

Translated by Greg Gorsuch
Volume 2 Part 5

SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA,

BY THE FRENCH ARMY OF ARAGON,
IN 1808 AND 1809.

The castle, a square building measuring one hundred meters on each side, flanked by four bastioned towers, was linked to the city by a double caponier and put into a defensive state. It contained quarters and stores for a garrison of fifteen hundred men. A lined moat, fifteen to twenty meters deep, protected it from an attack. The Sancho and Portillo gates were covered with earthworks; and the entire section of the wall extending from these gates to the Huebra was surrounded by a new terraced enclosure, faced with sun-dried bricks, and preceded by a steep-cut moat. This part of the line was flanked by the Augustinian and Trinitarian convents, and by an intermediate structure built in the Field of the Sepulcher.

The Huebra bridge, located in front of the Santa Engracia promenade, was covered by a redoubt with a good ditch, forming a bridgehead on the right bank. This structure was armed with eight cannons. At the entrance, one could read this inscription: *Redoubt of the Pillar, impregnable because of this sacred name. Zaragozans, conquer or die for the Virgin of the Pillar.* From the bridge, a double entrenchment reached the convent of Santa Engracia, which the Spaniards had turned into a kind of citadel armed with numerous artillery. To the left, an ancient wall, on which a few batteries had been erected, completed the closure of the city as far as the lower Ebro, where the suburb of Tanneries was located, which had been fortified. These fronts were covered by the Huebra, a canalized and fordable river, whose steep banks formed a natural ditch four to five meters deep. On the right bank, the vast convent of Saint Joseph was fortified as a bridgehead on the road to Valencia. This rectangular building, one hundred and twenty meters long and eighty meters wide, was surrounded by a large ditch and a covered palisade way cut into the counterscarp. It was armed with twelve cannons and garrisoned by three thousand men, under the command of Colonel D. Mariano Renovalès, an officer who had already distinguished himself in the first siege.

Outside the walls, the Spaniards occupied the canal line on Monte Torrero as an advanced position, about fifteen hundred meters from the square. There, they built on the Buena Vista plateau a large work in the shape of a priest's cap, armed with artillery and palisade. This work was advantageously situated to enfilade this line from both sides, and to sweep the neighboring heights. The bridge of America, which was on the left of the canal and near the large magazines, was cut, and a battery was built behind it. On the extreme left, the arch of the aqueduct bridge built in the valley at Barranco de la Muerte, for the canal crossing, was barricaded. Field Marshal Saint Mark was charged with defending the whole of Monte Torrero with six thousand men. His right leaned against the large locks, which were covered by a bridgehead. The bridge of the Muela, located a little further away, was defended by a battery. Brigadier Torres defended this part of the line and covered the approaches to the city on the Alagon road.

On the left bank of the Ebro, the suburb, located on a low, marshy plain, was fortified to serve as a bridgehead with sections of dry-stone-lined entrenchments, palisade, and covered on the left by a flood.

Brigadier D. Rosé Manso, captain of the Spanish Royal Guards, was tasked with defending this important point with three thousand men. Finally, a few gunboats, manned by sailors from Cartagena, ensured the defense of the Ebro and flanked the approaches to the city and the suburb.

These were the regular, external defenses of Zaragoza; but, through the experience of the first siege, the inhabitants had learned that house-to-house warfare offered them a much more powerful means of resistance. Sacrificing all personal convenience, all notions of property, they surrendered their possessions, their homes, and their persons entirely to the chances of war; and, mingling with regular troops and peasants, they formed nothing more than a strong garrison in the vast fortress into which Zaragoza was transformed. The streets leading to the Coso were defended by traverses lined with artillery. Most of the doors and windows of the houses were walled up. The front walls were pierced with battlements for firing, and large openings were made in the adjoining walls to facilitate communication. Each building, each house, thus became a citadel, and the thickness of Zaragoza's ramparts had to be measured by the entire space covered by the city.

Palafox, wishing to ensure the defense of the works of the enclosure, ordered the razing, over a very large area, of the olive trees, country houses, and gardens that masked the approaches to the wall. This order was carried out without complaint; barely was a house designated than it fell instantly. All the beautiful trees that made the wealth of the country disappeared under the axe, and the gardens, once so beautiful, were reduced to nothing but uncultivated land. The conviction that these sacrifices were necessary for the common good armed thousands of hands who took pleasure in destroying at a single blow the results of the industry of so many years.

Palafox ruled as dictator, and his power was further increased by a system of terror maintained by the monks. A gallows was permanently on the market square; and every day, some unfortunate victims were dragged there. The people also arbitrarily exercised some portion of the authority they had delegated to the governor. The slightest suspicion of treason or lukewarmness, the first denunciation, were death warrants: happy were those who, led to the castle in the prisons of the Inquisition, redeemed their lives at the price of a harsh captivity! Every demand was made in the name of the Fatherland and the King; every disobedience was a crime of *lèse-majesté*. Thus, even if unanimity of feelings had not existed in the hearts of all the citizens, fear alone would have been enough to give the appearance of it. Added to these already powerful means of action were the intoxication of an initial success, the natural tenacity of the Aragonese, and the exaltation of their religious sentiments. Our Lady of Pilar, protectress of Zaragoza, had signaled her power, and the lifting of the first siege was the greatest of her miracles. In such a state of mind, what results could the Spanish leaders who commanded the place not hope for?

Meanwhile, Marshal Moncey took advantage of his stay in Alagon to make his siege preparations. As early as 28 November, General Dedon, commanding the artillery, had requisitioned the horses and mules of Navarre to take the siege equipment to Tudela, which consisted of sixty guns and a large quantity of projectiles. Transport was then to take place via the canal to Zaragoza; but the enemy having captured all the boats, they were forced to bring some of the cannons by land to Alagon, with a supply of two hundred rounds per gun, as well as everything necessary for the construction of the batteries. Alagon became the army depot: stores, warehouses, and hospitals were established there. General Lacoste, commander of the engineers, gathered twenty thousand tools and one hundred thousand sandbags, and had the sappers make three or four thousand gabions, as well as a large number of fascines.

On 15 December, Marshal Mortier, Duke of Trévise, arrived with the Fifth Corps at Tudela. Marshal Moncey sent a colonel from his staff to guide his columns. The Fifth Corps was formed by the Suchet and Gazan Divisions, a cavalry brigade, seven artillery companies, a company of workers, a company of pontoon builders, and a company of sappers; in total about twenty-four thousand men: it was to cover the siege and also form part of the investment. The Third Corps, specially intended for the work of the siege,

was formed by the Grandjean, Musnier, and Morlot Divisions, a cavalry brigade under the command of General Wattier, and seven artillery companies: in all, twenty-three thousand men. The siege crew was followed by six artillery companies, a company of pontoon builders, and a company of workers, representing a total of about six hundred men. The engineering personnel were composed of forty engineers, eight companies of sappers, and three companies of miners, making up about eleven hundred men¹.

On 19 December, the two marshals, having coordinated their operations, put their troops into motion in three columns: the first, composed of the Third Corps, the artillery, and the engineers, advanced along the right bank of the canal; the second, formed by Suchet's division of the Fifth Corps, marched between the canal and the Ebro; Gazan's division of the Fifth Corps, which formed the third column, crossed the Ebro opposite Tauste, heading via Castejón for Zuera. Marshal Moncey left at Tudela, at Alagon, and on the line, the Second Reserve Legion, two thousand five hundred strong, and eighteen hundred men from the 121st Line, to guard the stores, maintain communications with Pamplona, and advance mobile columns on both banks of the Ebro. The spirit of unrest that animated the country, and the existence of a mass of soldiers or armed peasants who, dispersed at the Battle of Tudela, were carrying out their brigandage from Haro and Soria to Borja, made this measure indispensable.

On the afternoon of 20 December, French troops appeared in sight of Zaragoza. Marshal Mortier advanced with Suchet's division along the right bank of the Ebro and took up position at Saint-Lambert, a league from Zaragoza, while Gazan's division advanced along the left bank to Zuera and Villanueva. Marshal Moncey advanced with the Third Corps as far as the Huebra, which Grandjean's division crossed to surround Monte Torrero. The division of Morlot remained on the heights of the left bank, opposite the large locks, and the division of Musnier formed the reserve with the artillery and sappers.

Before nightfall, Marshal Moncey reconnoitered the enemy's line on the canal and gave orders to attack it the next day. Two batteries were constructed and armed during the night to attack Fort Buena Vista: one on the right, with four 12-pounders and two six-inch howitzers, positioned four hundred meters from the fort, on the extension of the capital of the left salient; the other on the left, with two 12-pounders and four eight-inch howitzers, three hundred twenty meters away and on the extension of the right face.

The 21st, at eight o'clock in the morning, these two batteries began firing; they dismounted one of the enemy's guns and set fire to a powder depot. At the same time, Artillery Captain Monot moved to the right, in front of the América Bridge, with six light artillery pieces, and attacked the enemy's entrenchments at the foot of the main magazines. Supported by this artillery, Grandjean's division advanced on Monte Torrero: the Second Brigade made a feint frontal attack, while the First, under the command of General Habert, moved to the right to turn the position. The day before, General Habert had seized the vaulted passage of Barranco de la Muerte, through which the canal runs. The enemy had barricaded this passage and was firing heavily. To dislodge them, our soldiers decided to fire obliquely under the vault without showing themselves; the bullets, ricocheting off their right feet, hit the Spaniards, who, unable to respond with advantage, were forced to withdraw. Having mastered this passage, General Habert advanced with his brigade along the left bank of the canal and positioned himself between Monte Torrero and the city. The enemy, intimidated by this movement, hastily abandoned their position. He left two six-inch howitzers and a dismantled 4-pounder in the Buena Vista redoubt. General Habert's troops took a flag belonging to the Murcia Regiment. A bridge was immediately built over the canal, behind the large stores at Monte Torrero.

¹ See the tables of the army's composition at the end of the report.

In the center, General Morlot attacked the bridgehead of the Grandes Écluses. One of his columns followed the Huebra ravine, passed under the canal at the Almenara del Pilar aqueduct, and took the bridgehead from behind, while the artillery battered it from the front. The enemy, in retreating, abandoned two cannons and a howitzer in this position.

On the far left, General Suchet seized La Bernardona position, opposite the castle. His first brigade was to move to the rear of the Grandes Écluses and Monte Torrero, to create a diversion and collect prisoners; but it was unable to arrive in time due to the obstacles caused by the breaching of the canal dikes.

By eleven o'clock in the morning, the Monte Torrero line, which had appeared so formidable, was in our hands. This important conquest cost us only about twenty dead and fifty wounded².

General Gazan had received orders to seize the suburb on the left bank in the morning, the possession of which would be very useful to us in shortening the duration of the siege by allowing us to attack the city from behind. This attack did not take place until one o'clock in the afternoon, two hours after the capture of Monte Torrero, and before the enemy's works could be completely reconnoitered. Two battalions of the Second Brigade, preceded by a detachment of sappers, seized by force a large factory located on the road to Villa Mayor, six hundred meters from the suburb. Five hundred Swiss who were defending themselves there were killed or taken prisoner: the enemy immediately withdrew the posts they had at the Gállego bridge, so as not to expose them to being cut off. General Gazan's First Brigade advanced along the Villanueva road, and, taking advantage of the olive trees and gardens that covered the terrain, reached the suburb's entrenchments. But, caught in the flank by grapeshot from the large redoubt adjoining the enclosure, near the overflow channel of the Ebro, it suffered greatly. It then fell back to the left, where the fusiliers occupied a house located near the Barcelona road, a hundred paces from the entrenchments, thus threatening to cut off the communication between the Convent of Jesus and the suburb. Suddenly, a panic seized the Spaniards, who abandoned the battery of the Convent of Saint-Lazare, and rushed en masse across the bridge to return to the city. At the sight of this rout, Palafox, who was keeping watch on a tower on the right bank, rushed with reinforcements, made available by the cessation of the fighting at Monte Torrero, had the battery of Saint-Lazare reoccupied by a battalion of the Walloon Guards, and restored order. If, at this critical moment, General Gazan had had the convent of Jesus attacked by the Second Brigade which had remained in reserve, he would have infallibly carried it and probably also the suburb. Colonel Rogniat of engineers, who had been sent to him to direct the columns, urged him strongly; but General Gazan, who already had about seven hundred men killed or wounded, and who feared a sortie by all the Spanish troops, did not want to commit the only reserve which remained to him, and made his retreat at four o'clock in the evening³. He took up his headquarters at Villanueva; and as he did not believe himself strong enough to invest in the suburb, he left all the land beyond the Gállego free.

Marshal Mortier was very eager to have news of this division, which, finding itself isolated on the left bank, could be attacked by all the enemy forces without being able to come to their aid; but no boat was on the Ebro, whose waters were then very rough and violently agitated by the wind. Captain Henry of the sappers volunteered, with a man from his company to swim across the river, and these two brave men, after incredible efforts, reached the opposite bank; but they were so overcome by the cold that, upon emerging from the water, they fell dead in the reeds. It was there that they were found the next day,

² See supporting documents, no. 2

³ In the Spanish account of D. Augustin Ibieca, we find the following reflection on this affair:

"The sortie of the Walloon Guards, at the moment when the French were about to occupy the most neglected point, was very opportune. Fortunately, the enemy did not know how to take advantage of the circumstances to seize the Convent of Jesus, which, once in their power, would have allowed them to penetrate through Saint-Lazare to the bridge and seize the suburb. But often, in war, fate destroys the best combinations or grants victory."

when, in order to establish communications, a flying bridge had been thrown over the Ebro, opposite Juslibol and upstream from the town. The army long retained the memory of such fine devotion.



STATE

OF THE TROOPS EMPLOYED IN THE SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

STAFF.

Marshal Lannes, Duke of Montebello, superior commander of the 2nd and 3rd Corps.
Frère, Division General, Chief of the General Staff.
Dumolard, Adjutant Commander, Sub Chief of General Staff.

3rd CORPS.

STAFF.

Junot, Duke d'Abrantès, Division General, Commandant of the 3rd Corps.
Harispe, Brigadier General, Chief of Staff.

INFANTRY.

1st Division, General Grandjean.

At Headquarters.	{	70 th			
		Line.....	1	Bn.	407 m.
		2 nd			
		Light.....		Detach.	100
1 st Brigade, General Habert.	{	14 th			
		Line.....	4		2122
		2 nd of			
		Vistula.....	2		1226
2 nd Brigade, General Laval.	{	44 th			
		Line.....	3		1754
		3 rd of			
		Vistula.....	2		1138

2nd Division, General Musnier.

1 st Brigade, General Brun.	{	114 th			
		Line.....	4		2235

		1 st of Vistula.....	2	1163
2 nd Brigade, General Razout.	{	115 th Line.....	4	2206

3rd Division, General Morlot.

1 st Brigade, General Rostollant.	{	5 th Light.....	2	Bn.	1244	m.
		116 th Line.	2		878	
2 nd Brigade, General Augereau.	{	117 th Line.....	4		1532	
3 rd Brigade, General Buget.	{	121 st Line.....	4		2187	
		2nd Reserve Legion.....	4		<u>2507</u>	
Including above.....					20598	m.

CAVALRY.

			Brought forward	20598	m.	
		4 th Hussars.....	4	sq.	573	585 h.
		13 th Cuirassiers.....	4		336	379
Brigade, General Wattier	{	1 st Regiment Prov. Hussars.....	Detach.	309	230	
		2 nd and 10 th Hussars.....	Detach.	113	119	
		Cavalry in march dragoons and chasseurs..	Detach.	386	394	
		Gendarmerie.....	"	27	29	
		Polish Lancers.....	"	<u>21</u>	<u>22</u>	
TOTAL.....				22473	m.	1758 h.

NOTE. The Reserve Legion, two thousand five hundred strong, and eighteen hundred men of the 121st Line Regiment, were detached throughout the siege to Alagon and Tudela to cover communications. In addition, General Wattier was sent to Alcañiz with eleven hundred infantry and seven hundred cavalry. Only about sixteen thousand five hundred men remained in the 3rd Corps for the siege.

5th Corps.

STAFF.

Marshal Mortier, Duke of Trévisé, Commandant of the 5th Corps.
Daultanne, Division General, Chief of Staff.
Dambouski, Adjutant Commandant, Sub Chief of Staff.

INFANTRY.

1st Division, General Suchet.

1 st Brigade, General Dumoustier .	{	17 th Light.....	3	Bn.	2302	m.
		34 th Line.....	4		2590	
		40 th id.....	3		2246	
2 nd Brigade, General Girard.	{	64 th Line.....	3		2222	
		88 th id.....	3		2471	

2nd Division, General Gazan.

1 st Brigade, General Guérin.	{	21 st Light.....	3	Bn.	1827	m.
		100 th Line.....	3		2632	
2 nd Brigade, General Taupin.	{	28 th Light.....	3		2230	
		103 th Line.....	3		2553	

CAVALRY.

Brigade, Adjutant Commander Delaage.	{	10 th Hussars.....	3	Sq.	777	m.	750	h.
		21 st Chasseurs.....	3		731		765	
		Gendarmerie.....	"		26		27	

TOTAL.....	22607	1542
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ARTILLERY.

Siege Equipment.

Staff.

Dedon (senior), Division General, Commandant of the Siege Artillery.
Camas, Colonel, Director of the Park.
Roquefert , Battalion Chief, Chief of Staff.
Gaudenard , Battalion Chief.
Lallier, id. (wounded).
Ferey, id., Under director of the Park.
Natali, Squadron Chief, Aide de camp of General Dedon.

Brion, Captain.	Guillot, Captain.
Lagrange, id.	Cony, id.
Troche, id.	Viviant, Sub-lieutenant, Aide
Demonchy, id.	de Camp to General Dedon.
Letourneur, id.	Methias, Adjutant-major.

TROOPS.

Foot artillery.	{	3 rd Regiment.....	{	4 th Company.....	5	off.	70	h.
		{		14 th Company.....	4		78	
				19 th Company.....	4		71	
				10 th Company.....	4		66	
	{	6 th Regiment.....	{	13 th Company.....	4		84	
				15 th Company.....	1		26	

Pontooners...	" "	2 nd Company.....	2	69			
Workers.....	" "	2 nd Company.....	2	29			
Train.....	6 th Battalion (<i>bis</i>)	2 nd Company.....	"	23	49	h.	
		TOTAL.....	26	off. 516	h. 49	h.	

ARTILLERY.

3rd Corps.

STAFF.

Couin, Brigadier General, Commandant of the Artillery of the 3rd Corps.
Raffron, Battalion Chief, Chief of Staff.
Boulard, Squadron Chief, Director of the Park.
Vangrineuse, Battalion Chief.
Joliclerc, id.

Lablossière, Captain, Aide de Camp to General Couin.	Besnard, Captain. Ferdinand Saint- Léger, id.
Legriél, Captain, Aide de Camp id.	Ozella, id. Fournier, Lieutenant.
Hery, Captain.	
Balcon, id.	

TROOPS.

	1 st Regiment.....	20 th Company.....	2	off. 79	h.		
		7 th Company detach.....	"	17			
Foot artillery.	{ 3 rd Regiment.....	{ 18 th Company.....	2	55			
			21 st Company.....	1	59		
			22 nd Company.....	2	43		
	5 th Regiment.....	7 th Company.....	3	47			
Horse art.....	5 th Regiment.....	7 th Company.....	2	69	70	h.	
Workers.....	" "						
Train.....	Imperial Guard	4 th , 5 th , 6 th Companies.....	3	196	355		
	{ 6 th Battalion (<i>bis</i>)	{ 5 th Company detach.....	2	99	245		
			2 nd , 4 th Companies.....	2	100	277	h.
	12 th Battalion (<i>bis</i>)			off. 769	h. 947	h.	
		TOTAL.....	19	off. 769	h. 947	h.	

ARTILLERY.

5th Corps.

STAFF.

Foucher, Division General, Commandant of the Artillery of the 5th
Nourry, Colonel, Chief of Staff.
Humbert, Colonel, Director of the Park.
Fruchard, Battalion Chief.

Devaux, id.

Dubois, Captain, Aide de
Camp to General Foucher.
Saint-Vincent, Captain.
Guillemin, id.
Bonnotte, id.

Sorel, Captain.
Audry, id.
Gourgaud, Lieutenant, Aide de
Camp du général Foucher.
Guillot, id.

TROOPS.

	1 st Regiment.....	5 th Company.....	2	off.	95	h.	
		1 st Company.....	2		88		
Foot	{ 5 th Regiment.....	2 nd Company.....	2		65		
artillery.		15 th Company.....	2		65		
		20 th Company.....	1		60		
		11 th Company.....	1		85		
Horse art.....	6 th Regiment.....	3 rd Company.....	3		62	70	h.
Workers.....	" "	4 th Company	1		31		
Pontooners.	1 st Battalion	4 th Company	2		71		
	3 rd Bn. Princip.	4 th , 5 th , 6 th , 9 th Companies.....	2		318	448	
Train.....	{ 5 th Battalion (<i>bis</i>)	{ 1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th , 5 th , 6 th Companies	8		558	827	
			2		134	129	h.
	8 th Battalion (<i>bis</i>)	3 rd , 5 th Companies.....	2		134	129	h.
		TOTAL.....	28	off.	1632	h.	1474 h.

ENGINEERS.

STAFF.

Count Lacoste, Brigadier General, Aide de Camp of the Emperor, Commandant of the Siege Engineers (killed).

Rogniat, Colonel, Commandant in second (wounded).

Breuille, Major, Director of the Mines, Commandant of the sappers and the miners.

Valazé, Battalion Chief, Chief of Staff.

Haxo, id., Chief of the attack of the right.

Prost (Ambroise), Captain, Chief of the attack of the center (wounded).

Henry, Captain, Chief of the attack of the left.

Fabien, Captain.

Dubourg, id.

Plagniol, id.

Second, id. (killed).

Saint-Léger, id.

Tinseau, id.

Duriveau, id.

Boudhors, id.

Vallantin, id. (wounded).

Guoery (Joseph), id. (killed).

Daguenet, id. (blessé).

Taskin, id.

Christin, id.

Joffrenot, Captain. (killed).

Nempde, id. (wounded).

Provence, Captain of sappers,
Director of the Park.

De Hauteclouque, Lieutenant.

Olry, id.

Vivier, id.

Thiebault, id.

Fournier, id. (wounded).

Brenne, id. (wounded).

Kerdaniel, id.

Foucault, id.

Defranc, id.

De la Palme, id. (wounded).	Cartron, id. (killed).
Barthélemy, id. (killed).	Montauban, id.
Virvaux, id. (killed).	Morlet (Hippolyte), id. (wounded).
Jencesse, id. (killed).	Girard, id.
Goussard, id. (wounded).	

TROOPS.

Miners.	7 th Company.....	{	Lenoir, Captain (wounded).....	}	3	Off.	70	m.	5	h.
			Chamband, Lieutenant.....							
			Mailhet, id.....							
	{	8 th Company.....	{	Heré, id.....	}	4		84		1
				Lebeschu, Lieutenant.....						
				Amillet, id.....						
				Aubertin, id.....						
	9 th Company.....	{	Véron-Reville, Captain.....	}	3		74		10	
			Reggio, id. (killed).....							
			Subard, Lieutenant (wounded).....							
TOTAL.....					10		228		16	

Continued..... 10 Off. 228 m. 16 h.

Sappers.	1 st Bn.	{	6 th Co.	{	Henry, Captain (killed).....	}	2	89	"			
				{	Dupuy, Lieutenant.....	}						
		{	7 th Co.	{	Combes, Captain.....	}	2	90	7			
				{	Delros, Lieutenant.....	}						
		{	1 st Co.	{	Martin (Nicolas), Captain.....	}	3	90	14			
				{	Audoy, Lieutenant.....	}						
	2 nd Bn.	{	3 rd Co.	{	Lessart, id.....	}						
				{	Marconnier, Captain.....	}						
		{	3 rd Co.	{	Maltzen, Lieutenant.....	}	3	91	8			
					{	Vernon, id.....	}					
		{	4 th Co.	{	Merlis, Captain	}	3	85	4			
					{	Cathala, Lieutenant	}					
3 rd Bn.	{	2 nd Co.	{	Robert, id. (wounded)	}							
				{	Foucauld, Captain	}						
	{	2 nd Co.	{	(wounded)	}	3	103	5				
				{	Leviston, Lieutenant	}						
	{	4 th Co.	{	Leclerc, id.	}							
				{	Lemaire, Lieutenant	}	2	103	4			
{	6 th Co.	{	Lamorlette, id.	}								
			{	Bossy, Captain (killed)	}	2	108	11				
		{	Vitard, Lieutenant	}								
TOTAL.....							30	Off.	987	m.	69	h.

ENGINEERS.

5th Corps.

STAFF.

Dode, Colonel, Commandant of the Engineers of the 5th Corps and the attack of the suburbs.

Larcher-Chamont, Battalion Chief, Chief of Staff.

Lepot, Capitaine (killed).

Lefaivre, id.

Thomassin, id. (wounded).

Prétet, Lieutenant.

Dupau, id.

Dorlodot, adjutant.

TROOPS.

Sappers	2 nd Bn., 5 th Comp.	{	Clerget, Captain.....	}	3 Off.	62 m.	7 h.
			Costes, Lieutenant (wounded).....				
			Bruchon, id.....				



No. 2.

Report from Marshal Moncey, commanding the Third Corps, to the Major General on the capture of Monte Torrero.

Monte Torrero, 23 December 1808, at one o'clock in the afternoon.

Monseigneur,

I had the honor of reporting to Your Majesty on the 19th on the general movement of the two army corps. On the 20th, the Grandjean Division, taking up its right-hand position on the right bank of the canal, nearly half a league above Monte Torrero, forced the Spanish guarding a bridge crossing below the canal, and thus placed itself in a position to outflank the enemy the next day. The Morlot Division moved opposite the large locks, and the Musnier Division was placed in reserve, protecting the artillery, also supporting the other two divisions, and able to coordinate its movement with theirs.

The necessary reconnaissance took place the same day. Two batteries were established during the night by general of artillery Dedon, who displayed remarkable zeal, as well as General Couin and all the artillery officers. They were positioned to advantageously attack the Spanish redoubt known as *Bonnevue*, on the left bank of the canal, and on the right flank of Monte Torrero, which connected with the other magazine works and the stone bridge across the canal, which the enemy had already cut.

The enemy, seeing our batteries by daylight, began firing. Our artillery was forced to respond and directed its fire so well that in less than two hours, it dismantled several guns, set fire to artillery caissons and the powder magazine, which caused two powerful explosions, a general upheaval, and the evacuation of the redoubt.

After the first explosion, I ordered the Morlot Division to attack and capture by force the large locks, defended by two batteries and a fairly considerable force of infantry. At the same time, I advanced two artillery pieces from the Musnier Division, commanded by Captain Fols, which took up positions on the heights to flank the lock batteries. These two pieces were so well directed and so well served that in less than an hour the enemy's works and their artillery were abandoned. For his part, Captain Monnot received orders to place his six light artillery pieces in battery, to defeat the enemy established in force at the magazines and other buildings of Monte-Torrero linked together by a battery opposite the cut bridge, and to prevent them from withdrawing their artillery from the Bonnevue redoubt. Meanwhile, the Grandjean Division, which had orders to move between the canal and the town to surround Monte Torrero, was carrying out its movement. The appearance of this column's head, and the promptness and good direction of the light artillery fire, were so successful that the enemy was forced to completely abandon Monte Torrero, as well as the guns and horses they did not have time to withdraw from the redoubt.

During this attack on Monte Torrero, the Suchet Division, from the army corps of the Duke of Trévise, surrounded the town along the Alagon road, driving the enemy ahead. Its right-wing brigade followed the left side of the canal and moved in such a way as to threaten the flank of the great locks and Monte Torrero.

The Gazan Division began its fire on the suburban works after us and gained some advantages over the enemy; but the resistance was vigorous. General Gazan has taken up a position a little further back, and he is requesting an additional brigade to form the complete investment of the place on the left bank of the Gállego and the Ebro. Marshal Mortier reports to Your Majesty the particular movement of his army corps.

The Bonnevue redoubt, covered by the canal, and the works of the great locks and Monte Torrero, form a truly formidable position, which would have cost a great deal of blood if attacked only with field artillery and bayonets. We suffered at most about twenty dead and fifty wounded. The success of the attack on Monte Torrero is due in particular to the artillery. The enemy must have lost many men. With Monte Torrero under fire from the square, it was difficult to take many prisoners. The enemy abandoned seven bronze artillery pieces to us; Habert's brigade captured a flag belonging to the Murcia Regiment.

The Grandjean Division is astride the road to Valencia, extending its positions on its right to the Ebro, and linking up on its left with the Musnier Division, which is positioned on the city avenues at Monte Torrero. This division supports its left at the Huebra, where it links up with the division of Morlot, which is mounted in front of the great locks on the road to Madrid, holding on to its left with Suchet's division, which extends as far as the Ebro. We are busy with the necessary reconnaissance and with the means to establish some batteries against the city as quickly as possible. It is battering Monte Torrero so badly that since we occupied this last position, we have already lost as many men as in our attack. On the 22nd, at eight o'clock in the morning, I wrote the enclosed letter to the General-in-Chief and the magistrates of the city of Zaragoza. Your Highness will read with astonishment the reply sent to me by General-in-Chief Palafox, which I did not receive until nightfall.

I beg Your Highness to accept the homage of my respectful consideration,

MARSHAL DUKE OF CONEGLIANO.

Signed: MONCEY.