

**Translated by Greg Gorsuch
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**SIEGE
OF LÉRIDA,
BY THE FRENCH ARMY OF ARAGON,
IN 1810.**

ANALYTICAL

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SIEGE OF LÉRIDA,

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IN 1810.

General Suchet, commander of the Third Corps in Aragon, had largely pacified the province. The presence of a well-disciplined army and the organization of a regular administration had already significantly improved the situation in the region. Gradually, the inhabitants were returning to their peaceful occupations and appeared to be genuinely embracing submission. However, the proximity of Lérida (Lleida, Cat.) and Mequinenza fostered a spirit of insurrection and incursions by armed bands along the Catalan border. These strongholds provided the Spanish armies of Catalonia and the Kingdom of Valencia with footholds on the Segre River from which to attempt a renewed invasion of Aragon; furthermore, they were the only obstacles preventing the junction of the Third and Seventh Corps.

As early as January, General Suchet had begun preparations for the siege of Lérida. He had received reinforcements and orders to establish large supply depots in Aragon. A siege train had been organized at Pamplona. A brigade of engineer officers and seven companies of sappers and miners had been assembled at Bayonne, along with twenty thousand tools. Finally, Marshal Augereau, commanding the Seventh Corps in Catalonia, had been ordered to advance toward the lower Ebro to cover the Third Corps' operations and contain the army of Henry O'Donnell, which had retreated to Tarragona.

General Suchet had not yet completed his siege preparations when, on 15 February, he received a letter from King Joseph, dated from Córdoba, ordering him to march on Valencia. The King hoped that the city would open its gates upon the approach of the French army; and that from there, General Suchet could communicate via Murcia with Marshal Soult, who had just invaded Andalusia. General Suchet did indeed march on Valencia with twelve thousand men, but his expedition proved fruitless. After remaining before the city for five days with no hope of capturing it other than by a formal siege, he returned to Aragon in compliance with the repeated order he had received from the Emperor as early as March 1st to lay siege to Lérida. He was back in Saragossa by 17 March and devoted himself entirely to assembling the necessary resources for the planned siege.

Two roads lead from Saragossa to Lérida: one via Fraga, and the other via Alcubierre and Monzón. The former is the main route connecting Aragon with Catalonia and is the most direct;

however, the Spanish had destroyed the wooden bridge at Fraga where the road crosses the Cinca River. Furthermore, this route posed a serious disadvantage: it ran too close to Mequinenza, whose garrison, fifteen hundred strong, could be reinforced by troops from Valencia and launch offensive operations. The second, less exposed to enemy attack, traversed territory where forage supplies were not yet exhausted. It also had the advantage of leading directly to the post of Monzón on the right bank of the Cinca; protected by a well-preserved castle, this position contained bombproof quarters and served as an ideal depot for siege equipment. Consequently, this route was selected as the line of operations. Two battalions were stationed at Monzón, where a hospital, ovens, and supply depots were established. The artillery moved up the siege train, comprising twenty-four cannons, ten mortars, and six howitzers (forty pieces in total, each supplied with seven hundred rounds of ammunition). The engineers assembled eight thousand tools, one hundred thousand sandbags, ladders, baskets, and other items manufactured in Saragossa, as the depots at Bayonne had not yet sent any supplies. All this material was placed under the guard of the Third Division, consisting of Habert's brigade, which advanced to the Cinca.

General Laval, commander of the First Division, was tasked, with ten battalions and six hundred cavalry, with covering Aragon during the siege. He was to guard against both partisan forces from Navarre and Upper Catalonia and a Spanish corps of three to four thousand men under Villacampa, which was stationed at Daroca near the borders of Valencia and Castile. A battalion was stationed at Candanos, on the road to Fraga, to keep watch over the Mequinenza garrison.

General Musnier, commander of the Second Division, advanced from Alcañiz to the lower Ebro with the Paris Brigade and forced the Tortosa garrison to withdraw into the fortified town. On 2 April, he occupied Mora, where he assembled the boats found on the Ebro to secure a crossing and establish communication with Marshal Augereau, who was due to advance. At the same time, Brigadier General Buget moved from Caspe toward Flix with a reserve of three battalions. The Vergès Brigade, part of the same division, was already positioned on the Cinca River near Fraga.

Having cleared the upper Cinca, General Habert advanced on 4 April to the Segre opposite Balaguer, while Colonel Robert, leading the One-hundred seventeenth, crossed the river at Camarasa, a league upstream. The Balaguer outpost, protected by ancient fortifications and armed with five pieces of artillery, was strategically important due to its stone bridge. Brigadier Perena, commanding four battalions there, learned of Colonel Robert's advance and feared being outflanked; he moved down the left bank, crossed the river at the Lérida bridge, and marched up the right bank to Corbins, where he took up a position behind the Noguera. General Suchet, now assured of a crossing over the Segre, left Saragossa with a portion of the cavalry and advanced to Monzón on 10 April. There, he rallied the artillery and engineer troops, the Vergès Brigade, and General Buget's reserve, which had arrived from Flix via Caspe and Alcolea. Continuing his march toward Lérida, he came within sight of the stronghold on 12 April. He established his headquarters at Villanueva de Alpicat, a village situated slightly to the left of the Monzón road; the Vergès Brigade deployed to the right toward the lower Ebro, while General Buget's reserve remained in the center. That same day, General Habert left Balaguer, moved down the right bank of the Segre, forced the crossing of the Noguera, compelled Perena to retreat into Lérida, and completed the investment of the city by taking up a position on the left, upon the heights of

Sant Ruf (Cat.). That evening, General Paris, arriving ahead of General Musnier, came from Flix with two battalions of the One-hundred fifteenth and appeared on the left bank of the Segre, facing the bridgehead. After driving in all the Spanish outposts there, he took up a position on the heights of Alcoletge.

Lérida is a city of eighteen thousand souls, situated on the main road from Zaragoza to Barcelona, roughly twenty-five leagues from each, and on the right bank of the Segre, where it possesses a stone bridge. Its strategic importance is all the greater because it effectively commands the plains of Urgell, known as the *granary of Catalonia*. The Governor, Don José González, was an ailing old man; however, all authority rested with Don Garcia Conde, a Mariscal de Campo and Major General of the Spanish army in Catalonia. Young and energetic, he harbored the ambition of making the siege of Lérida last even longer than that of Girona, where he had distinguished himself by successfully bringing a supply convoy into the besieged town. The garrison consisted of nine thousand men, in addition to the local inhabitants and the refugee peasants who had taken up arms.

The city is shielded to the southeast by the Segre; on the river's left bank stands a lunette, surrounded by a ditch, which serves as a bridgehead. On the opposite side, the perimeter consists of a wall, lacking both a ditch and a covered way, that is backed by an earthen rampart; it is partially bastioned and partially flanked by towers, some of which are constructed of rammed earth. To the east, perched on a rocky outcrop seventy meters above the river level, rises the castle; at its center stands a towering keep, surrounded by substantial, solidly built structures. The surrounding fortifications form an irregular square with outer sides measuring two hundred and fifty meters, flanked by strong bastions featuring scarp walls twelve to fourteen meters high. The slope of the rock is relatively gentle on the side facing the city, where the defensive works are protected by ditches. Elsewhere, the walls stand exposed; however, its base stands so high above the surrounding countryside that it can only be engaged from a great distance; furthermore, the rocky escarpment makes the approaches nearly impassable. The area between the castle and the river is enclosed by the La Madeleine and El Carmen bastions, as well as by an earthen hornwork of very low profile.

Fort Garden stands on the ridge of a plateau west of the city, at a distance of approximately six hundred meters. The Spanish had reinforced it with a large hornwork; its right flank bordered the escarpment, while its left connected to an old redoubt. The ditches, hewn from very hard tuff, featured sheer scarp and counterscarp faces five to six meters high, rendering the fortification virtually immune to a sudden assault. At the opposite end of the plateau, the two large redoubts of Del Pilar and San Fernando had been constructed, seven hundred meters from the hornwork and over fifteen hundred from the city, to command the approaches to the mountain.

The fortifications of Lérida were in good condition and mounted with one hundred and ten pieces of artillery. The magazines were well-stocked, and nothing was lacking for a vigorous and prolonged defense.

General Suchet had counted on Marshal Augereau, following orders received from the Emperor, arriving with the Seventh Corps to cover the siege operations against O'Donnell's army;

however, this hope soon vanished. Marshal Augereau did indeed move toward Barcelona and, on 29 March, detached General Severoli with two divisions to Reus. Taking advantage of the isolation of a battalion left at Vilafranca on the road to Barcelona, O'Donnell captured it on 3 April; then, heading for Manresa, he routed General Schwartz's brigade, which was stationed there without immediate support. Marshal Augereau then feared the Spanish army might approach Hostalric, whose garrison, blockaded for three months, was on the verge of collapse due to a lack of provisions. Consequently, abandoning his plan to link up with the Third Corps, he resolved to withdraw immediately to Girona. However, before receiving the order to retreat, General Severoli had, on 4 April, sent Colonel Vilatte with two infantry battalions and a squadron of chasseurs to Mora on the Ebro, a march of fourteen hours from Reus. Colonel Vilatte descended via Fontaubella to Falset in the Ebro basin; he spent the night there and resumed his march on the 5th. Yet, observing the rugged nature of the terrain leading to Mora, he took up a defensive position with his troops, detaching only a platoon of mounted chasseurs and a few infantrymen to the riverbank. Upon reaching General Musnier's outposts, the detachment identified itself and brought news of the Army of Catalonia, news that had been entirely lacking, even though the bulk of that army had been stationed at Reus, just a short distance away, for the past six days. Once the troops had exchanged whatever information they could, Colonel Vilatte rallied his men and returned to Falset that same evening. From there, pushing back the bands of irregulars that were already closing in on him, he made his way to Reus on the evening of the 6th. General Severoli had just received, via a secret route, a reiterated order from Marshal Augereau to rally his two divisions without delay and to retreat by forced marches to Barcelona and Girona. This retreat began that very night, leaving O'Donnell free to move to the relief of Lérida.

General Suchet was thus forced to rely solely on his own resources. With only twelve thousand five hundred men and nine hundred horses at his disposal, it was virtually impossible for him to besiege the stronghold, which held a garrison of nine thousand, while simultaneously holding off O'Donnell's force of fifteen thousand. Faced with this unforeseen situation, he decided not to hasten siege operations and to keep his troops concentrated for the time being.

On 13 April, General Paris, finding himself isolated on the left bank of the Segre, unable to communicate directly with the troops on the right bank due to a lack of boats, moved closer to Balaguer. General Harispe, the chief of staff, who had advanced to that location, moved out on the 15th with the Fourth Hussars and a battalion of the One-hundred seventeenth; he linked up with General Paris's two battalions and established a camp on the heights of Alcoletge. The following day, he was joined there by another battalion of the One-hundred seventeenth, which crossed the Segre in small boats.

On 18 April, General Musnier arrived from Flix with the remainder of his division and took up a position behind Alcoletge. He was tasked with monitoring the roads to Tarragona and Barcelona with a force of four thousand men, comprising the One-hundred fifteenth Line, the First Vistula, and cavalry units. General Harispe blockaded the bridgehead with three battalions. To facilitate communication between the various encampments, work began on a flying bridge a league upstream from the city, protected by a large redan. Furthermore, the bridge at Balaguer, held by a single battalion, offered troops on the left bank a secure crossing point in the event of the river overflowing, a contingency that both the season and past experience gave reason to fear.

On the right bank of the Segre, the brigades of Habert, Buget, and Vergès had taken up positions along the roads to Corbins, Monzón, and Fraga. The vast area encompassed by Fort Garden and the advanced redoubts of San Fernando and Del Pilar left the right flank of the investment line dangerously weak. To reinforce it, a section of trench was opened opposite the San Fernando redoubt, and two cannons were positioned there. However, a significant stretch of the plain towards the lower Ebro could not be invested due to a lack of troops, and the guns of Fort Garden kept the forces blockading the bridgehead well away from the river. General Suchet therefore limited himself to using patrols to monitor the low-lying ground along both banks of the Segre in this sector. As they were not completely encircled, the besieged forces were able to communicate with the outside world at night and expel individuals who were neither residents of the city nor essential to its defense.

Scarcely had these arrangements been completed when a Spanish officer, apparently attempting to make his way into the stronghold, was captured at the left-bank outposts. He claimed to be the bearer of a proposal for a prisoner exchange, but his mission appeared suspicious. The general-in-chief was in no hurry to send him back, surmising that he might have come to convey news to the garrison. Indeed, rumors were already circulating that O'Donnell was gathering troops at Montblanc; that one of his divisions, under the command of the Marquis de Campoverde, was at Cervera; and that the peasants of the high valleys were up in arms along the upper Segre. General Suchet, wishing to verify the validity of these reports, dispatched General Musnier's observation corps to Balaguer on 19 April. The Governor of Lérida seized the opportunity to attempt an attack on General Harispe, who had remained alone on the left bank of the Segre with the One-hundred seventeenth. He launched a rather vigorous sortie, but it was repulsed with losses.

That same day, the General-in-Chief also traveled to Balaguer. There, he ordered defensive works for the bridge and sent a detachment to cut the bridge at Camarasa, located a league upstream. On the 21st, he set out from Balaguer with seven battalions and five squadrons, advancing as far as Tàrraga, about thirteen leagues along the road to Barcelona, to gather news of Marshal Augereau's army, whose movements were unknown to him, and to obtain information on O'Donnell's maneuvers. Gathering intelligence was extremely difficult in a land where every inhabitant was an enemy; it was by chance that General Suchet learned of O'Donnell's arrival at Montblanc, where the latter was preparing to descend from the mountains with two divisions to relieve Lérida.

If this news were true, O'Donnell would be in a position to hinder or even prevent the siege. General Suchet, however, doubted it, unable to convince himself that the Seventh Corps had already moved entirely away. Nevertheless, not wishing to disregard such important intelligence, he hastened on 22 April to bring his column back to the vicinity of Lérida and ordered General Musnier to take up his initial position at Alcoletge. Speed was essential, for O'Donnell, having passed through the Montblanc defiles, had camped on the 22nd at Vinaixa, about eight leagues from Lérida, with the Ybarola and Pirez divisions, comprising some seven thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry: the finest troops in his army. There, he received a note from the Governor of Lérida informing him that a portion of the French infantry and almost all the cavalry had made a move and withdrawn from the stronghold. Misled by this report, which was no longer accurate by the time he received it, as the French troops had already

returned to the camp at Alcoletge, O'Donnell pressed on to capitalize on the opportunity, without waiting for the four-thousand-strong Campoverde Division that was due to join him. On the 23rd, at ten in the morning, he arrived at Juneda, a mere two leagues from Lérida. After allowing his troops to rest, he set out again at noon at the head of his cavalry and an infantry division, advancing with complete confidence toward Lérida across the high plain of Margalef; he had no suspicion that his flanks were at risk in such open terrain, where he could see no sign of the enemy anywhere in the surrounding area. The Spanish vanguard, consisting of a cavalry company and a light infantry battalion, encountered the outposts of General Harispe halfway, beyond Margalef, and they immediately fell back. At the sound of the first fusil shots, and upon sighting the relief force, which was clearly visible from the castle of Lérida, the Governor sent some troops across the bridge; however, Colonel Robert, leading the One-hundred Seventeenth, prevented them from making any headway. Seeing that this regiment was sufficient to contain the sortie, General Harispe immediately mounted his horse and, accompanied by the Fourth Hussars and the voltigeur companies of the One-hundred Fifteenth and One-hundred Seventeenth, advanced to meet the enemy on the road to Tarragona, where he realized he was facing only a vanguard. An impetuous charge by the hussars against the head of the column gave the enemy no time to form up or get their bearings; halted and driven back, the unit lost half its men, who were cut down or captured before reinforcements could arrive.

Upon hearing the sound of gunfire, General Musnier guessed what was happening. He immediately left Alcoletge and marched straight for Margalef with his infantry and four hundred cuirassiers to cut off the Spaniards' retreat. Alerted by the dust raised by the approaching column, O'Donnell halted the second division, which had barely cleared Juneda, and ordered the first to fall back. General Navarro's light infantry brigade, having already lost its vanguard battalion to General Harispe's charge, returned and barely had time to form a column to the left of the Dupuig Brigade; O'Donnell had drawn up the latter in battle formation along the Tarragona road, with a howitzer on its right and his cavalry, numbering about three hundred horse, on the far left. The French cuirassiers and a light artillery battery advanced rapidly and deployed within two fusil-shots of the enemy line. A cannonade ensued; the Spanish cavalry moved to advance, but the cuirassiers, led by General Boussard, immediately charged them, driving them back in disarray onto the battle line, which began to waver. The cuirassiers did not hesitate to press home their charge; the Walloon Guards tried in vain to form a square; the Spanish infantry, taken in the flank, was enveloped, cut down, and forced to lay down its arms. Sweeping past the battlefield, our cuirassiers then encountered an arriving Swiss battalion, the vanguard of the Pirez Division, and inflicted upon it the same fate as that suffered by the eight battalions of the first division. General O'Donnell only managed to rally his fleeing troops near the second division before hastening to withdraw. Despite the vigor of the pursuit ordered by the Commander-in-Chief and carried out as far as Borjas-Blancas by Squadron Commander Saint-Georges, the enemy retreated in good order along the road to Montblanc, reaching safe positions before nightfall.

The engagement at Margalef was, like all cavalry actions, sudden and quickly decided. The credit belongs entirely to the Thirteenth Cuirassiers, who, finding themselves on favorable terrain, resolutely capitalized on the opportunity. Our losses amounted to about forty men, nearly all of whom had suffered bayonet wounds. We captured three pieces of artillery, three standards, and a large number of fusils from the Spanish. Three hundred men were left dead on

the battlefield, and five thousand six hundred seventeen were taken prisoner. Among them were Brigadier Dupuig, eight colonels, and two hundred seventy-one officers. These prisoners were marched to the headquarters at Villanueva Alpicat, within sight of the town. There, they were reviewed in the presence of the Spanish officer who had claimed to be an envoy and had been detained on suspicion. Immediately afterward, this officer was sent back via the road to Cervera¹.

General Suchet, having long recognized the need to capture the San Fernando and Del Pilar redoubts to facilitate the blockade, sought to capitalize on the psychological impact his victory had on the besieged forces. During the night of the 23rd to the 24th, he ordered General Vergès to launch a surprise attack on these fortifications. At midnight, a battalion of the One-hundred fourteenth swiftly stormed the Del Pilar redoubt and secured it with almost no resistance; however, a battalion of the One-hundred twenty-first, attacking the San Fernando redoubt, failed to break through. This redoubt, larger and more heavily fortified than the other, was defended by fifty resolute men who had been alerted by the attack of the One-hundred Fourteenth. Nevertheless, our soldiers unhesitatingly leapt into the ditches, only to find their progress halted by a twelve-foot scarp. Lacking scaling ladders, they attempted to smash down the rear gate, but the ceremonial axes carried by the sappers of the One-hundred twenty-first proved inadequate. In such a predicament, they would have suffered heavy losses had the ditches been better flanked or had the Spaniards possessed hand grenades. The inability of either side to engage or inflict damage on the other resulted in a sort of truce, during which parley took place. Fearing a final assault by our brave troops, the Spanish captain commanding the redoubt pledged on his word of honor not to fire upon them if they agreed to withdraw. This offer was accepted, and our men returned to their camps. The Del Pilar redoubt, which could not have been held during daylight hours against the commanding fire from the San Fernando redoubt, was subsequently abandoned. A piece of 12, which was located there and could not be taken away, was overturned on the escarpment.

On the 24th, the Commander-in-Chief wrote to the Governor calling upon him to surrender, offering safe conduct to any commissioners he might wish to send to the battlefield of Margalef and to headquarters to make a return of the men killed, wounded, or taken prisoner². Garcia Conde replied laconically that Lérida had not counted on any outside relief³.

Relieved of any concern regarding O'Donnell's army, General Suchet focused entirely on vigorously pressing the siege. General Valée, the artillery commander, was ordered to bring up the siege train from Monzón. Colonel Haxo, the engineer commander, had already arranged for the preparation of six thousand gabions, fifty thousand fascines, and sixty thousand pickets. As the garrison still held outposts, he requested that they be driven back into the fortress. Consequently, on the night of the 26th to the 27th of April, several companies of voltigeurs boldly approached the Madeleine fronts without firing a shot and dislodged the enemy outposts, despite the fusillade from the ramparts. Repeating this operation over the next two nights along the entire perimeter of the fortifications discouraged the besieged from maintaining outposts, thereby

¹ See supporting documents, No. 1.

² See supporting documents, No. 2.

³ See supporting documents, No. 3.

allowing the engineer officers to approach the stronghold and conduct a thorough reconnaissance.

Lérida had withstood three memorable sieges that could serve as guides for selecting the front of attack.

In 1644, Don Felipe de Silva besieged Lérida, which was defended by thirty-six hundred French troops and two thousand Catalan peasants. He directed his attacks against Fort Garden, then merely a simple tower, and, having captured it, established batteries on the plateau's ridge that pounded the city. The city surrendered after a blockade of two and a half months, subdued more by famine than by force of arms.

In 1647, the Prince of Condé opened trenches against the northern side of the castle without taking action against the city or Fort Garden; this left the besieged free to make frequent sorties, which significantly slowed the progress of the attack. The miners began their tunnel from a considerable distance to avoid the plunging fire from the castle, but their progress was halted by the extreme hardness of the ground. Finally, after twenty days of open-trench operations, the Prince of Condé, seeing the Spanish army approaching to relieve the stronghold and finding his own forces severely depleted by disease and desertion, decided to lift the siege.

In 1707, the Duke of Orléans adopted a different approach: he first directed his attacks against the town via the upper Segre and took it by storm after ten days of open-trench operations. He then besieged the castle from the same northern side and, after another twenty-five days of grueling labor, succeeded in positioning his miners beneath the walls, prompting the besieged garrison to capitulate.

Guided by these precedents, the commander of the engineers proposed following the approach laid out by the Duke of Orléans and opening the trench against the city fronts situated between the Madeleine Gate and the Upper Segre. The aim was to penetrate via the Carmen bastion (Sector I), where the scarp, like other sections of the ramparts, lacked both a ditch and a covered way, making it vulnerable to breaching by the initial batteries. The Commander-in-Chief approved this plan, and work began on establishing material depots near the attack front. The artillery park and field hospital were set up near the Sant Ruf mill; the engineer park and engineers' quarters were established to the right of General Habert's camps, at the Gualda mill, facing the village of Villanueva Alpicat.

It rained heavily on the 26th and 27th. The roads were ruined as a result, and since artillery convoys struggled to reach the camp from Monzón, the opening of the trench had to be postponed until the 29th. In the meantime, work was undertaken to block the irrigation canals leading toward the city, as their waters were flooding the terrain where the attacks were to be launched.

On 29 April, one hundred hussars and four hundred voltigeurs from the vanguard commanded by General Paris surprised outposts of the division of General Pirez in front of Vinaixa, killing about thirty men and capturing nineteen. Two thousand five hundred Spaniards, survivors of the

engagement at Margalef, had remained in the area; they withdrew, and nothing more was heard of them.

Everything was ready for operations to begin. In a general order dated 18 April, General Suchet had established the overall organization of duties for the duration of the siege⁴. A new order set out the procedures to be followed for opening the trench⁵.

1st NIGHT, of 29 to 30 April: sixteen hundred workers.

The besieged, accustomed to sensing French patrols at the foot of their walls every night, took no more alarm than usual on this occasion; consequently, the engineer officers were able, without being detected, to lay out the line of the first parallel at a distance of 260 to 280 meters from the Carmen and Madeleine bastions. This parallel ran on the right near the Cruz road, in front of a stream or *acequia*, crossed the Balaguer road, and extended to the left as far as the banks of the Segre; its total length was approximately six hundred meters. Two communication trenches were laid out to reach it: the one on the right started from the sunken road at Corbins, which offered good cover, while the one on the left began at a gunpowder mill located on the bank of the Segre. At the same time, the working parties, armed but without knapsacks, and each equipped with a shovel and a pickaxe, were assembled behind the end of the slope terminating at the Cruz post, eight hundred meters from the stronghold. From there, they were led in succession by the engineer officers along the marked lines of the parallel and the communication trenches. Work could not begin until around eleven o'clock at night, due to delays inevitably caused on such occasions by the inexperience of both officers and soldiers. Trench guards were posted in accordance with the previous day's orders.

The operation was successfully carried out. The enemy, hearing the work in progress, launched firepots and fired grapeshot, but with almost no effect; all the shots went too high, as the enemy assumed we were further away than we actually were. There were only two men killed and two wounded.

At daybreak, the besieged clearly saw the works completed during the night and were surprised by their extent and proximity. They kept up a very heavy fire from both the city batteries and those of the castle. General Buget, on duty in the trenches, had his hat knocked off by a cannonball that shattered the spyglass he was holding and inflicted a slight facial wound. Twelve hundred laborers were employed in improving the parallel and its connecting trenches. The General-in-Chief inspected the trench line and approved the sites for three batteries, selected jointly by the commanders of the engineers and artillery; these were:

No. 1, mounting four eight-inch mortars and located at the end of the parallel, was designed to protect the breaching batteries by dropping bombs on the castle.

No. 2, mounting four pieces of 12, was intended to demolish, or at least knock down the parapet of, the right shoulder of the Madeleine bastion (marked K), thereby rendering the adjacent flank useless for the defense of the Carmen bastion (marked I).

⁴ See supporting documents, No. 4

⁵ See supporting documents, No. 5.

No. 3, mounting six pieces of 16, was designated to breach the left face of the Carmen bastion (marked I), the point through which the assault force intended to enter the city.

2nd NIGHT, of 30 April to May 1st: sixteen hundred laborers.

The parallel was extended by approximately 140 meters toward the river, and work proceeded on the three newly laid-out batteries. These batteries were constructed within the parallel itself, necessitating the opening of additional communication trenches to the rear to allow for troop movement. The right-hand connecting trench was extended toward the trench depot established behind Sant Ruf Hill. As the left-hand connection was partially exposed to enfilading fire from the castle, its alignment was adjusted. The enemy kept up little fire.

During the day, eleven hundred and twenty laborers were employed to improve the communication lines begun the previous night. At two o'clock in the afternoon, a thunderstorm accompanied by heavy rain brought work to a complete halt. Half of the parallel situated between the gun batteries and the mortar battery became impassable, as did the communication line on the right; the water there was waist deep. It had been impossible to prevent this flooding, as it was caused by the swelling of streams, which the parallel had to cross, that carried runoff from the countryside into the Segre River; however, the right-hand communication line could have been spared by avoiding the low-lying areas of the terrain. The clayey soil further compounded the difficulties of movement.

3rd NIGHT, of 1st to 2 May: eleven hundred sixty laborers.

The trenches were so flooded that there was a fear that part of them would have to be abandoned. Work proceeded ceaselessly to drain the water. To this end, a trestle bridge was constructed beneath the parapet of the parallel at the point where it crossed the main stream, which could not be diverted and into which all the other streams had been channeled.

The parallel was extended one hundred fifty meters to the right and approximately one hundred ten meters to the left, so as to envelop the right face of the Carmen bastion (Bastion I). Work began on the initial sections of two zigzag approaches: one directed toward the Madeleine bastion and the other toward the Carmen bastion. Both were laid out so as not to obstruct the batteries' line of fire.

On 2 May, work was underway to improve the existing fortifications, and there was hope that the water problem would soon be resolved, when a second storm flooded the trenches and rendered them impassable once more. After the rain, the enemy launched a minor sortie on the left bank, but it achieved no result.

4th NIGHT, of 2 to 3 May: four hundred and eighty workmen.

The parallel was extended seventy meters to the left, reaching the bank of the Segre; to the right, it was extended one hundred meters, drawing ever closer to the castle. A return trench was constructed for each of the approach trenches begun the previous day in front of the first parallel.

This work was carried out undisturbed, with the gabions placed in the open; the enemy fired only a few musket shots around midnight.

General Harispe attempted to capture the outposts held by the garrison on the left bank of the Segre. At the same time, he advanced two horse-artillery howitzers along the Barcelona road, near the bridgehead, and fired a few shells into the city. The enemy responded with intense fire from all parts of the stronghold.

During the day, five hundred and twenty laborers were employed to refine the works already underway. Fine weather had returned, and the sun was drying out the mud in the trench. A few Spanish skirmishers, creeping along the left bank of the Segre, were harassing the left flank of the parallel with their fire, catching it in enfilade. The One-hundred Seventeenth Regiment moved closer to the bridgehead and put an end to these minor enemy forays. The artillery continued work on its batteries, the construction of which had been significantly delayed by the bad weather.

5th NIGHT, of 3 to 4 May: four hundred and forty laborers.

The right end of the parallel was extended by approximately sixty meters toward the foot of the castle. A third traverse was added to each of the two saps already begun. The left sap was thus brought to within less than eighty meters of the salient of the Carmen Bastion (designated Bastion I). Two zigzags were opened to the left of the parallel to advance toward the bastioned entrenchment held by the besieged forces between the Carmen Bastion and the Segre.

At daybreak, work proceeded as usual to refine the structures begun during the night.

The extreme right of the parallel crossed the Monzón road, which led to the Madeleine Gate, at a point where the road had not yet been fully cut. The gabions forming the parapet had not been filled with earth; as the enemy persisted in knocking them over with cannon fire, the decision was made to abandon the attempt to complete this task during daylight hours. In the second section of the extreme-left sap, the artillery began constructing Battery No. 4, comprising two pieces of 16 and two six-inch howitzers, intended to breach the right face of the Carmen Bastion and to enfilade the bastion's left face as well as the adjacent curtain wall.

The besieged had not yet made any move against our works. As the attack front had neither a ditch nor a covered way, sorties were difficult and perilous; the troops could only emerge through the Madeleine Gate or the barrier of the Carmen outwork, and it was easy for us to keep watch on these two points. However, at daybreak on 4 May, a few men from the stronghold crept along the Segre River to the trench section begun the previous day and surprised the workmen there. The latter, who had initially fled, returned to the trench upon seeing they were not being pursued; this was merely a reconnaissance. Yet at five in the evening, following intensified fire from all the batteries in the city and the castle, six hundred men emerged through the Carmen barrier and rapidly advanced on the left flank of the parallel, occupying it along with Battery No. 4. At the same time, another column, exiting via the Madeleine Gate, threatened the right flank. The workmen and the two companies guarding the trench withdrew along the parallel to the point where the first night's work had ended. There, Captain Bugeaud of the One-

hundred Twenty-first rallied his grenadier company and attacked the enemy, who had seized the left side of the works. A fierce struggle ensued, during which Captain Bugeaud personally killed a Spaniard who was grappling hand-to-hand with Lieutenant Leclerc of the sappers. As the central work crews and the reserve advanced, the Spaniards fled and retreated in disorder into the city through the Carmen barrier, having come under heavy fire from our infantry. We suffered eight killed, eleven wounded, and nine captured. The enemy carried off three hundred tools, about fifty muskets, and some clothing belonging to workmen who had gone to fetch gabions from the rear of the trench. The column that had emerged through the Madeleine gate, halted by the steadfast bearing of the trench guards, failed to reach the parallel.

6th NIGHT, of 4 to 5 May: four hundred and eighty workers.

On the right, the parallel was extended sixty meters up the slope toward the castle. The besieged kept up a very brisk fire on this work, but to no effect. On the left, between Battery No. 4 and the river, a trench was opened to serve as a secondary assembly point against sorties. Two new zigzags were added to the approach works leading to the Madeleine bastion.

Regarding the work begun the previous day at the right end of the parallel, the nature of the ground, a mix of tuff and rock, had made it impossible to dig deep enough for adequate cover; consequently, work there had to cease at daybreak. The parallel was topped with sandbags arranged to form loopholes, making infantry fire more secure and less hazardous.

7th NIGHT, of 5 to 6 May: seven hundred laborers.

The right flank of the parallel was extended a few meters further, and the section begun the previous day was improved; however, the nature of the terrain made this a difficult task. At the Madeleine approach, a sixth trench section was opened, crossing a stream via a timber bridge that supported a parapet made of several rows of gabions. At the Carmen approach, a short trench was constructed using the flying sap method. At the far-left approach, two new sections were opened; the second was extended to the river to serve as a secondary assembly point against sorties. Darkness and rain aided the approach operations but delayed artillery work; the batteries should have been in action days earlier. As isolated skirmishers along the banks of the Segre continued to harass the laborers, it was decided, in order to eliminate the threat entirely, to open an approach along the left bank and thereby secure control of that side. An irrigation canal crossing the Barcelona road was utilized to form a parallel facing the bridgehead, and three zigzags were pushed forward.

At daybreak, five hundred laborers were set to work refining the fortifications begun the previous day.

8th NIGHT, of 6 to 7 May: six hundred laborers.

The right flank of the parallel was extended toward the foot of the castle, reaching a small mound; a guard platoon was stationed under its shelter to support this exposed section. This task required a large number of gabions, and earth had to be carried in baskets to fill them. This gave us a foretaste of the difficulties to be expected in subsequent attacks, should we have to lay siege

to the castle after capturing the city. At the Madeleine approach, two new return trenches were opened; at the Carmen approach, a trench was dug using the flying sap method to crown the curtain wall; and at the extreme left, two more return trenches were opened, with the second extended as far as the river. On the left bank, two zigzags were added to the initial three. The horse artillery company, encamped with the One-hundred Seventeenth, began constructing Battery No. 7 on this side, at the end of the third trench, mounting a piece of 8 and a howitzer to counter-battery several field guns the enemy had positioned on the bridge. That night, the artillery completed the arming of Batteries Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 on the right bank. Two pieces of 16 became bogged down in the parallel and were replaced by two six-inch mortars.

At five in the morning, our artillery opened fire with ten cannons and eight mortars or howitzers. Soon, this fire disabled four guns the enemy had positioned on the Madeleine and Carmen bastions. Battery No. 1 lobbed shells at the castle. Battery No. 4 and two field howitzers, placed on the far right along the Varcalas road, in front of the camp of the One-hundred Twenty-first, fired upon the city, while light artillery on the left bank engaged in counter-battery fire against the guns stationed on the Segre bridge. However, the castle's artillery concentrated ten guns against breaching batteries No. 2 and 3; they disabled three cannons, put about twenty gunners out of action, and silenced those batteries. The garrison redoubled its fire; one of the howitzers of the One-hundred Twenty-first was disabled, and the other fell silent. Captain Brador, commanding Battery No. 1, was struck down by a cannonball, and a moment later, a shell exploded within the battery, throwing it into disarray. Finally, by four in the afternoon, all our batteries had been silenced. Encouraged by this success, three hundred of the besieged troops sallied forth from the Puerta Nueva, crept along the wall to the right of the parallel trench, surprised and drove back the platoon standing guard there, and then fanned out along the trench as far as the road leading to the Puerta de la Madeleine. The working party took up arms and rallied behind a screen of cover bordering the road, while some chasseurs from the Third Light simultaneously moved to attack the enemy's left flank. Polish Battalion Chief Schutz and Lieutenant Regnault of the One-hundred Fourteenth also rushed to the scene with a reserve force of brave men. The enemy fled and was pursued beyond the trenches, which they hastily abandoned. During this rash pursuit, the One-hundred Fourteenth company lost an officer and several grenadiers, killed by enemy grapeshot. Lieutenant Bordières, Aide-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief, sustained a severe wound from which he died a few days later. The Spaniards left behind nine prisoners and eight dead, including a gunner carrying four incendiary lances intended to set fire to our mortar battery.

9th NIGHT, of 7 to 8 May: one hundred thirty laborers.

The artillery worked to repair the damage to its batteries. A first zigzag approach toward the castle was opened near the right end of the parallel. The rain returned with greater intensity than ever and lasted all night. The trenches were flooded once more and became impassable, making it impossible to extract the two pieces of 16 that remained mired in the parallel.

Rain fell all day, rendering useless all efforts to make the trenches passable. Work continued on repairing the batteries; their parapets, originally built of loose earth and unable to withstand cannonballs, were thickened. Battery No. 7 on the left bank was not yet complete, and the besieged forces sent skirmishers down along the Segre River to disrupt the work. Captain

Monnot, commanding the left-bank artillery, was killed there by a bullet to the head. Meanwhile, mortar battery No. 1 kept firing, single-handedly bearing the brunt of the castle's fire, which failed to silence it. It suffered no damage other than the destruction of a platform, which was blown up by a bomb from the fortress.

10th NIGHT, of 8 to 9 May: one hundred and sixty workmen.

A second parallel was opened between the approaches to the two bastions under attack. The aim was to advance siege batteries No. 2 and 3 to make their fire more effective and to shield them from the castle's fire, which would be less dangerous the more plunging its trajectory became. As this operation would take time and prolong the siege, it was decided to undertake it only if absolutely necessary. The enemy subjected the skirmishers to intense musketry and grapeshot fire, wounding two men. On the left bank, two new zigzags were opened to extend the approach trench that had been started between the Barcelona road and the Segre River.

The artillery continued to refurbish its batteries, arming them with larger caliber guns. The pieces of 12 at Battery No. 2 were exchanged for four pieces of 16 taken from Battery No. 3, where the latter were replaced by four pieces of 24. Two long pieces of 12 were added to Battery No. 4, and a new battery, No. 5, was constructed to the left of the Balaguer road, mounting two 12-inch and two 6-inch mortars.

At daybreak, work began on refining the night's fortifications. As the excavation on the left side of the second parallel was still too shallow, there was hesitation about manning it; however, men from the One-hundred Sixteenth Regiment voluntarily slipped into the trench and, working on their knees under a hail of grapeshot, managed to deepen it sufficiently before nine in the morning.

Work began on a new battery, No. 6, for two 8-inch howitzers, situated between Battery No. 4 and the Segre River. Firing steps were constructed along the left-bank parallel, which had been established within the irrigation canal; the enemy still held a position nearby in the ruins of the old Trinity Convent. Throughout the day, an artillery duel raged between the castle batteries and the mortars of Battery No. 1, supported by the two howitzers of the One-hundred Twenty-first Regiment stationed on the Varcaldas road. Although the besieged forces fired their shells with great skill, they caused no damage. There was only one fatality and a few wounded, including Lieutenant Lemaire of the sappers.

11th NIGHT, of 9 to 10 May: three hundred laborers.

The second parallel was completed, a task that required cutting across the Balaguer road. This difficult work drew the enemy's attention, resulting in one man killed and three wounded. At the Madeleine approach, the bridge carrying the sixth trench's parapet over the stream, which the besieged had destroyed with cannon fire, was entirely rebuilt. The trench opened two days prior at the foot of the castle was extended to meet the road leading to the Madeleine Gate. Work proceeded simultaneously on all batteries, and a trench was constructed behind Battery No. 5.

At daybreak, the cut across the Balaguer road had to be finished using full-sap techniques. Fearing a sortie on our right flank, we leveled an area offering natural cover at the end of the trench dug the previous night near the Monzón road and stationed a platoon of the trench guard there.

12th NIGHT, of 10 to 11 May: four hundred and fifty laborers.

The Monzón road provided cover for a distance of about thirty meters where it emerged on the right, along the slope at the foot of the castle and forward of the previous night's works. This was used for the approaches; subsequently, a return trench was opened to the right, extending to the base of the rocky outcrop, which also offered shelter, and this position was topped with sandbags. Skilled marksmen were stationed there, and their fire greatly harassed the besieged garrison's gunners. A new communication trench was added to the Madeleine line and to the one leading to the Carmen outwork. On the left bank, two zigzag trenches were opened against the bridgehead, aligned with the salient angle (*en capitale*); the last of these crossed the Montblanc road. The weather had cleared, and as the moon illuminated the approaches, work could not begin until midnight.

Since the siege began, the Swiss Traxler Regiment, stationed within the town and composed of German and Polish recruits, had been yielding a few deserters daily. That night, twenty grenadiers from the regiment, who were on guard near the San Martín Gate, lowered themselves down the city walls on ropes and made their way to our outposts.

At daybreak, the parapet of the second parallel was topped with sandbags to shield the skirmishers, whose fire was directed at the embrasures of the city's bastions. Artillery crews continued work on their batteries; two men were wounded there by grenade fragments fired by the enemy using small mortars.

13th NIGHT, of 11 to 12 May: three hundred laborers.

At the right end of the first parallel, a second approach trench was opened toward the château via an initial forty-meter return; this was executed using the flying sap method without casualties, despite heavy musketry fire aided by bright moonlight.

Behind the first parallel, in a position offering natural cover, work began on a final battery (No. 8) for four field howitzers. It was intended to increase the volume of high-angle fire directed at the château and to protect our breaching batteries.

At daybreak, work continued on the sap, excavated the previous night ahead of the first parallel's right flank, even though the position was overlooked by the château; the troops succeeded in establishing cover there. Trench parapets that had suffered the most damage from rain or enemy cannonballs and bombs were repaired, particularly those along the communication trench behind mortar battery No. 1. Large stockpiles of gabions and fascines were amassed on the rear slopes of the parallel, ready for use in establishing positions at the breaches once they had been captured.

By nine o'clock in the morning, our artillery was ready to resume firing with fifteen cannons and nineteen mortars or howitzers. The number of mortars and howitzers designated to disable or harass the château's artillery was thus nearly doubled. The enemy returned fire with thirty guns: four on the town bastion, six on the bridge, and twenty at the château. These guns engaged in a fierce counter-battery duel with battery No. 4, but the effort was brief and unsuccessful. Our artillery, served with skill and coordination, gained the upper hand; it disabled the guns on the Madeleine bastion (side K) and the Carmen bastion (side I), rapidly opening breaches in both. Each gun fired more than one hundred rounds during the day. The first shells from Battery No. 8 set fire to a chest containing shells and grenades in the Louvigny bastion (on the castle's east side), causing considerable disarray there. By evening, the breaches made in the two faces of the Carmen bastion appeared wide and accessible.

14th NIGHT, of 12 to 13 May: nine hundred laborers.

At the far left of the approach trench leading to the castle, a return was constructed using the flying sap method to crown a small rise in the terrain; however, finding enough earth to fill the gabions proved difficult. A new return was opened on the Madeleine approach trench, as well as on the one begun near the Segre. The second parallel lay no more than one hundred meters from the breach in the left face of the Carmen bastion (side I); and, since the flank of the Madeleine's right bastion had been destroyed, this space could have been crossed in the open without risk. Nevertheless, to ensure the attacking columns could launch from the very foot of the breach, a new communication trench was pushed toward the bastion's salient angle, reaching the stream that flowed at its base, and a small timber bridge was built over the stream. Throughout the night, the artillery continued to lob bombs into the city and the castle.

Swiss deserters, passing through the breaches in the Carmen bastion, made their way into the trenches. From them, it was learned that the besieged forces had established cut-off lines and batteries in the city streets, intending to hold out even after the assault.

This detail particularly caught the attention of the General-in-Chief; he saw, as he had hoped from the very start of the siege, that the Governor, rather than isolating the castle and preparing its defense, was persisting in the defense of the city, even though the time had come for it to capitulate. This was undoubtedly due to the influence of the armed populace, who acted as auxiliaries to the garrison with more zeal than prudence. The same error had been committed during the siege of 1707.

"While the Duke of Orléans was besieging Lérida," writes Santa-Cruz in his Military Reflections, "the inhabitants, fearing the assault launched against the city by the troops of the two crowns, withdrew into the castle. His Royal Highness, fully realizing that this multitude merely encumbered the castle and would hasten the depletion of its provisions, ordered that fire be opened on anyone attempting to leave; and although the Prince of Darmstadt, who was in command, requested that women and children at least be allowed to exit, the Duke of Orléans steadfastly refused, a decision that led to the castle's surrender shortly thereafter."

To carry out his plan, the Commander-in-Chief resolved to capture, without delay, the two redoubts of San Fernando and Del Pilar, as well as the hornwork on the Garden plateau. The

vast area covered by these outworks could, at the moment of the assault on the city, have served as a refuge for the inhabitants; his intention, however, was to force them to take shelter in the castle, precisely in the hope of shortening the siege. That very night, General Vergès was ordered to capture the redoubts with a battalion of the One-hundred Fourteenth, four elite companies of the One-hundred Twenty-first, and one hundred laborers equipped with tools. General Buget was ordered to attack the hornwork with six elite companies and a detachment of sappers led by Captain Foucault of the Engineers. He was to force his way in through a breach spotted in the right flank of the work, a point that could be approached under the cover of a ravine. At the same time, Engineer Battalion Commander Plagniol was to advance on the face of the work with several companies and four hundred laborers.

At midnight, the three columns set out, hindered rather than aided by the moonlight. Engineer officers and sappers marched alongside them, and they were equipped with scaling ladders. The Redoubt del Pilar was captured without a shot being fired, just as it had been the first time. The thirty men defending it fled hastily; as they ran toward the hornwork, they ran straight into Commandant Plagniol's column, which charged them and reached the edge of the work's ditch, where only a small guard was stationed. Our soldiers, having descended using their ladders, prepared to scale the walls, while the sappers moved to the barrier to smash it open. Sergeant Maury climbed over it by stepping onto a grenadier's back and struck down the locking bar with a blow from his axe. Our two columns then forced their way into the work, for General Buget's column, having lost its way in the ravine, had joined up with Commandant Plagniol's. The Spaniards, retreating, attempted to rally behind a guardhouse but were forced into the covered ways of Fort Garden. The hornwork had been captured, and work was already underway to secure a foothold there, while fighting was still raging at the San Fernando Redoubt. First, two companies of the One-hundred Twenty-first Regiment established themselves on the counterscarp, maintaining a steady fire to prevent the defenders from showing themselves above their parapets. Two other companies leapt into the ditch and placed their ladders against the scarp. After a fierce struggle in which Captain Montauban of the Engineers was mortally wounded, our soldiers breached the redoubt; however, they only secured it after putting to the sword the garrison, which, cornered in one of the angles, had put up a desperate defense. Only a lieutenant and about twenty men, who had become separated from the main group, laid down their arms and were taken prisoner. We suffered around a hundred casualties, killed or wounded, whereas of the three hundred Spaniards defending the redoubts and the hornwork, barely sixty escaped. We captured fifteen pieces of artillery.

By daybreak, the lodgment begun on the berm of the hornwork extended along the entire length of the parapet's outer slope; it was subsequently improved and fitted with firing steps. The two redoubts facing our camps were opened up and reoriented to face the fortress. The artillery resumed its bombardment of the Carmen bastion to widen the breaches. Steps were cut into the second parallel to allow the troops to sally forth at the moment of the assault. Materials needed for lodgments at the breaches were also gathered on the reverse slope of the trench. Meanwhile, the enemy was preparing a major sortie to retake the Garden hornwork during the night, but they were given no time to do so.

The order for the assault was given in the afternoon. Troops were assembled in the two parallels and in the trenches near the Carmen bastion (Sector I). Two companies of carabineers and

voltigeurs from the Fifth Light were ordered, under Colonel Rouelle, to scale the breach in the left face. Another company of carabiniers from the same regiment, led by Engineer Captain Vallantin, was tasked with assaulting the right face, where the breach did not appear very practicable. These two columns, each followed by a detachment of sappers, were ordered to cross the breaches without firing, regroup at the bastion's gorge, and press the enemy without a moment's respite. A third column, consisting of a company of voltigeurs and a detachment of miners led by Lieutenant Romphleur, was to follow the first column in the assault on the left face and then fan out along the ramparts toward the Madeleine Gate; miners were simultaneously advancing on the gate from the outside to force it open or blow it up. The assault columns were to be supported by elite companies from the One-hundred Sixteenth and One-hundred Seventeenth, as well as center companies from the Fifth Light and the One-hundred Sixteenth. Four hundred and fifty laborers from the One-hundred Fifteenth and the First Vistula were stationed in the right section of the second parallel; they were to be employed later by Engineer Battalion Chief Henri to construct a passage within the lower Carmen bastion connecting to the upper section, which would have allowed troops to reach the town's first houses under cover. General Habert commanded the attack.

15th NIGHT, of 13 to 14 May.

With everything ready by seven in the evening, the General-in-Chief took his position in the first parallel to the left of mortar battery No. 5. He gave the signal for the assault by having four bombs fired simultaneously. At that same instant, our fire ceased; the four elite companies of the Fifth Light, followed by sappers and miners, cleared the trench parapet and charged toward the two breaches, scaling them rapidly and without loss. The enemy attempted to defend a rammed-earth entrenchment located behind the breach on the left face, but the leading column outflanked it and drove the defenders back to the entrance of the main street. A fierce fight ensued there, during which Colonel Rouelle was bayoneted in the face. A moment of hesitation followed, which General Habert cut short by ordering the charge to be sounded. The enemy took refuge behind a cut, a defensive trench, equipped with a cannon and covered by withering musket fire from nearby houses, which stalled our troops' momentum for a considerable time. Lieutenant Romphleur, having entered through the left-face breach with the leading column, struggled to reach the Puerta de la Madeleine; he succeeded in opening it only by demolishing a three-foot-thick wall that concealed it. Throughout the two hours this task took, the men had to withstand fire from houses near the château and hold back the besieged troops occupying them. On the left, the troops who had ascended the breach in the right face of the lower Carmen bastion with Captain Vallantin of the Engineers, instead of turning right to enter the upper bastion and join the forces attacking the main street, veered left. They found themselves inside the entrenchment raised between the bastion and the river but outside the city proper, moving along the crenellated houses that served as the perimeter wall in this sector. Hugging the base of these houses to avoid their fire, they advanced rapidly in search of an opening that would grant them access to the city. They thus reached, sustaining few casualties and braving fire from six enemy artillery pieces positioned on the bridge, a large barrier flanked on the right by a revetted redan mounting a cannon. Because the gun's embrasure was poorly aligned and could not provide direct flanking fire across the barrier, the sappers were able to approach it; Sergeant Baptiste climbed onto the barrier and opened it, allowing the troops to rush onto the quay. This maneuver outflanked the Spanish forces defending the barricades on the main street, causing them to abandon the defense.

At that moment, General Harispe, under orders to act as soon as the breach was secured and fighting had begun within the city, attacked the bridgehead with the One-hundred Seventeenth and captured it. The defenders and the gunners manning the artillery on the bridge, unable to retreat into the city, escaped along the banks of the Segre under cover of darkness and fled to Mequinenza. The commander-in-chief then ordered the reserves forward, crossing the breach himself to direct them. This buildup of forces made it impossible for the Spaniards to continue their resistance and brought an end to the bloody combat as daylight faded. The bridge, the quay, and the streets were abandoned by the besieged, and the garrison began to withdraw toward the castle.

The Commander-in-Chief aspired to a more significant result than the one his troops' valor had just secured for him. Avoiding a siege of the castle, if possible, would be a far more fortunate outcome. He ordered Colonel Robert to advance across the bridge with the One-hundred Seventeenth and directed him toward the San Antonio Gate. Then, executing a concentric maneuver, the troops pressed the garrison and the inhabitants, driving them back with fusil fire, street by street and house by house, toward the upper town and the castle, forcing them to seek refuge there. The fire opened by the castle upon the town heightened the danger and terror felt by the residents, driving them pell-mell into the stronghold alongside the garrison. A large crowd had already surged inside when the terrified Governor ordered the drawbridges raised. All the rest remained huddled in the moats and covered ways. Women, children, and the elderly who had failed to reach the castle took refuge in the churches. The Commander-in-Chief stationed guards there to protect them, yet he could not prevent the looting or the burning of several houses in the town where the fighting had been fiercest.

At daybreak on 14 May, the mortars and howitzers that had been trained on the castle during the night resumed their bombardment throughout the morning. Every bomb landing amidst the packed throngs of combatants and non-combatants brought destruction and terror. Clearly, the efforts of the Governor and the most resolute soldiers were hamstrung by the presence of this mass of unarmed townspeople and peasants, who had suddenly shifted from popular fury to despondency and the fear of death. These circumstances produced a swift and decisive effect. At noon, a white flag was hoisted over the keep, and shortly thereafter, an envoy arrived to propose terms of surrender. The Commander-in-Chief dispatched General Valée and Adjutant-Commandant Saint-Cyr Nugues to the castle, and Colonel Haxo to Fort Garden, to finalize and sign the capitulation⁶. The garrison was granted the honors of war, and the inhabitants who had taken up arms received a full and complete amnesty; respect for property and the free exercise of the Catholic religion were also guaranteed. The main gate of the castle was handed over to the grenadiers of the One-hundred Seventeenth. An artillery officer, an engineer officer, and a military commissary arrived to take possession of the stores.

At four o'clock in the afternoon, the garrison troops marched out through the breach, laid down their arms, and became prisoners. They had lost approximately twelve hundred men during the siege and still numbered seven thousand seven hundred and forty-eight soldiers and officers, including four hundred and seventy-five wounded men in the hospital. The total Spanish loss, including the engagement at Margalef, thus amounted to about fifteen thousand men. General

⁶ See supporting documents, No. 6.

Suchet dispatched an officer by post-chaise to announce the surrender of the stronghold to the Emperor⁷.

The capture of Lérida placed in our hands one hundred and five pieces of artillery, a million cartridges, one hundred thousand units of gunpowder, ten thousand fusils, ten standards, a saltpeter works, a powder magazine, and provisions for more than a month. Yet a trophy of the greatest value in the eyes of the victor was the liberation of thirty-three French officers from the Army of Catalonia; held captive in the castle, they embraced their liberators with all the joy imaginable. The besieging army suffered approximately two hundred dead and five hundred wounded, casualties incurred during siege works and assaults, as well as in the fighting that took place between 12 April and 14 May, spanning the period from the initial investment to the capture of the town. The artillery fired six thousand cannonballs and three thousand bombs or shells at the town and the castle. The engineers constructed six thousand four hundred meters of trenches. This conquest gave the Third Corps command of the line of the Segre, which shielded Aragon, and a solid foothold amidst Catalonia's strongest positions; it opened up the high valleys to him, and above all the fertile plains of Urgell, which became one of his most valuable resources at a time when Aragon, already exhausted by war, could no longer provide enough food to sustain its own inhabitants⁸.

The siege of Lérida lasted only a fortnight, owing to the Governor's error in failing to separate the defense of the castle from that of the town. Although the Spaniards accused him of treason, he was guilty only of a lack of foresight. Conducting a formal siege of the castle after the town had been taken would have presented immense difficulties. The terrain was almost entirely solid rock; the artillery had already exhausted nearly half its supplies; many of the sapping tools were worn out or lost; and the supply depots established at the frontier were a great distance away. Yet time was of the essence: the division of Campoverde and the peasants from the high valleys had already drawn closer to the upper Segre and Noguera rivers; O'Donnell's army had received fresh reinforcements and numbered fourteen thousand men; the Marquis de Lazán was at Tortosa with five or six thousand troops; and, finally, an army of fifteen thousand regulars and over thirty thousand irregulars was available in the Kingdom of Valencia. Had all these forces been skillfully led and given time to converge on Lérida, they would not only have forced the abandonment of the siege, whether by military action or by cutting off supplies, but would have placed the Third Corps itself in jeopardy.

General Suchet set about restoring order and tranquility in the city. He selected a corregidor, established a new junta, and appointed Baron Henriod, colonel of the Fourteenth, as governor. As the Spaniards had made off with the public funds, he levied a contribution of 1,500,000 francs on the inhabitants⁹. He dispatched General Habert and Colonel Robert of the One-hundred Seventeenth to the upper Segre region to disperse the bands that had drawn close to Balaguer. He directed a portion of his troops toward Mequinenza to begin the siege of that stronghold immediately; then, after remaining in Lérida for a few days to have the trenches filled, the breaches repaired, and the defenses fully restored, he returned to Aragon, where the troops of Villacampa and various bands, taking advantage of his absence, had resumed the

⁷ See supporting documents, No. 7.

⁸ See supporting documents Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

⁹ See supporting documents, No. 13.

offensive. For their part, O'Donnell and the Catalan junta made renewed efforts to sustain the struggle, issuing several spirited proclamations intended to revive the courage of the Catalans, which had been shaken by the fall of Lérida¹⁰.

STATE

OF THE TROOPS DEPLOYED IN THE SIEGE OF LÉRIDA.

GENERAL STAFF.

Count Suchet, Division General, Commandant in Chief of the Third Corps.
 Harispe, Brigadier General, Chief of Staff.
 Saint-Cyr-Nugues, Adjutant Commander, Under Chief of Staff.

Meyer, Squadron Chief, Aide-de-Camp.	Douarche, Battalion Chief.
Ricard, Captain, id.	D'Eschalard, Captain .
Desaix, id., id.	Domenget, id.
Bordières, Lieutenant, id. (killed).	Ricou, id.
De Rigny, id., id.	Canteloube, Lieutenant.

INFANTRY.

2nd DIVISION, General Musnier.

1 st Brigade,	{	115 th Line.....	3	bn.	1804	m. pres.
General Paris.		1 st Vistula.....	2		1508	
2 nd Brigade,	{	114 th Line.....	1		563	
General Vergès.		121 st id.....	3		1649	
Reserves,	{	114 th Line.....	2		1126	
General Buget.		3 rd Vistula.....	1		608	

3rd DIVISION, General

Brigade, General Habert.	{	5 th Light.....	2		960	
		116 th Line.....	2		960	
		117 th id.....	3		1799	

CAVALRY.

Brigade, General Boussard.	{	13 th Cuirassiers.....	4	sq.	454	452	h.	
		4 th Hussars.....	3		328	317		
		Polish Lancers.....	1		80	80		
TOTAL.....					11839	m.	849	h.

¹⁰ See supporting documents, Nos. 14, 15, and 16.

NOTE. Infantry troops provided approximately two battalions to guard the trenches throughout the siege. Grenadiers and voltigeurs were designated for this duty. The working parties were drawn from the center companies.

ARTILLERY.

GENERAL STAFF.

Valée, Brigadier General, Commandant of the Artillery.
 Raffron, Squadron Chief, Chief-of-Staff.
 Vangrineuse, Battalion Chief.
 Desclaibes, Captain, Aide-de-Camp of General Valée.
 Heuraux, Captain.
 Lieffroy, id.

TROOPS.

Foot Artillery...		3 rd Regiment.....	{	18 th Company.....	2	off.	70	m.	
				21 st Company.....	1		67		
Horse Artillery..		5 th Regiment.....		7 th Company.....	2		71	63	h.
Pontooners.....		1 st Battalion.....		2 nd Company.....	2		61		
		3 rd Battalion princip..		4 th and 6 th Companies.....	2		93	152	
Train.....	{	6 th Battalion <i>bis</i>		5 th Company.....	1		104	182	
		12 th Battalion <i>bis</i>		1 st and 3 rd Companies.....	2		146	260	
TOTAL.....					12	off.	612	m.	657 h.

ENGINEERS.

GENERAL STAFF.

Haxo, Colonel, Commandant of the Engineers.
 Plagniol, Battalion Chief, Chief-of-Staff.
 Henry, id.
 Vallantin, Captain, Attack Chief.
 Pedemonte, id.
 Dupan, id.
 Montauban, Lieutenant (killed).

TROOPS.

Miners.....		2 nd Battalion.		4 th Company.	{	Véron-Reville, Captain.....	}	2	off.	63	m.
						Romphleur, Lieutenant.....					
						Foucault, Captain.....					
Sappers.....		5 th Battalion.	{	2 nd Company.	{	Léviston, Lieutenant.....	}	3		93	
						Leclerc, id.....					
				4 th Company.		Lemaire, Captain (wounded).		1		97	
TOTAL.....								6	off.	255	m.

NOTE: These troops provided twenty to forty men daily for the trenches.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.

No. 1.

Report from General Suchet, commander of the Third Corps, to Prince Berthier, Major General, regarding the engagement at Margalef.

At the camp before Lérida, 26 April 1810.

My Prince,

As the Spanish Army of Catalonia had taken up a position at Gerona, I had to anticipate that General O'Donnell, who commands it, would not remain an idle spectator of the siege of Lérida; I therefore made my dispositions accordingly.

On the 23rd, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the Spanish army, numbering between twelve and fifteen thousand men, appeared before the bridge at Lérida. General Harispe, who was at the outposts, ordered the Fourth Hussar Regiment to charge their vanguard. Colonel Burthe led the charge with such intrepidity that the enemy was routed in an instant, and the greater part of them were forced to lay down their arms.

The garrison then attempted to sally forth via the bridgehead. Colonel Robert, whom I had tasked with keeping watch on them, made them regret their boldness and forced the town to confine itself to being a spectator of the battle.

The main enemy force, witnessing the defeat of its vanguard, hastened forward to support it, presenting a formidable line of infantry. General of Division Musnier advanced to meet them, but General Boussard was eager to share in the day's glory. He led the Thirteenth Cuirassiers against the enemy's rear, charging them from behind; just as the French line's artillery began to roar, the Spanish infantry broke ranks. Their cavalry attempted to come to their aid but was immediately routed. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery alike fled in disarray; all who were not slaughtered fell into our hands or sought safety in flight. The Fourth Hussars, taking advantage of their branch's superior mobility, joined in the success achieved by the Thirteenth Cuirassiers.

General Boussard pursued the enemy for more than five leagues. Our infantry did not fire a single shot.

The enemy left the battlefield strewn with their finest troops. We took five thousand six-hundred and seventeen prisoners, including Major General Dupuy (who was wounded), eight colonels, and two hundred seventy-one officers. Furthermore, we captured three pieces of artillery, two ammunition wagons, three standards and one regimental color, six to seven thousand fusils, a

thousand sabers, and over four to five hundred thousand cartridges. Our total losses amounted to twenty-three killed, eighty-two wounded, and sixty horses killed. Young d'Houdetot, formerly a page of H. M. and, at eighteen, already a recipient of the Legion of Honor, suffered a bayonet wound from which he died the following day. Generals Harispe and Boussard, and Colonels Robert, Burthe, and Daigremont, distinguished themselves by their skill and intrepidity. I must also commend Squadron Commanders Devallant, of the Fourth Hussars, Saint-Georges and Rubichon, of the Thirteenth Cuirassiers; Captains Scarempi, Lafarge, and Destombes; Quartermaster-Sergeant Mouton; and Cuirassier Tartarin, all of the Thirteenth Regiment. The second-to-last captured a howitzer, and the last captured a standard.

I remain, with respect, Monseigneur, etc.

Signed: COUNT SUCHET.

No. 2.

Letter from General Suchet, Commander of the Third Corps, to the Governor of Lérida.

At the camp of Borjas Blancas, 24 April 1810.

I urge you, General, to designate a number of military personnel and citizens of Lérida to visit yesterday's battlefield, strewn with a thousand dead or dying men, eight thousand fusils, and all the debris left by a bloody battle. They will inspect six thousand prisoners, led by General Dupuy, eight colonels, and three hundred officers. Witnessing such a scene, by proving to you that all hope of relief for your stronghold is extinguished, should inspire you with the prudent idea of sparing the blood of your fellow citizens. I offer you the best means to ensure your garrison's honor, by allowing all its military personnel to retain their service status and ranks, while simultaneously saving a large population and a city of great importance. In doing so, I am merely obeying the orders of the Emperor, my master, who extends special goodwill toward the people of Catalonia.

I have the honor to salute you, General, with distinguished consideration.

Signed: COUNT SUCHET.

No. 3.

Reply from the Governor of Lérida to General Suchet.

Lérida, 24 April 1810.

General, this stronghold has never counted on relief from any army.

I have the honor to offer you the assurance of my highest consideration.

The General commanding the Segre and Cinca sectors.

Signed: GARCIA CONDE.

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### **No. 4.**

*General order regarding the organization of duties  
during the siege.*

At General Headquarters, Villanueva Alpicat, 18 April 1810.

A general officer shall be designated daily by army orders to command the trenches, along with a corps chief to serve as the superior trench officer; the rotation shall be determined by seniority. As the trench commander is personally responsible for guarding the trenches, and has all guards, pickets, and work parties under his command for this purpose, he must ensure, through precise knowledge of the terrain and frequent communication with engineer officers, that appropriate measures are taken to protect the works, to receive timely warning of enemy sorties, and to repel them. He shall share supervisory duties with the senior trench officer serving under him. He shall never permit any of his posts to be withdrawn without being relieved by another. He shall report directly to the General-in-Chief and promptly notify him of any events deemed worthy of his attention.

Battalion Commander Douarche, attached to the General Staff, is appointed Trench Major for the duration of the siege: he shall have two lieutenants or second lieutenants under his command to serve as trench adjutants. He shall be responsible for receiving work parties, maintaining cleanliness, and overseeing the transport of the wounded. He will report to the Chief of the General Staff, informing him whether the workers have been brought in an orderly manner, at the appointed time, and in the prescribed numbers; the number of killed and wounded; and the events of the day and night.

In accordance with the daily service order, each regiment or battalion shall provide a specified number of trench guards and laborers each day. Both groups must consist of entire companies, brought up to a strength of eighty men each, so that, having their own officers and non-commissioned officers, they may be more effectively supervised. The requested number of men

must be provided exactly; this requirement is strict. Trench guards shall be relieved every twenty-four hours, and laborers every twelve hours.

The guards and laborers from a brigade, having assembled at the location designated by the general, shall be led from the camp by a staff officer to the rear of the attack sector where they are to be employed. He shall hand them over to the trench major, who in turn shall transfer them to the engineer officers. As trench work is of paramount importance, especially at night, the officers commanding the laborers shall ensure the punctual execution of tasks prescribed by the engineer officers; they shall not permit the men to leave their work, even to retrieve their weapons, except in cases of absolute necessity, at which point the laborers shall act in concert with the trench guards whom they are reinforcing.

A special order shall specify the locations and designations of the attack sectors, the names of the engineer officers in charge of the attacks, the assembly points for guards and laborers upon leaving camp, and the times for their relief.

The chief engineer and artillery commanders shall submit a daily memorandum to the Chief of the General Staff detailing the number of laborers required for the following day and the locations to which they must report. They shall also include observations regarding the disposition of trench guards and any service details deemed open to change or improvement, so that these may be noted, where appropriate, in the daily siege service order.

## No. 5.

### *Order of 28 April for opening the trench.*

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |   |               |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---------------|
| Brigadier Buget, Trench Commandant<br>Colonel of the One-hundred Seventeenth, Rouelle, Senior Trench<br>Officer<br>Trench Guards, three elite companies and a reserve battalion, who<br>are designated by the Commander-in-Chief. | } | For 24 hours. |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---------------|

|                               |               | For the night of 29 to<br>30 April. | For the day of 30 April. |
|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| GENERALS.                     | REGIMENTS.    |                                     |                          |
| Workers to be furnished<br>by | { HABERT..... | 5 <sup>th</sup> Light.....          | 3 whole cos. Men         |
|                               |               | 116 <sup>th</sup> Line.....         | at 80 each. 240          |
|                               |               | 117 <sup>th</sup> id.....           | 2 id..... 160            |
|                               | { BUGET.....  | 114 <sup>th</sup> id.....           | 4 id..... 320            |
|                               |               | 3 <sup>rd</sup> Vistula.....        | 2 id..... 160            |
|                               |               | 121 <sup>st</sup> Line.....         | 3 id..... 240            |
|                               | VERGÈS.....   | 116 <sup>th</sup> id.....           | 2 id..... 160            |
|                               |               |                                     | 1 id. 80                 |
|                               | PARIS.....    |                                     |                          |
|                               |               | 1600                                | 1200                     |

Tomorrow, the 29<sup>th</sup>, the sixteen hundred laborers, brought from their respective brigades as prescribed by the order of the 18<sup>th</sup>, must report at nightfall, that is to say, about half past seven in the evening, at the Gualda Mill, carrying their weapons but without their packs; there, the engineer commander will have a shovel and a pickaxe issued to each man. From that point, they

will be led by the officers who brought them to the depot behind the trench, where Commander Douarche will receive them and keep them in formation, ready to hand them over to the engineer officers as the latter arrive to collect them.

Work on the trench will be protected by three elite companies: two positioned at the front, forward of the work site itself, and the third on the left bank of the Segre River, to repel any sortie emerging from the Carmen Gate. Outposts from the Buget Brigade will advance to the foot of the castle wall, as ordered on previous nights.

The general commanding the trench operations must ensure that the soldiers empty the priming powder from their pans; this is to guarantee that no one fires a shot, which would inevitably cause disorder and draw fire from the stronghold. Strict care must be taken to ensure that no dogs follow either the laborers or the guards.

In addition to the elite companies designated to guard the trench, a position to the rear will be assigned for the reserve battalion, and one of the labor companies will remain on standby to provide replacements for any wounded men. The trench major will ensure an adequate number of stretchers is available and oversee the evacuation of the wounded without disrupting the laborers.

The two elite companies positioned forward of the worksite will be divided into four sections to effectively cover the entire area of operations. The soldiers are to lie prone and maintain absolute silence. Three sentinels will be stationed on their knees in front of each section, though they are not permitted to fire. Should they spot enemy patrols, they are to withdraw silently to their platoons; the platoons will then rise to drive back the enemy with the bayonet for a distance of about fifty paces before returning to their posts.

Engineer officers will use a line to position the working party along the designated trace, ensuring they maintain proper alignment. The men will lie flat on the ground, awaiting the signal to begin work from the right; they will then set to work with all their might to secure cover, throwing the excavated earth toward the enemy position and resting their fusil on the opposite side of the trench. They will be informed that they are not to be relieved until the trench reaches a depth and width of three feet, with each man occupying a frontage of three to four feet to allow for comfortable working. Company officers and sergeants will ensure strict adherence to these instructions.

The working party is to take up arms only if elite enemy companies are decisively driven back upon them; officers must take care to prevent anyone from raising a false alarm.

Once the workers have dug down about two feet, the commanding general may order the elite companies to withdraw into the trench, leaving only a few sentinels kneeling a few paces in front of the work. At daybreak, if the work meets the prescribed dimensions, the twelve hundred assigned workers will come to relieve the night shift, using the same tools left by the first group on the trench's outer bank. The day workers will be required to widen the trench to seven feet and deepen it to three feet.

Night workers will be paid seventy-five centimes, and day workers fifty, non-commissioned officers and soldiers alike. Payment will be made at the Gualda Mill upon presentation of vouchers signed by company officers and countersigned by the duty engineer officers; the latter reserve the right to reduce the number of days' pay credited if they are dissatisfied with the work. Brandy will be distributed under the supervision of the trench major, also upon vouchers signed by the engineer officers.

This order is to be immediately entered into the registers and read at least twice to each company, so that everyone fully understands their duties.

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## **No. 6.**

### *Capitulation of Lérida,*

Proposed by Brigadier Don José Veguer, second commanding general of this district, and Don Pedro Fleix, advocate of the royal councils and resident of Lérida, acting as authorized representatives of Field Marshals Don Jayme Garcia Conde and Don José González (Governor of the town and castle);

And accepted by Brigadier General Valée, commander of the Third Army Corps artillery, and Adjutant-Commandant Saint-Cyr-Nugues, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, acting as authorized representatives of H.E. Count Suchet, Governor-General of Aragon, Commander-in-Chief of the Third Corps of the French Army in Spain.

ARTICLE I<sup>st</sup>. The garrison of Lérida shall march out today, 14 May, at four o'clock in the afternoon, through the breach in the Madeleine front; it shall file past the French troops with the honors of war, lay down its arms, and remain prisoner of war.

ART. II. Officers shall retain their swords, horses, and personal baggage, and shall be treated according to their rank.

ART. III. The governor of the castle, who is currently ill there, may remain until his recovery and keep his three adjutants.

ART. IV. The wives of military personnel of all ranks may accompany their husbands at their own expense.

ART. V. All Spanish officers who pledge, on their word of honor and in writing, not to take up arms against France again may remain in Spain as prisoners under the supervision of French commanders.

ART. VI. Should there be any officers, sergeants, corporals, or soldiers in the garrison who were taken prisoner on previous occasions, full amnesty shall be granted to them.

ART. VII. The Catholic religion, its clergy, and property shall be respected.

ART. VIII. Amnesty shall be granted to inhabitants who took up arms during the siege, and they shall remain free, including members of the urban militia companies.

ART. IX. Protection shall be afforded to finance officials, physicians, surgeons, apothecaries, chaplains, and other clergy members to travel wherever they wish, as well as to inhabitants of Lérida or foreigners wishing to leave the city.

ART. X. Members of the corregimiento junta and the provincial junta, whether current or former, shall not be prosecuted in any way for past actions and may be retained in their posts.

ART. XI. A French artillery officer, an engineer officer, and a war commissary shall immediately enter the castle to inventory the stores and take possession of them.

At Lérida, 14 May 1810.

*Signed:* JOSE VEGUER, PEDRO FLEIX, VALÉE, SAINT-CYR-NUGUES.

Approved by the commander of the Segre and Cinca, and by the governor of the town and castle of Lérida.

*Signed:* JAYME GARCIA CONDE, JOSE GONZALES.

Approved by the commander-in-chief of the Third Corps of the French Army in Spain, Governor-General of Aragon.

*Signed:* COUNT SUCHET.

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Capitulation of Fort Garden.

Fort Garden at Lérida accepts the terms of capitulation granted this day, 14 May 1810, for the city's main castle, and signed by General Garcia Conde, the superior commander.

The main gate of the fort shall be occupied immediately by French troops.

Signed: FRANCISCO NUNÈS, commander of the fort; HAXO, colonel of engineers, authorized representative of the Commander-in-Chief.

Approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Corps of the French Army in Spain, Governor-General of Aragon.

Signed: COUNT SUCHET.

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## No. 7.

### *Letter from General Suchet to the Emperor.*

At Lérida Headquarters, 14 May 1810, at eleven o'clock in the evening.

Your Majesty's triumphant eagles soar over the city and the formidable castles of Lérida.

A battle, a month-long investment, a fortnight of open trenches, three days of bombardment, and two bloody assaults have brought about this result.

One hundred pieces of artillery, one and a half million cartridges, two hundred thousand pounds of gunpowder, ten thousand muskets, eight thousand prisoners, ten standards, six colonels, three brigadiers, two field-m Marshals, and the Commander-in-Chief, Garcia Conde, are in your power.

M. de Mekenemon, a staff officer to His Highness the Prince of Wagram, who has not left my side since April 23<sup>rd</sup> and is truly worthy of the school from which he graduated, will convey to Your Majesty an account of the brilliant valor he witnessed in your soldiers.

Tomorrow, I shall have the honor of dispatching to His Highness, the Major General, via one of my officers, a detailed report on these successful operations, accompanied by the terms of capitulation, inventories of the castles, and a plan.

Your Third Corps, Sire, is overjoyed to be able, at the time of your memorable marriage, to prove to Europe that the soldiers of the great Emperor know how to surpass those of Louis XIV.

I remain, with profound respect, etc.

*Signed:* COUNT SUCHET.

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No. 8.

Letter from General Suchet to Prince Berthier, Major General.

At Lérida Headquarters, 19 May 1810.

My Prince,

The enemy's losses during the night of the 13th to 14th are far greater than I had previously reported to you; the death toll exceeds three thousand. Lacking the time to bury them, the bodies were taken to the river, a task that took two days. It was solely due to the terror inspired by such an attack that I was able to drive the entire population back into the castle. General Garcia Conde himself told me that the courtyards, moats, and even the glacis were so packed with men, women, and children that he could not fire a single fusil shot without hitting his own countrymen. Had it not been for this circumstance, we would, despite all our efforts, have spent

two months besieging this justly renowned castle, which possesses twice the armament and more than three times the garrison it had in 1707. Lérida is rightly called the bulwark of Catalonia. I believe that, should the Emperor so order, it could, at little cost, become the bulwark of the Ebro provinces as well, serving as a counterpart beyond the Pyrenees to what Alexandria represents beyond the Alps.

I have ordered the immediate repair of the breaches, the filling in of the trenches, and the restoration of all the city's defenses. I have even taken advantage of the devastation caused by bombs and fire to level certain areas, thereby improving the city's sanitation and enhancing its defensive capabilities.

I have convened the insurrectionary junta. I informed its members that, now under the protection of the great Emperor, they should think only of atoning for the misfortunes they had brought upon their country. This news appeared to please them greatly. Dissatisfied that they could give me no account of the sums extorted from the people, I issued the attached decree, for the execution of which they are personally and financially liable. I have appointed the colonel of the Fourteenth Regiment, Baron Henriot, as governor of the city and its forts. Although afflicted by gout, this officer retains sound judgment, great mental vigor, and the qualities needed to govern Spaniards. He is a man of impeccable integrity, an essential quality in this country for commanding the respect that the people are otherwise reluctant to accord us. I request Your Highness to ask the Emperor to confirm this appointment and to secure Colonel Henriot's promotion to the rank of brigadier general in command of this province. He will do good work there, for he possesses great firmness and a necessary degree of wariness.

On the 15th, the enemy advanced to attack Balaguer via Cubells but, upon learning of the surrender of Lérida, retreated in haste; many deserters, both on foot and on horseback, brought us this news. I have dispatched General Habert in pursuit with six battalions and the hussars. At the same time, the General is to subdue and disarm the districts of Talarn and the valleys dependent on Lérida. I have ordered him to proceed to Cervera from time to time to gather news of our Army of Catalonia. I advise against establishing any fixed detachments, as I am convinced that the enemy's entire tactic is to seize them by consistently massing forces three or four times the size of the garrisons to attack them. This is not the only obstacle Catalonia presents to maintaining lines of communication; the scarcity of supplies in the region is so acute that it is extremely difficult to sustain a force there. I believe success can only be achieved by restoring the people's confidence and by capitalizing on the surrender of Lérida, which has caused great demoralization among the Catalans and within the insurgent army.

I am about to undertake the investment of Mequinenza and will soon proceed to Aragon, a region we are seeking to incite to revolt by every possible means.

I remain, with respect, etc.

Signed: COUNT SUCHET.

P.S. Instead of the seven bronze pieces of 24, listed in the summary report of the artillery captured at Lérida, thirteen were found; these, combined with six iron ones, make a total of nineteen pieces of 24.

No. 9.

*Report from General Suchet to Prince Berthier, Major
General, regarding the capture of Lérida.*

Prince,

Convinced that General O'Donnell's defeat near Lérida on April 23rd would favorably influence the capture of the stronghold, I hastened to press forward with the siege operations vigorously. The opening of the trench on the night of the 29th to the 30th, at a distance of one hundred and forty toises from the town, was a bold and successful maneuver that reflects great credit on Colonel Haxo of the Engineers. On May 7th, fire commenced from five batteries: two were breach-batteries aimed at the town, while the others targeted the castle. Torrential rains flooded the trenches, collapsed the earthworks, and necessitated the redoing of some of the work already completed. Within a few days, General Valée had repaired everything; the artillery displayed its characteristic mettle, both in the labor involved and in the face of danger. On the 8th, a second parallel was opened at a distance of sixty toises, and communication trenches were pushed almost to the foot of the walls. I had these manned by infantry who, by keeping up a constant fire against the embrasures day and night, prevented the enemy's lower batteries from firing. On the 12th, our batteries, now numbering seven, launched the decisive attack at eight in the morning, initiating the two-day engagement of May 12th and 13th that sealed Lérida's fate.

We maintained fire superiority throughout the evening of the 12th; a shell magazine in the castle blew up, and breaches were opened in two places, sufficiently wide to allow a few deserters to climb down through them. Satisfied with this advantage, which secured my operations for the following day, I moved during the night to my extreme right flank, where I had assembled the elite troops from the Vergès and Buget Brigades. From there, I directed a combined attack on the two redoubts at the far end of the Garden plateau and on the hornwork that covered the center of that plateau, a work that anchored the entire defense and forced the besieging army to deploy over a vast front.

These imposing works were built of masonry on a difficult escarpment, defended by a ditch, a palisade, and cannon, and protected by all the firepower of Garden. The central work, in particular, featured a ditch twelve toises wide and fifteen feet deep, cut sheer into extremely hard tuff and topped by a twelve-foot-high wall; its flanks were further supported by two entrenchments. General Vergès, with the Second Battalion of the One-hundred Fourteenth, four elite companies of the One-hundred Twenty-first, and one hundred laborers, was tasked with capturing the first two redoubts. Meanwhile, General Buget, with four elite companies of the One-hundred Fourteenth, two from the One-hundred Twenty-first, two from the Third Vistula,

and four hundred laborers armed with shovels and pickaxes, was to advance in two columns against the main work, under the cover of night and the terrain's undulations. At ten o'clock, I set the columns in motion, despite the moonlight, which was somewhat of a hindrance, and they soon reached their assigned positions. The Second Battalion of the One-hundred Fourteenth charged the redoubt on the right, planted their ladders, and smashed in the gate; the Spanish troops, after a fierce firefight and several rounds of grapeshot, were attacked within the enclosure itself; some leaped the ditch and fled, while the rest were killed by bayonet thrusts. For its part, the One-hundred Twenty-first captured the redoubt on the left with equal speed and success. Captain Montauban of the Engineers was wounded while on the ladder; but our impetuosity gave the enemy no time to inflict heavy losses upon us; they were surrounded, driven into the inner angle, and slaughtered without quarter. These two assaults cost us eighty wounded and twenty-five dead. The enemy lost more than three hundred men. At the same time, General Buget, with his elite companies, and Engineer Battalion Commander Plagniol, with the working parties, advanced in two columns toward the great redoubt and breached the perimeter; the workmen themselves dropped their tools and pursued the enemy as far as the Garden palisades, under intense fire. Thus, within half an hour, all three fortifications were stormed and captured by our soldiers to the cry of "Vive l'Empereur", shouts that, in the silence of the night, could be heard as far away as the camps and towers of Lérida. We immediately took advantage of the darkness to entrench ourselves, and by daybreak, the position was secured.

On the morning of the 13th, I inspected these positions; I deployed the troops to repel any hostile move, while the artillery resumed its fire against the city front with even greater success than the day before. I received hourly reports on the progress of the breach. I had succeeded in causing the garrison serious alarm regarding a key point of the defense and had deprived them of a vast retreat where the city's large population could have taken refuge as a last resort. By the evening of the 13th, the Spanish general was organizing a sortie to retake, under cover of night, those works that had taken so long to prepare and had been lost so quickly; but events left him no time to do so.

At four in the afternoon, I returned to the trenches: the main breach, at the salient bastion of the Madeleine front, was wide and accessible; the breach in the counterguard and the bastion's flank was less ideal but passable with the aid of ladders. I immediately ordered the assembly of the four elite companies of the Sixth Light Infantry, those of the One-hundred Sixteenth, and three from the One-hundred Seventeenth; the remnants of the Fifth and One-hundred Sixteenth were placed in reserve on the left, and four hundred fifty workers from the One-hundred Fifteenth and the First Vistula in reserve on the right, all equipped with gabions and ladders, under the command of General Habert (trench commander), Colonel Rouelle, and Major Barbarou. The leading companies, each followed by a few sappers and an engineer officer, were to advance after crossing the bastion: some were to enter via the main street running parallel to the river, while others were to move to the right toward the Madeleine Gate, simultaneously with miners advancing outside the walls to force the gate open or blow it up, thereby admitting as many troops as necessary.

Everything being in readiness, at seven o'clock our batteries fell silent, and I gave the signal by firing four shells simultaneously. Immediately, the carabiniers and voltigeurs of the Fifth crossed the trench parapet, leapt over the stream, and dashed toward the double breach, while the

enemy, taken by surprise, watched this sudden movement from the heights of the fort yet seemed afraid to halt it. Soon, they opened a devastating fire from all their batteries upon the breach, and a fierce firefight erupted from the houses, the streets, and the quayside; General Habert, leading the vanguard, directed the companies and checked an initial moment of hesitation by ordering the charge to be sounded; the companies on the right forced the Madeleine Gate with great difficulty and under murderous fire; the defensive cuts and batteries along the main street were swiftly overrun; the companies on the left, accompanied by sappers and Captain Vallantin of the Engineers, discovered a gate on the quayside blocked by an entrenchment; Sergeant Baptiste of the sappers climbed the barrier and threw it open; once the passage was forced, the troops surged through; the enemy was routed and driven back at bayonet-point to the vicinity of the bridge, where six field guns were maintaining a heavy fire. Meanwhile, on the left bank, General Harispe and the One-hundred Seventeenth were vigorously pressing the bridgehead. I advanced the reserves as we gained ground; and soon, thanks to the impetuous charge of the One-hundred Sixteenth, the entire quayside was occupied and the bridge fell into our hands; everyone there was killed, the guns were captured, and the enemy was driven back toward the lower part of the town. I had passed through the breach with my staff, intent on following up this initial success vigorously, yet with more restraint than I had shown during the assault itself. I immediately summoned Colonel Robert from the opposite bank with two battalions of the One-hundred Seventeenth and directed them toward the San-Antonio Gate and the San-Martin Tower, known as the "Black Battery." While the castle was pounding the city with its fire, something that served my strategic aims, I wanted to give the inhabitants no respite; I intended to press them back step by step, force them to yield ground, and avoid house-to-house fighting in a city containing over forty thousand souls, comprising both residents and refugees from the countryside. By doing so, I drove them back into the castle, where the moats, courtyards, and buildings became crowded with women, children, and all the elements that encumber the defense of a stronghold. Throughout the night, I ordered a slow but continuous bombardment of bombs and shells to complete the effect of these measures, the rapid success of which I had scarcely dared to hope for.

It was under these circumstances that the day of the 14th began. Houses from which shots had been fired at us were ablaze, and certain scenes of disorder inevitable in a city taken by storm clearly signaled to the inhabitants the fate awaiting them and the price at which they might escape it. Certain signs foreshadowed the course of action they were about to take; General Habert sent back an insignificant envoy; fire from the castle was already ceasing; finally, at ten o'clock, the white flag was hoisted on one of the bastions of the main fort. Shortly thereafter, just as I was entering through the harbor gate, General Paris presented a brigadier, accompanied by several officers, and a member of the junta to me, for the purpose of negotiating the capitulation. I immediately ordered a cessation of hostilities; I listened to the proposals, and at noon the capitulation, which I have the honor of forwarding to Your Highness, was signed.

Its principal terms were immediately carried out. I had the fort occupied; my commissioners conducted the inventories; and at four o'clock, I watched the entire garrison march out through the breach, led by General Garcia Conde, as Governor González was ill. At the same time, with my authorization, Colonel Haxo of the Engineers had proceeded to Fort Garden; it capitulated, and its garrison marched out this morning and laid down their arms in the same manner. I am

sending all prisoners under strong escort to Saragossa and Bayonne, and am having a summary list drawn up, along with a nominal roll of the officers.

Such, Monseigneur, is the account of the event that places the stronghold of Lérida, which His Majesty ordered me to capture, under his control. We have secured one hundred and five pieces of artillery, one million five hundred thousand cartridges, one hundred and fifty thousand units of gunpowder, ten thousand fusils, eight thousand prisoners, ten standards, a saltpeter works, a gunpowder mill, etc. I am forwarding to Y. H. the summary inventory of the artillery and provisions, the plan of the city and the siege operations, a view of the city and the castle, and the names of the senior officers taken prisoner within the stronghold. Furthermore, we found thirty-three officers of the French Army of Catalonia, prisoners of war, who were liberated with the joy one can well imagine.

Enemy losses during the assault on the city may be estimated at twelve hundred men. On our side, we count nearly two hundred dead and five hundred wounded, half of them only slightly. Overall, in this siege, where operations began in such close proximity to the stronghold, where the enemy attempted several sorties, and where we fired six thousand cannon shots and three thousand bombs or shells, with the enemy firing four times that amount, our losses were far lower than might have been expected. The Third Corps displayed as much steadfastness in their labor as bravery; in fifteen days, they dug thirty-two hundred toises of trenches, despite appalling weather.

I remain, with the deepest respect, etc.

Signed: COUNT SUCHET.

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**No. 10.**

*Summary statement of ordnance and ammunition of the fortified town, the castle, and the forts of Lérida, at the time of the capitulation, 14 May 1810.*

*Ordinance.*

|                                         |       |         |     |
|-----------------------------------------|-------|---------|-----|
| Bronze cannons.....                     | of 24 |         | 7   |
|                                         | of 16 |         | 9   |
|                                         | of 12 | { long  | 10  |
|                                         |       | { short | 6   |
|                                         | of 8  | { long  | 8   |
|                                         |       | { short | 7   |
|                                         | of 4  | { long  | 7   |
|                                         |       | { short | 8   |
| Iron cannons.....                       | of 24 |         | 6   |
|                                         | of 16 |         | 7   |
|                                         | of 12 |         | 4   |
| Bronze siege howitzers.....             | of 8  | inches. | 2   |
|                                         | of 6  | inches. | 4   |
| Bronze mortars.....                     | of 12 | inches. | 2   |
|                                         | of 10 | inches. | 6   |
| Bronze pierriers.....                   |       |         | 2   |
| Bronze battle cannons on carriages..... | of 12 |         | 2   |
|                                         | of 8  |         | 2   |
|                                         | of 4  |         | 4   |
| Bronze howitzers.....                   | of 6  | inches. | 2   |
| TOTAL Ordnance.....                     |       |         | 105 |

*Projectiles.*

|                                       |       |         |             |
|---------------------------------------|-------|---------|-------------|
| Cannonballs.....                      | of 24 |         | 5,000       |
|                                       | of 10 |         | 6,020       |
|                                       | of 12 |         | 5,123       |
|                                       | of 8  |         | 6,000       |
|                                       | of 4  |         | 5,300       |
| Shells.....                           | of 8  | inches. | 700         |
|                                       | of 6  | inches. | 1,000       |
| Bombs.....                            | of 12 | inches. | 442         |
|                                       | of 10 | inches. | 970         |
| Infantry cartridges of Spain.....     |       |         | 990,250     |
| of England.....                       |       |         | 40,000      |
| For fusils of different calibers..... |       |         | 250,000     |
| Gunpowder.....                        |       |         | 60,000 lbs. |

Lérída, 15 May 1810.  
The Chief of Staff of the Artillery, charged with  
taking over the town's artillery.

*Signed:* RAFFRON, Squadron Chief.

## No. 11.

*Statement of the Spanish troops comprising the garrison  
of Lérida on the day of the town's surrender.*

| CORPS DESIGNATION.                                                | Generals. | Senior officers. | Officers. | NCO's and soldiers. | OBSERVATIONS.                                                                                                                           |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|------------------|-----------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Don Jayme Garcia Conde, Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief.....    | 6         | "                | "         | "                   | Not including two battalions of city guards, and three hundred and forty-six artillerymen of the city, sent away by capitulation terms. |
| Don José González, Field Marshal, Governor.....                   |           |                  |           |                     |                                                                                                                                         |
| Don José Balaguer, Brigadier, Second in Command.....              |           |                  |           |                     |                                                                                                                                         |
| Don Narcisso Codina, Engineer Brigadier, Governor of Tortosa..... |           |                  |           |                     |                                                                                                                                         |
| Don Felipe Penena, Infantry Brigadier.....                        |           |                  |           |                     |                                                                                                                                         |
| Don José Sarigenis, Artillery Brigadier.....                      |           |                  |           |                     |                                                                                                                                         |
| -----                                                             |           |                  |           |                     |                                                                                                                                         |
| General Staff.....                                                | "         | 3                | 10        | "                   | Four hundred sixty-seven wounded found in Lérida hospital, counted as prisoners.                                                        |
| 2 <sup>nd</sup> Battalion, Second Regiment Traxler, Swiss...      | "         | 2                | 37        | 1427                |                                                                                                                                         |
| 1 <sup>st</sup> Battalion, Second Regiment, Santa Fe.....         | "         | 2                | 39        | 852                 |                                                                                                                                         |
| 1 <sup>st</sup> Battalion, Fernando VII.....                      | "         | 2                | 39        | 803                 |                                                                                                                                         |
| 2 <sup>nd</sup> id. , Huesca Volunteers.....                      | "         | 1                | 69        | 1415                |                                                                                                                                         |
| 1 <sup>st</sup> Battalion, Murcia Chasseurs.....                  | "         | 2                | 37        | 757                 |                                                                                                                                         |
| 1 <sup>st</sup> Battalion, Catalan Legion.....                    | "         | 1                | 41        | 907                 |                                                                                                                                         |
| 1 <sup>st</sup> Company, First Regiment, Line Artillery.....      | "         | 2                | 3         | 127                 |                                                                                                                                         |
| 7 <sup>th</sup> Company, Light Horse Artillery.....               | "         |                  | 3         | 123                 |                                                                                                                                         |
| Sappers.....                                                      | "         |                  | 1         | 122                 |                                                                                                                                         |
| Horse Chasseurs of Olivenza.....                                  | "         |                  | 9         | 125                 |                                                                                                                                         |
| Battalion of miquelets.....                                       | "         |                  | "         | 320                 |                                                                                                                                         |
| Skirmishers of Doyle.....                                         | "         |                  | 4         | "                   |                                                                                                                                         |
|                                                                   |           |                  |           |                     |                                                                                                                                         |
| TOTAL.....                                                        | 6         | 15               | 292       | 6978                |                                                                                                                                         |

Certified correct by the Governor of Lérida.

*Signed:* GARCIA CONDE.

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## No. 12.

### *Statement of tools and materials consumed during the siege of Lérida in 1810.*

| DESIGNATION<br>OF OBJECTS.              | QUANTITIES<br>requested. | QUANTITIES<br>transported to site<br>or fabricated. | QUANTITIES.<br>consumed or lost. | OBSERVATIONS. |
|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Pickaxes.....                           | 4,000                    | 2,015                                               | 964                              |               |
| Large pickaxes of 7 pounds.....         | 1,000                    | 500                                                 | 300                              |               |
| Rock picks.....                         | 1,000                    | 694                                                 | 300                              |               |
| Simple hoes.....                        | 500                      | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Round shovels.....                      | 5,000                    | 2,041                                               | 314                              |               |
| Square shovels.....                     | 3,000                    | 2,688                                               | 1,281                            |               |
| Tool handles.....                       | 18,000                   | 11,211                                              | 3,1501                           |               |
| Large axes.....                         | 300                      | 390                                                 | 80                               |               |
| Hand axes.....                          | 500                      | 366                                                 | 201                              |               |
| Billhooks.....                          | 1,000                    | 500                                                 | 194                              |               |
| Sapping hooks.....                      | 20                       | 11                                                  | "                                |               |
| Rammers.....                            | 50                       | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Bags of earth.....                      | 100,000                  | 100,000                                             | 25,940                           |               |
| Wool bales.....                         | 800                      | 489                                                 | 100                              |               |
| Earth-carrying baskets.....             | 1,000                    | 843                                                 | 243                              |               |
| Fascines.....                           | 50,000                   | 10,000                                              | 2,000                            |               |
| Gabions.....                            | 10,000                   | 6,840                                               | 2,840                            |               |
| Pickets.....                            | 60,000                   | 10,000                                              | 2,600                            |               |
| Filled gabions.....                     | 25                       | 25                                                  | 6                                |               |
| Mantlets.....                           | 100                      | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Dark lanterns.....                      | 10                       | 6                                                   | "                                |               |
| Wooden mallets.....                     | 200                      | 200                                                 | 10                               |               |
| Marking lines.....                      | 2,000 m.                 | 2,000 m.                                            | 1,500 m.                         |               |
| Eighteen-foot ladders.....              | 30                       | 174                                                 | 68                               |               |
| Stretchers.....                         | 50                       | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Steel.....                              | 600 lbs.                 | 500 lbs.                                            | "                                |               |
| Coal.....                               | "                        | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Complete forges.....                    | 2                        | 1                                                   | "                                |               |
| Breastplates.....                       | 20                       | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Helmets.....                            | 20                       | 12                                                  | "                                |               |
| Sheet steel.....                        | 100                      | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Sheet tin.....                          | 200                      | 300                                                 | 12                               |               |
| Long-handled sledges.....               | 20                       | 20                                                  | 2                                |               |
| <i>Miners' tools.</i>                   |                          |                                                     |                                  |               |
| Crowbars or pinch bars.....             | 10                       | 14                                                  | "                                |               |
| Pistols.....                            | 20                       | 36                                                  | "                                |               |
| Curettes.....                           | 15                       | 20                                                  | "                                |               |
| Pricking needles.....                   | 15                       | 19                                                  | "                                |               |
| Hammers for striking with a pistol..... | 15                       | 38                                                  | "                                |               |
| Pine cone hammers for rock.....         | 10                       | 12                                                  | "                                |               |
| Tin powder containers.....              | 4                        | 2                                                   | "                                |               |

| DESIGNATION<br>OF OBJECTS.          | QUANTITIES<br>requested. | QUANTITIES<br>transported to site<br>or fabricated. | QUANTITIES.<br>consumed or lost. | OBSERVATIONS. |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Copper-tipped tamping bars.....     | 15                       | 12                                                  | "                                |               |
| Rock picks.....                     | 25                       | 25                                                  | "                                |               |
| Iron sledges.....                   | "                        | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Double pointed picks.....           | 25                       | 25                                                  | "                                |               |
| Chisel ended picks.....             | 25                       | 23                                                  | "                                |               |
| Crow bars.....                      | 10                       | 10                                                  | "                                |               |
| Heavy-duty pincers.....             | 10                       | 16                                                  | "                                |               |
| Smaller pincers.....                | 15                       | 16                                                  | "                                |               |
| Mason's hammer.....                 | 10                       | 12                                                  | "                                |               |
| Pointed chisels.....                | 30                       | 71                                                  | "                                |               |
| Iron wedges.....                    | 20                       | 22                                                  | "                                |               |
| Small hand sledges.....             | 30                       | 30                                                  | "                                |               |
| Small saws.....                     | 10                       | 25                                                  | "                                |               |
| Hatchets.....                       | 10                       | 6                                                   | "                                |               |
| Claw hammers.....                   | 6                        | 6                                                   | "                                |               |
| Gimlets.....                        | 20                       | 43                                                  | "                                |               |
| Mason's level.....                  | 6                        | 6                                                   | "                                |               |
| Plumb bobs.....                     | 6                        | 6                                                   | "                                |               |
| One-meter straightedges.....        | 10                       | 4                                                   | "                                |               |
| Balls of chalk line.....            | 5                        | 4                                                   | "                                |               |
| Balls of twine.....                 | 5                        | 5                                                   | "                                |               |
| Copper hammers.....                 | 10                       | 10                                                  | 2                                |               |
| Sounding tool or drill bit.....     | 1                        | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Pincers.....                        | 4                        | 10                                                  | "                                |               |
| Miner's candle holders.....         | 10                       | 9                                                   | "                                |               |
| Lanterns.....                       | 6                        | 19                                                  | "                                |               |
| Tallow candles.....                 | 300 lbs.                 | 600 lbs.                                            | "                                |               |
| Wax candles.....                    | 50                       | 28                                                  | "                                |               |
| Six centimeter nails.....           | 1,000                    | 500                                                 | 60                               |               |
| Nine centimeter nails.....          | 500                      | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Tin measures.....                   | 4                        | 3                                                   | "                                |               |
| Funnels.....                        | 4                        | 4                                                   | "                                |               |
| Leather powder bags.....            | 4                        | 9                                                   | "                                |               |
| Meters of blasting hoses.....       | 500 m.                   | 400 m.                                              | "                                |               |
| Lighters, tinder.....               | "                        | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Sulfured fuses.....                 | "                        | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Lacing cords.....                   | "                        | 50                                                  | "                                |               |
| <i>Tools for skilled craftsmen.</i> |                          |                                                     |                                  |               |
| Large pit saws.....                 | 4                        | 4                                                   | "                                |               |
| Two-man crosscut saws.....          | 6                        | 6                                                   | "                                |               |
| Breaking-down saws.....             | 15                       | 5                                                   | "                                |               |
| Adzes.....                          | 15                       | 19                                                  | "                                |               |
| Mortise axes.....                   | 10                       | 8                                                   | "                                |               |

| DESIGNATION<br>OF OBJECTS.     | QUANTITIES<br>requested. | QUANTITIES<br>transported to site<br>or fabricated. | QUANTITIES.<br>consumed or lost. | OBSERVATIONS. |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Augers.....                    | 15                       | 15                                                  | "                                |               |
| Braces.....                    | 4                        | 4                                                   | "                                |               |
| Draw-knife.....                | 20                       | 32                                                  | "                                |               |
| Chisels or firmer chisels..... | 30                       | 31                                                  | "                                |               |
| Mortise chisels.....           | 10                       | 13                                                  | "                                |               |
| Gouges or roughing gouges..... | 10                       | 15                                                  | "                                |               |
| Jointers.....                  | 4                        | 4                                                   | "                                |               |
| Trying planes.....             | 6                        | 6                                                   | "                                |               |
| Planes.....                    | 6                        | 6                                                   | "                                |               |
| Hammers.....                   | 10                       | 10                                                  | "                                |               |
| Tap wrenches.....              | 6                        | 6                                                   | "                                |               |
| Files.....                     | 30                       | "                                                   | "                                |               |
| Taper saw files.....           | 20                       | 25                                                  | "                                |               |
| Iron calipers.....             | 4                        | 1                                                   | "                                |               |
| Sharpening stones.....         | 6                        | 1                                                   | "                                |               |
| Black and white chalk.....     | "                        | 2 lbs.                                              | "                                |               |
| Wooden squares.....            | 4                        | 4                                                   | "                                |               |
| Cold chisels.....              | 12                       | 20                                                  | "                                |               |
| Clamps.....                    | 20                       | 30                                                  | "                                |               |

At Lérida, 22 May 1810.

The Battalion Commander, Chief of Staff of the Engineers.

*Signed:* PLAGNIOL.

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No. 13.

*Decree by General Suchet regarding a war levy
imposed on Lérida following the capture of the stronghold.*

IN THE NAME OF THE EMPEROR AND KING.

We, Count Suchet, General Commanding-in-Chief of the Third Corps of the Imperial Army in Spain,

Having been informed by the commissioners charged with taking possession of the food depots and public treasuries that no cash was found on hand, nor any records accounting for the use of public funds, and that, furthermore, the insurrectionary junta had exacted considerable sums from the province,

Have decreed:

ARTICLE Ist. A levy of one million five hundred thousand coins shall be imposed upon the province of Lérida; this sum must be collected in full by the 30th of June next and shall be used to pay the troops' wages.

ART. II. Acceding to the petition of the members of the corregimiento junta, we agree to release the six individuals whose arrest we had ordered to guarantee payment of the said contribution, and we accept the joint and several surety they have offered, pledging both their persons and their assets, to ensure the collection of this contribution within the set timeframe.

ART. III. Baron Henriot, Governor of Lérida, the Commissary-Intendant, and the Chief Paymaster are charged, each within his respective sphere, with the execution of this decree.

Issued at the headquarters in Lérida, 18 May 1810.

Signed: COUNT SUCHET.

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## **No. 14.**

*Report from O'Donnell to the Supreme Junta of Catalonia  
regarding the capture of Lérida.*

Tarragona, 19 May 1810.

Excellency,

Cowardice and the most inconceivable perfidy have surrendered the important stronghold of Lérida to the enemy; its infamous defenders, through such disgraceful conduct, have tarnished the reputation of the intrepid Army of Catalonia and exposed themselves to public execration and the contempt of our very enemies. The last dispatch the commanding general of Lérida received from me warned him that the capture of the city would never excuse him for failing to defend the forts to the very last extremity. This wholly unexpected event has taken me greatly by surprise; yet it does not daunt my spirit, galvanized as it is by the sacred love I have vowed to my homeland. Nor must Your Excellency lose heart or abandon the hope of saving the Principality. There remain numerous strongholds, which I shall entrust to officers who are as valiant as they are loyal, and of proven patriotism; there remains a battle-hardened, disciplined army, animated by the desire to defend the land that sustains and values it; and there remains, finally, the unshakeable valor of the brave Catalans, a valor so often disastrous for our enemies, as demonstrated once again in the noble resistance put up by the brave and unfortunate inhabitants of Lérida. As long as our firm resolve to defend our homeland to the last extremity remains unshaken, and as long as there are men, steel, and money, nothing is lost; the mountains will take the place of fortresses to prolong the war indefinitely.

Such are the sentiments of my heart, and they shall serve as the guiding principles of my conduct until the very last moment of my life. Deeming it just that the government should assist this worthy principality in the bloody struggle it is waging with such valor, I have ordered the army's

First Adjutant General to proceed to the Isle of León to report to H. M. on the principality's current state and to solicit the aid of which it stands in such urgent need, aid to which it has a greater claim than any other province of the monarchy; furthermore, I believe it would be appropriate for the Supreme Junta to send one of its own members for the same purpose.

May God protect Your Excellency.

*Signed:* HENRY O'DONELL.

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### **No. 15.**

*Proclamation of the Superior Council of Catalonia.*

Solsona, 22 May 1810.

Catalans,

After two years of resistance against a fierce and bloodthirsty enemy that is devastating your beautiful province and plunging your families into mourning; after two years of a succession of misfortunes that you have consistently risen above; after two years of the most righteous war, during which your steadfastness and valor have commanded the admiration of Europe, which has its eyes upon you and awaits the moment of your freedom and independence; after swearing to defend your rights and your very existence at the cost of the greatest sacrifices, rumors are now beginning to circulate among you that herald terror, despondency, and fear. Is it the enemy, whom you have defeated and humiliated time and again, and whose dominion you have repelled with such heroism, that causes your terror? Is it the loss of Lérida that causes your despondency, when you have become, so to speak, inured to misfortune? And will you allow yourselves to be frightened by rumors spread among you by French agents, claims: *that peace negotiations are underway and that the government intends to abandon you*, when in fact it supports you with all its might? When it has repeatedly sworn to maintain the integrity of the kingdom, and when the Supreme Junta and the other juntas have pledged to be buried beneath the ruins of the homeland, preferring death to sacrificing your rights and freedom to a tyrant who has inflicted such suffering upon the noblest nation in Europe? Yes, beloved Catalans, these rumors fueling your mistrust have reached the ears and hearts of the very authorities who have stood by you through your misfortunes and striven to alleviate them amidst the gravest perils. This Supreme Junta does not wish to leave you in a state of anxiety or uncertainty regarding your fate and the government's intentions. If you believe that the loss of Lérida must entail the loss of the entire Principality, you are mistaken; we still possess formidable strongholds which, defended by your valor, will prolong the war in this province and renew the glorious days of Roses, Girona, and Hostalric. We still have a formidable, valiant, and disciplined army, led by a general whose military zeal and patriotism will immortalize his name, a man of proven valor and experience who covered himself in glory during the brilliant engagements at Colluspina, Mollet, Santa-Perpetua, Vilafranca, Esparraguera, and Manresa, and who, filled with fervor, has vowed never to abandon this province. We still have the ruggedness of our mountains, from which we shall swoop down upon the enemy as in times past; the Principality still has the arms of its children, who, hardened by the rigors of war, offer fresh laurels to the homeland. We still have the hope

of succor from our brothers in other provinces and from foreign powers. The misfortunes suffered by the city of Lérida have been deeply painful and disastrous for us, as have the cowardice and inconceivable treachery with which its impregnable forts were surrendered to the enemy, while the authorities governing you did nothing but grieve and lament their loss. Yet this loss can be redeemed by your valor and sacrifices; it must rekindle your patriotism and sustain your steadfastness until it is made good. And do you think that Catalonia, with its immense strength, could succumb, provided you fulfill the sacred duties to which you have pledged yourselves by oath? Will you leave unpunished an enemy that has unjustly shed the blood of your brothers, blood that still cries out and calls for your vengeance? Will you be able to avoid seizing every weapon and exhausting every resource to preserve your existence? What would Europe say of you if it saw your enemies oppressing you while you looked on with indifference at the outrages suffered by your families? And what would generous England say of you if, after lavishing its aid upon you, you submitted to a tyrant's yoke? That is precisely when you would cease to be Catalans, and the honors with which you have exalted your name would turn to scorn. If you think that the government could abandon your rights and you yourselves, so long as it retains a single acre of land to defend with the sword, such an idea is an insult to the sovereign and to the authorities whose steadfastness you have witnessed. If you imagine that the government could forget its oaths and abandon its people to misery and ignominy, you fail to recognize its honor and the sanctity of its promises; if you believe its fate is not inextricably bound to your own, you desire the onset of anarchy and forget the rights and liberty of the nation, as well as the bonds that tie us to it. Those who put these ideas into your heads are your greatest enemies, agents of the tyrant who, unable to subdue you by force, seeks to achieve his ends through intrigue. We shall defend ourselves despite him, and we shall seal our independence with his ruin, provided you contribute by every possible means to the great work of liberty and the restoration of public confidence, without which the government's wisest measures would prove futile.

*Signed:* PHILIPPE ANER,  
Acting Member Secretary.

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No. 16.

Proclamation of O'Donnell to the inhabitants of Catalonia.

Tarragona, 22 May 1810.

Catalans,

The shameful and cowardly surrender of the stronghold of Lérida must not diminish your valor. The illustrious and unfortunate inhabitants of that city (deserving of a better fate), cry out for vengeance and implore your aid amidst the horrors surrounding them! Is there a single one among you who does not harbor a desire to sacrifice the assassins responsible for such atrocities to the noble spirits of those unfortunates who perished in the flames of their own homes?

Was it not you who reduced to dust those numerous divisions that boasted so arrogantly they would swiftly dictate terms to you? And was it not you who, in frequent and glorious battles, added fresh laurels to the crown of valor you have always worn so majestically?

Lérida has fallen! Yet Catalonia is not conquered, nor shall it ever be, so long as the spirit of its invincible inhabitants remains unbroken.

Tarragona, Tortosa, Cardona, Berga, La Seu d'Urgell, the Balaguer Pass, and Mequinenza stand as bulwarks of the Principality; commanded by patriotic, intelligent, and brave leaders, these strongholds will form an impenetrable barrier against the enemy.

And even if, after many years, all these strongholds were to fall, Catalonia's inaccessible mountains would still serve as bastions for those who choose liberty over slavery.

When we began this war, we possessed neither an army nor fortified places, for they had all been stripped of their defenses; today, we have both an army and strongholds. Catalans, rally to arms! Do not believe the claim that the *quinta* is intended to prevent the valiant Somatènes from defending their country.

All Catalans must take up arms; but the disciplined army must support them. Those among them who desert their colors shall be punished by death, and the same penalty shall be inflicted upon any Spaniard who shelters them.

I shall appoint patriot commanders who, in the various districts, will direct the valor of the somatènes militias maintained by their own communes; yet any somatènes commander who dares to harbor a soldier shall be punished for doing so.

Catalans! El Bruch, Manresa, Esparraguera, Vilafranca, and Mollet remind you that the enemy is not invincible, take courage, then! Let us all fight to secure the independence of our homeland! Perish the vile egoist who watches its destruction with indifference! Let eternal scorn be the lot of anyone who loses heart over a single reversal of fortune! And let us firmly resolve to remain Spaniards until the very last moment of our lives!

Signed: HENRY O'DONELL.

