with the engineer Colonel Lacoste, and decided on the ground on two routes, one directed towards the castle and the other towards the Porte del Carmen, where the wall was not flanked. Colonel Lacoste had with him only one engineer officer; there was a shortage of artillery officers, and the ammunition taken from Pamplona was exhausted. General Verdier sent the Major General a statement of the supplies he needed and began the planned advance against the castle that very night, postponing the one planned against the city until the arrival of the means of attack, so as not to arouse the enemy's attention in that direction and give them time to retreat.

During the day of the 3rd, a parliamentarian left the city to warn General Verdier, on behalf of the Governor: "that if we wanted to enter Zaragoza as friends, we were its masters; but if we wanted to enter by force, he would defend the city to the point of extinction." Since the parliamentarian offered no explanation for this unusual proposal, it was presumed that he had been sent only to find out what was happening in our camps. General Verdier replied to the Governor: "that no other parliamentarian would be received unless he carried a letter from all the authorities of the city, in which it would be stated: "The city of Zaragoza has committed a fault in taking up arms against His Majesty the Emperor; it deplores it, repents of it, and implores the clemency of His Majesty, into whose hands it places its fate." The same day, General Lefebvre left for Calatayud, with five battalions, the regiment of Polish lancers and four cannons, in order to disperse the bands of Baron de Warsage. A battalion of grenadiers and chasseurs of the elite National Guard and two cannons were sent at the same time to Tudela to reinforce this important point, and to ensure our communication with Pamplona, threatened by the rebels on the left bank of the Ebro.

The Emperor, who was still in Bayonne, learned with displeasure that General Verdier, in his main attack, had directed all his efforts precisely against the strongest points of the enclosure, the castle and the convents protecting the wall. He thought that the attack should have been made from the angle where the Torre del Pino is located, near the Huebra, and that it was still from this point and the convent of Santa Engracia that the approach should be made. He also greatly approved of General Lefebvre's departure for Calatayud, and he ordered General Verdier to cross to the left bank of the Ebro, in order to take control of

the surrounding area, to conduct reconnaissance on the roads to Barbastro and Lleida, and to intercept as much as possible all the city's communications with the outside world.

General Verdier deemed the Emperor's proposed attack almost impracticable because the terrain along the left bank of the Huebra was very narrow and flanked by the convent of Santa Engracia and the fortifications built at the Carmen Gate. Nevertheless, he began to implement this plan, which the progress of the attacks soon led to recognition as the best. Indeed, once the section of the wall surrounding Santa Engracia and the Pino Tower was under control, a large area of gardens was occupied from which the defenses of the Santa Engracia and Carmen Gates, as well as the Trinitarian Convent, could be attacked from behind.

However, General Verdier continued to advance toward the castle, in order to confirm the enemy's belief that this was the point on which the main attack should be directed; on 6 July, they were within 160 toises of it. At the other point of attack, we began by tightening the Spanish outposts by advancing along both banks of the Huebra, through considerable clumps of olive trees, gardens, and houses that completely obscured the wall and prevented us from assessing its shape. Colonel Lacoste received seven thousand francs for the work. Engineer Battalion Commander Dabadie brought five thousand tools and fifteen thousand bags of earth; convoys of the siege crew and two artillery companies arrived successively from Pamplona.

However, the insurgents in the city, having been informed of General Lefebvre's departure, and wishing to take advantage of the weakening of our camps, made a general sortie through all the gates on 4 July; but none of our posts took a single step backward, and everywhere the enemy was driven back with losses. He employed a large number of workers to cut down the olive trees and demolish the houses closest to the enclosure, without our being able to prevent this work.

On 5 July, General Lefebvre returned from his expedition to Calatayud. The insurgents had dispersed as he approached, abandoning the city to him with 8,000 pounds of gunpowder. Another reconnaissance, directed from Tudela to Tauste, had dispersed a group that was threatening our communication with Pamplona.

In accordance with the Emperor's orders, a flying bridge was built on the night of 11 July across the Ebro, at the salient formed by the bend in the river near Saint-Lambert, upstream from the city. For this purpose, the timber and two longboats found at Monte Torrero were used. With the intention of building a permanent bridge, two boats, also taken from Monte Torrero, had been brought up the canal to Tudela, from where an attempt was made to bring them down the Ebro; but the river not being navigable, this project had to be abandoned. The enemy made every effort to oppose our crossing to the left bank. A cloud of skirmishers covered the shore; but they were dispersed by two battalions of infantry who crossed the river in longboats, and by two hundred lancers who forded it. A small project was immediately begun to cover the bridge. Don Francisco Palafox, who had just returned to the city with numerous reinforcements, made several vigorous sorties from the suburb on the 11th and 12th to overthrow our works and throw out our posts; but having been repulsed each time, he took up position, with two 8-pounders, on the heights of the village of Juslibol, in order to flank our crossing. General Verdier brought reinforcements to the left bank, attacked the enemy, and forced them to return to the suburb, despite the irrigation streams and olive trees that covered the terrain. He then withdrew, leaving only two hundred lancers to observe the road to Villanueva. A few days later, he returned to the Gállego, burned the wooden bridge that crosses the main road to Catalonia, and destroyed all the wheat mills that supplied the city. He left Colonel Piré with a few troops to monitor the exits from the suburb and intercept the enemy's communications with the outside world. At the same time, a column was sent to Villafeliche, located twelve leagues from Zaragoza, to destroy the gunpowder mills where the enemy obtained supplies: these mills were too far away for us to guard.

However, we continued along the Huebra River, where we captured the Capuchin convent, located three hundred meters from the square, opposite the Santa Engracia Gate. The enemy set fire to it as they retreated.

"The terrain we are advancing on," General Verdier wrote to the Major General on 16 July, "is extremely difficult, covered with gardens and pleasure houses; it is being conquered inch by inch from the enemy, who is defending it with incredible ferocity. This war, the only one that can allow us to advance close enough to the city walls to clearly see where we will need to breach, is very favorable to the enemy. He knows this well, and makes us pay dearly for the little ground we conquer from him every day: every wall, every house offers the rebels shelters that they vigorously defend. In addition to this defense, truly pushed forward with all possible energy, the enemy still makes sorties almost every day which, in truth, are less successful. He is always being pushed back; the charge gets the better of him, but it is never without some loss on our side."

"Our positions," says Colonel Lacoste in his report of 17 July, "are advancing from obstacle to obstacle, to the right and left of the Huebra, until we have found good battery emplacements and can clearly see the walls that must be struck. You may be surprised that these emplacements have not already been positively designated and that the details of the main attack have not been decided; but the terrain is so cut, wooded and crossed by walls in all directions that one cannot see four steps ahead, and that at every four steps one takes, one must withdraw to spare the life of the soldier. We are nevertheless approaching our objective. But the left of the attack is holding us back the most; from this evening onwards we will make efforts to flush out the enemy. He is in force in the large convent of the Trinitarians, which we are trying to avoid. In addition to the batteries adjoining this convent, he has brought two guns to the wall of the enclosure, taking on the flank the post of the burnt convent, which is continually disturbed. It still holds the two houses in front of its enclosure wall; it is there that it is important to lodge to secure this left. On the other side of the Huebra, the approaches offer much less difficulty. According to a reconnaissance made this morning by General Verdier, we have finally found the best position for our batteries; this is what I had foreseen. In this case, we will pound the convent of Santa-Engracia, an important point in all respects. The Huebra must serve us to approach the breach under cover. Batteries will have to extinguish the fire of the besieged, especially on the left. I have roughly reconnoitered the location of the mortars and howitzers. I am all the more pleased with this favorable disposition of the terrain to the right of the Huebra, since having reconnoitered last night that of the left up to very close to the enclosure, I found it very low, and consequently not very favorable to pound with advantage, unless we move further to the left. But I cannot tell you anything very positive yet. Probably, in two or three days, our ideas will be well established, and I will then be able to submit, with a sketch, a reasoned plan of attack. His Majesty will then be able to judge it and communicate his intentions to me before the big blow begins."

"According to new measures taken, within ten or eleven days we should receive the completion of a large supply, in order to overcome the supposed resistance at its last stage."

"According to General Verdier's orders, I have arranged the artillery service jointly with Battalion Commander Roquefer, who has just arrived from Pamplona with an artillery convoy. Our siege equipment now consists of twenty-four guns, namely: four 16-pounders, four 12-pounders, four 8-pounders, each equipped with sixteen hundred rounds; four twelve-inch mortars, each with two hundred rounds; and eight eight-inch howitzers, each with two hundred and fifty rounds."

The location scouted by General Verdier was indeed favorable for attacks. The right bank of the Huebra commands the left bank and the city, from the bridge near Santa Engracia to the vicinity of the Convent of Saint Joseph. From Monte Torrero, it was possible to reach the city walls under cover through the olive

groves and garden walls, less than two hundred meters from the wall, and establish batteries capable of striking the foot of the Santa Engracia convent, and that section of the wall surrounding the convent's vegetable garden, the Campo Real enclosure and the cemetery of Saint Michael, all the way to the Quemada Gate. Finally, the Huebra embankment, a short distance from the wall, offered favorable cover from which our troops could launch their attack.

During the night of 17-18 July, a parallel route was undertaken along the right bank of the Huebra and near the embankment of this river, from the Santa Engracia bridge, where the Monte Torrero road ends, to the Saint Joseph convent. Behind this parallel, some communications were established to reach it under cover from the olive trees, and four batteries were erected there, namely:

No. 1, to the right of the parallel, and almost opposite the church of Saint Michael, was to be armed with two eight-inch howitzers and two 8-inch-long guns, to breach the surrounding wall, counter the guns placed by the enemy behind this wall, and ricochet the section leading to the convent of Santa Engracia.

No. 2, to the left of the first, had four 8-pounders, aimed at the same wall.

No. 3, opposite the Santa Engracia enclosure, had six 16-pounders and four 8-inch howitzers. This battery, known as a breaching battery, was to breach the wall of the Santa Engracia garden and that of the convent itself.

No. 4, near the Huebra bridge, where the Monte Torrero road ends, had two 12-pounders, four 8-pounders, and two 8-inch howitzers, to attack the Santa Engracia gate and the Pino tower.

The attack against Santa Engracia from the right bank of the Huebra was also to extend to the left bank. To this end, we left the burnt Capuchin convent to carry, one hundred and forty meters from the enclosure towards the tower of Pino, a parallel of about three hundred meters in length, the right of which was supported by the Huebra near the bridge, and the left by a country house which was seized. From this parallel, our skirmishers greatly worried the Spanish gunners. The inhabitants, seeing us established so close to the wall, feared that we were establishing mines under the gate of Carmen and the tower of Pino. Their miners immediately opened two counter-mine galleries to come to meet us. There were also several sorties made on our parallel, but all of which were repulsed. For our part, to support our attacks in this area, we erected several batteries, namely:

No. 5, to the right of the ruined Capuchin convent and near the edge of the Huebra, with four twelve-inch mortars, to crush the convent and the Santa Engracia Gate, and to launch bombs within a certain radius beyond, intercepting the enemy's access.

No. 6, adjoining the ruined Capuchin convent, in front of No. 5, with two twelve-inch guns and two six-inch howitzers, to batter the Torre del Pino and the Santa Engracia Gate, and to ricochet the portion of the wall between these two points.

No. 7, to the left of the ruined Capuchin convent, with two twelve-inch guns and two six-inch howitzers, to batter the Carmen Gate and fire shells at the Santa Engracia Square.

No. 8, consisting of three 8-pounders, a six-inch howitzer, and a nine-inch mortar, were placed a little to the left of the Madrid road to attack the castle opposite, the Portillo gate, and all the artillery shells the enemy had in that area.

The routes leading to the castle were connected to the ruined Capuchin convent by a communication route cut through the olive trees, taking advantage of the crenellated garden walls, and also by a few sections of trenches built near Battery No. 7.

Two flying batteries were placed in reserve; one of two 8-pounders, two 4-pounders, and a six-inch howitzer, behind Battery No. 4; the other of one 8-pounder, two 4-pounders, and two six-inch howitzers, behind Nos. 4 and 6.

By 27 July, the construction of the trenches and batteries was well advanced, and almost all the convoys expected from Pamplona had arrived. General Verdier ordered that everything be prepared for an imminent attack.

However, the enemy was making frequent sorties on the left bank of the Ebro to maintain communications with the outside world, which they felt were important. They expected reinforcements from Catalonia any day now. Gatherings were taking place at Osera, Aguilar, and Pina, on the left bank of the Ebro. A battalion of Aragon volunteers had taken a strong position in front of Osera, supported by the Ebro, and had entrenched itself there; it was to be joined by a second battalion and by the Majorca Regiment, which had landed at Cartagena. General Verdier, having learned of these gatherings, detached General Habert on the 28th with three battalions, two cannons, and two hundred lancers, to defeat the enemy before it was in force. The Spaniards were driven from their position. They lost one hundred and fifty men killed and some prisoners. General Habert pursued the fugitives to Pina and returned to the camp under Saragossa on July 30th. During this expedition, the garrison had left the bridgehead on the left bank to move to the rear of the French column; but it had been contained, despite all its efforts, by two battalions and a squadron posted in front of the suburb, and commanded by Squadron Leader Maisonneuve, Aide-de-Camp to the General-in-Chief.

On August 1st, a brigade arrived from Pamplona, escorting the remaining artillery we were expecting. It consisted of the Fourteenth and Forty-fourth Line Regiments, and the Eleventh March Squadron. General Bazancourt commanded these troops under the command of General Lefebvre-Desnouettes.

"This fine and good brigade," said the Emperor as he sent it from Bayonne, "brings General Verdier's army to nearly fifteen thousand men. Not that these troops could advance the surrender of Zaragoza, which is a matter of cannon, or that they were necessary for General Verdier to hold the campaign, since he had defeated the rebels at every point; but they would be useful against the insurgents of Valencia, if they wished to reinforce those of Zaragoza."

The arrival of this reinforcement rekindled the ardor of our soldiers and gave them hope of soon finding shelter in the city. They bore the privations to which they were exposed with greater patience. A large number of men could not serve due to lack of shoes; most had no greatcoats, and it was very difficult to obtain food in a country where the inhabitants were in revolt. The army was without administration, having neither an inspector of reviews nor a war commissary, not even a single agent or employee of food and hospitals.

The defenders of Zaragoza were hardly in a better situation. As food began to become scarce, Palafox had the supplies of individuals and convents transferred to the public stores. All the inhabitants were obliged to declare the provisions they had at home, under penalty of being considered traitors to the country. Horse-drawn mills were established for grinding grain. With most of the ammunition consumed, the artillery Colonel, D. Ignacio Lopez, was tasked with creating a gunpowder factory. An oil mill, located near the mouth of the Huebra, was rebuilt for this purpose; but since this factory was too exposed, they were forced to requisition all the mortars of the city's confectioners, grocers, and dyers. They were gathered in the Inquisition building, where the materials were ground. More than two hundred

men were constantly employed there until the end of the siege. Saltpeter was collected wherever it could be found. The earth in the streets was washed to extract it, and charcoal was made from the stalks of the hemp, which grows so high in this region. A foundry was also created to cast projectiles. Nevertheless, all these resources would have been insufficient if from time to time a few convoys had not entered the city through the suburb on the left bank of the Ebro. The exasperation reigning in Zaragoza gave rise to several debates between the bourgeoisie, armed peasants, and soldiers; under the pretext of treason, several unfortunates were assassinated. It took all the influence of the priests and monks, and the fear of a common danger, to maintain tranquility, which was repeatedly compromised. Palafox also had to fight against the defense junta, which was dissolved and replaced by a consultative junta.

On 2 and 3 August, our batteries were armed and supplied. Before opening fire, General Verdier wanted to make a final effort to reach an agreement with the governor; but the parliamentarian he sent to the Spanish outposts was repulsed. Palafox seized this opportunity to rekindle the zeal of the inhabitants with a vigorous proclamation¹. He promoted several times, including Father D. José Terradillos, whom he appointed captain of artillery in recognition of the remarkable skill with which he had led the batteries under his command in the preceding days. An order from the junta required all priests, both secular and regular, who were in the regiments to dress in uniform or peasant clothing for their personal safety. On the night of 3-4 August, Colonel D. Mariano Renovalès, who commanded the Huebra fronts, received the following notification from Palafox:

"The Captain General warns D. Mariano Renovalès that the French are to launch an assault tonight using ladders. Reconnaissance of the entire line from the San Miguel ditch to the vegetable garden of Campo-Real. Your means of defense are fusils, lances, pistols, and stones; if you add courage and composure, woe to those who attack you! Your activity will not only prevent you from sleeping but will also awaken the torpor of your soldiers. --PALAFOX."

At daybreak on 4 August, our artillery began thundering against the city with forty-three cannons, including eighteen mortars or howitzers; several fires soon broke out, and the inhabitants of the threatened neighborhoods fled to the city center. The Governor had the sick, wounded, and insane people who had been confined in the general hospital transferred to the vast stock exchange building. In the shared terror, a crowd of these unfortunates, to escape the ravages of the bombs, fled half-naked into the streets, contributing to the horror of this scene of desolation.

By noon, much of the square's artillery had been dismantled, and three breaches were possible in the enclosure: the first, at the left corner of the Convent of Santa Engracia and the enclosure wall of the convent garden; the second, at the salient corner of the enclosure wall of the same convent, which adjoins the Santa Engracia Gate; and the third, at the wall joining the Torre del Pino to the Porte del Carmen.

The troops intended to launch the assault were divided into three columns:

1st The right column, commanded by General Habert and composed of the First Vistula Regiment, had as its vanguard the companies of voltigeurs of the same regiment, and the grenadiers and voltigeurs of the battalions of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Regiments under the command of Colonel Robert. It was to enter through the Convent of Santa Engracia, capturing, if possible, the first houses, as well as the entrance to Santa Engracia Street, which leads to the Coso. The Forty-Fourth Regiment was placed in reserve to support this column, while two battalions of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Regiments were to cover the right and attack the convent orchard.

¹ See supporting documents, no. 8.

2nd The central column, commanded by General Bazancourt and formed of the Fourteenth Regiment, had as its vanguard a company of grenadiers and the fusiliers of the Fourteenth and Forty-fourth Regiments. It was to emerge by a ramp built next to the Huebra Bridge, or by the bridge itself, advance along the main road leading to the Santa Engracia Gate, to capture this gate, then proceed to its left to the Plaza del Carmen, and there occupy the first houses on the Rue du Jeu de Paume, at the same time as those on the left side of the square.

3rd The left column, commanded by General Grandjean, formed from the Second Vistula Regiment, had as its vanguard six elite companies from the Second and Third Vistula Regiments and the Forty-seventh Line Battalion, under the command of Squadron Leader Maisonneuve, Aide-de-Camp to the General-in-Chief. This column was to emerge from the low ground between the left bank of the Huebra and the road to the right of the camps of the Grandjean Brigade, and head for the breach between the Torre del Pino and the Porte del Carmen. After capturing it, it was to divide into two parts: one turning right to capture the Torre del Pino, marching along the wall and taking the defenders of the Porte Santa-Engracia from behind; the other turning left to capture the convent and the Porte del Carmen. The First Regiment of the Legions and the battalion of the Forty-seventh Regiment formed its reserve.

Each of these columns was supported by artillery; the commanders were generally instructed to position their guns in the city squares they would enter, simultaneously capturing the houses fronting the streets in these squares, in order to hold their ground against all enemy efforts. The rest of the troops stood in parallel to guard the positions already occupied and oppose any attempt by the enemy to break out. The Third Vistula Regiment was posted on the heights opposite the castle, ready to march wherever its presence was needed. The cavalry was assembled at Monte Torrero and was to conduct patrols in the surrounding area. Three hundred Polish lancers crossed the Ebro opposite the mouth of the Gállego, and advanced in front of the suburb to close the roads to Catalonia to the besieged.

The signal for the assault was given at one o'clock in the afternoon. Our troops rushed forward with cries of "Long live the Emperor" under a terrific barrage. The right column, commanded by General Habert, forded the Huebra, entered the convent and the enclosure of Santa Engracia, and emerged onto the square beyond. It attacked the street leading from this square to the Coso; and, despite the artillery-armed trenches that blocked it and a hail of bullets and stones thrown from the houses, it reached the Coso.

The center column, commanded by General Bazancourt, was stopped for nearly an hour in front of the Santa Engracia gate, which was so heavily barricaded that it could only be opened from behind.

The left column entered through the breach, stormed the Torre del Pino, and then split into two parts: one advanced on the Convent del Carmen, which it was unable to capture until very late; the other joined the central column in the Plaza del Carmen. These latter troops were stopped on their left by the Convent of the Incarnation and the Convalescent Hospital, where the enemy was in force; they were nevertheless able, thanks to the progress of the other columns advancing along Calle Santa Engracia, to move along Calle del Azoque and capture the Convent of Santa Rosa and the neighboring houses of Santa Fe.

From the beginning of the action, Palafox, despairing of holding Zaragoza without the arrival of help, which he expected at any moment from Pina, escaped from the city with a weak escort. He crossed the Gállego by ford, and arrived that same evening at Osera, located four leagues from Zaragoza. The Marquis of Lazan, who was defending the Santa-Engracia street, seeing the French troops emerging on the Coso, also believed that all was lost. Carried along by the mass of fugitives to the suburb on the left bank, he left with his brother, Don Francisco, to join Palafox at Osera. Terror was at its height in the city, and the people flocked to the Porte del Angel to escape by the bridge over the Ebro; but some officers, who commanded the suburb, turned their artillery on the fugitives, threatening to unleash grapeshot on

them. At the same time, the monks rushed into the midst of the crowd, crucifix in hand, and finally managed to stop them.

Arriving at the Coso, the city promenade, built along the old Moorish ramparts and about forty meters wide, our troops divided into three columns: one headed from the right, towards Plaza de la Madeleine, to occupy the Puerta del Sol; another advanced from the left, towards Plaza de las Estravedès, to join the troops following the Calle del Azoque and march together on the Puerta de San Ildefonso; the third column was to head through the center towards the Puerta del Angel to capture the bridge.

The right column was stopped in the Plaza de la Madeleine by a crowd of armed men, ambushed behind the old Valencia gate, located at the entrance to Calle Mayor, and at the outlets of the neighboring streets. The defenders of the Sol gate came to reinforce them by Calle de la Trinidad with a piece of cannon; the insurgents also spread into the houses, at the entrance to Calle San Lorenzo, and soon our troops, contained from the front and taken from the flank, found themselves in a very critical position. The news of this resistance spread immediately to all the quarters of the city and revived the courage of the Spaniards. Those who had fled towards the Plaza de la Seo and Plaza de N. S. del Pilar retraced their steps, brought back by Brigadier Don Antonio Torres and Colonel Obispo; they reoccupied the streets leading to the Coso, erected barricades there, and placed a cannon at the entrance to Saint-Gil Street. At the same time, the defenders of the Quemada Gate and the Saint-Michel Cemetery brought cannons to Para Street and occupied all the neighboring streets that also lead to the Coso. Our troops, finding themselves surrounded on all sides in the Plaza de la Madeleine, seized, at the mouth of Medio Street, on their right, the houses ruined by the explosion of 27 June, where they held firm until a reserve force, arriving by the Coso, came to free them. They then retreated, but not without suffering many losses under the fire coming from the streets and houses overlooking the Coso.

The center column, instead of taking Saint-Gil Street, which leads directly to the Ebro Bridge, turned into the winding Arc de Cinegia Street, forcing it to retrace its steps.

The left column was stopped at the entrance to the street leading to the New Market. Some of the defenders of the Portillo Gate, led by the intrepid priest Jago Sas, moved to the flanks and rear of this column and occupied the neighboring houses of Santa Fe, where they massacred many soldiers.

From the beginning of the action, our columns had been greatly weakened by various detachments; for the enemy, continually returning to the houses we left behind, threw stones from the roofs and fired through the battlements, windows, and cellar vents. It was necessary to occupy a large number of houses; and then the officers were no longer in control of the soldiers, who dispersed to plunder. However, we fought for a long time on the Coso against a fierce fusillade and the grapeshot of the guns that the enemy had brought to the Place des Estravedès, to that of the Madeleine and to the entrance to the streets Saint-Gil and de la Para. But, unable to make any further progress, we withdrew to the street Santa-Engracia, occupying at the head of this street the general hospital and the convent of Saint-François. From this convent, our troops reached the mansion of the Count of Sástago and the palace of the Count of Fuentes, which immediately overlook the Coso; but the enemy returned through the gardens of the palace of Fuentes, and the mansion of Sástago was set on fire. The convents of Saint-Diego and Santa-Rosa remained with us.

The city was like a volcano from the continual explosions that were taking place. One could hear the cries of the victors and the vanquished; here victory, there disorder and flight; friends and enemies were all fighting pell-mell and without order. Each defended himself where he was attacked and attacked where he encountered the enemy; chance alone presided over this chaos. The streets were strewn with corpses; the cries that one heard from the midst of the flames and smoke added to the horror of this scene

of desolation, and the tocsin, which sounded from all sides, seemed to announce the agony of Saragossa. Finally, after seven hours of the most stubborn combat, night came and put an end to the fire.

No. 8.

Order of the Day of the Aragonese Army.

Zaragoza, 30 July 1835 (sic).

Aragonese,

General Verdier has summoned me, for the third time, to surrender the city; and my response has been the same as the previous ones.

One hundred cannons, with which the French thought they could intimidate us, will fire continuously on the city, starting tomorrow. But what are one hundred cannons to us? To us, who are already accustomed to them, and who, following the example of our ancestors the Numantines, are resolved to bury ourselves all under the ashes and ruins of the city!

Could we surrender today, seeing the signal victory of the Andalusians!

We know what one hundred cannons are, and we will respond with valor and energy.

Cannoneers of the terraces! Follow your commanders' orders punctually and do not cease firing for a moment. Always be careful not to leave the gunpowder uncovered, so that the unfortunate event that has already occurred does not repeat itself.

Brave regiments of Aragonese! Let everyone be on their guard; and let some watch while others sleep.

Aragonese! Valor and steadfastness, and in a few days, we will be freed from our enemies. We will teach them that when the Spaniards fight for their King and their religion, they are capable of competing with the best troops on earth.

Given at headquarters, 30 July, Year I of Liberty.

Signed: PALAFOX.