

**Translated by Greg Gorsuch
Volume 3 Part 3**

**SIEGE
OF MEQUINENZA,
BY THE FRENCH ARMY OF ARAGON,
IN 1810.**

ANALYTICAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Description of the fort of Mequinenza. --The Second Division of the Third Corps invests the fort.....	
Construction of a road to bring up artillery.....	
The enemy makes a sortie, which is repulsed. -- Opening of the trench facing the fort.....	
Approach works are directed along the Ebro towards the town.....	
Boats laden with inhabitants escape from Mequinenza. --Two of these boats are captured.....	
Construction of batteries. --Storming of the town.....	
Continuation of approach works against the fort. --Capture of the "horseshoe" position located in front of the hornwork	
General Suchet, commander of the Third Corps, arrives at the camp. --Our batteries open fire. --The Governor capitulates	
Our troops take possession of the fort.....	

END OF THE TABLE OF CONTENTS.

SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA,

BY THE FRENCH ARMY OF ARAGON,

IN 1810.

LÉRIDA had just fallen. Situated very close to that stronghold and on the same bank of the Segre, Mequinenza (Mequinensa, Cat.) provided the Spaniards with a supply depot and a secure crossing point over the Ebro; this allowed them to operate at will on either bank, harassing Aragon with reinforcements drawn from Lower Catalonia and the Kingdom of Valencia. General Suchet, intent on depriving the insurgents of this strategic foothold, dispatched the One-hundred Twenty-first Regiment along the left bank of the Segre the very day after entering Lérida, 15 May, and sent his aide-de-camp, Captain Ricard, to offer favorable terms to General Carbon, the town's governor. Carbon rejected the offer, even though the capture of Lérida was bound to demoralize his garrison and dash any hopes of relief.

The small town of Mequinenza lies on the right bank of the Segre, near its confluence with the Ebro, at the foot of a steep spur of Mount Negro, the ridge separating the two rivers. Hemmed in between the rocky heights and the riverbank, the town features a landing point on the Ebro, which is navigable from Caspe onwards. Although it lies on no major overland route, it can be considered the key to the Ebro all the way to Tortosa and the sea. The position's only defenses consist of a fort built upon the crag that towers more than two hundred meters above the town, marking the end of the mountain spur. The fort's central feature is an ancient castle, the ramparts of which crown the summit of the rock. It would have been easily accessible from the west via a plateau about three hundred meters wide, had a masonry-faced hornwork not been built there during the War of the Succession, a structure anchored on either side to the steep cliffs and fronted by a rock-cut ditch and a substantial covered way. On the east, the town is enclosed by an ancient wall that climbs the steep slope leading up to the castle, connecting with it; on the opposite side, the town lies largely open. The main challenge of the siege lay in getting artillery onto the plateau to batter the castle's hornwork, the only side vulnerable to attack.

Two roads lead to Mequinenza on the left bank of the Ebro: one, passable for wagons, comes from Fraga and Torrente, skirting the right bank of the Segre at the foot of the Mount Negro cliffs; the other, suitable only for horses, comes from Zaragoza via Candanos. Both were exposed to fire from the fort and from entrenchments recently thrown up by the Spanish near the town. The cliffs framing the horizon around Mequinenza looked so rugged that bringing up siege artillery was deemed impossible, and the stronghold was considered impregnable. Yet, as

early as the previous October, Colonel Haxo of the Engineers, taking advantage of a troop movement toward Fraga, had advanced across the Candanos plain close enough to Mequinenza to verify that the high spurs of Mount Negro (which border the Ebro and Segre and present virtually inaccessible slopes facing the rivers) actually featured vast plateaus at their summits, passable all the way to the main road to Fraga. This information was of great importance for the impending siege and indicated the route to be taken to bring the artillery up to the level of Fort Mequinenza.

On 18 May, General Valée, commander of the Third Corps artillery, received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to deploy a portion of the siege train that had been used at Lérida. The rapid surrender of that stronghold made it possible to immediately assemble ten cannons and eight mortars or howitzers, along with a supply of four hundred rounds per piece; however, to transport this materiel to Mequinenza, it was first necessary to rebuild the bridge over the Cinca River at Fraga, a bridge the Spanish had destroyed a few months earlier. A company of pontooners was assigned this task. Boats that had served for communications at Lérida, along with some from Monzón, were transported to Fraga. The Cinca is a torrential river that rises rapidly and alarmingly with even the slightest rainfall. Consequently, for eleven days, all efforts were thwarted: the water level would suddenly rise and fall by eight to ten feet; the abutments, however securely anchored, were swept away, and the mooring cables snapped. Protecting the boats proved extremely difficult, and it was not until 31 May that the siege train began crossing to the right bank of the Cinca.

Meanwhile, General Musnier had already left Lérida with the One-hundred Fourteenth Regiment and the First Vistula, heading toward Mequinenza via Fraga and Torrente. His objective was to invest the town from the right bank of the Segre and link up with the One-hundred Twenty-first Regiment, which was already positioned on the opposite bank. Colonel Haxo followed this column to conduct a fresh reconnaissance of the Mont Negro plateau and lay out a road there. He quickly discovered a track known as the San Salvador path; leading directly from Torrente to the plateau, it could be made passable for wagons with relatively little effort. The troops took this route; and, on the evening of 19 May, they came within sight of the fort of Mequinenza, accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief, who, after reconnoitering the position, left General Musnier in command of the siege troops¹.

On 20 May, the troops descended to the plateau where the fort was built and forced the enemy to retreat into their fortifications. From Torrente, and for a distance of two leagues, the route for the artillery road could follow the plateau without requiring extensive work; however, to descend from the final peaks of Mount Negro to the Mequinenza plateau, the road had to be cut into the rock over a stretch of approximately two thousand four hundred meters. Colonel Haxo laid it out with a gentle gradient, initially following a ravine that led to a hermitage on the Ebro, and then guiding it in a long detour along the mountainside to the fort's plateau. Captain Papigny of the Engineers, commanding four officers and a company of sappers, was placed in charge of the project; the workforce consisted of two hundred peasants brought in daily from Catalonia, along with roughly the same number of regular soldiers. Completing the work involved overcoming significant difficulties, and in many places, blasting the rock was necessary; finally, on the 1st of

¹ See supporting documents, No. 1.

June, just as the artillery was finishing the reconstruction of the bridge over the Cinca, the road was fully passable along its entire length.

While these works were underway, General Musnier was positioning his camps on both banks of the Segre; part of the One-hundred Twenty-first took up a position on the left bank, while the remainder crossed to the right bank to form the left flank of the line, situated behind a rise near the Fraga road. The One-hundred Fourteenth and the First Vistula, along with the artillerymen and sappers, occupied the head of the plateau from which the attack was to be launched. Several companies of voltigeurs extended their lines to the banks of the Ebro, where the need for water compelled the soldiers to make constant trips to fetch a supply. The path was long and steep, leaving those traversing it highly exposed to fire from the enemy's remaining advanced posts on the right bank of the Ebro, posts that fired upon anything approaching the river from the left bank.

On 28 May, General Montmarie (Louis François Élie Pelletier), commanding a brigade of the First Division, arrived from Alcañiz with the Fourteenth Regiment on the right bank of the Ebro. He drove out the Spanish forces, who retreated after dumping a howitzer into the river, thereby completing the investment. The First Vistula Regiment, assigned to the assault on the city, was stationed along the Ebro at the foot of the left bank's steep slopes. A spur of the new road was extended to this bank to facilitate communication between the river and the camps. The artillery park remained on the upper plateau of Monte Negro.

On 30 May, General Rogniat arrived from Bayonne to assume command of the Engineers. He brought a brigade of twenty officers, two companies of sappers, and a train company, along with thirty-two caissons loaded with ten thousand tools. The main guards on the plateau advanced under cover of the terrain and forced the garrison's advanced posts to fall back to within six hundred meters of the fort's covered way.

On 31 May, following a prolonged cannonade, the enemy sent eight hundred men out against our leading troops; however, three hundred voltigeurs, standing their ground, halted the sortie with a point-blank volley, and our outposts held the positions they had just established. The enemy retained one outlying post, shielded by a small rise located three hundred meters from the fort.

Everything was readied to open the trenches that very evening.

1st NIGHT, of 2 to 3 June.

At nightfall, the voltigeurs of the One-hundred Fourteenth captured the enemy's outpost located behind the hillock in front of the fort. Immediately, five hundred laborers, led by Colonel Haxo, the officer in charge of the attack, began constructing a parallel trench and a communication trench behind the right flank on that very hillock. The terrain was difficult; the sound of tools striking rock alerted the enemy, who directed heavy canister fire at the workers throughout the night. Being so close to the stronghold and in such a confined space, the men suffered casualties before they could find cover: nine were killed and twenty-three wounded. Engineer Battalion Commander Sèbe was struck by grapeshot.

There was also a plan to advance by sap toward the city; capturing it would further hem in the garrison, isolate it completely, and make it impossible for the troops to escape by night by floating down the Ebro in boats. To this end, the Second Vistula Battalion captured a crenellated guardhouse situated on the road along the Ebro, one hundred and sixty meters from the city; starting from this point, Engineer Captain Chulliot immediately opened a trench in the narrow, difficult terrain lying between the mountain and the river. Twenty-four men were lost in this attack. While it was underway, General Montmarie established infantry posts along the water's edge on the right bank, positioning them in trench sections sheltered from the plunging fire of the castle, and deployed skirmishers on the spurs closest to the city. These dispositions were not yet complete when eleven boats unexpectedly set out from the city to head down the Ebro; despite their best efforts, our soldiers, unable to keep pace with the current-assisted boats due to the difficult terrain, managed to bring in only two of them. All the boats were laden with inhabitants fleeing with their belongings, hoping to reach Tortosa to escape the hardships of the siege. This minor incident underscored the need to capture the city quickly.

At daybreak, as sections of the parallel and the communication trenches cut into the rock proved incomplete, blasting charges had to be used to deepen them.

2nd NIGHT, of 3 to 4 June.

The parallel was widened, deepened, and extended about forty meters to the left. Sandbag loopholes were successfully constructed to allow firing into the enemy's embrasures.

On the city-attack front, the troops advanced eighty meters along the river and attempted to shield their positions with a short parallel trench; however, musket fire from the fort, and especially from a small breastwork, called *fer à cheval*, located sixty meters in front of the castle's left flank, enfiladed our trenches in this sector. Furthermore, it was impossible to position cannon here to fire on the city, owing both to the narrow space between the mountain and the riverbank and to the fire from a gun mounted on a square tower at the end of the defensive wall by the Ebro.

At daybreak on 4 June, during the assault on the castle, our musket fire forced the enemy to block their embrasures with wool bales. General Rogniat deployed skirmishers on the right bank of the Ebro, opposite the city, to drive the enemy from the square tower position.

The artillery began work on three batteries.

Battery No. 1, consisting of four 8-inch mortars and situated behind the parallel in a hollow, about five hundred meters from the fort, was tasked with lobbing bombs at the castle.

Battery No. 2, built for two pieces of 16 and two howitzers on the right side of the parallel, two hundred and sixty meters from the covered way, was to fire upon the left bastion and the adjacent flank.

Battery No. 3, mounting four pieces of 24 and two of 16, was placed in the center of the parallel on a small rise three hundred meters from the covered way; its mission was to batter a breach in

the face of the hornwork, the scarp of which was partially visible. The battery's platform was excavated into the ground, with the natural terrain serving as the parapet, thereby significantly reducing the labor required.

3rd NIGHT, of 4 to 5 June.

Work advanced from the right of the parallel via a zigzag trench sixty meters long. Communication trenches were completed and improved, while miners continued blasting the rock to widen the trench. Lieutenant Marry of the Engineers was wounded.

General Rogniat, observing that fire from our skirmishers on the right bank of the Ebro had forced some of the square tower's defenders to evacuate it and retreat to the castle, ordered an advance against the tower. The force comprised a detachment of sappers commanded by Captain Foucauld and a company of Vistula Grenadiers led by Battalion Commander Chlusowietz. The walls and entrenchments were scaled, and by nine o'clock in the evening, the troops had established a foothold within the tower and the town's outermost houses. The enemy then withdrew into the fort, abandoning eight cannons, four hundred fusils, and a quantity of ammunition in the town. The sappers immediately set about creating covered passages through the streets and across the squares to shield themselves from the fort's musket fire. As for the artillery fire, it was too high to cause any harm. The Vistula Battalion occupied the town. Houses facing the fort's ramps were loopholed to prevent the enemy from sallying out. In any case, it was unlikely they would dare attempt a surprise attack via a route that was steep and narrow, and offered a perilous line of retreat. Consequently, they limited themselves to lobbing shells and rolling down stones, actions that caused little trouble for our outposts.

4th NIGHT, of 5 to 6 June.

The right-hand zigzag begun the previous day on the plateau was extended by forty meters. On the left, the troops took advantage of a fold in the terrain to advance sixty meters beyond the parallel, where they began constructing an assembly area. Enemy fire was intense; a dozen men were lost.

5th NIGHT, of 6 to 7 June.

A detachment of grenadiers and sappers was ordered to capture the outpost known as the horseshoe, located in front of the left bastion. Our men behaved like true elite soldiers, acting with vigor and speed; they seized the fortification and held it under heavy fire from the stronghold. Miners were set to work there to breach the scarp on our side, a task accomplished in short order. A second communication trench, about sixty meters long, was then constructed from the right approach line to reach a hollow that offered covered access to the horseshoe. An additional communication trench was also opened from the assembly area.

At daybreak on 7 June, these works were improved. General Suchet, who had been called to Saragossa by affairs in Aragon, arrived at the camp and inspected the trenches and the positions facing the city.

6th NIGHT, of 7 to 8 June.

A lodgment about sixty meters long was constructed at the gorge of the horseshoe (captured the previous day) and converted into an assembly area for stationing skirmishers and gathering the troops designated for the assault. Two sections of communication trench were added to the left approach line; however, finding cover proved difficult in several places, as the ground consisted of nothing but bare rock. We were now only six hundred meters from the covered way. After overcoming the terrain's difficulties to set up their batteries, the artillery crews finished arming and supplying them that very night.

On 8 June, at five in the morning, we opened fire with eight cannons, four mortars, and two howitzers. The enemy contested our superiority for a time, and three guns in our Battery No. 3 were dismounted; however, our gunners, supported by the fire of skirmishers posted behind sandbagged embrasures, soon gained the upper hand. By nine o'clock, the stronghold's masonry parapets had already been leveled, and its cannon was all but silenced. For an hour, the enemy attempted to mask their artillery's failure with intense musketry fire while striving to bring their guns back into action. Yet our shells, wreaking even greater havoc within the keep than our solid shot did upon the ramparts, soon threw the entire garrison into disarray and panic. At ten o'clock, the governor hoisted a white flag and asked to capitulate.

The garrison remained prisoners of war and retained their baggage. It numbered fourteen hundred men, including seventy-eight officers; it had lost approximately four hundred men. While negotiations were underway, soldiers who had left the trenches to converse with the Spaniards had made their way into the fort; the officers designated to carry out the terms of capitulation found them already established there when they entered through the gate to take possession. There were forty-five pieces of artillery, four hundred thousand cartridges, thirty thousand pounds of gunpowder, a large quantity of projectiles, and provisions for three months. The water in the cistern was very poor and was beginning to run low².

The fall of Mequinenza completed our occupation of the fortified points in Aragon. Wishing to capitalize on the enemy's demoralization, the General-in-Chief sent General Montmarie with his brigade to capture the castle of Morella, located fourteen leagues south of Alcañiz in the Kingdom of Valencia; this post was occupied on 13 June, meeting almost no resistance. It was put into a state of defense and became a highly useful stronghold for the Third Corps, serving to cover Aragon and keep watch over the Kingdom of Valencia, while the strongholds of Mequinenza and Lérida provided bases to support operations against Lower Catalonia, a region the Seventh Corps had not yet managed to subdue.



² See supporting documents, No. 2

STATE

OF TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF MÉQUINENZA.

INFANTRY.

2nd DIVISION, General Musnier.

1 st Brigade, General Paris.	{	1 st Vistula.....	1	bn.	731	m.
		" "	"			
2 nd Brigade, General Vergès.	{	114 th Regiment.....	3		1,678	
		121 st Regiment.....	3		1,765	
3 rd Brigade, General Montmarie.	{	14 th Regiment.....	2		846	
		" "	"		608	
TOTAL.....			9		5,020	m.

ARTILLERY.

GENERAL STAFF.

Baron Valée, Brigadier General, commanding the artillery of the Third Corps and at the siege.
 Raffron, Battalion Commander, Chief of Staff.
 Desclaibes, Captain, Aide-de-camp to General Valée.
 Lieffroy, Captain.

TROOPS.

Foot Artillery	{	1 st Regiment.....	{	20 th Company.....	68	m.
		3 rd Regiment.....		18 th Company.....	132	
TOTAL.....					192	m.

ENGINEERS.

GENERAL STAFF.

Baron Rogniat, Brigadier General, commanding the engineers.

Haxo, Colonel, Chief of Attack.

Sèbe, Battalion Commander, Chief of Staff (wounded).

Chulliot, Captain.

Ponssin, id.

Pinot, id.

Maillard, id.

Papigny, id.

Thiebault, Aide-de-camp to General Rogniat.

Dupau, Captain.

Séa,

Cartier, id.

Hudry, id.

Dombre, Lieutenant.

Ordinaire, Lieutenant.

Valessie, id.

Lamezan, id.

Morvan, id.

Marry, (wounded).

Guillemain, id.

Revol, id.

Jacquand, id.

Berthois, id.

Becquerel, id.

Lemercier, id.

Raffart, id.

TROOPS.

Miners.		2 nd Bn., det. of the 4 th Co.		Romphleur, Lieut.....		1	off.	30	m.	4	h.
		4 th Comp.	{	Quéru, 2 nd Capt.....	}	2		60		10	
		4 th Bn. {		Aubert, 2 nd Lieut.....	}	2		83		11	
Sappers.	{	6 th Comp.	{	Legros, 2 nd Capt.....	}	2		105		6	
			{	Duguet, Lt. (wounded)..	}	3		84		115	
		5 th Bn.	2 nd Comp.	Foucauld, Capt.....							
			{	Leviston, 1 st Lieut.....	}	3		105		6	
			{	Leclerc, 2 nd Lieut.....	}	3		84		115	
			{	Lemancel, Capt.....	}	3		84		115	
Train.....		4 th Comp.	{	Michaud, Lieut.....	}	3		84		115	
			{	Ribette, Sub-Lieut.....	}	3		84		115	
TOTAL.....						11	off.	362	m.	146	h.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.

No. 1.

*Letter from General Suchet, Commander of the Third
Corps, to Prince Berthier, Major General.*

Zaragoza, 21 May 1810.

My Prince,

I have just begun the investment of Mequinenza. Its position at the confluence of the Ebro and the Segre, and the vast wasteland surrounding it, present only a fraction of the difficulties that must be overcome to bring artillery into position. Its garrison numbers fifteen hundred men, and there are thirty-six pieces of cannon, as opposed to the four present in 1707. I have five hundred peasants and five hundred soldiers at work, not to build a road, which would require months of labor, but to clear away the main obstacles and finally, through great effort and caution, manage to transport the artillery; I therefore do not foresee being able to open the trenches before the 30th at the earliest. I shall be compelled to open trenches against both the fort and the town in order to achieve a quicker result. General Rogniat of the Engineers has arrived in Zaragoza and is about to depart to oversee the operation.

Possession of this fortress is essential to command the course of the Ebro and to threaten Tortosa. It is the only point through which siege artillery can be moved; the roads formerly used on both banks of the Ebro have fallen into such disrepair that it is difficult to traverse them even on horseback.

I am, etc.

Signed: COUNT SUCHET.

No. 2.

*Report from General Suchet, Commander of the Third Corps,
to Prince Berthier, Major General.*

At the camp of Mequinenza, 8 June 1810.

My Prince,

The situation of the fortress of Mequinenza, perched on a steep crag amidst a vast, desolate landscape and at the confluence of the Ebro and Segre rivers, could rightly be considered inaccessible along three-quarters of its perimeter; it consists of a keep fronted by a fortification line where the ditch and the palisaded covered way are hewn directly into the rock. The town of Mequinenza itself, situated on the banks of the Ebro, entrenched, barricaded, and armed, further compounded the difficulties of this position.

The investment, begun on the night of 20 May by a detachment of General Musnier's division, was completed on the 25th when General Montmarie appeared on the right bank of the Ebro. From the very first day, the enemy kept up a sustained artillery fire on our camps and launched three sorties, all of which were vigorously repulsed.

The task at hand was to construct a road for our cannons. Colonel Haxo skillfully laid out a fine route through the rugged mountains guarding the approaches to the stronghold; a thousand Catalan peasants and an equal number of soldiers energetically undertook this arduous task, while a company of sappers used mines to blast through the rock. This road was extended to the Ebro, enabling us to open trenches against both the town and the fort simultaneously.

The artillery had already assembled its resources when, on the night of 2 to 3 June, Colonel Haxo oversaw the opening of the trench by seven hundred men at a distance of one hundred toises from the hornwork. During the day, the workmen were not fully under cover in certain sections of the parallel and the communication trenches, where solid rock had been encountered; it was even necessary to tether the miner so he could excavate using blasting charges. Grapeshot rained down on our men yet failed to daunt them. We suffered sixty casualties, killed or wounded; among the latter was Engineer Battalion Commander Sèbe.

The following night, work resumed with greater vigor; the parallel was completed, and construction of our batteries began in extremely hard ground.

During the night of the 4th to 5th, General Rogniat, having identified the possibility of attacking the town via the Zaragoza road, organized an assault to capture a square tower armed with two pieces of 12. The Second Battalion of the First Vistula Regiment, despite massive stone blocks being hurled down from above, flanked the fortification by moving along the banks of the Ebro and scaling a difficult escarpment situated between the castle and the tower. Hemmed in, the enemy was forced to flee; the perimeter wall was scaled, and we soon secured the town, along with eight cannons, four hundred fusils, fifteen barrels of gunpowder, and eleven large boats. Battalion Commander Chlusowietz and Captain Foucauld of the Sappers led the attacks with great vigor; though the enemy rained heavy fire upon the town, we succeeded in establishing a

foothold there. During the night of the 5th to 6th, new approach trenches were pushed forward onto the plateau to within fifty toises of the glacis.

I inspected the trenches and the town on the 7th; satisfied that the encirclement was so complete that nothing could escape us, I turned my attention entirely to pressing the attack on the castle.

The artillery had succeeded in bringing sixteen guns into battery when, at four o'clock on the morning of the 8th, the enemy spotted our embrasures and opened up a furious barrage. I ordered Squadron Leader Raffron, who was in command of the siege artillery and performed his duties with great distinction, to return fire. The enemy contested our superiority for a time; three guns in Battery No. 3 were put out of action; however, the skill of our artillery officers, the dexterity of our gunners, and above all their intrepid bravery, soon secured a decisive advantage. By nine o'clock, a large section of the hornwork's parapet had completely collapsed, four embrasures were out of action, and the fortress's fire had been almost entirely silenced.

For an hour, the enemy attempted to mask their artillery's failure with intense musketry fire; at the same time, they could be seen working to repair their batteries and vainly trying to remount their guns. Yet, our shells were wreaking as much havoc inside the keep as our cannonballs were on the ramparts, soon spreading disorder and terror within.

At ten o'clock, the enemy beat the parley and hoisted the white flag; I ordered them to surrender at discretion, to punish the insolence with which one of my aides-de-camp had been received after the capture of Lérida, having been refused any hearing whatsoever. I entered the fort with two companies of grenadiers; I then agreed, out of regard for the Governor and the bravery of the garrison's artillerymen, to allow the troops to march past General Musnier's division, lay down their arms on the glacis, and be taken to France as prisoners of war. The force consists of fourteen hundred men, including seventy-eight officers.

Among the prisoners is the regiment of the English General Doyle, Commissioner in Aragon, who had sought to demonstrate to that province the interest England takes in the insurgents by raising, two years ago at his own expense and with the Junta's authorization, a regiment of chasseurs, uniformed and armed in the English style, even though the men were almost entirely Aragonese and Navarrese.

At Mequinenza, we found forty-five pieces of artillery, four hundred thousand English cartridges, fifty thousand pounds of gunpowder, a large quantity of cast iron, and provisions for two thousand men for three months. It is rightly called the key to the Ebro. The enemy artillery fired ten thousand rounds in nineteen days.

I am sending Squadron Commander Meyer, my Aide-de-Camp, to deliver this report to Your Highness; I have entrusted him with ten standards captured from the enemy, a tribute the Third Corps is proud to lay at the Emperor's feet; I ask Y. H. to present it to His Majesty.

I must not conclude without mentioning to Y. H. the distinguished manner in which Generals Rogniat and Valée are commanding their respective arms. I particularly request that Y. H. bring

this to the attention of H.M. General of Division Musnier, who commanded the siege troops, displayed both zeal and energy.

I remain, with respect, etc.

Signed: COUNT SUCHET.

