

Translated by Greg Gorsuch
Volume 2 Part 8

SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA,

BY THE FRENCH ARMY OF ARAGON,
IN 1808 AND 1809.

9th NIGHT, 6 to 7 January.177

Attack on the right. The second parallel was extended about twenty-four meters to the left, and the route leading to the center was perfected. Two hundred and fifty workers and seventy-eight sappers were employed in this work. The armed batteries Nos. 1 and 2. The enemy fired numerous grenades, shells, and stones throughout the night.

Attack on the center. The parapets of the half-platform were adjusted, and the communication bends were rounded to facilitate the transport of guns to the batteries.

DAY of 7 January.

At daybreak, the enemy laid down a very heavy musket fire from a small platform they had established in front of the southern corner of the Convent of Saint Joseph and continued this fire throughout the day.

10th NIGHT, 7 to 8 January.

Attack on the right. One hundred workers and seventy-five sappers were employed to extend the left side of the second parallel by eighty meters and to create ramps to facilitate the arming of the batteries. Despite the darkness of the night and the bad weather, the enemy continued to fire. We suffered one man killed and two wounded. The sappers captured a Spanish soldier who was trying to escape from the town.

The artillery armed batteries Nos. 5, 7, and 8.

Attack on the left. We extended the right side of the first parallel beyond the Alagon road.

That same night, a boat escaped from the city and descended the Ebro despite the fire from our posts on both banks. General Wattier, who was in Fuentes, was immediately notified; but he was unable to prevent the boat from crossing.

11th NIGHT, 8 to 9 January.

Attack on the right. The artillery armed batteries Nos. 4 and 6. The enemy threw many stones. An artillery sergeant and several soldiers were wounded.

Attack on the center. They waited until the artillery could begin firing before continuing the advances.

Attack on the left. The first parallel was extended to the right.

DAY of 9 January.

The improvement work continued despite very heavy artillery and musketry fire from the enemy. A shell fell into the trench in the middle of a group of soldiers, Grenadier Guillemain caught it and threw it beyond the parapet, where it burst almost immediately afterward; this act of bravery was placed in the army's Plan of the Day. The Huebra bridge, built for communication, was swept away by the waters; work began immediately to restore it.

We had one man killed and seven wounded.

12th NIGHT, 9 to 10 January.

Attack on the right. The artillery armed battery No. 3 and completed the supply of all its other batteries. Work began to put the communications in good condition.

Attack on the center. We left the half-platform to advance towards the bridgehead.

DAY of 10 January.

At six thirty in the morning, our artillery began thundering against Saint-Joseph and the bridgehead with thirty-two guns, distributed among batteries Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. It soon gained a very great superiority over the enemy artillery. Battery No. 1 fired against the western face of Saint-Joseph; and, of the four guns located there, silenced three. Battery No. 2, which was partially masked by breach battery No. 3, attacked the eastern face of the same convent with less success. Battery No. 3 opened the southern corner of the convent, but the axles of two 24-pounder artillery pieces broke, so the breach could only be continued with two 16-pounders. Mortar Battery No. 4, although intended to crush the convent of Saint-Joseph, fired only on the town, fearing to expose our own troops in the forward paths. Battery No. 5 began battering the bridgehead to open the parapet. Battery No. 7 ricocheted against this structure, while Battery No. 6 dropped bombs on it, and battery No. 8 battered the gorge and the bridge.

The enemy engaged in extremely fierce fire all day; but, fearing an assault during the night, they withdrew part of their artillery from Saint-Joseph and the bridgehead that evening.

Within twenty-four hours we had three men killed, including an officer, and seven wounded.

In the afternoon, the Spanish attempted a small expedition against the posts on our right, to attack our trenches from behind. A large boat, manned by twenty men and armed with three guns, descended the Ebro and positioned itself near the right bank, opposite a small country house we were occupying. There, a very heavy fire began, to which our posts responded advantageously. This boat, having soon lost a few men, rowed back up the Ebro to take shelter among the houses along the quay, where this little scene had attracted a large number of residents.

13th NIGHT, 10 to 11 January.

Attack on the right. The artillery repaired its batteries and rebuilt the embrasures of No. 3, which exposed only a very small portion of the wall of the Convent of Saint Joseph. Until midnight, the silence of the night was broken only by a few bombs dropped on the city, and a few shells fired at Saint-Joseph, to which the enemy made no response. General Laval, who commanded the trench, thinking that the convent had been evacuated, sent two men to verify this. The Spanish believed they were under attack and engaged in a terrible fusillade that lasted until two o'clock in the morning. They even attempted a sortie to seize Battery No. 1; but our musketry and the grapeshot from two 4-pounders positioned in the parallel forced them back. We suffered two men killed, including an officer, and five wounded.

Attack on the center. We extended the advance toward the bridgehead to within thirty meters of this bridge; and, on the left bank of the Huebra, we dug a trench in front of the first parallel.

DAY of 2 January.

At six o'clock in the morning, our artillery resumed its fire and continued to do so all day. At three o'clock in the afternoon, with the breaches of the Convent of Saint-Joseph appearing passable, General Grandjean, in concert with Engineer Battalion Commander Haxo, made the necessary preparations to launch an assault. An elite battalion of six hundred men was assembled in the trench under the command of Major Stahl and formed into three columns, each headed by an engineer officer with a detachment of sappers carrying ladders, fascines, and tools. At four o'clock, the signal having been given, the columns, full of enthusiasm, crossed the parallel and advanced against the convent. At the same time, two pieces of horse artillery moved forward from the right of the second parallel to attack a dugout occupied by the Spanish below the convent, along the Huebra ravine. Intimidated by such a well-combined attack, the enemy began to withdraw in disorder. The three columns arrived at the counterscarp; the right and center columns descended with ladders into the ditch, which was fourteen or fifteen feet deep, and tried to climb the breach whose debris was held back by a berm six feet wide. Unable to do so, they extended to the left into the ditch to reach the gorge, where they were again stopped by a retaining wall that closed the ditch. Captain Daguene of the engineers, who led the left column remaining on the counterscarp, was also trying to go around the convent by the gorge, when he saw a wooden bridge over the ditch on the right side. Rushing forward and entering the small courtyard of the convent in front of the church door was a matter of a moment; but the terrible fire from the place immediately forced him to make his men lie flat on their stomachs. Meanwhile, the enemy was fleeing, in full rout, across the Huebra, and re-entering the city by scaling the walls. Then, our troops, who had remained in the ditch, entered the convent through

the breach, using ladders, and killed about thirty Spaniards there. The enemy also lost a fairly large number of men in the quarters bordering the Huebra and at the river crossing. We took about fifty prisoners, among whom were the colonel of the Second Valencia Regiment and four officers. We captured two 4-pounder guns, a howitzer, and the bronze shells of a twelve-inch mortar in the convent. We had eight men killed and thirty wounded; among the latter was Captain Foucauld of the engineers¹.

Since morning, batteries Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8 had been firing heavily on the bridgehead; but, finding themselves too far away, they were unable to open a practicable breach, which caused the assault to be postponed. Nevertheless, to create a diversion from the attack on Saint-Joseph, a few companies were placed in the half-platform and in the forward trenches to engage in the fusillade. It was so fierce on our side, as was the cannonade, that the defenders of the bridgehead, after suffering thirty men killed and eighty wounded, abandoned the bridgehead; but reinforcements immediately rushed in and reoccupied it before we could get in a position to penetrate it.

14th NIGHT, 11 to 12 January.

Meanwhile, the capture of the convent of Saint Joseph had spread alarm throughout the city; the drums were beating the call, and the great bell of the new tower, ringing the tocsin, called the population to arms. A frightful fusillade emanated from the city walls to prevent us from crossing the Huebra, and various batteries in the town were converging their fire on Saint Joseph. We hastened to make a solid encampment at the convent's gorge, establish a passage with fascines and sandbags in the ditch on the southern face, and open a double caponier to connect to it behind. The Huebra bridge was barricaded, after unsuccessfully attempting to breach it with four bombs, and the third parallel was initiated to the right of the convent along the Huebra escarpment.

Battery No. 3, now useless, was disarmed. Batteries Nos. 1, 2, and 4 directed their fire on the town. Batteries Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8 continued to batter the bridgehead, toward which the advance was pushed to within about fifteen meters of the counterscarp.

DAY of 12 January.

The enemy continued its artillery and musketry fire on the Convent of Saint Joseph and caused the church dome to collapse with its bombs. They worked diligently to repair the damage caused by our batteries to the city walls.

Palafox addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants and peasants to rekindle their enthusiasm and urge them to work on the fortifications².

We had three men killed and four wounded.

¹ See supporting documents, Nos. 10 and 11.

² See supporting documents, No. 12.

15th NIGHT, 12 to 13 January.

Attack on the right. We perfected the position at the Saint-Joseph Gorge, and opened, on the right, a connection with the interior of the convent. We widened the portion of the third parallel begun the day before. We emerged from the second parallel by a zigzag branch, to approach the Huebra. The artillery began a new battery No. 9, with two 24-pounders and two 16-pounders, to breach the city wall and silence the battery, known as Palafox, established opposite, near the city's oil mill. We suffered four men wounded.

Attack on the center. We advanced in a standard sapping fashion on the bridgehead and began a first traverse four meters from the opening. It would undoubtedly have been better to make a parallel against this work, to beat it with greater advantage, and to drive the Spaniards from the promenade of Santa-Engracia, along the Huebra, where they were exposed. This was supplemented by a battery, No. 10, of four eight-inch howitzers, which the artillery undertook to the left of the paths of the right attack.¹⁸⁸

DAY of 13 January.

The work begun the day before was perfected. The settlement begun at the Saint-Joseph Gorge was partly surrounded by the Santa Engracia convent, and bombs and shells, falling into the rubble, sent shards of stone flying, making it very dangerous; we lost several men there.

16th NIGHT, 13 to 14 January.

Attack on the right. Three zigzags were made on the left of Saint-Joseph to approach the Huebra bridge. The third parallel was extended one hundred and ten meters to the right. Three hundred infantrymen and sixty sappers were employed in this work.

Attack of the center. The advance continued by sapping, upright on the bridgehead. It was discovered that the ditch of this structure was three meters and twenty centimeters deep and dug steeply into solid ground. Two new zigzags were added to the route along the left bank of the Huebra.

The artillery armed Battery No. 10. Mortar Batteries Nos. 4 and 6, continuing to bombard the city, blew up a powder depot and set fire to several houses.

DAY of 14 January.

Along the vertical sapping route toward the bridgehead, the two hooks of the first traverse were made. The artillery began battery No. 11, with two 10-pounders and two six-inch howitzers, to destroy the crenellated houses and the city wall.

NIGHT, 14 to 15 January.

Attack on the right. Four hundred and thirty workers and ninety sappers. The third parallel was extended by one hundred and forty meters to the right, and a section of trench was opened behind battery No. 11, which, located on the same parallel, hindered communication. Two new trenches were added to the central route to reach the site of the third parallel. The left route was continued towards the bend of the Huebra.

The enemy worked actively to extend a trench they had opened the previous night between the wall and the Huebra.

Attack on the center. The second traverse of the route was made by standing sap directed towards the bridgehead.

DAY of 15 January.

Four hundred and fifty workers and eighty-five sappers were employed to perfect the third parallel and the works at Saint-Joseph. One officer and four soldiers were wounded.

Battery No. 10 joined its fire with that of batteries Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8 to counterthrust the bridgehead and the works behind it.

At four o'clock in the evening, an enemy boat, coming up the Ebro under cover of thick fog, took up position in the extension of the castle parallel; but it withdrew after exchanging a few cannonballs with the battery on the left. The left of this parallel was reinforced with an entrenchment built on a terrace at the edge of the escarpment, and the road at its foot was cut.

18th NIGHT, 15 to 16 January.

The bridgehead, battered all day by our artillery, was now occupied by only about fifty men; the parapets were plowed, the breach opened, and the paths were very close to the counterscarp. From then on, it was decided to seize it. Colonel Rogniat of the engineers was charged with leading this attack. It took place at eight o'clock in the evening, and was executed with great courage by Captain Gilbert, at the head of a detachment of the First of the Vistula, and by Lieutenant Aubertin of the miners, who commanded a detachment of sappers and miners. These troops advanced on the counterscarp of the unflanked face. A mine exploded under the glacis but did them no harm. Our brave men scaled the structure with ladders, lay down on the berm to fire, then rushed with bayonets on the Spaniards, who crossed back over the river and blew up the bridge. During the night, our sappers turned the parapet of the bridgehead against the enemy, filled the ditch and made, with fascines, a communication to reach it. The Spaniards, entrenched behind a kind of pincer movement at the mouth of the bridge on the left bank of the Huebra, were laying down a very heavy artillery and musketry fire; but our soldiers were soon covered: we only had one man killed and two wounded³.

³ See supporting documents, nos. 13 and 14.

During the same night, four hundred and sixty workers and eight four sappers were deployed in the right attack. The third parallel was extended about thirty meters to the right of Saint-Joseph, to a wide, deep, and lined ditch, which served as an overflow for the irrigation canal in which the second parallel had been established. The third parallel was initiated to the left of Saint-Joseph for a length of one hundred meters, and the route along the salient angle of this river was pushed to within thirty meters of the Huebra. The artillery changed the direction of the embrasures of battery No. 10 and armed batteries Nos. 9 and 11, which were manned by the gunners of the Third Corps.

DAY of 16 January.

At daybreak, batteries Nos. 9 and 11 opened fire on the enclosure, silencing several enemy guns. The work that had begun was perfected. The town came under heavy fire on our bridgehead quarters; we suffered three sappers killed, including a sergeant, and several wounded.

Despite our work, the inhabitants were lulled into hope that we would lift the siege, and rumors of the imminent arrival of a relief army had spread several times through the city. The garrison had taken up arms and lit fires at various points, as if in league with the troops outside; but nothing had yet appeared. The cold was severe, and the soldiers from Valencia and Murcia confined in the town were suffering greatly. A large number of families lacked all necessities. The deprivation and poverty, as well as the overcrowding of a crowd of individuals who had taken refuge in the city, had given rise to diseases that were already causing great devastation. The dying dragged themselves through the streets, seeking shelter from the bombs under the porticoes. The Church of the Pilar was invaded and crowded by the multitude; and it was only with the greatest difficulty that the municipal and ecclesiastical authorities managed to preserve this revered temple for worship.

Such a sad spectacle greatly affected the inhabitants, who began to foresee a sinister future. On the 16th, Palafox, to revive spirits, had a very interesting gazette published. This news spread with the speed of lightning; and, despite the bombs and shells falling in the city, the people flocked to the royal printing house where this gazette was to be distributed. It announced: that the French troops had been beaten in Catalonia; that General Reding was maneuvering, under the support of Tarragona, with an army of seventy thousand men; that the Marquis of Lazan, who had moved from Girona into the Empordà, had entered France; that his army had been enriched with spoils, and had carried terror to the gates of Toulouse; that a strong division of Reding's army and another of the army of the Duke of Infantado, which was in Cuenca, were marching on Saragossa; that Blake, the Marquis of La Romana, and Sir John Moore had completely defeated the army commanded by Napoleon; that twenty thousand men of this army remained on the battlefield; that Berthier and Ney had been killed, Savary wounded, and that the Emperor, surrounded on all sides, would soon be forced to lay down his arms; that sixteen million piastres had arrived in Cadiz to be sent to Zaragoza, and that all the roads were covered with troops advancing to the aid of the besieged.

This news had a magical effect on the population, and, however absurd it was, it found no disbelievers. For, during this war, the character of the Spaniards was such that the imagination of their leaders must always have given rise to absurdities equal to the credulity of the people:

hence the boasting and confidence that increased as the danger became more imminent. So that evening, the entire city was illuminated; the bells rang out in full peal; the artillery and infantry of the square fired several salvos; the air resounded with shouts of joy, and the noise of fanfares and all kinds of instruments could be heard even in our camps. All this activity lasted from five o'clock in the afternoon until nine o'clock in the evening. We did not know what to attribute it to; our batteries of mortars and howitzers redoubled their fire on the city.

Meanwhile, difficulties were piling up around us, and the hope the Spaniards had of seeing us lift the siege was not entirely without foundation. The insurrection was making great progress in our rear; the peasants were massacring the foragers and the isolated detachments that were roaming the countryside to get food, and bands, who had appeared on the roads to Épila and Tarazona, had murdered several soldiers. Brigadier Perena was organizing a corps of seven to eight thousand men at Huesca; the whole valley of the Aragon River was in arms, and, under the support of the citadel of Jaca, the insurgents were making incursions as far as the road to Pamplona, where they attacked our convoys. From the beginning of the siege, General Wouillemont and Adjutant General Lomet, who commanded the departments of the Hautes and Basses-Pyrenees, had received the order to move towards Jaca by the mountains with four battalions of mobile national guards; but the snow and the Spanish bands had forced these troops to make a long detour via Pamplona, and when they arrived, on 13 January, in Zaragoza, they found themselves so reduced by desertion that they could undertake nothing.

The Spaniards were also forming stores in Tortosa and Mequinenza. They had established a cordon of volunteers and armed peasants on both banks of the Ebro, protecting the collection of grain from the villages where we were going to collect supplies. On 6 January, General Wattier was forced to leave Fuentes with part of the cavalry and six hundred infantrymen to scour the countryside on the road to Valencia. Numerous detachments were needed to escort the convoys and search for supplies in the villages within nine or ten leagues of the area. The besieging army was thus greatly weakened. Fatigue, deprivation, and bad weather were alarmingly increasing the number of sick people; the hospitals were overcrowded, and every day, fifteen to twenty men were dying.

As of 15 January, the Third Corps had only thirteen thousand three hundred infantrymen under arms under the walls of Zaragoza, and thirteen thousand one hundred and twenty-three men (sic) in the hospitals⁴. Gazan's division still had seven thousand men; but the blockade system it had adopted did not allow it to be counted for the works.

However, the advances were pushed forward with as much activity as the small number of workers at our disposal permitted. With the capture of the Convent of Saint Joseph and the bridgehead giving us control of the right bank of the Huebra, General Lacoste directed the advances in such a way as to develop the third parallel along the entire length of this bank, in order to support our subsequent attacks against the city.



⁴ See supporting documents, no. 15.

No. 10.

*Report from General Grandjean to General Junot on the
capture of the convent of Saint-Joseph.*

At the camp outside Zaragoza, 12 January 1809.

Monseigneur,

In accordance with the intentions of Your Excellency, the attack on Saint-Joseph began yesterday at four o'clock. I first gathered the three attack commanders and explained to each of them how they were to proceed. When I was convinced that they had understood me correctly, I gave the signal, and the troops marched impetuously. The left and center columns found themselves stopped by a wide ditch three fathoms deep, and they were forced to circle around to enter through the face on the Huebra side. In the attack from the right, the sappers used ladders, and Saint-Joseph was instantly occupied. To facilitate this movement, I had advanced two cannons on my extreme right, in order to enfilade the enemy's trenches. They were well directed by Captain Joliclerc and produced a good effect.

We found two cannons and a howitzer in Saint-Joseph, as well as several gun carriages. A colonel, two captains, and about forty men were taken prisoner. Two to three hundred men were killed or drowned crossing the Huebra.

We suffered three men killed and about sixty wounded. Battalion Commander Stahl has fully justified my opinion of him. He has deserved not only the highest praise for the intelligence and intrepidity he displayed in this attack, but also the favor of being presented to His Majesty as capable of making a good colonel.

MM. Lazovski, Captain of the Second Regiment of the Vistula, d'Auxion and Bonnafous, officers of the Fourteenth Regiment (the latter was wounded), commanded the three columns; all three deserved to be recommended to His Majesty: it is difficult to demonstrate greater bravery and devotion. Commander Stahl is extremely pleased with Messrs. Billon and Buffon, officers of the Fourteenth Regiment; these two young officers supported him perfectly and showed great courage and composure in the assault.

The bridge over the Huebra was not cut, as I had the honor of informing you yesterday; the orders of the General of Engineers could probably not be carried out.

I am pleased with all the troops who cooperated in the capture of Saint-Joseph. Enclosed, Monseigneur, is a note from those who, according to the admission of their leaders and comrades, distinguished themselves the most.

I have the honor to be, Monseigneur,
Your Excellency's, most humble and obedient servant,

Signed: GENERAL GRANDJEAN.

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No. 11.

*Report made to Palafox by Colonel Don Mariano  
Renovalès, commander of Fort Saint-Joseph, on the  
capture of this fort on 11 January.*

Zaragoza, 12 January 1809.

Monseñor,

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the details of the defense of Fort Saint-Joseph; it is a new claim to glory for the Spanish nation, and a circumstance that demonstrates the enthusiasm with which it defends its homeland and its sovereign, as well as the bad faith and perfidy of the tyrant of Europe who would enslave us. On the 9<sup>th</sup> of this month, the enemy had completed three batteries against the fort: one on the left and two others on its front. Having recognized that the enemy was going to breach me, I reported this to Your Excellency the same day. Indeed, on the 10<sup>th</sup>, at daybreak, he opened a very lively fire from his three batteries, armed with siege guns, howitzers, and mortars. Our artillery returned fire vigorously, supported by a very brisk fusillade. I had positioned the battalion of the Spanish Royal Guards on the right, behind a parapet that I had had built as a precaution; the left was occupied by the Swiss Regiment of Aragon, similarly positioned behind a parapet; the Chasseurs Regiment of Valencia was in the center, vigorously returning fire to the enemy, who occupied a semicircular hollow at a distance of fifteen toises.

At noon, the enemy opened the breach, completely demolishing the left front on which I had three guns. Although surrounded by ruins, I continued to lay down a very lively and well-directed fire: my right-hand fire barely gave the enemy time to fire their guns. His nearest battery had two guns dismounted, which forced him to slow down the fire of this battery, which was partly ruined, and he continued to fire against the left face of the fort, where our valiant artillerymen continued to behave with bravery. At half past one, this face was almost as damaged as that of the front. At this moment the enemy placed a battery on the right, covered by the fire of the oil mill, and he beat the right front until four o'clock in the afternoon. I then found myself struck by four batteries, and mine were in ruins. Nevertheless, my artillery maintained its fire in the open, which caused it to suffer a great loss. At five o'clock, I had it withdrawn, with the intention of having my batteries repaired during the night: the defense continued by means of the fusillade. The troop which occupied the right was relieved by the battalion of Volunteers of Huesca; that of the left, by the first battalion of the Volunteers of Aragon, and part of the Royal Walloon and Swiss Guards; and that of the center, by the Second Regiment of the Volunteers of Valencia and the militias of Soria. These corps, with their usual courage, continued to show that they were superior to the conquerors of Italy; that my garrison despised their cannonballs, their bombs and their grenades, and that it knew how to preserve ruins which covered it with glory. At seven o'clock in the evening, the firing ceased; I ordered the Captain of Engineers Don Manuel Perez to put the batteries back in order, which he began to execute. At eleven thirty in

the night, the enemy appeared in large numbers, formed in battle formation, at a distance of about twenty paces from the ditch, with the intention of seizing the ruins of Saint-Joseph; but it was received by two volleys of musketry which threw it into disorder. A very heavy grenade fire continued until two o'clock in the morning, when he returned shamefully to his entrenchments. Recognizing that it was impossible to repair my batteries, I ordered the withdrawal of seven 4-caliber artillery pieces and a mortar, retaining only one howitzer and two 4-pounders in the battery.

On 11 January, at daybreak, the enemy resumed firing. I responded with the remaining artillery and with gunfire. They continued to demolish the parapets we had made with sandbags during the night, reducing to dust what remained of the building, leaving not a foot of ground that was not covered with cannonballs, bomb fragments, grenades, and bullets. At two o'clock in the afternoon, not only the four batteries intended to attack the fort, but also those located on the Santa Engracia side, were sending their bombs and grenades at us, so that not a single soldier could be positioned without being instantly struck by these projectiles. In this state, I ordered all our ammunition to be collected, even the iron bars that had fallen from the windows, and from the rubble were removed three hundred cannonballs, bombs or grenades thrown by the enemy, which had not exploded. The enemy's devouring fire gradually increased; at four o'clock, a column of cavalry, formed in battle formation, presented itself from the olive trees located to the left of the Huebra side; two cannons were placed by the enemy at half grapeshot range from my left; the troops there, unable to resist the fire of these pieces any longer, found themselves obliged to retreat. I then ordered the parapet inside the fort on this side to be manned, to support the retreat of these troops, and to guard the flank of the fort. While I was busy with this operation, I was informed that some disorder was occurring on my right; I immediately went to this point and found that our troops were withdrawing, unable to hold out any longer without being completely sacrificed by the enemy's continual fire. In this state of affairs, I ordered the central troops, who occupied the fort, to withdraw, as the enemy's bombs, cannonballs, and grenades made it impossible for them to remain there any longer. In my retreat, I left the enemy the ruins of Saint-Joseph, soaked in blood, covered with arms, legs, and fragments of corpses; ruins that cover it with ignominy and that are our glory.

I recommend to Your Excellency Don Diego Pedrosa, commander of the wall at the Quemada Gate, and Don Policarpo Romea, who, through their zeal, activity, and patriotism, provided me, at all times, broth, lint, bandages, and other necessary aid for the wounded, and contributed to the defense by their active surveillance of the threatened points. I also commend to Your Excellency, for their zeal and activity, the leaders and overseers of the works Don Antonio del Royo, Don Miguel Ugalde, and Don Francisco Ricarte, and the peasants Joaquin Urcenque, Pascual Serrano, Alberto Borraz, and Mariano Borraz. The enemy's loss in this action was very considerable, and I dare to assure Your Excellency that it was no less than fifteen hundred men, both killed and wounded; ours is in accordance with the report I have already given to Your Excellency.

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No. 12.

*Proclamation of Palafox to the inhabitants of Zaragoza,
urging them to work on the fortifications.*

At the headquarters in Zaragoza, 14 January 1809.

Inhabitants of Zaragoza, your heroism has reached its peak: your glory will be eternal; it will be applauded and envied by all nations. Every day, and even yesterday, the horrible heat of battle seemed to want to intimidate you; but, far from it, you rushed armed to repel the enemy and gave new proof of your valor and your loyalty. I pride myself on being the general of an army that distinguishes itself so well, and of citizens who will serve as an example to all warrior peoples determined to preserve their religion, their king, and their freedom. You lack only one thing to complete your heroism: to exercise it methodically. You gladly risk your lives in battle, but you refuse to commit yourself to fortification work, no doubt believing that honor consists only in handling weapons. Zaragoza, I must warn you that this is a very fatal error; your general assures you of this. It is right to fight with our enemies, but it is also right to provide all possible security to your worthy defenders. Workers and combatants serve the King and the country equally, and, like them, all those who contribute to containing, destroying and exterminating the enemy, cooperate in the preservation of the city and the army. As soon as circumstances permit, I will reward all services according to their merit: I will have regard for the inhabitant who goes to battle; for the one who devotes himself to fortification work; for the one who helps the sick and wounded; finally, I will not forget any of those who have distinguished themselves in any way in the glorious enterprise that we are supporting, and from which we will emerge victorious as last time, if, as I hope, you lend yourselves to the execution of my orders. If we had had more workers, we would perhaps still possess Fort Saint-Joseph, and, in the event that we had lost it, we would have seen the enemy blow up with the mine furnaces that I had ordered to be made, and which could not be carried out due to lack of arms. This deeply afflicted me: what could I demand from a troop that neither slept nor rested, and that always fought until the moment when it was surrounded by ruins and rubble? How much the olive trees in front and on the left of the fort did us harm by not having been cut down! Compare the fruits they may produce with the harm they have caused, and you will recognize that the general good has been sacrificed to private interest. If my occupations, which you are not ignorant of, permitted me, I would go myself to help you in your work, carrying baskets of earth, and imitating the noble laborers in their honorable occupations of opening and digging the soil, as I have already done at the Redoubt of Pilar, and as I have seen some of the principal inhabitants of this city do. If you do not imitate them because of your penchant for fighting, come, your weapons in one hand and your tools in the other, and you will perform both services alternately. There is little left for us to do to win victory, and to peacefully enjoy its sweet fruits. Help me; let everyone help me; the enemy is cowardly, for he does not dare to come into the open. The war he is waging against us is against all military rules; always under cover, without daring to present his columns, he uses only iniquitous means and cowardice; help me, and we will have the satisfaction of annihilating him and delivering our soil from these foolhardy ignoramuses who were mistaken when they counted on being able to conquer Spain, and even more so when they believed they could take control of this faithful city, center of good faith, school of valor, and the most distinguished by its works and its virtues.

Signed: PALAFOX.

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No. 13.

*Report from General Lacoste to the Duke of Abrantès, on the  
capture of the Huebra bridgehead or Pilar redoubt.*

At the camp near Zaragoza, 16 January 1809.

Monsieur Duke,

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Huebra bridgehead was captured yesterday evening. This attack, led by Colonel Rogniat of the Engineers, was executed with great courage by Captain Milbert and his company of voltigeurs from the First Battalion of the First Vistula Regiment; this officer deserves the highest praise. Lieutenant Aubertin of the Eighth Company of Miners rushed forward, at the head of the voltigeurs, with a detachment of sappers from the Second Battalion and miners from the Eighth Company, carrying ladders that were used to cross the ditch and seize the outer face of the structure, which was immediately turned against the besieged. The ditch was filled with fascines; work was immediately undertaken to establish communication from the head of the sap to the counterscarp: it was nine to ten toises away. Our musketry fire soon drove the enemy from the entire fortification. Until we were covered, we had to endure a heavy fire, especially grapeshot; but in the darkness, the shots hit too high. We only suffered one man killed and two wounded.

The besieged, at the moment of the attack, detonated a mine whose entry was made in the counterscarp; it produced no effect.

The services rendered on this occasion by Messrs. Gilbert and Aubertin warranted Your Excellency's request for the decoration.

I have the honor, Your Excellency, to offer you my profound respect.

General, Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor,  
Commander of the Engineers,

*Signed:* COUNT LACOSTE.

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No. 14.

Report from the First Captain of the Second Battalion of Aragon Volunteers, Don Mariano Galindo, to Colonel Amoros, commander of the Santa Engracia Gate, on the capture of the Pilar bridgehead or redoubt.

Zaragoza, 15 January 1809.

I was charged, with forty men, two corporals, and three sergeants of the first company, to defend the redoubt of Pilar, from five to nine o'clock in the evening. Shortly before this last hour, having taken all means to ensure the preservation of this post, I went with the officers near the sentries of the right angle. After descending from the parapet, I was warned by the sentry Jose Garcia that the enemy was approaching the ditch. I myself climbed onto the parapet to observe it, and I saw that indeed the enemy was approaching from two sides. I ordered a general discharge; the fire of the primers showed me that the enemy was equipped with ladders and strong planks, and that, in spite of the fire of the defenders, he was rushing into the ditch and climbing the breaches. In this state of things, I ordered the bayonets to be fixed, and the fire to continue. I received word from Vicente Perez, sentry on the left, that the enemy was coming from the direction of the ruined house, and was pushing before him the advanced sentries who were retreating. Immediately afterward, the enemy mounted the parapet through the breaches, and attacked us with the bayonet, at the same time as they fired: they numbered about two hundred. These superior forces obliged me to withdraw behind the parapet of the gorge of the redoubt, continuing the fire during my retreat, to guard the bridge, while waiting for the preparations to blow it up to be completed. I reported our situation to Brigadier Don Domingo de la Ripa, commander of the redoubt, informing him that the enemy could penetrate further because of the superiority of his forces, and I decided to blow up the bridge to ensure my retreat. Before the bridge was cut, we were so hard pressed by the enemy that Sergeant Manuel Bailo, some volunteers, and I fought with bayonets. Second Captain Don Mariano Marqués and Second Lieutenants Don Ignacio Medina and Don Francisco Brunos distinguished themselves in this battle.

Signed: MARIANO GALINDO.