HISTORY OF THE LIFEGUARD JÄGER REGIMENT

1794-1815

Compiled by Staff-Captain V.A. Grendal, Staff-Captain Baiov (1871 to 1935) and Sub-Lieutenant A.P. Kosagovsky (1871 to ?) of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment from archived documents and other historical sources.

St. Petersburg 1896.

[Edited and translated from the original Russian into English by P.G.A. Phillips].

CONTENTS.

Chapter 1. The raising of the Guard Jäger Battalion.

Appendix I. Extract from the 1765 jäger regulations.

Appendix II. Classes for officers of the Gatchina Force.

Appendix III. Composition of the Gatchina Force.

Appendix IV. Description of the manoeuvres at Gatchina from 1794 to 1796.

Appendix V. Supreme Orders dated 9 [20] November 1796.

Appendix VI. Rescript to Lieutenant Colonel Rachinsky dated 6 [17] February 1797.

Appendix VII. Officers assigned to the new battalion.

Appendix VIII. Establishment for the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion, 10 [21] July 1798.

Appendix IX. Gatchina manoeuvres, 1 to 15 [12 to 26] September 1797.

Appendix X. Gatchina manoeuvres, 1800.

Chapter 2. The Lifeguard Jäger Battalion's baptism of fire.

Appendix I. Establishment of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion, 29 December 1802 [10 January 1803].

Appendix II. List of officers present on the 1805 campaign.

Chapter 3. The War of 1806 to 1807.

Appendix I. List of officers decorated for Lomitten, 24 May [5 June] 1807.

Appendix II. List of officers decorated for Heilsberg and Friedland, 1807.

Appendix III. List of lower ranks awarded the Military Order in 1807.

Chapter 4. The Swedish War of 1808 to 1809.

Appendix I. Regimental Order of the Day, 22 January [3 February] 1808.

Appendix II. List of officers decorated for 2 to 3 [14 to 15] June 1808.

Appendix III. List of officers decorated for 19 June [1 July] 1808.

Appendix IV. List of officers from the regiment on Bagration's staff, 1808 to 1809.

Appendix V. List of lower ranks awarded the Military Order from 1808 to 1809.

Appendix VI. Ensign Batyushkov's poetry dedicated to his fellow officers.

Chapter 5. The Patriotic War of 1812.

Appendix I. March-route of the Lifeguard Jägers to Vilna.

Appendix II. Colonel Bistrom's report to General Lavrov, 31 August [12 September] 1812.

Appendix III. List of officers decorated for 26 August [7 September] 1812.

Appendix IV. List of lower ranks awarded the Military Order for 26 August [7 September] 1812.

Appendix V. List of officers decorated for 3 to 6 [15 to 18] November 1812.

Chapter 6. The wars against Napoleon from 1813 to 1815.

Appendix I. List of regimental officers in 1813.

Appendix II. List of officers left behind at the start of the 1813 campaign due to illness and wounds.

Appendix III. General Lavrov's report to Grand Duke Konstantin, 30 April [12 May] 1813.

Appendix IV. Reserve Battalions of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment.

Appendix V. General Yermolov's report to General Osterman-Tolstoy, 22 August [3 September] 1813.

Appendix VI. Count Osterman-Tolstoy's report to the Commander-in-Chief.

Appendix VII. Supreme Rescript to the Guard, dated 26 August [7 September] 1813.

Appendix VIII. Alexander Semchenko's Song Commemorating the Battle of Kulm.

Appendix IX. General Bistrom's report to General Yermolov, 21 October [2 November] 1813.

Appendix X. March-route from St. Petersburg to Vilna, June to August 1815.

Appendix XI. List of officers who served in the regiment from 1796 to 1815.

CHAPTER 1.

The Raising of the Guard Jäger Battalion.



The origins of light infantry.

Infantry has been classified into heavy and light since ancient times. The distinction was based on the differences in armament: light infantry operated primarily with missile weapons and in loose formation, while heavy infantry were intended for decisive strikes in close formation in hand-to-hand combat. By the beginning of the 18th century, long after the introduction of firearms and after the invention of the bayonet attached to the musket, all infantry had became identical in armament, and the distinction between light and line (heavy) was blurred.

The light infantry of Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great.

Thereafter, light infantry was revived for operations in what was referred to as the *petite guerre*. In the middle of the 18th century, Maria Theresa, straining all her resources in the fight against Prussia, sent Croats and Pandurs against Frederick the Great. Living on the Austrian border, in constant clashes with the Turks, they had developed naturally into excellent light infantry. Untrained to operate in close formation, they performed excellent outpost and reconnaissance duties, deftly attacked enemy units, outposts and convoys, while in pitched battles they operated skilfully in close and rugged terrain, in villages and scrub, something that Frederick's line infantry was less capable of. The Croats and Pandurs inflicted much damage on the enemy and shielded Austrian units from surprise attacks.

Frederick the Great wanted to introduce something similar for himself in order to counter the Austrian light infantry. During the Seven Years' War (1756 to 1763) he raised several free battalions (*Freibataillone*); but this light infantry turned out to be not particularly good quality, perhaps because Frederick did not have such good raw material as the Austrians, rather, they were manned by *Werben* [recruited] troops. He had more success with *Jäger zu Fuß*.[1]

In 1740, during the First Silesian War, Frederick took a detachment of 60 jägers with him armed with rifled muskets in order to carry out outpost and reconnaissance duties. By the beginning of the Second Silesian War this detachment had increased to 300 men, forming two companies, and in 1756 it was reorganised into a battalion of 400 men; in 1760, the Russians completely destroyed it in the Battle of Charlottenburg, but a similar new battalion was immediately raised in its place, which was later expanded into a regiment of ten companies and 1,300 men.

1 Light infantry was first encountered under the designation of jägers in the Thirty Years' War, namely: three jäger companies under Landgraf Wilhelm von Hesse-Kassel, are mentioned; somewhat later, jägers also appear in Wallenstein's forces. The jägers were armed with rifled muskets. In 1674, in the army of the Großen Kurfürsten von Brandenburg, each company included several jägers, whose job it was primarily to shoot at enemy officers.

The reliability of the jägers was based on them being manned by peasants, the sons of forestry game keepers, and after several years of service in the army they themselves could obtain positions as foresters on royal estates. The main advantage of the jägers was their accurate shooting; their formation was open.

To counteract the Prussian *Jäger zu Fuß*, the Austrians formed a corps of German jägers in 1758, and a corps of Tyrolean marksmen in 1778; the latter distinguished themselves with great talent.[2]



General-Feldmarschall Count Pyotr Alexandrovich Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky.

Jägers in Russia under Rumyantsev, Panin and Potemkin.

The foundations for jäger infantry in Russia, as well as loose formations, were laid by Rumyantsev. Having noticed the advantages that the jägers and *Freibataillone* brought to the Prussians in the Seven Years' War during his operations around Kolberg [Kołobrzeg] in 1761 he raised a special battalion of *okhotniki* [hunters],[3] which, although not designated a jäger battalion, by the nature of their operations fully corresponded to this title. The battalion was divided into five companies of 100 men each; for greater sustained fire, two muskets were assigned per man. Their equipment was lightened to the greatest possible extent: bayonets were hung from their sword belts instead of swords, heavy grenadier pouches were replaced with light musketeer ones, tents were withdrawn, braid was ripped from hats, ponchos (cloaks) were left only to those who wanted them; each soldier was provided with a *schnabsack* (haversack) with three days of rations; each *artel* [mess] (12 men) was supposed to have a small camp kettle. When going into action, they were ordered to select 'the most appropriate and advantageous' locations: 'in forests, villages, in meadows; in ambuscades (ambush), they are to lie quietly and keep silent, always having foot patrols ahead and to the sides' the enemy were ordered 'to be attacked from behind' even the strongest enemy were ordered to be attacked in forests, since they could not assess the strength of their assailants. Jägers were also employed in support of operations by light cavalry.

Rumyantsev was not the only one to draw the concept of the need for jägers in the Russian army

2 Rustov, *История пехоты* [History of the Infantry], St. Petersburg, 1876, volume XVI, pp. 227 to 236, in the Military Library; Duhesme, *Essai historique sur l'infanterie légère*, Paris, 1864.

3 Military Science Archive of the General Staff [M.S.A.], minute No. 247, Count Rumyantsev's orders to Second-Major Miller, dated 18 [29] August 1761.

from the experiences of the Seven Years' War.



General-in-Chief Count Pyotr Ivanovich Panin.

General-in-Chief Count Pyotr Ivanovich Panin, commanding the forces stationed in Finland in 1763 and 1764 ('where the lay of the land is such that in the event of military operations it is completely impossible to exploit the advantages of light cavalry units, rather, it requires light and capable infantry in order to employ them to advantage'), formed a special 300 man jäger detachment in his division, manning it by allocating five men per company from every infantry regiment. Panin asked the military commission to inspect his sub-unit and, if there was any benefit in such a corps, to include it in the Russian army. The military commission, seeing the obvious benefit of such an innovation, requested Supreme permission to establish jäger sub-units in line infantry regiments in its report dated 13 [24] October 1765.[4]

Permission was granted and the jäger sub-units were formed, numbering just 1,650 men,[5] while by 1767 the total in all jäger sub-units reached 3,540 men.[6]

According to a report by the Military Collegium dated 13 [24] November 1769, such sub-units were excluded from the complement of line infantry regiments and formed independent companies, while by 1770, such sub-units had been established in the Lifeguard Preobrazhensky, Semyonovsky and Izmailovsky regiments, numbering 72 men in each.

The sub-units of Guard Jägers under Catherine II underwent almost no changes in their composition. They served on a par with the rest of the Guard of that time. In peacetime, in addition to their regular daily duties, they maintained sentry posts in St. Petersburg, as well as in Tsarskoye Selo and the Peterhof, whenever the Royal Family were in residence.

The Guard Jägers, as with all the volunteers from Guard regiments, participated in the Archipelago Expedition [the Aegean Sea], on the ships of Count A.G. Orlov's fleet, which operated in Mediterranean waters during the war against the Turks from 1769 to 1774. The jägers joined the expedition on 25 December 1770 [6 January 1771] at the port of Auza [Naousa] on the island of Paros; they had been delivered there by Rear Admiral Arf's squadron (three ships-of-the-line, one

4 Military Encyclopaedic Lexicon, 1854, volume 5, p. 322. For the text of the Supreme approved regulations on jägers, see Appendix I to Chapter 1.

5 Dubrovin, A.V. Suvorov, St. Petersburg, 1885, p. 47.

6 Maslovsky, *Записки по истории военного искусства въ России* [Notes on the history of the art of war in Russia], 2nd edition, St. Petersburg, 1894, p.59

frigate and several transports), but their amphibious operations on the shores of the Archipelago were insignificant.



Empress Catherine II in 1773.

During the First Turkish War under Catherine, in 1770, the commander-in-chief Rumyantsev, on his own initiative, combined the regimental jäger sub-units into detachment jäger battalions, but in addition to this, every company contained several jägers in each of the other army units; four guns were assigned to each jäger battalion. The jäger battalions formed independent squares on the flanks of the battle formation, sometimes supported the cavalry and were mostly employed in loose formation.

Jägers participated with considerable success in Rumyantsev's victories at Larga and Kagul in 1770, but Suvorov, who commanded a detachment in Rumyantsev's army, made particularly extensive

use of them. Suvorov's use of jägers in loose formation during the raids on Turtukaya [Tutrakan] on 10 [21] May and 17 [28] June 1773, was remarkable.

Suvorov's type of battle formation at Turtukaya, with screens of jägers, advanced far beyond the flanks and forward of the close-order units, vividly brings to mind the type of battle formation from the perpendicular tactics developed during the era of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Thus, Suvorov's battle formation arose in our army independently and much earlier than its appearance in Western Europe.[7] Rumyantsev's organisational measures were granted Supreme approval after the war.

The jäger sub-units established in 1765 and 1769, were reorganised into independent six-company jäger battalions by way of decrees dated 22 February [5 March] 1775 and 26 May [6 June] 1777.[8]

Potemkin, who was the president of the Military Collegium and served under Rumyantsev in the First Turkish War, clearly understood the importance of jägers and was concerned about increasing their number, their ideal composition and organisation. In 1785, the independent jäger battalions (except for those in Siberia), with the addition of men from various regiments, were reformed into a four-battalion Jäger Corps,[9] while the number of jägers in 1786 reached 29,940 men.[10]

In 1786, the Kuban Jäger Corps was added, while the Yekaterinoslav Jäger Corps was added in 1787;[11] In 1788, the Estland Jäger Corps was formed, in 1793 the Malorussia Infantry Marksman Corps (5,600 men) and the Caucasus, Tauride [Crimea], Bug, Belorussia, Finland and Livonia Jäger Corps,[12] and in 1795 the Lithuania Jäger Corps.[13] The number of jägers reached 38,922 men in 1795.[14]

Potemkin fully developed Rumyantsev's principles of organising light infantry: the ability to conduct independent operations, the requirement for forced marches, speed, covert movement, individual action across rough terrain, accuracy of musketry in general and individual fire by the best marksmen in particular. With regard to the types of formation for jägers, who were tasked with implementing extended order, the following can be said;

1. The types of closed formations in the jäger battalions remain strictly in accordance with the format from the old regulations, but in all cases they are to be protected by a screen of skirmishers.
2. The men of the screen are to be positioned five paces apart, in a single rank, approximately 30 paces[15] from the closed-order element, covering their front and flanks.
3. If necessary, the entire battalion could spread out as a screen, with weak reserves behind

7 Maslovsky.

8 1st and 2nd Siberia, Belorussia, Bug, Kabardia, Gorsky, Dnieper and Finland (Complete Collection of Laws [C.C.L.] volume XLIII, No. 14,257 and No. 14,614). In 1784, the Sviyazhsk, Mozdok, 1st and 2nd Jäger Battalions were also formed.

9 Imperial Russian Guard 1700 to 1878; Baron Steinheil's Chronological Tables of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment.

10 Maslovsky, p. 62.

11 Imperial Russian Guard 1700 to 1878; Baron Steinheil's Chronological Tables of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment; Bobrovsky, History of the Leib-Grenadier Yerivan Regiment, St Petersburg, 1893, part III, p. 21; Prince Potemkin's log of outgoing documents, No. 967.

12 C.C.L. volume XLIII, No. 16,128 and No. 16,131.

13 Dubrovin, p. 106.

14 Maslovsky, p. 62.

15 Let us remember that the effective accurate range of musket fire reached only 60 paces [about 50 yards] at that time.

it: behind the centre in defence, or behind the centre and both flanks during an attack.[16]

In 1788, Potemkin drafted specific instructions for training jägers, which, by the will of the Empress, were made mandatory for all jäger units of the Russian army in 1789.[17]



General-Feldmarschall Prince Grigory Alexandrovich Potemkin-Tavrichesky.

16 Maslovsky, p. 60 and 82.

17 Here is an excerpt from these instructions: 'Handle the musket and keep it to the required cleanliness, without extending this to the point of polishing the ironwork, which is harmful to the weapon and adds to the soldier's pointless tasks. Teach them the proportions of powder to ball; they are to patch rifle ball for long range fire. Teach them how to load quickly but precisely, aim accurately, and release the shot correctly and swiftly. Train them to run quickly, to crawl into cover, to hide in pits and hollows, to hide behind rocks, scrub, mounds, to shoot from cover and, to reload the gun lying on their backs. Show them the huntsman's tricks of deception and concealment of their position, such as: placing a helmet off to one side in order to give the enemy a false target and thus save oneself, playing dead and then killing the approaching enemy. Also teach them pistol shooting, showing them the range of a shot, so that they do not shoot in vain beyond pistol range. It is good practice to prepare several rounds of buckshot for each man, one for every eight of ball. The movements used in such training cannot be harmful, but on the contrary, through them the limbs are straightened, the men become more lively and agile, and often courage is born of this. Select the best, healthiest and most agile 20 men from each company, who have already been trained, and will thereafter serve to train the others. I would like the jägers not deliver fire in any other way, than soundly and promptly, which should result in better combat shooting (Dubrovin, A.V. Suvorov, p. 121).

The jäger corps were composed of men who were agile and resourceful, while field officers who had attracted the most attention were selected to command them. And indeed, they often produced men who became renowned for their military talents. Thus, among the commanders of the jäger corps, we find M.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov (later Prince Smolensky), Gudovich and Mikhelson, and the following were battalion commanders at various times: Barclay de Tolly, Prince P.I. Bagration and Count N.M. Kamensky.[18]

At the beginning of the reign of Paul Petrovich in 1796, a decree was issued on the reorganisation of the jäger corps into five-company jäger battalions, and then, on 17 [28] May 1797, about the formation of ten-company jäger regiments.[19]



His Imperial Majesty, Sovereign Emperor Paul I Petrovich.

The Gatchina Force under Grand Duke Paul Petrovich.

The jäger company, which formed the basis for the Guard Jäger Battalion, was raised in the Gatchina Force, which, in the eyes of Tsarevich Paul Petrovich, seemed to be the future breeding ground for true military evolution in Russia.

Upon the return of the Grand Duke from abroad, he settled on Kamenny Island, and in 1782, a permanent squad of 30 men was raised from the marine battalions instead of the sentries that

18 Dubrovin, p. 106.

19 Bobrovsky, part III, p. 76.

were assigned there from the fleet.[20] Another similar squad was assigned to Pavlovsk, which belonged to Paul Petrovich.[21]

In 1784, each squad was increased to 80 men. Command of both was entrusted to Captain-Lieutenant [staff-captain] Baron Steinwehr. The successful training of these squads in accordance with Prussian military regulations gave rise to the idea of increasing their numbers even further. When the Tsarevich moved to Gatchina in 1786, his force already numbered 360 men, comprising three companies, namely: His Highness', Lieutenant May's and Captain Steinwehr's. Each company had its own banner.

On 20 [31] May 1788, a five-company battalion was formed from these companies, designated His Imperial Highness' Battalion. At this time, the Gatchina Force took part in combat operations for the first and last time, namely, the battalion was sent to Finland by sled, reached Fredrikshamn [Hamina], where it was present for the cannonade of the Swedish force. From there the battalion returned via Vyborg, where some of the men were seconded to the navy.

In 1791 the battalion was reformed into a six-company structure of five grenadier companies and one flank company.

The raising of a jäger company in the Gatchina Force in April 1794.

The Gatchina Force continued to expand. Thus, in 1792, men were allocated from the aforementioned battalion to form Battalions No. 2 and No. 3. Each consisted of five companies, but in 1793 a sixth company was added to each. Having acknowledged the benefits of the existence of light infantry and approving the introduction of jägers into the Russian army, Paul Petrovich considered it necessary to assign some to his small Gatchina detachment; therefore, in 1793, a jäger company was formed, consisting of seven men from each company of the Gatchina Force; however, after some time, the men were returned to the battalions. In April 1794, 60 men from battalions No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 were seconded to form a jäger company, which was then not disbanded, but rather developed into larger units. Their commander was Major Anton Mikhailovich Rachinsky.[22]

In July 1794, Battalion No. 4 was raised, and in 1796 two more new battalions: No. 5 from some men from Battalions No. 1 and No. 4, and No. 6 from No. 2 and No. 3; 20 men were assigned from the jäger company to replenish No. 5 Battalion, while the company's composition was confirmed to be 52 officers and lower ranks.[23]

Employment and service in the Gatchina Force.

The Gatchina Force was divided into inspectorates according to combat arm; Lieutenant Colonel Baratynsky was initially the inspector of infantry, but having incurred the displeasure of the Tsarevnich, he was replaced in early 1796 by Arakcheev, who combined the positions of inspector of artillery and of infantry. Arakcheev took his duties very seriously, and training sessions lasted 12 hours a day. Considering that the formation was required to maintain impeccable alignment during difficult movements with the battalion in line, perform complex evolutions, load according to tempo, and perform musket drill according to the *Flügelmann* [right-hand marker],[24] it was natural

20 Paul Petrovich was listed as General-Admiral.

21 V. Ratch, Information regarding Count A.A. Arakcheev, p. 75.

22 Lieutenant Colonel Liedler was initially appointed colonel-in-chief of the jäger company, but in that same year he was retired from service with a pension. Information on the Gatchina Force, St. Petersburg, 1835, p. 87.

23 Information on the Gatchina Force, p. 108. On page 8 of the same brochure, the composition of the company in 1795 was determined to be 32 full-time and two supernumeries.

24 The best soldiers in the companies, who knew the techniques and drills very well, were appointed as *Flügelmann*;

that tired soldiers made many mistakes, which infuriated their superiors, who did not understand that it was not the men who were to blame, rather, the system. Possessing an iron constitution and an almost supernatural tirelessness, the new inspector would not leave the field during the entire training session; nothing escaped his watchful eye, and anyone found blameworthy was subject to severe punishment. A contemporary of Arakcheev described him as follows: '*jamais poète pyndarique ne fut plus impérieusement tourmenté de son Apollon, que cet homme n'est obsédé de son démon martial*' [no Pindaric poet was ever more imperiously tormented by his Apollo than this man is obsessed with his martial demons].[25] Corrective measures in Gatchina included running the gauntlet, or being struck with the flat of a sword, ramrod, or cane. It must be assumed that the old proverb: 'where there is learning, there are canes' was born in Gatchina.

Sentry duty was perhaps the most difficult. Gatchina, by then already considerably enlarged by the addition of palace buildings, barracks, and officers' quarters, had the appearance and even the structure of a small German town; barriers with guardrooms were built on all its entrance roads, such that the number of guardrooms and posts was quite large for the small Gatchina garrison. And the requirements were strict; the inspector visited every guardroom and punished any shortcomings. While Catherine's guards stood sentry, sometimes simply going out in dressing gowns to pick mushrooms, Gatchina officers were obliged to sit for 24 hours dressed in uniform, not daring to smoke or read.

The manoeuvres between 1794 and 1796.

In addition to drill exercises and sentry duty, manoeuvres were often carried out, in which the Tsarevich often took direct part.

During manoeuvres, jägers were assigned to occupy forests, scrub, enclosures, and generally to operate in rough terrain, in loose formation; they were deployed forward or to the flanks, in the vanguard, to operate alongside Cossacks, thus jägers were supposed to be employed to make the initial contact with the enemy in the most dangerous locations. Because the Russians had to swim across rivers and lakes and land along the coast during the war with Sweden, the Tsarevich trained the troops in amphibious operations during the manoeuvres in Gatchina, with the jägers being the first in line.[26]

The service support element of the force: the provisioning department and the commissariat department were united under the jurisdiction of the military department established in Gatchina at that time. Their purpose was to draft precise and proper regulations for the issue and receipt of all supplies.[27]

The department's task was far from easy, since the Grand Duke maintained the entire court and made improvements to the Gatchina estate from the paltry sum of 30,000 roubles, allocated at the Empress' discretion.

The Gatchina Force included a wide variety of people: Serbs, sons of Malorussia, various men on furlough, those on secondment, volunteers, and sometimes even deserters from the army. The reason for this was as follows: the Empress looked unfavourably on her son's plans, who sought to

---

They were obliged to perform musket drills in front of the formation, who repeated everything after the *Flügelmann*. For example, in the Military Regulations on Infantry Field Service, p. 12 states: 'All techniques are to be performed swiftly and briefly as done by the *Flügelmann*; the *Flügelmann* is also to perform these swiftly, but with flair.'

25 V. Ratch, Information regarding Count A.A. Arakcheev, pp. 98 and 99.

26 Information on the Gatchina Force, pp. 27 to 70.

27 Ratch, Information on Count Arakcheev, p. 97.

constantly increase the strength of his battalions; the men assigned from the navy to perform sentry duty were not enough, and therefore it was necessary to resort to *Werben*.



Count Alexei Andreevich Arakcheev.

It was mentioned above that the Tsarevich wished to strictly adhere to Prussian doctrine in training his troops; who could teach it better than the Germans themselves; this explains the large number of Germans among the Gatchina officers, especially since the conditions for acceptance into service were not onerous: the consent of the applicant and some basic knowledge of Prussian doctrine. One of the contemporaries summarised the general composition of Gatchina officers as follows: 'they knew nothing but the line; they had no education whatsoever and were practically the dregs of the army, because they could not be employed in the war and had not moved anywhere except for the marches from Gatchina to Pavlovsk and from Pavlovsk to Gatchina, and therefore there were few who wanted to serve in the Gatchina Force.'[28]

28 Engelhardt's papers, p. 197.

It should be added that, given his insignificant resources, Paul Petrovich could not support his troops as luxuriously as the St. Petersburg Guard were supported, as the officers received a very low salary; the simple and unattractive uniform, the long and tiring training and the onerous sentry duties would not attract wealthy youth to the Tsarevich's army, and therefore the majority of his officers consisted of Germans and the sons of impoverished landowners, who would place their relatives in the Gatchina Force at that time; only those who had absolutely no alternative served.

Classes for the officers.

Acknowledging the lack of military education among his officers and wishing to supplement it as much as possible, the Tsarevich established classes for junior officers, sub-ensigns, and *Junkers* in Gatchina through Arakcheev in 1794.

The artillery officers Cannabich, Kantsevich, Aprelev and Sievers were appointed as instructors. Classes took place in the afternoons from four to six o'clock in order not to interfere with the course of military training. In the first class, sub-ensigns and *Junkers* from the infantry and cavalry were taught handwriting, Russian language, arithmetic and the basics of geometry; in the second class, Russian language, mathematics and artillery were taught to artillery *Junkers*, and finally, in the third class, tactics and fortifications were taught to all officers.[29]

Attendance at these classes was mandatory for everyone, and Arakcheev kept a close eye on this.[30] But he could only achieve one thing: that all the officers attended classes; the main objective was not achieved due to the fact that the professors themselves were almost completely uneducated men, and contemporaries spoke of this institution as something risible.

Tactics, for example, were taught by Major I. Ya. Cannabich. A Saxe-Weimar nobleman, he joined the Gatchina Force from the Naval Cadet Corps and, with the rank of Auditor in the Sovereign Heir's Cuirassier Regiment, served as a *Bereiter* [riding master], and from 1789 had taught equestrian skills to the horse artillery.[31] He reduced the teaching of tactics to the presentation of statutory formats and placed particular emphasis on the officers' positions during all battalion evolutions.

Speaking poor Russian, Cannabich used broken phrases to talk comically about various formations and used his cane to perform spontaneous rhythms. At that time, everyone said that it was spectators who were invited to the tactical class rather than pupils.

Uniform and equipment of the jäger company.

The uniform of the Gatchina Force was a true copy of Prussian uniform. The jäger company had a long, double-breasted coat, lighter green in colour, with a collar, split cuffs and a red lining, without lace or shoulder straps, instead of which there was a yellow worsted lanyard on the right shoulder. Jäger waistcoats were lighter green, their breeches were suede, their boots were mid-calf-length, their neck-cloths were black, and their hats were untrimmed, with tassels only on the side corners made of yellow and dark green wool. The weapons and equipment consisted of a *Stutzer* [rifle], a sword-bayonet and black leather cartridge pouch.[32]

---

29 Vasily Ratch 1st, *Сведения объ артиллерии гатчинскихъ войскъ* [Information on the artillery of the Gatchina Force], St. Petersburg, 1851, p. 93.

30 The extent to which Pavel Petrovich was interested in the education of his officers is evident from the fact that he ordered a room for classes to be set aside in his own palace and ordered that he be informed as often as possible about the progress of the classes. For further details, see Appendix II at the end of this chapter.

31 V. Ratch, p. 21.

32 Viskovatov, *Описание вооружения о одежди войскъ* [Description of weapons and clothing of the troops], 1849, part 6, p. 141; Information on the Gatchina Force, pp. 78 to 79.



Jäger of the Gatchina Force.

The sword-bayonet,[33] when necessary, was fitted to the *Stutzer*. Officers, in addition to the usual distinctions of sword, spontoon and cane, were distinguished from privates by a gold lanyard on the right shoulder and a hat edged with wide gold braid; their suede gloves with long cuffs were the same as those of the lower ranks. Short sticks were used to measure the queues. The short queues played a role in dressing both the ranks and the files; the standard expression was: to 'dress on the queue' and not on the back of the head. There was a lot of fussing over powder, curls and queues; the wide hats also brought a lot of grief to the jägers, because they often flew off their heads when moving in double time, which the jägers constantly broke into when deploying.[34]

The raising of the Guard Jäger Battalion on 9 [20] November 1796.

On 6 [17] November 1796, Empress Catherine II the Great passed away and Emperor Paul I ascended the Russian throne. One of his first concerns was to properly thank his Gatchina Force. By means of a Supreme order dated 9 [20] November, they were all transferred to the Guard. From the time of this same order, the Guard Jäger Battalion (later the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment) began its existence. Here is the actual phrasing of the order:[35] 'The Semenovsky and Izmailovsky jäger companies, together with the company under Lieutenant Colonel Rachinsky, shall form the Guard Jäger Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rachinsky.' On 10 [21] November, the former private force of the Heir to the throne ceremonially entered St. Petersburg with bands playing and drums beating. The Emperor rode out to greet them with a glittering retinue. The detachment proceeded straight from the march onto the palace square and marched ceremoniously past the Tsar. The entire Guard were formed up in front of the Winter Palace to meet their new comrades. As the Gatchina Force approached with a quiet, measured, Prussian pace, they were formed up in front of the Guard. The impression made on the Guard by the Gatchina Force, or 'Prussians' as they were referred to in St. Petersburg, was enormous: they looked on with amazement at the orderly rows of passing battalions and squadrons, dressed in the Prussian style; everything was striking: even the modest uniforms worn by officers, and the dexterity and bearing of the soldiers and the excellent condition of the horses. Once the parade was complete, the Emperor rode around the troops and, turning to his charges, said to them: "I thank you, my friends, for your faithful service to me, and as a reward for it, you are joining the Guard, and the gentlemen officers are rising in rank."[36] After this, riding through the ranks, he announced that the old regiment would become part of the new regiment.[37]

The formation of our battalion took place in the following way: it took place on the site where the old Jäger Barracks are now located, while on 10 [21] November 1796, there were short wooden

33 The sword-bayonet was single edged, 13½ *vershok* [23⅝ inches] long and ¾ *vershok* [1⅓ inches] wide with a brass handle; it could be used without being fitted to the *Stutzer*. The *Stutzer* was shorter than the fusee, namely one *arshin*, 6.75 *vershok* [39⅜ inches] (the fusee was one *arshin*, 14 *vershok* [52½ inches]) and had an iron ramrod, a barrel faceted on the outside and internal rifling of eight helical grooves.

34 In order to study service in the Gatchina Force in the last period after the accession of Paul Petrovich to the throne, there is a precious manuscript in Strelna in the palace library, No. 2720: 'watchword and order book since 5 [16] July 1796.' As an example, we shall cite His Imperial Highness the Heir's Orders issued on 10 [21] July: 'If a soldier from a company deserts, the sergeant major of that company shall be demoted to private and run the gauntlet, while the company commander shall be placed under arrest for a month.'

35 Supreme Orders dated 9 [20] November 1796.

36 Count Komarovsky's papers, *Russky Arkhiv*, 1867. In addition, officers were granted estates according to their rank (field officers received from 300 to 1,000 peasant souls, captains 100, and junior officers 30), while lower ranks were given shortened terms of service for retirement and for receiving the medal of the Order of St. Anne, established for impeccable service for lower ranks;

37 *Russkaya Starina*, 1877, p. 581; Lebedev, *Преобразователи Русский армии 1796 - 1801 г.* [Reformers of the Russian Army 1796-1801].

posts. The Semenovsky, Izmailovsky, and Gatchina jägers were formed into a single rank. Their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Rachinsky, by order of Emperor Paul I, divided the battalion into three companies, assigned officers to each company, and immediately began organising the administrative element.



Anton Mikhailovich Rachinsky
Colonel-in-Chief and commander of the Guard Jäger Battalion
9 [20] November 1796 - 9 [21] June 1800.

A.M. Rachinsky.

Anton Mikhailovich Rachinsky, from the Bely *Uezd* nobility, Smolensk Governorate, was born in 1769. When he left for service, he received one rouble and a serf valet from his father: the family's

limited resources did not allow him to give more than this. He began his working life with these meagre assets; his first steps in service were not easy, not to mention all the hardship that he would have to endure; he was even dependent on the soldiers for his daily meals, because he was fed with whatever was available from the company cauldron. On one occasion, some insolent lower rank poured away the remains of the company pot in front of him, saying: "a nobleman, yet still eating from the soldier's pot." His conscientious attitude towards his duties helped him overcome all these difficulties. Tsarevich Paul Petrovich took notice of him and transferred him to his Gatchina Force; he owed his entire subsequent career to Tsar Paul Petrovich.[38]

The new battalion was assigned to the units making up the St. Petersburg Inspection. By all accounts, the battalion was raised very swiftly,[39] given that just a few days after the Supreme Order of 9 [20] November, along with other Guard units, they took part in the sombre ceremonies of re-interring the body of Emperor Peter III and the funeral of Emperor Paul's Sovereign parents.[40]

The establishment of 1798.

The speed of their formation may explain the fact that they were not issued an establishment; the number of officers, combatant and non-combatant lower ranks had been determined by chance and on its own, dependent upon the number of Guard jägers available. An establishment was issued to the battalion only on 10 [21] July 1798, which settled on a three-company composition for the battalion (see Appendix VIII at the end of this chapter). According to this establishment, there was one general, one colonel, 14 subalterns, and in total there were 448 all ranks in the battalion, both combatant and support personnel.[41]

The transfer of the battalion to Moscow in order to take part in the coronation.

At the beginning of 1797, the Guard were preparing for the journey to Moscow for the coronation. The Guard Jäger Battalion, commanded by Colonel Rachinsky, set out (on 19 [30] January 1797) before other units with orders to assist the *zemstvo* authorities in pacifying the peasants along the route through the Novgorod and Tver governorates, who were rebelling against their landowners. Colonel Rachinsky, guided by the Directed Supreme Orders issued to him (see Appendix VI at the end of this chapter), sent out orders to all *zemstvo* leaders to report on the state of the districts to the battalion and, if necessary, he would dispatch sub-units to pacify the peasants. In early [mid] March, the jägers arrived in Moscow, where they awaited the arrival of the Tsar with the other Guard regiments. On the day of the Imperial arrival, 28 March [8 April], the entire force under the command of Field Marshal Repnin was stationed at the Petrovsky Travel Palace, from where they marched towards the Kremlin. The Guard Jäger Battalion marched on both sides of the procession. Upon the arrival of the procession at Count Bezborodko's palace, which was designated as the Tsar's residence, the troops dispersed to their quarters. During their two-month stay in Moscow, the battalion, along with other Guard regiments, occupied sentry posts in the Kremlin and Kitay-gorod. In early [mid] May, the troops set off back from Moscow and the following month arrived in Pavlovsk,[42] where the Tsar reviewed each regiment separately.[43]

The march to Finland in 1799.

The battalion spent the first years of its existence in peacetime routine, with the exception of

38 As reported by Anton Mikhailovich's grandson N.A. Rachinsky.
39 Private papers, provided by Petukhov.
40 M.S.A., No. 255 and No. 258.
41 C.C.L. volume XLI, No. 18577.
42 On 12 [23] November 1796, the village of Pavlovskoe was renamed the city of Pavlovsk.
43 As reported by Ryleev.

participation in the 1799 march towards Finland, in view of an expected uprising there with the aim of secession from Sweden.

On 11 [22] April 1799, Major General Rachinsky received orders from the Heir Tsarevich: 'The Guard Jäger Battalion is to be ready to set off on campaign to Finland tomorrow.' On 12 [23] April, the jägers set off from Pavlovsk with the following composition:

Companies	Rachinsky's	Krasilnikov's	Leichner's	**TOTAL:**
General	1			**1**
Field officers		1	1	**2**
Subalterns	9	5	5	**19**
Non-commissioned officers	14	15	12	**41**
Hornists	4	3	3	**10**
Jägers	98	96	100	**294**
Support personnel	31	2	2	**35**
TOTAL:	**157**	**122**	**123**	**402**

They arrived in Volkovo that same day; the next morning [24 April new style] the battalion paraded past the St. Petersburg Palaces and, on the orders of the Inspector of the Finland Inspection, General-of-Infantry Kutuzov, moved towards Abborfors [Ahvenkoski] via Vyborg, Fredrikshamn, and Kymengrad [Kyminlinna]. At that time, there were no quartermasters among the officers and their duties were carried out by auditors [administrative officials]. To what extent they were fit for this purpose and were efficient may be judged from the attached copy of the report by one such quartermaster:

> 'Yesterday, on Your Excellency's orders, I wanted to occupy quarters in the village of Mertut [Merituittu], but the artillery had already occupied quarters there before me and collected all the forage, which is why I was forced to occupy quarters on the Beloostrov [Valkeasaari] estate and yesterday evening I wrote to all the gentlemen field officers and subalterns and lower orderlies and gave orders to strive to prepare forage, but today, at 11 o'clock at night, a captain from the artillery came to this estate and forcibly occupied the quarters, and forced me to go aside, regarding which I have the honour to report to Your Excellency by courier and I await your orders on this.'
>
> Auditor Denisov, 17 [28] April 1799.'

On 10 [21] May, the jägers arrived in Abborfors and lined the border with pickets, which was the limit of military operations. Two weeks later they set off on the return march along the same route and re-entered St. Petersburg on 31 May [11 June].[44]

Emperor Paul I's reforms.

Peacetime service in the military was not easy. The Tsar, even as Heir, viewed many aspects of

44 As reported by Ryleev.

Russian state life with displeasure, including the internal structure of our army; throughout his solitary life in Pavlovsk and Gatchina, Paul Petrovich accumulated a multitude of ideas and projects; when he became Emperor, he immediately set about eradicating everything that seemed corrupt to him. By the time Paul I ascended the throne, the court had lost its former militaristic character; military uniforms that had glittered at Peter's court had given way to luxurious court costumes of the dignitaries; powder, silk, lace, and stockings adorned the members of the enormous palace household; the military also often exchanged their uniforms for courtly attire; the morals of the court and contemporary St. Petersburg society were reminiscent of the golden age of refined living at the court of the French kings; Prince Repnin even submitted a proposal to transfer the Guard from the military to the court's administration. And suddenly, by the will of Paul I, the enemy of extravagance, idleness and luxury, the halls of the palace were filled with modest Gatchina uniforms and resounded with the clatter of heavy broadswords and the spurs on officers' boots.

In a very short time the Emperor transformed the forces completely in the Prussian style. Orders concerning the reorganisation of military forces followed one after another.

Firstly, the Tsar obliged all those in service to be more strict in their duties and to actually serve; as a result of this, Supreme orders were issued that all regiments should be fully manned according to the required establishment levels and that every man should be present; the period for sending lower ranks on furlough was strictly defined, how many men and for how long; the colonels-in-chief had the right to let an officer take leave for no more than 28 days, while between 1 [12] April to 1 [12] September they could not let them go at all, not even for a day; those absent without leave were reported to the Tsar and 'named everywhere at the drumhead, whereupon the absentee was imprisoned in a fortress for two years' and 'discharged from service.'[45] Generals were also forbidden to leave their commands without specific orders.[46]

Officers were prohibited from wearing civilian clothing;[47] an order dated 12 [23] November required all formations to submit reports to the Military Collegium regarding their process for promoting field officers and subalterns. In order to reduce the number of officers reporting sick, the Tsar ordered stoppage of pay for everyone reporting sick for the duration of their illness.[48] It was strictly forbidden to divert lower ranks away from service, such that none of the commanding officers, under fear of severe punishment, could use soldiers as personal employees.[49] 'Penances' were also imposed in such a way as not to distract the soldier from his drill training.[50] In order to be able to closely monitor the precise execution of his orders, the Tsar ordered that monthly reports be sent to him from every unit;[51] in addition, the colonels-in-chief had to report directly in the Sovereign's name regarding the death of an officer.[52]

Having assumed direct command over the entire forces, the Tsar went into the smallest details of service, and the slightest omission entailed most unpleasant consequences for the offender; these were announced in Supreme Orders the very next day; in addition to reprimands and arrest, the

45 Military regulations on infantry service of 1797, pp. 196 and 197.

46 C.C.L. volume XXIV, No. 17714.

47 Supreme orders dated 7 [18] November 1796, state that 'gentlemen generals are not to wear any uniform other than that of the corps to which they belong; in general, officers are not to wear any clothing other than uniform under any circumstance.

48 C.C.L. volume XXV, No. 18433.

49 C.C.L. volume XXIV, No. 17559.

50 C.C.L. volume XXV, No. 18977.

51 C.C.L. volume XXV, No. 18466.

52 C.C.L. volume XXV, No. 19041.

guilty could be expelled from service (cashiered), or transferred to distant garrisons, even to Siberia.[53]

Regulations for infantry on field service.

The regulator of the entire service at that time was the Charter issued by Supreme Command on 29 November [10 December] 1796. At first glance, the speed with which it was published seems incredible: on 7 [18] November, the Tsar ascended the throne, and 22 days later, a new Charter has already been published, and the Charter not only covered all branches of military service in remarkable detail, but also touched on the private lives of officers and lower ranks; however, one should not forget that this Charter already existed previously in the Gatchina Force in almost the same form and had been compiled by Baron Steinwehr and Kushelev; upon the accession of Paul I to the throne, the Charter was published under the supervision of Rostopchin.[54]

In addition to the Charter, the book 'Tactical Rules' served as guidelines, which was nothing more than a bad translation of a brochure published in Prussia under the title; '*La tactique ou discipline selon les nouveaux réglements Prussiens 1760.*'[55]

The battalion's service was divided between garrison and camp. Our battalion performed garrison duty in St. Petersburg in the winter; camp duty was initially performed around Pavlovsk, and later at Krasnoe Selo. Winter training consisted of preparing soldiers to take their place in the line, with young soldiers being taught by instructors; the company commander was responsible for their successful training.[56] Drill exercises were carried out before lunch, since the Tsar had prohibited them after lunch.[57]

---

53 Here is one of these orders as an example (C.C.L. volume XXV, No. 19131). 'His Majesty has deigned to note that the officers are extremely indecent in all those locations where decency is required of them and have reached such ignorance that they sit in the palace guardhouse and eat wearing their hats, and if similar ignorance is noticed in the future, such officers will be sent to garrison regiments in Siberia.'

54 *Russkaya Starina*, 1877 p. 240, 'Reformers of the Russian army from 1796 to 1801.' We have not seen the charter issued on 29 November [10 December]; Emperor Paul's charter in the libraries of the General Staff and the General Staff Academy is under the title: 'His Imperial Majesty's Military Regulations for Infantry Field Service with plans.' Moscow, Senate Printing House, 1797. This charter is an almost verbatim reprint of the charter of the Gatchina Force, which was published in 1792 under the title 'The Practice of Military Field Craft and so on, Published in St. Petersburg, 1792.' In the library of His Imperial Highness Prince Dmitry Konstantinovich's palace in Strelna, serial No. 2167 is a proof copy of this charter kept with handwritten corrections by Paul Petrovich in pencil and Captain Koshelev in ink. In this same library, serial No. 2294 is a printed copy of this charter without a title page and with a note in ink (apparently in Koshelev's hand): '1 [12] January 1793.' Comparing this charter with Catherine's Charter (we had in our hands 'Infantry Drill Regulations' from the St. Petersburg State Military Collegium, 1792, sixth edition), we find huge differences; for this reason, the charter by Paul Petrovich seems to be a very close reproduction of a manuscript found by us in the palace library in Strelna, No. 2293, under the title 'Grand Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein Military Charter for Infantry.' The question of the origin of Paul Petrovich's charter is very interesting and deserves investigation. Until now it was thought that Paul Petrovich was under the influence of the Prussian procedures of Frederick the Great, but a comparison of the Gatchina charter with the aforementioned manuscript suggests that Paul Petrovich did not desire to follow these procedures, rather that he had sympathies for His August Father, Emperor Peter III.

55 *Russkaya Starina*, 1877 p. 241, 'Reformers of the Russian army from 1796 to 1801.' The elder Lebedev. Suvorov called all these tactical novelties a 'Russo-German translation of a manuscript chewed by mice and found twenty years ago in the ruins of an old castle' Russkaya Starina, February 1877, p. 252.

56 Military Regulations on Infantry Field Service of 1797, p. 80. In parapraph IV it states: 'Captains should notice those soldiers who have poor posture and are weak in their training, officers should take them to their quarters, straighten them out, and give them a soldierly bearing... The captain should not always rely on his officers, but should be responsible for his company, and therefore should make every possible effort to bring it in and maintain it in order, and the officers should merely assist him in this.'

57 M.B. Supreme Instructions, 19 [30] May 1797.

All the attention of the commanding officers was focused on shooting, while the bayonet charge was viewed as something secondary and the dominant formation was open order line. In an effort to move large masses in strict alignment in this way, it was necessary to limit ourselves to short paces: the regulations defined 75 paces per minute,[58] but on page 30 paragraph II of the regulations the length of the pace was defined as no more than three-quarters of an *arshin* [21 inches].[59]

For a spectator, such movements were very impressive, but for the participant it was extremely tiring, given that the instructors found fault with every protruding shoulder or knee bent a little too far, and regarded the untrained as blameworthy.[60]

Company and battalion exercises were carried out quite extensively; the main focus was on the presentation side.

Muster parades.

In addition to these activities, every morning at nine o'clock there was a muster parade by the battalion in the Sovereign's presence, which was called the 'changing of the guard' at that time. Here is how an eyewitness described the parades:

> 'All active-serving generals, field officers and subalterns, not on essential duties, gathered daily for the parade at nine o'clock in the morning, which sometimes lasted until noon. The Tsar arrived very punctually before the arrival of the battalion on parade and personally designated a point for the right flank, along which officers were stationed to mark the line along which the guard would form up. After this, the Colours were brought from the Winter Palace; the parade greeted them with a salute, beating drums and band playing, at which the Tsar himself removed his hat, and all those present followed suit. After that, he walked around the battalion, inspecting each soldier personally and paying strict attention to their individual turnout. Whereupon the Emperor produced the exercises with several evolutions. The Tsar personally issued daily orders, which were received from him by the Duty Field Officer of the Guard, which lasted about an hour. At the end of the infantry exercises, a cavalry platoon would move out and perform various evolutions. Thereafter the Tsar accepted reports from those presenting themselves and after that, issued Supreme Orders along with the Watchword. At the end, the unit ceremonially trooped their Colours for the Tsar and those present to remove their hats as they marched past. The Grand Dukes Alexander Pavlovich and Konstantin Pavlovich marched on the right flank of the leading two ranks. After the ceremony, the main guard proceeded to the palace, where in the courtyard, in the presence of the Tsar, the dismounting guard were relieved, from whom the Colours were carried to the inner chambers.'[61]

Service in camp.

Camp service began on 1 [12] April;[62] orders were issued for no training between 1 [12] June and 15 [26] July.[63] At the appointed time, the battalion would set off in field service marching order for

58 Regulations for Infantry Field Service, 1797, p. 68.

59 Suvorov said of this: 'My pace has been reduced to three *chetvert* [21 inches], and now the distance to the enemy is 40 *versta* [27 miles] instead of 30 [20 miles].'

60 Ratch, Notes on Count Arakcheev, p. 99.

61 Bernhardi, *Denwürdigkeiten des Grafen von Toll*; History of the Lifeguard Pavlovsk Regiment, St. Petersburg, 1890, p. 15.

62 C.C.L. volume XXIV, No. 17756.

63 M.B. Supreme Instructions, 10 [21] May 1797.

Pavlovsk. A characteristic feature of the marching columns of that time were the incredibly large trains: a battalion commander was entitled to a four-horse carriage, one wagon, six pack horses and the same number of riding horses; a colonel, a carriage with no more than four horses, two wagons, six pack horses and four riding horses; a captain was entitled to take a cart and two riding horses, junior subaltern officers, a pack horse and a riding horse each. Every company had three wagons, one of which was for provisions and two for the *artels*.[64] Upon arrival at the camp, the battalion formed up in the place assigned to it, sent out field and 'cane' guard forces, after which they pitched tents, one company behind the other in extended line; firearms were piled in pyramids. These two guard forces served as security for the camp and posted sentries; in addition, the 'cane' guard force carried out punishments.[65] All ranks of the battalion were required to remain in their sub-unit at all times; the colonel-in-chief could release officers from the camp for no more than four hours, but if an officer needed to spend the night outside camp, then Supreme approval or permission from the commander-in-chief was required.[66] For example, in Supreme Orders date 9 [20] June 1797 in Pavlovsk it stated: 'Adjutant Leichner of the Guard Jäger Battalion has been released to St. Petersburg for three days.'[67]



Constable-Square, from where manoeuvres in Gatchina usually began.

64 Regulations for Infantry Field Service, 1797, p. 297.
65 Regulations for Infantry Field Service, 1797, pp. 235 to 250.
66 Regulations for Infantry Field Service, 1797, pp. 273 and 278.
67 *Russkaya Starina*, 1873, p. 963.

The camp usually ended with large-scale manoeuvres and the Tsar was always present at these.

The manoeuvres of 1797, 1798 and 1800.

In early to mid [mid to late] September 1797, Pavel Petrovich carried out manoeuvres in Gatchina for the first time as Emperor.[68] The nature of the manoeuvres (five in total) was the same as those carried out in 1794 to 1796, only there were twice as many troops (some 7,500 men), and they were commanded by field marshals and Grand Dukes rather than captains and majors, as in the past. According to the order of battle, the infantry were divided into three divisions (Field Marshal Prince Repnin's, Grand Duke Alexander's and Konstantin Pavlovich's), and each division was formed up in two waves. As before, two files were taken from each platoon of every battalion to form a combined battalion, which, together with the Guard Jäger Battalion, formed the vanguard under the command of Field Marshal Count Kamensky. In the manoeuvres on 1 [12] September, the vanguard and its artillery drove 'the enemy out of the forest they occupied in order to clear a sufficient field of movement for the battle line and deny the vital ground on the left flank of the infantry'; as the battle developed, the vanguard, having joined the rearguard, 'was to advance in order to secure the infantry's left flank'; at the end of the manoeuvre, the vanguard were tasked with occupying an embankment and a position on high ground. In the manoeuvres of 3 [14] September, the vanguard were 'to advance, seize the dominant ground and move in such a way as to hold the enemy back and give the cavalry and infantry time to realign themselves in the prescribed order of battle'; in other words, the vanguard was assigned to shield the deployment into battle order. In the manoeuvres of 7 [18] September (an attack on positions at Bolshaya Zagvozdka), the vanguard 'is to establish itself on the high ground at the exit to Zagvozdka. The Sovereign Emperor has deigned to take two squadrons of horse guards, to ride out to the Malaya Gatchina gatehouse and has chosen to ride out to reconnoitre the enemy positions himself; should the enemy oppose this attempt and attack, then the vanguard are to support and shield a withdrawal.' In the manoeuvres of 10 [21] September (in defence), the enemy were to force the vanguard to retreat, but, reinforced by four battalions under Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, they drove the enemy off themselves, pursued, took up their previous positions behind the bridge, and most importantly, the main body stormed the high ground, 'to establish posts and set up camp in the occupied position in accordance with regulations.' In the manoeuvres on 25 September [6 October], the vanguard initially occupied the forest in front of Zagvozdka, and as the battle developed, they occupied Malaya Gatchina 'in order to refuse the cavalry's flank.'

Thus, we see that the manoeuvres were one-dimensional, an enemy force was not assigned, but was simply assumed to be in the designated locations. At the end of the reign of Paul I, manoeuvres in Gatchina were already being carried out by two sides, as can be seen, for example, from the description of the manoeuvres that took place in early [mid] September 1800, when the corps manoeuvring against each other were commanded by Generals Kutuzov and von der Pahlen.[69]

Overall, the training did not achieve the actual military objective. The regulations were executed with astonishing persistence: inspectors sent by the Tsar, all Gatchina men, were checking to what

68 Their description (valuable for the history of military matters during the reign of Paul I, an era that has not yet been fully studied) was compiled by Grigory Ivanovich Kushelev and is kept in Pavlovsk in the palace library (see Appendix IX at the end of this chapter). In the palace library in Strelna, No. 2957, there is a hand-drawn military topographic plan of the environs of the Grafskaya Slavyanka estate, as can be seen on the plan 'drawn from life in 1797.' It depicts a force (of 11 infantry regiments, five of cavalry and artillery) in standard battle formation along the Slavyanka River. From this we can conclude that manoeuvres in 1797 also took place around Pavlovsk. The plan also shows the Guard Jäger Battalion.

69 See Appendix X at the end of this chapter.

extent the new orders had been adopted by the regiments, and the most insignificant omission could lead to disaster for the commander. Various deceptive tricks were developed. Service became extremely superficial and was reduced to succeeding at parades and inspections.

Beyond their mandatory service, the Guard Jäger Battalion was often obliged to dispatch sub-units to assist the *zemstvo* police in tracking down various gangs hiding out in the capital and its environs; such assignments came directly from the Tsar or Tsarevich Alexander Pavlovich.

Every year, before the Tsar's move to Pavlovsk, the jägers would set out there in advance and take up sentry duties in the city, while setting up pickets in the surrounding villages, which had to be maintained in particularly good order, since the Tsar attached great importance to them. The pickets were ordered to record all travellers, inspect the passports or visas of people of common rank, and, if they did not have them, detain them and send them to the commandant of Pavlovsk.[70]

Service, employment, punishments and awards for lower ranks.

Both in summer and winter, all ranks of the battalion, including officers, had to be present on church parade, and to ensure that none of the lower ranks could leave before the end, a non-commissioned officer was stationed at the doors of the church with an halberd.[71] For conduct unbecoming of the service, the regulations prescribed that lower ranks be subject to severe penalties. The annual observance of Lent was obligatory for everyone.[72] It seems the battalion did not have its own chapel.

At that time, the main corrective measures considered were: running the gauntlet or transferring lower ranks from the Guard to garrison units.[73] Although cruelty had existed before, it varied in different parts of the army; now it had been institutionalised, officers were issued uniform canes, and even generals did not hesitate to inflict punishments by their own hands.

On 12 [23] November 1796, Emperor Paul I established the St. Anne medal for non-commissioned officers and privates who had served impeccably for 20 years,[74] consisting of a gilded silver medal with images: on the obverse, a red cross inside a circular red border all under a golden crown, on the reverse, also with a circular red border, and inside the latter, an engraved serial number under which the medal was issued. This medal was to be worn on a red ribbon with yellow edges.[75] Those who received it were exempted from corporal punishment and received a pension.[76] In 1800, this medal was replaced by the Donat of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem,[77] that is, a bronze cross with lilies between the arms and a serial number on the back. The cross was hung from a buttonhole on a black ribbon.[78] After serving the established term, lower ranks had the right to request retirement. Those who received their discharge would be sent back to their home if they could present evidence from the local authorities that there was someone to support them in old age; otherwise, they were transferred to invalid companies;[79] where those unfit for service were also transferred.

The Guard Jäger Battalion was replenished with lower ranks transferred from other Guard

70 As reported by Ryleev.
71 Regulations for Infantry Field Service, 1797, paragraph III, p. 108.
72 Regulations for Infantry Field Service, 1797, paragraph V, p. 109.
73 C.C.L. 1801, No. 20061.
74 C.C.L. volume XXIV, No. 17547.
75 Description of weapons and clothing of the troops, volume 9, p. 127.
76 C.C.L. volume XXIV, No. 17547; volume XXV, No. 18687.
77 C.C.L. volume XXVI, No. 19594.
78 Description of weapons and clothing of the troops, volume 9, p. 127.
79 C.C.L. volume XXVII, No. 20737.

regiments, but mostly with *cantonists* from various military orphanages. Only a small percentage were conscripts; for example, in a company of 100 jägers, only one or two were conscripts.[80]

Lessons in tactics.

In addition to the usual exercises and daily attendance at the changing of the guard, field officers and subalterns were required to attend tactical classes, established by the Tsar on 15 [26] December 1796, in order to study the new regulations. Supervision of this class was entrusted to Arakcheev, while Colonel Cannabich delivered the instruction. Lectures were given in the White Hall of the Winter Palace; the Emperor attended them in person daily, encouraging the audience and asking questions.[81] To humour him, senior, experienced generals, famous masters of military affairs (Field Marshal Repnin, Kutusov) also attended. Of course, these lectures would bring no real benefit to the listeners and had no academic significance.[82]

The battalion's officer cadre was replenished primarily with chamber pages or from their own *Junkers* [noble senior non-commissioned officers] on promotion.[83]

Before being promoted to the most junior officer rank, those classed as *Junkers*, after a practical test of their knowledge of the line and their potential to command a company or battalion, were presented to the Sovereign Emperor, who personally confirmed their knowledge of:

1. The Fundamental Laws of the Empire, the Regulations regarding the Imperial Family and on the Succession to the Throne proclaimed during the Sacred Coronation of His Majesty.
2. The Greater Imperial Title.
3. Their own family coat of arms with an explanation of its heraldic meaning.[84]

It must be assumed that the battalion was well trained and fully met the strict service requirements of that time, given that it included a jäger company from the Gatchina Force and that Lieutenant Colonel Rachinsky, who was well acquainted with Emperor Paul's requirements, had been appointed commander. This is confirmed by Supreme Orders from 1796 to 1801, which do not contain any cases of dismissal of Guard jägers from service, while there are expressions of Supreme favour towards the battalion. Supreme Orders dated 25 July [5 August] 1797 state: 'His Majesty announces his pleasure to all the Lifeguard Battalions and to all the cavalry that reached Pavlovsk today, besides the Jäger Battalion.'[85]

The Tsar often arrived completely unannounced at various exercises by his favourite battalion. Thus, one day in the summer of 1799 he visited company training being carried out by Sub-Lieutenant Stankevich, due to the company commander, Captain Tolbuzin, being ill. The Tsar followed the smallest details of the training carefully and, being completely satisfied, promoted Sub-Lieutenant Stankevich to the next rank for his particularly skilful application of the new Jäger regulations, for distinction ahead of his peers.[86]

Control over the battalion was concentrated in the hands of the colonel-in-chief and his staff. The headquarters consisted of the battalion commander, an adjutant, and an auditor. The battalion had

80 M.B. monthly returns.
81 *Russkaya Starina*, 1877, p. 583, the elder Lebedev.
82 Suvorov did not attend these lectures and called them 'lessons where the blind teach the crooked.'
83 M.B. battalion proforma.
84 As reported by retired Staff Captain A.V. Penskoy.
85 *Russkaya Starina*, 1873, p. 972.
86 As reported by retired Staff Captain A.V. Penskoy.

no chancellery,[87] and all written correspondence was handled by the adjutant.



Non-commissioned officer, horn-major, subaltern, hornist, and private of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion, 1796 to 1801.

87 C.C.L. volume XXIV, No. 17593.

Uniform and equipment.

In terms of administrative matters, the battalion communicated directly with the Military Collegium, from which it received cash to pay for provisioning and all ranks salaries;[88] equipment was obtained from the Commissariat Expedition,[89] lead and gunpowder from the artillery.[90]

The uniform and equipment were as follows: privates wore a caftan of lighter green cloth lined in green, with a sewn-down collar and split cuffs in light orange, brass buttons, a woollen light orange lanyard; a lighter green waistcoat with brass buttons; suede trousers, whitened with chalk, or of linen in summer; square-toed boots, coming up to just above mid-calf, with a notch at the back; a musketeer's hat without trim; a forage cap made of lighter green cloth with a light orange band; a dark green cloth greatcoat with covered buttons; a thermal or short sheepskin vest; a *Stutzer* [rifled carbine] with a sling, a frizzen cover and a half-case made of red *yuft* [waxed] leather; a sword bayonet, sword belt, cartridge pouch and finally, a knapsack, a water canteen and a bread bag. Non-commissioned officers had similar equipment as privates, with the addition of gold braid on the collar and cuffs, suede gloves with gauntlet cuffs and a cane. The company hornists had the same as the privates, with the addition of stripes of yellow and red patterned lace with tassels at the ends on the sleeves of their caftans and with a sword with a hanger blade, a black sword belt and a sword knot instead of a *Stutzer*, sword bayonet and cartridge pouch; the sword knot had a black leather strap and a woollen tassel.

The horn-major had the same outfit as company hornists, but with lace along all the seams of the caftan and with the addition of gold braid, gloves and a cane, similar to those of non-commissioned officers.

Subalterns had a caftan, waistcoat, breeches and boots exactly the same as those of privates; only the first two had gilded buttons; gold braid lanyard; hat with gold braid; gloves with gauntlet cuffs; cane, sword, sword knot, sash, gorget, spontoon with a black shaft.

The adjutant had the same as subalterns, but with high topped boots, spurs and boot-cuffs, with shabraques and holster covers made of lighter green cloth with a single row of gold braid edging.

Field officers wore the same as the adjutant.

The general, also the same as field officers, except with white plumage on the hat.

Officers also had undress frock-coats and greatcoats.[91]

Prince P.I. Bagration, colonel-in-chief of the battalion on 9 [21] June 1800.

In 1800, the original colonel-in-chief and commander, Anton Mikhailovich Rachinsky,[92] was promoted to lieutenant general and on 9 [21] June of that same year was nominated to be a privy councillor with the right to wear uniform. His place was taken by Major General Prince Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration, who was appointed colonel-in-chief of the battalion by way of that same order.

Prince Pyotr Ivanovich, who came from a Georgian princely family, was born in Kizlyar in 1763. Bagration entered Russian service in 1782, as a sergeant in the Caucasus Musketeer Regiment and

88 C.C.L. volume XXIV, No. 17595.

89 C.C.L. volume XXIV, No. 18194.

90 C.C.L. volume XXV, No. 18979.

91 Viskovatov, Description of weapons and clothing of the troops, volume 9, p. 16.

92 A surviving anecdote regarding Anton Mikhailovich serves as the best evidence of the affection of the lower ranks for him: a man named Domashnev achieved nobility through service and expressed a desire to have a line of Lifeguard Jägers on his coat of arms with Rachinsky on horseback in front of them (as reported by N.A. Rachinsky).

the following year he took part in a campaign against the Chechens, while in 1784, he fought against Sheikh Mansur, who was inciting the highlanders to raid the Russian borders; in 1786 he took part in an expedition across the Laba River against the Circassians; in 1788 he took part in the storming of Ochakov; in 1790 he was again in the Caucasus facing the Turks and highlanders. He was wounded in one of these actions and was extricated from a pile of corpses by the Chechens, who released him from captivity, thanks to the fact that they were somehow indebted to his father.

In 1792, he was transferred to the Kiev Cuirassier Regiment with the rank of second major. In 1793, Prince Bagration was promoted to premier major, and in 1794 he was transferred to the Sofia Carabinier Regiment. He distinguished himself in Poland that year: while commanding a minor vanguard, he defeated the Confederates at Brest on 25 June [6 July]; on 7 [18] July, he took part in the defeat of the enemy at Siedlce; on 26 July [6 August], while gathering forage with 50 carabiniers, he encountered a cavalry detachment three times stronger and routed it completely; after that, on 21 September [2 October], he scattered an infantry battalion with one squadron; on 23 September [4 October], he defeated a six-squadron detachment under Major Puzino, with one squadron and took him prisoner. On 13 [24] October, he and his carabiniers defeated a detachment of 1,000 men entrenched in the forest near the town of Brody; finally, on the day of the storming of Praga, Bagration drove some of the enemy cavalry into the Vistula [Weichsel or Visla] with a swift charge. Promotion to lieutenant colonel and Suvorov's personal gratitude were his reward for this feat. In 1798, Prince Pyotr Ivanovich was promoted to colonel and appointed colonel-in-chief of the 6th Jäger Regiment; the following year, he received the rank of major general and joined the corps deploying to Italy. A new field of glory opened up for him here. Prince Bagration was the first to break into Brescia and forced the garrison to surrender the citadel; a day later, while pursuing Sérurier's rearguard, he took the city of Bergamo; at Lecco he was wounded in the left leg by a bullet and, despite this, continued the attack; On 21 April [2 May] he seized Novi; he participated in the capture of Tortona, in the victory at Marengo, in the capture of Turin; from 6 to 8 [17 to 19] June he was an active assistant to Suvorov in Macdonald's defeat at Tidona, Trebbia and the Nure; from 16 [27] June to 11 [22] July he took part in the siege and capture of the citadel at Alexandria. While commanding an independent detachment, Bagration besieged and captured the castle of Serravalle. The Battle of Novi, where he commanded the vanguard, was the conclusion of his exploits in Italy.

On the memorable campaign across Switzerland, Bagration commanded the vanguard. Having encountered the enemy at Airolo, he pushed them back to the St. Gotthard position, which he then enveloped on its left flank, thereby deciding the victory; upon arriving in the Muotathal, he surrounded and captured a small French detachment. At the village of Klöntal he put up a stubborn fight and received a severe contusion. Upon leaving Switzerland, he commanded the rearguard and stubbornly held off the pursuing French, after which he linked up with other units at Lake Constance [Bodensee] and returned to Russia at the beginning of 1800. Here is one of Suvorov's responses to Emperor Paul I: 'I most earnestly submit Prince Bagration, as a most outstanding general and worthy of the highest rank, for Supreme favour.' He received the Order of St. Anne, 1st class for the Italian campaign (which Suvorov himself also received) and the Commander's Cross of St. John of Jerusalem.[93]

The death of Emperor Paul I.

Although Prince Bagration had no academic education at all, he had received excellent practical training and knew the service very well; remarkably brave and cool-headed in battle, he possessed

93 *Russky Invalid*, 1838, p. 808.

a natural military talent, perfected in the school of the great Suvorov; Bagration had a charismatic influence over the soldiers; they idolised him. Such was the knight appointed colonel-in-chief of the Guard Jäger Battalion. However, Prince Bagration did not have to serve Emperor Paul I in this post for long: on 11 [23] March 1801, Emperor Paul Petrovich died suddenly and Alexander I ascended the throne.



His Imperial Majesty, Sovereign Emperor, Alexander Pavlovich.

APPENDIX I TO CHAPTER 1.

Extract from the 1765 jäger regulations.

In the Supreme approved regulations resulting from the report dated 13 [24] October 1765, the following was written, among other things, regarding jägers:

> ‘Each regiment from the Livonia, Finland, Smolensk and Estonia divisions shall include 60 jägers, no taller than two arshin, five vershok [five feet, 4¾ inches], of the best, most agile and healthiest constitution... such that officers are selected for their specific, versatile inclination for drill commands and for skilful military observation of the distinctions in every kind of situation and appropriate formations in accordance with the military situation... Jägers are always to form up in two ranks, rather than three, and they are to march in no other way than in closed column, by fours, as prescribed in the exercise... In every exercise, train them to always present with perfect aim... while in addition to the training assigned to infantry regiments, train them in the most efficient manner in the following:
>
> 1. Always form line after every disorder as quickly as possible.
> 2. They must march very quickly and their march must be by fours, such that all subsequent ranks to the rear do not detach in the least, neither from the front, nor from each other, but such that their entire column can always move suddenly and swiftly forwards, and such that they can always deploy at the first command or drum beat and extent their line with great agility, with volleys as much as the situation demands, or in the event of narrow defiles, might allow.
> 3. Load quickly, shoot boldly and with a firm grip.
> 4. Upon the order, just as the entire line is to extend file by file, albeit by only two *sazhen* [14 feet], so it is to be closed again at the first command.
> 5. Upon command, double-march out by files from the flanks, spread out into one line and open fire, maintaining a certain number of those remaining in close-order line as supports for those spread out, and then, upon a drum signal, those scattered should reform into line with great agility, while those who had been supports in the line should spread out in their stead.
> 6. Just as by *plutong* [platoon] or division [pair of companies], so by files and, in turn by ranks, advancing and retreating with volleys just like the cavalry, they are normally to skirmish on this basis.
> 7. Train them to ascend and descend over steep slopes and forest defiles with as much agility as possible, and to turn about anywhere and to form up with agility on every available clearing.
> 8. During winter, move with musket and ammunition on skis directly across fields and forests rather than along the roads.

Complete Collection of Laws, book of land forces regulations, 1765, volume XLI, No. 12494.

APPENDIX II TO CHAPTER 1.

Classes for officers of the Gatchina Force.

His Highness handwritten note to Arakcheev, dated 4 [15] July 1794:

> ‘Pavlovsk.
>
> In accordance with your ordinance, Lieutenant Colonel Arakcheev, following up My orders, for military classes for officers, I order you to maintain diligent supervision both of their success in training and of their behaviour during them, and at the same time to ensure that they are always dressed in the correct uniform, not allowing them to go to class in frock coats; should anyone disobey this, then I authorise you to arrest them immediately, informing the Commandant of it, and report to Me immediately; just as you are also to report on all of this to me. You should choose a suitable time for classes, such as after dinner, when officers are free from their duties; this only applies to those who are in Gatchina, and not those who live in Skvoritsy. Nevertheless, I remain graciously disposed to you. Paul.’

Two days later, the Grand Duke wrote to Arakcheev again and noted that not all officers were attending classes and directly identified several officers by name:

> ‘Pavlovsk, 6 [17] July 1794.
>
> By way of your instructions, Lieutenant Colonel Arakcheev, for the military class for officers, I have ordered Commandant Steinwehr that one of the battalion majors should be placed under supervision every day. From the list you sent me regarding officers attending classes, I note that Major Herzenberg’s company only listed Aristov 2nd, and because there is another one therein, then order him to attend classes as well. There is no need to show Kornepov, Frolovsky and Wrangel, as they are not in Gatchina. Sub-Lieutenant Knab sends himself to you personally. Nevertheless, with my favour, there is your graciousness. Paul.’

APPENDIX III TO CHAPTER 1.

Composition of the Gatchina Force.

Infantry (from 25 October [5 November] 1796)	Field Officers	Subalterns	Non-commissioned Officers	Musicians	Privates	Support Personnel	**TOTAL:**
Grenadier Battalion No. 1, H.I.H. the Heir's	1	11	28	13	202	11	**266**
Musketeer Battalion No. 2, H.I.H. Alexander Pavlovich's	1	11	26	7	199	9	**253**
Musketeer Battalion No. 3, H.I.H. Konstantin Pavlovich's	1	11	28	11	197	10	**257**
Musketeer Battalion No. 4, Colonel Arakcheev's	2	10	31	11	201	10	**265**
Musketeer Battalion No. 5 Major Malyutin's	2	10	29	9	199	12	**261**
Musketeer Battalion No. 6, Major Nedobrov's	2	9	26	8	191	11	**247**
Major Rachinsky's Jäger Company	1	2	8	3	35	3	**52**
Cavalry (from 16 [27] May 1796)							
Gendarme Regiment	2	11	24	8	109	27	**181**
Dragoon Regiment	2	10	27	12	99	15	**165**
Hussar Regiment	2	7	21	4	114	27	**175**
Cossacks	1	5	7		50		**63**
Artillery							
Foot	1	11	22	14	58	65[94]	**171**
Horse	1	1	4		30	7	**43**
TOTAL:	**19**	**109**	**281**	**100**	**1,684**	**206**	**2.399**

Jäger Company Officer's Nominal Roll:

Major Anton Rachinsky.

Lieutenant Ivan Miller.

Sub Lieutenant Ivan Lechner.[95]

94 This includes seven men assigned to the pontoniers.

95 Information on the Gatchina Force. Brochure from 1835. Sub Lieutenant Lechner was listed as Leichner in Supreme Orders.

APPENDIX IV TO CHAPTER 1.

Description Of The Manoeuvres At Gatchina From 1794 To 1796.

We provide here a description of several manoeuvres that took place in 1794-1795 and 1796 at Gatchina (Information on the Gatchina Force, pp. 30-70).

In the manoeuvres of 1794 the force was composed as follows: infantry under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Baratynsky: His Imperial Highness' Battalion of five musketeer companies commanded by Major Mertens; Major Pushchin's Battalion of five musketeer companies; a grenadier battalion of four grenadier companies commanded by Major Ertel; a jäger company of 25 men commanded by Captain Rachinsky. Cavalry under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Puzyrevsky consisting of: two squadrons of cuirassiers commanded by Major Pritwitz; two squadrons of dragoons commanded by Major Davydov; two squadrons of hussars commanded by Major Kologrivov and a Cossack sub-unit of 40 men commanded by Lieutenant Budarin.

Manoeuvre of 11 [22] September 1794. The force was assembled on the parade ground in front of the palace and formed up in five lines, facing the field. The first line consisted of the horse and heavy artillery; in the second were His Highness' and third battalion; in the third were second battalion and jäger company together with the vanguard and rearguard infantry; in the fourth line were the cuirassiers and dragoons; in the fifth were the hussars and cossacks together with the vanguard and rearguard cavalry. The mission was to seize control of the forest, to which the road leading to the right of the palace leads, and to reposition themselves in front of it. To that end, the jägers were initially spread out facing the forest exits, and then the artillery opened fire. Attacks were launched by the infantry and cavalry, following which the assigned positions were occupied.

Manoeuvre of 12 [23] September 1794. The force was assembled at the sawmill, where they were positioned in two lines, facing the menagerie and with their right flank towards the river. The first line were supposed to cross via a pontoon bridge, while the second crossed by the mill bridge. The vanguards of the four battalions that were in formation were sent forward, supported by the Cossacks, and formed an independent leading body, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arakcheev, in order to protect the bridge crossings being carried out by the entire force. The jägers and Cossacks advanced; and the former, having crossed the bridge, immediately scattered into the gardens and scrub, while the latter launched an attack.

It was assumed that the main body had encountered resistance, but once the batteries located on the opposite bank opened heavy fire, the entire detachment crossed and formed up in a single line. Meanwhile, the opposition were to conduct a cavalry attack, and to that end the battalions formed two squares and opened fire, while the cavalry went on the attack. After this the cavalry withdrew behind the infantry and the firing line was reformed, the manoeuvre ended with platoon volleys.

13 [24] September 1794. The units were assembled in front of the palace and formed up facing the field as follows: two squadrons of cuirassiers and one of hussars were stationed on the right flank, then the following battalions: Fedorov's, His Highness', Ertel's and Pushchin's; on the left flank were two squadrons of dragoons and one squadron of hussars; the Cossacks were divided into two elements, each of which was located behind the cavalry on the flanks. The artillery were placed in the intervals. Operations began with the infantry advancing behind the artillery, which opened fire; the cavalry withdrew and reformed as the second line.

But after this the cavalry moved forward, launched an attack and, upon withdrawing to the right

and left, sent out a guard force, who occupied the entire sector to the front with their vedettes, with the exception of the forest where the jägers were deployed.

The infantry, in turn, formed two columns and advanced to attack the village of Kaplino. During this movement, the cavalry rejoined the infantry columns and formed their vanguard and rearguard. Having reached the high ground in front of the village, the artillery were sent forward, while the infantry deployed into a single line, with cavalry on the flanks.

A dedicated detachment consisting of two columns was formed under Major Ertel's command in order to take the bridge in front of the village. The artillery opened fire; whereupon the jägers deployed in skirmish order, and finally the first column crossed the bridge, while the second took up positions on the opposite bank, in reserve.

Major Ertel, moving forward, dispatched the jägers to the left and the Cossacks to the right, in order to envelope the village and thus sever the enemy line of retreat.

But because the main force was already crossing the stream by this time, it was assumed that the enemy had evacuated the village and had repositioned to its right, on high ground.

As a result, Major Ertel reformed his detachment parallel to the enemy position and waited for the main body, which soon arrived and formed up in two lines: the front line consisting of infantry, the second of cavalry.

4 [15] June 1795. The force was deployed in two columns: the first, consisting of jägers and grenadiers, was located along the road to the palace; while the second, consisting of two battalions of infantry and one battery of artillery, was at the Constable[96] itself; the cavalry on the right flank adjoined the Constable.

The manoeuvre began with an advance by the infantry columns toward the parade ground.

Having crossed the entire field, the infantry deployed into line with their right flank towards the palace; the jägers continued to advance by bounds, and, having reached the forest, dispersed into skirmish order and soon cleared it through firepower. The grenadiers, meanwhile, moved forward and also joined the firefight.

The rest of the infantry followed this movement, while the cavalry launched several attacks. The entire force formed up again into one line on the march and, having passed the 3rd avenue, made a move to the left; the cavalry were repositioned in the second line. At the same time, the artillery, having moved off to the flank, began to engage the enemy.

The infantry opened fire in extended line, and after the volleys were completed, the cavalry launched a swift attack, after which they took up position in the second line, which completed the manoeuvre.

6 [17] June 1795. The infantry and cavalry were ordered to assemble at the Krugly Rey [round post]. Formed into two columns, the force moved along the road towards Kolpino, with a small vanguard of jägers and light cavalry in front, and a rearguard of one platoon of infantry behind. Having reached the forest, both columns turned right and, proceeding one after the other, moved along the English Road. The cavalry, having reached the firing range, halted; while the infantry, having changed front, formed up to the right of the corner of the forest, and continued their offensive movement. The grenadiers, supported by a battery, conducted a bayonet charge. The infantry changed front once more with the left flank forward, while the cavalry, meanwhile, having

96 The Constable is an obelisk erected by Paul I, inspired by the obelisk to the duc de Montmorency in Chantilly, France.

formed up covertly behind the forest, launched an attack and, after completing it, withdrew to the flanks.

From 3 to 17 [14 to 28] September of the same year, 1795, manoeuvres in the Gatchina area were carried out as follows:

3 [14] September 1795. The force formed up at Mariyenburg:

1. The infantry were in the yard near the barracks in two lines, with the left flank towards the river and with the stables to their front.
2. The cavalry were on the road between the menagerie and the barracks.
3. The foot artillery were behind the infantry while the horse artillery were behind the cavalry.
4. One rank from each platoon was assigned to a vanguard for each battalion. These vanguards, under the command of Major Malyutin, were positioned behind the foot artillery.
5. The foot vanguards were positioned behind the foot artillery, while the cavalry vanguards were behind the horse artillery; each of them was made up of one rank per platoon.
6. The rearguards, both foot and horse, were positioned behind the barracks, opposite the right flank of the line.
7. The jägers were in the interval between the infantry and the artillery.

The aim of the manoeuvre was to conduct an opposed crossing over two bridges (the pontoon bridge and the mill bridge), and to that end the jägers, having dispersed into skirmish order first, opened the action; whereupon all the artillery was concentrated into a single battery, and finally the jägers and the battalion vanguards crossed the river via the pontoon bridge.

The battalions followed this movement and, having crossed the same bridge, formed up in two lines on the far bank. The artillery were located in the centre of the front line.

The cavalry crossed via the dam. Following this, every unit was to move forward along the road in battle order (that is, having deployed a vanguard and a rearguard and having placed artillery in the battalion intervals). Having reached the square, the troops formed up in two lines, with Baratynsky's and Ertel's battalions in the first, while Mertens' and His Highness' were in the second.

The cavalry took post on the flanks.

The infantry front line opened fire and fell back through the second line, which in turn conducted a similar movement. The troops set up camp.

6 [17] September 1795. The force was assembled near the sawmill and formed up in the following order, starting from the left flank, which was opposite the dam:

1. The rearguard with one cannon.
2. Major Mertens', His Highness', Lieutenant Colonel Baratynsky's and Major Ertel's battalions.

The action began with fire from batteries in order to remove the enemy, who were assumed to be on the far side of the river, which had to be crossed. To that end, a flotilla of small yawls was stationed near the shore. One gun and the jägers were to cross first on these yawls and take up positions on the far bank; the cavalry were to be stationed near the menagerie, in order to clear the dam across which Major Mertens' and His Highness' battalions were to cross. The latter were

to form up in a single line on the far bank; Major Ertel's and Lieutenant Colonel Baratynsky's battalions crossed over a previously constructed pontoon bridge and formed up in a single line together with the previous battalions. After this, all the units moved in column along the road, which concluded the manoeuvre.

10 [21] September 1795. The force was assembled on the field in front of the Krugly Rey and formed up in two lines.

1. The vanguard was located on the right flank of the front line.
2. Then came His Highness', Major Mertens', Ertel's and Lieutenant Colonel Baratynsky's battalions.
3. Each battalion had one regimental gun.
4. The horse artillery battery was on the right flank of the entire detachment, while the foot battery was on the left.
5. The cavalry were in the second line, while the squadrons were positioned individually opposite the battalion intervals.
6. The rearguard was on the left flank.

The vanguard moved forward, and the entire infantry followed. Having completed a loop on the main road, the battalions formed up in individual squares, while the cavalry formed up in the previous order behind the infantry. The vanguard formed an independent square on the right flank, while the rearguard formed a similar square behind the entire detachment.

Thereafter, all the squares moved forward in a chessboard formation; after which they reformed in a single line.

The cavalry, having galloped through the intervals, launched an attack, and, having withdrawn in regulation order, took up their former positions. The manoeuvre ended with the occupation of the high ground near the church: infantry in the front line, and cavalry in the second.

12 [23] September 1795. The force assembled at the Constable, and were stationed in the following order:

1. The vanguard on the left flank of the front line.
2. Lieutenant Colonel Baratynsky's, Major Ertel's, Major Mertens' and His Highness' battalions to the right of the vanguard.
3. The cavalry were in the second line. On the left flank of this line was the rearguard; to their right were the gendarmes, dragoons, and hussars.

The objective of the manoeuvre was to train the units in foraging, carried out under full tactical precautions. The vanguard took the lead with patrols of Cossacks and jägers; behind them came the main body in the following order:

Firstly, the hussars and dragoons, then Lieutenant Colonel Baratynsky's, Major Ertel's, Major Mertens' and His Highness' battalions. The infantry were followed by heavy artillery, gendarmes, and finally forage carts and the rearguard.

Having reached the lake, the vanguard split into two elements, each of which went along one side of the lake. The main body was also divided into two equal parts, following the vanguard. Having reached the village of Bolshaya Zagvozdka, the vanguard reunited and positioned itself in front of

the village; the other units surrounded it such that the left column was located on the left side of Zagvozdka, and the right on the right.

The entire position was ringed by outposts and vedettes.

Foraging was carried out under these precautions, during which the units were kept at instant readiness.

The manoeuvre ended with the return to Gatchina; the units proceeding in reverse order, meaning that the rearguard took the place of the vanguard.

The manoeuvre on 15 [26] September. The units were positioned on this manoeuvre as they had been on 12 [23] September. The movement began from the left flank along the road to Zagvozdka; jägers and Cossacks were stationed on the flanks of the vanguard, in order to clear the forest of enemy ambushes. All units, as in the previous manoeuvre, marched in a single column; but having reached the New Lake, they divided into two, and, having gone with the left flank, changed about, and continued marching with the right flank. When this had been accomplished, the vanguard occupied the village, while the cavalry, which had until then been behind the infantry, took up position in the lead. Having entered the fields in front of the village, the cavalry carried out a reconnaissance to the right and left and, upon falling back, formed up in a single line in order to shield the infantry. The right column passed the village, while the left turned left before reaching it; having left the village, they formed line and opened small arms fire. The cavalry again moved into the second line; after which the entire force camped in that same place.

17 [28] September 1795. All units were assembled on the field behind the settlement and deployed in a single line: the cavalry on the left flank, facing Malaya Gatchina; the infantry, formed by platoons to the right and then leading by the right, moved toward the village of Malaya Gatchina. A similar movement was made by the cavalry, the head of whose column was brought level with the head of the infantry's. Both columns them wheeled to the right and formed line; after this movement was completed, the cavalry formed a second line behind the infantry; the infantry opened fire with small arms, and both lines moved forward.

Acting on the assumption of strong enemy pressure from the left flank, the infantry halted, and the cavalry formed up on the right flank perpendicular to the infantry and attacked the enemy. Having been repulsed, they withdrew to their previous position, after which, together with the infantry, they began to fall back in a chessboard formation and, having reached the place from where the advance had been launched, formed line with the cavalry in front of the infantry.

But once the enemy had seized the village of Malaya Gatchina, located on the left flank, the cavalry, having ridden around behind the infantry, formed up on the left flank, and launched an attack on the rear of the village. At this point the infantry took up positions almost perpendicular to the former. Three battalions were located one behind the other on the left flank, while the other three were in line with the rearmost battalion. The former were assigned to attack the village, while the latter were to support the former. Two batteries were formed from all the artillery: one, consisting of five guns, protected by jägers, was positioned on the left flank such that it could enfilade the village to their right; the other, consisting of six guns, was on the right flank and was to operate against the centre of the village. After a strong cannonade from both batteries, the entire line moved forward, supported by artillery fire. After this, three battalions charged with fixed bayonets and seized the village, behind which the other battalions were repositioned with the batteries, while the jägers were in front, in the kitchen gardens.

Manoeuvres of 4 [15] September 1796, conducted in Pavlovsk, in the presence of the King of

Sweden. The force was divided into brigades.

With regard to Battalion No. 2, His Highness Alexander Pavlovich's, it is not mentioned in the disposition.

In the first brigade were: His Highness' and Colonel Arakcheev's battalions, under Arakcheev's command.

In the second brigade were: Major Malyutin's and Fedorov's battalions, commanded by Malyutin.

In the third brigade were: His Highness Konstantin Pavlovich's battalion and the jäger company, all under Major Fedorov's command.

In the fourth brigade were the cavalry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kologrivov.

The force moved from the assembly area across the bridge, along the Sylvia road. The cavalry were leading the detachment, and, having reached the cattle yard, formed into line and launched an attack. After this, they withdrew and fire was opened by the foot artillery, which had been positioned in front of the infantry formed up in columns of divisions [pairs of companies].

The horse artillery, positioned on the left flank, simultaneously fired salvoes. Meanwhile, the jägers had been sent forward, while the other units deployed under their protection. The regimental guns were stationed with their battalions. The infantry fired volleys initially by platoon, and then by battalion. At the end of the manoeuvres, the force were stationed in three lines: the first contained infantry and Cossacks, the second artillery, and the third cavalry.

Autumn manoeuvres were carried out in Gatchina in the presence of His Imperial Highness on 17 [28] September 1796. The infantry were divided into three brigades; each brigade formed a separate column, of which His Imperial Highness was pleased to command the first; the second was commanded by Colonel Kushelev; the third by Colonel Arakcheev. The cavalry were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kologrivov and constituted an independent column.

The force was deployed in columns at full battalion interval, in the following order: the cavalry on the right flank, Colonel Arakcheev's column to their left, then His Highness' column, while Colonel Kushelev's column was on the left flank. Each of them had its own vanguard and rearguard of two platoons of hussars, three guns and the jägers.

The entire force moved forward along the Rozhestvensky road: the cavalry, having ridden forward, halted on the road leading to the palace; while the infantry, shielded by this, formed line in a single echelon. The vanguard and rearguard took their places, while the jägers formed up behind His Highness' column. Once the cavalry, having launched an attack, fell back to the left flank of the infantry, the latter immediately opened small arms fire and moved forward by battalion. Once the infantry had marched off some distance, the cavalry, having ridden around behind them, formed up on the right flank and launched a second attack. At this point, Colonel Arakcheev's infantry column moved along the Mariyenburg road with the hussars. Having taken over and been supported by the artillery of the other two columns, they took possession of the bridge, repositioning themselves on the far side, resting their left flank on it. The battery from this column was in the centre, while the hussars held the barracks on the right.

Meanwhile, Colonel Kushelev's column, having exchanged places with the jägers, went around the forest in order to take the enemy in the flank, and, having detached an infantry division [pair of companies] with one gun to hold the dam and the porcelain factory, formed line and began firing platoon volleys. His Highness' column moved straight ahead and, having reached the far side of the forest, also formed line facing the river: which marked the end of the manoeuvre.

Those present on this manoeuvre included: 10 field officers, 57 subalterns, 151 non-commissioned officers, 71 musicians and 1,094 privates, for a total of 1,383 men.

The manoeuvre of 19 [30] September 1796. The force was deployed as follows: all the infantry were in one line alongside the Constable; the cavalry were behind the infantry; the artillery were with their battalions. The vanguard, consisting of the jägers and several ranks detached from the first three infantry battalions, three platoons of hussars and one horse artillery piece, the rearguard had an equal number of troops, but without jägers. The entire infantry column, having left the Constable, wheeled to the right and continued their movement in this order to the high ground by the orangery, where they halted and, protected by the cavalry, which was moving parallel to them, deployed into line; and once the cavalry was repositioned on the right flank, they opened fire with small arms. During this time, the jägers had managed to occupy the woodland opposite the right flank, passed through the scrub and took control of the forest opposite. At the same time, the cavalry, having parted from the right flank of the infantry, went around the woodland, changed front to the left, attacked the enemy and, upon falling back, took up positions on the flanks of the infantry. The latter moved forward in three columns and, having covered some distance, upon a signal from a cannon, redeployed into line. The vanguard of the columns were stationed behind the batteries for their protection; while the jägers set up an independent observation post in the forest itself. The following were on duty for this exercise: 10 field officers, 59 subalterns, 157 non-commissioned officers, 73 musicians and 1,122 privates, for a total of 1,415 men.

24 September [5 October] 1796. For this manoeuvre, the infantry were divided into two brigades: the first, commanded by Colonel Kushelev, consisted of His Highness Paul Petrovich's, His Highness Alexander Pavlovich's and Major Fedorov's battalions; the second, commanded by Colonel Arakcheev, consisted of His Highness Konstantin Pavlovich's, Colonel Arakcheev's and Major Malyutin's battalions. The units were stationed in front of the palace, facing the Constable, in the following order: the infantry in two lines, first brigade in front and second brigade behind; the cavalry on the right flank, also in two lines; the artillery were deployed with four foot artillery pieces in the front line and one in the second; the horse artillery were with the cavalry. The vanguard and rearguard were on the right and left flanks. Both lines, turning to the right, moved forward, and, having reached the forest, the jägers immediately occupied it, while the infantry formed up in two lines, with the cavalry on the right flank, which, having launched a feint attack, reassumed their former place. Meanwhile, the infantry front line began firing platoon volleys and fell back behind the second, which carried out a similar manoeuvre. Thereafter both lines moved forward and halted in front of the forest. The rearguard, which had until then been located between the two lines, was sent out to hold the forest together with the jägers. The artillery, forming a single battery, was positioned on the right flank: which marked the end of the manoeuvre.

On duty were: 10 field officers, 60 subalterns, 156 non-commissioned officers, 72 musicians and 1,118 privates, for a total of 1,416 men.

26 September [7 October] 1796. The division of the infantry into brigades was the same as in the previous manoeuvre. The force took up the following position: Colonel Kushelev's brigade was stationed at the Constable in two lines, with the rearguard to their front; the rest were on the Palace Square, also in two lines by brigade, with the vanguard to their front; the foot artillery were along the avenue running past the kitchen yard; the horse artillery were at the Constable, behind His Highness Alexander Pavlovich's battalion; the cavalry were along the road from the palace to the Constable. The jägers, divided into two pickets, were stationed along two side lanes.

There were Cossack vedettes forwards of the skirmishing screen sent out by them. As the enemy approached, the latter opened fire and fell back behind the jäger screen, which, upon being reinforced by the pickets, also began firing volleys: but, yielding to enemy superiority, retreated to the fortification located in front of the palace, and positioned themselves on the left flank of the vanguard. Thereafter the artillery opened destructive fire and halted the enemy attack. Taking advantage of this success by the artillery, the infantry located in the palace square and at the Constable, moved forward and, having passed the lanes, formed up in a single line. The artillery, protected by the jägers, was repositioned on the flanks. The cavalry, having ridden along the narrow lane from the kitchen yard, formed up on the right side, in line with the infantry, and launched an attack. The infantry moved forward and took up a new position in line with the cavalry. Having occupied this last position, the batteries immediately protected themselves with a breastwork of fascines and continued their action against the retreating enemy.

On duty were: 10 field officers, 59 subalterns, 154 non-commissioned officers, 73 musicians and 1,124 privates, for a total of 1,420 men.

29 September [10 October]. For this manoeuvre, the force assembled near the woodland. The infantry were positioned in the front line; the cavalry behind them in the second; the artillery were in a single battery, in front of the infantry. The gunners from the horse artillery were located on the Palace and Constable squares, with the guns located there, and which were intended to operate against an advancing enemy.

The cavalry began operations with their line facing the Palace. Having launched an attack, they then fell back in a chessboard formation. Meanwhile, the infantry, formed up behind the cavalry, fired a volley. After this, the first three battalions (combined and jäger included) moved forward to attack the Constable; the other three battalions and artillery followed this movement along the Rozhestvensky road. Having reached the Constable, they set up ladders and, having scaled the wall, positioned themselves in two lines on the Palace square to conclude the manoeuvre.

Manoeuvres on the Gatchina waterways. The entire fleet was divided into three squadrons: the *corps-de-bataille*, commanded by Major General Pleshcheev, consisted of the yacht *Nadezhny*, the yawls *Zaleta*, *Zabiyaka*, *Khodky*, *Tikhy* and *Repetichny-ukazuyushchy*. The vanguard, commanded by Colonel Kushelev, consisted of the *trekschuit* [barge] *Tverdy*, the yawls *Skory*, *Legky*, *Pospeshny* and *Bystry*. The rearguard, commanded by Colonel Arakcheev, consisted of the *trekschuit Khrabry*, the yawls *Letuchy*, *Provorny*, *Udaly* and *Smely*. Aboard these vessels were the Jäger Battalion, one division [pair of companies] from His Highness' Battalion and several guns. The entire fleet assembled on the Maly or Cherny Lake and moved to the Bolshoy Lake by squadron through three narrows. Having entered the Bolshoy or Bely Lake, the fleet continued to move in three lines past the Temple of Venus and, having passed it, formed up in single line-ahead, turning in the wake of the leading vessel and fired salvoes. Having reached the green bridges, the fleet turned back and formed line-abreast. Upon reaching the Temple of Venus for the second time, a signal was raised on the flagship, the yacht *Nadezhny*, for the vanguard to look for a suitable place for a landing. During this period the fleet lay adrift and fired at the shore. Once the vanguard had completed its mission, it raised a signal, at which the entire fleet approached the shore. The flagships continued firing, while the smaller vessels transported the landing force to the shore.

Landing party operations. As soon as the vessels reached the shore, the jägers engaged the enemy, who had taken up position on the high ground.

Major Malyutin's battalion, which had been designated to operate as opposition to the landing force, was in the first line, with two guns on the flanks; there was a screen of vedettes to their

front. The squadron of gendarmes was in the second line. Some of the jägers spread out across the forest and opened fire on the vedettes, who began to fall back. Meanwhile, a transport had arrived with fascines and other necessities for the construction of fortifications. Whereupon another jäger element began to set up an earthwork, which was occupied by the division [pair of companies] from His Highness' Battalion and two falconets brought from the boats. The enemy cavalry, having attacked the jägers, forced them to retreat, but noticing a battery on their flank from which Colonel Kushelev opened fire, they themselves hastily retreated. Meanwhile, the division from His Highness' Battalion left the fortifications and moved forwards. Colonel Malyutin, who was planning to go to engage them with his battalion, could not do this due to the confined space, so he detached one division to take the division from His Highness' Battalion in the flank, which, noticing this movement, withdrew to the shore and, protected by jägers, boarded the vessels, from which fire was immediately opened. The division detached from Colonel Malyutin's battalion occupied the fortification and, upon leaving their artillery there, continued to operate against the troops retreating onto the boats.

APPENDIX V TO CHAPTER 1.

Supreme Orders dated 9 [20] November 1796.[97]

The password is 'Poltava.'

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor retains the rank of Admiral General of the Navy.

He has most graciously deigned to promote: General Prince Repnin to the rank of field marshal; from the Chamberlains to the Guard as lieutenants; Tulubiyev to the Preobrazhensky, Nazaryev to the Semenovsky, Lasunsky to the Izmailovsky, Prince Vyazemsky to the Horse Guards.

Tomorrow, units from the Pavlovsk Garrison are to enter the city, and are to be deployed as follows: His Imperial Majesty the Emperor's and Major General Arakcheev's battalions are assigned to the Preobrazhensky Regiment as grenadier companies, His Imperial Highness Alexander Pavlovich's and Lieutenant Colonel Nedobrov's battalions to the Semenovsky Regiment in the musketeer companies; His Imperial Highness Konstantin Pavlovich's Battalion to the grenadier company, and Lieutenant Colonel Malyutin's Battalion to the musketeer company of the Izmailovsky Regiment; the Gendarme and Dragoon regiments into the Horse Guards.

The fifteen companies of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, including the jäger companies, are to be divided into three musketeer battalions, while the sixteenth is to form the third grenadier company; the 10 companies each of the Semenovsky and Izmailovsky regiments are to be divided into two battalions; the eleventh company is to be formed from the jäger company. And thus each battalion will consist of five musketeer companies and one of grenadiers.

The Semenovsky and Izmailovsky jäger companies, together with Lieutenant Colonel Rachinsky's company, will form the Guard Jäger Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rachinsky.

The gunners from all three Guard regiments and the artillery sub-unit under Lieutenant Colonel Cannabich will form the Guard Artillery Battalion, which will be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Cannabich.

All lieutenant colonels of the Pavlovsk Garrison are to be transferred to the Guard regiments, namely: Glazov, Adamovich, Snazin and Rotgov to the Preobrazhensky Regiment; Nedobrov, Kuperyanov 2nd and Pevtsov to the Semenovsky Regiment; Malyutin, Essen, Kuperyanov 1st and Bilistein to the Izmailovsky Regiment; Kaptsevich and Kotlubitsky to the Guard Artillery Battalion; Davydov, Frolovsky, Karakulin and Afrosimov 1st to the Horse Guards. However, subaltern officers shall enter the Guard rank for rank.

Major General Arakcheev is to command the Preobrazhensky Regiment's combined grenadier battalion, consisting of three grenadier companies.

Major General Arakcheev will be the major of the Preobrazhensky Regiment.

Nelidov, aide-de-camp to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, is promoted to lieutenant colonel.

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor announces his pleasure at the Izmailovsky's Changing of the Guard ceremony.

Tomorrow the Preobrazhensky Regiment are to be on parade at 11 o'clock.

Signed in original by His Imperial Highness' own hand: Alexander. Verified as authentic by Major General and Chevalier Aleksei Arakcheev.

97 General Archive of the General Staff.

APPENDIX VI TO CHAPTER 1.

Rescript to Lieutenant Colonel Rachinsky dated 6 [17] February 1797.

To the honourable Colonel Rachinsky. According to rumours that have reached us that there is some unrest among the peasants in the Tver Governorate, I authorise you to pass through that governorate to discover If there are anywhere outbreaks of violence or disorder in the villages regarding obedience to the landowners, then dispatch your battalion to such places to pacify the peasants and restore order. I remain graciously yours.[98] Pavel.

98 M.B. Instructions from Emperor Paul I.

APPENDIX VII TO CHAPTER 1.

Officers Assigned To The New Battalion.[99]

From the Preobrazhensky: Lieutenant Nikilai Ivanovich Rogachev 1st.

From the Semenovsky: Captain-Lieutenant Sergey Ivanovich Mistrov; Ensign Vasily Ivanovich Rogachev 2nd.

From the Izmailovsky: Captain Maslov;[100] Lieutenant Sergey Lvovich Pushkin; Sub-Lieutenant Prince Yakov Alexeevich Dolgorukov; Sub-Lieutenant Dmitry Matveevich Krasilnikov 1st.

From the Gatchina Jäger Company: Second-Major Anton Mikhailovich Rachinsky as lieutenant colonel; Captain-Lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich Miller; Ensign Dmitry Petrovich Desyatov; Ensign Ivan Ivanovich Leichner.

From the latter jäger company assigned to form the Guard Jäger Battalion.[101]

Major Anton Rachinsky: he subsequently served as colonel-in-chief of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion. As a lieutenant general, he was nominated to privy councillor on 9 [21] June 1800.

Lieutenant Ivan Miller: he later served as a Lifeguard colonel in the Jäger Battalion and, upon promotion to major general on 13 [24] May 1799, was appointed colonel-in-chief of the 7th Jäger Regiment. In 1810 he was discharged from service with uniform rights and a half pension. In 1812 and 1813 he commanded the Tula Opolchenie, and on 15 [27] December of that same year, 1813, he was discharged from service for a second time due to wounds, with a full pension.

Sub-Lieutenant Ivan Lechner: subsequently holding the rank of major general, was appointed colonel-in-chief of a jäger regiment renamed for him [formerly 16th Jägers, renamed 15th Jägers in 1803] and on 25 January [6 February] 1801, he was removed from the lists as deceased.

99 From private papers delivered by Petukhov.

100 Captain Maslov was not listed on orders, and therefore he is not included in the list of generals, field officers and subalterns of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, appended to this History.

101 Gatchina Cathedral contains bronze plaques inscribed with information on the Gatchina Force. The contents of the first bronze plaque are listed here.

APPENDIX VIII TO CHAPTER 1.

Establishment for the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion of Three Companies, 10 [21] July 1798.

		Number of men	Number of allowances		Annual Salary[102]			
					Each		Total	
			Each	Total	Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
General		1		40			2,293	38
Colonel		1		17			900	
Captain		1		15			558	60
Staff Captain		2	11	22	445	50	891	
Lieutenant		3	5	15	249	30	747	90
Sub-Lieutenant, including one adjutant		4	4	16	191	90	767	60
Ensign, including one general's aide-de-camp		4	4	16	172	20	688	80
Non-commissioned officers, 42 in total.	Feldwebel	3			95	31	285	93
	Portepée-Junker	3			56		168	
	Junker	6			56		336	
	Other	30			56		1,680	
Each company having 100 privates, 300 in total, of whom:[103]	Senior pay	105			24	80¼	2,604	26¼
	Junior pay	195			16	33	3,184	35
Horn-Major		1					95	31
Hornist		9			21	27	191	43
Auditor [administrative officer]		1		6			257	25
Physician		1		5			450	
Assistant Physician		1					180	
Feldscher [combat medic]		3			21	80¼	65	40¾
Infirmary Attendant		3			21	80¼	65	40¾
Wagenmeister		1					95	31
Gunstock maker		1					21	80¼
Assistant Gunstock maker		1					13	33
Master Armourer		1					300	

102 Minus the cost of medicines and hospital expenses, while for field officers and subalterns with orderlies and allowances, assuming seven roubles 30 kopecks per orderly per year, and allowances for eight months, each at one rouble 50 kopecks per month.

103 The name-day money due to privates, three roubles each per year, is included in annual pay, which is paid to each man in thirds of the year along with their pay.

	Number of men	Number of allowances		Annual Salary			
				Each		Total	
		Each	Total	Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
Assistant Armourer	1					21	80¼
Master Farrier or Blacksmith	1					56	
Blacksmith	2			21	80¼	43	60½
Carpenter	3			21	80¼	65	40¾
Provost	1					21	80¼
Drivers for three infirmary wagons	3			7	38	147	60
Drivers for three ration articulated wagons	3						
Drivers for three cartridge box-carts	3						
Driver for the pharmacy wagon	1						
Driver for the office & treasury wagon	1						
Driver for the armoury & tool wagon	1						
Drivers for six clothing articulated wagons	6						
Muleteers for three cauldron pack animals	2						
General's orderlies	8						
Colonel's orderlies	6						
Captain's orderlies	4						
Staff Captain's orderlies (three each)	6						
Lieutenant's orderlies (two each)	6						
Other orderlies (one each, including Auditor's)	9						
Physician to receive pay for one orderly						7	30
TOTAL:	**448**		**152**			**17,141**	**18**
Deductions from pay by all ranks for medicines and hospital care, for issue from the commissariat, the former to the Medical Collegium, and the latter to the regiment for care of the sick:							
The general, field officers, subalterns, auditors, and physicians shall pay 1.5 kopecks for medicines, while non-commissioned officers and other lower ranks, except for drivers and orderlies, pay one kopeck per rouble:						176	66¼
The general, field officers, subalterns and non-commissioned officers, as well as for craftsmen, shall pay one kopeck per rouble towards hospital care:						85	81¾
GRAND TOTAL:						**17,403**	**66**
Including 300 privates receiving name-day money and 12 hornists, a total of 312 men, each receiving three roubles, for a total of 936 roubles, which are issued in						16,467	66

	Number of men	Number of allowances		Annual Salary			
				Each		Total	
		Each	Total	Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
accordance with demands from the regiments from the cabinet of His Imperial Majesty, deducted from the entire sum:							

Those entitled to receive provisions are: three *Feldwebel*, three *Portepée-Junkers*, six *Junkers*, 30 non-commissioned officers, 300 privates, one horn-major, 12 hornists, three *Feldscherer*, three infirmary attendants, one *Wagenmeister*, one gunstock maker, one assistant gunstock maker, one master armourer, one assistant armourer, one farrier, two blacksmiths, three carpenters, 20 drivers, 40 orderlies, including for one physician's orderly, one provost, for a total of 432 men, each of them is to receive annually: three *chetvert* [629¾ dry litres] of flour, two *chetverik* and two *garnets* [59 dry litres] of cereals, making a total for all of: 1,296 *chetvert* [272,043⅓ dry litres] of flour, 121 *chetvert* and four *chetverik* [3,188 dry litres] of cereals.

Signed in original: Alexander, Admiral Pushchin, General-of-Infantry Lamb, General-of-Cavalry Baron Pahlen, Lieutenant General Count Buxhöwden, Vice-Admiral Kushelev, Lieutenant General Chelishchev, Lieutenant General Obolyaninov, Major General Prince Dolgorukoy.

Table of uniform, munitions and weapons items for the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion of three companies:

	Service life (years)	Number of items	Total cost of items		Annual budget	
			Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
Hats for all combatant ranks: 42 non-commissioned officers, 300 privates, one *Wagenmeister*, one horn-major, nine hornists, for 353, plus 14 spares per company to replace damaged items, for an additional 42 in total, at one rouble each:[104]	2	395	395	00	197	50
Lengths of black woollen (or similar) cord for combatant ranks' hats including spares, around the crown with two tassels at the ends, and a third on the hat, a total of 26½ kopecks for cord and tassels per hat:	2	395	10	67½	52	33¾
Hats without decoration, except for a black woollen cord to bind them at five kopecks each, for support personnel: three *Feldscherer*, three infirmary attendants, one gunstock maker and his assistant, one	2	35	28	00	14	00

104 It was observed that the hats were always to be properly bound and rebound once a year.

	Service life (years)	Number of items	Total cost of items		Annual budget	
			Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
master armourer and his assistant, two blacksmiths, three carpenters, 20 drivers, one provost, for 35 men, at 80 kopecks each with cords:						
Flat brass buttons for all combatant, support ranks and spare hats, for 430, one each, 10 kopecks for a set:	20	350 sets of 10	3	58½	0	17⅚
Greatcoats for all combatant and support ranks, to match the number of hats, 388 men, plus 14 spares per company, 42 spare in total, making 430, each of four *arshin* and four *vershok* dark green cloth at 84 kopecks per *arshin*; three *arshin* of linen lining at six kopecks per *arshin*, five kopecks for tailoring, thread and wooden buttons; three roubles 80 kopecks for each coat. Greatcoat buttons are to be cloth covered:	4	430	1,634	00	408	50
Coats of lighter green wool: 42 non-commissioned officers, 300 privates, one horn-major, nine hornists, one *Wagenmeister*, for 353 men, plus 14 spares per company for 42 in total, making 395; each of two *arshin* 14 *vershok*, plus five *vershok* each of orange wool for cuffs and collar, at two roubles per *arshin* for both colours; two *arshin* eight *vershok* of green lining for the skirts at 60 kopecks per *arshin*; two *arshin* eight *vershok* of linen sleeve and pocket lining at six kopecks per *arshin*; tailoring, cords and thread at 12 kopecks each; for a total of eight roubles 87 kopecks per coat:[105]	1	395	3,306	15	3,306	15
Brass flat cast buttons for these coats, 32 on each, at 10 kopecks per set, and for 395 coats:	20	1,053 sets of 4	105	33⅓	5	26⅔
Regimental pattern lace for all non-commissioned officers, the horn-major and *Wagenmeister*, for the decoration of their uniforms, two *arshin* each at 90 kopecks per *arshin*, for a total of one rouble 80 kopecks per uniform:	2	44	79	20	39	60

105 Coats were to be made in such a way that they could be buttoned up in winter and that there was room in the sleeves and other seams to accommodate fleece waistcoats; the tail-coats of support ranks were to be of similar cut; the lining of coats, regardless of facing colours, was to be green.

	Service life (years)	Number of items	Total cost of items		Annual budget	
			Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
Regimental pattern lanyards for all coats at 60 kopecks each:	1	395	237	00	237	00
Two brass tips for each lanyard at 10 kopecks a pair:	20	395	39	50	1	97½
Gold braid with red detail of regimental pattern for nine hornists, for decoration of coat sleeves, 20 *arshin* each, or 50 *arshin* for sleeves and seams on the horn-major's coat, at 80 kopecks per *arshin*:	1	230 *arshin*	184	00	184	00
Tail-coats for 35 support ranks of four *arshin* of dark green cloth each with similarly coloured collar and cuffs, at 84 kopecks per *arshin*; three *arshin* each of dark green skirt lining at 30 kopecks per *arshin*; four arshin of linen lining at six kopecks per *arshin*; 12 kopecks each for tailoring, cords and thread; for a total of four roubles 62 kopecks per tail-coat:	2	35	161	70	80	85
Flat cast buttons for these tail-coats, 26 on each, at 10 kopecks per set, and for 35 tail-coats:	20	75 sets of 10	7	58⅓	0	37⅚
Sleeveless waistcoats of lighter green cloth to match 395 coats, each of one *arshin* four *vershok* of cloth at two roubles per *arshin*; three *arshin* 12 *vershok* of linen lining at six kopecks per *arshin*; four kopecks for tailoring, cord and thread; for a total of two roubles 76½ kopecks per waistcoat:[106]	1	395	1,092	17½	1,092	17½
Cast brass buttons, 10 on each waistcoat, at 10 kopecks per set:	20	329 sets of 2	32	91⅔	1	64⅔
Waistcoat sleeves of 12 *vershok* of lighter green cloth per pair, at two roubles per *arshin*; two *arshin* four *vershok* of linen lining at six kopecks per *arshin*; one kopeck for tailoring and thread; for a total of one rouble 64½ kopecks each:	2	395 pairs	649	77½	324	88¾

106There was a pleat in the back of the waistcoat such that a fleece could be worn underneath in winter; old waistcoats were used to make fleeces, caps, and mittens; while waistcoats for support personnel were made in a similar manner.

	Service life (years)	Number of items	Total cost of items		Annual budget	
			Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
Waistcoats for support ranks of one *arshin* four *vershok* of dark green cloth at 84 kopecks per *arshin*; three *arshin* 12 *vershok* of linen lining at six kopecks per *arshin*; four kopecks for tailoring, cord and thread; for a total of one rouble 31½ kopecks per waistcoat:	2	35	46	2½	23	1¼
Waistcoat sleeves of 12 *vershok* of dark green cloth per pair, at 84 kopecks per *arshin*; two *arshin* four *vershok* of linen lining at six kopecks per *arshin*; one kopeck for tailoring and thread; for a total of one rouble 77½ kopecks per pair. Waistcoats for support ranks were to have cloth covered buttons:	2	35 pairs	27	12½	13	56¼
Deerskin breeches to match the number of coats, at 10 roubles each:	2	395	3,950	00	1,975	00
Trousers for support ranks, 35 pairs to match the number of tail-coats, made of white cloth with similar cloth-covered buttons, 14 *vershok* of cloth each at 72 kopecks per *arshin*; three *arshin* each of linen lining at six kopecks per *arshin*; four kopecks for tailoring, cord and thread; two kopecks for opening ties; for a total of 87 kopecks per pair:	2	35	30	45	15	22½
Overalls of Flemish cloth for all combatants to match the number of coats with spares for a total of 395 men, three *arshin* each at 27 kopecks per *arshin*; four kopecks for tailoring, thread and wooden buttons; 85 kopecks per pair of overalls:	1	395	335	75	335	75
Trousers for support ranks of Flemish cloth lined with linen of one *arshin* eight *vershok* at 27 kopecks per *arshin*; three *arshin* of lining at six kopecks per *arshin*; two kopecks for tailoring; for a total of 60½ kopecks per pair:	1	35	21	17½	21	17½
Fleece vests for every combatant and support lower rank to match the number of greatcoats, excluding spares (388 men), for which one rouble each is to be allocated for the initial issue, and 50 kopecks each allocated annually thereafter:	1	388	194	00	194	00
Regimental pattern cloth forage caps for all non-commissioned officers, privates and support ranks, including spares, for a total of 430 men at 27½	1	430	117	17½	0	00

	Service life (years)	Number of items	Total cost of items		Annual budget	
			Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
kopecks each:[107]						
Two pairs of boots for 353 combatants, with spares for 42 men, for a total of 395 men, at one rouble 50 kopecks per pair, 15 kopecks for construction, making a total of one rouble 65 kopecks per pair:	1	790 pairs	1,303	50	1,303	50
One pair of boots for each of the 35 support ranks, and one pair of uppers each, for a total of two roubles 25 kopecks for boots and uppers:	1	35	78	75	78	75
Two pairs of soles for each combatant and support rank at 25 kopecks per pair, in total for 388 men:	1	776 pairs	194	00	194	00
Two pairs of woollen stockings for every combatant and support rank, for 388 men; yarn for two pairs of stockings, at one rouble per man:	1	388	388	00	388	00
Linen shirts for all combatants and support ranks including spares to match the number of coats and tail-coats for a total of 430 men; 18 *arshin* for three shirts each at 13 kopecks per *arshin*, for a total of two roubles 34 kopecks per man:	1	430	1,006	20	1,006	20
Black neck-cloths, two each for all combatants and spares, one each for support ranks, for a total of 430 men with linen lining and ribbon ties to match the number of greatcoats; at 10 kopecks each:	1	825	82	50	82	50
Black woollen braid ribbon for all combatant and support ranks, excluding the provost, for a total of 387 men, two each, each of two *arshin* in total, at four kopecks per *arshin*:	1	1,548 *arshin*	61	92	61	92
One pair of suede gloves for each non-commissioned officer, horn-major and *Wagenmeister* at one rouble 50 kopecks per pair:[108]	2	44	66	00	33	00
A cane for each non-commissioned officer, horn-major and *Wagenmeister*; with bone knobs and copper tips, at two roubles each:[109]	-	44	8	00	0	00

107Having made the forage caps, they were a one-time issue to the battalions.

108Non-commissioned officers, the horn-major and *Wagenmeister* would buy a replacement pair of gloves for themselves every two years.

109The canes were delivered as a one-time issue to the battalion and were considered permanent and no further issues would be needed.

	Service life (years)	Number of items	Total cost of items		Annual budget	
			Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
Rifled *Stutzer* with brass fittings and ramrods for non-commissioned officers and jägers, as well as for the *Wagenmeister*, for a total of 343 men, at 10 roubles 77¾ kopecks per *Stutzer*:	20	343	3,696	68¾	184	83⅜
Sword bayonets with brass mounted hilts, to match the number of *Stutzer*, at two roubles 16 kopecks each:[110]	20	343	740	88	37	4¼
Flints and cartridge paper, to the value of 13½ kopecks for each *Stutzer*:	1	343	46	30½	46	30½
Waldhorn with all accessories at 30 roubles each:	12	9	270	00	22	50
Swords for the horn-major and hornists with cutlass blades and brass hilts, hooks and tips, at two roubles 24¾ kopecks each:	20	10	22	47½	1	12⅜
Scabbards for sword-bayonets and swords, made of polished leather at 5½ kopecks each:	1	353	19	41½	19	41½
Brass tips and hooks for bayonet scabbards at 12 kopecks each:	20	343	41	16	2	5⅘
Leather sword knots with a woollen tassel, one each at 10 kopecks each:	1	10	1	00	1	00
Half-cases for *Stutzers* made of red yuft leather, with similar buttons, at 50 kopecks each:	10	343	171	50	17	15
Rifle slings of red yuft leather at 20 kopecks each:	8	343	68	60	8	57⅜
Flint and frizzen covers of red yuft leather at three kopecks each:	8	343	10	29	1	28⅝
One brass button for each rifle sling at 10 kopecks per set:	20	28 sets of 7	6	85⅝	0	14⅓
Cartridge pouches made of polished black leather, to match the number of *Stutzer*, at one rouble 15 kopecks, plus 10 kopecks for their finishing, for a total of one ruble 25 kopecks each:	8	343	428	75	53	59⅜
Sword belts for the total of bayonets and swords, on which the cartridge pouches are also to be mounted,	8	353	176	50	22	6¼

110Each rifle was to be provided with 75 cartridges with bullets, of which, except in emergencies, 40 should be kept in the pouch and 35 in the caissons, from gunpowder and lead issued by the artillery.

	Service life (years)	Number of items	Total cost of items		Annual budget	
			Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
made of polished black leather, at 50 kopecks each:						
Brass sword belt buckles, at 10 kopecks each:	20	353	56	49	2	82⅕
A water canteen for all combatant and support ranks, 388 men, made of double-skinned tin, at 70 kopecks each:	8	388	271	60	33	95
Knapsacks made of hair-on calfskin, square, unlined, for all combatant and support ranks except for drivers, for 368 men, at 69 kopecks each:	8	368	253	92	31	74
One large and two small iron buckles for each knapsack, at 13 kopecks for a set of three:	20	368	47	84	2	39⅕
Bags for hard-tack, made of plain white leather, to match the number of knapsacks, at 50 kopecks each:[111]	3	368	184	00	61	33⅓
Tin-plated copper cauldrons of a size fit for purpose, with lids and an iron loop handle, 12 per company, at 11 roubles each:	20	36	396	00	19	80
For the re-plating of cauldrons at 50 kopecks each:	1	36	18	00	18	00
Entrenching tools:						
Ten axes per company at 70 kopecks each:	20	30	21	00	1	47
Five iron shovels per company at 35 kopecks each:	20	15	5	25		
Three pick mattocks per company at 35 kopecks each:	20	9	3	15		
Leather covers for axes, pick mattocks and shovels with straps, at 25 kopecks each:	8	54	13	50	1	68¾
For casting bullets:						
Cast iron kettle:	20	1	7	50	0	67½
Iron ladle:	20	1	3	25		
Steel mould in *Stutzer* calibre:	20	1	2	75		
Three hay scythes per company at 70 kopecks each:	20	9	6	30	0	31½
Locksmith tools:						
Bellows:	20	1	8	00	3	40.7
Anvil:	20	1	5	00		

111Straps for knapsacks, bread bags and water flasks were to be made from worn-out sword belts and rifle slings.

	Service life (years)	Number of items	Total cost of items		Annual budget	
			Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
Two small hammers at 67 kopecks each:	20	2	1	34		
Hacksaw	20	1	1	50		
Clamp:	20	1	1	50		
Nail forge:	20	1	4	00		
Table vice:	20	1	5	50		
Hand vice:	20	1	1	50		
Drill:	20	1	1	50		
Brace:	20	1	1	50		
Large screwdriver:	20	1	7	50		
Medium screwdriver:	20	1	4	00		
Small screwdriver:	20	1	2	50		
Large saw at one rouble each:	20	3	3	00		
Medium saw at 80 kopecks each:	20	4	3	20		
Small saw at 70 kopecks each:	20	20	14	00		
Small anvil:	20	1	2	60		
For all blacksmith tools:	20	-	25	00	1	25
Carpentry tools:						
Hub jig:	20	1	3	50		
Axes at 80 kopecks each:	20	3	2	40		
Chisels at 20 kopecks each:	20	2	0	40		
Drills, large and small at 90 kopecks each:	20	3	2	70		
Hand-held circle cutter:	20	1	0	55		
Planes at 27 kopecks each:	20	2	0	54	0	67.1
Saws at 70 kopecks each:	20	2	1	40		
Chisels, small, at 20 kopecks each:	20	4	0	80		
Carving blades at 16 kopecks each:	20	2	0	32		
Round chisels at 20 kopecks each:	20	2	0	40		
Joiner’s chisels at 20 kopecks each:	20	2	0	40		
Gunstock maker’s tools:						

	Service life (years)	Number of items	Total cost of items		Annual budget	
			Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
Hand vice:	20	1	1	88	0	77.3
Rasp:	20	3	1	20		
Saws at 65 kopecks each:	20	3	1	95		
Drills at 12 kopecks each:	20	3	0	36		
Lathes at 42 kopecks each:	20	2	0	84		
Barrel gouges at 16 kopecks each:	20	3	0	48		
Ramrod gouges at 16 kopecks each:	20	3	0	48		
Large and small chisels at 17 kopecks each:	20	3	0	51		
Plug chisels at 20 kopecks each:	20	3	0	60		
Cutting blades at 16 kopecks each:	20	3	0	48		
Hatchets at 80 kopecks each:	20	2	1	60		
Semicircular chisels at 16 kopecks each:	20	3	0	48		
Large carving saws at one rouble 25 kopecks each:	20	2	2	50		
Bolt extracting pliers at 75 kopecks each:	20	2	1	50		
Small hammers at 30 kopecks each:	20	2	0	60		
Full transport:						
Infirmary carriages, one per company at 100 roubles each:	8	3	300	00	120	00
Articulated provisions wagons, one per company at 80 roubles each:	8	3	240	00		
Cartridge caissons, one per company, at 30 roubles each:	8	3	90	00		
Pharmacy cart:	8	1	30	00		
Regimental office and treasury cart:	8	1	30	00		
Armoury instruments and tool cart:	8	1	30	00		
Articulated wagons for lower ranks' clothing, footwear and spare equipment, two per company, at 40 roubles each:	8	6	240	00		
Horses:						
Pack animals for cauldrons, one per company, at 50 roubles each:	8	3	150	00	18	75

	Service life (years)	Number of items	Total cost of items		Annual budget	
			Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
Draught horses: 12 in three teams of four for infirmary carriages; nine in three teams of three for provisions wagons; six in three teams of two for cartridge caissons; two for the pharmacy cart; two for the office cart; two for the tool cart; 12 in six teams of two for the baggage wagons, for a total of 45, at 25 roubles each:	8	45	1,125	00	140	62½
Horse harness:						
Blinkers for the number of draught horses with strap bridles and rope reins and traces, at 15 roubles each:	8	45	675	00	107	62½
Saddles with saddle cloths and all other equipment to match the number of carts, at seven roubles each:	8	18	126	00		
Pack saddles with all fittings, with bridles and lead reins, at 20 roubles each:	8	3	60	00		
Iron bits and buckles for bridles for pack saddles, at 50 kopecks per saddle:	20	3	1	50	0	7½
Blankets for pack saddles, dark green cloth, exactly the same as those required in other Lifeguard regiments and described in the table of these regiments, to match the number of pack saddles, at 35 roubles 77½ kopecks each:	4	3	107	32½	26	83⅛
Two canvas covers for each pack saddle at 50 kopecks each:	1	6	3	00	3	00
Axle grease for carts at 80 kopecks per wheel:	1	18	14	40	14	40
Horse shoeing and veterinary services at one rouble per horse:	1	-	48	00	48	00
For the maintenance of regimental matters:	1	-	50	00	50	00
For various minor repairs between annual inspections:	1	-	50	00	50	00
For the repair and restoration of battalion buildings, such as: barracks, stables, sheds, armouries, for firewood, candles and oil, and for all other battalion and household necessities annually:	1	-	0	00	8,000	00
In total, for all weapons, uniform and munitions items, for the purchase of draught and pack horses,	-	-	26,530	35¼	20,848	72.1

	Service life (years)	Number of items	Total cost of items		Annual budget	
			Roubles	Kopecks	Roubles	Kopecks
for the regimental baggage train and harness, and for all other necessities for the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion:						

Daily forage for three pack horses and 45 draught horses, for a total of 48 horses is: two *garnets* four *chast* [12⅓ dry pints] of oats each; 20 *funt* [18 pounds] of hay each, for eight months each year; for which 384 *chetvert* [2,216½ bushels] of oats and 5,760 *pud* [208,057 pounds] of hay are needed.

With regard to the maintenance of weapons, uniform and munitions items, the supply of these from the Commissariat and the formation of the battalion in the accounts with the Commissariat and the Provisioning departments and in relation to the maintenance of draught and pack horses, proceed in accordance with the regulations already prescribed for line jäger regiments.

Signed in original: Alexander. Admiral Pushchin. General-of-Infantry Lamb. General-of-Cavalry Baron Pahlen. Lieutenant Genera Count Buxhöwden. Vice Admiral Kushelev. Lieutenant General Chelishchev. Lieutenant General Obolyaninov. Major General Prince Dolgorukoy.

APPENDIX IX TO CHAPTER 1.

Gatchina Manoeuvres, 1 To 15 [12 To 26] September 1797.

Ordre de Bataille. The entire infantry are to be divided into three divisions, and each division into two lines, with the first division consisting of the following: Lifeguard Preobrazhensky Regiment's battalions under Major General Baron Arakcheev, His Imperial Majesty, and Major General Talyzin, and Colonel Fedorov's battalion from the Pavlovsk Grenadier Regiment; this division is to be commanded by *General-Feldmarschall* Prince Repnin with Major General Baron Arakcheev, Major General Chertkov and Major General Talyzin as his subordinate lieutenants general.

The second division is to include Major General Nefediev's battalion from the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment with Major Tsvilenev's Flank Company from the Pavlovsk Grenadier Regiment attached, His Highness Alexander Pavlovich's battalion and *Feldmarschall* Saltykov's battalion; this division is to be commanded by His Highness Alexander Pavlovich, with Major General Korsakov and Major General Nefediev as his subordinate lieutenants general.

The third division is to include the Lifeguard Izmailovsky Regiment, Lieutenant General Kushelev's battalion, with a Flank Company from the Pavlovsk Grenadier Regiment attached, Major Barataev's battalion, His Highness Konstantin Pavlovich's battalion, and *Feldmarschall* Prince Repnin's battalion. This division is to be commanded by His Highness Konstantin Pavlovich with Lieutenant General Vadkovsky, Major General Barshchov and Major General Chemodanov subordinate to him.

Two files are to be taken from each platoon of every battalion except the jägers, from which three battalions-of-platoons are to be formed, each of six platoons. The first is to be commanded by Colonel Snazin, the second by Colonel Kupreyanov 2nd, and the third by Colonel Pevtsov. The Guard Jäger Battalion and the combined battalion under Colonel Snazin are to form the infantry vanguard commanded by *Feldmarschall* Count Kamensky.

Colonels Kupreyanov's and Pevtsov's combined battalions are to form the infantry rearguard commanded by Lieutenant General Benckendorff.


The artillery ratio is two guns per battalion; one battery of heavy guns, and another of battalion guns are to be formed, of which the first division takes the heavy battery, while the second takes the battalion guns.

The vanguard and rearguard are to have two guns each.

The cavalry component is to be commanded by Lieutenant General Vasilchikov, when it is all in one echelon, then ten squadrons shall make up the first brigade of Lieutenant General Vasilchikov's division commanded by Major General Bobrinsky; while three squadrons of Lifeguard Hussars and two squadrons of Cossacks shall form the second brigade commanded by Major General Kologrivov.

If the cavalry are in two echelons, Major General Bobrinsky shall remain with the first echelon and Major General Kologrivov with the second. When divided into wings, the right wing is to be commanded by Lieutenant General Vasilchikov, while Major General Kologrivov commands the left; whereupon the first echelon is to detach: five squadrons of Horse Guard and three squadrons of Lifeguard Hussars; while the left wing are bound to detach five squadrons of Horse Guard and two squadrons of Cossacks to the second line of the horse vanguard and rearguard.

First manoeuvre. The vanguard and rearguard were to gather on the square between the forests opposite the palace.



Manoeuvre at Gatchina, 1 [12] September 1797.

His Highness Alexander Pavlovich's division on the left side of the palace square and along the road between the Constable and the palace.

His Highness Konstantin Pavlovich's division from the Constable along the main road to the settlement.

Feldmarschall Prince Repnin's division on the right side of the palace square.

The cavalry (less those detached to the vanguard) in Silviya facing the orangery.

The enemy were assumed to be holding the open ground from the mill to the large avenue opposite the palace.

Upon the vanguard firing a cannon signal, then all divisions and the cavalry were to begin moving in order to attack the enemy.

At the beginning, the vanguard were to advance with their artillery, dislodging the enemy from the forests they were holding, in order to clear a sufficient amount of open ground for the battle lines and to create an anchor point for the left flank of the infantry of the *ligne de bataille*. They were to manoeuvre at will and, if necessary, in order to further anchor themselves, erect a flèche or a redoubt.

The entire infantry were to enter the field in three columns under His Highness Konstantin Pavlovich from the rye plantation to the vanguard's location. His Highness Alexander Pavlovich facing the palace avenues was to turn up the road towards the mill. Prince Repnin was to proceed along the lane that leads to the barracks and turn along the road towards the mill, so as to push their heads into *ligne de bataille*, instantly judging the distance in order to form a single echelon from three columns, holding the battalions assigned to the second line in readiness. Immediately, as the first echelon is deploying, the second line is to form facing the left flank of their divisions.

The rearguard, having let the divisions pass, is to move from its location and support the vanguard.

However, in order to shield these operations by the infantry, the cavalry were to quickly advance along the road near the orangery onto the open ground and, having passed the woodland near the mill, were to deploy from right to left at full interval in order to screen all the infantry, at the same time as these manoeuvres, the vanguard, united with the rearguard, were to advance in order to protect the left flank of the infantry.

The infantry, having brought their column heads level, were to deploy from left to right as stated above in two echelons.

The cavalry, having formed fours, were to unmask the infantry, the vanguard were to send their cavalry to them, while they swiftly moved forwards from their location, forming a salient angle with the infantry, were to launch a full charge on the circle in the middle of the open ground, rally back twice by squadron and take up a salient position to the infantry in the first position and were to move forward from there.

At the same time, the vanguard were also to clear the left flank of the infantry and, once space allowed, were to send two battalions from itself to the main line.


The infantry were to lay down fire, advancing twice by battalion and twice by platoon; they were to halt upon reaching the high ground.

Throughout these coordinated attacks and movements it was assumed that the enemy were facing Mariyenburg. While a change of position was to be made in order to prevent them from getting there also using the crossing over the dam near the porcelain factory: the cavalry were to screen

the infantry once more; the infantry at that time, having formed by platoons, were to proceed along the canals in Silviya, bypass the place and proceed to the dam by the porcelain factory near the woodland that juts out into the open ground, eyes to the left, as they say; having reached the appointed place, they were to form line: Major General Arakcheev's battalion were to hold the forest, establishing out posts there. The vanguard were to be detached to hold the dam. While the vanguard and rearguard had to take positions on the high ground, as the cavalry took post on the left flank of the infantry.

Through this movement the enemy were to be defeated, prevented from reaching Mariyenburg and driven off.

The manoeuvre ended with a ceremonial parade.



Manoeuvre at Gatchina, 3 [14] September 1797.

Second manoeuvre. The division's assembly areas were planned to be the same; the cavalry division were to approach the kitchen bridge head-on.

The enemy were dependent upon irregular forces striving to take possession of the open ground near Mariyenburg. Upon a signal, all units were to begin to move - the vanguard were to go forward, occupy the high ground itself and make movements in such a manner as to hold the enemy off and gain time for the cavalry and infantry to form themselves up in the prescribed *ordre de bataille*.

The cavalry were to move quickly along the lane by the barracks, shift to the right side of the position and bring their head to the end of the drainage ditch on the open ground; they were to deploy from right to left into two lines by squadron *en echequier*; such that the squadrons of the rear line were between the squadrons of the front line. The hussars on both flanks were stationed *en potence* by platoon, the Cossacks were spread out and carried out patrols in order to prevent the enemy irregulars from infiltrating anywhere. And in this formation they were to make movements forwards and to the sides at the trot; when moving to the sides, the hussars were to form up and, if necessary, could make attacks to the sides: should the enemy appear in strength on the flanks.

Meanwhile, the heads of the infantry columns, having quickly ascended to the semicircular area in front of the palace, were to move *en évantillé*, that is, almost fan-like, to occupy the assigned position such that the centre and bearing or direction of the entire movement was along a straight line towards Mariyenburg along the Stone Central Vale, and having brought the heads of the columns perpendicular to it, they were to deploy into two lines and form battalion squares, three in the first line, and two in the second also *en echequier*, that is, the squares of the second line were to be opposite the intervals of the first, while there was to be sufficient gap between the lines to accommodate the cavalry.

While the cavalry were still in the early stages of their movement, the vanguard moved to the left flank of the position, while the rearguard, having separated from the infantry, moved to the right: as soon as the infantry had reformed into battalion squares and moved forwards, then the vanguard and rearguard formed battalion squares and moved to the flanks; the former slightly ahead, and the latter slightly behind the main lines of infantry squares.


Having been reinforced, the enemy soon forced the cavalry to retreat, the latter immediately withdrew and repositioned themselves between the infantry squares such that there were four squadrons in the intervals of the first infantry echelon and two in the intervals of the second. The hussars were also *en potence*, while the Cossacks remain spread out behind the line. Whereupon the battalion squares, descending from the high ground, advanced firing by ranks until the enemy were driven off. As soon as the enemy began to retreat: the cavalry quickly rode out from the squares and formed up in two lines, the hussars on the flanks of the second; the first line launched a full charge, the second were in support at the trot, while the hussars make a concentric attack from the flanks, the Cossacks further behind them launched a similar attack with a yell and immediately fell back after the heavier cavalry: while the cavalry conducted a general withdrawal and became the third line behind the infantry.

The infantry halted on the approaches to Mariyenburg, sending batteries ahead of them, which fired a cannonade at the enemy still holding out on the far side of the lake.

At the same time, the rearguard were approaching the mill dam, while the vanguard constructed a pontoon bridge at the exit of Mariyenburg, and until it was complete the batteries of both the

vanguard and the rearguard fired salvoes, then when the pontoons were ready, the vanguard crossed them, while the rearguard crossed the dam, seized the settlement and barracks, established outposts as required by regulations, and thus the manoeuvre ended.

This was followed by a ceremonial parade and the trooping of the colours.



Manoeuvre at Gatchina on 7 [18] September 1797.

Third manoeuvre. The divisions were assembled: His Highness Alexander Pavlovich's and *Feldmarschall* Prince Repnin's at their previous locations; the cavalry from the Constable to the palace to the open ground. The division under His Highness Konstantin Pavlovich was at Shpitalny Square; the vanguard was at the Constable, while the rearguard was at the Ingerburg [fortress].

The enemy held Bolshaya Zagvozdka with their main corps, their front lines were assumed to be in Malaya Zagvozdka, while the outposts were in the forest in front of the village near Gatchina.

At a signal given at the Constable, the entire army set off to attack the enemy positions.

The vanguard went from the Constable along the road on the right side of the Cherny lake, after passing it took the left and established themselves on the high ground by the Zagvozdka exit.

The Sovereign Emperor deigned to take two squadrons of Horse Guards, rode out to the small Gatchina gatehouse and chose to ride on reconnaissance of the enemy positions himself; as soon as the enemy tried to prevent this and to attack him, the vanguard supported and shielded the retreat.

Meanwhile, the cavalry column entered the open ground and deployed to the right and left; and as soon as the Emperor had withdrawn, launched a full attack; then rallied back and halted in order to shield the deployment of the infantry.

The infantry divisions under His Highness Alexander Pavlovich and Prince Repnin were to debouch from the line of march and deploy to the right and left; likewise, the division under His Highness Konstantin Pavlovich, having left the Ingerburg, was to march along the Shpital onto the same open ground and, wheeling toward Malaya Gatchina at the wattle fence, was to align itself with the other divisions and deploy with them into a single line, while any that could not fit from the entire corps were to remain in column on the flanks without deploying.

The rearguard, meanwhile, was to march from the Ingerburg straight to Malaya Gatchina, attack and seize it and was to support [*апеурует*ь] the left flank of our line.

Once the infantry were reformed, the cavalry, falling back through them, were to stand in the second line such that the vanguard and rearguard could fit between them (as necessary).

The infantry advanced as an entire line and fired three rounds each; as soon as the rearguard passed, they entered the second line on the left, while the vanguard also did so on the right flank; and they were stationed along the entire line.

Two grenadier battalions from the Preobrazhensky and Izmailovsky, upon approaching the forest, halted on the high ground, moving to attack the forest.

The vanguard were detached and passed on the right side, while the rearguard passed on the left.

Whereupon the two remaining grenadier battalions commanded by Lieutenant General Benckendorff, under the direction of *Feldmarschall* Prince Repnin, attacked the enemy position at Malaya Zagvozdka. The vanguard took it from the right while the rearguard came from the left, drove the enemy out and seized it. At this time, the Sovereign Heir took command of the entire infantry line and moved into the forest, the cavalry were stationed in front of the infantry on open ground.

After driving the enemy out of Malaya Zagvozdka, the grenadier battalions went on to attack the second enemy position in Bolshaya Zagvozdka, the vanguard from the right and the rearguard from the left.

The Sovereign Heir at that time moved into position at Malaya Zagvozdka along the entire street in

front of the enclosures; the cavalry, having ridden out through the intervals, were stationed along the slopes of the ravine such that the infantry line battery could, if necessary, reinforce the attack along it, and such that the cavalry were ready to act if needed.

As soon as Bolshaya Zagvozdka was taken after the enemy had been driven out, the manoeuvre came to an end.

There was a ceremonial parade and trooping of colours.

Fourth manoeuvre. Camps were to be set up in two lines in accordance with regulations - the first under the command of His Highness Alexander Pavlovich and the second under *Feldmarschall* Prince Repnin.

The cavalry were on both flanks in accordance with the *ordre de bataille*.

The vanguard and rearguard formed a third line.

Forward and picket guard forces, and all outposts and duty stations were to be in accordance with regulations; surplus Cossacks were to occupy the woodland and forests to the front.

Camp was broken upon notification of the enemy's approach to Kolpino: firstly, the vanguard passed through both lines along the Kolpino road, followed by the echelon under *Feldmarschall* Prince Repnin close to the forest; while His Highness Alexander Pavlovich's took the road. The column heads were kept level. Upon reaching the wide avenue facing the palace, they conducted a passage of lines, passing one through the other, thereafter His Highness Alexander Pavlovich was to march along the road close to the forest, while *Feldmarschall* Prince Repnin was to march along the open road.

Upon reaching the Porkhov road, they halted and moved the tail to the head of its respective line; but the cavalry remained on their respective flanks only.

Both of these movements were done in order to move into place in the correct positions in the *ordre de bataille*.

At this point, *Feldmarschall* Kamensky was to attack the high ground at Kolpino with his vanguard, making the ascent as the columns approached the high ground.

The enemy forced the vanguard to fall back, for which reason four battalions were sent up from the columns under His Highness Konstantin Pavlovich's command, that is, two from each. Having thus been reinforced they obliged the enemy to retreat, the vanguard set off in pursuit while the battalions returned to their posts.

Whereupon, both lines crowned the high ground with outposts and set up camp on the occupied position in accordance with the regulations.

The vanguard took up positions behind the Kolpino bridge, while the rearguard, having crossed the canal to the left of the camp, also took post, and that marked the end of the manoeuvre, while the colours were trooped in a ceremonial parade.

Fifth manoeuvre. The assigned rendezvous for all units was Zagvozdka Street; the vanguard were to lead, followed by the cavalry, with the infantry behind them in accordance with the *ordre de bataille*; any units unable to fit in were to stand along Bombandir Street.

The entire column was to move along the Zagvozdka road until the tail end passed beyond the barrier.

The vanguard were to hold the forest in front of Zagvozdka. The cavalry were to stand on the open

ground between the forest and Zagvozdka in order to protect themselves from the enemy, who were assumed to be in Malaya Gatchina. Meanwhile, the infantry conducted a counter-march, while the rearguard, having emerged from behind the barrier, supported [*апюируетьь*] the flank and, being formed up a little further ahead, shielded the movement.

From the countermarch, the infantry deployed from right to left into one echelon. The vanguard, having emerged from the forest, were stationed on the right flank in a second line, and the rearguard on the left, having passed through the lines to form the second infantry echelon.

The infantry echelon began to fire on the move and at the halt, and upon reached the high ground, fell back as battalions *en echequier* while firing; and having reached their previous post or further, were to halt, having dressed the echelons level again.

The vanguard passed through the lines with their cannon and occupied Malaya Gatchina in order to support [*апюируетьь*] the flanking cavalry; the cavalry passed through the infantry on the right flank and extended out towards Malaya Gatchina in order to form an oblique front to the infantry line, which in the meantime began to form a line of battalions *en echelon*.

The cavalry launched a full charge. Meanwhile, the vanguard returned to the second infantry line, while the infantry advanced *en echelon*. The cavalry withdrew firing volleys, and, having ridden through the infantry intervals, formed up as a third line. Once the advance was complete and halted, then the manoeuvre ended, while foraging honours in place were granted for whatever time remained, and a ceremonial parade.

Numbers on duty on 1 [12] September:

DIVISION	Generals	Field officers	Subalterns	Non-commissioned officers	Musicians	Privates
Feldmarschall Prince Repnin's	3	8	75	187	63	1,580
His Imperial Highness Alexander Pavlovich's	2	5	65	167	40	1,380
His Imperial Highness Konstantin Pavlovich's	3	6	62	114	40	1,250
Feldmarschall Count Kamensky's vanguard	2	3	20	43	12	548
General-of-Infantry Levashev's rearguard	1	3	15	38	14	512
Lieutenant General Vasilchikov's	3	13	92	160	33	910
TOTAL:	**14**	**38**	**329**	**709**	**202**	**6,180**

For a grand total of 7,472.

Numbers on duty on 3 [14] September:

DIVISION	Generals	Field officers	Subalterns	Non-commissioned officers	Musicians	Privates
Feldmarschall Prince Repnin's	3	8	75	180	60	1,588
His Imperial Highness Alexander Pavlovich's	2	5	65	164	40	1,376
His Imperial Highness Konstantin Pavlovich's	3	6	62	116	40	1,258
Feldmarschall Count Kamensky's vanguard	2	3	20	52	13	548
General-of-Infantry Levashev's rearguard	1	3	15	50	17	520
Lieutenant General Vasilchikov's	3	13	92	139	30	900
TOTAL:	**14**	**38**	**329**	**717**	**200**	**6,170**

For a grand total of 7,468.

Numbers on duty on 7 [18] September:

DIVISION	Generals	Field officers	Subalterns	Non-commissioned officers	Musicians	Privates
Feldmarschall Prince Repnin's	3	8	79	198	60	1,576
His Imperial Highness Alexander Pavlovich's	2	5	61	145	39	1,378
His Imperial Highness Konstantin Pavlovich's	3	6	58	137	40	1,250
Feldmarschall Count Kamensky's vanguard	2	3	23	52	15	550
General-of-Infantry Levashev's rearguard	1	3	23	50	15	521
Lieutenant General Vasilchikov's	2	13	79	120	31	899
TOTAL:	**13**	**38**	**323**	**717**	**200**	**6,174**

For a grand total of 7,465.

Numbers on duty on 10 [21] September:

DIVISION	Generals	Field officers	Subalterns	Non-commissioned officers	Musicians	Privates
His Imperial Highness Alexander Pavlovich's	6	18	175	350	100	2,780
Feldmarschall Prince Repnin's	5	15	121	260	96	2,480
Feldmarschall Count Kamensky's vanguard	2	4	18	46	12	470
General-of-Infantry Levashev's rearguard	1	3	17	47	10	460
TOTAL:	**14**	**40**	**331**	**703**	**217**	**6,190**

For a grand total of 7,495.

Numbers on duty on 15 [26] September:

DIVISION	Generals	Field officers	Subalterns	Non-commissioned officers	Musicians	Privates
Feldmarschall Prince Repnin's	4	8	75	199	74	1,567
His Imperial Highness Alexander Pavlovich's	2	4	62	148	55	1,257
His Imperial Highness Konstantin Pavlovich's	4	6	59	157	49	1,279
Feldmarschall Count Kamensky's vanguard	2	5	25	52	14	532
General-of-Infantry Levashev's rearguard	1	2	19	45	10	475
Lieutenant General Vasilchikov's	3	18	93	131	31	1,067
TOTAL:	**16**	**43**	**323**	**722**	**233**	**6,177**

For a grand total of 7,514.

The manuscript was compiled by Adjutant General Kushelev; it is on standard format sheets of paper, bound in red morocco leather, and is kept in Pavlovsk, in the palace library, according to the new catalogue of manuscripts.

APPENDIX X TO CHAPTER 1.

Gatchina Manoeuvres, 1800.

Here is how the manoeuvres that took place in 1800 were described: 1 [13] September saw the arrival of: the Chevalier Guard; Lifeguard Hussars; Lifeguard Cossacks; His Imperial Highness Grand Duke and Heir, Alexander Pavlovich's [Semenovsky] Guard Battalion; the Guard Jäger Battalion, with subunits from the Finland Jäger Battalion and Kerbits' [Pavlovsk] Grenadier Regiment, who were already stationed in and around Gatchina; from the Guard cavalry - His Imperial Highness Konstantin Pavlovich's Leib-Cuirassier Regiment [Lifeguard Horse], a combined grenadier battalion, four battalions from His Majesty's [Preobrazhensky] Guard, two battalions of Grand Duke Alexander Pavlovich's [Semenovsky] and three battalions of Nikolai Pavlovich's [Izmailovsky] Guard with the Lifeguard grenadier regiments under Sedmoratsky and Yefimovich and an artillery detachment with 60 guns, in order to carry out manoeuvres as two corps under the command of generals Kutuzov and Count von der Pahlen on 4, 6 and 7 [16, 18 and 19] September.

This army was disposed by His Majesty in such a way that one corps consisted of the Lifeguard Hussars, Lifeguard Horse, 11 Guard battalions and the Guard Jäger Battalion, while the other consisted of the remaining regiments, and each corps would have 30 artillery pieces and two horse-artillery cannon. The generals were required, by order of His Imperial Majesty, to draw lots to determine which corps each should command, and thus General Kutuzov received the corps from the general Guard, while Count von der Pahlen got the corps made up of other regiments.

His Majesty had chosen to arrange the main plan for this manoeuvre such that General Count von der Pahlen would take up positions at Malaya Zagvozdka, and General Kutuzov would attack it from the left wing - the only side from which it could be attacked. But since the position of von der Pahlen's corps was very advantageous and they made a strong spoiling attack against the left wing of Kutuzov's corps, this corps was forced to retreat, and because von der Pahlen's feint through Maly Gatchina prevented Kutuzov's corps from retreating between the towns of Gatchina and Maly Gatchina, to the St. Petersburg road from which the attack had begun, then he had to retreat through the defile near the Priory to the side of the château, and choose a position there for himself, where the second manoeuvre was to begin. The arrangements by the generals, in pursuance of Supreme Orders, had been combined with such skill and regularity that each element of the army gained the complete favour of His Imperial Majesty, and every tactician had to admit that they had never seen a greater or more appropriate regularity in all arms of the army anywhere. The obvious favour and gratitude of His Imperial Majesty brought joy to the hearts of these glorious and skilled warriors; every onlooker was touched and all blessed the most merciful and great Paul, who had kept an attentive eye on everything during the manoeuvres and therefore did not leave a single feat unrewarded. Every soldier received a gift and all the generals and colonels took the opportunity of the special favour, being honoured in the evening at His Imperial Majesty's Supreme Table, while also honoured at the imperial tables were field officers in the château, and the officers in their various quarters.

From *Russkaya Starina*, 1889, p. 212.

CHAPTER 2.

The Lifeguard Jäger Battalion's baptism of fire.

The coronation of Emperor Alexander I.

In August 1801, the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion, along with other Guard regiments, was sent to Moscow for the impending coronation celebrations. On 8 [20] September, the day of Tsar Alexander I's entry into Moscow, the entire Guard lined the route all the way across the city from the Petrovsky Palace to the German Quarter. After the coronation, the jägers returned to St. Petersburg and classes went on as usual.

Emperor Alexander I's reforms.

Upon ascending the throne, the Tsar, who had been closely acquainted with military service as the Heir, decided to correct the shortcomings of the fundamental reform of the Russian armed forces carried out by His Father. To that end, Alexander I established a military commission on 24 June [6 July] 1801 to examine the situation of the forces and their organisation.[1]


Thereafter, in 1802, the former Military Collegium was transformed into the Ministry of Military Land Forces. This ministry and the 14 Inspections subordinated to it united the administration of the forces in peacetime. There were no permanently organised higher tactical formations, that is, larger than a regiment. At the beginning of each war, often also for every independent operation, the army received a specific, temporary organisation, specific combat roles (*ordre de bataille*), for the vanguard or rearguard, right wing, left wing, and centre. As a result of this kind of force generation, preparations were almost absent for combined operations or en mass between the various combat arms; attention was only paid to the preliminaries, so to speak, preparations at unit level.

Demanding meaningful knowledge from the soldiers, the Tsar ordered individual training to begin and, after approval of the initial service requirements, they were to bring the soldiers together as sub-units,[2] with special attention being paid to target shooting.[3] They put particular emphasis on the jägers' marksmanship; at the beginning of 1805, there was also an order to increase the gunpowder supply for each jäger by three cartridges above that which had been issued up to that time.[4]

Every holiday and Sunday, before church parade, in order to reinforce knowledge of service for youths and veteran soldiers, officers had to read aloud the military articles to them, especially those chapters that spoke 'of being God-fearing, about resolute faith and loyalty to the Tsar, about words of command, about the precedence and respect for senior and junior officers, regarding obedience from privates, on the importance of sentry duty, about the maintenance of personal weapons, uniform and equipment, about residence in quarters and camps, about the punishment for desertion, of fines and punishments for lower ranks.'

Sentry duty continued as before; but from 1 [13] January 1804, the Tsar granted those on sentry duty in St. Petersburg an allowance of four kopecks for privates and five kopecks for non-commissioned officers.[5]

1 C.C.L. 1801, No. 19926.
2 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 3, No. 125, No. 101.
3 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, bundle 5, No. 123, No. 1022.
4 C.C.L. volume XXVIII, No. 21601.
5 C.C.L. volume XXVIII, No. 21113.



Field officer, clerk and non-commissioned officer of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion, 1802 to 1804.

Camp service would begin at different times by order of the inspector, but only with the

expectation that they would set out no earlier than 16 [28] May and, having stayed in camp for no more than six weeks, return to their quarters no later than 16 [28] August.[6] However, occasionally they remained in camp longer for manoeuvres. Thus, manoeuvres took place at Krasnoe Selo from 1 to 11 [13 to 23] October 1803.[7] Following annual camp, there was a six-week rest period.[8] In the summer, in addition to camp duty, the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion performed sentry duty in Pavlovsk, at the palace of the Dowager Empress Maria Fyodorovna. The companies were sent out for one month in turn from 1 [13] May to 1 [13] September.[9] For example, in August 1803 there were nine officers and 114 lower ranks in Pavlovsk.[10] These assignments did not always go smoothly for the officers; thus, in 1803, Captain Rtishchev was transferred to the 20th Jäger Regiment by Imperial order for some indiscretion during his stay in Pavlovsk.[11] Overall, the difficulties of military service became significantly easier for both senior and junior ranks with the accession of Alexander Pavlovich to the throne, thanks to which, the pedantic observance of statutory details and nuances began to fade to legends of the past reign.

The battalion had quite a few married lower ranks; their families caused the commanding officers much trouble; they had to care for the upbringing of the soldiers' children, of whom, for example, in January 1803 there were 47 sons,[12] and also sort out various domestic squabbles. Thus, we find a message to the St. Petersburg police expedition with a request to place the wife of Jäger Fedot Stepanov 'in the workhouse as she is always in a state of drunkenness and repeatedly deserts her husband.'[13]

In 1802, the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion was issued a new establishment, which designated a four-company battalion; according to these regulations, they were to have: one general, two field officers, 15 subalterns, 450 combatant lower ranks and 101 junior support personnel.[14]

Under this establishment, the pay for field officers and subalterns was to be increased by a quarter over what they had been entitled to before.

In addition to the monthly returns sent to His Majesty, the Tsar ordered the colonels-in-chief to report each and every time pay was distributed[15] as well as the supply of provisions and forage by officials.[16]

Uniform.

The Tsar made a number of changes to external appearances, the most important of which for the lower ranks was the elimination of curls and the determination of the length of the queue at four *vershok* [seven inches].[17] Orders were issued to wear green trousers in winter, while white ones were to be reserved for summer. Generals, field officers, and subalterns were issued new-style hats. Officers were permitted to wear breeches while on campaign. In 1802, the lower ranks had their bicorns replaced by round-hats, trimmed with orange lace around the top, while non-

6 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 4, No. 37.
7 Battalion Log of Outgoing Documents for 1803.
8 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 4, No. 50, No. 898.
9 M.B. monthly returns for the Guard Jäger Battalion, 1803 and 1804.
10 Battalion Log of Outgoing Documents for 1803.
11 Supreme Order dated 12 [24] September 1803.
12 Battalion Log of Outgoing Documents for 1803.
13 Battalion Log of Outgoing Documents for 1804.
14 C.C.L. Establishment book, 1801, No. 20570. See Appendix I at the end of this chapter.
15 C.C.L. volume XXVII, No. 20932.
16 C.C.L. volume XXVIII, No. 21415.
17 C.C.L. 1801, No. 19826.

commissioned officers had gold braid; The cockade on the hat had orange edging; the pompom had a green centre. Thereafter, the battalion was issued the uniform that line jägers had at the end of 1802, but with split cuffs without flaps, which, like the piping, were orange; there were lace-loops on the collar and cuffs.



Company drummer, battalion drummer and hornist of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion, 1802 to 1804.

In 1804, officers were issued hats with a lace-loop of narrow gold braid with a high green plume, while lower ranks were issued cloth forage caps.[18]

In November 1804, the Sovereign Emperor approved lacquered black straps for knapsacks as proposed by the commander.[19] As can be seen from the establishment, officers pay entitlement was low; for example, subalterns, up to and including the rank of captain, received between 324 to 628 roubles per annum; but we must take into account that money had greater value at that time, the cost of living was very cheap. For 50 copper kopecks, one could have a fine dinner with wine and dessert at the then-famous restaurant 'France'; a roast grouse cost 25 copper kopecks; a bottle of champagne cost two roubles.[20]

Let us now move on to a description of the first strides by the Guard Jägers onto the fields of military glory.

The cause and pretext for the war against Napoleon in 1805.

At the beginning of the 19th century, Europe was presented with an astonishing phenomenon: two states at the extremities of the continent, Russia and France, which had no apparent physical points of contact, stood facing each other, preparing for combat.

Military success had given France the leading position in Western Europe, which, with its penchant for conquest, was threatening the independence of other states. Napoleon's ambition seemed to know no limits: he had annexed the Netherlands and the territories of the King of Sardinia to France, declared himself King of Italy, occupied Rome and Naples with French troops, established his rule in Switzerland and, finally, assembled an army on the shores of the English Channel with the aim of landing in Great Britain in order to deal a decisive blow to its very heart.

While everyone in the West reluctantly bowed before the might of the military genius of the *Empereur des Français*, there remained a state in the East of Europe with which France had to reckon: Emperor Alexander openly stated the fundamental principle of his policy: to act for the good of humanity, for general peace, and for the independence of states; he could not allow the exclusive domination of Europe by France.

Under such conditions, the struggle between the two powerful states became inevitable; this was the reason for the war of 1805.

Once the motivating reason for war is sufficiently developed, then pretexts and excuses will be found quite easily; sometimes the question of pretexts is ignored completely.

In this case, the reason that served as the most powerful impetus for the initiation of a diplomatic spat was Napoleon's murder of the duc d'Enghien (from the Bourbon family), abducted by French gendarmes from the territory of Baden.

The [Third] Coalition against France consisted of Russia, Britain, Austria, Sweden and Naples. Britain had the most pressing interest: by creating new difficulties for Napoleon in Europe, they hoped to distract him from his plan to invade English territory. Overall, Britain, which prospered at the expense of continental Europe, would benefit from causing its states to quarrel among themselves; which is why it is always the overt or covert organiser of various coalitions.

Russia fielded two armies: 50,000 under Kutuzov (concentrating at Radziwiłłów [Radywyliw]), and 50,000 under Buxhöwden (assembling at Brest); the Guard were intended to move up behind

18 Viskovatov, Description of weapons and clothing of the troops, volume 14, pp. 42 to 45.

19 Battalion Log of Outgoing Documents for 1804, Lieutenant General Count Tolstoy's report.

20 Bulgarin, volume II, p. 309; History of the Lifeguard Pavlovsk Regiment, St. Petersburg, 1890, p. 39.

them. All these forces were intended for operations in the Danube valley together with 80,000 Austrians under the command of General Mack. It would seem that the aforementioned Coalition forces would have been sufficient to face the 200,000 sent into the Danube valley by Napoleon, but only had they been deployed in a coordinated manner. The most skilled of the Austrian generals, *Erzherzog* Karl, actually advised waiting for the Russians to link up; but the opinion of the character-less military theorist Mack prevailed, demanding an immediate offensive along the Danube Valley in order to seize Bavaria; thus, 80,000 Austrians were left exposed to enemy attack.



Private, drummer, non-commissioned officer and subaltern of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion 1804 to 1806.

Once Napoleon realised that a landing in England could not take place, he moved his superbly organised army from the shores of the English Channel into the Danube valley, carried out a remarkable march-manoeuvre, surrounding Mack at Ulm (in Bavaria) and forced him to capitulate (on 8 [20] October) with the greater part of that Austrian army. However, Napoleon willingly released General Mack from captivity himself.

Kutuzov, by way of forced marches (50 to 60 *versta* [33 to 40 miles] per day), rushed to assist the Austrians, but nevertheless arrived too late: at Braunau (on the border with Bavaria), only 18,000 to 20,000 Austrians joined him, having escaped the Ulm capitulation. Kutuzov had about 35,000 Russians, and together with the Austrians the army amounted to more than 50,000. However, one should never risk a battle against an enemy three times as strong led by Napoleon with such an army.

Whereupon Kutuzov made an exemplary retreat towards Olmütz [Olomouc] in Moravia, marked by brilliant rearguard battles at Amstetten (24 October [5 November), Dürenstein (30 October [11 November) and Schöngraben (4 [16] November). On 8 [20] November, Kutuzov joined forces with Buxhöwden near Wischau [Vyškov], while the Russian Guard reached the position at Olšany [u Prostějova] (near Olmütz)on 12 [24] November.[21]

On 10 [22] August 1805, the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion set out on campaign following the Sovereign's review on the Izmailovo parade ground.

The battalion set off commanded by Colonel comte Saint-Priest with the following composition: two field officers, 16 subalterns, 65 non-commissioned officers, 15 musicians, 382 privates and 54 support personnel,[22] the colonel-in-chief of the battalion, Prince Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration, was already far ahead at that time, commanding Kutuzov's vanguard.

Comte E.F. Saint-Priest, battalion commander from 7 [19] March 1805.

Coming from an ancient French family, the son of one of the outstanding statesmen of the reign of Louis XV and Louis XVI, comte Emmanuel Frantsovich Saint-Priest was born in Turkey in 1776. Having received a thorough education at home in France, he was sent to Heidelberg University for two years as his higher education in France had become impossible due to the outbreak of the revolution. At Heidelberg, he showed brilliant aptitude in the sciences and a particular penchant for mathematics. At the end of 1792, at 16 years of age, he emerged under the banner of the prince de Condé, who commanded a formation of French emigrants. Saint-Priest's father, granted the favour of Catherine the Great, decided to stay in Russia and asked the Empress to allow his sons to join the Russian service. As a result of receiving permission in 1793, Emmanuel Frantsovich was appointed as a company officer in the Artillery Engineering Cadet Corps. Soon after this, he was transferred to the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment as a lieutenant. At the coronation of Emperor Paul, he received the rank of captain. In 1799, circumstances forced Emmanuel Frantsovich to leave Russia and he was discharged from the service. He rejoined the corps under the prince de Condé, which was on its way to join the Russian detachment under Korsakov in Switzerland at the time, and was appointed aide-de-camp to the duc d'Angoulême. After the conclusion of the Peace of Luneville, many emigrants were allowed to return to France; but Napoleon excluded some from the list, including the Saint-Priest family; whereupon Emmanuel Frantsovich decided to adopt Russia as his permanent homeland. Emperor Alexander, who knew him personally from before, received the request favourably and promoted him colonel in the

21 Soloviev, Emperor Alexander I, St. Petersburg, 1877; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1805 [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips, Helion, 2022]; Bogdanovich, History of the Reign of Emperor Alexander I, volume I.

22 M.B. register 161, bundle 231, No. 16.

Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment. On 7 [19] March 1805, comte Saint-Priest was appointed commander of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion.[23]

The march to Moravia.

The Guard Corps, commanded by Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich, set out in a single common column to Krasnoe Selo; here the Guard was split into three columns, with the Lifeguard Hussar Regiment and the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion in the vanguard.

From Krasnoe Selo the vanguard was to move to Brest-Litovsk, via Gatchina, Luga, Porkhov, Velikiy Luki, Vitebsk, Orsha, Borisov, Minsk, Nesvizh and Slonim.[24]

The movement to the Austrian border was completed in the strictest order, observing the dressing of ranks and files; the order was to keep in step as much as possible, maintaining spacing; officers were strictly forbidden from leaving their posts.[25]

The lower ranks on campaign received half a pound of beef per per per day over and above the allotted rations.[26]

The march was carried out with rest days on every third day.

The movement from St. Petersburg to Brest-Litovsk was a real triumphal procession; our Guardsmen were greeted joyfully everywhere, given water and food. The peasants of the Porkhov *Uezd* in the village of Beshkovichi distinguished themselves with particular hospitality, for which the Tsar granted them 1,000 roubles.[27]

In Brest-Litovsk, the regiments were placed in quarters and stayed here for several days in order to give the entire corps the opportunity to close up. Here the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion was brought up to war establishment with men from the Petrov Musketeers and Tenginsk Musketeers.[28]

From Brest, the jägers moved to Krakau [Kraków] and onwards via Kalwaria and Friedeck [Frýdek] towards Olmütz. Forced marches were conducted from Brest to Olmütz, sometimes covering 40 *versts* [27 miles] or more. From the borders of Austrian territory, by order of Kaiser Franz, lunches were prepared for the officers at the halfway point of each stage; the soldier's equipment was transported on carts.

On 12 [24] November, the jägers entered Olmütz in full ceremonial uniform straight to a review by the monarchs. It was a glittering review; in the centre stood the troops that had retreated from Braunau, on the right flank stood the Guard, and on the left was Buxhöwden's corps. The Tsar thanked everyone and especially the troops who had already been in battle.[29] By combining the Guard with Kutuzov's army, the total strength of our force increased to 86,000 men.[30] The coalition army occupied a strong position here near Olšany on high ground that sloped gently down in the direction of the enemy, secured on the right by a swampy stream, on the left by the Morava River and in the rear by the Olmütz fortress.[31] Despite the tactical advantages of the position, it had to be abandoned due to a lack of provisions. The supply of rations to our army had been entrusted to

23 Emperor Alexander And His Compatriots [*Император Александр I и Его сподвижники*], Volume I.
24 History Of The Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment, p. 378.
25 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 9, No. 251, No. 1819.
26 M.S.A. No. 1551, p. 31.
27 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1805, p. 83.
28 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 9, No. 287, No. 292.
29 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1805, p. 83.
30 Detailed Summary Of The War Of 1805; Leer, The Battle Of Austerlitz, p. 1.
31 Leer, The Battle Of Austerlitz, p. 5.

the Austrians, who, not believing that the war could move to Moravia so quickly, had not prepared magazines. Resupply columns were far away and were approaching slowly. The peasants had fled from the vicinity of Olmütz; the villages were deserted, bread had to be obtained by force; further delay at Olmütz risked starvation.[32]

Kutuzov proposed to retreat, to close up to the supplies and generally adhere to a wait-and-see approach, since Prussia was preparing to join the coalition and to send 80,000 troops, another 80,000 Austrians commanded by *Erzherzog* Karl were coming from Italy to link up, reinforcements were expected from Russia (12,000 under Essen, and Bennigsen's force). But the fiery youths who had joined the army in the entourage of the young Emperor Alexander demanded a decisive, immediate offensive; these individuals pointed to the dispersion of Napoleon's forces, the fatigue of his troops, significant attrition, the Russian successes at Amstetten, Dürenstein and Schöngraben, and finally, Napoleon's pause, so unusual for his typical modus operandi. Despite the paucity of evidence for these arguments, the council of war did not accept Kutuzov's opinion and decided to attack.

On 13 and 14 [25 and 26] November, the army remained in place, resupplying with rations. On 15 [27] November the offensive began; on this day the entire army was divided into five columns, the Guard constituted the reserve. These columns were intended to play the role of higher tactical formations - corps, with the difference that they did not function in the role of permanent formations from the army, as corps do, but merely in a temporary form, assembled simply for the duration of a specific operation. The columns were composed of only two combat arms (infantry with artillery or cavalry with artillery), and therefore did not have independence of action; for example, the infantry columns, lacking any mounted men, thus also lacked satisfactory administrative services. However, the reserve commanded by the Tesarevich was an exception and contained all three combat arms.

Under cover of the cavalry, the coalition army marched along five parallel routes towards Proßnitz [Prostějov]. The third column, followed by the Guard corps, moved along the Proßnitz highway. The troops, proceeding in the strictest order, were ordered to march in step.[33] In the afternoon the jägers deployed at Proßnitz.[34]

On 16 [28] November, it was decided to capture Wischau, occupied by eight squadrons of *Tirailleur* [*sic*] in order to continue the offensive. This mission was entrusted to Prince Bagration, who completed it with success.[35] On this day, the army deployed in front of Wischau itself, 30 *versts* [20 miles] from Brünn [Brno].[36]

There was rejoicing in the headquarters at the successful offensive and the only concern was that Napoleon might escape. The Quartermaster-General of the army, Austrian General Weyrother, drew up a plan that would envelope the right flank of Napoleon's position at Brünn and cut off the line of retreat to Vienna. But the fact of the matter was that Napoleon had already abandoned his lines of communication along the right bank of the Danube to Vienna and beyond, and had ordered the transfer of supplies to the Passau fortress and arranged a new line of communications from Brünn to Iglau [Jihlava] and Passau along the left bank of the Danube. Consequently, the coalition attack was pointless and Weyrother's armchair machinations led to a risky three-day flank march along the worst roads, instead of moving directly along the Wischau-Brünn highway and


32 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1805, p. 87.
33 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1805, p. 90.
34 Bogdanovich, volume II, p. 50.
35 Leer, The Battle Of Austerlitz, p. 12.
36 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1805, pp. 90 to 91.

catching Napoleon before he had time to concentrate his forces.

On 18 [30] November, the Guard, continuing its offensive movement through Malkowitz [Málkovice], Orlowitz [Orlovice], Pawlowitz [Pavlovice], Kozlan-Schraditz [Kozlany-Šardičky] and Kojatek [Kojátky], reached Butschowitz [Bučovice], where they dispersed into quarters.[37]

The slowness of our two-day march was due to a lack of provisions, waiting for resupply, complete uncertainty of the enemy positions and abominable roads.[38]

On 19 November [1 December], having broken camp at noon and having passed Austerlitz [Slavkov u Brna], the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion deployed themselves with other regiments of the Guard on the high ground in front of Austerlitz, with the left flank towards Krzenowitz [Křenovice], and the right on the highway to Hungary.[39]



There was a battle to be fought tomorrow.

37 M.S.A. Dispositions For The Offensive Movement Towards Austerlitz On 18 [30] November, No. 4407, p. 76.
38 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1805, p. 92.
39 M.S.A. Dispositions For The Offensive Movement Towards Austerlitz On 19 November [1 December], p. 77.

The Battle of Austerlitz, 20 November [2 December] 1805.

Kutuzov was not counting on success, but Emperor Alexander insisted on battle, and Kutuzov did not have the courage of his convictions to present the truth resolutely to the Emperor, who subsequently reproached the old commander for this. The Austrians (Kaiser Franz himself was present with the army), after the failures they had suffered, passionately desired an end to the war one way or another and therefore demanded battle.[40] Under such conditions, one cannot help but acknowledge Kutuzov's position, the powerless commander-in-chief, as extremely problematic. On 19 November [1 December], at 11 o'clock in the evening, the commanders of the Russian formations assembled with Kutuzov in the village of Krzenowitz, in order to receive orders for the attack. Kutuzov was quietly dozing by this time, and General Weyrother, having laid out the map in front of the audience, theatrically read out the project, a disposition built entirely on wishful thinking that was at odds with the situation. After reading these notes, there was only one person who disagreed with the opinion of the Austrian Quartermaster-General, General Langéron (Bagration was not present). Weyrother stubbornly stood his ground. Their dispute was halted by Kutuzov, who suggested that everyone go to their posts and await the disposition,[41] which Colonel von Toll was tasked to translate from German into Russian. According to the long-winded disposition, the left wing of the coalition army, commanded by Buxhöwden, was to advance in the direction of the crossings over the Goldbach, envelope the enemy right flank and sever their line of retreat; Bagration's vanguard, on the Brünn highway, was obliged to fix the enemy left flank, and then to join the general offensive; Liechtenstein's fifth cavalry column was initially to maintain communications between Bagration and the other columns, before switching to the offensive; the Tsarevich's reserve, the Guard, at dawn on 20 November [2 December], were to break camp and occupy positions beyond Blasowitz [Blažovice] and Krug [Kruh] and serve as support for Fürst Liechtenstein's cavalry and the left flank of Prince Bagration's vanguard.[42]

Napoleon's plan was to hold the coalition pressure on the flanks, go on the offensive on the Pratzen [Prace] Heights and break through the centre of the enemy's over-extended battle formation. Indeed, while Buxhöwden was relatively successful in crossing the Goldbach stream, Napoleon had occupied the Pratzen Heights with Soult's corps and drove back the force sent there by Kutuzov (the fourth column). At 11 o'clock in the morning, Emperor Alexander ordered these elements of the force to retreat, while Kutuzov forwarded these orders to Buxhöwden.

Napoleon, wanting to cut our centre off from Bagration's force, ordered his troops to occupy the sector to the left of Pratzen, that is, facing Blasowitz; Murat's *réserve de cavalerie* lined up in three waves in front, followed by the divisions under Rivaud (from Bernadotte's corps) and Caffarelli (from Lannes' corps).

Having spent the night forwards of Austerlitz, Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich led the Guard out at the pre-appointed hour in the disposition (at seven o'clock). The column guide was the Austrian *Oberst* Bülow. The Guard crossed the Raußnitz stream at the fulling-mill and halted after marching about a *verst* [⅔ mile] towards Blasowitz, where Prinz Liechtenstein was supposed to have been. Troops were visible ahead that were initially mistaken for the column under the Fürst von und zu Liechtenstein, but in fact they were the above-mentioned French troops. The Tsarevich deployed the infantry in two echelons in line; in the first stood the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments, having artillery front and centre (Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich's battery), in the second were the Izmailovsky and Lifeguard Jäger Battalion. There were two guns on the right flank of each

40 Soloviev, p. 93.

41 Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, Vol. 6, p. 303.

42 M.S.A. Dispositions For 20 November [2 December] 1805, No. 1551.

battalion. The cavalry were stationed behind the flanks of the infantry. No sooner had the formation deployed than a round shot arrived from the batteries standing in front of the troops, initially mistaken for Austrians, and knocked down a file of the Preobrazhensky Regiment.[43] The mistaken identity was resolved. This shot confirmed that it was the enemy ahead.

Intending to delay the French columns marching towards Blasowitz, His Highness ordered the occupation of this village. Major General Depreradovich 1st directed the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion towards the village with orders to spread three companies out and leave the fourth in reserve; he also ordered backpacks to be removed and left on the battlefield, to be secured by 16 jägers.

The battalion safely entered the village of Blasowitz, without the slightest harm, under round shot fire from the enemy batteries; comte Saint-Priest's company occupied it from the right side, spread out along the ravine facing a French battery; the companies under Colonel Potemkin and Captain Riedinger entered the gardens on the left side of the village; Prince Bagration's company formed the reserve.

Soon after this, Colonel Kridner came to the aid of the commander of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion with two companies of the third battalion of the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment. They linked up with the reserve.

Meanwhile, the French column (from Rivaud's division), in order to conceal itself from our batteries, moved to their right, their skirmishers began to move towards the gardens and envelope our left flank, where Lieutenant Ofrosimov 2nd was in command. Having asked permission from Captain Riedinger, he immediately took the necessary precautions to halt the enemy and, concealing his jägers in the scrub and behind the enclosures surrounding the gardens, he waited on the approach of the French, in spite of their heavy fire; once they had closed the range, Lieutenant Ofrosimov gave the order to shoot and, having caused significant damage, forced them to double the numbers of their skirmishers. Our two companies then charged with fixed bayonets and, having driven the enemy off, returned to the gardens once more. Staff Captain Turchaninov, who had earlier been shot in the leg, handed over command of his company to Lieutenant Ogon-Doganovsky. The French skirmishers again attempted to envelope our left flank, but were repulsed a second time with cold steel and launched an attack on the right flank. Comte Saint-Priest, seeing this movement, sent his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Prince Shcherbatov, to summon the reserves. Prince Shcherbatov reported that Colonel Kridner had withdrawn with his battalion; whereupon Prince Bagration's company were ordered to support the right flank, while comte Saint-Priest's company stayed in reserve in the centre of the village.[44]

The outflanking movement by Caffarelli's (infantry) and Kellerman's (cavalry) divisions forced Saint-Priest to begin to fall back, which was successfully carried out under the cover of Lieutenant Ofrosimov 2nd's marksmen. As the jägers formed up outside the village, the third battalion of the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment with a battalion of (Austrian) *Kaiser Infanterie* moved up in support; upon seeing the French, the *Kaiser Infanterie* fled throwing down their muskets. Having halted the French with rapid fire, the jägers rejoined the Semenovsky, with whom they withdrew. During this retreat, Staff Captain Wolf and Lieutenant Sazonov 2nd were wounded, thus Prince Bagration's company remained under the command of Sub Lieutenant Uvarov. Receiving no news from anywhere and not knowing what was happening in the centre, the Tsarevich was in an extremely awkward situation, the way out of which, of course, would have been simply to retreat; but before deciding on this drastic measure, the Tsarevich, wanting to know what was happening

43 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1805, p. 106.

44 M.B. the Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 124, No. 330.

on the Pratzen Heights, made a bold decision to move there, moving the entire battle formation of the Guard to the left by sections. At the same time, the jägers also received orders from the Tsarevich, through Colonel Ozerov, to move up in support. Having climbed the high ground, we could see the entire enemy army. Having opened rapid fire, we had to retreat due to the complete impossibility of countering such a numerous enemy, especially since the entire Guard, having withstood cavalry attacks by significantly superior enemy forces,[45] had retreated beyond the Raußnitz stream.[46] Retreating in the same direction, the Jäger Battalion held the river line and palisade fence surrounding the right side of the village of Krzenowitz, and opened fire on the enemy columns that were descending from the high ground. The Lifeguard Cossacks spread out in front of us and began shooting. During the retreat, Captain Riedinger, Lieutenant Prince Gagarin 2nd and Turchaninov were wounded.[47] After all the infantry had retired, we began to cross the river, beyond which we joined the Leib Grenadiers who were holding the high ground. Lieutenant General Malyutin (commanding some of the Lifeguard cavalry), seeing that the French marksmen were beginning to cross the stream opposite the position of our battalion, ordered us to stop the enemy; several shots from the jägers achieved their objective.

After this, the French stopped trying to pursue the Guard, as they had mistaken the Leib Grenadiers for the vanguard of Essen's corps.

In the battle of Austerlitz, the Lifeguard Jägers lost 47 lower ranks killed while Sub Lieutenant Prince Shcherbatov died of wounds on the return march home.[48]

The Battle of Austerlitz, although ending unsuccessfully for the Russian army (casualties of some 27,000 men), plays a prominent role in the history of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion; here for the first time the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion stood toe to toe with an adversary led by Napoleon. Due to their low numbers, the battalion could not, of course, have any influence on the course of the battle, but in any case they played an active role; they were given orders for independent missions, which they completed and showed that they were worthy sons of their Fatherland, and no less worthy to take up the glories of the old regiments of our Guard. Those young jägers who had not yet been under fire showed themselves no worse than their older brothers and on this bloody day laid a solid foundation for their military glory, which has not yet been eclipsed since then.[49] Napoleon and his troops had seized the positions of the Coalition army, having won decisive success over the enemy at all points, and the army was retreating in complete disorder through Hodejitz [Hodějice] to Czejtsch [Čejč].

In Holitsch [Holíč], close to where the army was camped, the Grand Duke Tsarevich announced his gratitude to the entire Guard for their courage and outstanding deeds in the fighting on 20 November [2 December]. In His Highness' order of the day, it states, *inter alia*, that 'the Guard corps fully proved their courage, having been employed against the strongest enemy resistance, to which the enemy themselves do them justice.'[50]

The return to St. Petersburg.

The Austrian Kaiser, aware of the very critical situation of his state, immediately sent Fürst

45 Bogdanovich, volume II, p. 72.

46 We will not dwell on the actions of other Guard regiments at Austerlitz; it is enough to cite Kutuzov's assessment of them from his report to the Tsar: 'Overall, the entire Guard fought on that day with courage worthy of a detachment that has the good fortune to guard the Sacred Person of Your Imperial Majesty.'

47 M.B. register 152, bundle 563.

48 M.B. the Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 124.

49 A. Baiov, The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, p. 9.

50 History Of The Lifeguard Hussar Regiment, part II, p. 23.

Liechtenstein to Napoleon to begin negotiations for an armistice. This truce was concluded; its consequence was the departure of Russian troops from Austrian territory.[51] Having put the army in order and collected the trains, on 27 November [9 December] Kutuzov set out from the camp at Senitz [Senica] on the return march through Hungary and Galicia to Kaschau [Košice], Eperies [Prešov] and Lemberg [Lwiw].[52] On their march through Hungary, the Russians received a warm welcome everywhere, and the population provided whatever assistance they could to the troops in every location. In many places the entire officer cohort were regaled at no charge; the sick were cared for like family and lovingly let them recuperate in their homes.[53] The soldiers, appreciating such attention, behaved impeccably towards the population, as evidenced by the letters from Graf Josef Haller to Kutuzov.[54]

Almost the same warm welcome awaited the troops in Galicia and made the march easier amid the approaching frosts. Finally, after difficult winter marches, the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion entered Radziwiłłów on 26 December [7 January 1806].[55]

In early [mid] January 1806, the Guard was assembled at Brest-Litovsk. Here they was split into six columns, thereby achieving more convenient quartering locations for the lower ranks. The Jägers and Chevalier Garde regiments formed the third column commanded by Major General Depreradovich 2nd.[56]

On 29 March [10 April] 1806, the Jägers arrived on the outskirts of St. Petersburg, via the same route along which they had set out on campaign, and settled down here for several days, preparing for their ceremonial entry into St. Petersburg. On 9 [21] April, in full dress uniform, they marched ceremonially from the Moscow Gate to the Winter Palace. The Guard was halted on the square; the Tsar thanked them all for their efforts. The officers were granted awards; in addition, they were not only given a third of their pay, but the lower ranks were given a rouble per man.[57]

51 Jomini, *Napoléon au Tribunal de César*, p. 191.
52 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1805, pp. 133.
53 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1805, p. 133.
54 M.S.A. No. 1556, p. 130.
55 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1805, p. 134.
56 M.B. Reports, 1806, No. 305, No. 917.
57 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1805, p. 135.

APPENDIX I TO CHAPTER 2.

Establishment Of The Lifeguard Jäger Battalion, 29 December 1802 [10 January 1803].

Consisting of four companies:[58]

RANK AND APPOINTMENT	Men	Pay excluding allowances		Allowances per man per year, at one rouble 50 kopecks per month for eight months
		Roubles	Kopecks	
Battalion colonel-in-chief	1	1,800	00	480 roubles
Colonel	2	836	00	204 roubles
Captain	1	448	00	180 roubles
Staff-Captain	3	375	00	132 roubles
Lieutenant	5	340	00	60 roubles
Sub-Lieutenant	6	276	00	48 roubles
Feldwebel	4	97	25	
Portepée-Junker	4	57	14½	
Junker	4	57	14½	
Kaptenarmus (quartermaster sergeant)	4	57	14½	
Junior non-commissioned officer	20	57	14½	
Privates on senior pay	140	22	2½	
Privates on junior pay	260	13	46½	
Battalion Drum Major	1	97	25½	
Company drummer	8	18	45½	
Waldhornist	5	18	75½	
SUPPORT PERSONNEL				
Auditor	1	200	00	60 roubles
Battalion physician	1	394	70	48 roubles
Battalion *Feldscher*	1	97	25	
Infirmary supervisor (non-commissioned status)	1	97	25	
Barber	4	22	2½	
Infirmary attendants	4	22	2½	
Wagenmeister	1	97	25	

58 Complete Collection of Laws, Book of Establishments, 1802, No. 20570.

RANK AND APPOINTMENT	Men	Pay excluding allowances		Allowances per man per year, at one rouble 50 kopecks per month for eight months
		Roubles	Kopecks	
CLERICAL STAFF				
Battalion chief clerk	1	57	14½	
Quartermaster's clerk	1	57	14½	
Paymaster's clerk	1	57	14½	
CRAFTSMEN				
Locksmith's mate	4	22	2½	
Battalion locksmith	1	102	00	
Armourer	1	306	00	
Armourer's mate	2	22	2½	
Farrier and regimental blacksmith	1	150	00	
Blacksmith	4	22	2½	
Carpenter	4	22	2½	
CART DRIVERS				
For infirmary wagons	4	8	00	
For provisions wagons	4	8	00	
For cartridge caissons	4	8	00	
For the battalion office and cash safe	1	8	00	
For the tool and instrument cart	1	8	00	
For the paymaster's cart	1	8	00	
For the apothecary's cart	1	8	00	
For the pharmacy box cart	1	22	2	
ORDERLIES				
Eight for the battalion colonel-in-chief; six for each colonel; four per captain; three per staff-captain; two per lieutenant; one for each sub-lieutenant, auditor and physician.	51	7	30	
TOTAL:	**569**	**22,362**	**66½**	

APPENDIX II TO CHAPTER 2.

List Of Officers Present On The 1805 Campaign.

With an indication of awards received during this campaign.

1st Company, Prince Bagration's:

Company commander, Staff-Captain **Wolf**, wounded, Golden Sword.

Subalterns; Lieutenant **Sazonov 2nd**, wounded, Golden Sword.

Sub-Lieutenant **Uvarov**, St. Anne Sword [Order of St. Anne, 3rd class].

2nd Company, Colonel Potemkin's:

Company commander, Staff-Captain **Turchaninov**, wounded.

Subalterns; Lieutenant **Ogon-Doganovsky**, St. Anne Sword.

Sub-Lieutenant **Kologrivov**, St. Anne Sword.

3rd Company, Captain Riedinger's:

Company commander, Captain **Riedinger**, wounded, Golden Sword.

Subalterns; Lieutenant **Ofrosimov 2nd**, St. Anne Sword.

Sub-Lieutenant **Matsnev**, St. Anne Sword.

4th Company, comte Saint-Priest's:

Company commander, Prince **Gagarin 1st**, St. Anne Sword.

Subalterns; Prince **Gagarin 2nd**, missing in action, wounded, St. Anne Sword.

Comte **de Rastignac**, St. Anne Sword.

Ensign Prince **Turkestan**, St. Anne Sword.

Battalion Adjutant, Sub-Lieutenant Prince **Shcherbatov**, died of wounds in Kraków.

Junior Field Officer, Colonel **Potemkin**, Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class.

Battalion commander, Colonel comte **Saint-Priest**, Order of St. George, 4th class.[59]

59 Moscow Branch of the Archive of the General Staff, Tsarevich's Papers, register 160, bundle 11, No. 1, No. 488.

CHAPTER 3.

The War of 1806 to 1807.

Reorganisation of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion into the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, 10 [22] May 1806.

Upon returning from the 1805 campaign, the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion was to experience an important peacetime event, namely on 10 [22] May 1806, it was expanded into a two-battalion regiment, each battalion of four companies, and was renamed the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment.[1] The lower ranks were replenished with men from the Narva, Novgorod and Pskov garrison battalions, selected by Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich;[2] the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment became part of 1st Division, commanded by the Tsarevich. In March 1806, the Inspections were transformed into divisions from every combat arm and troop type. Garrison duty for the newly formed regiment did not last long.

The Russo-Prussian alliance against Napoleon.

Napoleon's extremely aggressive attitude towards Prussia and his failure to comply with treaties obliged Friedrich Wilhelm III to abandon his peaceful policies and issue a protest to the French government, after which war became inevitable. The Prussian army was put on a war footing and the King turned to other sovereigns for help. Austria excused themselves by citing their recent defeat; Britain, after Pitt's death, was inclined towards peace with France; only Russia continued to maintain its hostile attitude towards Napoleon, and our Tsar did not abandon the idea of freeing Europe from his powerful ambitions. Arriving in February 1806, the King's *Envoyé Extraordinaire*, the Herzog von Braunschweig, was received by Alexander I and the Tsar promised to assist Prussia in the war against Napoleon. On 10 [22] October, Russia signed a treaty with Prussia, committing to fielding an army of 100,000.[3]

Events in Prussia before the arrival of Russian troops.

Having learned of Prussia's demands, Napoleon reached Bamberg, the *quartier général* [headquarters] of his army, on 6 [18] October, his formations being located along the Main and in Bavaria, and declared war on Prussia by way of an Order of the Day. The Prussians decided to begin an offensive war and to that end, without waiting for the arrival of the Russian army, they moved an army of 143,000 under the command of Herzog Karl von Braunschweig and Prinz Hohenlohe to the left bank of the Saale River, with the right flank at Eisenach and the left at Schleiz and Hof. The councils of war that followed one after another came to the following decision: the Herzog von Braunschweig would wage a defensive war; the main body would be concentrated at Weimar and Erfurt; Prinz Hohenlohe would stand at Jena and Schleiz. These decisions were prompted by Napoleons skilful show of force. Meanwhile, Napoleon launched an offensive himself with the aim of outflanking the Prussian left flank, cutting off communications with the Elbe and capturing the entire army by surrounding them. Dividing his force into three columns, he moved the right from Bayreuth towards Gera; the centre from Bamberg towards Schleiz; the left towards Jena. On 9 [21] October, part of Prinz Hohenlohe's force was defeated at Schleiz and retreated; his vanguard was destroyed at Saalfeld by Napoleon's left column on 10 [22] October, while the right

1 C.C.L. volume XXIX, No. 22120.

2 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 199, No. 2587.

3 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1806 to 1807 [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips, Helion, 2023]; Lieutenant General Leer, *Обзоръ Войнъ России* [Review of Russian Wars], part II.

column seized Gera without hindrance on 12 [24] October. Expecting to find the entire Prussian army at Jena, Napoleon moved there with his main body, sending Murat towards Naumburg. Having become convinced of the actual movements by the *Empereur des Français* and having learned of the fall of Naumburg with all its stores, the King and the Herzog von Braunschweig decided to retreat to the Elbe:

1. The main body was to move from Weimar towards Wittenberg on 13 [25] October.
2. The units stationed at Erfurt were to move towards Weimar and, depending on the circumstances, either support Prinz Hohenlohe or follow the main body.
3. Prinz Hohenlohe was to shield the army's movements and follow on behind on 15 [27] October.

The Herzog von Braunschweig set off on 13 [25] October and stopped for the night at Auerstedt. On 14 [26] October, Napoleon decided to attack the Prussians at Jena with all his strength. Prinz Hohenlohe, forgetting that he was carrying out a rearguard mission, plunged into a pitched battle and was completely routed; the units marching to support him suffered the same fate. Davout had received orders to move from Naumburg and attack Prinz Hohenlohe's left flank; he encountered the main Prussian army on the march and defeated it. Thus the Prussians suffered a total defeat and retreated towards the Elbe at Nordhausen and Magdeburg. On 16 [28] October, the French pursued the Prussians; on 25 October [6 November], Davout seized Berlin, while Lannes took Spandau; on 28 October [9 November], Hohenlohe's detachment was surrounded by Murat and was forced to lay down its arms. The consequences of the defeat at Jena and Auerstedt were most dire for the Prussians: the morale of the troops collapsed utterly, fortresses surrendered without any resistance, the military power of Prussia was destroyed and the entire territory, with the exception of its eastern part, lay in enemy hands. This was the situation under which our forces crossed the border at Grodno on 22 October [3 November] 1806.[4]

The Guard's approach march.

In mid [late] February 1807, the Guard set off from St. Petersburg in two columns.[5] The first, which included the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, was under the command of Lieutenant General Kologrivov. The jägers did not set out at full strength; four officers, namely: lieutenants Matsnev, Prince Turkestanov, Petin and von Mengden and 39 lower ranks were attached to the St. Petersburg Militia Battalion, with which they took part in military operations.[6] Each column proceeded in several detachments one after another, with a gap of one or more stages.

On 15 [27] March, the jägers entered Riga in a grand parade; after a day's rest, the first column continued its march towards Mitau [Jelgava],[7] where another day's rest was scheduled. Here a deputation from the Guard Jägers was presented to King Louis XVIII. It included: the regimental commander, Colonel comte Saint-Priest, lieutenants comte de Rastignac, Chevalier De la Garde and Sub-Lieutenant Prince Khilkov. In bidding them farewell, Louis XVIII said: "Gentlemen, beat the French soundly, but spare them afterwards, for they are my children."[8] On 27 March [8 April], the

4 *Энциклопедия воен. и морск. наукъ* [Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences], volume II, pp. 277 to 280.

5 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 128.

6 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 124, No. 502.

7 The march route of the first column to Mitau was: Krasnoe Selo, Kaskovo, Chirnovitsy, Opole, Yamburg [Kingissepp], Narva, Shudleyg, Pungern, Lugaseo, Torsha, Igafer, Dorpat [Tartu], Ringen [Rõngu], Teilitz [Tõlliste], Walk [Valga], Wolmar [Valmiera], Groß Roop [Straupe], Westroten, Riga, Olai [Olaine] and Mitau. M.S.A. No. 1589.

8 "*Messieurs, battez bien les français, mais épargnez les après, car ce sont mes enfants.*" Levshin's home monument, Russkaya Starina, 1876, p. 62.

entire Guard were assembled in Jurburg [Jurbarkas],[9] where Emperor Alexander I, King Wilhelm III of Prussia, and Queen Louise rode out to review the newly arrived Guard.[10]

The journey was unpleasant due to the condition of the roads in spring and the haste with which they were moving:[11] The marches were 30 *versta* [20 miles] or more long, and rest days were after five or six stages. Flooded rivers were no obstacle; most efficient crossings had been prepared everywhere. In order to increase the mobility of the infantry, each battalion was followed by carts for the exhausted, while behind them came carts for weapons and knapsacks. In addition to the standard trains, two officer's wagons were permitted per battalion and one *artel* wagon per company.[12] Each regiment was assigned 784 draught horses.[13]

On 1 [13] April, the jägers crossed the Neman on barges. The onward movement by the Guard continued in the same manner, only the trains were significantly reduced. Upon entering Prussia, on the basis of the treaty concluded with Russia, the King had taken upon himself the responsibility of issuing provisions and forage to Russian units against receipts. Each soldier received daily from the host with whom he was quartered, 2½ *funt* [about 2¼ pounds] of bread, ½ *funt* [7¼ ounces] of meat boiled in a soup with potatoes or some greens, a *kruzhka* [just over two pints] of beer or a *charka* [about ⅕ pint] of wine, and, in addition, the host was obliged to provide straw for bedding for men and horses. All the draught and war horses were given four *garnets* [about 23 dry pints] of oats and eight Berlin *Pfund* of hay per day, which is more than 10 *funt* [over nine pounds]. Despite the agreement with the Prussian government, regiments constantly complained about a lack of provisions and forage, which they obtained with great difficulty at high prices. A consequence of this receipt system was that the Russian government paid three times the cost for food. Many quartermasters and other officials assigned to receive provisions and forage gave fictitious receipts to the *richters* and elders in the villages, for example: 'someone was there, someone took, no one gave a receipt' and many others like that. The Prussian King personally handed over such receipts to the Tsar during a meeting in St. Petersburg. The Memel [Klaipėda] Commission established on this occasion could make no sense of anything.[14] The roads from Jurburg were extremely bad, such that regiments were forced to leave a significant part of their supply trains at Gumbinnen [Gusev], Schuterburg [*sic*] and other places; some of them subsequently rejoined their regiments, but the rest were redirected to Jurburg. On 10 [22] April, the Guard assembled in the vicinity of Schippenbeil [Sępopol] and settled into quarters.[15] Before reaching their designated quarters, they had to cross the Pregel [Pregolya] River; the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment were in the vanguard and were to be the first to cross. Due to spring weather and the unusually fast current, even the thought of crossing by ferry was out of the question. This had to be reported to the Grand Duke immediately, who had long since been on the far bank. General Kologrivov sent Ensign Levshin on this mission, who accomplished it by crossing in a fishing boat, putting his life at immediate risk. The Jäger Regiment were transported across on heavy barges delivered by the Prussian government from Königsberg [Kaliningrad].[16]

A summary of the 1806 to 1807 campaign before the Guard joined the operational army.

9 The march route of the first column to Jurburg was: Hofzumberg [Tērvete], Okshany, Pyryshin, Tenym, Lukinki, Krozeli, Vidukli [Viduklė], Rossieny [Raseiniai], Babervin and Jurburg. M.S.A. No. 1589.

10 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1806 to 1807, p. 135.

11 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 128.

12 M.S.A. No. 1589.

13 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1806 to 1807, p. 135.

14 Levshin's home monument, Russkaya Starina, 1876, p. 64.

15 M.S.A. No. 1589.

16 Levshin's home monument, Russkaya Starina, 1876, p. 65.

Before moving on to a description of the participation of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment in military operations, we will briefly summarise the campaign of 1806 to 1807 before the Guard joined the operational army. Having crossed the border at Grodno on 22 October [3 November] 1806, Bennigsen reached Ostrolenka [Ostrołęka] on 1 [13] November. Buxhöwden's corps followed him, while Essen 1st's corps was concentrated at Brest. The elderly Count Kamensky was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Sensing his incapacity, Count Kamensky left the army after staying with it for just seven days.

Bennigsen, having joined forces with L'Estocq's Prussian corps, marched from Ostrolenka to Pultusk [Pułtusk] and pushed his vanguard towards the Vistula: Sedmoratsky's division moved into Praga, and the detachment commanded by Barclay de Tolly moved towards Plotsk [Płock], while L'Estocq was ordered to hold the fortress of Thorn [Toruń]. Yurkovsky's detachment was stationed on the left bank of the Vistula at Błonie. The fortresses of Danzig [Gdańsk], Pillau [Baltiysk], and Graudenz [Grudziądz] were held by Prussian garrisons.

Napoleon directed an army of 160,000 against the Coalition. On 14 [26] November, Yurkovsky's detachment was forced to evacuate its position and retreated to Praga. General Sedmoratsky, believing false rumours that Napoleon was making a flanking march through neutral Austria, made a major mistake and evacuated Praga on 19 November [1 December], giving them the opportunity to breach our Vistula line, and Bennigsen was forced to retreat to Ostrolenka, ordering L'Estocq to withdraw to Strasburg in Westpreußen [Brodnica]. During these movements the French had crossed the Vistula at Warsaw, Plotsk and Thorn. Seeing that the French were not pressing him (they were busy setting up magazines and fortifying the Vistula line), Bennigsen returned to Pultusk on 24 November [6 December], where he stationed his main body while moving vanguards to the Wkra River at Sochocin, and to Czarnowo and Zegrze. On 11 [23] December, having split his army into two groups, Napoleon ordered an offensive with the objectives of breaking through the Coalition line and, after enveloping the Russian force, of pushing them into the Narew. The first clashes took place at Sochocin and Kollosomb [Kołozą b]; these clashes resulted in the French being delayed on the Wkra for ten hours. Napoleon assessed that our main body was at Gołymin, and moved a significant number of troops in that direction, while sending Lannes towards Pultusk. The great commander was mistaken this time: Lannes was checked by Bennigsen, while the French main body executed an attack for little gain, since only elements from a number of divisions were located at Gołymin. Despite this success, Bennigsen was obliged to withdraw, as his right flank was threatened with being enveloped.

Following these actions, Napoleon limited himself to simply pushing the Russian army some distance away in order to give his units the opportunity to occupy comfortable winter quarters. From 15 [27] December, our forces began to retreat towards Tykocin, where they arrived on 28 December [9 January 1807] and where the formations under Bennigsen and Buxhöwden linked up.

Bennigsen was appointed commander-in-chief on 1 [13] January and immediately began to implement his plan, namely: to move covertly, concealed among forests and lakes, through Arys [Orzysz], Rhein [Ryn], Bischofstein [Bisztynek] and Heilsberg [Lidzbark Warmiński] towards the lower Vistula and, taking advantage of the enemy's overextended positions, to smash the left-flank French corps in detail, reopen communications with Danzig and relieve Graudenz. If successful, he might force Napoleon to abandon the Vistula line.

The plan was good, but poorly executed due to the slowness with which the units advanced, and because the opportunity to defeat the enemy in detail was twice missed: firstly, when Ney's corps was at Guttstadt [Dobre Miasto] on 9 [21] January and then, on 14 [26] January, when elements of

Bernadotte's force were at Mohrungen [Morąg]. Following this, Bennigsen, concerned for his left flank, changed front, occupying a line from Freystadt [Kisielice] to Seeburg [Jeziorany] and abandoning the offensive. Napoleon, meanwhile, was preparing to attack our left flank, for which he ordered the army to concentrate at Allenstein [Olsztyn]. Dispatches sent by Napoleon were intercepted by the Russians, and Bennigsen immediately ordered the army to concentrate on a position near Jonkowo [Jonkendorf], which was achieved by 22 January [3 February]. Napoleon sent a portion of his force towards Bergfriede [Barkweda] in order to get behind our left flank; a stubborn fight ensued here, which resulted in the retreat of our army towards Preußisch-Eylau [Bagrationovsk], during which a series of rearguard actions took place, culminating in the bloody Battle of Preußisch-Eylau on 26 and 27 January [7 and 8 February]. Both armies were completely exhausted after this battle, and Bennigsen ordered a retreat to Königsberg. Napoleon, however, wishing to convince Europe of his supposed victory, remained on the battlefield for nine days, after which he withdrew behind the left bank of the Passarge [Pasłęka] River and settled into winter quarters. Having learned of the French retreat, Bennigsen set out after them, but was halted at Landsberg [Górowo Iławeckie] by the thaw. On 17 February [1 March] he set off for Launau [Łaniewo], while on 20 February [4 March], having set up his headquarters at Bartenstein [Bartoszyce], he dispersed his army around it.[17]

The situation in April and May 1807.

The Guard remained around Schippenbeil completely undisturbed until 29 April [11 May]. Only once, more precisely on 13 [25] April, were there orders from the Tsarevich that the Guard should be on alert and, in the event of hearing a heavy and prolonged cannonade, the regiments were to assemble in those of their quartering areas closest to Schippenbeil. Comte Saint-Priest's headquarters were in Kloster Springborn [Stoczek Klasztorny, six miles east of Heilsberg].[18] Throughout this period, various exercises were being carried out by the regiments. By order of the army commander-in-chief, General Bennigsen, it was prescribed that infantry regiments conduct these exercises to synchronise their pace, such that 75 paces would be taken per minute; the soldiers were led out to these exercises without rifles or sword-bayonets. Orders were also issued to keep the soldiers busy with target shooting.[19]

On 29 April [11 May], the Guard were moved to Heilsberg, in front of which they took up positions on 30 April [12 May]. Having ascertained that the French army was located between Braunsberg [Braniewo] and Hohenstein [Olsztynek], and Ney's corps, which constituted the vanguard, was stationed at Guttstadt isolated from the rest of Napoleon's forces,[20] Bennigsen decided to attack this corps. In order to execute this plan, the majority of the army, which included the Guard, were to move from Heilsberg to Launau and further forward, while 7th and 8th divisions were assigned to outflank the enemy. Taking advantage of the enclosed terrain and the darkness of the night, our troops covertly carried out these movements and on 1 [13] May were preparing to launch an attack, when suddenly Bennigsen received intelligence, which later turned out to be false, that Napoleon was approaching with his entire force. The army was ordered to remain in the positions they held and we lost the opportunity to defeat Ney.[21] On 2 [14] May, the Lifeguard Jägers were stationed in the villages of Springborn [Stoczek], Kerwienen [Kierwiny, five miles east of Heilsberg] and Kobeln [Kobiela]; the regimental headquarters was in Kloster Springborn.[22]

17 Lieutenant General Leer, Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences, volume II, pp. 280 to 282.
18 M.S.A. No. 1589.
19 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 128.
20 Leer, Review of Russian Wars, part I, p. 309.
21 M.S.A. No. 1587.
22 M.S.A. No. 1589.

Then came three-weeks of inactivity, the cause of which was a lack of food, which prevented Bennigsen from undertaking an offensive, as well as the expectation that Austria would take part in the war and would inform us of a plan of action with which the Russian army would need to conform. The lack of bread was due to the carelessness of the authorities and their inability to halt the abuses that had crept into the provisioning directorate. Once, in response to a representation regarding hunger in the army, Bennigsen responded: "One must endure. Indeed, at my table only three dishes are served." The supply of food to the troops and hospitals was provided exclusively by Jews. Cash was issued to regimental commanders and hospital commanders in order to buy food supplies, but money could not buy supplies where there were none. The hospitals were in dire straits. The British General Wilson, who was in our headquarters, called them 'the horror of humanity' in his book.[23]

Food supplies began to arrive from mid [late] May, and only then did Bennigsen decide to attack Ney's corps again, which was still stationed at Guttstadt. To that end, Dokhturov (7th and 8th divisions) was ordered to move from Wormditt [Orneta], drive off the French outposts on the right bank of the Passarge and, having captured the Pitein crossing (near Lomitten[24]), was to isolate Soult's corps from Ney's corps; Sacken (2nd, 3rd and 14th divisions and most of the cavalry) was to go from Arnsdorf [Lubomino] to Wolfsdorf [Wilczkowo], in order to get behind Ney; Prince Bagration's vanguard (4th and 5th divisions) was to move from Launau towards Ney frontally, towards Guttstadt; Prince Gorchakov (6th division) was to advance from Seeburg, cross the Alle [Łyna] upstream of Guttstadt and attack Ney's right flank; Platov was to cross the Alle at Bergfriede and sweep in behind Ney; Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich was to advance to Arnsdorf with 1st Division in reserve. On 21 May [2 June], the Russian army left quarters.[25]


After two days of marching, the Guard, which was part of the reserve corps commanded by the Tsarevich, settled at Benern [Bieniewo, three miles north-east of Arnsdorf]. At three o'clock in the morning on 24 May [5 June], the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, as part of the right hand column of the reserve corps, moved through Arnsdorf to Dittrichsdorf [Biała Wola, three miles south-west of Arnsdorf], the left to Petersdorf [Piotrowo, two miles north of Wolfsdorf] (the reserve corps having been divided into two columns),[26] where they took up positions awaiting further assignment.[27]

Lomitten, 24 May [5 June] 1807.

Major General Engelhardt, who commanded Lieutenant General Dokhturov's first column, was in combat at the village of Olbersdorf [*sic*, Albrechtsdorf or Wojciechowo]. The French launched a powerful attack against him. Seeing four new columns rushing to their aid, Engelhardt sent a message to the Tsarevich asking for reinforcements.[28] The Grand Duke sent the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment to him. At two o'clock in the afternoon the regiment approached the village of Lomitten; here they made a halt and rested for a moment. There was a tall pine forest, in which there was a deep ravine forwards of the fortified village of Lomitten. On the far side of this ravine the French skirmishers or *voltigeurs* had up-rooted the dense pine trees lining it, such that the tops and branches made an attack almost impossible, and the roots protected them from gunfire like shields. The Lifeguard Jägers did not pause for long. Comte Saint-Priest and his first battalion went left around the ravine, into the heaviest canister fire, where he was immediately seriously wound-

23 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1806 to 1807, p. 146.
24 [Now a 'ghost village' no longer in existence].
25 Leer, Review of Russian Wars, part I, pp. 320 to 321.
26 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 128; Oder of march on the day of the attack, 24 May [5 June].
27 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, dispositions for 24 May [5 June] 1807.
28 War diaries of the Imperial Russian Army, 1806 to 1807, p. 160.

PLAN No. 5
The Fighting at Lomitten
24 May [5 June] 1807



Legend to The Plan of The Action at Lomitten, 24 May [5 June] 1807.

AA	Lieutenant General Dokhturov's infantry	HH	First position of Marshal Soult's corps
B	Cavalry from 7th Division	II	Their second position
C	Battalion of Yekaterinoslav Grenadiers sent in support of the Lifeguard Jägers after the capture of the forest	KK	Abatis and redoubts (held by 5,000 French, according to prisoner interrogations) taken by the Lifeguard Jägers
D	Battalion of His Highness' Ulans	aa	Lifeguard Jäger screen after taking the forest
E	First position of Major General Khitrovo's infantry	bb	Lifeguard Jäger screen after seizing Lomitten
F	Second position and attack by the Lifeguard Jägers	cc	Cossack outposts
G	Second position of Colonel Kridner's battalion of Lifeguard Semenovsky		

ed in the leg by canister shot. Captain Wolf, who took command, was killed; but despite this, the battalion reached the Passarge River, driving the enemy column beyond the bridge and their

batteries. The second battalion, commanded by Colonel Potemkin, took the ravine by storm; the jägers scrambled through the branches with incredible bravery. Our casualties were significant. Having driven the French out of the forest, they joined up with the first battalion, moved up the Passarge River, ran up to the earthworks, and immediately scaled the batteries. The jägers stuck their bayonets into the parapets and climbed up their muskets as if they were ladders; having been reinforced by a battalion from the Yekaterinoslav Grenadier Regiment, they seized the village itself (see Plan No. 5). Lieutenant Ogon-Doganovsky and 28 lower ranks were killed here. Captain Riedinger and Staff Captain Sazonov; lieutenants Gribunin, Prince Gagarin, and De la Garde; sub-lieutenants comte Saint-Priest, Prince Khilkov, Engelhardt, and Levshin were wounded.

After taking the village of Lomitten, the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment was ordered to march to Ankendorf, where the reserve was stationed under the command of the Tsarevich. All spoke unanimously of the gallantry of the Guard Jägers. As the regiment took its place in the main army's line, everyone greeted them with shouts of: "Glorious, glorious! Well done, the Guard Jägers!" And every soldier tried to give the jägers some of their provisions, since our regiment had eaten almost nothing for three days.[29] In paying tribute to the valour of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, General Bennigsen reported on them to the Tsar on 25 May [6 June] in the following manner: 'The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment performed so well that they attracted the astonishment of the entire army.'[30] On 26 May [7 June], the army remained in the same positions. Following Ney's reverse, having concentrated his main body, Napoleon crossed the Passarge River at Elditten [Ełdyty Wielkie, 4½ miles east of Liebstadt] on 27 May [8 June]. This movement threatened the communications between our right flank and the Prussian corps under General L'Estocq, stationed at Spanden [Spędy, nine miles north-west of Wormditt], and placed him in a dangerous position, as a result of which Bennigsen was forced to retreat along the right bank of the Alle in the direction of Heilsberg through Guttstadt. On 29 May [10 June] the commander-in-chief of the Russian army decided to give battle on the positions at Heilsberg.

Heilsberg, 29 May [10 June] 1807.


The town of Heilsberg is situated on high ground around which the Alle River flows. The right bank is significantly higher than the left. These hills were heavily fortified during our inactivity; three redoubts had been built on the left bank. The Russian army took up positions here early in the morning. Anticipating that Napoleon would advance along the right bank of the Alle, Bennigsen concentrated his main body there, including the Guard; the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment were ordered to hold a redoubt. Prince Bagration was in command of the vanguard four *versta* [2⅔ miles] from Heilsberg; the remaining units took up positions on the left bank of the Alle. The French army advanced along the left bank of the Alle with the aim of cutting Bennigsen off from Königsberg and the sea. Murat fed his units into combat as they arrived. At 10 o'clock in the morning, he drove Borozdin's vanguard back. Bennigsen then ordered Bagration to cross to the left bank of the Alle and hold the enemy off until the entire army had crossed. Under pressure from significantly superior enemy numbers, Bagration was forced into a retreat that threatened to become extremely disorderly, but Uvarov's cavalry appeared at that moment, holding back the enemy cavalry torrent; the French infantry were halted by the Tsarevich's resourcefulness.[31] During the fighting that had broken out between Prince Bagration's vanguard and the French at Bewernick [Bobrownik], the Tsarevich had been keeping a close eye on the enemy and, having identified the direction of attack, ordered a battery to be placed concealed in the forest on the right bank of the

29 Levshin's papers, *Russkaya Starina*, 1876, pp. 68 to 70.

30 War diaries of the Imperial Russian Army, 1806 to 1807, p. 149.

31 Leer, Review of Russian Wars, part I, pp. 324 to 327.

Plan of The Battle of Heilsberg
29 May [10 June] 1807



Alle River, in front of which he scattered a battalion of Lifeguard Jägers. The enemy columns that appeared along the Launau road, under cover of a dense screen of skirmishers, were thrown into confusion by enfilade fire from the artillery concealed in the forest, while the skirmisher screen shielding the columns were shot down by the Lifeguard Jägers.[32] Two lower ranks were killed and 23 were wounded in this action.

At six o'clock in the afternoon Napoleon arrived on the battlefield; intending to break through our centre, he ordered Legrand to attack the redoubt facing Lawden [Lauda]; but every French effort was in vain, they were beaten back. Whereupon Napoleon directed an attack on the right flank of our position, held by Uvarov's cavalry, but here too the enemy were repulsed. From that moment on the battle was restricted to a heavy cannonade and the French withdrew beyond the Spibach.[33] The next day, once the enemy army's movements towards Landsberg were noted, Bennigsen decided to cross to the right bank of the Alle, moving towards Bartenstein and Schippenbeil to Wehlau [Znamensk], behind the Pregel River and to take up positions that covered both Königsberg and the line of retreat to our western borders.[34]

On 31 May [12 June], the jägers continued their withdrawal with the entire army through Kleitz [Kłajty], Kerwienen [Kierwiny], Springborn, Polpen [Połapin], Gallingen [Galiny] and Minten [Minty] to Bartenstein.[35] Shadowing Bennigsen, Napoleon sent some of his cavalry, Murat, Soult and Davout towards Königsberg; Lannes was directed through Domnau [Domnovo] towards Friedland in Ostpreußen [Pravdinsk]; all the other corps were directed towards Preußisch Eylau, as the central point from where they could be moved either towards Königsberg or towards the Alle depending on the demands of the situation.[36]

The appearance of the French at Domnau obliged us to abandon Bartenstein and head towards Friedland in order to prevent the French from taking possession of the Alle river crossings there. On 1 [13] June, after a short pause at Shippenbeil, the army continued its march, with the Guard infantry at the head of the columns.


Bennigsen learned from the interrogation of prisoners that they belonged to Lannes' corps, stationed at Domnau, and that Napoleon and other formations were moving towards Königsberg. On the basis of this intelligence, unverified and in fact completely incorrect, since the majority of French forces were concentrated at Preußisch Eylau on 1 [13] June and were much closer to Friedland than to Königsberg, Bennigsen decided to attack Lannes' corps in front of him, defeat it and then continue moving towards Königsberg,[37] as a result of which he ordered the Guard infantry, which had reached Friedland at 11 o'clock in the evening, to cross to the right bank of the Alle River and occupy the Sortlack forest.

Friedland, 2 [14] June 1807.

The town of Friedland is located in the depths of a loop of the Alle River. The Müllenfluss [Pravda] stream flows into the Mühlenteich [mill pond] near the Alle at this point, flowing along a deep ravine that divides the entire area ahead into two isolated sectors. The ground where the Russian army was deployed by dawn on 2 [14] June was completely open; every troop movement was as visible as the lines on the palm of one's hand. The terrain across which the French army was mov-

32 War diaries of the Imperial Russian Army, 1806 to 1807, p. 205.
33 Leer, Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences, volume II, p. 408.
34 Leer, Review of Russian Wars, part I, p. 329.
35 War diaries of the Imperial Russian Army, 1806 to 1807, p. 238.
36 Leer, Review of Russian Wars, part I, p. 330.
37 Leer, Review of Russian Wars, part I, p. 331.

1st Plan of The Battle of Friedland
2 [14] June 1807 (dawn to five o'clock in the afternoon)



ing, thanks to the Sortlack and Bothkeim [Chistopole] forests and the village of Postehnen [Peredovoe], facilitated the covert French approach and deployment. From a defensive point of view, our position presented no advantages: on the right flank, there was a complete absence of strong points; the left flank, although not devoid of them, presented a very cramped space.[38] The Guard were stationed at the entrance to Friedland, and constituted Bagration's reserve force, holding positions on the south bank of the Mühlenfluss ravine (Prince Gorchakov's force was on the north bank) forwards of Friedland, with their backs to the river (see First Plan of the Battle of Friedland).[39]

A firefight broke out between the forward outposts at dawn on 2 [14] June. The fog and early hour prevented either side from discerning the strength or locations of the opposing units. Anticipating that the Russians were ready to give battle, Lannes reported this to Napoleon and, awaiting his orders, limited his operations to skilful manoeuvring. Having received this report, Napoleon immediately ordered the entire army to head for Friedland. Matters gradually escalated. Things were particularly heated on our left flank in the Sortlack forest, where the French had established a battery. This battery, however, was soon forced into silence, because the actions of our artillery created an obstacle of fallen trees in front of the French guns, almost as if deliberately felled. Whereupon Prince Bagration ordered the edge of the Sortlack forest to be held. The numerous enemy that emerged were halted by the 20th Jäger Regiment and the Lifeguard Jägers coming up in support. This infantry fight was initially limited exclusively to musketry. Our marksmen competed with the French in their ability to adapt to the ground and to target each other. Yet little by little we were still moving forwards. Oudinot sent a column of grenadiers to reinforce his line. The Lifeguard Jägers drove them back and took one field officer, 20 subalterns and 48 privates prisoner.[40] Bennigsen then advanced our army by 1,000 paces.[41] Napoleon arrived at noon and the entire French army gradually began to assemble. Having personally inspected the Russian positions, Napoleon decided to engage in battle and ordered:


1. Ney was to attack our left wing with Victor, the *Garde* and La Houssaye's and Latour-Maubourg's dragoons backing him, push it back into Friedland and then take the town, isolating the Russian units stationed behind the Mühlenfluss from the river crossings, since all our bridges were in Friedland and there were no crossings behind the right flank of our position.
2. Lannes and Mortier were to limit themselves to a cannonade against our right wing, and to launch a general attack once our left flank was driven off.[42]

Meanwhile, Bennigsen did nothing, giving the French every opportunity to build up their strength; at around five o'clock in the afternoon, he finally realised the danger of our situation and ordered a retreat, but it was already too late. No sooner had the commander-in-chief's orders begun to be carried out, than the French artillery from Victor's corps, concentrated by General Senarmont, began to smash Prince Bagration's columns. The front line wavered; the regiments in the support line, including the Lifeguard Jäger, raced forward, but were disrupted by the fire and were driven back with heavy casualties. Unable to hold the line any longer and concerned about being enveloped, Prince Bagration withdrew some of his force. Having thus formed a salient angle, the sides of which rested on the Alle River and the Mühlenfluss ravine, he began to retreat, yielding

38 Leer, Review of Russian Wars, part I, pp. 333 to 334.
39 Leer, Review of Russian Wars, part I, p. 335.
40 War diaries of the Imperial Russian Army, 1806 to 1807, pp. 249 and 250.
41 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1806 to 1807, p. 172.
42 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1806 to 1807, p. 173.

2nd Plan of The Battle of Friedland
2 [14] June 1807 (from six o'clock in the evening)

№ 22.



every step to the French at a high price. The units, concentrated in a small area, crowded each other and lost mobility, while at the same time presenting a great target for the French artillery;[43] despite this, it was not until eight o'clock in the evening that Prince Bagration began to cross the Alle River, squeezed between the town and the river.[44] The right flank of our army suffered a similar fate.

Having noted that Bagration was under pressure from Ney, Napoleon ordered a general offensive. Prince Gorchakov had been holding his ground courageously, but the steadfastness of his troops was shaken, however, when French artillery opened fire enfilading our right flank. The losses on our side were so significant that Prince Gorchakov began to retreat towards Friedland, which had already been seized by the French; a terrible massacre ensued here. Having been driven out of the town by the French, the retreating troops, since all the bridges had been destroyed, had to ford the Alle while resisting the weight of Napoleon's entire army.

The defeat of the Russian army at Friedland cannot be used to belittle them. The soldiers and officers fulfilled their duties religiously. This is how the British ambassador Lord Hutchison spoke of our troops in a report to his government: 'I lack terms sufficiently strong to describe the valour of the Russians, and which would have rendered their success undoubted, if courage alone could ensure victory. The officers and men have done their duty in noblest manner. They justly deserve the praise and admiration of everyone who witnessed the Battle of Friedland.'[45] On this day the jägers lost Captain Vlasov killed; Sub-Lieutenant Svechin, ensigns Zykov, Engelhardt, Prince Cherkassky, Levshin 1st and Levshin 2nd wounded; Ensign Ofrosimov 4th was missing in action; 146 lower ranks were killed, wounded or missing in action (see Appendix II to Chapter 3). In the evening, once the fighting had ceased, the army marched to Wehlau, where they crossed the Pregel. After spending a few hours in Wehlau, Bennigsen directed his force towards Schierau [*sic*], where they arrived on 4 [16] June.

The return to St. Petersburg.

Continuing to retreat, the Russian army crossed the Neman River on 6 [18] June, and set up camp four *versta* [2⅔ miles] away. At the same time, Bennigsen sent a detailed report to the Tsar about the Russian army's defeat, pointing out the need to conclude an armistice.[46] The armistice was ratified by Napoleon on 12 [24] June. Following a meeting between Emperor Alexander I and Napoleon on the Neman, peace negotiations began, which resulted in the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit between Russia and France on 25 June [7 July] 1807.[47] On 13 and 14 [25 and 26] June, the Guard set off from the camp near the Neman River and moved into cantonment quarters in several columns in two main directions, towards Shaulen [Šiauliai] and Ponewiesch [Panevėžys]. The Guard remained in quarters along these roads until early [mid] July and soon set off for St. Petersburg in two columns. The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment was part of the first column commanded by General Kologrivov and made up the third detachment together with the Imperial Militia Battalion. The first column went from Shaulen to Riga, Dorpat [Tartu], Narva and Krasnoe Selo. In mid [late] August, both columns assembled at Krasnoe Selo and were stationed in the surrounding villages. The Guard were stationed here until 24 August [5 September], the day appointed for entering St. Petersburg.[48] In addition to awards granted by the Tsar to 1st Division 'for valour and

43 M. Derode, *Bataille de Friedland*, p.6, No. 8.
44 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1806 to 1807, p. 176.
45 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1806 to 1807, p. 178.
46 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1806 to 1807, pp. 184 to 188.
47 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 1806 to 1807, pp. 197 to 199.
48 M.S.A. No. 1589.

subordination' (see appendices I and II to Chapter 3), all officers and lower ranks received a bonus of one-third their pay.[49]

On 30 August [11 September] 1807, the Tsar granted 10 Military Order crosses to each company of Lifeguard Jägers for services rendered by the lower ranks during the past campaign (see Appendix III to Chapter 3). This mark of distinction was established on 13 [25] February 1807. The manifesto published on this occasion stated: 'As special Imperial favour to the army and as proof of our attention to their merits.' This same manifesto also indicated the feats for which lower ranks could be nominated for this distinction, and the rights and benefits associated with receiving it. This decoration consisted of a silver cross, in the circular centre of which on the obverse was the image of St. George on horseback, while on the reverse was the monogram of St. George; this cross was worn on a silk St. George ribbon [black and orange]. Upon receiving these crosses for issue, a council of field officers and various commanders was assembled in the regiment, who awarded these decorations to the most distinguished. The regimental commander personally handed over the crosses to those awarded this distinction in front of the entire regiment, after which this badge was never removed. In the event of particularly serious crimes, it was prescribed that the perpetrator be excluded from the list of holders of this distinction.[50]

Upon returning from the campaign, the officers naturally sought permission to go on leave, as a result of which Supreme orders were issued stopping officers from being granted leave, given that too few of them remained available.[51] This order was all the more necessary because the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, in addition to the usual work of putting every branch of regimental administration in order following the campaign, on 16 [28] September was issued orders by which the regiment was to be reorganised from a two-battalion establishment into three battalions.[52] By that time, changes in the regiment's all ranks uniform had arrived: on 17 [29] September, generals, field officers and subalterns of the regiment were ordered to wear a gold epaulette on the left shoulder;[53] on 26 September [8 October], lower ranks, instead of the cartridge pouches issued to them on 18 [30] October 1806, were ordered to wear a pouch without the coat of arms on the lid and on a black cross-belt; on 7 [19] November, the lighter green colour of coats and trousers, as well as shabraques and holster caps, should be changed to dark green; on 19 [31] December, lower ranks were ordered to wear the sword belt over the right shoulder rather than around the waist, as a result of which the seventh button at the bottom of the coat, under the old sword waist-belt, was removed and shoulder straps made of orange cloth were issued for both the coat and the greatcoat; on 23 December [4 January 1808], lower ranks were issued summer trousers with gaiters, and winter trousers with leather trim and seven brass buttons.[54] From that same year, Guard Jäger officers stopped wearing curls, continuing to powder their hair only for major parades and appearances at the Imperial Court.[55] The Tsar ordered the release of 15,000 silver roubles from the Commissariat Department in order to implement these changes in the Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky, Izmailovsky and Jäger regiments.[56]

Thus 1807 passed; in late January [early February] 1808 the Lifeguard Jägers began to prepare for a new campaign.

49 War Diary for 1807.
50 M.S.A. No. 432.
51 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 11, No. 131, No. 2092.
52 Chronicle of the Russian Imperial Army, Lifeguard Jäger Regiment.
53 Viskovatov, Description of weapons and clothing of the troops, part 14, p. 46.
54 Viskovatov, Description of weapons and clothing of the troops, part 14, p. 47.
55 Viskovatov, Description of weapons and clothing of the troops, part 14, p. 46.
56 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 11, No. 207, No. 2757.

APPENDIX I TO CHAPTER 3.

List Of Officers Decorated For Lomitten, 24 May [5 June] 1807.[57]

Colonel **Potemkin** - Order of St. George, 4th class.

Captain **Riedinger** - Order of St. Vladimir, Equal-of-the-Apostles, 4th class with ribbon.

Captain **Turchaninov** - Order of St. Vladimir, Equal-of-the-Apostles, 4th class with ribbon.

Captain Prince **Gagarin 1st** - Order of St. Vladimir, Equal-of-the-Apostles, 4th class with ribbon.

Staff-Captain **Sazonov** - Order of St. Vladimir, Equal-of-the-Apostles, 4th class with ribbon.

Staff-Captain comte **de Rastignac** - Order of St. Vladimir, Equal-of-the-Apostles, 4th class with ribbon.

Lieutenant Prince **Khilkov** - Order of St. Vladimir, Equal-of-the-Apostles, 4th class with ribbon.

Lieutenant Prince **Gruzinsky** - Order of St. Vladimir, Equal-of-the-Apostles, 4th class with ribbon.

Lieutenant **Svechin** - Order of St. Vladimir, Equal-of-the-Apostles, 4th class with ribbon.

Sub-Lieutenant **Rall 1st** - Order of St. Vladimir, Equal-of-the-Apostles, 4th class with ribbon.

Sub-Lieutenant Prince **Cherkassky** - Order of St. Vladimir, Equal-of-the-Apostles, 4th class with ribbon.

Staff-Captain Prince **Gagarin 2nd** - Golden Sword, *за храбрость*.

Staff-Captain **Gribunin** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Staff-Captain **De la Garde** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Lieutenant **Bogaevsky** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Lieutenant **Penksy 1st** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Lieutenant comte **Saint-Priest 3rd** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Lieutenant **Levshin 1st** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Sub-Lieutenant **Engelhardt 4th** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Sub-Lieutenant **Engelhardt 5th** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Sub-Lieutenant **Rall 2nd** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Sub-Lieutenant **Zykov** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Sub-Lieutenant **Ofrosimov 3rd** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Sub-Lieutenant **Ofrosimov 4th** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Sub-Lieutenant **Levshin 2nd** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Sub-Lieutenant **Levshin 3rd** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Sub-Lieutenant **Kasperov** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class (St. Anne Sword).

Forty-eight lower ranks received the Military Order medal of distinction.[58]

57 M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 160, bundle 11, No. 1, No. 27.

58 M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 160, bundle 122 (see Appendix III to Chapter 3).

APPENDIX II TO CHAPTER 3.

List Of Officers Decorated For Guttstadt-Deppen, Heilsberg And Friedland, 24 May to 2 June [5 to 14 June] 1807.[59]

Colonel-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Prince **Bagration** - Order of St. Vladimir, 1st class.

Colonel **Potemkin** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Captain **Turchaninov** - Order of St. Anne, 2nd class.

Captain Prince **Gagarin 1st** - Order of St. Anne, 2nd class.

Captain **Ofrisimov 2nd** - Order of St. Anne, 2nd class.

Captain Count **Grabovsky** - Order of St. Anne, 2nd class.

Lieutenant comte **de Rastignac** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant Prince **Khilkov** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant **De la Garde** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant **Uvarov** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Penskoy 4th** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Svechin** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Rall 1st** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Levshin** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Ensign **Rall 2nd** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Ensign **Zykov** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Ensign Prince **Cherkassky** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Ensign **von Loman** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Ensign **Ofrosimov 3rd** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Ensign **Ofrosimov 4th** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Ensign **Levshin 2nd** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Ensign **Levshin 3rd** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Ensign **Kasperov** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Bogaevsky** - Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class with ribbon.

Sub-Lieutenant **Engelhardt** - Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class with ribbon.

Sub-Lieutenant comte **Saint-Priest** - Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class with ribbon.

One hundred and twenty eight lower ranks received the Military Order medal of distinction.[60]

59 M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 160, bundle 11, No. 2, No. 1900.

60 M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 160, bundle 122 (see Appendix III to Chapter 3).

APPENDIX III TO CHAPTER 3.

List Of Lower Ranks Awarded The Military Order In 1807.

Extracted from the files of the Expedition for Administrative Orders, register 58, bundle 414, part 4. Moscow Branch of the General Staff Archive.

Serial	Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
	Portepée-Junker		
1	Alexander Naryshkin	874	For distinction in action on 29 and 30 May [10 and 11 June] 1807 at Heilsberg.
2	Baron Lev Bode	875	24 May [5 June] 1807, at Guttstadt by the village of Lomitten, on the Passarge River, for taking a fortification and driving the enemy beyond the Passarge River.
3	Alexei Lanskoy 1st	876	
4	Mikhail Lanskoy 2nd	877	
5	Dmitry Yesakov	878	
6	Alexander Yuriev	879	
7	Pavel Potemkin	880	
	Feldwebel		
8	Nikolai Shalygin	881	
9	Mikhail Ivanov	882	
10	Pyotr Spitsyn	883	
11	Yakov Papovtsov	884	
12	Ivan Kulakov	885	
13	Alexander Shishkin	886	
14	Alexander Mironov	887	
15	Vasily Oshev	888	
	Non-commissioned Officers		
16	Sergei Grigoriev	889	
17	Yakov Yudin	890	
18	Boris Inozemtsev	891	
19	Dmitry Volkodaev	892	
20	Theodor Dmitriev	893	
21	Andrei Volkov	894	
22	Alexei Zakharov	895	
23	Anton Ruslov	896	

Serial	Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
24	Andreyan Karev	897	24 May [5 June] 1807, at Guttstadt by the village of Lomitten, on the Passarge River, for taking a fortification and driving the enemy beyond the Passarge River.
25	Timofei Yestifiev	898	
26	Ivan Saprygin	899	
27	Martyn Ageev	900	
28	Nikita Grigoriev	901	
	Jägers		
29	Stepan Torgashev	902	
30	Timofei Yevseev	903	
31	Prokhor Karelin	904	
32	Nikita Makurin	905	
33	Leonty Theodorov	906	
34	Afanasy Lebedinov	907	
35	Pavel Mamontov	908	
36	Pyotr Khoroshilov	909	
37	Pyotr Ivanov	910	
38	Mosei Aikaev	911	
39	Afanasy Grebnev	912	
40	Stepan Atasov	913	
41	Dmitry Burmagin	914	
42	Lukyan Kuzmin	915	
43	Ignaty Bolshakov	916	
44	Fyodor Yemelyanov	917	
45	Andrei Yakovlev	918	
46	Semyon Ivanov	919	
47	Gerasim Kuzmin	920	
48	Zakhar Alexandrov	921	
49	Gerasim Koshelev	922	
	Portepée-Junker		
50	Pyotr Shcherbin	923	For distinction in the recent battles of 29 and 30 May [10 and 11 June] 1807, at Heilsberg, and 2 [14] June at Friedland.
51	Nikolai Repninsky	924	
52	Krestyan Schumann	925	

Serial	Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
53	Ludwig Distel	926	For distinction in the recent battles of 29 and 30 May [10 and 11 June] 1807, at Heilsberg, and 2 [14] June at Friedland.
	Feldwebel		
54	Yegor Akentiev	927	
55	Ivan Petrov	928	
	Non-commissioned Officers		
56	Timofei Prokofiev	929	
57	Theodor Razgulyaev	930	
58	Gavrila Babardin	931	
59	Ivan Latyshov	932	
60	Afanasy Zherkoy	933	
61	Ernst Brygin	934	
62	Vasily Chezhin	935	
63	Login Kholopov	936	
64	Pyotr Bushuev	937	
65	Gur Bezshchastnov	938	
66	Andrei Prosekov	939	
67	Nikita Tokarev	940	
68	Philip Serebryakov	941	
69	Nikifor Sedov	942	
70	Dmitry Trushchin	943	
71	Afanasy Sidyakin	944	
72	Vasily Suleikin	945	
73	Savostyan Soloviev	946	
74	Ivan Shirokoy	947	
75	Ivan Kryukov	948	
76	Ivan Kolosov	949	
77	Alexei Afonasiev	950	
78	Vasily Sokolov	951	
79	Stepan Rezanov	952	
80	Andrei Zotov	953	
81	Vasily Smotrov	954	

Serial	Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
82	Pavel Volkov	955	
83	Savely Kreitsov	956	
84	Vasily Ivanov	957	
85	Spiridon Ivanov	958	
86	Semyon Izmailov	959	
87	Karl Volkov	960	
88	Theodor Panin	961	
89	Pyotr Kolesnikov	962	
90	Andrei Timofeev	963	
91	Dmitry Petrov	964	
92	Afanasy Muzulevskoy	965	
93	Semyon Tolstoukhov	966	
94	Vasily Simanov	967	
	Jägers		
95	Alexei Sergeev	968	For distinction in the recent battles of 29 and 30 May [10 and 11 June] 1807, at Heilsberg, and 2 [14] June at Friedland.
96	Nikolai Zhukov	969	
97	Nikolai Zverev	970	
98	Timofei Bykov	971	
99	Zakhar Arkhangelov	972	
100	Afanasy Poluyanov	973	
101	Nikolai Konstantinov	974	
102	Grigorei Ivanov	975	
103	Theodor Sukhanov	976	
104	Mikhaila Prostyakov	977	
105	Yakov Luzin	978	
106	Vlas Sokolov	979	
107	Nazar Petrov	980	
108	Theodor Alexeev	981	
109	Fedosei Gorbunov	982	
110	Dmitry Telgin	983	
111	Yefim Yerokhin	984	

Serial	Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
112	Semyon Mikhailov	985	For distinction in the recent battles of 29 and 30 May [10 and 11 June] 1807, at Heilsberg, and 2 [14] June at Friedland.
113	Kondraty Zakharov	986	
114	Theodor Zazimka	987	
115	Ivan Prestupin	988	
116	Nikita Ivanov	989	
117	Yekim Ivanov	990	
118	Grigory Plotnikov	991	
119	Nikolai Nikitin	992	
120	Alexei Yakovlev	993	
121	Vasily Zinoviev	994	
122	Andreyan Semyonov	995	
123	Vasily Ankudinov	996	
124	Pyotr Kuzmin	997	
125	Yefim Yakovlev	998	
126	Ivan Zaikin	999	
127	Semyon Yegorov	1000	
128	Kuzma Rusinov	1001	
129	Vasily Ryzhey	1002	
	Non-commissioned Officers		
130	Vasily Sidorov	1003	
131	Yekim Androsov	1004	
132	Leonty Shiryaev	1005	
133	Yegor Spiridovskoy	1006	
134	Miron Yakovlev	1007	
135	Pyotr Karkunov	1008	
136	Vasily Taskaev	1009	
137	Yakov Dmitriev	1010	
138	Theodor Lepeshinskoy	1011	
139	Yegor Ivanov	1012	
140	Andrei Vasiliev	1013	
141	Abram Kuzmin	1014	

Serial	Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
142	Nikolai Theodorov	1015	For distinction in the recent battles of 29 and 30 May [10 and 11 June] 1807, at Heilsberg, and 2 [14] June at Friedland.
143	Prokofy Sergeev	1016	
144	Theodor Thadeev, Regimental Drum Major	1017	
	Jägers		
145	Vasily Yakovlev	1018	
146	Marko Bogdanov	1019	
147	Andrei Puzin	1020	
148	Nikifor Patupa	1021	
149	Vasily Loshchilov	1022	
150	Alexei Chesnikov	1023	
151	Ivan Kozhin	1024	
152	Nikita Rubtsov	1025	
153	Grigory Zolotushkin	1026	
154	Dmitry Sorokin	1027	
155	Vasily Nikitin	1028	
156	Pyotr Theodorov	1029	
157	Timofei Ivanov	1030	
158	Mikhaila Soloviev	1031	
159	Boris Theodotov	1032	
160	Vasily Theodorov 1st	1033	
161	Kondraty Semyonov	1034	
162	Terenty Leontiev	1035	
163	Mosei Mikhailov	1036	
614	Semyon Osokin	1037	
165	Dmitry Paramonov	1038	
166	Ivan Ilin	1039	
167	Nikolai Denisov	1040	
168	Stepan Yefimov	1041	
169	Yakov Theodotov	1042	
170	Grigory Malyshev	1043	
171	Ivan Lezov	1044	

Serial	Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
172	Stepan Petrov	1045	For distinction in the recent battles of 29 and 30 May [10 and 11 June] 1807, at Heilsberg, and 2 [14] June at Friedland.
173	Theodor Titov	1046	
	Wagenmeister		
174	Vasily Gorodetskoy	1047	
	Regimental Chief Clerk		
175	Ivan Simakov	1048	
	Feldwebel		
176	Pyotr Izvolskoy	1049	For distinction in the battles of 29 and 30 May [10 and 11 June] 1807, at Heilsberg
	Jäger		
177	Timofei Baranov	5961	Awarded by the Supreme Command on 25 February [9 March] 1811 for heroic feats during the late French campaign.

CHAPTER 4.

The Swedish War of 1808 to 1809.

Preparing the regiment for the campaign.

In late January [early February] 1808, a secret Supreme order was issued that the regiments of the 1st Division, which included the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, were to be prepared to set off on campaign at immediate notice.[1] As a result of this order, a rush began in order to complete the uniform changes that had begun in November 1807; to that end, the setting up of sewing rooms in companies or battalions was ordered and the tailored uniforms issued to the companies by the regimental paymaster were to be made up in them;[2] at the same time, every firearm from each company was inspected and those unfit for use were presented for replacement.[3] On 29 January [10 February], Supreme orders were issued to bring the trains and horses into full working order and readiness for departure.[4] The jägers' administrative preparations did not end there. On 20 February [3 March], the regiment was issued with tailored greatcoats, which had to be made up by 1 [13] April;[5] on 2 [4] March, the regiment received a half-month's supply from the provisioning magazines in order to bake and dry hard tack.[6] Numerous concerns regarding administrative matters did not distract comte Saint-Priest from the regiment's military life; he vigilantly monitored the training of lower ranks and, at the same time, their instructors, the junior officers. Emmanuel Frantsovich [Saint-Priest] held the company commanders accountable in the event of junior officers not knowing their duties. In winter, exercises were carried out outside in good weather, while in very cold weather, they were held in the Mikhailov drill-hall. On 24 February [7 March], rank-and-file exercises began, and orders 'to monitor the men's posture' date back to that time: 'chests forward, shoulders level, heels together, feet forming almost a right angle, hands along the trouser seams...'[7]


Changes in uniform.

At the beginning of 1808, some minor changes were made in the uniform for all ranks of the regiment: on 26 January [7 February] 1808, generals were ordered to wear the newly established general's uniform on working days and in general when mustering the unit, while wearing dark green trousers when wearing regimental uniform off duty, instead of white ones. On 16 [28] April, lower ranks and officers were issued shakos without plumes, and at around the same time they were ordered to have dark green cuff flaps on their coats, with three buttons on each, like those on the collar; the officers' green plumes were replaced with white ones.[8]

The planned departure by the entire regiment did not take place. Only the second battalion (Colonel Potemkin's) took part in the war against the Swedes. Before the battalion set off,

1 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 121, No. 27, 20 January [1 February] 1808.
2 Regimental Daily Orders, 26 January [7 February] 1808.
3 On 28 January [9 February] 1808, the regiment had 366 rifles and 2,118 muskets, of which 45 rifles and 430 muskets were unserviceable (M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 202, No. 50).
4 The regimental trains consisted of: six infirmary carts with 24 horses; 12 rations carts with 48 horses; one pharmacy cart with two horses; one paymaster's and regimental office cart with two horses; one tool cart with three horses; one treasury cart with four horses; 12 cartridge caissons with 24 horses, and 12 pack horses, for a total of 34 vehicles and 119 horses (M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 202, No. 119).
5 M.S.A. No. 265, p. 14.
6 M.S.A. No. 265, p. 16.
7 Regimental Daily Orders for 25 February [8 March] 1808.
8 Viskovatov, Description of weapons and clothing of the troops, part 14, p. 48.

Lieutenant Zagryazhskoy was sent to deliver hard-tack to Fredrikshamn with two non-commissioned officers and 10 privates.[9] Before describing the participation of the Lifeguard Jägers in the war of 1808 to 1809, let us say a few words about the causes that gave rise to it, and the events that preceded their entry into the theatre of war.



Subaltern, non-commissioned officer and privates of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, 1808 to 1809.

The political situation before the Swedish War.

One of the conditions of the Peace of Tilsit of 1807 was that Russia would close its harbours to Britain, inducing Sweden to do the same or obliging them to do so by force. The Swedish King

9 Regimental Daily Orders for 15 [27] March 1808.

Gustav IV resolutely refused such an alliance against Britain and brought matters to a breach with Russia.[10]

The Swedish King was informed that military action could be reduced to mere precautions should he immediately join with Russia and Denmark in order to close the Baltic Sea to Britain.

The plans of the warring factions.

Upon entering Finland, we intended to occupy as much territory as possible, and to that end an operational plan was drawn up, the essence of which was as follows:[11] the right wing, or First Column, commanded by Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st, was to operate in the direction of Kuopio; the centre, or Second Column, under Lieutenant General Prince Bagration was to march on Tavastehus [Hämeenlinna]; the left wing, or Third Column, under Lieutenant General Prince Gorchakov, was to march on Helsingfors [Helsinki] in order to seize Sveaborg [Suomenlinna]. The total strength of the army was some 26,000. General-of-Infantry Count Buxhöwden was appointed commander-in-chief.

The commander-in-chief in Swedish Finland was General *Greve* Klingspor, and in his absence (in Stockholm) this position was being filled by General Klercker. The Swedish government did not believe that serious military operations in Finland were likely and had not taken any measures to repel a Russian offensive. On 20 January [1 February], Klercker received a letter from the Swedish ambassador in St. Petersburg warning of the possibility of an imminent outbreak of hostilities. He immediately sent out orders on his own initiative for the units in winter quarters in Finland to concentrate. According to the establishment lists, the fighting strength of these units exceeded 16,600 regular troops and 3,100 reserves (militia); to this could be added 2,500 from the navy's marines, for a total of 22,000 men. Klercker assigned almost all the militia and 3,000 regular troops, a total of 5,600, to garrison the fortresses. Of the remaining forces, 9,800 were assigned to operations in western Finland and 4,300 to eastern Finland.

On 21 January [2 February], the King ordered the Commander-in-Chief, *Greve* Klingspor, to go to Finland and provided him with the following instructions in the event of a Russians incursion:

1. To allocate as many units as possible to garrison the fortresses of Sveaborg and Svartholm, and withdraw into Ostrobothnia [Österbotten] with the rest until receding sea ice permits navigation and other means can be used to drive the Russians out of Finland.
2. Under no circumstances should he engage in battle with superior enemy forces, but should make the preservation of the army the priority.

A brief summary of military operations prior to the Guard Jägers reaching the theatre of war.

Russian troops crossed the border on 9 [21] February 1808. The forward Swedish units, spread out in a cordon, engaged them with a few shots and then fell back towards their reserves. By late February [early March], our troops had taken Jockas [Juva], Tavastehus and Helsingfors without hindrance and had begun the blockade of Sveaborg. The advance continued to move thereafter and Russian detachments consistently pushed back weak enemy forces, occupying the coast in March as far as Åbo [Turku] and Vasa [Vaasa]. Tuchkov 1st seized Kuopio on 4 [16] March and, leaving a weak garrison there, departed for Gamlakarleby [Kokkola] on 7 [19] March, arriving there on 28 March [9 April]. *Greve* Klingspor was approaching Brahestad [Raahe] by this time. Tuchkov's

10 Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire, Livre XXVII, Friedland et Tilsit, Juin 1807*.

11 According to dispatches from the Swedish ambassador, General Stedingk, this plan was drawn up by General Suchtelen in collaboration with generals Pfuel and Opperman (Stedingk's dispatch, dated 25 November (7 December), 1807).

entire advance succeeded thanks only to the inexplicably hasty retreat by *Greve* Cronstedt from the Savolax *Landskap* [region] towards Uleåborg [Oulu]. Count Buxhöwden still hoped to cut the Swedes off from Uleåborg, and therefore ordered the garrison left in Kuopio, commanded by General Bulatov, to march there via Idensalmi [Iisalmi], while Tuchkov 1st and Raevsky were to pursue them along the coastal road.

Thus, by the end of March [mid April], only the 6,150 men under Tuchkov, Raevsky, Kulnev and Bulatov remained at the disposal of the commander-in-chief for operations in the field against the Swedish army. The remaining units were stationed partly opposite Sveaborg, partly monitoring the 500 *versta* [333 mile] sector from Vasa to Åbo or were holding Tavastehus.[12]

Greve Klingspor's army had meanwhile grown to 12,922 men. The Swedes halted at Siikajoki, where they drove off Kulnev's vanguard on 6 [18] April. On 15 [27] April, Klingspor defeated Bulatov at Revolax [Revonlahti] and forced Tuchkov 1st, who had joined Raevsky, to retreat 150 *versta* [100 miles] back to Gamlakarleby. These local successes encouraged the Swedish army and raised the population; guerrilla and partisan warfare broke out. Immediately after the battle on 15 [27] April, *Greve* Klingspor detached *Överste* [colonel] Sandels with 3,000 men and six guns along the Kuopio road. Colonel Obukhov was marching along this road from Kuopio, escorting the parks and supply trains with three companies. He was defeated and captured at Pulkkila. Sandels, encountering no serious resistance anywhere else, seized Kuopio and Varkaus, and raised the entire population against us.

Count Buxhöwden became convinced of the impossibility of conquering Finland with the troop strength he had at his disposal, and asked for reinforcement of the Army of Finland.[13]

At his request, the following were sent to Finland:

1. 3,000 privates, veterans and trained personnel, who had returned from being held as prisoners of war in France.
2. 2,000 of the healthiest and strongest recruits.
3. A detachment commanded by Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly consisting of elements of 6th Division, two battalions from the Leib-Grenadier Regiment, one battalion of Lifeguard Jägers, His Highness' Uhlan Regiment, a company of Guard artillery and two regiments of Cossacks.

The Army of Finland was to be brought up to 34,000 men with these reinforcements.

The departure of the second battalion of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment from St. Petersburg on 8 [20] May 1808.

Thus, one battalion from the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment was called up to participate in the Swedish War of 1808 to 1809. The second battalion, commanded by Colonel Potemkin (see Appendix I to Chapter 4), was assigned with one company from the Lifeguard Artillery Battalion attached.[14]

12 By 1 [13] April, 23,000 Russian troops were deployed as follows: 9,054 men from 17th Division and part of 14th Division, commanded by Count Kamensky 2nd at Helsingfors, Hankö, Borgå [Porvoo] and Svartholm; 5,845 men from Prince Bagration's 21st Division, between Åbo and Vasa and in Tavastehus; 4,623 men from 21st and 5th divisions under Tuchkov 1st at Gamlakarleby; 1,527 men in Bulatov's detachment (5th Division), en route from Kuopio to Uleåborg, for a total of 21,049 men. The remaining units were in garrisons along the supply routes, in hospital, or on the Åland Islands.

13 Count Buxhöwden's report to the Tsar of 24 April [6 May], from Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky's Description of the War in Finland, p. 112.

14 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 124, No. 320, No. 30.

The battalion set out from St. Petersburg on 8 [20] May 1808,[15] and proceeded via the Sestroretsk factory (9 [21] May) and Vyborg (15 [27] May), from where they marched to Ruokolax [Ruokolahti] on 16 [28] May and Puumala to Jockas to join the rest of Barclay de Tolly's force. The battalion covered this 275-*versta* [183-mile] route in two weeks and two days. During the march, a cash bonus granted to the lower ranks by Supreme authority was distributed to them: one rouble per man.[16]

While awaiting the arrival of units and while the thaw and *rasputitsa* in early [mid] May prevented military operations, the Commander-in-Chief divided his units into three formations, or corps:

1. Raevsky's corps (who succeeded Tuchkov 1st) with a strength of 6,800 men.
2. Barclay de Tolly's corps (which included the battalion from the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment) with a strength of 7,500 men.
3. Kamensky's and Bagration's force, reinforced with the soldiers returned from France and recruits.

At the opening of the spring campaign, at the end of May [mid June], Raevsky was at Gamlakarleby, while Barclay de Tolly set off from Nyslott [Savonlinna] towards Kuopio, having orders to clear the Savolax *Landskap* and then operate on the Swedish flanks and rear. Colonel Vlastov was sent to Saarijärvi with the 24th Jäger Regiment in order to maintain communications between them.

Greve Klingspor was in Brahestad, and his troops, rested and settled after the winter campaign, numbering 13,000, were stationed along the Kalajoki River. *Överste* Sandels' independent brigade was stationed at Kuopio, consisting of 5¼ battalions, one squadron and four guns, a total of some 2,800 men.[17] His outposts were positioned as follows: at Kivisalmi, *Överste* Fahlander with 150 men; at Turikkala [*sic*, St. Michel or Mikkeli], Major Malm with 300 men; at Jorois [Joroinen], Major Grotenfelt with 166 men, and at Varkaus, Major Schildt with a detachment from the *Västerbottens regemente*. A total of some 1,200 men were sent to reinforce the brigade from Uleåborg, consisting of the *Vasa regemente* [*sic*, *bataljon*?], *Kajana bataljon*, *Uleåborgs bataljon*, a squadron of *Karelska dragonkåren* and artillery. In order to prevent a Russian advance through Pieksämäki, Major Essen was sent to Kivisalmi with elements of the *Österbottens bataljon* and *Västerbottens bataljon*, a total of 100 men, and thus Fahlander's outpost was strengthened to 250 men. Provisions were transported to Kuopio, the guns to Toivola, boats were collected from all the surrounding lakes; the position at Henriksnäs was fortified.

Raevsky found the position of his corps unsafe, advanced far forwards (like a spike, in the words of Friedrich II), and therefore he retreated back to Lilkit [*sic*, Lillkyro?] in early [mid] June. Meanwhile, Barclay de Tolly entered Finland from Nyslott and Villmanstrand and concentrated his corps at Jockas on 25 May [6 June] (including the second battalion of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, which arrived on 24 May [5 June]) with the vanguard (one squadron of lancers and two companies of

15 Consisting of: one field officer, 11 subalterns, 40 non-commissioned officers, eight musicians and 480 privates (Archive of the Chancellery of the War Ministry [C.W.M.], register 152, No. 1271, No. 416 and No. 1211).

16 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 124, No. 320, No. 30.

17 Sandels' brigade consisted of: ¾ of a battalion from the *Österbottens regemente*; one battalion from the *Västerbottens regemente*; 1½ battalions from the *Vasa regemente*; the *Kajana bataljon*; a ½ battalion from the *Savolax jägarregemente*; a half battalion of militia; a squadron from the *Karelska dragonkåren*; four guns from the *Finska artilleriregementet*; 1¾ battalions from the *Arméns flotta*, for a total of 5¼ battalions, one squadron, four guns and 1¾ battalions of marines, with an establishment strength of 2,850 infantry, 100 cavalry, 50 gunners and 475 marines.

infantry) 20 *versta* [13 miles] ahead, at Kumbois [*sic*], where the road to Pieksämäki branches off. He stationed the Reval Musketeer Regiment in the vicinity of Rantasalmi with three guns from 17th Artillery Brigade; it was planned to send another squadron of lancers to them; while the detachment under Major General Lobanov, which was supposed to go to Pieksämäki, consisting of two battalions from the Leib-Grenadier Regiment, a reserve battalion from the Veliko Lutsk Musketeer Regiment, a squadron of lancers and four guns from 14th Artillery Brigade, were located in St. Michel. A sub-unit of Guard Jägers was left in Puumala with four three-pounder Licorns [gun-howitzers].

The corps' onward advance was initially delayed by difficulties in supplying the force with provisions. Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly reported on this subject to the Minister of War in the following terms:[18]

> 'The Guard Jäger Battalion, the Guard Artillery, as well as the lancers and the Leib Grenadier Regiment, arrived here without any reserve provisions. I was forced to resupply them with stocks from the St. Michel magazine, located 50 *versta* [33 miles] from here, before I was able to begin my offensive movement, even though I know how vital this was. I cannot determine exactly when cargo vessels might dock in Sulkava [20 miles south-east of Jockas], while the local area is so depleted and poor that, despite every effort, not the slightest resources are being provided to supply provisions for the force, and for this reason, at every step I must keep the provisioning of my detachment in mind, because without this the troops shall always be exposed to the risk of suffering hunger. I do not think that this region has been depleted by our passing units; while as for the units proceeding with me, I must give them full justice before Your Excellency regarding their constant observance of the strictest discipline and the best order.'

The capture of Kuopio on 7 [19] June.

On 29 May [10 June], Barclay de Tolly set off from Jockas and bivouacked in front of Jorois on 31 May [12 June]; he was joined here by the Reval Musketeer Regiment, which had been at Rantasalmi together with a squadron of lancers. The enemy occupied an advantageous position at Jorois, located between lakes connected by a fast-flowing, deep river with marshy banks.

Major General Lobanov's detachment also set off on 29 May [10 June], from St. Michel; he had been assigned to march to Haukivuori on 30 May [11 June] and on to Pieksämäki on 31 May [12 June]. Colonel Potemkin's detachment was supposed to join him on this second stage, moving through Kumbois, consisting of the second battalion of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, the Azov Musketeer Regiment, half a miner company, several guns and one platoon of lancers.[19]

On 2 [14] June, Barclay attacked the Swedes at three o'clock in the afternoon in snow and high winds and drove them from the Jorois position; Grotenfelt retreated to Varkaus.

Meanwhile, Major General Lobanov was moving through Pieksämäki; on 31 May [12 June], his vanguard was engaged by an enemy patrol, joined by a crowd of armed peasants at Putkola; after a few shots, they fled. On 1 [13] June, he ordered the publication of the declaration of the annexation of this region to Russia and directed the clergy and residents to swear an oath, without any resistance.[20]

18 Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly's report No. 28 to the War Minister, dated 25 May [6 June] 1808 from Jockas, in the M.S.A. No. 1657.

19 Count Buxhöwden's report to the Tsar from Åbo dated 4 [16] June 1808 (M.S.A. War Diary of the Army of Finland, part II, no. 36).

20 Count Buxhöwden's report to the Tsar from Åbo dated 15 [27] June 1808 (M.S.A. War Diary of the Army of Finland,

On this same day, on the Swedish side, Captain Söderhjelm was sent forward on a reconnaissance with 100 infantry and 20 dragoons through Kutumäki to Surnumäki [*sic*]. Upon receiving reports of a Russian offensive, 200 men from the *Vasa regemente* were sent to Suonejoki [Suononjoki] with two six-pounder guns. The rest of the *Vasa regemente* and *Österbottens regemente* were stationed in reserve at Vehmasmäki [13 miles south of Kuopio]. Fahlander was ordered to move to Kutumäki, leaving a small unit at Kivimäki [20 miles north of Pieksämäki]. But before he could do this, Söderhjelm's outpost was vigorously attacked at nine o'clock in the morning on 2 [14] June by the Guard Jägers between the villages of Vipperi [Viippero] and Kutumäki.[21]

The successful advances by Major General Lobanov's column led Major Schildt, who had taken over from Grotenfelt, to consider it impossible to hold out in the strong position at Varkaus and he retreated to Paukarlaks [Paukarlahti].

The leading units under Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly, on arriving at Varkaus, found no enemy there; patrols sent out found bridges destroyed everywhere and discovered no one. On the morning of 4 [16] June, Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly detached the 3rd Jäger Regiment with half a company of miners and labourers to repair the bridges, and sent the cavalry to the left to link up with Lobanov's column.

The latter's detachment had been engaged by the enemy at Jugomäki [*sic*, Jauhomäki?] on 3 [15] June, and 15 *versta* [10 miles] from Vehmasmäki on 4 [16] June; in the clashes that took place during these actions, the enemy were constantly receiving reinforcements; Sandels himself, with a detachment of 1,500 infantry and cavalry and five guns, was headed there, but, having received a report of Schildt's retreat from Varkaus and concerned about being cut off from Kuopio, he retreated to Henriksnäs on the morning of 4 [16] June, joining Schildt at Vehmasmäki. Major General Lobanov had some 20 men killed and 40 wounded during the entire period; our vanguard always managed to gain the Swedes' flank and thus forced them to retreat.

Lobanov reached Vehmasmäki on the morning of 6 [18] June and linked up with the main body under Barclay de Tolly here, which arrived later; our patrols sent from here discovered the enemy occupying the Henriksnäs position, seven *versta* [4⅔ miles] from Vehmasmäki.

General Barclay de Tolly immediately sent Colonel Marquis Paulucci to reconnoitre this position with a company of Lifeguard Jägers,[22] a company of Leib Grenadiers and a troop of lancers. The remaining companies of the Jäger Battalion and a squadron of lancers followed them up. As Marquis Paulucci approached, the enemy burned the bridge in front of their position and began to fall back. Marquis Paulucci pursued them and a heated firefight ensued, but since the rest of our troops were delayed in crossing by the destroyed bridge, General Barclay de Tolly sent Marquis Paulucci orders to be cautious and not to engage in combat with a stronger enemy unless absolutely necessary. He halted and the enemy, taking advantage of that pause, put their last unit on boats and sailed to Toivola.[23] Two jägers were killed and Lieutenant Venyukov and eight jägers were wounded in this action.

At three o'clock in the morning of the following day, 7 [19] June, our leading detachment, consisting of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion, a sub-unit of miners, one squadron of lancers and 30 Cossacks, occupied the city of Kuopio. Major General Rakhmanov's brigade and the rest of the units arrived behind this detachment. A group of Cossacks were sent up the Vasa road to

part II, no. 40).

21 Mankell, *Anteckningar Rörande Finska Arméens Och Finlands Krigshistoria*, II, p. 121.

22 4th Company of the second battalion.

23 Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly's report to Tuchkov 1st (M.S.A. No. 1657).

Rautalampi in order to maintain forward patrols towards Koivisto.

Having taken their initial operational objective, Kuopio, Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly left a detachment under Major General Rakhmanov there, while he set off himself with the remaining units on 8 [20] June for Rautalampi in order to coordinate operations with Raevsky against the army under *Greve* Klingspor.

The feats of the Guard Jägers in repelling Sandels' attacks on Kuopio in June and July 1808.

Rakhmanov's detachment consisted of the second battalion of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, the Nizov and Reval musketeer regiments, a squadron of lancers, 20 Cossacks and a company of Guard artillery.

This detachment had the following orders:[24]

1. Hold the position at Kuopio.
2. Strive to keep the enemy under constant threat with manoeuvres to deceive them into thinking we intend to cross the lake.
3. Conceal our true strength.
4. Ambush the enemy near the coast using boats taken from the population.
5. Upon the arrival of our flotilla, take control of the outpost at Toivola.
6. Establish communications with the detachment that is to march from Serdobol [Sortavala], across the lakes wherever possible.

Moreover, he was entrusted with the protection of the lines of communications, and all the garrisons along it were subordinated to him, of which the most important were Varkaus and St. Michel.

Major General Rakhmanov set up camp with his detachment to the west of the city of Kuopio. The defence of the shore line facing the Swedish position at Toivola was entrusted to the Guard Jäger Battalion under Colonel Potemkin. The second company of this battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Petin, was stationed at the northeastern end of the Kuopio Peninsula, at the site of the ferry crossing to Toivola. The remaining three companies were stationed behind in reserve with two guns. Lieutenant Petin's company set up the forward outposts.

Meanwhile, Barclay de Tolly had reached Rautalampi on 10 [22] June; his vanguard, transported by boat, was at Koivisto, 140 *versta* [93 miles] from Lappo [Lapua], where Raevsky's right flank was located and to where Count Klingspor was moving at the same time. Vlastov's detachment had been directed from Saarijärvi to Lintulaks. By continuing his advance without stopping, Barclay de Tolly would have emerged on the enemy flank in a few days. But Count Buxhöwden's operational plan was destined for collapse a second time. Every crossing over Lake Konnevesi had been destroyed and the ferry boats had been spirited away; this delayed Barclay de Tolly in Rautalampi for a week. While he was busy arranging a crossing, new information was constantly reaching him regarding Swedish attacks on Kuopio from Toivola and operations by partisans on the lines of communications to Nyslott.

The first attack by Sandels was launched 10 [22] June;[25] at seven o'clock in the evening he embarked his troops on boats and sent them across Lake Kallavesi towards our outposts. At eight

24 Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly's report to Tuchkov 1st (M.S.A. No. 1657).

25 Count Buxhöwden's report to the Tsar from Åbo dated 17 [29] June 1808 (M.S.A. War Diary of the Army of Finland, part II, no. 41).

o'clock in the evening, Lieutenant Petin's company opened fire on them. The Swedes intended to land in the small bay separating our company's advanced post from the rest of the peninsula, thereby severing Lieutenant Petin's line of retreat. A gunboat was operating to their front, opposite the ferry landing stage. Colonel Potemkin ordered Lieutenant Petin to withdraw behind the bridge, to dismantle it, and defend the southern shore of the bay, while he moved up to support the forward company himself with the remaining three companies of his battalion and two light guns. The enemy, having landed their jägers in the forest on the northern shore of the bay, attacked the bridge with 20 boats, each carrying about forty men, under heavy small arms fire. But our two guns had already been brought up to the shore and opened fire with canister at point-blank range taking the enemy completely by surprise. This forced the Swedes to pull back in haste. Our artillery saw them off with round shot and sank several more large boats. Two jägers were wounded on our side.

After this action, our outposts on the shore were reinforced: every company from the Guard Jäger Battalion went into the front line. The left sector, at the ferry crossing to Toivola, was held by two companies under the overall command of Captain comte de Rastignac with two guns under Sub Lieutenant Korobin. The right sector, between the bridge over the small bay and the city, was occupied by the remaining two companies under the overall command of Staff Captain De la Garde. A battalion of the Nizov Musketeer Regiment was stationed in reserve. Command over all the shoreline outposts and reserves was entrusted to Colonel Potemkin; he was accompanied by the Lifeguard Jägers battalion adjutant, Lieutenant Prince Golitsyn.


Meanwhile, Sandels, having learned about the transport of our food supplies by water from Nyslott to Varkaus and onwards to Kuopio by land, decided to attack the convoy of 75 wagons as it left Varkaus. On 12 [24] June, Major Duncker with 240 men of the *Österbottens regemente* and the *Savolax jägarregemente* set off for Paukarlaks in 20 boats. In order to divert the Russians' attention from this location, the next day, 13 [25] June, an attack was launched on Kuopio. Sandels assigned 600 men for this attack, whom he placed on 60 boats.[26] 330 men with two six-pounder and two three-pounder guns, under Sandels' personal command, were to land between the Likolaks brickyard and Cape Itkoniemi, thus in the sector under comte de Rastignac, and attack from the east; 270 men of the *Vasa regemente*, commanded by Major Arnkihl, were to land at Cape Julkulaniemi (the northwestern end of the peninsula) and attack from the west.

On Saturday, 13 [25] June, at nine o'clock in the evening, the Swedes boarded their boats and headed towards our shore.[27] Captain comte de Rastignac was the first to open fire on the approaching boats. Colonel Potemkin dispatched a half-company of Nizov Musketeers under Captain Bolt to reinforce comte de Rastignac, and another half-company from the same regiment, led by Sub Lieutenant Kozlovsky, to join Staff Captain De la Garde.

The enemy gunboats approached Sub Lieutenant Korobin's guns to the closest possible range, trying to knock them out, but accurate fire from our guns forced them to draw away. The Swedes then attempted to land to the left of the battery; Captain comte de Rastignac sent skirmishers from the Nizov Musketeers to shield the battery on that side, and they also drove the Swedes off at this location. The Swedes now rushed straight at the jägers under comte de Rastignac; but the crossfire of musket and canister fire again drove them back with heavy casualties and forced them to withdraw altogether.

26 Mankell, pp. 124 to 125; G. Montgomery, *Historia öfver kriget emellan Sverige och Ryssland åren 1808-1809*, pp. 180 to 182.

27 Count Buxhöwden's report to the Tsar from Åbo dated 25 June [7 July] 1808 (M.S.A. War Diary of the Army of Finland, part II, no. 44).



Having failed in their first landing attempt, the Swedes approached the city itself in 50 large boats and renewed the attack against Staff Captain De la Garde's sector and to the left of it. Colonel Potemkin ordered another battery, located near the bridge north of the city, to open fire, while two companies of Staff Captain De la Garde's jägers were to defend the shoreline with marksmen; he sent a company of Nizov Musketeers under Lieutenant Belov to support them.

The Swedes managed to land most of their troops under cover of canister fire from the gunboats and, forming a column, moved towards the main road leading north from Kuopio in order to cut off our troops defending the coastline from the main body. Staff Captain De la Garde, having brought his reserves closer in order to support his left flank, which had already been enveloped, entered into a firefight and, under canister fire from the Swedes, attacked them with bayonets fixed, driving them out of the strong position they held on a rocky outcrop, and shoved them all the way to their boats. The Swedes barely had time to get back into the boats just as the largest of them

was hit by round shot and sank with the men. At five o'clock in the morning on 13 June [*sic*], the firing at Kuopio had already begun to die down, when west of the city, near the Fagernäs manor, fighting flared up again: Major Arnkihl was trying to land facing a picket of Nizov Musketeers commanded by Staff Captain Zelenko. Although the picket was soon supported by its entire company, the Swedes managed to reach the shore and Staff Captain Zelenko began to fall back. Colonel Potemkin sent Captain Zhirkevich's company, from this same regiment, up in support. The Nizov Musketeers enveloped the Swedes' flanks, the companies charged with fixed bayonets and drove the enemy off. The enemy lost some 70 men killed, not counting those drowned, and nine taken prisoner in this night action. On our side, 12 men were killed, 37 wounded, and 12 were missing.

Major Duncker's expedition that same day was crowned with success: the convoy of 75 wagons, travelling under escort from an Azov Musketeers sub unit, fell into enemy hands.

Having received reports of these actions, Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly decided to return to Kuopio in order to secure the army's right flank and lines of communications back to Russia. Not knowing Sandels' strength, with visions of a terrible guerilla war that had flared up before him, he could not entrust these important tasks to Rakhmanov's weak detachment, as the Paukarlaks action had already shown. He sent the Azov Musketeer Regiment and a *Sotnia* [squadron] of Cossacks to Raevsky via Lintulaks, and arrived in Vehmasmäki with the other units at noon on 17 [29] June, from where he sent a battalion of Leib-Grenadiers commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shevnin with the mission of maintaining outposts at Paukarlaks and Lapvik [*sic*], and left one battalion and a squadron of lancers commanded by Major General Lobanov in Vehmasmäki to guard the Varkaus road.

On the night of 17 to 18 [29 to 30] June, Barclay de Tolly arrived in Kuopio with the rest of his detachment.

At dawn on 18 [30] June, the Swedes carried out a reconnaissance in force along all points of the coast and our entire force prepared itself for immediate action. But Sandels had scheduled the renewed attack on Kuopio only for the following day. He knew that our detachment was awaiting the arrival of the Saimen [Saimaa] Flotilla's gunboats from Villmanstrand and wanted to drive the Russians out of Kuopio before their arrival;[28] this attack was intended to be more powerful than all previous ones.

Sandels' disposition was as follows: on the night of 19 June [*sic*, 30 June], 900 men would be embarked at 11 o'clock on 100 boats and would set off from Toivola; Major Grotenfelt with 150 men and two guns on 15 boats would go south and attack the town itself in order to distract their adversary's attention. At the same time, Major Duncker was to land between the Likolaks factory and Cape Itkoniemi with 400 men and two guns on 40 boats and was to push the units located there back into the city in order to cut the line of retreat of the units defending the northern part of the peninsula at Kelloniemi. With that same objective, Captain Söderhjelm was to land at Kettulanlaks (northwest of Kelloniemi) with 240 men and was to advance southwards. Captain Burman was to head for Cape Kelloniemi between these two detachments with 100 men and two guns in 12 boats. Sandels himself would be with Captain Burman's detachment. The attack was to be carried out simultaneously by all at one o'clock in the morning (see Plan of the Action at Kuopio).

The progress of this action may be seen from the report by General Barclay de Tolly given below.[29]

28 Mankell, p. 127.

29 Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly's report and Tuchkov 1st's dispatches regarding this action, dated 19 [31] July

‘Report on the battle that took place with Swedish forces at Kuopio, 19 June [1 July] 1808.

This month, 19 June [1 July], in the early hours, at one o'clock, the enemy approached our position from Toivola with 130 large boats in four groups. Each of the first three groups had two gunboats to protect them; the fourth had just one. The first group from the enemy left flank (Grotenfelt’s), having moved its gunboats forward, began the action with a powerful cannonade. Meanwhile, the enemy boats stretched around our right flank behind these floating batteries. The second group from the enemy flotilla (Duncker’s), approaching from a similar direction, moved its batteries closer inshore, opening fire with canister so as to push the two companies of Lifeguard Jägers commanded by Captain comte de Rastignac back from the shoreline along with the company of Nizov Musketeers under Captain Bolt, holding this sector. The third group (Burman’s) lined up opposite the usual crossing point from Toivola and opened a strong cannonade on this post, which was held by two companies of Lifeguard Jägers with two guns under the command of Staff Captain chevalier De la Garde. The fourth group (Söderhjelm’s) was directed against our left flank, where the low-lying foreshore, covered with scrub, was held by skirmishers from the Reval and Nizov musketeer regiments. To the left of these skirmishers, two companies from the Nizov Musketeer Regiment had been deployed to a likely landing site together with a gun under the command of Captain Zelenko.

The gunboats from the first enemy group were quickly forced to withdraw by the effective fire from three guns of the 14th Artillery Brigade from Major Sudakov’s company, stationed on the shoreline under the command of artillery Lieutenant Ratitsev. The other enemy boats, which were trying to get around our right flank to carry out the landing, were driven off by the very effective fire from three guns commanded by Captain Matsylev of the Guard Artillery. The enemy drew back behind an island lying near our shore, landed their force on it and began to lay down strong small arms fire, but were quickly forced to fall back by several salvos of canister.

Meanwhile, the fourth enemy group had managed to push our skirmishers away from the shoreline with canister fire. The enemy, taking advantage of this and landing their units, put pressure on our skirmishers and forced them to retreat before moving forward to the high ground opposite the left flank of our camp. At that very moment, Lifeguard Jäger Staff Captain chevalier De la Garde, was swiftly attacked, but held his post, and the artillery supporting him, commanded by Guard Artillery Sub Lieutenant Korobin, greatly contributed to his outstanding defence. But since the units landed by the fourth enemy group were already encroaching almost from behind, he retreated with his detachment in the best order and without haste across the bridge that was behind him. Lifeguard Jäger Colonel Potemkin kept him there to defend this bridge, where an infantry picket with a six-pounder gun was already stationed.

According to the dispositions issued by me, 3rd Jäger Regiment, left five to six *versta* [three to four miles] back in order to reinforce whichever outpost, was immediately to move forward at the first cannon shot, which this valiant regiment did with astonishing speed. This regiment arrived at the very moment that the enemy, having pushed our skirmishers back, emerged on our left flank. The commander of this regiment, Colonel Sabaneev, was detached with a battalion in that direction and drove the enemy units back to their landing point with such speed that the enemy only just regained their boats by beating a hasty

(M.S.A. No. 1657).

retreat. Captain Zarzhitsky pursued the enemy to their boats with the marksmen from his battalion together with captains Bistrom and Vedeniev with their companies, and although the enemy tried to drive them back from the shoreline several times, they held their positions right up to the end of the action.

Since this action had secured Staff Captain chevalier De la Garde's left flank, Colonel Potemkin ordered this very brave officer to cross the bridge immediately with the two companies with him, while he remained at the bridge himself, being ready to support Staff Captain chevalier De la Garde with the troops I had sent him as reinforcements. De la Garde charged the enemy with fixed bayonets, throwing them into disorder with this swift attack, defeating and driving off all those who had crossed to our shore from that direction. A considerable number of enemy troops were cut off from their boats in this action, some of whom, having no means of escape, dashed to try to swim and reach the boats, but many of them perished in the water. No sooner had Staff Captain chevalier De la Garde reoccupied his former positions, than Colonel Potemkin ordered the artillery from this post to return to their original firing positions, as a result of which the entire enemy enterprise was halted at this location.

Meanwhile, the second group from the enemy flotilla had managed to push two companies of Lifeguard Jägers, holding the coast in the sector between the city and Staff Captain chevalier De la Garde, back from the shoreline by way of a powerful and continuous storm of canister fire, and they landed troops at this location, which, rushing forward, had already reached the Kuopio to Toivola main road, and thereby completely severed communications from the city to the outposts located at the bridge and under Staff Captain chevalier De la Garde. Colonel Potemkin supported these outposts with a company of Nizov Musketeers commanded by Major Achkasov, which I had sent him as reinforcements at the very start. The enemy were held back at these points with all possible force until Major Kosagovsky of the 3rd Jägers came up with two companies from this same regiment, supported by a company of Reval Musketeers under Major Pukhinsky. At the same time, Colonel Potemkin, advancing with all these units, attacked the enemy, who, after stubborn resistance were driven back at all points. On this occasion the enemy left a number of prisoners with us.

Colonel Potemkin gives special credit to Major Kosagovsky of the 3rd Jägers, who charged at the enemy with the two companies alongside him, with a determination that nothing could resist and routed them completely. Although only some of the units located here fought against all the forces standing facing us, nevertheless, the enemy was defeated with heavy losses and forced to retreat.

This serves as evidence of the unparalleled courage and determination of the troops which I have the honour to command. It is for this reason that I dare to commend them to Your Excellency's special favour.

Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly.'

Thus ended Sandels' final and strongest attempt to seize Kuopio; although he failed, an important objective was nevertheless achieved: the distraction of Barclay de Tolly from joint operations with Raevsky against Klingspor. A few days later, our position at Kuopio became stronger, as gunboats from the Saimen flotilla began to arrive.

The first six gunboats arrived on 23 June [5 July]; the enemy engaged them with their armed vessels, but disappeared behind the islands after a few shots.

On 24 and 25 June [6 and 7 July], a reconnaissance of the enemy positions at Toivola was carried out under cover of two gunboats. Our vessels were engaged from the shore with cannon fire, which was answered by our gunboats. After a half-hour cannonade, the enemy battery fell silent.

Meanwhile, rafts and ferries were being built with vigour under the supervision and direction of shipwrights sent from St. Petersburg. On 2 [14] July, two more gunboats arrived.

But General Barclay de Tolly fell ill before all these preparations were completed and command of the detachment in Kuopio was again entrusted to Tuchkov 1st in his place. He was ordered to take control of the Swedish position at Toivola and send part of the force to Lintulaks to support Raevsky, whose situation was very troubling. With Barclay de Tolly halted in Kuopio, Raevsky had been left to his own devices and was too weak to fight the Swedes alone. Surrounded by partisans and lacking provisions, he retreated through Alavo [Alavus] towards Tavastehus, having lost communications with the flanking forces and headquarters and having no grain resupply. The units defending the coast were expecting the Swedish King to land on the Åland Islands at any moment. All the corps were operating without communications with each other; the flanks - the right at Kuopio, the left and Björneborg [Pori] - were restricted to self defence; the centre had exposed central Finland with its retreat.

Then, on 12 [24] July, Count Kamensky 2nd was sent to replace Raevsky, without reinforcements, but with orders for victory![30] Tuchkov 1st was ordered to send four battalions and two squadrons from Kuopio to link up with Colonel Vlastov, to form Count Kamensky 2nd's vanguard. Colonel Sabaneev had set off from Kuopio on 8 [20] July with his 3rd Jäger Regiment, a battalion of Nizov Musketeers, two squadrons of lancers and artillery.

Count Kamensky carried out the commander-in-chief's orders precisely and arrived in Gamlakarleby on 10 [22] September, with Kulnev's vanguard five *versta* [3⅓ miles] ahead.

Reconnaissance by Marquis Paulucci.

Meanwhile, immediately upon his arrival in Kuopio, Tuchkov began the execution of his primary mission, the capture of Toivola. On 11 [23] July, he sent Colonel Marquis Paulucci to make a reconnaissance in force towards the Maninga [Maaninka] chapel with three companies of infantry, embarked on gunboats, and to facilitate the execution of this undertaking, he made daily shows of force against Toivola with the remaining three gunboats.

On 14 [26] July, Colonel Marquis Paulucci returned from his expedition. He had monitorer all the roads to the rear of the Swedish position and had confirmed the strength of the force stationed there.

The Marquis visited the Swedish camp in person, where he came to ask for newspapers and found out the latest. He was received very amicably and was given newspapers, chiefly those which reported tendentious news of 'the atrocities committed by the Russians in the sack of Vasa.' In a conversation with Gustav Andersin, an *underlöjtnant* from the *Savolax jägarregemente* who was escorting him, Marquis Paulucci on one occasion stated that the Russians would already be in Toivola in eight days time. The Swedish *underlöjtnant*, of course, claimed the opposite, and it ended, with *Överste* Sandels' permission, with Marquis Paulucci making a wager with *Underlöjtnant* Andersin for 10 glasses of punch.

Eight days later, Marquis Paulucci returned to the Swedish camp, expressed regret that for reasons

30 Count Buxhöwden's order No. 137, dated 12 [24] July; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War in Finland, p. 212.

beyond his control he had lost the bet, and invited the Swedish officers to come to one of the islands to drink the 10 glasses of punch he had lost. On the Swedish side, 10 officers were appointed to the deputation and, according to *Underlöjtnant* Andersin, 'the spread was opulent.' Only Swedish accounts of this episode have survived,[31] but it is safe to assume that the Guard Jägers also played some role in it.

Having gained a grasp of the state of affairs, Tuchkov reported that there were only two ways to drive the enemy out of Toivola: either by moving significant forces behind them, towards Idensalmi, or by attacking Toivola by crossing Lake Kallavesi by boat.

He regarded the detachment as being too weak for the former, because it would be necessary to leave the appropriate number of troops to secure Kuopio, the holding of which was vital, as it was the key point on our lines of communications. Moreover, the commander-in-chief considered a northerly advance by Tuchkov 1st to be untimely and pointless in mid-July, because Count Kamensky had not yet begun his offensive operations.

The second course of action, that is, to transport the troops across the lake, was impossible, because there were not enough boats: on 14 [26] July there were only enough to lift 500 men; despite every effort, by the end of July [mid August] there were only enough for 1,000 men. The rafts being constructed turned out to be unreliable and unsafe; during the initial trials, they almost drowned the men onboard.[32]

Thus, Tuchkov 1st could not undertake anything decisive against Sandels and the whole of July passed in inaction. To break this stalemate, he asked for the Serdobol detachment under Major General Alexeev to be subordinated to him and to order this detachment to get behind Toivola and thereby force Sandels to abandon the position. Tuchkov 1st's request was honoured; Alexeev was ordered to serve under his command, but the Serdobol detachment's operations in Karelia had remained unresolved for a long time. Whereupon Major General Alexeev was replaced by Major General Prince Dolgorukov, who was ordered to leave Serdobol, march through Karelia to Lake Kallavesi to get behind the Toivola position and, having informed Tuchkov of his approach, attack the enemy in coordination with him.

All this time, Tuchkov 1st remained stationed in Kuopio, where nothing of note happened except for clashes with armed peasants.

Meanwhile, Count Buxhöwden, who had been in Åbo until then, arrived in Gamlakarleby on 12 [24] September, where Kamensky was preparing to attack the Swedes and was to drive them out of the positions they held across the river.

Upon learning of the arrival of the Russian commander-in-chief, *Greve* Klingspor proposed that they conclude a truce, which was signed for an indefinite period on 17 [29] September in Lochteå [Lohtaja].

The conditions were as follows:

1. In the Vasa province, Russian troops were to halt at Gamlakarleby, while Swedish units were to retreat to Himango [Himanka], 50 *versta* [33 miles] away.
2. In the Kuopio region, Sandels was to leave the Toivola position and station himself 100 *versta* [67 miles] away at the village of Idensalmi, designated as the boundary line between the troops under Tuchkov and Sandels.

31 A.R. Andersin, *Bidrag till historie nom 1808 års fält tag*, Finland, manuscript, quoted in Montgomery, p. 242.

32 Tuchkov 1st's report No. 328 dated 14 [26] July; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War in Finland, p. 276.

Tuchkov 1st's corps thus gained some 100 *versta* [67 miles] without firing a shot, which was all the more advantageous since it was more convenient to operate from Idensalmi to get behind Klingspor's army and the Swedes had to abandon their strong positions prepared forwards of Idensalmi at Palois [Paloinen].

Count Buxhöwden considered the truce he had concluded to be so advantageous that in his report to the Tsar he wrote:

> 'Once the rivers have been closed for one month, Finland may be cleared out. The main considerations that prompted me to pause military operations were that Sandels would have to leave the Toivola position, and Tuchkov 1st could link up with the Serdobol detachment, and thus the way would be open for him to march on Idensalmi unhindered.'

The commander-in-chief's calculations were fully vindicated: on the same day as the armistice was signed, Sandels voluntarily abandoned the Toivola position and retreated to Idensalmi. On 18 [30] September, Tuchkov crossed Lake Kallavesi to Toivola and linked up with Prince Dolgorukov there.

Tuchkov 1st's report on the occupation of Toivola arrived in St. Petersburg at the same time as Count Buxhöwden's report on the conclusion of the armistice. The Sovereign Emperor was in Erfurt at the time. The Committee of Ministers unanimously decided, in the name of His Majesty, to announce in orders for Count Buxhöwden that: the truce was immediately to be broken off and the resulting halt in operations was to be rectified by Tuchkov's swift advance towards Uleåborg.

Count Buxhöwden, without breaking the truce, sent a new report to St. Petersburg, setting out the motives that had prompted him to this course of action and hoping that the reasons stated would be respected and that he would receive permission not to announce a resumption of hostilities.


Meanwhile, the commander-in-chief took measures to organise provisioning and to strengthen Tuchkov 1st's corps, which was almost out of grain; supplies sent to him from Varkaus, across the lakes, had been halted by contrary winds and storms; the surrounding population also had insufficient grain and livestock. The 3rd Jägers, Azov Musketeers and a battalion of Nizov Musketeers were sent to Kuopio from Count Kamensky's corps to reinforce Tuchkov. The Lifeguard Preobrazhensky and Izmailovsky battalions, having set off from St. Petersburg under the command of Major General Count Stroganov, were also directed there. Having received a repeat order to break off the truce, Count Buxhöwden ordered Count Kamensky 2nd to occupy the neutral zone and advance to contact the enemy, while Tuchkov 1st was to attack the defile beyond the Idensalmi chapel and race on to Pulkkila.

The latter had to attack the enemy and move forward ahead of Count Kamensky 2nd, because he had a greater distance to cover. Consequently he was ordered to announce the end of the truce to Sandels several days before Count Kamensky.

When the deadline arrived, Tuchkov informed Sandels of the resumption of military operations on our part at noon on 15 [27] October, and prepared to attack the enemy, who were holding positions behind the straits connecting the Idenijärvi [Iijärvi] and Porovesi lakes, north of the Idensalmi chapel.

At one o'clock in the afternoon, Prince Dolgorukov's swift attack drove the Swedes back across the straits; the enemy were holding fortifications on the opposite bank, having dismantled the bridge but the miner company from 2nd Pioneer Regiment, despite a fierce cannonade and crossfire, hurried to repair the bridge with piles and fascines, while the 4th Jäger Regiment and a battalion of Navaginsk Musketeers ran across the still unfinished bridge and attacked the Swedes. At the same time, our artillery had set fire to the village closest to the Swedish position with *Brandkugel*

[incendiary rounds]. The Swedes, thrown into confusion by the fire, sent strong infantry columns to engage the jägers and forced the 4th Jägers to retreat all the way to the bridge. A battalion of Tenginsk Musketeers supported the jägers and the enemy was again pushed back, while a battalion of Reval Musketeers, coming to the rescue with two guns, forced them to retreat beyond the second straits towards Kavakkala. Darkness put an end to the fighting at seven o'clock in the evening.




Plan of the action at Idensalmi between a Russian Imperial force commanded by Lieutenant General Tuchkov I and a Swedish force commanded by *Överste* Sandels on 15 [27] October 1808.

At the height of the battle for the bridge, the enemy attempted to land on our side across Lake Idenijärvi under the cover of its distant batteries, but were driven off by three companies of the Navaginsk Musketeers with two guns. The Lifeguard Jäger Battalion was held in reserve throughout the battle (see Plans of the action at Idensalmi on 15 [27] October).[33]

Sandels withdrew to Vieremä overnight; during the battle, Tuchkov received orders from the commander-in-chief not to continue offensive operations and therefore halted at Idensalmi.

For two weeks, neither side took any action.

The action at Idensalmi, 30 October [11 November] 1808.



Tuchkov settled his units in villages and dugouts, but as a result, he scattered his corps across a wide area. The vanguard of the 4th Jägers and Tenginsk Musketeers were stationed at Kaupila with

33 Tuchkov 1st's report No. 693 to Buxhöwden dated 29 October [10 November] 1808 (M.S.A. No. 1657).

two guns, forwards of the bridge; the Reval, Nizov and Navaginsk regiments were stationed behind the bridge, with 12 guns also stationed on the high ground there; the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion was stationed near the *Prästgård* [rectory], while the Leib-Grenadier Regiment were in Palois.

Having learned of the extended positions of the Russian detachment, Sandels decided to launch a surprise attack and to destroy Tuchkov 1st's vanguard at least. His plan was as follows: Major Duncker, with 400 *Livregementets grenadjärkår*, 300 men of the *Savolax lätta infanteriregemente* and 300 from the *Savolax jägarregemente*, would set off from Vieremä on the night of Wednesday, 28 October [9 November], skirt Lake Idenijärvi from the east and arrive at the Idensalmi bridge in the early hours of Friday, 30 October [11 November], between two and three o'clock in the morning. At the same time, *Överste* Aminoff, upon a signal from Duncker, was to attack the Russian vanguard frontally with 500 infantry and two guns.

Duncker's detachment was divided into a vanguard, main body, demolition column and a rearguard. The vanguard and main body were to clear the route to the bridge for the detachment and cross it, the demolition party were to destroy it immediately, while the rearguard were to cover them from the direction of Tuchkov's main force. Once our vanguard was thus isolated from the main force, Duncker and Aminoff were to attack it simultaneously (see Plan of the action on 30 October [11 November]).

The deployment of our units was apparently secured by completely impassable swamps; but during the severe frosts that had set in, the swamps froze over, and not only men but also horses could move freely across them.

At two o'clock in the morning on 30 October [11 November], Duncker's column encountered our forward outposts and quickly raced towards Major General Rakhmanov's brigade. The men jumped out of their dugouts to utter chaos, but quickly came to their senses and prevented the Swedes from breaking through to the bridge.

The darkness of the autumn night, the unexpectedness of the attack, the shouting and gunfire created general confusion in our camp. Some of the Swedes were already by the battery forwards of the bridge and were preparing to fire the agreed signal rockets for Aminoff's detachment, but at that moment the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion, commanded by Colonel Potemkin, attacked them from behind, having been sent there by General Tuchkov, who was informed of the danger threatening Rakhmanov's brigade and the vanguard by his aide de camp, Baron Pahlen. After moving along a country lane through the forest, the Lifeguard Jägers emerged behind the Swede's left flank and charged across the frozen swamp towards Duncker's rearguard with fixed bayonets. This daring attack decided the outcome of the battle; here is how the commander of the Swedish rearguard, *Löjtnant* Aminoff, described it.[34] His orders were to protect the labourers during the destruction of the bridge, and in the event of a reverse, to secure the line of retreat. His detachment were stationed waiting on the outcome of the fighting, with ordered arms. Suddenly, from the forest to their left came loud shouts of Hurrah! The battalion charged out... In the dim moonlight he could only make out tall black shakos, and so he mistook them for his *Savolax jägar* and quickly went to greet them to find out what was going on. The officer to his front asked him in Russian if these were his own infantry? It was only then that *Löjtnant* Aminoff realised that these were Russian Guard Jägers, he ran back to his own and opened fire.

Having fired a volley, the jägers raced at the Swedish rearguard with lowered bayonets. The companies under Staff Captain De la Garde and Lieutenant Petin were at the front. Having driven

34 G. Aminoff, *Relation om f.d. Sawolaks brigadens, af Kongl. Finska Armeen, deltagande i 1808 & 9 årens fälttåg i Finland och Westerbotten*, pp. 93 and 94.

the enemy back, they began to pursue; but soon De la Garde suffered a bullet wound through his right arm, and Petin was shot through his leg above the knee by a bullet. Lieutenant Engelhardt took command of both companies and chased off the Swedes. The rest of Duncker's detachment had to break out through our lines with fixed bayonets or escape through the forest. The Swedes were rescued by local peasants who happened to be accompanying them.

The Swedes lost more than 200 men at the scene of the fighting; Major Malm, three subalterns,[35] one *Översergeant* [sergeant major], three non-commissioned officers and 87 privates were taken prisoner. On our side, among others, Lifeguard Jäger Staff Captain De la Garde and Lieutenant Petin were wounded, while Sub Lieutenant von Lohmann suffered a contusion. Four lower ranks were killed, 13 were wounded and two were missing in action.

Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly concluded his report on the action of 30 October [11 November] as follows:

> 'having witnessed the order and speed with which the units from the corps entrusted to me were prepared to engage the enemy, I must say that the Guard Jäger Battalion and the brigade under Major General Rakhmanov were particularly distinguished on this day by the valour and good order through which they defeated the enemy.'[36]

Överste Aminoff's detachment, assigned for the frontal attack, arrived at its start line on time, and waited until nine o'clock in the morning for the agreed signal before returning to Vieremä.

The next day Sandels received orders to hurry to Uleåborg. Tuchkov 1st pursued him slowly, delayed by bad roads and damaged river crossings. On 3 [15] November, Tuchkov's corps arrived in Vieremä, reached Salahmi on 4 [16] November, Aho on 5 [17] November, Pulkkila on 6 [18] November, Mattila [*sic*] on 7 [19] November, and Sipola on 8 [20] November, where they remained on 9 [21] November. On 10 [22] November, they took Frantsila [Rantsila] and two battalions of Lifeguard Preobrazhensky and Izmailovsky joined the corps here, under Major General Count Stroganov's command; the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion also passed to his command on 7 [19] November.[37] On 12 [24] November, the vanguard commanded by Major General Alexeev took Temmes. Count Stroganov's battalions moved there on that same day.

Over the following days, Tuchkov's corps took up posts in and around Uleåborg. The Guard battalions remained in Temmes.

In the meantime, on 7 [19] November, Count Kamensky had concluded the Olkijoki Convention, ending the 1808 campaign.

The Swedes retreated to Torneå [Tornio], while Russian units settled into quarters. The army was to be divided into four corps and an independent Kuopio detachment in accordance with a new schedule drawn up at headquarters: I Uleåborg Corps under Tuchkov 1st; II Vasa Corps under Prince Golitsyn; III Åbo Corps under Prince Bagration; IV Nyland [Uusimaa] Corps under Count Wittgenstein. The Kuopio detachment was subordinated to Vyborg military governor, General Obrezkov. Major General Arakcheev's artillery reserve was stationed at Tavastehus.

The march to Vasa.

The brigade under Major General Count Stroganov (battalions of Lifeguard Preobrazhensky,

35 *Löjtnant* Weber, *Fänrik* Savander and *Fänrik* Plomgren.

36 Tuchkov 1st's report No. 709 to Buxhöwden dated 30 October [11 November] (M.S.A. No. 1657). For Ensign Batyushkov's poem dedicated to Lieutenant Petin, see Appendix VI to Chapter 4.

37 C.W.M. general business, register 152, Count Stroganov's report No. 15 to the Minister of War, dated January 1809.

Izmailovsky and Jägers) was assigned to the corps under Prince Bagration and after 20 November [2 December] moved along the coast road through Brahestad and Nykarleby [Uusikaarlepyy] to Vasa initially to join the detachment under Prince Golitsyn 5th. During the march, the provisions were always good; meat was issued every day, which had been acquired at a cheap price. Although the poor roads and fast-paced marches meant that the supply wagons could not keep up with the battalion, the men willingly carried four-day's of rations. According to routine, rest days were scheduled on every fourth day after three days on the move. Having covered more than 300 versta [200 miles], Major General Count Stroganov's brigade reached Vasa on 15 [27] December, and the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion settled into cantonment quarters in the village of Kvevlaks [Koivulahti].[38] At the beginning of 1809 this brigade moved to Åbo.

The march to Sweden over the ice across the Gulf of Bothnia in March 1809 commanded by Prince Bagration.

Emperor Alexander I, wishing to reach a speedy conclusion of peace, decided to move the theatre of war to Sweden and ordered the newly appointed commander-in-chief, General-of-Infantry Knorring, to set off on campaign via three routes: from Åbo to the Åland Islands, from Vasa to Umeå, and from Uleåborg through Torneå.

But Knorring deemed this plan unfeasible; the Tsar thereupon dispatched the Minister of War, Count Arakcheev, to Finland with imperative orders to move the forces across the Gulf of Bothnia. On 20 February [4 March], Count Arakcheev arrived in Åbo; Knorring repeated his arguments about the impossibility of getting to Åland; other generals were of a similar opinion. Prince Bagration alone did not think it hopeless. When Count Arakcheev asked him for his opinion, he replied: "give the order, we shall go!"

Preparations began immediately and a week later, on 28 February [12 March], units and provisions had been concentrated for the march on the Åland Islands.

The obstructions that Barclay de Tolly and Count Shuvalov envisioned for the crossing of the Kvarken and the advance to Torneå were removed with a similar energy.

By the end of February [mid March], the corps assigned to the Åland Islands was concentrated between Åbo and Nystad [Uusikaupunki]. It consisted of 30 battalions, four squadrons, 600 Cossacks and 20 guns. The infantry component included battalions of Lifeguard Preobrazhensky, Izmailovsky and Jägers; 1st, 2nd, 30th and 31st Jäger, Belozersk, Petrovsk, Pernov, Libau, Neva, Brest, Villmanstrand, Ryazan and Kexholm Musketeer regiments and a battalion of Veliko Lutsk Musketeers. The cavalry comprised four squadrons of Grodno Hussars, the Lifeguard Cossacks, an Ural *Sotnia* and Isaev's and Loshchilin's Cossacks, making up 15,622 infantry, 893 cavalry, 307 gunners, 155 pioneers, for a grand total of 16,977 men.

Command of this force was entrusted to Lieutenant General Prince Bagration. His corps was to form up on the island of Kumlinge and set off from there in five columns. The first four columns were assigned to march across the islands of Vårdö and Lumparland to Fasta Åland, while the fifth column was to proceed across Sottunga, quickly bypass the Åland archipelago to the south, reach the ice-covered part of the bay between Eckerö and Signilskär and sever the enemy line of retreat (see Scheme for the march on Stockholm). This fifth column was entrusted to Major General Count

38 The march-route for the Lifeguard battalions to Vasa was: Temmes to Martilla [*sic*], Lumijoki, Siikajoki, Brahestad, Pyhäjoki, Kalajoki (in two stages), Himango, Lento, Gamlakarleby (in two stages), Kronoby, Nykarleby (in two stages), Munsala, Oravais, Vörå, Lillkyro [Vähäkyrö], Vasa (C.W.M. register 152, Count Stroganov's report No. 15 and minute No. 3371).



Route of the main force.

Route of General Kulnev's vanguard.

SCHEME FOR THE MARCH ON STOCKHOLM

10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 versta

Stroganov;[39] its vanguard, commanded by Major General Kulnev, consisted of the Ural Sotnia, 200 of isaev's Cossacks, a squadron of Grodno Hussars under Captain Kirilenko, the second battalion of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment and two light guns. Its main body consisted of two battalions from the Belozersk Musketeer Regiment, the battalions from the Lifeguard Preobrazhensky and Izmailovsky regiments, four heavy guns and a half-company of pioneers.

On 26 February [10 March], Prince Bagration received orders to set off on campaign, and on that same day his units departed for the forming up point, Kumlinge Island. The soldiers were provided with short fleece jackets, warm caps and warm footwear. The columns were followed by a large number of sleighs carrying provisions, wine and firewood.

The columns formed up on Kumlinge Island throughout 1 and 2 [13 and 14] March. General Kulnev's vanguard (5th Column) was positioned at the southern end of the island.

All the columns advanced on 3 [15] March. The vanguard of the 5th Column captured a 17-man Swedish outpost on the island of Bänö at three o'clock in the morning. At around midday the Swedes wanted to retake the island, but seeing the approaching Guard Jäger Battalion, they hastily withdrew. On our side, one lower rank was killed and four were wounded. By evening, the vanguard had reached Stentorpa [Degerö Island].

On 4 [16] March, having reached Degerby, the vanguard captured nine gunboats set on fire by the Swedes and saved some of them from flames. From here the vanguard were supposed to go to the island of Flaka, but their guide deliberately led them under the Swedish batteries at Nordnes [*sic*, Haddnäs?]. General Kulnev immediately went around the Swedish position and forced them to retreat, leaving us with five 24-pounder guns and six falconets, one gunboat and six transport vessels. Kulnev pursued the enemy through Vessingsboda, Bengtsböle, and Knutsboda. The vanguard's outposts reached Öningeby.

On 5 [17] March, the vanguard set off at three o'clock in the morning and proceeded through Bemböle [*sic*] and Ytternäs to Cape Hammar [*sic*], where they paused for an hour in the snow. Upon approaching the island of Eckerö, Major General Kulnev sent the Guard Jäger Battalion onto the straits separating this island from Fasta Åland with several Cossacks, while he went around the south of the island himself with the cavalry. Having passed the southern tip of Eckerö Island, Kulnev noticed the Swedish army retreating in the distance. He initially dispatched Isaev's Cossack Regiment for the pursuit, and thereafter two squadrons of Colonel Hirsch's Grodno Hussars.

The Cossacks found the Swedish rearguard between the islands of Eckerö and Signilskär and rushed to attack them. The rearguard, marching in closed column, repelled the attack, but 260 stragglers and two mortars fell into the hands of the Cossacks.

At about five o'clock in the afternoon the Swedish rearguard, one battalion strong, having lingered for some time on the island of Signilskär, went out onto the ice once more and headed for the Swedish coast. The hussars who had arrived there by that time immediately attacked them.

The Swedish battalion formed square, with the baggage train and several horsemen in the centre.

The negotiations lasted for about two hours, while the vanguard infantry had not yet come up. Whereupon General Kulnev lined up his Swedish prisoners of war in several columns and led them across the ice. The commander of the Swedish rearguard, Captain Engelbrechten, mistook them for Russian infantry from a distance and immediately surrendered. These were a battalion of the

39 The corps order of march from Kumlinge, divided into five columns and two reserves, commanded by Lieutenant General Prince Bagration is in the M.S.A. No. 1644.

Södermanlands regemente, 427 men in total, and eight *Livgardet till häst* [horse guards]. The hussars took them to the island of Signilskär; one squadron had 50 horses, the other 64. Isaev's Cossacks were sent to pursue the Swedish army, which was retreating in disorder; by nightfall they had brought back 86 more prisoners. The vanguard could barely cope with guarding all the prisoners and was reinforced by the Belozersky Musketeer Regiment and another squadron of hussars sent to Signilskär island.

At 3:30 on the morning of 7 [19] March, Major General Kulnev with his entire cavalry, three squadrons of hussars, Isaev's Cossacks and the Lifeguard Ural *Sotnia*, headed across the Åland Straits to the Swedish town of Grisslehamn.[40] At 10 o'clock they arrived in front of the Swedish positions. The cavalry were unable to operate, but Kulnev dismounted the Ural Cossacks, and their skirmishers quickly drove the enemy from the woods they had been holding. The hussars were formed into a single line, some dismounted. Advancing between the piled-up ridges of ice, they appeared to the Swedes to be a force of 10,000. After a half-hour firefight, Kulnev sent a demand for their surrender; the Swedes ceded the town and a two-*versta* [1⅓ mile] radius around it to him. In the evening, Kulnev's forward outposts allowed Swedish *Generaladjutant* Lagerbring to pass through, sent to our commander-in-chief with news of the coup in Stockholm and that King Gustav IV had been deposed on 1 [13] March.

During the night of 7 to 8 [19 to 20] March, a strong south-westerly wind sprang up and the position of Kulnev's cavalry became perilous. The next day he received orders to return to Signilskär.

From 8 to 10 [20 to 22] March, Prince Bagration's corps set off on the return journey from Åland to Åbo.

This ended military operations in Finland and after the conclusion of peace the troops returned to Russia.

The return of the second battalion to St. Petersburg.

Colonel Potemkin's battalion returned via Lovisa [Loviisa] (11 [23] October) and Vyborg (24 October [5 November]) to St. Petersburg in early [mid] November 1809.

The life and service of the first and third battalions of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment from 1808 to 1809.

While the second battalion was participating in the campaign of 1808 to 1809, the first and third battalions of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment continued their peacetime routine in St. Petersburg, which found expression, as before, in the execution of garrison duties and training soldiers. The following were assigned to carry out administrative duties, daily: the Regimental Duty Officer; the Infirmary Duty Officer; the Regimental Guard of: one non-commissioned officer and 19 privates, one lower rank for the post, two orderlies for the colonel, four for chancellery post.[41] The regiment was busy on sentry duty almost exclusively and quite frequently for the Second Detachment.[42]

40 Kulnev's order of the day: 'God is with us! I shall be leading you, Prince Bagration is behind you. At two o'clock in the morning, assemble at the mill. The march to the Swedish coast shall crown all our efforts. Honour and immortal glory are the true reward of these waters! Have two *charka* [⅗ of a pint] of vodka per man, a piece of meat and bread and two *garnets* [11½ dry pints] of oats with you. The sea holds no fear for those who trust in God. Get some rest, comrades!'

41 Regimental orders for 1808 to 1809.

42 Schedule of sentries for the Second Detachment: to the guardhouse of the Military Collegium, to the Commissariat Depot, to the new Admiralty, to New Holland, to the Orphanage, to the regimental court of the Izmailovsky Regiment, to the Moscow and Narva gatehouses (Regimental orders for 1808).



Officer, non-commissioned officer and private of the Lifeguard Jägers, 1809 to 1810.

Following the example set in previous years, companies were sent to Pavlovsk to take up sentry duty whenever Empress Maria Feodorovna was resident there. Drill exercises proceeded as usual.

Grand Duke Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich vigilantly ensured that all regimental ranks were fully versed in their duties. Frequent amendments to the regulations were developed by him and, under his supervision, implemented in the Guard regiments, for which purpose frequent exercises were held in the Horse Guards *Manège* [riding school]. All officers were required to attend, otherwise they would face disciplinary action. The most common disciplinary measure against officers in those days was to be assigned a week of extra duties at the regimental infirmary; of course, they might also be sent to the guardhouse.[43] From 3 [15] June, the jägers had to carry out a new routine; from that day on, orders were issued every day to send a detachment of four battalions, two squadrons, and 12 guns from the units in the St. Petersburg garrison in order to defend the coastline closest to St. Petersburg.[44]

On 25 June [7 July 1808], the Lifeguard Jägers were ordered to have muskets with triangular bayonets, instead of the previous sword-bayonets, always fixed on parade, and thereafter the 12 rifled *Stutzer* that were in each company were ordered to be withdrawn from service. Every jäger private was to have a bayonet scabbard on their sword belt, while others were to carry swords with hanger blades.[45] On 14 [26] July, the previously used cylindrical backpacks were replaced with rectangular ones.[46] On 23 August [4 September], the number of non-commissioned officers in each company was determined to be 15 men while the number of musicians for the entire regiment was set at 25 men.[47]

No significant events occurred in the routine of the first and third battalions with the onset of 1809; they continued to serve, adapting to new requirements and changes in service routine. One of the most important orders issued by the military department was the publication of precise rules for paying military compliments.[48]

Changes in uniform and manning.

On 27 January [8 February] 1809, an invalid company was established for the regiment of six non-commissioned officers and 75 privates with one subaltern. Whenever the regiment went on campaign, this sub-unit would remain in barracks with the regimental heavy baggage; their main role was administration within the regiment. The formation of an invalid sub-unit was to include

43 Regimental orders for 1808 to 1809.

44 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 203, No. 816.

45 Viskovatov, part 14, p. 50.

46 Viskovatov, part 14, p. 51.

47 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 204, No. 1163. The composition of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment's orchestra was as follows: two bassoons; four *Waldhorn*; four clarinets; four flutes; two trumpets; one bass drum; one snare drum; one contrabassoon; one trombone; two serpents; one triangle; one [pair of] cymbals; one tambourine (C.C.L. volume XXX, No. 23582).

48 Excerpt from Regimental Orders dated 11 [23] January 1809: 'On every occasion, in order to preserve respect for rank among all military ranks, this order has been announced throughout the infantry and artillery as follows: all sentries are to present arms for all generals, also field officers and subalterns of their own regiments, equally to all field officers of other regiments, but only to those subalterns from other regiments who are distinguished by decorations; to shoulder arms for the rest; to shoulder arms for all non-commissioned officers, similarly for privates who have the cross of the Military Order of St. George or the Order of St. Anne. All sentries are to be called out to present arms for all generals, as well as field officers from their regiments, except for the latter on duty at the guardhouse, for whom sentries are to be called out to present arms only to the regimental commander and colonels from their regiments. For field officers of other regiments, only non-commissioned officers of the guard force are to be called out to present arms, while they are to be called out for officers (except for those in the guardhouse) but do not present arms at all. Gentlemen officers are to stand to attention in front of all generals when not on duty, both in the street or in any other place, raising their left hand to their hat or shako, except if this occurs in rooms where, upon greeting generals, they must face them, and every junior field officer or subaltern, without stopping on their way, must raise his left hand to his hat or shako.'

men from the Guard Garrison Battalion, the regiment's existing supernumerary lower ranks and those who had been removed from the Guard Invalid Battalion.[49] The training of the lower ranks continued as before; on 11 [23] April, it was ordered that battalion exercises be conducted no more than once a day in order to avoid exhausting the soldiers.[50] Orders were issued to pause these exercises between 23 June [5 July] to 7 [19] August and to release the men for private work.[51] The following changes occurred in the regiment's manning and uniform in 1809: On 7 [19] May, it was ordered that the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment should have the same number of field officers and subalterns as the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment.[52] On 8 [20] June, the plumage on generals' hats was abolished and a new pattern for embroidered lace-loops was approved; according to the new design, they were to consist of four thick wire braids, the two centre ones being intertwined like a rope. On 6 [18] December, field officers and subalterns were ordered to have shakos with flat gilded chin-scales (without plumes across the entire regiment). Generals were not to wear shakos. In the same year, canes and powder, which were still used by officers, were abolished. Officers and generals were permitted to wear undress double-breasted frock coats made of dark green cloth with a similar collar to the coat, only without lace-loops, with dark green cuffs, with a dark green stamen lining and with gilded buttons.[53] On 25 December [6 January 1810], officers were permitted to wear bicorn hats instead of shakos when off duty.[54]

In that same year, special attention was paid to improving the living conditions of wounded officers and lower ranks: on 10 [22] May, an order was issued to establish a home for the disabled in St. Petersburg for military personnel unable to serve due to wounds or injuries;[55] on 24 June [6 July], sick and wounded officers in hospitals were to be maintained at government expense;[56] on 25 August [6 September], the deduction of half pay from sick and wounded enlisted personnel for the time spent in hospitals was ordered to be cancelled.[57]

Nomination of Colonel K.I. Bistrom as regimental commander on 19 November [1 December] 1809.

On 19 November [1 December] 1809, the regimental commander, comte Saint-Priest,[58] was appointed colonel-in-chief of the 6th Jäger Regiment and Colonel Karl Ivanovich Bistrom was nominated in his place. Bistrom came from an ancient Baltic noble family and was born on 1 [13] May 1770. He entered Lifeguard service in the Izmailovsky Regiment in 1784 as a corporal and was promoted to sergeant in 1787. In 1790, Bistrom was transferred at his own request as a captain to the Neva Musketeer Regiment, and in 1796, to the 1st Jäger Regiment. Promoted to major in 1798 and lieutenant colonel in 1800, he was appointed commander of the 20th Jäger Regiment when it was raised in 1803. Karl Ivanovich, in the rank of colonel, participated in the campaigns of 1805, 1806 and 1807 and was present in every battle with this regiment. He particularly distinguished himself in the campaigns of 1806 and 1807 and was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th class, for his actions at Czarnowo. This was his first decoration. Bistrom received the *Pour le Mérite* from the King of Prussia for the battle at Pultusk; he was awarded a Golden Sword *за храбрость* [for

49 Regimental orders for 1809.
50 M.S.A. No. 265, p. 59.
51 M.S.A. War Minister's orders dated 27 January [8 February] 1809.
52 C.C.L. volume XXX, No. 23633.
53 Viskovatov, part 14, p. 54.
54 C.C.L. volume XXX, No. 24049.
55 C.C.L. volume XXX, No. 23637.
56 C.C.L. volume XXX, No. 23720.
57 C.C.L. volume XXX, No. 23808.
58 For Batyushkov's quatrain of comte Saint-Priest, see Appendix VI to Chapter 4.

valour] for Preußisch-Eylau, and he was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir, 3rd class and the Order of St. Anne 2nd class with diamonds for rearguard actions. Bistrom was shot through the right cheek in the fighting at Guttstadt. On 25 September [7 October] 1807, he transferred to the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment and on 20 December 1809 [1 January 1810], was appointed regimental commander.

Bistrom knew both the officers and the lower ranks of this regiment well. The traditions of the Lifeguard Jägers were well known to him, having served in their ranks himself, and his combat experience and skill in handling soldiers, demonstrated in previous wars, served as a guarantee that the efforts comte Saint-Priest had made to adapt this young regiment to the demands of service and discipline would not be wasted, but rather would develop; the regiment subsequently demonstrated this brilliantly on the fields of glory.

The basic principles of discipline and training for soldiers remained the same, only some details were changed in accordance with the requirements of the Tsar, who constantly monitored the development of military affairs. The year 1810 was particularly rich in explanations on training soldiers in target shooting. On 6 [18] September, Supreme orders were issued to pay particular attention to training the lower ranks in marksmanship, in view of the fact that 'skill at arms determines the merit and morale of the troops.' In this case, the following principles were proposed as guidelines during training:

1. To develop a passion for shooting in soldiers.
2. Officers must be well acquainted with this when training lower ranks.
3. No more than 10 men are to be brought out for training at any one time in order to avoid fatiguing the lower ranks, which is detrimental to the success of the cause.
4. After each shot, draw the attention of the lower ranks to the place where the bullet fell, thus giving them the opportunity to correct their mistakes.[59]

On 10 [22] September, this command was confirmed, with the addition of rules for position, aim and shot release:

> 'The most important thing to remember is that soldiers should keep the butt of their musket firmly pressed against their shoulder and cheek during the entirety of the shot; officers should not rush commands, so as to give them time to aim properly first.'[60]

Regimental service from 1810 to 1811.

The following year, in addition to their usual work, the jägers had to prepare *Hülse* [cartridges] with sealed-in ball, in order to replenish the reserve parks[61] and first-line recruit depots[62] with ammunition. This work had to be completed in a very short time period; for example, two weeks were given to make 266,078 *Hülse*. The materials needed for this work were received by the regiment from the director of the St. Petersburg laboratory, and finished *Hülse* were also handed over to him against receipts.

On 22 February [6 March] 1811, the battalions of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment were each reorganised with one grenadier and three jäger companies, and their designation by the surnames

59 M.S.A. No. 277.

60 M.S.A. No. 282.

61 On 16 [28] May 1811, orders were issued to prepare 266,078 *Hülse* by 30 May [11 June] 1811 (M.S.A. No. 282).

62 On 28 December 1811 [9 January 1812], the preparation of 290,000 *Hülse* was ordered for 20 January [1 February] 1812 (M.S.A. No. 282).

of their commanders was ordered to be abolished while they were to be referred to as: First, Second and Third battalions. First Battalion would consist of 1st grenadier company, 1st, 2nd and 3rd jäger companies; Second Battalion of 2nd grenadier company, 4th, 5th and 6th jäger companies; Third Battalion of 3rd grenadier company, 7th, 8th and 9th jäger companies.[63] Each company was divided into two platoons: the grenadier company consisted of the first platoon (grenadiers) and the second platoon (marksmen); the other companies were divided into first and second platoons. When forming up in battle order, the first platoon (grenadiers) were stationed on the right flank of the battalion; next to them, in order of precedence, were the other companies, while the marksman platoon took post on the left flank. Two platoons formed a division, two divisions, a half-battalion.

The same order specified in detail the posts taken within the battalion for both officers and non-commissioned officers, and which of the regiment's appointments were assigned to which company.[64] On 10 [22] June 1811, a very important order for successful marksmanship training was made, namely:

> 'It is recommend to commanders of divisions [pairs of platoons] that they order the training to be carried out with fixed bayonets, and sometimes also with live ammunition, because the men must be trained to shoot accurately in the same situation in which they will find themselves in combat with the enemy.'

Over these two years, the following changes were made to the regiment's uniforms:

On 10 [22] February 1810, flat brass chin-scales were issued for lower ranks' shakos instead of a side strap, and white cap cords were issued instead of coloured, while non-commissioned officers had with coloured tassels.

On 5 [17] September 1810, orange collars and cuffs were replaced with dark green ones piped orange; the same piping was found on officers' saddle-cloths and holster-caps; the orange edging between the two rows of gold braid was replaced by dark green.[65]


On 25 September [7 October] 1811, lower ranks were issued forage caps with an orange band. The companies were distinguished by the colour of the piping and a number on the front of the band.

---

63 On the occasion of the reorganisation carried out in the regiment, the jägers were ordered to have the following pompoms: First Battalion, 1st grenadier company - red for grenadiers, yellow for marksmen; other companies - white with a green centre; Second Battalion, 2nd grenadier company - red over green halves for grenadiers, yellow over green halves for marksmen; other companies - green with a white centre; Third Battalion, 3rd grenadier company - red over blue halves for grenadiers, yellow over blue halves for marksmen; other companies - blue with a white centre. Sword knots: First Battalion, 1st grenadier company - red body, crown and wreath for grenadiers, yellow body, crown and wreath for marksmen; 1st jäger company - white body, crown and wreath; 2nd jäger company - white body, blue crown and wreath; 3rd jäger company - white body, orange crown and wreath; Second Battalion, 2nd grenadier company - red body, green crown and wreath for grenadiers, yellow body, green crown and wreath for marksmen; 4th jäger company - green body, white crown and wreath; 5th jäger company - green body, blue crown and wreath; 6th jäger company - green body, orange crown and wreath; Third Battalion, 3rd grenadier company - red body, blue crown and wreath for grenadiers, yellow body, blue crown and wreath for marksmen; 7th jäger company - blue body, white crown and wreath; 8th jäger company - blue body, crown and wreath; 9th jäger company - blue body, orange crown and wreath (Viskovatov, part 14, pp. 24 to 25).

64 On the locating of field officers with battalions and companies: colonel-in-chief - with First Battalion, 1st grenadier company; commander of First Battalion - with 3rd jäger company; junior field officer, First Battalion - with 1st jäger company. Regimental commander with Third Battalion, 3rd grenadier company; commander of Third Battalion - with 9th jäger company; junior field officer, Third Battalion - with 7th jäger company. Commander Second Battalion - with 4th jäger company; junior field officer, Second Battalion - with 6th jäger company (C.C.L. volume XXXI, No. 24526).

65 Viskovatov, part 14, p. 55.



Grenadier subaltern, non-commissioned officer and private, 1811.

Officers were issued similar caps, but with a sewn-on visor made of black patent leather and without numbers.[66]

On 3 [15] November 1811, gloves were abolished for non-commissioned officers while they were allowed to wear mittens in winter.[67]

The orders from high command, one must assume, were quickly introduced into the regiments and were well assimilated, since line officers would have their capability for service tested after they had been seconded to the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment.[68]

66 Viskovatov, part 14, pp. 56 to 57.
67 Viskovatov, part 14, p. 58.
68 Regimental orders for 1808, 1809, 1810 and 1811.

APPENDIX I TO CHAPTER 4.

Regimental Order Of The Day, 22 January [3 February] 1808.

I order the gentlemen regimental field officers and subalterns to be present in companies in accordance with the following schedule.

Battalion and company roster for the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment for field officers and subalterns:

Prince Bagration's Battalion	
Prince Bagration's Company	Staff-Captain **Matsnev**
Lieutenant General Prince **Bagration**	Lieutenant **Andrzheikovich**
Captain **Chebyshev 1st**	Sub-Lieutenant **Zomov**
Captain **Chebyshev 2nd**	Ensign **Lanksoy 2nd**
Staff-Captain **Kologrivov**	Count Grabovsky's Company
Lieutenant **Plyuskov**	Captain Count **Grabovsky**
Lieutenant Prince **Bagration**	Lieutenant **Rall 3rd**
Lieutenant **Engelhardt**	Sub-Lieutenant **Rall 4th**
Ensign **Lanskoy 1st**	Ensign **Tolstoy**
Captain **Ofrosimov 2nd**, aide-de-camp	Bistrom's Company
Captain **Bogaevsky**, adjutant	Colonel **Bistrom**
Lieutenant **Gribunin**, paymaster	Staff-Captain Prince **Turkestan**
Lieutenant **von Loman**, quartermaster	Lieutenant Prince **Gruzinsky**
Turchaninov's Company	Sub-Lieutenant **Rall 5th**
Colonel **Turchaninov**	
Potemkin's Battalion	
Potemkin's Company	Sazonov 2nd's Company
Colonel **Potemkin**	Captain **Sazonov 2nd**
Staff-Captain **De la Garde**	Lieutenant **Svechin**
Lieutenant Prince **Khilkov**	Sub-Lieutenant **Andreevsky**
Sub-Lieutenant **Levshin 2nd**	Ensign **Yuriev**
Ensign **Naryshkin**	Riedinger's Company
Lieutenant Prince **Golitsyn**, adjutant	Colonel **Riedinger**
Prince Gagarin 2nd's Company	Staff-Captain comte **de Rastignac**
Captain Prince **Gagarin 2nd**	Lieutenant **Venyukov**
Lieutenant **Petin**	Sub-Lieutenant Prince **Cherkassky**
Sub-Lieutenant **Kasperov**	Ensign **Batyushkov**
Ensign **Repninsky**	

Comte Saint-Priest 1st's Battalion	
Comte Saint-Priest 1st's Company	Ensign **Shcherbinin**
Colonel comte **Saint-Priest 1st**	Voeikov 2nd's Company
Staff-Captain **Voeikov 1st**	Captain **Voeikov 2nd**
Staff-Captain **von Mengden**	Lieutenant **Penskoy 4th**
Lieutenant comte **Saint-Priest 3rd**	Sub-Lieutenant **Ofrosimov 4th**
Sub-Lieutenant **Levshin 3rd**	Ensign **Ushakov**
Ensign Baron **Bode**	Makarov's Company
Lieutenant **Levshin 1st**, adjutant	Colonel **Makarov**
Richter 2nd's Company	Staff-Captain **Uvarov**
Captain **Richter 2nd**	Lieutenant **Baryshnikov**
Lieutenant **Penskoy 3rd**	Sub-Lieutenant **Engelhardt 5th**
Sub-Lieutenant **Ofrosimov 3rd**	Ensign **Zagryazhskoy**

Signed: Colonel comte Saint-Priest.

From the regimental archives: Regimental Orders of the day for 1808, 1809, 1810 and 1811.

APPENDIX II TO CHAPTER 4.

List Of Officers Decorated For Distinction in Battle Against Swedish Forces, 2 To 3 [14 To 15] June 1808.[69]

SURNAME	Feats performed by them for which they were awarded a decoration.
Lieutenant **Svechin**, Lifeguard Jäger Regiment	In the first action, having been sent into the forest on the left side of the main road with the company he commanded, he swiftly attacked the enemy and, having driven them out of the forest, forced them to retreat across the river.
Sub-Lieutenant **Andreevsky**	In the same action, when attacking the enemy, his fearlessness in the advance was an example to his subordinates.

69 M.S.A. No. 1657.

APPENDIX III TO CHAPTER 4.

List Of Officers Decorated For Distinction Fighting Swedish Forces, 19 June [1 July] 1808.[70]

SURNAME	Feats performed for which they were awarded a decoration.
Colonel **Potemkin** of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, knight of the Order of St. George, 4th class, St. Vladimir, 4th class, and Golden Sword.	Commanded all the outposts along the lake shore and had already performed as an outstanding, courageous officer during the action on the night of 13 to 14 [25 to 26] June and was recommended by me for this action. In the fighting on 19 June [1 July], even in the vulnerable and isolated position into which his force had been directed, he always calmly made the soundest decisions and thereby contributed greatly to maintaining ascendancy over the enemy. The enemy, having already driven in the most important outposts and with some of our detachments being completely isolated with their three guns, were driven back and defeated everywhere by the skilful and prudent counteractions taken by him, which saved those detachments.
Staff-Captain **De la Garde**, knight of the Order of St. Anne, 3rd class, and Golden Sword.	Was initially forced to retreat by superior enemy forces that had enveloped his flank and rear, whereupon he decisively counterattacked the enemy with bayonets fixed and drove them off completely.
Staff-Captain comte **Chapt de Rastignac**, knight of the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class with ribbon, St. Anne, 3rd class, and Golden Sword.	Held the onrushing superior enemy numbers back with two companies from the Guard Jäger Regiment until he received reinforcements and thereafter the enemy were completely driven off by him.
Lieutenant **Petin**, knight of the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class.	Throughout this action, and especially during the final attack, by which they contributed to the fortunate outcome, they demonstrated outstanding valour, encouraging their subordinates through their own examples. Sub-Lieutenant Engelhardt 5th was severely wounded.
Lieutenant **Svechin**, knight of the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class with ribbon, and Golden Sword.	
Sub-Lieutenant **Engelhardt 5th**, knight of the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class with ribbon, and Golden Sword.	
Lieutenant Prince **Golitsyn**, battalion adjutant.	Sent to the most dangerous places by Colonel Potemkin and me with reports and orders, he also executed every instruction given to him with the greatest success and the utmost precision.

Signed: Lieutenant General Barclay de Tolly.

70 M.S.A. No. 1657.

APPENDIX IV TO CHAPTER 4.

List Of Officers Of The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment Who Served Under Prince Bagration During The War Of 1808 And 1809.

SURNAME	Feats performed by them for which they were awarded a decoration.
Captain **Ofrosimov** of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, my aide-de-camp, knight of the Order of St. Anne 2nd class with diamonds, St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon, Golden Sword, and of the Prussian Military Order of Merit.	I employed him during the Åland expedition and throughout the entire campaign, wherever there was risk, for important matters and movements, and his tireless work on the missions assigned to him, day and night, oblige me to recommend him as an outstanding officer.
Sub-Lieutenant Prince **Bagration** of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, knight of the Order of St. Anne 3rd class.	I employed him to good effect during the entire conquest of the Åland Islands, in distributing my orders, on these occasions demonstrating efficiency, diligence, and prudent, boundless zeal for service to His Imperial Majesty.
Auditor Titular Councillor **Tveritinov** of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment.	Having been with me from the very beginning of the Finnish campaign, he was employed throughout its entire duration, from beginning to end, carrying out the duties specifically entrusted to him by me; he has distinguished himself through his diligence, activity, and tirelessness, and in all fairness deserves particular attention from his superiors and due reward for his efforts.

Signed: Lieutenant General Prince Bagration.

APPENDIX V TO CHAPTER 4.

List Of Lower Ranks Awarded The Military Order From 1808 To 1809.

Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
Feldwebel Fyodor **Potapov**	11898	On 19 June [1 July], on the shoreline at the town of Kuopio, as in this and previous actions, that is, on 2, 10 and 13 [14, 22 and 25] June, setting an example for the jägers, he carried out every order issued to him with outstanding efficiency and courage, was in the most dangerous locations and kept the men in the best order. When Sub-Lieutenant Engelhardt 5th was wounded, he took his place, commanded the screen force and valiantly repelled the enemy with fixed bayonets.
NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS		
Sergei **Sergeev**	11899	On 2 [14] June, at Vipperi, he was sent as a skirmisher with jägers to serve as marksmen in order to shield the miners who were repairing a bridge; through effective fire they swiftly repelled the enemy marksmen who had been hindering the work.
Grigory **Ilin**	11900	Serving on a dedicated picket with the jägers, he bravely held back the enemy who were trying to carry out a landing and stabbed some of those coming ashore with their bayonets.
Mikhail **Shelintsev**	11901	He defended a gun that had fallen into enemy hands.
JÄGERS		
Vasily **Danilov**	11902	On 10 [22] June, on the shoreline at Kuopio, were first to eagerly rush forward against the enemy and defeat them severely, thereby setting an example to their comrades.
Vasily **Petrov**	11903	
Theodor **Parfenov**	11904	
Semyon **Karasev**	11905	On 19 June [1 July], on the shoreline at the town of Kuopio, he bravely defended his post, despite superior enemy strength, and although he was wounded, he held his position and repelled the enemy.
Gavrila **Bokanov**	11906	In every action they dashed fearlessly into the most dangerous locations; both by their example and through their vocal encouragement they inspired bravery in the young soldiers, through which they contributed greatly to driving out the enemy landing on the shore.
Stepan **Sokolov**	11907	
Afonasy **Takovkin**	11908	
Yakov **Bernikov**	11909	
Feklist **Artemiev**	11910	On 2 [14] June, at Vipperi, they were skirmishers

Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
Pyotr **Abramov**	11911	detached as marksmen in order to shield the miners repairing a bridge; through effective fire they swiftly repelled the enemy marksmen.
Andrei **Asafov**	11912	
Ivan **Filipenkov**	11913	On 13 [25] June, being on dedicated picket duty with a non-commissioned officer, they bravely held back the enemy trying to make a landing and stabbed some of those who landed on the shore with bayonets fixed, during which Koshkin suffered seven bayonet wounds.
Ivan **Koshkin**	11914	
Ivan **Kashirin**	11915	Together with three non-commissioned officers, he defended a gun that had fallen into enemy hands.[71]

71 M.S.A. Actions Abroad.

APPENDIX VI TO CHAPTER 4.

Konstantin Nikolaevich Batyushkov's poetry dedicated to his fellow officers.

The night action at Idensalmy is mentioned by Lifeguard Jäger Ensign Batyushkov in a poem dedicated to Lieutenant Petin:

O, beloved of the god of war,
My brother in arms!
I have paid many tributes
With you to the glory of God:
You, with laurels of myrtle
On your ancient shako;
I gathered forget-me-nots
In a quiet corner.
Glory's favourite, do you recall
The dreadful night of Idensalmi?
"Such fun is not to my liking"
Said I, and was away with the Muse!
Beyond the trees were you
Chasing Swedes with bayonets fixed,
While I, with heroic hands...
Was preparing your dinner.
You are blissful, my dear rascal,
Even in Cythera's embrace...

The Works of Batyushkov, St. Petersburg, 1850, volume II, p. 165.

The personality of comte Saint-Priest and the feelings he managed to instil in the officers subordinate to him may be judged from the following quatrain by K.N. Batyushkov:

From his homeland he was torn by Fate,
Yet true to Fleur-de-lis remained;
And in our camp he brought to life
The soul of Bayard and Du Guesclin brave.

The Works of Batyushkov, St. Petersburg, 1850, volume II, p. 211.

CHAPTER 5.

The Patriotic War of 1812.

Causes and events leading to the war of 1812.

Following the Peace of Tilsit, friendly relations between France and Russia were shaken by the weak assistance shown by the latter in the war of 1809 against Prussia [*sic*, Austria]. Napoleon saw from the actions of the Russian auxiliary corps that, while pursuing the interests of his nation, the Tsar was far from the mind-set of following his wishes to the exclusion of all else. Napoleon's irritation was further increased by Russia's failure to observe the Continental System as he understood it; the introduction of new trade tariffs at the end of 1810, disadvantageous to French trade, was interpreted by the *Empereur des Français* as a measure directed exclusively against himself, and this was his justification for the conscriptions of 1811. Besides these reasons for the cooling between the allies, there were also others: Napoleon's desire to restore Poland, the annexation of the *Hansestädte* [Hanseatic cities] and the territories of the Herzog von Oldenburg, whose independence was stipulated in the Treaty of Tilsit and, finally, the refusal of our Tsar to give his August sister in marriage to Napoleon. In anticipation of an imminent breach, both sides began preparing for war. The problems of the impending clash with Napoleon were obvious, so Emperor Alexander I nearly doubled his army; the most important fortresses were put into a defensible state, and stocks of provisions and live ammunition were assembled on the Dnieper, Dvina, and in the border governorates.

The inevitability of war seemed to be increasing, yet Napoleon nevertheless continued negotiations, wanting to gain time and to persuade Austria, Prussia and Sweden to form an alliance against Russia. He was mistaken only with the latter: on 24 March [5 April] 1812, Sweden entered into an alliance with Russia. Thus, we faced a fight not only against Napoleon, but also against an entire coalition. At the beginning of 1812, Napoleon began to gradually concentrate his troops on our western border; by the end of April, they were assembled between the Oder and the Vistula. Russian forces were concentrated near the border by that time; they were divided into three armies: the First Western (about 120,000), which included V Corps with the entire Guard, under commander-in-chief Barclay de Tolly; Second Western (around 45,000), under colonel-in-chief of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, Prince Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration,[1] and Third Reserve Army of Observation (40,000) under General-of-Cavalry Count Tormasov.

The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment sets out on campaign from St. Petersburg on 2 [14] March 1812.

In February 1812, the Guard were ordered to prepare for campaign service. The most active preparations began immediately and on 2 [14] March the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment set off from St. Petersburg for Vilna [Vilnius]. Before the march, communications were established with the heads of the governorates through which their march-route lay, regarding the dispatch of officials to accompany the regiments, the repair of roads and collection of information on the prices of food and fodder. On the day of their departure, Emperor Alexander Pavlovich reviewed the Lifeguard Jäger and Finland regiments, as well as the Guard *Équipage* [crew of the Imperial Yacht] (together they made up 3rd Guard Infantry Brigade commanded by our regimental commander, Karl Ivanovich Bistrom).[2] Having graciously thanked the men, granting them a *funt* [14½ ounces] of fish, a *charka* [4⅓ fluid ounces] of wine and a rouble per man, the Tsar, in bidding farewell to the officers, expressed his confidence:

1 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume I, p. 127.

2 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 121, No. 89.

> "That these troops will under no circumstances forget the title they bear, and as elite troops they will serve as an example to other units through all their brilliant exploits on the fields of glory."

A heartfelt "Hurrah!" was the Lifeguard Jägers' response to the Monarch's gracious words.[3] On that same day, the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment set off on campaign with 2,218 men.[4] The regulation supply train accompanied the regiment; the men had ten days worth of provisions in hard-tack on them.[5]

According to this regiment's route-card, the jägers were intended to arrive in Vilna on 15 [27] April.[6] A ceremonial march was conducted through every town along the way, observing the following routine: prior to the regiment's departure from its previous overnight halt in a town, the lame or not entirely fit men were left with an officer with the required number of non-commissioned officers; they set off as a sub-unit behind the regiment, passed through the town then rejoined the regiment; upon entering the next town, the regiment, company or sub-unit halted at the entrance; the commanders again reviewed all the men, and, separating the exhausted, left them with an officer and several non-commissioned officers in the nearest village or hamlet; by the men's choice, the files and platoons in the companies were sized-off, and only then would the regiment pass through the town in ceremonial march order; the sub-unit of the lame followed them some time later, as assigned by the commander.[7]

In early [mid] April, the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment was ordered to change its march-route and head for Tauroggen [Tauragė], where the regiment arrived on 10 [22] April. This change was made in order to secure food supplies for the units in V Corps,[8] which included the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment. The commander of V Corps was Grand Duke Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich. The jägers remained in Tauroggen until 24 May [5 June], and drill exercises continued here as usual, with particular attention being paid to target shooting. On 24 May [5 June], the regiment set off from Tauroggen via Suginty [Suginčiai], Malty [Moletai], Gedrojcie [Giedraičiai] and Pikieliszki [Pikeliškės] to the Verka manor house (near Vilna),[9] where it was deployed on 28 May [9 June]. Before the regiment's departure, they received orders from the Minister of War, which commanded them to take the greatest possible care of the men's health and not to put into action fewer than 22 files per platoon, otherwise any such regiment would be deprived of permission to have bands playing and the musicians would be placed in the ranks with muskets.[10] Upon arrival in Vilna, the jägers had to sell the *artel* carts and horses, because the commander-in-chief had forbidden them from accompanying the regiments.[11]

Although war had not yet been declared, no one doubted its inevitability and the general opinion was that there was only one thing left to do: defend oneself and resolve the matter by force of

3 F. Rostkovsky, History of the Lifeguard Finland Regiment, volume I, p. 89.

4 Seven field officers, 48 subalterns, 165 non-commissioned officers, 72 musicians, 1,801 privates, 125 support personnel.

5 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 580, No. 92.

6 For the march-route of the Lifeguard Jägers to Vilna, see Appendix I to Chapter 5.

7 War Minister's order No. 45 for 1809; History of the Lifeguard Finland Regiment, volume I, p. 91.

8 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 1, No. 17.


9 The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment occupied the following villages around Vilna: Bolshie Gumbiny [Gumbinės], Malie Gumbiny, Gospodsky château at Gumbiny, Vokazin tavern, Apekintsi, Boyari, Skertini, Bukishki, Lesniki, Vershuleshki, Dubovka, Dubovka tavern. The headquarters was in the Verka manor house (M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 1, No. 17).

10 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle I, No. 17.

11 They were purchased by the intendancy for the needs of mobile magazines: 14 horses for 2,757 roubles, and 13 carts for 1,040 roubles (M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle I, No. 17).

arms. As if to confirm this, orders were received to prepare one dressing, one compress and a half-*funt* [7¼ ounces] of lint for every four men. In addition, it was made known that Empress Maria Feodorovna had donated seven *pud*, 12¼ *funt* [264 pounds] of lint, 100 dressings, 100 compresses and another 10,000 *arshin* [1,944 yards] of bandage for units of the Guard.[12]

The regiment did not stay at Vilna for long: after an Imperial review and manoeuvres, on 4 [16] June they was assigned to headquarters in the village of Strukoitsy [*sic*].[13]



The Vilna campaign.

Meanwhile, Napoleon concentrated all his formations and on 12 [24] June, without any declaration of war, simply the issuing of orders to the army, he began to cross the Neman. The bulk of the French force (220,000) crossed the Neman over three bridges at Panemunė; a force under the *vice-roi* (80,000) crossed at Preny [Prienai] on 18 [30] June; while the King of Westphalia's force (80,000) concentrated at Grodno on 21 June [3 July]. At this time, the Russian armies were located as follows: First Army, with headquarters in Vilna, held a line from Rossieny [Raseiniai] to Lida; the

12 F. Rostkovsky, History of the Lifeguard Finland Regiment, volume I, p. 95.

13 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle I, No. 17.

Second, held the sector between the Neman and the Western Bug, with headquarters in Wołkowysk; the Third Army were stationed on the southern side of Polesia, with headquarters in Lutsk.[14] The significant superiority of Napoleon's forces and the division of ours forced Emperor Alexander Pavlovich to order the corps of First Army to retreat towards Sventsiany [Švenčionys] and onwards towards Drissa in order to link up with the Second Army, directed towards Vileyka. Napoleon's plan was to prevent the Russian armies from joining forces. As soon as news of the French invasion became known, the Guard regiments were ordered to assemble at Sventsiany; the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment also arrived there and settled down in bivouacs in line with the rest of the Guard infantry.

Although before leaving St. Petersburg the Tsar had ordered that each lower rank man be issued four *charka* [⅕ pints] of vodka and 1½ *funt* [one pound, 5¾ ounces] of meat or fish per week, the subsistence in Sventsiany was so bad and the difficulties regarding provisioning were so great that it was ordered that rations be collected through requisitioning.[15]

Due to the First Army's retreat towards Drissa that began soon thereafter, the jägers did not stay here for long.

On 23 June [5 July], the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, as part of V Corps, was stationed between Ugor [*sic*] and Zamoshie,[16] and on 24 June [6 July] moved through Ikazn, Milashovo towards the fortified camp of Drissa, which it entered on 28 June [10 July].[17] The fortified camp at Drissa was located on the left bank of the Dvina, in an angle or loop enclosed by it between the village of Bredziova and the settlement of Putri; this entire area had been fortified with three lines of redoubts.[18] The jägers were stationed here according to the '*ordre de bataille*': the Lithuania and Jäger regiments were stationed in the centre of the first line; the left flank of the latter adjoined a large ravine through which the Tseskevka River flowed. In the camp, the troops received abundant food, daily allowances of wine and meat; the soldiers built good stalls for themselves.[19] Here, by way of orders from higher command, huge reserves of hard-tack were being prepared, for the baking of which the regiments sent work parties to the headquarters. Having remained in camp until 1 [13] July, the Guard Corps crossed to the right bank of the Dvina on 2 [14] July and settled near the town of Drissa on the right bank of the eponymous river.[20] On 4 [16] July, First Army moved to Polotsk and onwards towards Vitebsk in order to link up with Bagration. They marched through Volyntsy and Sokolovitsy [*sic*]; on 6 [18] July, the troops set up camp on the Vitebsk road. The Jägers then moved through Obol-Ezuitsky [*sic*], Sirotino, Pogoreltsy [*sic*], and on 11 [23] July the entire army was concentrated at Vitebsk. The Guard, having crossed to the left bank of the Dvina, set up camp near the Luchosa River along the main Beshankovichy road.[21]

The march from Polotsk was very difficult due to the poor condition of the roads and river crossings; in fact, it was impossible to cross the Obol River at all, as only one small raft had been prepared. The incidental presence of a pontoon company got V Corps out of a difficult situation.

The retreat towards Smolensk.

The onset of a heat-wave greatly fatigued the soldiers, as a result of which they were ordered to

14 Leer, Summary of Russia's Wars, volume 1, p. 359.
15 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle I, No. 17.
16 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle I, No. 17.
17 M.S.A. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky's papers, No. 3.
18 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume I, p. 195.
19 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume I, p. 225.
20 M.S.A. 1835, Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky's papers, No. 3.
21 M.S.A. 1835, Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky's papers, No. 5.

take off their neck-cloths and unbutton their coats.[22] The regiment's ration resupply on the march was dependent on local resources, due to the fact that nothing was delivered from the provisioning department.[23] It was assessed that the unification of our armies might not take place at Vitebsk. First Army, having had no word from Prince Bagration, was obliged to halt there. In the early hours of 16 [28] July, news was received that Bagration's movement towards Mogilev had ended in failure and Second Army would be retreating towards Smolensk via Mstislavl.[24] First Army immediately set off in that direction in three columns. The Lifeguard Jägers, who were part of the third column, had set off from Vitebsk on 15 [27] July and arrived in Liozna the next day.[25] The day after the army's departure, intelligence was received that Napoleon, wishing to block the army's route to Smolensk, had sent his forces there. The expected unification of the Russian armies here made Smolensk an absolutely vital key-point, and therefore Barclay de Tolly ordered Dokhturov, who was with his and the Guard corps on the shortest route to Smolensk, to move there immediately by forced marches and to reach Smolensk no later than 19 or 20 July [31 July or 1 August]. Dokhturov's instructions stated:

> 'The salvation of the fatherland is now completely dependent upon our speedy occupation of Smolensk. Remember Suvorov's marches and mimic them. Send officers ahead to collect provisions from the nobles and population in exchange for receipts in order to ensure your food supplies along the way, which the government will repay with gratitude in due course. In order to unburden the troops, strive to collect the majority of peasant carts and order them to transport the knapsacks.'[26]

An independent detachment was formed from the following units in order to execute this order: Chevalier Garde, Lifeguard Horse, Lifeguard Jägers, Lifeguard Finland, a combined grenadier battalion, Lifeguard Horse Artillery Company and 2nd Light Artillery Company; command of the detachment was entrusted to Lieutenant General Depreradovich.

On the evening of 16 [28] July, having gathered the unit commanders, General Depreradovich said to them:

> "Although I am absolutely sure that each of us is ready to risk his life for Tsar and Fatherland, I have decided to warn you of our mission with the fact that if anyone does not feel strongly enough about marching into obvious danger, then it would be better not to join this detachment!"

Whereupon he ordered preparations for their departure, and everyone dispersed. The detachment left the bivouac with particular caution and in silence and set off on the march towards Rudnya. The move was carried out with such speed that when the detachment's cavalry reached a resting place, some of the infantry would arrive at the same time, and within an hour or two the tough Jägers and Finland Guards were already back up to full manning each time. They usually halted for three or four hours during rest-breaks, and after cooking porridge, they set off again. Despite the unbearable heat, the detachment travelled the 75 *versta* [50 miles] to Smolensk in 38 hours without encountering the enemy.[27]

On 19 [31] July, the Lifeguard Jägers and other regiments from the detachment reached Smolensk,

22 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume II, p. 293.
23 M.S.A. No. 1837(A).
24 Leer, Summary of Russia's Wars, volume I, p. 368.
25 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume I, p. 344.
26 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume I, p. 345.
27 *Russkaya Starina*, 1874, Zhirkevich's Notes, p. 643.

and the next day the entire First Army were concentrated. On 23 July [4 August], First and Second Armies united and stayed at Smolensk until 25 July [6 August], using these days to bake hard-tack and replenish the losses in the regiments from replacement and reserve units.



General-of-Infantry Barclay de Tolly, commander-in-chief of First Western Army.

Our stay at Smolensk was marked by an event never before seen in the army. The constant retreat from the border to Smolensk aroused grumbling, but moreover, in the act of abandoning large areas of their homeland to the enemy, the soldiers not only became accustomed to regarding the devastation of their native land with indifference, but even contributed to it themselves, reasoning: 'It is better to take it ourselves than to leave it for the enemy.' They did not consider it a particularly serious crime if they took something from homes or estates for themselves; this was the origin of marauding, for which there was no word in the Russian language. It reached significant levels at Smolensk, and the commander-in-chief decided to put an end to it by the

strictest of measures. Seven men were shot in the presence of detachments assigned from each unit in the force.[28]

The advance towards Rudnya.

The council of war assembled here decided to attack Rudnya as the centre of Napoleon's extended deployment.[29] At that time, the weakened French army was occupying quarters from Surazh and Vitebsk to Mogilev, a frontage of 200 *versta* [133 miles].[30] On 26 July [7 August], the combined armies moved from the vicinity of Smolensk and the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, advancing with the other Guard regiments through Shelomets, reached the night-halt at Prikaz-Vidra. On the morning of 27 July [8 August], the regiment, all ready to march, received completely unexpected orders to cross the Porechye road towards the village of Stabna. This change followed a report received by the commander-in-chief, which later turned out to be incorrect, about the presence of a strong enemy detachment in Porechye.[31]

V Corps stayed at Stabna on 29, 30 and 31 July [10, 11 and 12 August], awaiting intelligence on the enemy. Having received intelligence on enemy movements towards Vitebsk, Barclay de Tolly decided once more to attack, as a result of which the Guard moved through Shelomets to the villages of Volokova and Gavriki on 1 [13] August, where First Army took up positions on 3 [15] August.[32]

Meanwhile, Napoleon had concentrated 180,000 troops on the left bank of the Dnieper, between Rossasno and Lyady; on 2 [14] August, the vanguard of the French army reached Krasny, where Neverovsky's division had been deployed on 22 July [3 August] in order to secure the left flank of the Russian armies. Bitter fighting ensued here and Neverovsky was forced to retreat, yielding to superior enemy numbers. The subsequent Battle of Smolensk had the objective of holding this city until our armies could reassemble there, since otherwise they would be cut off from Moscow. First Army marched at a forced pace in two columns. The right column, commanded by the Tsarevich, moved through Debritsa, Prikaz-Vidra and Shelomets. That same evening, both armies concentrated at Smolensk, and here, following compelling arguments from Barclay de Tolly, it was decided to retreat. He entrusted the defence of Smolensk to General Dokhturov, who had 20,000 men at his disposal.


Participation of the Lifeguard Jägers in the battle of Smolensk on 5 [17] August 1812.

The fighting on 5 [17] August was limited to small arms and cannon exchanges until three o'clock in the afternoon. Napoleon was biding his time, hoping to provoke the Russian army into a pitched battle; when he learned that Second Army was retreating along the Moscow road, he immediately decided to seize Smolensk. The persistence of the enemy attacks forced Dokhturov to send a request for assistance to Barclay de Tolly. Barclay sent him reinforcements, including Prinz Eugen von Württemberg's 4th Division and the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, and ordered the Prinz to convey to Dokhturov that the survival of the army depended on his fortitude.[33] Upon arrival in the city, the Lifeguard Jägers took up positions between the city wall and the Rachenka suburbs; the Tobolsk and Volhynia Infantry had also been sent here and had to repel Poniatowski's attacks (see Plan of the battle of Smolensk). All efforts by Napoleon's forces to capture Smolensk remained frustrated,

28 *Russkaya Starina*, 1874, Zhirkevich's Notes, p. 647.
29 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume II, p. 67.
30 Leer, Summary of Russia's Wars, volume I, p. 371.
31 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume II, p. 71.
32 M.S.A. No. 1836, document 5.
33 Bogdanovich, War of 1812 [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips, Helion, 2024], volume 1, pp. 184 to 186.

PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF SMOLENSK

5 (17) AUGUST 1812



and every enemy attack was repulsed with outstanding valour. During the battle, Colonel Bistrom was tasked with defending the hugely important Dnieper Bridge with the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, supported by two battalions from 33rd Jäger Regiment and four Cossack horse artillery pieces, while the troops defending Smolensk were under attack from almost the entire French army. Despite swift attacks by Polish units, the jäger detachment drove the enemy back, causing them significant losses, and saved the bridge not only from further enemy attempts to seize it but also from destruction by French *Brandkugel*.[34] Having realised that it was impossible to take the city by storm, Napoleon restricted himself to a cannonade and brought forward 100 guns, with which he began to destroy Smolensk. By nine o'clock in the evening the cannonade had died down at all points. On that same day, Barclay de Tolly ordered Dokhturov to evacuate the city, which was carried out two hours before dawn, while the bridges on the Dnieper were destroyed in a timely manner.[35]

After clearing Smolensk, the First Army positioned itself on both sides of the Porechye road and, in order to better conceal their direction of march, began to retreat only after dark that day [18 August, new style]. At seven o'clock in the evening, once enemy attacks were expected to be highly unlikely, First Army set off in two columns. The first (right) column (which included V Corps), commanded by Dokhturov, proceeded through Zykolino, Poisklova [*sic*], Marshulki [*sic*] and Sushchevo to Prudishche, where they spent the night. Both columns reunited on 8 [20] August at the Solovieva crossing.

The retreat to Borodino.

Meanwhile, Napoleon had crossed to the right bank of the Dnieper and was following First Army with his main force. On 9 [21] August, First Army reached Usvyatie on the Uzha River. The position chosen by Barclay here was considered disadvantageous by Bagration, whose relationship with him had become acrimonious. In the early hours of 12 [24] August, the troops retreated to Dorogobuzh to a position designated by Bagration; however, Barclay identified it as inadequate, and therefore both armies retreated to Vyazma. The Guard, as part of V Corps, moving through Chobotovo and Semlevo, reached Vyazma on 15 [27] August, from where they set off the following day through Fedorovskoe to Tsarevo-Zaimishche, where they arrived on 17 [29] August.[36]

The grumbling that had risen against Barclay in Smolensk, after the surrender of this city to the French and as a result of the constant retreat, grew stronger and stronger. Barclay could not completely disregard the opinions in the army and sought an opportunity to give battle (even against his convictions); but circumstances had developed in such a way that the achievement of this intention became impossible. The soldiers' hostility toward their commander-in-chief was fuelled by the commanders themselves; for example, during the fighting at Smolensk, as the townspeople began to leave, Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich, in the presence of the troops, loudly said to them:

> "What is to be done, friends? This is not our fault. We have been prevented from saving you. The man who commands us is not of Russian blood. And we, painful as it may be, must listen to him. It breaks my heart no less than yours."[37]

It was unlikely that such speeches would reconcile the soldiers, who dreamed only of fighting the French, with their commander-in-chief, who was ordering constant retreats. Barclay soon removed

34 As reported by N.A. Ryleev.

35 Bogdanovich, 1812, volume 1, pp. 187 to 188.

36 M.S.A. No. 1835, document 5.

37 Russkaya Starina, 1874, Zhirkevich's Notes, p. 651.

the Tsarevich from the army under the pretext of the impossibility of entrusting anyone else with particularly important documents for the Tsar's eyes only. With his departure on 16 [28] August, General Lavrov took command of the Guard Corps. Tsar Alexander Pavlovich became aware of the troops' mood; while paying tribute to the service rendered by Barclay de Tolly, he understood that success in war was possible only with the army completely trusting in its leader. Therefore, on 5 [17] August, by Supreme command, a special committee was formed to select an overall Commander-in-Chief; Kutuzov was selected unanimously.



General-of-Infantry Prince Golenishchev-Kutuzov, commander-in-chief of all armies.

On 17 [29] August, the new commander-in-chief, Prince Golenishchev-Kutuzov, reached the army holding positions at Tsarevo-Zaymishche. After greeting the guard of honour he said: "How is it possible to retreat with such fine fellows!" Then, amidst delighted cheers, he rode round the units, and during the ride, an eagle soared across the clear sky and hovered above Kutuzov, and wherever he went, the eagle followed; the prince took off his forage cap, greeting the eagle as a harbinger of success, and exclaimed "Hurrah!" The regiments repeated the cheers. Word of Prince Kutuzov's arrival spread throughout the camp, and everyone congratulated each other on this sure sign of victory. Whoever could, hurried to greet him. A catchphrase immediately emerged: 'Kutuzov is here; the French are beaten.' His arrival at the nadir of daily operations raised fallen morale and revived a feeling of invincibility in the troops. Having inspected the positions they held, Kutuzov found them unsuitable and ordered a retreat.[38]

On 19 [31] August, the army set off and, on the same day, having passed Gzhatsk [Gagarin], spent the night near the village of Ivashkova; on 20 August [1 September], the retreat continued retreat to Durykina; to the Kolotsky Monastery on 21 August [2 September]; and on 22 August [3 September], they moved toward Mozhaisk. During these marches the regiments were brought up to strength with reserves brought up by Miloradovich.[39] On 22 August [3 September], the army entered camp at Borodino. They halted at Borodino simply because there were no better positions until Moscow itself, and Kutuzov had decided to accept the battle here, which public opinion demanded. The retreat by Russian forces over a distance of about 300 *verst* [200 miles] from

38 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume II, p. 200.

39 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume II, p. 210.

Smolensk to Borodino represents a most remarkable example of the maintenance of good order and discipline in the units. The enemy, following behind the retreating units, failed to capture either stragglers or wagons; the troops were not exhausted by the marches, thanks to the steadfast actions of the rearguard.[40]



40 Bogdanovich, War of 1812, volume 2, p. 101.

The Borodino position, 10 *versta* [6⅔ miles] west of Mozhaisk, stretched from the river Moskva to the village of Utitsa, on the old Smolensk road. Its front was protected by the Kolocha River, and its centre, partly by the Kolocha, and partly by its tributaries, the Semenovka and Kamenka streams, flowing through deep ravines. Within this area the position consisted of a series of hills. The left flank of the position was undulating ground, partly covered with forest and scrub. In the centre, near the village of Borodino, it was intersected by the new Smolensk road, while on the left flank, near Utitsa, by the old road; both of them joined near Mozhaisk.[41] Immediately upon the arrival of units on the position, its strengthening began through field fortifications. The village of Borodino was put into a defensible state. The strength of our army amounted to 103,000 regular troops with 640 guns; in addition, there were 7,000 Cossacks and 10,000 *opolchenie* [militia] armed only with pikes. Among the regular troops there were about 15,000 hastily trained recruits, such that the actual veteran soldiers numbered no more than 90,000. The right flank and the centre of the position were earmarked to be held by units from First Army, under Barclay de Tolly, while the left would be held by units of Second Army, under Bagration. The general reserve were to be stationed near the village of Knyazkovo.[42] The unit deployment was shielded by jäger regiments spread out to the front (see Plan of the Battle of Borodino).

On 24 August [5 September], the village of Borodino was occupied by the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment in order to facilitate the rearguard's crossing of the Kolocha River. Colonel Bistrom detached the third battalion with this mission commanded by Colonel Makarov, who, having deployed a screen force opposite the left bank of the river to observe enemy movements, sent the battalion adjutant Lvov to find several fords, since there was only one bridge on the rearguard's line of retreat. This mission was executed very quickly and successfully.[43] The rearguard of the Russian army commanded by Konovnitsyn at the Kolotsky Monastery was attacked by Murat's force on 24 August [5 September]; the *vice-roi's* flanking movement forced Konovnitsyn to retreat to the main position.[44] Having given the rearguard the opportunity to retreat quickly and without loss, Colonel Makarov continued to hold the enemy back. The first and second battalions were located behind Borodino and the bridges connecting the armies at this time.[45]

The battle of Borodino on 26 August [7 September] 1812.

Having forced the Russians to evacuate Shevardino, in the early hours of 25 August [6 September] the French army positioned itself on both banks of the Kolocha River, about two versta [1⅓ miles] from the Russian positions. Napoleon's total troop strength reached 130,000 with 587 guns. 25 August [6 September] was spent preparing for the imminent battle. On 26 August [7 September], at around six o'clock in the morning, the enemy opened fire, and two attacks were launched simultaneously: one on the Semenovsky flèches and the other on Borodino.

Taking advantage of the thick fog blanketing the surroundings of the marshy Kolocha, Delzon's division approached Borodino led by *106e régiment de ligne* and caught the Lifeguard Jägers in a surprise attack.[46] Colonel Makarov reported on this to the regimental commander. Having orders to hold the village for as long as possible, Colonel Bistrom ordered Makarov to delay the enemy. Colonel De la Garde, seeing an advancing column, rushed at it with desperate courage with the third battalion, inflicting considerable losses on the enemy; after this, the commander of the third

41 Leer, Summary of Russia's Wars, volume I, p. 387.
42 Leer, Summary of Russia's Wars, volume I, p. 388.
43 Bistrom's report, M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 124, No. 658.
44 Leer, Summary of Russia's Wars, volume I, p. 390.
45 Bistrom's report, M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 124, No. 658.
46 Bogdanovich, War of 1812, volume 2, p. 131.

battalion dispatched Captain Petin with the 3rd Grenadier and 9th Jäger companies to stop the enemy advance at bayonet point, which Captain Petin accomplished with remarkable courage, being wounded in the process.[47] During the ensuing firefight, a young jäger came into the village of Gorki to see the commander-in-chief and brought a French officer, whom he introduced to Kutuzov, handing over the sword he had taken from the prisoner. The French officer declared that when they were taking the bridge, this jäger had rushed forward, seized his sword, took it from him and dragged him away by the collar; that he had not been abused by him and he had not even demanded his wallet. Kutuzov immediately placed a St. George Cross on the young soldier, and the new knight ran back into battle.[48]

Having been driven back by an incomparably stronger enemy, Captain Petin, despite the fact that he had been shot through above the knee, rallied the companies and restored them to battle formation under heavy enemy fire and then attacked the enemy a second time with fixed bayonets, which gave the 7th and 8th Jäger companies the chance to fall back. Unable to hold the enemy advance back any longer, Third Battalion were forced to retreat behind First and Second Battalions, which had been arranged in combat formation by Bistrom and, having rallied there, were stationed in reserve. The commander of Second Battalion, Colonel Richter 2nd, engaged the enemy pursuing Third Battalion with heavy small arms fire, after which he charged with bayonets lowered; through this onslaught he forced the enemy to retreat with heavy losses, and captured several prisoners (including two field officers), and this helped Colonel Makarov to form up on the regiment. Second Battalion, while rescuing its comrades from trouble, almost found itself in a tricky situation, from which it was rescued by the resourcefulness of comte Saint-Priest. Seeing that the enemy had seized the bridge and were trying to isolate Second Battalion from First and Third, which were already under the protection of the batteries, Captain comte Saint-Priest 3rd, despite two wounds, was the first to dash at the French with his company with bayonets fixed and, having driven them off the bridge, ascended to the enemy held position; First Battalion, commanded by Colonel Count Grabovsky [Grabowski], were protecting a 12-gun battery and, despite every effort by the French to take it, repulsed them every time. The battery withdrew from its position and retreated under escort from this same battalion, having received orders to do so from higher command.[49] Under pressure from superior numbers, the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment was forced to retreat across the bridge over the Kolocha. The enemy, encouraged by this, raced in pursuit of the Lifeguard Jägers and crossed the bridge; but Bistrom, noticing that the French had acted too rashly, fell upon them with the Lifeguard Jägers and, with the help of the 1st, 19th and 40th Jäger Regiments sent by Barclay de Tolly, completely scattered the *106e régiment de ligne*, the remnants of which retreated in disorder under cover of the *92e régiment de ligne*. Bistrom's biography states:

> 'Anyone who witnessed Bistrom defending the bridge with the valiant Lifeguard Jäger Regiment at the Battle of Borodino, should they wish to inflame the soul and raise the morale of soldiers, would have no need to resort to the age of chivalry and need not seek a better example of personal bravery from the hoary past. An exercise in futility! There were equals, but none better. Bistrom revealed everything of himself that the brush of a genius

47 Colonel Liprandi in commenting on the History of the Patriotic War, by Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky states that the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment suffered greatly at Borodino solely due to a lapse of vigilance: that the soldiers were in a bath house when the French launched their attack (M.S.A. No. 1835, document 5, p. 477). This opinion is completely unjustified. Colonel Bistrom reported to the Tsarevich that he knew of the French offensive at four o'clock in the morning and made the appropriate arrangements (see Appendix II to Chapter 5).

48 *Russky Arkhiv*, 1885, article by N.N. Muraviev, p. 255.

49 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 124, No. 658; award nominations for 1812, bundle 10, No. 2.

might find, to paint and to present in praise of a noble warrior's soul faithful to the Tsar, with an utter contempt for risk to his own life.'[50]

The French advance had been halted by our successful destruction of the bridge over the Kolocha. The Lifeguard Jägers withdrew and rejoined their division. After a short rest, the Lifeguard Jägers were sent to the left flank of the position, where they stood under hellish fire until 11 o'clock in the evening. On this day the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment lost: staff captains Prince Gruzinsky and Levshin 2nd; Lieutenant Howen; ensigns Leontiev and Kisilev 1st as well as 47 lower ranks killed in action. Colonels Makarov, De la Garde and Matsnev; captains Petin, Penskoy 3rd, and comte Saint-Priest 3rd; staff captains Svechin, Prince Golitsyn (died of wounds) and Baryshnikov; lieutenants Levshin 3rd (died of wounds), Repninsky, Korsakov and Krivtsov; sub-lieutenants Khlopov, Frolov-Bagreev 2nd, Gederstern and Volkov; ensigns Zhilin (died of wounds), Baturin, Yermolaev, Strandmann and Shchepotiev were wounded. Lower ranks wounded or missing in action numbered 646; the total from the regiment rendered hors de combat was 27 officers and 693 lower ranks.[51]

We mentioned above that the French launched an attack on the Semenovka flèches at the same time as the attack on Borodino; a bitter struggle ensued here, and the flèches repeatedly changed hands. Under pressure from significantly superior enemy numbers, Russian units, having lost their senior commanders one after another, by 11:30 in the morning had been forced to retreat to another position behind the ravine near the village of Semenovskaya. During the final attack on the Semenovka flèches, a shell fragment had struck Prince Bagration in the right leg and lodged in the front of the tibia. Idolised by his troops, he wanted to hide his pain from them and overcome it; but blood loss exhausted his strength; he almost fell from his horse and was carried from the battlefield.[52]

We were also forced to retreat from this position and took up another, at long cannon range from Semenovskaya, where we held out until the end of the battle.

After the Lifeguard Jägers had been driven out of Borodino, the *vice-roi* crossed the Kolocha and led an attack on the Raevsky battery, which he captured only after repeated attacks. The French were soon forced to abandon it and Raevsky's force was relieved by Likhachev's division. The French were preparing to assault this point again, when the attack was unexpectedly paused; the reason for this was confusion among the French supply trains caused by the sudden appearance of Platov's Cossacks to their rear. This pause gave Barclay de Tolly the opportunity to reinforce the threatened location. Having reassured himself regarding his left wing, Napoleon ordered a resumption of the attack on Raevsky's battery. After a stubborn fight, with the assistance of cavalry, and artillery striking the Russian units in the flank, the enemy captured this battery.

The left flank of the Russian position was attacked by Poniatowski's force. Having pushed Tuchkov's corps back, he seized the high ground behind Utitsa village. The reinforcements reaching Tuchkov gave him the opportunity to go on the offensive and retake the high ground.

By six o'clock in the evening, the Russian army was holding a line a half to one *versta* [⅓ to ⅔ miles] from its starting positions, having yielded Bagration's flèches and Raevsky's battery to the enemy. These were the insignificant [territorial] gains from one of the bloodiest battles. The deeper meaning of the Battle of Borodino was that, although it was an atoning sacrifice for the surrender of Moscow for us, in essence it was the mutual massacre of two armies that were the equal of

50 Lukyanovich, Biography of Adjutant General Bistrom.

51 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 124, No. 654..

52 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume 2, p. 248.

each other, a massacre in which, in an apt phrase by Yermolov: ‘The French army smashed itself against the Russian.’



Colonel-in-chief of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, Prince P.I. Bagration is mortally wounded at Borodino, 26 August [7 September] 1812.

After dark on 26 August [7 September], Napoleon withdrew to the starting positions he had held the previous dawn. Kutuzov intended to attack the enemy on 27 August [8 September], but, having received precise information on the enormous losses, he ordered a retreat to a position selected close to the walls of Moscow via Mozhaisk, Zemlino, Krutitsy, Nikolskoe and Mamonova. The French army followed us a few hours later. On 1 [13] September, the day the new position was reached, a council of war was convened in Fili, at which it was decided to abandon Moscow without a fight.

On 2 [14] September, the army left the camp at Fili at three o'clock in the morning and, having entered Moscow past the Dragomilov gatehouse, moved through the entire city and exited via the Kolomna gatehouse. The decision of the council of war was kept secret and the troops learned of it only after entering the city. Despondency spread throughout the ranks of the army; the city presented a most sorrowful spectacle: the shutters on the windows of all the houses were closed, there were few people on the streets and these were in a hurry to run away, carrying their most treasured possessions. The army's march, carried out in surprisingly good order, resembled a funeral ceremony rather than an army on campaign. The sad and pensive appearance of the soldiers clearly demonstrated how painful the necessity of abandoning Moscow to the enemy was for them.[53] Having crossed Moscow, the army followed the Ryazan road and settled near the village of Panki.[54] The entire population of Moscow followed the army; after one day the ancient capital was deserted. Not a single soul greeted Napoleon; Moscow received him like a tomb.

The retreat to Tarutino.

On 4 [16] September, the Lifeguard Jägers crossed the Moskva River along with other army units, and took up positions at the Borovsky crossing; on 5 [17] September, the troops moved up the right bank of the Pakhra River to the Kashira road and on to Podolsk and Krasnaya Pakhra. On 9 [21] September, the army took the Kaluga road. The objective of this bold flanking march was to hold a position on the old Kaluga road that would shield Tula, Kaluga, Bryansk and the most fertile governorates and at the same time threaten the enemy line of operations along the sector from Moscow to Smolensk.[55] Napoleon had initially entrusted the pursuit of the Russian army to General Sebastiani; then to Murat from 10 [22] September.

Having learned of the enemy movement, Kutuzov assessed that it was a general offensive; concerned at being outflanked from the right, the commander-in-chief decided to exchange the position at Krasnaya Pakhra (where we had stood for six days) to one that would satisfy the above-mentioned conditions and be protected from being enveloped. A position was chosen near Tarutino, to where the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment advanced on 15 [27] September through the villages of Babenkova and Spas Kuplya.[56] On 23 September [5 October], the regiment entered the fortified camp and, along with other Guard regiments, became part of the reserve commanded by General Miloradovich.

The march to Tarutino was difficult for the troops; it rained constantly: it is easy to imagine the state of the country roads at this time of year. As for provisions, they were supplied, and if it happened that the convoys with bread were late due to bad roads, then either a double allowance of meat was issued, of which there was no shortage, or the regiment bought meat and bread for themselves. In extreme cases, it was permitted to take food supplies from peasants closest to the

53 Buturlin, History of the Invasion of Russia by Emperor Napoleon in 1812, part 1, pp. 299 to 301.
54 M.S.A. No. 1835, document 5, Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky's papers.
55 Leer, Summary of Russia's Wars, volume 1, p. 403.
56 M.S.A. No. 1835, document 5.

regiment's location, against receipts.[57]

The army remained in the camp at Tarutino until 6 [18] October, with Murat four *versta* [2⅔ miles] from its vanguard.

This period saw the widespread development of partisan detachments and guerilla raiding parties, which caused the French a lot of anxiety.

During the pause at Tarutino, our units got into good shape: they were replenished with recently arrived reserves, equipment was repaired, the men were supplied with footwear, felt boots, and sheepskin coats.

The awards for Borodino were announced here (see Appendices III and IV to Chapter 5) and cash bonuses granted to the lower ranks were distributed, five roubles per person, while the officers received a third of their salary. The lower ranks were issued a wine ration three times a week, or every day in bad weather. Baths were built in villages and on the river banks in order to rejuvenate the soldiers after four months of wandering in bivouacs. The days were spent training young soldiers and recruits, especially in target shooting.[58]

It was a completely different situation for Napoleon's troops. During their initial occupation of Moscow, the French were able to find food; however, this soon ran out, and Napoleon was left to subsist on the resources collected from the surrounding area. However, he faced strong opposition from the partisans and guerilla groups. Seeing his army in dire straits, Napoleon decided to enter into negotiations with Russia; but all negotiations were rejected, because Emperor Alexander Pavlovich resolutely recalled the phrase with which he had concluded a rescript addressed to Field Marshal Count Saltykov: 'I shall not lay down my arms for as long as a single enemy warrior remains in My Kingdom.'

Meanwhile, partisans reported to the commander-in-chief that Murat's vanguard was deployed without any security measures, as a result of which it was decided to carry out an attack with the aim of encircling the enemy. On 5 [17] October, the Russian army advanced in several columns, and on 6 [18] October, the Battle of Tarutino took place. The Guard formed the reserve for VI, VII and VIII corps, which were in the first line, and they were not committed in this clash. On 7 [19] October, a thanksgiving prayer service was held in the Russian army to mark the victory. The Field Marshal listened to it in front of the Guard regiments, where the icon of the Smolensk Madonna had been brought out.[59]

Napoleon learned of Murat's defeat on that same day and immediately ordered a retreat from Moscow. He decided to move along the old Kaluga road and, having crossed over to the new one, to push our army back to the south and thereby open up a free line of retreat for himself to the West. Having received a report on the emergence of the French onto the new Kaluga road, Kutuzov gave the order for the entire army to move towards Maloyaroslavets. On 11 [23] October, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the troops, having formed up in battle order in front of the bivouacs, set off to go left flanking. The main body, which included the Guard Corps, were sent via Letashevka, Ugorsky-Zavod and Spasskoe. The proceeded at forced march pace all night and the next day, 12 [24] October, were approaching Maloyaroslavets.[60] The Lifeguard Jägers, as part of the Guard, were stationed on the Kaluga road at Spasskoe, but, being in reserve, did not take part in the battle. The defence of the city was entrusted to General Dokhturov; the battle raged here from morning

57 F. Rostkovsky, History of the Lifeguard Finland Regiment, volume I, p. 127.

58 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume 2, pp. 139 to 141; M.S.A. No. 1892.

59 M.S.A. No. 1835, document 5.

60 Notes on 1812 and 1813 from Tarutino to the Battle of Kulm, part 2, p. 13.

onwards, and the city changed hands eight times before finally remaining under French control; but the objective had been achieved, the French offensive was held up until our entire army could be concentrated. The armies stood facing each other the entire next day.

When intelligence reached Kutuzov of French emerging at Medyn, the commander-in-chief, not wanting to let Napoleon get by and at the same time not wanting to take his eyes off the new Kaluga road, on 14 [26] October, moved the army in the direction of Goncharovo and settled near the village of Detchino. The army set off before dawn. The cloudy skies were illuminated by the pale glow of fires in the town of Maloyaroslavets; the soldiers marched in silence through the scrub along a country road; occasionally the silence was broken by the sound of a drum or the calls of stragglers searching for their regiments; few knew where they were going, but when they learned that they were retreating again, grumbling was heard in the ranks, the soldiers were saying: "It looks like we will be wandering around again, like at Smolensk." The next day, the second column of the Russian army commanded by Prince Golitsyn, which included V Corps, moved through Setun [*sic*], Durovko [*sic*], Redkino, Ustie to Polotnyanye Zavody,[61] while Napoleon had retreated to Borovsk. Thus both armies were moving away from each other: the French to the north, we to the south.[62] The army was stationed at Polotnyanye Zavody for two days. In the meantime, it became clear that Napoleon had begun to retreat along the Smolensk road. Kutuzov, not being completely certain of this, divided the army into two columns and sent the second column through Tolkachevo [*sic*] to the village of Adamovskoe, and from there towards Kremenskoe via Medyn. The commander-in-chief adopted the plan for a parallel pursuit of the retreating French here and the army was directed towards Vyazma; our main body moved towards Yelnya from here. The first deep snow fell on the final stage to this city together with strong winds. The Lifeguard Jägers had a rest day here [Vyazma] and, for the first time during the long, arduous campaign, went into quarters; the city, however, was completely devastated: houses without stoves, with broken windows, without floorboards, served as poor protection from blizzards and bad weather; of those that remained intact, even the sheds and bathhouses were occupied by headquarters officers. The soldiers lit fires in barns and threshing floors to cook food, breaking down roofs and fences; the fires quickly spread to the scattered straw and caused conflagrations in many places.[63]

The non-stop retreat along devastated roads, together with food shortages, had completely undermined discipline in French units. The soldiers were throwing down their weapons and dispersing in the hope of finding food somewhere. They were losing many stragglers with each passing stage. The onset of cold weather further disordered the enemy army, since the French had no warm clothing.


On 30 October [11 November], the Lifeguard Jägers, along with other regiments of the Guard, arrived in the village of Labkovo [Lobkovo]; on the same day, Colonel Bistrom received orders to proceed to the village of Klementieva [*sic*, Klemyatino? 25 miles south of Smolensk] with two battalions and to capture the enemy located there; this detachment was reinforced by a squadron of His Majesty's Leib Cuirassiers and a *Sotnia* of Tula Cossacks. The mission was carried out successfully: the regiment captured a large magazine and took one field officer, 18 subalterns and 1,650 lower ranks prisoner. From Klementievo, the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment moved to the village of Romanovo [*sic*] and from there moved on to the village of Golosovo [*sic*], where it rejoined V

61 M.S.A. No. 1925.

62 Notes on 1812 and 1813, part 1, pp. 15 to 16.

63 Notes on 1812 and 1813, part 1, p. 37.

Corps on 3 [15] November.[64]



The fighting at Krasny on 5 [17] November.

The next day [16 November, new style], V Corps advanced through the villages of Volkovo,

64 M.S.A. No. 1889, No. 380, No. 391, No. 397 and No. 406.

Khlamovo, Tolstiki [*sic*] and Malshevo in the direction of Novoselki.[65] On the march, intelligence was received of Napoleon's retreat from Krasny towards Lyady. Kutuzov, following persistent representations by the generals subordinate to him, agreed to attack the French on 5 [17] November at Krasny, directing the main attack towards Dobroe in order to isolate the corps under Ney and Davout as they approached Krasny. To that end, he ordered the V, VI and VIII corps and 1st Cuirassier Division commanded by General Tormasov to march on Dobroe; Miloradovich (II and VII corps with II and IV cavalry corps) were to wait at the village of Nikulino and, having let the enemy pass, to attack them from behind; Prince Golitsyn (III Corps and 2nd Cuirassier Division) were to attack from the flank from the village of Uvarovo.[66] The movement by Tormasov's column was halted as a result of news received that Napoleon was still at Krasny and had gone on the offensive against Prince Golitsyn. Kutuzov was wary of standing directly astride Napoleon's line of retreat and thus lost the opportunity to isolate a significant part of the enemy force. Napoleon had gone on the offensive simply in order to link up with Davout, after which he immediately began to retreat. Having noticed this, Kutuzov ordered Tormasov to continue the march which had been postponed for three hours.[67]

At the head of the force assigned to Tormasov was a vanguard commanded by Major General Rosen, consisting of the Lifeguard Jägers, Lifeguard Finland, His Majesty's Cuirassiers and Her Majesty's Cuirassiers and a light artillery company. This vanguard passed through the villages of Zunkovo, Sidorovichi, Kutkovo, Sorokino, Putyatino [*sic*] and Dobroe (see Plan of the Action at Krasny).[68] The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment set off at seven o'clock in the morning; the march was to be carried out swiftly and silently, with the skirmishers not spread out too far and were to operate mostly in closed columns with cold steel. The vanguard encountered many difficulties on their march, as it was necessary to rebuild bridges and repair the road; moreover, in many places they had to march almost knee-deep in snow.[69] A powerful cannonade had been audible from the direction of the Orsha road since early morning. On the way, orders to speed up were received via Colonel Shulgin, the Field Marshal's aide de camp. Having passed the defile of the village of Palkino [*sic*], the artillery and cavalry broke into a trot, the infantry broke into double time.[70]

Before reaching the village of Putyatino, the vanguard halted behind a small, narrow wood and deployed into battle formation in columns parallel to the main road between Krasny and Dobroe. Having emerged from the cover of the woods and unmasked his batteries, Major General Baron Rosen attacked the enemy retreating under cover of their batteries and several columns of infantry located along the road from Krasny to Dobroe. At the first salvo from our guns the French opened fire from their batteries, but their fire did us no harm, and they were soon forced to fall silent. At the same time, the Lifeguard Jägers advanced with drums beating; two squadrons of His and Her Majesty's cuirassiers struck the flanking column and, halting it, bought some time for the second and third battalions of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, commanded by Colonel Makarov, to close in and charge with fixed bayonets. The onslaught was so strong that the column, consisting of 1,200 men, was completely destroyed by the jägers and cuirassiers. A deployed screen of skirmishers from the Lifeguard Jäger and Lifeguard Finland Regiments, commanded by Lifeguard Finland Staff Captain Baikov, reached Dobroe, forcing the enemy to retreat. Colonel Bistrom committed First Battalion of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment and the entire Lifeguard Finland Regiment to the assault;

65 M.S.A. No. 1925.
66 Leer, Summary of Russia's Wars, volume 1, p. 433.
67 Leer, Summary of Russia's Wars, volume 1, p. 434.
68 M.S.A. No. 1835, document 5.
69 F. Rostkovsky, History of the Lifeguard Finland Regiment, volume 1, p. 140.
70 Notes on 1812 and 1813, part 1, pp. 50 to 51.

having reinforced the skirmishers, he occupied Dobroe.[71] The commander of the First Battalion, Colonel Count Grabovsky, was killed along with his horse during this attack; Lieutenant Tolstoy was wounded in the shoulder. Eight lower ranks were killed and 24 wounded. On this day, the victors captured 31 officers and some 700 lower ranks, nine cannon with ammunition caissons, two banners and many carts,[72] in which the marshal's uniforms and baton belonging to Davout were found.[73]

In the early hours of 6 [18] November, once everything had calmed down, Baron Rosen's vanguard were awakened by shouts from the sentries of: "Stand to!" the alarm was sounded. By the light of burning villages they saw crowds of enemy coming out onto the road. The Guard Jägers and the Finland Regiment raced to engage them, but at the first contact the crowd of Frenchmen fled.[74] As Baron Rosen approached the village of Sinyaki, he learned that it was occupied by the enemy; the darkness of the night made it impossible to dislodge them from there. The forward outposts soon reported that the village had been abandoned and orders were issued for it to be occupied by two companies from the Lifeguard Finland Regiment. As they were leaving Sinyaki, the French set fire to the village, which created an opportunity to pursue them and cut off a part of the retreating force for a second time in the village of Boyaritsy [Boyarintsevo]. Two companies of Lifeguard Jägers and two companies of Lifeguard Finland sent to seize this village, were halted by the enemy, who began to defend themselves with smalls arms fire, but the jägers, despite the fire, broke into the village and everyone that remained there was captured. The French fled towards Leshchy [*sic*] and, having crossed the river, were forced to abandon their trains, which went to the victors. During the pursuit from Dobroe to Leshchy, 15 officers, more than 1,000 lower ranks and three guns were captured and many were killed, both on the road and in the village. On our side, just four jägers were wounded.[75] In pursuing the retreating enemy, Baron Rosen's detachment reached Lyady on the evening of 7 [19] November. Appreciating the distinction shown by the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment in these actions, the Sovereign Emperor awarded the regimental commander the Order of St. George, 3rd class; every officer under his command was also rewarded (see Appendix V to Chapter 5).

At this time, General Yermolov suggested to the field marshal that he strengthen this detachment and place it under his command. As Yermolov recalled:

> 'He listened to me particularly favourably, expressed his consent, and an amendment was immediately made to the composition of the detachment. The Lifeguard Jäger and Lifeguard Finland Regiments, His and Her Majesties' Cuirassier Regiments, the Guards Foot Artillery and the Horse Artillery Battery Company came under my command. The infantry battalions, 12 in number, had the field guns attached to them.'[76]

Kutuzov intended to pursue the enemy, retreating in disarray and disordered by the losses at Krasny, directly from behind with this significant detachment, commanded by one of the best generals. By order of the Field Marshal, Yermolov was to plan his movements so as to always be ready to operate in support of Count Platov's detachment,[77] which had intended to intercept the

71 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 1, No. 17, Baron Rosen's report.

72 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 1, No. 17, Bistrom's report.

73 Baron Rosen's report to the Tsarevich and notes from 1812 and 1813 state that the baton went to the Lifeguard Jägers. But this misunderstanding is fully clarified in the History of the Lifeguard Finland Regiment: Davout's baton was a Finland Regiment trophy.

74 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1812, volume 4, p. 20.

75 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 1, No. 17, Baron Rosen's report to the Tsarevich.

76 A.P. Yermolov's notes.

77 *Russkaya Starina*, 1877, p. 617.

enemy at the Dubrowna crossing or at Orsha, but did not manage to forestall them.[78] Having joined his detachment, Yermolov immediately set them on a forced march towards Dubrowna. When Yermolov arrived there and, in fulfilling the orders issued to him, wanted to establish communications with Platov on the right bank of the Dnieper, he was forced to halt and wait for the crossing to be repaired. Having learned that the destroyed bridge at Dubrowna had originally been built by one of the town's residents under the direction of a French officer, General Yermolov forced him to repair the bridge, supplying him with the chains and ropes needed for this construction from the artillery and regimental trains, and remained almost constantly on this task for a day and a half. Once the bridge was reopened, the infantry moved forward without stopping; the guns were manhandled across thick planks laid along the bridge. The horses had to be dragged backwards, their legs in restraints and laid on their sides, as the bridge beneath them, shaking every minute, threatened to collapse. As soon as the troops had crossed, Yermolov hastened to link up with Platov, while the ice floes building up on the Dnieper destroyed the bridge, as a result of which all the supply trains, some of the cartridge caissons and all the provisions wagons remained on the main road, on the wrong side of the river, and were subsequently directed straight towards Orsha.[79]

The advance to the Berezina.

On the march to Tolochin, Yermolov received orders from the commander-in-chief to halt there and, after waiting for Miloradovich, to march together after the enemy along the main road towards Borisov. But Yermolov, having learned from reports that Victor's corps was still holding at Chereya, considered it essential to continue the advance and reported to Kutuzov that they had only received these orders after the detachment had passed Tolochin, even though he was still a whole stage from there. Platov agreed to confirm this report and, for his part, argued that he needed infantry support in the vast Minsk forests, thus he had urged Yermolov to proceed with his detachment.[80] Yermolov linked up with Platov's detachment beyond Orsha and they pushed on together, hot on the heels of the enemy rearguard.

The French had retreated from the town of Barany to Bobr so quickly that we could barely keep up with them. Along this route, the jägers were marching through a conflagration across damaged bridges, where they often dashed over smouldering beams or forded. Snowstorms and blizzards obscured the trail of the fleeing enemy; but the detonation of ammunition caissons and the chests of dead bodies and fallen horses indicated their route. Cannon and vehicles were being abandoned, and in some places there were so many of them that they even blocked the way. Every town, village, manor and tavern on each stage was a smoking heap of ash; the only visible features were bare, sooty chimneys, discarded weapons and crowds of exhausted men around dying fires. Yermolov's infantry were suffering from an extreme shortage of provisions; soldiers, officers and generals were all in a similar situation; there was not even a single hard-tack in their knapsacks, not a drop of wine in their canteens; their baggage lagged behind at river crossings, where it was usually held back to make way for the artillery. If some jäger happened to find a few potatoes during a halt, everyone would rush to the site. But the jägers were not always so fortunate; soon they could not find even potatoes; then a few handfuls of rye or oats, steamed in snow melt water, served as a meal for them. Over seven days, the troops had hard tack for only two; yet despite the shortcomings they suffered, no grumbling was heard.[81]

78 Bogdanovich, 1812, volume 3, p. 110.
79 Bogdanovich, 1812, volume 3, p. 112; Yermolov's notes, part 1, pp. 256 to 257.
80 Bogdanovich, 1812, volume 3, p. 114.
81 Notes on 1812 and 1813, part 1, pp. 75 to 77.

Pursued by Platov's and Ermolov's detachments, Napoleon hurried on towards Borisov, believing that Dąbrowski was holding the Berezina bridgehead fortifications.

Napoleon had been in Tolochin when he received word of Borisov's seizure by Chichagov. Having decided to make an opposed crossing, he ordered Oudinot to retake Borisov at any cost. Oudinot carried out his orders, defeating the Russian vanguard at Loshnitsa, and took Borisov; the retreating Russian force managed to demolish the bridge. The loss of the left [eastern] bank of the Berezina put Chichagov in a difficult position: he had to guess where the French would make their crossing; Oudinot's skilful deception misled him, and Chichagov moved his main body towards Shabashevichi, while the French began preparing to cross at Studyanka. On 14 [26] November, the first bridge was ready and units under Oudinot and Ney began to cross and occupy the Stakhov forest. The next day 15,000 Frenchmen were assembled there; on our side there was only a weak detachment under Chaplits [Czaplic]. Having learned that there were no French downstream of Borisov, Chichagov moved his forces towards Stakhov; at the same time, Wittgenstein's army began to approach Borisov from the north.

Yermolov reached the village of Loshnitsa late in the evening of 15 [27] November. The Lifeguard Jägers rested for a few hours here, after which they moved forward again and, without taking a break along the way, were approaching Borisov well before noon [28 November, new style]. The reconstruction of the crossing began immediately. Temporary bridges on trestles were built across the Berezina River and its tributaries, covered with wet straw; the frost hardened this covering. The infantry could cross easily, but the crossing of artillery and ammunition caissons was not without risk.[82] Having got his detachment across, Yermolov moved up behind Chichagov and reached the village of Stakhov, where he occupied nearby high ground.

On 16 [28] November, Chichagov and Wittgenstein decided to launch a joint attack on the enemy along both banks of the river. The Lifeguard Jägers did not take part in the fighting here, as Yermolov's detachment was in reserve for the Army of the Danube. The Battle of the Berezina was very bloody; the enemy army in particular suffered heavy losses: it was almost entirely destroyed (only 9,000 remained out of 36,000). Despite this, Emperor Alexander Pavlovich's plan was not fully achieved; we failed to block Napoleon's exit,[83] and he found himself with a few cadres from which to form a new army; as a result, the war would continue into 1813 and 1814.

The march on Vilna and crossing the Russian border.

That same night the French retreated towards Zanivki [*sic*], a small village located in the forest right by the junction of a country lane and the Zembin to Vilna road. Napoleon stopped to spend the night in this village, with his *Garde* stationed nearby. Yermolov's detachment moved forward through the forest and halted not far from the forward enemy campfires. The Lifeguard Jägers were still suffering from a shortage of food; having already spent two days surviving on boiled rye alone, they had to spend this night in the Stakhov forest without any food at all, among the burning pines. The next day, Platov sent several bulls and some vodka to the Jäger Brigade, for which the soldiers shouted a joyful 'Hurrah!' However, there was still no bread and the jägers had a hard time getting it from the soldiers of Chichagov's army in exchange for meat and vodka. It was only on the third day after the battle that the stragglers turned up. General Chaplits was entrusted with pursuing the retreating French; he was followed by Chichagov and Platov.

The Lifeguard Jägers, as part of Yermolov's detachment, having stayed for a day at the site of the battle, were to go along the same road one stage behind Chichagov in order to facilitate

82 A.P. Yermolov's notes, part 1, p. 261.

83 Leer, Summary of Russia's Wars, volume 1, pp. 441 to 448.

provisioning and to avoid the overcrowding of units through the defiles of the Gajna swamps. It was not until 18 [30] November that the detachment emerged from the Stakhov forest, littered with ours and enemy soldiers' corpses.[84]

The enemy tried to delay our movements as much as possible, destroying bridges and burning villages. Upon reaching Molodechno, the jägers were granted a rest day.[85] Continuing the pursuit of the retreating enemy through Smorgon and Oshmyany, the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment reached Vilna on 29 November [11 December].[86]

After continuous bivouacs, isolated clashes and forced marches amid blizzards, storms and ruined towns, the sight of a city that had survived the desolation delighted our weary army. Yermolov's detachment ran through the Ostrobramsky Gate with joyful cheering, and formed up on the square in front of the city hall. The jägers performed a ceremonial march-past for the commander-in-chief. In spite of the hardships that they had endured, the Guard Jäger Brigade presented a military and orderly bearing. Courage was written on their faces, darkened by smoke and with overgrown beards: it seemed that their bayonets were blackened with enemy blood. Even their greatcoats, riddled with bullets and scorched by bivouac fires, recalled battles and wintery forced marches.[87] Following the parade, the jägers dispersed to their assigned quarters on Zamkov and Nemetsky Streets.[88]


Yermolov's detachment was disbanded in Vilna and the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment was returned to V Corps, which arrived in the city on 5 [17] December; our main forces were gradually converging on Vilna.

In recognition of the services rendered by our regiment throughout the Patriotic War, the Sovereign Emperor Alexander Pavlovich congratulated the regiment on receiving St. George's Colours upon his arrival in Vilna. Our inseparable comrades, the Lifeguard Finland Regiment, were awarded the same honour.

During their stay, the regiment was replenished with manpower from replacement battalions,[89] uniforms and equipment were put in order, and soon the Guard was ordered to prepare for departure for the border.[90]

By 17 [29] December, not a single armed foe remained in Russia. The Tsar's grand decision had been achieved, but at the same time the Emperor made a new decision to transfer the war to the territories of Western Europe.[91] On 28 December [9 January, 1813], the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment set off from Vilna for Merecz [Merkinė] via Gobsht [Guopstos], Lipunen [Lieponys] and Orany [Varėna].[92] The Guard Jäger Brigade followed one stage behind V Corps; it arrived in Merecz on 1 [13] January 1813.[93]

84 Notes on 1812 and 1813, part 1, p. 105.
85 A.P. Yermolov's notes, part 1, p. 268.
86 A.P. Yermolov's notes, part 1, p. 271.
87 Notes on 1812 and 1813, part 1, p. 131.
88 Notes on 1812 and 1813, part 1, p. 129.
89 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 1, p. 279.
90 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 1, p. 397.
91 Leer, Summary of Russia's Wars, volume 1, p. 453.
92 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 1, p. 397.
93 M.S.A. No. 1889, No. 826.



Field officer, jäger, grenadier company officer and private, Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, 1812 to 1814.

APPENDIX I TO CHAPTER 5.

March-Route of the Lifeguard Jägers from St. Petersburg to Vilna, March to April 1812.

1 [13] March	St. Petersburg	24 March [5 April]	Bomatovo [Bolgatovo]
2 [14] March	Tsarskoe Selo	25 March [6 April]	Rest day
3 [15] March	Gatchina	26 March [7 April]	Opochka
4 [16] March	Rozhestveno	27 March [8 April]	Smagi [*sic*]
5 [17] March	Rest day	28 March [9 April]	Sebezh
6 [18] March	Sorochkino	29 March [10 April]	Rest day
7 [19] March	Dolgovka	30 March [11 April]	Lyakhova [*sic*]
8 [20] March	Luga	31 March [12] April	Zamoshie [*sic*]
9 [21] March	Rest day	1 [13] April	Rasitsy [Rositsa]
10 [22] March	Gorodets	2 [14] April	Rest day
11 [23] March	Zapole	3 [15] April	Druya
12 [24] March	Veleni	4 [16] April	Cherneva [Chernevo]
13 [25] March	Rest day	5 [17] April	Broslavl [Braslaw]
14 [26] March	Borovichi	6 [18] April	Rest day
15 [27] March	Porkhov	7 [19] April	Opsa
16 [28] March	Golodusha [*sic*]	8 [20] April	Vidzy
17 [29] March	Rest day	9 [21] April	Daugieliszki [Daugėliškis]
18 [30] March	Sorokino	10 [22] April	Rest day
19 [31] March	Knyazhevo [*sic*]	11 [23] April	Sventsiany [Švenčionys]
20 March [1 April]	Ivanovo [*sic*]	12 [24] April	Powiewiórka [Pavoverė]
21 March [2 April]	Rest day	13 [25] April	Niemenczyn [Nemenčinė]
22 March [3 April]	Novorzhev	14 [26] April	Rest day
23 March [4 April]	Sakharevo [*sic*]	15[27] April	Vilna

M.B. minutes of the Minister of War's General Chancellery, register 153, bundle 23, No. 1186.

APPENDIX II TO CHAPTER 5.

Colonel Bistrom's Report to General Lavrov, Dated 31 August [12 September] 1812.

'To the Divisional Commander, Lieutenant General and Chevalier Lavrov.

Colonel Bistrom reports:

Having received on the 23rd of this month (August) an order from the Honourable Commander-in-Chief of First Army, General-of-Infantry Barclay de Tolly to hold the village of Borodino with the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment entrusted to me by His Majesty, in order to facilitate the crossing of the rearguard over the river, I detached Third Battalion commanded by Colonel Makarov to maintain a screen facing the left bank of the river and to observe enemy movements and activity, as a result of which, in order to facilitate the safe and speedy withdrawal of the rearguard, which could only fall back across a single bridge, Colonel Makarov detached Battalion Adjutant Lvov to find fords, which was very efficiently and quickly accomplished by which the Lifeguard Cossack Regiment and some of the cavalry crossed down the left side of the village of Borodino, while the rest of the cavalry and the Izyum Hussar Regiment commanded by Major General Vsevolodsky crossed to the right, leaving the bridge for the artillery and other regimental heavy baggage alone, thus the entire rearguard was able to enter the army's general position without the slightest loss; the other two battalions were located behind me behind the village near the bridges connecting the armies.

Colonel Makarov reported to me at four o'clock in the morning on 26 August [7 September] that the enemy were about to descend on the right side of the village in two columns, roughly 8,000 strong, having received orders from the Commander-in-Chief of First Western Army to hold the village with my regiment for as long as possible, as a result of which I ordered Colonel Makarov to hold it at the outset, in pursuance of which he dispatched Captain Petin with the 3rd Grenadier and 9th Jäger companies to attack the enemy with fixed bayonets, but they were driven off by superior enemy numbers. Then, seeing the impossibility of resisting such a numerous enemy, that battalion was forced to fall back on the First and Second, which I had arranged in battle order, and there, having rallied, they remained in reserve for them. Second Battalion, commanded by Colonel Richter 2nd, went in pursuit of the enemy, Third Battalion engaged the enemy with strong small arms fire and I sent out marksmen from First Battalion under Staff Captain Rall 3rd's command, who had greatly assisted the withdrawal of Third Battalion and the enemy were forced to fall back. Whereupon the enemy launched another attack, but were engaged at bayonet point by Second Battalion commanded by Colonel Richter 2nd, who raced forwards and set an example to his subordinates with his personal bravery, through which he forced the enemy to yield a second time to their courageous resistance, with great loss and a certain number of prisoners, among whom were two field officers, leaving their killed and wounded on the ground; First Battalion under Colonel Count Grabovsky's command was used by me to protect a 12-gun battery, which the enemy made attempts upon several times, but thanks to the courage and perfect deployment of that battalion, they were repulsed every time with heavy losses, where Captain Bogaevsky and Staff Captain Andreevsky contributed to this success, and the battery, under escort from Captain Grabovsky's battalion, withdrew without harm on the orders of higher command.

Your Excellency, although fearlessness and diligence in the service of His Majesty were common, nevertheless some of the gentlemen officers, upon receipt of orders from the honourable battalion commanders, were particularly worthy of the Monarch's regard, such as: battalion commanders Colonels Makarov, Count Grabovsky, Richter 2nd, De la Garde, who greatly contributed with advice on the actions by Third Battalion, Captain Petin and Staff Captain Baryshnikov, on the

recommendation of Colonel Richter 2nd. Captain Count Saint-Priest 3rd was the first to race onto the bridge and thus set a courageous example for his subordinates. Captain Penskoy 4th and Lieutenant Suchtelen valiantly drove off enemy attacks with the sub-units entrusted to them; Lieutenant Tolstoy 2nd, sub-lieutenants Arbuzov, Meftodovsky, ensigns Nesterov, Kiselev 2nd, and sub-lieutenants Balkashin and Georgian Tsarevich Ilya, attached to Second Battalion from First Battalion's 3rd Jäger Company; battalion adjutant Lieutenant Repninsky, despite receiving two wounds, remained in combat until he was seriously wounded a third time. Lieutenant Prince Kozlovsky 2nd was cut off from Third Battalion and joined the Second, conducting himself valiantly, in the word of the latter's commander. Count Voinovich and Sub-Lieutenant Tolmechev contributed greatly to the rallying of Third Battalion, which had been disordered by withering enemy fire. According to the recommendations of battalion commander, Colonel Count Grabovsky, Lieutenant Bistrom, who was with the skirmishers, sub-lieutenants Bublik and Chernyshev, Ensign Yermolaev, and Lieutenant Lieders, who was battalion adjutant, are worthy of special attention from the Monarch, and are recommended as outstanding. The regimental adjutant, Lieutenant Yesakov, who accompanied me throughout the duration of this action, in the midst of the heaviest enemy fire, passing my orders to the gentlemen battalion commanders with total efficiency and precision, without the slightest delay, as befits a truly brave and respectable officer, encouraging the men and delivering harm to the enemy. My brigade aide-de-camp from the Noble Regiment, Staff Captain Kurzhevsky, and regimental quartermaster [operations officer], Lieutenant Schumann, also executed orders correctly.

Moreover, I present to Your Excellency, the gentlemen officers who were wounded at the beginning of the action and who set an example of bravery: Lieutenant Matsnev, Captain Penskoy 3rd, Staff Captain Svechin, lieutenants Levshin, Korsakov, Krivtsov, sub-lieutenants Khlopov, Frolov-Bagreev 2nd, Gederstern 1st, Volkov, ensigns Buturlin, Strandmann, Shchepotiev, whom I most humbly ask Your Excellency to present for petition where appropriate.

Colonel Bistrom.

No. 656, 31 August [12 September] 1812.'

M.S.A. No. 1925, pp. 37 to 38.

APPENDIX III TO CHAPTER 5.

List Of Lifeguard Jäger Officers Decorated For 26 August [7 September] 1812 During The War Against The French.

Colonel **Bistrom** - promoted to major general.

Colonel Count **Grabovsky** - Order of St. George 4th class.

Colonel **Richter** - Order of St. George 4th class.

Colonel **Matsner** - Order of St. Vladimir 3rd class.

Colonel **Makarov** - Order of St. Vladimir 3rd class.

Colonel **De la Garde** - Order of St. Vladimir 3rd class.

Captain **Petin** - Order of St. Anne 2nd class with diamonds.

Captain comte **Saint-Priest 3rd** - Order of St. Anne 2nd class with diamonds.

Captain **Bartholomäi** - Order of St. Anne 2nd class with diamonds.

Captain **Penskoy 4th** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Captain **Penskoy 3rd** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Staff-Captain **Baryshnikov** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Staff-Captain **Levshin 3rd** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Staff-Captain **Korsakov** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Staff-Captain **Krivtsov** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Lieutenant **Suchtelen** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Lieutenant **Tolstoy 2nd** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Lieutenant **Bistrom** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Lieutenant **Repninsky** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Lieutenant Count **Voinovich** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Lieutenant Prince **Kozlovsky** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Lieutenant **Yesakov** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Lieutenant **Lieders** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Captain **Bogaevsky** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Captain **Yafimovich** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Staff-Captain **Poleshko 2nd** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant **Schumann** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Lvov** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Khlopov** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Frolov-Bagreev 2nd** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Gederstern 1st** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Volkov** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Captain **Budenbrok** - Order of St. Anne 2nd class.

Staff-Captain **Rall 3rd** - Order of St. Anne 2nd class.

Staff-Captain **Svechin** - Order of St. Anne 2nd class.

Staff-Captain **Andreevsky** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Sub-Lieutenant **Arbuzov** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Sub-Lieutenant **Meftodovsky** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Sub-Lieutenant **Balkashin** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Sub-Lieutenant **Ilya** Tsarevich of Georgia - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Sub-Lieutenant **Bublik** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Sub-Lieutenant **Cherenkov** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Sub-Lieutenant **Tolmachev** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Nesterov** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Kiselev 2nd** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Yermolaev** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Buturlin** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Strandmann** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Shchepotiev** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Kaminsky** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Krylov** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

M.B. Awards, bundle 10, No. 2 and No. 12.

APPENDIX IV TO CHAPTER 5.

List Of Lower Ranks From The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment Awarded The Military Order Medal Of Distinction For Feats During The Battle Of Borodino, 26 August [7 September] 1812.

Serial	Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
	Feldwebel		On 26 August [7 September] 1812, at the village of Borodino, they fought thrice as skirmishers with the marksmen facing French forces, and through their fearlessness they set an example to others and turned to face the enemy with fixed bayonets; many of them saved the lives of wounded officers.
1	Ivan Yakunin	16866	
2	Demid Tolokonnikov	16867	
3	Gavriil Yesyuninskoy	16868	
	Portepée-Junker		
4	Nikolai Korsakov 2nd	16871	
5	Apollon Bibikov	16872	
6	Alexander Perkhurov 2nd	16873	
7	Pyotr Savelov 1st	16874	
8	Pyotr Kuzmin	16875	
9	Page Schilling[94]	16876	
	Non-Commissioned Officers		
10	Vasily Shilov	16877	
11	Alexander Alexeev	16878	
12	Dmitry Malyshenkov	16879	
13	Alexei Leontiev	16880	
14	Nikolai Gertsov	16881	
15	Yakov Theodorov	16882	
16	Savely Biserov	16883	
17	Vasily Yefremov	16884	
18	Filipp Pavlov	16885	
19	Vasily Vasiliev	16886	
20	Dmitry Theodoseev	16887	
21	Ivan Kalinin	16888	
22	Theodor Gritsenko	16889	
23	Semyon Theodorov	16890	
24	Prokofy Theodorov	16891	

94 Volunteer formerly from the Court of His Imperial Majesty.

Serial	Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
25	Yevstafy Slatov	16892	
26	Naum Ivanov	16893	
27	Larion Gerasimov	16894	
28	Ivan Zhavoronkov	16895	
29	Ivan Ventsov	16896	
	Grenadiers		
30	Alexei Vedrinsky	16897	
31	Ivan Yankin	16898	
32	Gerasim Stepanov	16899	
33	Leonty Karenkevich	16900	
34	Mikhail Soloviev	16901	
35	Moisei Gorbunov	16902	
	Marksmen		
36	Timofei Feklistov	16903	On 26 August [7 September] 1812, at the village of Borodino, they fought thrice as skirmishers with the marksmen facing French forces, and through their fearlessness they set an example to others and turned to face the enemy with fixed bayonets; many of them saved the lives of wounded officers.
37	Theodot Laushkin	16904	
38	Karl Alexeev	16905	
	Jägers		
39	Ivan Alexeev	16906	
40	Naum Mikhailov	16907	
41	Ivan Yefimov	16908	
42	Vasily Popov	16909	
43	Savely Lukin	16910	
44	Ivan Arkharov	16911	
45	Pavel Ivanov	16912	
46	Leonty Shebanov	16913	
47	Dmitry Yurkov	16914	
48	Andrei Ryakhovsky	16915	
49	Arsenty Kireev	16916	
50	Rodion Fedotov	16917	
51	Lukyan Vorontsov	16918	
52	Dorofei Alexeev	16919	

Serial	Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
53	Vasily Yevseev	16920	On 26 August [7 September] 1812, at the village of Borodino, they fought thrice as skirmishers with the marksmen facing French forces, and through their fearlessness they set an example to others and turned to face the enemy with fixed bayonets; many of them saved the lives of wounded officers.
54	Ivan Razzorikhin	16921	
55	Nikolai Saveliev	16922	
56	Alexei Nikitin	16923	
57	Yemelyan Andreev	16924	
58	Vasily Lyapyshev	16925	
59	Alexei Ivanov	16926	
60	Grigory Deyanov	16927	
61	Pyotr Filatov	16928	
62	Nikita Lysun	16929	
	Clerks		Saved the life of the seriously wounded battalion adjutant, Lieutenant Repninsky, under fire.
63	Vasily Ivanov, regimental	16930	
64	Vasily Gavrilov, quartermaster's	16931	On 26 August [7 September] 1812, at the village of Borodino, they fought thrice as skirmishers with the marksmen facing French forces, and through their fearlessness they set an example to others and turned to face the enemy with fixed bayonets; many of them saved the lives of wounded officers.
	Non-Commissioned Officers		
65	Nikolai Chemodurov	32784	
66	Kozima Ivanov	32785	
67	Ivan Belyaev	32786	
68	Stepan Karytov	32787	
69	Yegor Kalistov	32788	
70	Vasily Leontiev	32789	
	Jägers		
71	Anton Balakhonov	32790	
72	Yemelyan Ivanov	32791	
73	Abram Semenov	32792	
74	Maksim Kakushkin	32793	
75	Ivan Ustinov	32794	
76	Fyodor Titov	32795	
77	Matvei Medvedev	32796	
78	Andriyan Polyakov	32797	
79	Anton Dogaev	32798	
80	Stepan Theodorov	32799	

Serial	Name and Rank or Appointment	Medal Serial No.	Deed for which they were awarded
81	Ivan Butorin	32800	On 26 August [7 September] 1812, at the village of Borodino, they fought thrice as skirmishers with the marksmen facing French forces, and through their fearlessness they set an example to others and turned to face the enemy with fixed bayonets; many of them saved the lives of wounded officers.
82	Martin Andreev	32801	
83	Mikhail Pavlyuchenko	32802	
84	Roman Vasiliev	32803	
85	Vasily Kuznetsov	32804	
86	Astafy Istomin	32805	
87	Pavel Yakovlev	32806	
88	Savely Nekrasov	32807	
89	Yefim Optikov	32808	
90	Kirilov	32809	
91	Firs Chernov	32810	
92	Samoila Veselov	32811	
93	Stepan Mityushin	32812	
94	Ivan Pravalikhin	32813	

Serials 1 to 64: M.B. taken from the minutes of Fifth Desk, Second Section, Department of Inspections, 1813, register 137, bundle 94, No. 3, p. 53.

Serials 65 to 94: M.B. taken from the minutes of Fifth Desk, Second Section, Department of Inspections, 1814, register 137, bundle 196, No. 161.

APPENDIX V TO CHAPTER 5.

List Of Officers Of The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment Decorated For Actions Against The French From 3 To 6 [15 To 18] November 1812.

Major General **Bistrom** - Order of St. George 3rd class.

Colonel **Makarov** - promoted to major general.

Captain **Penskoy 3rd** - Order of St. Anne 2nd class.

Staff-Captain **Poleshko 2nd** - Order of St. Anne 2nd class.

Staff-Captain **Bistrom** - Order of St. Anne 2nd class.

Staff-Captain **Tolstoy** - Order of St. Anne 2nd class.

Lieutenant **Yesakov** - Order of St. Anne 2nd class.

Lieutenant **Lanskoy** - Order of St. Anne 2nd class.

Staff-Captain **Andreevsky** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Sub-Lieutenant **Lvov** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Sub-Lieutenant **Davydov** - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class with ribbon.

Staff-Captain **Suchtelen** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant Count **Voinovich** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant Prince **Kozlovsky** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant **Raevsky** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant **Tolmachev** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant **Balkashin** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant **Bublik** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant **Kvitinsky** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant **Baturin** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Meftodovsky** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Cherenkov** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Yermolov** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Krylov** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Sub-Lieutenant **Kiselev 2nd** - Golden Sword *за храбрость*.

Lieutenant **Schumann** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Korsakov** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Norov** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Gederstern 2nd** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Barnovolokov** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Bibikov** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Krivtsov** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Ensign **Perkurov** - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 280, bundle 10, No. 15.

CHAPTER 6.

The wars against Napoleon from 1813 to 1815.

Causes of the war for the liberation of Germany.

Russia's success in the war of 1812 had been bought at a high price. Yet Emperor Alexander was not content with merely ridding Russia of its foes; he considered it his most sacred duty to be the defender of every nation oppressed by Napoleon, and therefore he did not consider the war over until the rights and dignity of nations had been restored and limits had been placed on the powerful ambitions of the *Empereur des français*. Finally, Alexander I considered the only guarantee of any treaties being respected by Napoleon lay in the reduction of his powers, and such an objective could not be achieved without another war, which was intended to put an end to the French dominance of Europe. As a result, despite the fact that the Russian operational forces had been weakened in the extreme by the winter campaign, the reserves were still far away, the state finances were exhausted, and the assistance of Prussia and Austria could not be particularly relied upon due to the desolation of the former and the ambiguous behaviour of the latter, Emperor Alexander decided to continue the fight against Napoleon.[1]

The border crossing by the Russian army.

The crossing of the Neman by elements of the Russian forces at the end of 1812 and the Russian occupation of Königsberg marked the opening of the new campaign. By order of the Tsar, part of the force commanded by Count Wittgenstein was moved through Königsberg towards Marienwerder [Kwidzyn], units commanded by Admiral Chichagov, went through Guttstadt and Löbau [Lubawa] towards Thorn, one corps marched on Warsaw, and the remaining units, constituting the so-called Main Army commanded by Field Marshal Prince Golenishchev-Kutuzov, were directed towards the middle Vistula, towards Plotsk.

The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, together with the Finland Regiment, formed the Guard Jäger Brigade and was part of the V (Guard) Corps, which, in turn, was part of the Main Army. On 28 December 1812 [9 January 1813], the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, together with other units from this army, moved out of their cantonment quarters around Vilna. Before setting off, in view of the ragged state of their uniforms after the winter campaign, the regiment received 700 sets of uniform for the lower ranks; the officers, on the recommendation of Prince Kutuzov, were permitted to be issued an advance of allowances from 1 [13] January 1813, until their return to Russia.[2]

The Main Army was directed from Vilna through Rudniki [Rūdninkai] in two columns. The right column, under the command of General-of-Cavalry Tormasov, among other units, included the Guard Corps. The Tsar, Grand Duke Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich and Field Marshal Prince Kutuzov also proceeded with this column. On 29 December [10 January], the right column arrived in Orany, and was in Merecz on 30 December [11 January], where both columns of the Main Army united. On 1 [13] January 1813, in the presence of the Sovereign Emperor, the troops crossed the border of the Russian Empire over the ice of the Neman and entered the Duchy of Warsaw in three columns, which moved along three separate routes towards the Vistula. General Tormasov's force formed the right column, with which the Tsar and his headquarters proceeded. This column

1 Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1813 [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips, Helion, 2025], volume 1, pp. 25 to 28.

2 Bogdanovich, War of 1813, volume 1, p. 137.

headed from Merecz towards Plotsk through countryside covered with forests and lakes; they encountered only destruction, death, and disease all along the way. There were terrible complaints everywhere regarding the French, who, driven along by our leading Cossack detachments, were retreating towards Kalisz with almost no resistance. Overall, the march of the Main Army from Merecz saw no significant events and took place almost as if in peacetime. On 6 [18] January, Tormasov's column crossed the Prussian border at Raczki and entered a country that was markedly different from the region of Poland they had just crossed, both in geography and in population.[3] The vast forests and steppes, where their tired gaze found barely a poor village, were a thing of the past. Forests, and even then more in the form of woodland, became less common. Now almost every two *versta* [1⅑ miles] the troops were passing through villages surrounded by orchards and gardens, from behind which only the whitewashed chimneys of cottages could be seen. These villages, after the Polish and Jewish towns, made an extremely gratifying impression on the passing troops. At the nightly halts there was no longer a need to settle down among dirt and stench. The cottages in Prussia were striking for their cleanliness, spaciousness and regularity. In almost every village one could find a tavern, albeit a poor one, where officers could get coffee, white bread and good butter, and one or two decent dishes.[4] The Main Army continued moving through Prussia along its border with Poland until 17 [29] January,[5] with Adjutant General Wintzingerode's vanguard in the lead. On 18 [30] January, Tormasov's column crossed the border at Janowo and re-entered Poland.[6] Once again, a whole swarm of Jews surrounded the units, annoying them with offers of their unnecessary services. The whole time they were moving through countryside that had been absolutely devastated, where it was difficult to get even the most basic necessities. The situation was especially difficult for the officers, who were charged horrendous amounts of money for every little thing they needed to provide for their subsistence. In view of this, paying particular attention to efforts by units to continue the rapid pursuit of the enemy army, the Tsar ordered that all officers who crossed the border be given a six-month advance of salary without deductions.[7] They reached Mława on 19 [31] January and spent 20 January [1 February] on a rest day. As they moved on from Mława, Tormasov's column was divided into five detachments, with the Guard Corps making up the fourth detachment. On 25 January [6 February], the Guard Corps reached Plotsk,[8] where the Tsar and the commander-in-chief arrived on that same day. The Guard remained in Plotsk until 30 January [11 February]. News had been received here of Miloradovich's taking of Warsaw and of Pillau by Wittgenstein. The fall of Warsaw was of great importance to us. The Tsar was very pleased to receive this news, and on 29 January [10 February] a thanksgiving service was held to commemorate the occasion, attended by the entire Guard.

When Emperor Alexander I arrived for the muster parade and announced that Warsaw had been taken, the troops responded with a Russian "Hurrah!" At that moment, the commander-in-chief arrived with a report on the capture of Pillau. Whereupon the Tsar, embracing the prince, said: "They just cheered hurrah for me. The same must be done for you." The Guard regiments once

3 The march-route: 1 [13] January, Leiponai [Leipalingis]; 2 [14] January, Pozovtsy [*sic*]; 3 [15] January, Krasnopolie [*sic*]; 4 [16] January, rest day; 5 [17] January, Suwalken [Suwałki]; 6 [18] January, Raczki (M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 7)

4 Glinka, A Russian officer's letters, p. 54.

5 The march-route: 7 [19] January, Kallinowen [Kalinowo]; 8 to 9 [20 to 21] January, rest days; 10 [22] January, Drygallen [Drygały]; 11 [23] January, Johannisburg [Pisz]; 12 [24] January, rest day; 13 [25] January, Kurwien [Karwica]; 14 [26] January, Liebenberg [Klon]; 15 [27] January, Willenberg [Wielbark]; 16 to 17 [28 to 29] January, rest days (M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 14).

6 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 17.

7 Bogdanovich, War of 1813, volume 1, p. 137.

8 The march-route: 21 January [2 February], Wróblewo; 22 January [3 February], Kuchary; 23 January [4 February], rest day; 24 January [5 February], Dąbrusk; 25 January [6 February], Plotsk (M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 17).

again filled the air with a powerful, sustained cheer of hurrah.[9]

The week-long halt by the Main Army in Plotsk was vital, because the troops needed some rest after the forced marches, and in addition, the administrative support elements of the regiments at least required some restoration of order. However, there was no time for a longer rest. At that time, in the apt words of the Tsar himself, 'a minute was too precious to be lost by us and gained by the enemy' and therefore, having the emergence of Russian armies on the Oder in mind in order to win Prussia over to his side, he ordered the beginning of a general offensive on 1 [13] February. By this time, the entire area from the Vistula to the Oder and the Duchy of Warsaw had been almost completely cleared of the enemy by our advanced units, but they were still holding out in the fortresses of Danzig, Thorn, Modlin and Zamość.[10] The Main Army, which constituted the left-most column of all the leading formations, had already set out from Plotsk in two columns on 30 January [11 February], with the Guard Corps being part of the right column, under Tormasov's command. The original plan had been to direct the Main Army towards Poznań in order to take the war to the very heart of Germany. However, the Tsar's intentions could not be carried out, since an alliance for operations against Napoleon had not yet been concluded with Prussia, and the Prussian generals, having no such orders from the king, refused to operate in conjunction with Russian forces. Under such conditions, it would, of course, be too risky for Russian forces to penetrate deeper into the heart of Germany.[11] As a result of all this, the Main Army, leaving the Poznań road to their right, turned to Kalisz, where they arrived on 10 [22] February.[12]

The delay by Prussia in declaring war, the uncertainty regarding the position of the Austrian court, and the remoteness of our reserves coming from Russia, all this forced the Field Marshal, who already disapproved not only of overly rash undertakings, but of the continuation of the war itself, to move the army forward and to place it in quarters in the vicinity of Kalisz for a more or less prolonged period.[13] The Guard and grenadiers were stationed in Kalisz itself and in its immediate surroundings.[14]

The troops were kept busy preparing for the impending campaign: the regiments were making up new uniforms, refurbishing weapons, and repairing vehicles.[15]

Meanwhile, Wittgenstein had driven the French from Berlin and they were retreating towards Magdeburg and Dresden. Whereupon, on 17 [29] March, the Prussian King concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with Russia in Breslau [Wrocław].[16] The Guard regiments were brought closer to Kalisz: on 18 [30] March, our regiment, carrying its own provisions and forage for five days, set off from its quarters and, passing through Medzion [*sic*], Kurov [*sic*], Szachoty [*sic*] and Mlikow [*sic*], reached Kalisz on 19 [31] March. The entire 20 March [1 April] was spent preparing

9 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813; Notes on the campaign, p. 30.

10 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, pp. 59 to 60.

11 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, pp. 63 to 64.

12 The march-route: 30 January [11 February], Nowa-Wieś [*sic*]; 31 January to 1 February [12 to 13 February], rest days; 2 [14] February, Łanięta; 3 [15] February, Grerisbitze [*sic*]; 4 [16] February, rest day; 5 [17] February, Karszew; 6 [18] February, rest day; 7 [19] February Budy-Głodno; 8 [20] February, Brzeźno; 9 [21] February, Lyanden [Lądek]; 10 [22] February, Ciążeń area (M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 37).

13 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 74.

14 The Lifeguard Jägers were positioned as follows: regimental headquarters in Raszków; the battalions in Głogowa, Korytnica, Ligota, Bieganin, Skrzebowa, Raszkówsk, Rąbczyn, Pogrzybów, Przybysławice, Jaskółki, Jelitów and Radłów, one company in each (M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 160, bundle 3, No. 31, p. 55).

15 On 5 [17] March, 30 convalescent lower ranks (two non-commissioned officers, one musician, 27 privates, as well as Junker Alexander Lanevsky-Volk 2nd, newly enrolled in the regiment) reached the regiment from Plotsk (M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 31, p. 408).

16 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, pp. 66 to 67.

for the parade, and on 21 March [2 April] the King arrived in Kalisz.[17] The units on review had already been re-equipped and appeared in brilliant condition, although in small numbers.[18]

Once the Prussian forces had joined the Russians and Count Wittgenstein had moved towards the Elbe with General Blücher, there was no longer any reason for the Main Army to remain in Kalisz, especially since the commander-in-chief had received intelligence that Napoleon had completed the reformation of his corps and was ready to march with them.

The campaign into Saxony.

The six-weeks of rest at Kalisz had strengthened the units of the Main Army, the regiments had been replenished with reserves and they set off from Kalisz for Dresden on 26 March [7 April].[19] Throughout this campaign, each officer was allowed to have one pack horse, while the company pack horses were to be replaced by carts.[20] Our leading units crossed the Elbe and moved towards Leipzig. The French abandoned Dresden and, as they were leaving it, blew up the masonry bridge on the Elbe, retreating further almost without a fight.[21]

The Main Army entered Silesia two days after leaving Kalisz.[22] After the snows of Russia and the gloomy forests of Lithuania, the sight of fine Silesian fields captivated our troops with their beauty. Everything was novel, both the land and the people. On this day, 29 March [10 April], Ensign Krylov joined the regiment with 64 convalescent lower ranks (five non-commissioned officers, four musicians and 55 privates).[23] It should be noted that from the time of the pause in Kalisz, sickness rates in Poland were most insignificant and, on the contrary, a great many recovered men were arriving from Russian hospitals. Having said that, by the beginning of the campaign there were companies in the regiment which had only one or even no officers.[24] Despite the low levels of sickness in units, on 30 March [11 April] Imperial Instructions were issued for a grant of 9,000 roubles to each regimental infirmary, which the regiment received on 5 [17] April.[25]

On 2 [14] April, the Main Army crossed the Oder at Steinau [Ścinawa][26] and followed Miloradovich, who was marching from Glogau [Głogów] via Bunzlau [Bolesławiec], Görlitz and Bautzen to Dresden, which was occupied by him on 3 [15] April.

The army's march to Dresden was a proper triumphal procession. Triumphal arches were erected at the entrances to every city and town bearing slogans: '*der Deutsche dem Russen*' [the Germans greet the Russians] and '*Gott mit dir*' [God be with you] or '*des Allmächtigen Hand schütze dich*' [may the hand of the Almighty shield you] with the names of the victories we had won. The people came out to greet the Russian troops and accompanied them with joyful cheers. Young girls in white dresses were stationed at the entrances to gatehouses with garlands and laurel wreaths. At the appearance of Prince Kutuzov the air was filled with joyful shouts: '*Vivat der grosse Alte! Vivat unser Grossvater Kutusow!*' [Viva the great elder! Viva our grandfather Kutuzov].

17 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 31, p. 318.
18 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, p. 75.
19 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 31, p. 391.
20 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 31, p. 408.
21 Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, from the action at Tarutino to the Battle of Kulm, part 2, p. 12.
22 The march-route: 26 March [7 April], Raszków; 27 March [8 April], Sulmierzyce; 28 March [9 April], rest day; 29 March [10 April], Militsch [Milicz] (M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 74).
23 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 7, No. 60.
24 M.B. Monthly returns for March, bundle 476.
25 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 7, No. 60, No. 447.
26 The march-route: 30 March [11 April], Trachenberg [Żmigród]; 31 March [12 April], Winzig [Wińsko]; 1 [13] April, rest day; 2 [14] April, Steinau; 3 [15] April, Lindhardt [*sic*]; 4 [16] April, Thomaswaldau [Tomaszów Bolesławiecki]; 5 [17] April, rest day; 6 [18] April, Siegersdorf (M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 75).

Whenever the Tsar appeared, bells rang out, loud hurrahs and patriotic songs by the Germans were heard, along with curses against Napoleon. In the evenings, painted transparencies with various images and inscriptions in honour of Emperor Alexander shone with multi-coloured light from well-lit windows.[27] Whenever units halted, and especially during rest periods, the population, despite their extreme parsimony, treated them as best they could. Having believed Napoleon's propaganda, they expected to see Russian units of wild barbarians and, to their surprise, made good friends.[28] When the army entered Saxony, at Siegersdorf [Zebrzydowa] on 6 [18] April, the townspeople also greeted us with extraordinary friendliness. Such good relations between the Saxons were the result, firstly, of gratitude for their liberation from French abuse and, secondly, of the decent behaviour that distinguished our troops in foreign lands: not the slightest complaint was heard anywhere, rather, on the contrary, Saxon children often brought food from their parents to our soldiers on sentry duty, saying that they liked Russian soldiers because they were kind...[29]

Finally, on 12 [24] April, the eve of the Glorious Resurrection of Christ, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the Guard entered Dresden, the capital of Saxony, led by the Tsar himself, to the sound of bands playing and with Colours unfurled.[30] It was a beautiful day and the sun shone in all its splendour in the middle of a clear sky. Crowds of people ran out for three *versta* [two miles] in order to greet the Tsar, who was riding on horseback alongside the King of Prussia.

The vanguard units already in Dresden lined both sides of the road outside the city along with the Saxon *Garde*. Ladies stood at their windows and on balconies, throwing laurel wreaths into the street to the sounds of music and the joyful cheers of the population. Upon entering the city, the Tsar and the King of Prussia stopped in the square where all the troops performed a ceremonial march past. The troops were put into quarters in Dresden.[31] Some of the Guard regiments were stationed in the city itself, but our regiment was stationed in the villages of the Plauen Valley, where in the vineyards, in the company of lovely Saxon women, officers could forget the hardships of war and enjoy the present without thinking of the future.[32] However, they were unable to enjoy their peaceful stay in the capital of Saxony and relaxation in the luxurious Plauen Valley for long. As early as 15 [27] April, the regiment received orders to be at instant readiness, in order to march upon receipt of Supreme orders so to do,[33] while on 16 [28] April, the sounding of the general march was heard at dawn and by seven o'clock in the morning the regiment was marching along the Frohburg road in closed column, wreathed in clouds of dust. This was down to Napoleon's arrival from Mainz in Erfurt on 13 [25] April, which was the assembly area for enemy units moving there from various directions from France, Italy and the territories of the *Confédération du Rhin* [Confederation of the Rhine]. On 14 [26] April, Napoleon, at the head of his newly created army of some 128,000 men, set off from Erfurt for Weimar, where he arrived later that same day.

The Battle of Lützen, 20 April [2 May] 1813.

Having received intelligence on these movements by the French army, the Tsar took them as an undoubted sign of Napoleon opening an offensive and immediately ordered the concentration of the entire Coalition army at Leipzig with the aim of giving battle to the French. In following these instructions, the Main Army set off from Dresden towards Altenburg in two columns; the right

27 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 116; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Notes on the campaign of 1813, p. 91.

28 Shishkov, Brief notes, p. 54.

29 Shishkov, Brief notes, p. 54.

30 The march-route: 7 [19] April, Hennersdorf [Jędrzychowice]; 8 [20] April, Weißenberg; 9 [21] April, rest day; 10 [22] April, Spittwitz; 11 [23] April, Fischbach; 12 [24] April Dresden (M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 75).

31 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 116.

32 Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 15.

33 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 31, p. 455.

column, directed towards Nossen and Frohburg, also included the Guards Corps.[34] Thus on the morning of 16 [28] April our regiment found itself marching along the Frohburg road. All the trains, with the exception of cartridge caissons boxes and hard-tack wagons, were left in Dresden; no one was allowed to take any personal baggage.[35]

Meanwhile, on 15 [27] April, Napoleon's leading corps, commanded by *maréchal* Ney, occupied Naumburg, while on 17 [29] April, having encountered the Russian vanguard forwards of Weißenfels, he pushed it back beyond the Poserna stream [Rippach] and occupied Weißenfels, where Napoleon's entire army arrived on 18 [30] April. At the same time, another formation of the French army, commanded by the *vice-roi d'Italie*, moving from the lower Saale, concentrated at Merseburg on 18 [30] April and established communications with Napoleon on that same day.

On the basis of an earlier reconnaissance, Napoleon became convinced that the Coalition main body was located on the upper Elster, between Leipzig and the Bohemian Mountains, and therefore, having joined forces with the *vice-roi d'Italie*, decided to cross the Elster at Leipzig, envelope the Coalition army's right flank and push it back into the mountains. To that end he directed his army along the main Lützen road and on 19 April [1 May], after clashing with our leading corps under Adjutant General Wintzingerode at Rippach, occupied Lützen (see Plan of the Battle of Lützen).[36]


All this time, the Russian Main Army was slowly moving towards the Elster in two columns. The right column, in which our regiment was also present, spent the night of 16 [28] April at Etzdorf; it was at Geringswalde on 17 [29] April;[37] spent the night of 18 [30] April at Frohburg;[38] and on 19 April [1 May] the entire Main Army commanded by Tormasov, was bivouacked in front of Lobstädt.[39] Following the death of Kutuzov on 16 [28] April, Count Wittgenstein was appointed commander-in-chief of the entire Coalition army on 19 April [1 May]. His position immediately became extremely difficult; he had been appointed commander-in-chief at a time when there were four generals in the army who were senior to him,[40] which created some friction in command relations. Moreover, no sooner had he assumed command of the army than he was obliged to give battle against a most brilliant commander, whom he had never engaged before; to this it must be added that Wittgenstein was constrained in his actions by the presence of the Tsar and the King of Prussia, without whom, strictly speaking, he could decide nothing. It emerged from the very first days that his authority was very limited.[41]

Count Wittgenstein's intention to attack the enemy on 19 April [1 May] could not be realised due to the distance of our reserves from the leading units already located on the Elster. The reserves would not be able to take part in the fighting until 20 April [2 May], and therefore the attack on the French was postponed until that day.

The main concept for the battle planned for 20 April [2 May] was to catch the enemy army on the march, attack it from the flank and defeat the nearest French corps before the rest could come to their aid. On 19 April [1 May], the lengthy disposition was issued to the army, but was dispatched to the units late (some units in the force received it after the hour appointed for their departure)

34 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 158.
35 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, p. 467.
36 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 160.
37 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 31, p. 467.
38 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 125.
39 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 130.
40 Tormasov, Miloradovich, Blücher and Barclay de Tolly.
41 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 157.

and according to which on 20 April [2 May], the Main Army was to be at Pegau and Großstorkwitz by seven o'clock in the morning and was to form the reserve for the entire Coalition army.[42]



On 20 April [2 May], at about seven o'clock in the morning, the Coalition forces began to cross the Elster at Pegau and, having crossed it, formed up in battle order on the gentle reverse slopes between the Floßsgraben and the Grunaubach, with their right flank on the village of Werben and their left at the village of Tornau. The Prussian force under Blücher was stationed in the front line, in the second were the formations under Berg and Yorck. The Russian reserves were behind the

42 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, pp. 161 to 164.

second line: the Guard, grenadiers and cuirassiers. The infantry were formed into attack columns. In total, the Coalition had some 73,000 men concentrated in position on 20 April [2 May], including around 50,000 infantry, 17,000 cavalry, and 6,000 artillerymen with 400 guns; of this number, 37,000 were Russian.[43] The marshalling of units into battle order was completed at 11 o'clock in the morning, four hours later than should have occurred according to the disposition. After the units had formed up, they were given a break for about an hour; in the meantime, a survey was made of the ground ahead. At the same time, thick clouds of dust were noticed on the Lützen to Leipzig road, which revealed the French movement towards this city. A large bivouac was visible near the village of Großgörschen, within reach of the Coalition army. Count Wittgenstein mistook the formation stationed at Großgörschen for the strong vanguard of the French army, which, in his opinion, was located at Lützen, and decided, firstly, to drive this supposed vanguard out of the villages it held, and then to launch a general attack.[44]

Meanwhile, seeing that he had only been in action with a cavalry corps on 19 April [1 May] and, due to a shortage of cavalry, Napoleon was unaware of the approach of the Coalition army. He began to advance his left wing towards Leipzig at dawn on 20 April [2 May], leaving only Ney's corps, with a strength of 40,000 men, in the villages of Kaja, Rahna, Großgörschen and Kleingörshen for the time being in order to shield the advance by the rest of the army.[45]

In view of Count Wittgenstein's assessments, only one Prussian brigade (six battalions) was assigned to attack Großgörschen and Kleingörshen, held by Souham's entire division, and it was this brigade that engaged in a heated battle with the French. These villages changed hands several times; eventually, the Prussians, supported by Berg's entire corps, finally drove the French out of them. Victory was leaning our way, but the genius of Napoleon snatched it from our hands. Moving towards Leipzig and hearing the cannonade at Lützen, he instantly understood the situation and immediately redirected the units moving towards Leipzig to help Ney's corps. The *Garde* arrived first, numbering 15,000 men. The newly arrived units took Großgörschen and Kaja by storm. Our grenadiers came up at this point, charged with fixed bayonets and after a desperate fight passed Großgörschen and pursued the enemy beyond this village. The French opened fire on them with 70 guns and, under cover of this, launched a counterattack on the already burning villages. The Russian Guard reached the village of Großgörschen at this moment in closed columns. The enemy abandoned the burning villages and was retreating at all points. The skirmishers of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, commanded by Captain Rall 3rd and under the personal direction of the regimental commander, Major General Bistrom, reoccupied Großgörschen and held off the enemy advance with exemplary bravery. The regiment was positioned behind the village in attack columns, while Colonel Richter 2nd's second battalion was tasked with protecting our batteries, which had moved out to the right of the village. The retreating French, reinforced by new columns, tried with all their might to seize these batteries, but initially Captain Svechin with his company, and then Colonel Richter with his entire battalion, with captains Penskoy 3rd and Penskoy 4th, Staff Captain Lieders, Lieutenant Count Voinovich, Prince Kozlovsky and Krivtsov in front, encouraging the soldiers, drove the French away at bayonet point, preventing them from reaching the battery. Lieutenant Prince Kozlovsky was slightly wounded in the arm, but remained at his post.

The French then attempted to break the resistance of the Großgörschen defenders by deploying artillery against the jägers and reinforcing their units with fresh battalions. Captain Rall's marksmen, supported time and again by ensigns Barnovolokov, Perkurov 1st, Perkurov 2nd,

43 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 164.
44 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 166.
45 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, pp. 166 to 167.

Golenishchev-Kutuzov, Chernyshev 1st, Chernyshev 2nd, Kuzmin and Baron Schilling, put down rapid and accurate fire against the advancing French artillery. Colonel Makarov and the first battalion charged with lowered bayonets at the enemy pressing hard on our regiment, driving them back a great distance through this valiant strike, and held the enemy's intended artillery fire positions. During this glorious attack, lieutenants Bublik, Tolmachev, Kvitsinsky, Arbuzov, Frolov-Bagreev, Baturin, sub lieutenants Volkov, Meftodovsky, Krylov, Yermolaev and Kaminsky, as if competing with each other, marched ahead of their companies, setting an example of courage and fearlessness for the jägers. No less distinguished were Staff Captain Kurzhevsky, lieutenants Yesakov, Repninsky, Schumann and Ensign Norov, who accompanied the regimental commander, General Bistrom, as he calmly directed the regiment's operations amidst murderous small arms and artillery fire and incessant attacks by French battalions. The aforementioned officers delivered the orders of their intrepid commander calmly, as if they were on manoeuvres at Krasnoe Selo, paying no heed to the hell that was raging all around them. It is impossible not to mention here the extremely selfless work of the battalion physician Volsky, who dressed the wounded in the most dangerous combat sites with extraordinary composure, even in the skirmishing screen.

Meanwhile, at two o'clock in the afternoon, Bertrand arrived on the French right flank with 7,000 men, and Marmont on the left with 25,000 men; but Bertrand's efforts against our left flank were in vain, and the units on our right flank, commanded by Prinz Eugen von Württemberg, held the village of Eisdorf and began to envelope the French left flank. At five o'clock in the afternoon, new French units, led by the *vice-roi*, numbering 15,000 men, began to move to get behind our right flank. The French had thus concentrated some 102,000 men on the battlefield. Prinz Eugen and his soldiers fought bravely in the village of Eisdorf, but our ranks were constantly thinning, and the enemy kept advancing fresh columns and, eventually, having suffered enormous losses, drove us out of the villages we were holding and enveloped our right flank. The Russian units located here, exhausted by the six-hour struggle, fell back behind the Guard. The Lifeguard Jägers, reinforced for the last time by Lieutenant Yermolov, held out in Großgörschen for some time, but the village was now nothing but a mass of smouldering rubble. All the ammunition was eventually expended, but fortunately, night was falling. The skirmishers left the burned out village, the artillery fell silent and the soldiers of both sides, exhausted by the fierce fighting, put down their weapons and threw themselves to the ground. The fading embers of villages and their ditches separated our forward outposts from the enemy's. All was quiet; but at 10 o'clock the Prussian cavalry moved forward to test the enemy pickets. They encountered enemy infantry in the darkness, and a volley of musket fire forced them to retreat to our position. Our regiment was awakened by the command: "Form square against cavalry." It was the voice of our elderly but active corps commander, General Lavrov, who was sitting on a drum by a fire and mistook Prussian dragoons for French. The misunderstanding was soon cleared up, and the jägers fell into a deep sleep once more. This false alarm ended the bloody day of 20 April [2 May], in which the Coalition lost some 10,000 men.[46]

This was the first battle with Napoleon after his flight from Russia, the first in which our regiment had taken part since their crossing of the border. The Guard Jägers fought in this battle with the same courage with which they had fought under the walls of Smolensk, on the fields of Borodino and at Krasny. The regiment's losses on this day were as follows: five killed,[47] 25 wounded[48] and

46 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 174; Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, pp. 23 to 24; M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 5, No. 43, No. 1046, bundle 14, No. 4, p. 17 (appendix III).

47 One non-commissioned officer and four privates.

48 One subaltern (Lieutenant Prince Kozlovsky); two non-commissioned officers; 22 privates.

four missing in action.[49] Thus, after Lützen, 772[50] remained with the regiment from the original 806 men.[51]

When compiling the report of the battle of Lützen, the Tsar ordered Count Wittgenstein to include the following phrase, as if written by himself personally, at the conclusion of the report:

> 'Overall, I cannot give enough praise to the troops who fought on this memorable day in full view of their sovereigns, both for their courage and the discipline with which every movement was performed under the fiercest fire.'[52]

The next day, 21 April [3 May], Count Wittgenstein wanted to renew the battle, but the Coalition sovereigns, having witnessed the enormous losses in the units and having learned that the French had already seized Leipzig, ordered a retreat. In addition to the purely military situation, political factors also contributed to this decision.

The retreat to Bautzen.

The retreat began on the morning of 21 April [3 May] in two columns. The left [south] column included all the Russian formations, which, having crossed the Elster at Draschwitz, were to go to Dresden via Frohburg, Rochlitz, Etzdorf and Wildruhe [*sic*].[53]

The troops retreated in order and did not lose a single gun or a single wagon; the wounded, except for those left in Großgörschen, were all saved. On 24 April [6 May], near the village of Wilsdruff, 30,000 Frenchmen forcefully attacked our rearguard. The battle intensified hour by hour, and the entire army stood to arms several times, but around midday a severe thunderstorm began; thunderclaps and cannon fire echoed through the ravines and forests, illuminated by lightning and the flash of gunfire. Torrential rain interrupted the battle.

The next day, 25 April [7 May], our regiment, having passed Dresden, crossed the Elbe on a pontoon bridge and settled down for the night at Schloss Weißer Hirsch on the right bank of the Elbe. Night fell, a terrifying night for the inhabitants of Dresden, which was being held by Miloradovich's rearguard. The bivouac fires illuminating the forest around Schloss Weißer Hirsch, the guns trained on the square of the cathedral church, the sound of artillery passing with lit fuses, all showed the population of Dresden that the French were approaching and that tomorrow their city would become the arena for a bloody battle.[54] The books that had appeared in Dresden, which described every atrocity by the French, various prints and drawings depicting Napoleon in every kind of caricature, all of this was hastily removed and hidden.[55] Many residents left the city, and the sandy Radeberg road became congested with carriages, some of which contained young women: some were crying, others were smiling and looking at our bivouacs with curiosity. The officers crowded around the carriages, found acquaintances, told them of the dangers of driving through a forest filled with marauders at night, as a result of which some agreed to wait until the morning, taking shelter from the bad weather in shelters under felt cloaks.[56]

---

49 Four privates.

50 One general, two field officers, 27 subalterns, 69 non-commissioned officers, 27 musicians, 646 privates, 772 in total (M.B. Barclay de Tolly's minutes, register 209, bundle 9).

51 One general, two field officers, 28 subalterns, 72 non-commissioned officers, 27 musicians, 675 privates, 806 in total.

52 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 175.

53 21, 22, 23 and 24 April [3, 4, 5 and 6 May] respectively (M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 152.

54 Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 27.

55 Shishkov, Brief notes, pp. 135 to 136.

56 Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 28.

The next day at dawn the Guard began to retreat to Radeberg together with the entire army, which they reached on 27 April [9 May] and towards where our rearguard also retreated, after a heated battle with the French, who were trying to cross the Elbe.[57] It was then decided to retreat along the main road to Silesia and take up positions between Bischofswerda and Bautzen.[58] The commander-in-chief decided to wait here for Napoleon's next moves to become clear, because Count Wittgenstein believed that if the French crossed at Dresden with their entire force, then he would have time to concentrate the army in order to take up positions at Bautzen and give battle there; should the enemy cross downstream (along the Elbe), then he would march at full strength and attack Napoleon from the flank.[59] As a result, on 28 April [10 May], the Guard was deployed on the edge of the Bischofswerda forest, to the left of Geißmannsdorf, 35 *versta* [23 miles] from Dresden.[60] The Russian army remained in position at Bischofswerde all day on 29 April [11 May], and on 30 April [12 May], in view of the fact that the commander-in-chief, having become convinced of the concentration of the majority of French troops at Dresden and considering the position forwards of Bautzen not very strong, had decided to retreat behind the river Spree and Bautzen, the Guard Corps left the position at Bischofswerda and settled between Uenkowitz [*sic*, Oehna?] and Denkwitz, entering the second line of the army battle order.[61] However, this position turned out to be disadvantageous and therefore another one was chosen, four *versta* [2⅔ miles] from the Spree, beyond Bautzen. The former position was intended to play the role of a forward position, and was occupied by Miloradovich's rearguard, as they withdrew into it. The troops moved to the new position, significantly reinforced by field fortifications, on the morning of 1 [13] May. The Guard, remaining in the second line, were stationed behind the village of Baschütz.[62]

The Main Army remained inactive until 8 [20] May. This gave Napoleon the opportunity to concentrate his entire force at Bautzen by 7 [19] May, as a result of which the Coalition army at Bautzen, although reinforcements had arrived and it was stronger than at Lützen, was still numerically inferior to the enemy army. In total, the Coalition had 93,000 men, of whom 65,000 were Russian including Cossack regiments.[63] Napoleon had 140,000 men.[64]

Having concentrated his entire force, Napoleon decided to attack the Coalition on 8 [20] May. His plan was to draw reserves onto our left flank with feint attacks, and then to attack the right flank, envelope it, push the Coalition army back into the Bohemian Mountains and sever their line of retreat.[65] Around midday on 8 [20] May, the French attacked Miloradovich's rearguard in great strength, which, after four hours of fierce fighting, retreated to the main position. The French crossed the river Spree, separating them from the Coalition, and had taken Bautzen by six o'clock. In the evening the enemy tried to envelope our left flank, but, having suffered heavy losses, had to fall back. The firefight, however, continued until nightfall. Having captured the river crossings on the Spree, the French deployed in dense infantry and cavalry masses parallel to our army, covering the gentle slopes in front of Bautzen with their bivouac fires.[66]

57 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 166; On 27 April [9 May], the convalescents Lieutenant Kvitsinsky and ensigns Chernyshev 1st and Chernyshev 2nd, as well as 132 lower ranks, rejoined the regiment (M.B. register 161, bundle 7, No. 60).
58 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 206.
59 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, pp. 182 to 183.
60 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 172.
61 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 176.
62 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 178; Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1. pp. 225 to 227.
63 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1. p. 228.
64 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 200.
65 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1. p. 230.
66 Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 32; Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1. p. 231.

Participation of the Guard Jägers in the Battle of Bautzen on 9 [21] May.

Following the withdrawal of the leading corps into the main position, our army was deployed in two waves. The Guard, together with the grenadiers, cuirassiers and reserve artillery, formed the reserve commanded by the Tsarevich Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich and was deployed in attack columns in dead ground forwards of Emperor Alexander's bivouac; the infantry were behind the village of Baschütz between the Löbau and Weißenberg roads.[67]

The weather was fine on 9 [21] May. A cannon shot rang out from the French as soon as the sun appeared on the horizon. Macdonald's and Oudinot's columns moved slowly against our left flank under the cover of skirmishers and under the thunder of artillery, while Bertrand and Marmont moved against our centre. Despite every effort by these marshals, after repeated and unsuccessful attacks, the French not only had to switch from the offensive to the defensive, but also withdraw to Bautzen itself. However, the course of events at other points on the position prevented our left flank from completing the driving back of the enemy with defeat.

While things were going so well in the centre and on the left flank, when all the attention of our generals was turned to the French right flank, suddenly, at around 10 o'clock in the morning, fierce fighting broke out on our right flank, where *maréchal* Ney struck our right wing, having been sent by Napoleon to envelope us on this flank and to get behind the entire army. However, Ney, probably misunderstanding Napoleon's orders or unable to execute them, was not operating entirely coherently: instead of moving his force towards the Hochkirch belfry, getting behind the Coalition army and severing its line of retreat, he got immersed in an attack on the right flank of the tactical vital ground of the position, the Kreckwitz heights. In order to assist him, Napoleon ordered the corps under Bertrand and Mortier to attack our centre with elements of the *Garde* - to attack the Kreckwitz heights, the key to our position, with great force. The high ground at Kreckwitz was being held by Blücher's force. He fought off two French attacks; eventually, the French took the high ground, and the Prussians fell back to the village of Purschwitz.[68]

The Tsar watched this retreat by the Prussians and, having received reports of the enemy building up against the centre, personally ordered the commander of the entire Guard infantry component, General Yermolov, to go to relieve the disordered Prussian corps with the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment together with the Kexholm and Pernov Grenadiers, the Guard *Équipage* and the Glukhov Cuirassiers with one horse artillery company, which amounted to eight select battalions.[69] As soon as the Prussians learned of Yermolov's advance, they moved through Litten village led by their corps commander, Yorck, with the aim of recapturing the Kreckwitz heights. However, they were already being heavily engaged by the French: 60 enemy guns trained on them, devastated the ranks of the advancing Prussians and forced them to retreat. Meanwhile, the enemy were constantly reinforcing their artillery and were obviously directing fire at Nilus' battery, located to the left of the village of Litten, in order to knock out our guns and take control of the village, thereby creating a breakthrough of our battle formation at this point.[70]

It was about two *versta* [1⅓ miles] from the Lifeguard Jäger's previous location to the village of Litten. Our regiment moved towards the village at a fast pace. At this moment, the army's Quartermaster General, Toll, rode up to the column head where General Yermolov was located, and, pointing out the village of Litten to Yermolov, said: "See what kind of hell they have unleashed

67 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 220; Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1. pp. 232 to 233.
68 Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, pp. 34 to 35; Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1. p. 239.
69 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 227.
70 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1. pp. 240 to 241.

up there. I believe we have not a moment to lose; Yorck is retreating. If we take his place, then everyone will either condemn us or rally behind us."

By way of a response, Yermolov shouted: "Forward, lads! The Tsar is watching you!"

As one man, the entire regiment quickened the pace and soon came within range of cannon fire. Shells rained down on the Lifeguard Jägers and exploded with sharp cracks among the swiftly and silently advancing columns. Yermolov, turning to Bistrom and pointing to the village of Litten, said to him: "Once your first battalion reaches that burning village, you are to deploy them and at the same time send skirmishers forward and spread them between Nilus' battery and the Prussians. Meanwhile, I shall move the heads of the columns forward onto the line and we will deploy to the left, aligned with the first platoon of your first battalion. Forward, lads! Muskets levelled, at the double!"

Having formed up so that the enemy artillery, firing from three directions, would be less effective, our regiment reached the designated place within a few minutes and deployed into fighting line behind Colonel Nilus' battery, resting their right flank on the village of Litten. All this was carried out with speed and in extraordinarily good order under the most intense fire from enemy batteries. The disordered Prussians stopped their retreat and reformed in columns behind our regiment, while the Prussian *Garde* attacked the village of Purschwitz and drove the enemy out of there.

The French retreated to the crest of the Kreckwitz heights and continued the fight with artillery fire alone, directing it mainly at the salient formed by the alignment of our regiment and the arc of the battle formation of the entire right wing. The Guard Jägers stood courageously shielding the batteries on the key to our position for more than an hour while being pelted with brutal canister fire.[71] The officers, from ensigns to battalion commanders, set an example of composure and inspired the young jägers with their heroic behaviour.

Both armies remained in place for quite some time and continued to hammer each other with artillery. The 30,000 killed and wounded on both sides was already testament to the extraordinary efforts of the combatants, but the fighting did not stop. The decisive moment was approaching. Count Wittgenstein had to choose whether to commit his last reserves – the remaining regiments of the Guard – or to retreat. He requested orders to break off the battle from the Coalition Monarchs. Emperor Alexander, wary or risking his last units, having witnessed the heavy losses in the Coalition formations and relying on the fact that by retreating our army would soon be reinforced by approaching strategic reserves, ordered the beginning of the retreat just after five o'clock. Thus ended the Battle of Bautzen, in which the troops that participated, although they would not reap the laurels of victory, at least earned the honours of a courageous resistance and extraordinary resolve.[72] The losses from our regiment in the Battle of Bautzen were as follows: one private killed; Ensign Golenishchev-Kutuzov, one non-commissioned officer and 30 privates wounded.[73]

The retreat of the Coalition army from Bautzen was carried out in three columns, which were all intended to rendezvous at Reichenbach. Yermolov's detachment was required to shield the centre column, with the same composition as that which had been sent to reinforce the Prussians at the village of Litten.[74] Thus, our regiment was faced with one of the most difficult combat missions - to

71 Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, pp. 37 to 38.
72 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, pp. 211 to 212.
73 M.B. Barclay de Tolly's minutes, register 209, bundle 9.
74 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 229.

shield a retreat from force positions disordered after almost 12 hours of fighting, and to then hold back a pursuing enemy. The regiment carried out this difficult task with honour, laying a brilliant foundation for a whole series of similar glory-earning actions which were entrusted to it in the main in subsequent wars, and served as a kind of preparation for their immortal feat - the rearguard actions in the Polish campaign of 1831.

The day was drawing to a close. The centre column, consisting of Prussian units, began to withdraw toward Reichenbach via Wurschen. Three batteries, located to the left of Litten, and Yermolov's detachment secured their retreat. Only after these batteries had been removed from their positions did our regiment begin to retreat under the thunder of 150 guns and under the protection of our cavalry.[75] They withdrew to Wurschen, where positions were taken up on the high ground to the left of the village of Belgern. Yermolov remained here, with the assistance of Nilus' and Zakharzhevsky's batteries, while the units of the right and centre columns, having passed Weißenberg, settled behind the Löbauer Wasser river.[76] Yermolov's detachment then fell back to the village of Kotitz, where they spent the night.[77]

The retreat to Silesia.

The next day, that is, 10 [22] May, at half past two in the morning, our rearguard was attacked by two cavalry brigades from Reynier's corps at the position at Kotitz, but the steadfastness of the rearguard and successful operations by our cavalry and artillery forced the French to abandon frontal attacks, and they decided to send some of their force on a flanking march. While the French were carrying out this manoeuvre, the Coalition army had managed to pass the defile at Reichenbach with its entire supply train. Whereupon Yermolov's rearguard withdrew from its positions and slowly, step by step, began to fall back beyond the Löbauer Wasser. The Guard Jägers exploited every terrain obstacle lying along the line of retreat with remarkable skill in order to delay the enemy. The Löbauer Wasser was particularly advantageous for this, and the water crossings, as well as attacks on the high ground around Weißenberg, cost the French dearly.[78] The defence of the Rotkretscham position, behind one of the tributaries of the Löbauer Wasser, was even more stubborn. Every attack by the numerous enemy, directed here by Napoleon himself, was shattered by the Lifeguard Jägers and their comrades standing fast, while the French were driven back at bayonet point each time with heavy losses. Eventually, under attack from an enormous force and enveloped on the left flank, Yermolov's detachment was still able to fall back in exemplary order to new positions at the village of Schöps. They blocked the enemy here for a fourth time. From this position, enveloped on both flanks by Latour-Maubourg's cavalry and two of Lauriston's divisions and threatened with the complete loss of his line of retreat, Yermolov led the detachment entrusted to him back into Reichenbach.[79] On this day, the Coalition army, shielded by the Lifeguard Jägers and other units from Yermolov's detachment, had calmly withdrawn from Reichenbach to Görlitz, where they took up advantageous positions.

Our regiment was stationed at Reichenbach on 11 [23] May, until Miloradovich's rearguard relieved General Yermolov's detachment, and it then withdrew, following the rest of the Guard, along the main road to the Neisse River, via Mengelsdorf, Königshain, Nieder Markersdorf, and Ebersbach and on towards Löwenberg [Lwówek Śląski].[80] The Guard reached Lauban [Lubań] on that same

75 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 242.
76 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 230.
77 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 243.
78 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 256.
79 M.S.A. No. 1761, p. 247; Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 257.
80 M.S.A. No. 2057, p. 126.

day. Here, the Tsar ordered the the Guard infantry regiments to be formed into two divisions, and our regiment, together with the Izmailovsky and Guard *Équipage*, formed the second brigade of the 1st Guards Infantry Division, of which the first brigade was made up of the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments.[81]

On 12 [24] May, the Guard arrived in Löwenberg; reached Goldberg [Złotoryja] on 13 [25] May,[82] where a new commander-in-chief was appointed on 14 [26] May. Wittgenstein's position as commander-in-chief, extremely difficult and extremely constrained from the very moment of his appointment, now after two battles in which the Coalition forces, under his direction, had been unsuccessful and were forced to retreat, became even less comfortable, and he asked the Tsar to relieve him from the role as commander-in-chief and transfer command of the Coalition army to Barclay, to which Supreme consent was granted.[83]

From Goldberg, Emperor Alexander Pavlovich wanted to retreat towards Breslau, but at the request of the King of Prussia, the line of march was changed, and the Coalition army moved to Schweidnitz [Świdnica], where they wanted to take a flanking position relative to the line of the French army's advance.

On 15 [27] May, the Guard moved from the Katzbach River [Kaczawa], as part of Count Wittgenstein's right column, and reached Jauer [Jawor] on that same day. From that day on, following the defeat inflicted on the French vanguard by Blücher at Haynau [Chojnów], they pursued feebly, observing the greatest caution. On 16 [28] May the Guard arrived in Striegau [Strzegom].[84] In view of the advance by the entire French army against the Coalition, they decided to take up positions behind Schweidnitz on the high ground at Pilzen [Boleścin] in order to delay the enemy, where the entire Coalition army arrived on 19 [31] May. The Guard co-located in this position with the grenadiers and cuirassiers, under Miloradovich's command, in the second line, and were stationed behind the grenadiers.[85]

Napoleon, having seen that the Coalition were retreating towards Schweidnitz, occupied Goldberg, Liegnitz [Legnica], Breslau, and then, in view of the agreement with the Coalition to pause military operations from 20 May [1 June], initially for 36 hours, and then for three days, halted his army and established his *quartier général* in Neumarkt [Środa Śląska].[86]

This position of Napoleon's army, in which elements of the French force located at Breslau were behind the right wing of the position occupied by the Coalition at Pilzen, gave Barclay de Tolly the opportunity to suggest at the council of war on 21 May [2 June] that Napoleon, exploiting the time taken by negotiations, might concentrate his army at Breslau and sever the Coalition line of retreat to the right bank of the Oder river by marching upstream. As a result of both Coalition sovereigns acknowledging Barclay's concerns as justified, he ordered all units, except the vanguards, to move to positions running from Strehlen [Strzelin] to the north of Nimptsch [Niemcza], where the Guard arrived on 22 May [3 June].[87]

The armistice.

The armistice negotiations, which had begun on 13 [25] May, were finally concluded on 23 May [4

81 Gordey Bulantsov, Sources for the History of the Russian Imperial Guard, first edition, p. 57.
82 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 262.
83 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 262.
84 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, pp. 269 to 270.
85 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 271.
86 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 232.
87 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 271.

June] with Napoleon's consent,[88] prompted by the extremely dismal state of the French forces.[89] However, the situation in the Coalition force was no better: the majority of the infantry regiments from the Russian army were at single-battalion strength, in some regiments the number of men available did not exceed 150 to 200; some brigades were commanded by staff captains. In the [light] cavalry regiments, rather than eight squadrons, there were two, three, and only a few had four. The artillery, after two major battles and many rearguard actions in which they had taken a most active part, needed to replenish their projectiles, while the reserve parks, due to the constant movements by the army, had changed their assigned directions and were scattered such that the chief of artillery himself did not have precise information on their locations. It was a frequent occurrence that formation commanders did not know exactly which regiments had been detached or attached, and the troops did not know which general commanded them. The soldiers were poorly dressed and shod. Prussian units were in a similar situation.[90]

It is therefore unsurprising that the Coalition needed a truce: by doing so they would gain time for the expected reinforcements to arrive from the Vistula and for the army to be put in order; finally, they hoped that during the truce they would finally win Austria over to their side. Napoleon also intended to use the truce to engage in the much-needed reorganisation of his forces.

By way of the treaty concluded at Neumarkt on 23 May [4 June], it was decided that the armistice should run for six weeks, that is, until 8 [20] July, not including the six days notice both sides were obliged to give each other before a resumption of military operations. Demarcation lines were established and a neutral strip of three to five *Meilen* [14 to 23 miles] was left between the two sides, into which neither the French nor the Coalition could enter.[91]

During the armistice, the Allied headquarters were established in Reichenbach im Eulengebirge [Dzierżoniów]. Emperor Alexander took up residence in Schloss Peterswaldau [Pałac w Pieszycach], seven *versta* [4⅔ miles] from Reichenbach.[92] All units were stationed in cantonment quarters in the vicinity of Schweidnitz. The Guard were stationed at Reichenbach, in the beautiful villages located at the foot of the Fichtelgebirge [*sic*, Eulengebirge or Góry Sowie]. Our regiment had quarters in the village of Leutmannsdorf [Lutomia Górna].[93] The troops finally enjoyed constant rest here after eleven months of continuous campaigning.

Awards were also issued here to those who had distinguished themselves at Lützen and Bautzen. The Guard Jägers received many awards: a Supreme Commendation for Major General Bistrom; the Order of St. Anne, 2nd class with diamonds for Colonel Makarov, and captains Svechin and Rall 3rd; the Order of St. Vladimir, 3rd class for Colonel Richter 2nd; the Order of St. Anne, 2nd class to captains Penskoy 3rd and Penskoy 4th, Staff Captain Lieders, lieutenants Count Voinovich, Prince Kozlovsky and Krivtsev; the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class to Staff Captain Kurzhevsky, lieutenants Bublik, Tolmachev, Kvitsinsky, Arbuzov, Frolov-Bagreev, Baturlin, Schumann, sub-lieutenants Volkov, Meftodovsky, Kaminsky, Krylov, Yermolaev and Ensign Norov; Golden Swords inscribed '*за храбрость*' for lieutenants Yesakov and Repninsky; Lieutenant Yermolov was promoted to staff captain; Supreme Commendations for ensigns Barnovolokov, Perkurov 1st, Perkurov 2nd, Krivtsev, Golenishchev-Kutuzov, Chernyshev 1st, Chernyshev 2nd, Kuzmin and Baron Schilling.[94] In a word,

88 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 274.
89 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 272.
90 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 268.
91 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, pp. 274 to 275.
92 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 338.
93 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 31, p. 144.
94 M.B. Award nominations, bundle 14, No. 4, pp. 117 and 319.

not a single officer from the regiment who was with the Colours and took part in the Battle of Lützen was left without a reward. Of those Guard Jäger officers who were not with the regiment on the relevant day, the following also received awards for Lützen and Bautzen: Captain Akhsharumov, serving under Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn, and Captain comte Saint-Priest 3rd, serving under Lieutenant General comte Saint-Priest, received the Order of St. Anne, 2nd class, and Staff Captain Bistrom, formerly serving under Count Wittgenstein, received the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class.[95] In addition, two *Feldwebel*, nine non-commissioned officers, one drummer and 24 privates were awarded the cross of the Military Order for their courage and example to others during their time in the firing line.[96]

The replacement battalion of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment.

Throughout the armistice, every arm of service and army directorate was working hard to bring the army into proper order, so as to be fully prepared to wage a new campaign, the inevitability of which no one doubted. The men assigned to the various regiments were allocated according to their affiliation; the replacement battalions and squadrons located with the corps were directed to replenish their regiments. Our regiment was completed by members of the regiment's reserve battalion, which reached the regimental camp at Strehlen numbering 481 men on 22 May [3 June].[97] Many convalescent soldiers returned to their regiments from hospitals during the armistice. Few men went sick at this time and the chronically ill were sent to Silesian hospitals, and from there to the Duchy of Warsaw. The regiment was replenished with new recruits before the end of the armistice. Cartridges and artillery projectiles were brought from Russia and Britain, but not all of them were in our calibres.

As for provisioning, the situation seemed hopeless at the beginning of the armistice: the regimental supply trains had no hard tack at all, and the mobile magazines were lagging far behind the army. The part of Silesia held by Coalition forces had already been exhausted. Provisions were initially delivered from the nearest Prussian fortresses, then requisitions were made and provisions began to be delivered from Warsaw, Krakau and Thorn. Many of the supplies were acquired locally, covertly from Austrian territory in particular. The population of the neutral zone provided a lot of grain. Eventually, the mobile magazines, consisting of some 3,000 agricultural carts and originally intended for the former Army of Moldavia, arrived with over 60,000 *pud* [967 British tons] of hard tack. All this not only ensured proper and sufficient provisioning of the army during the armistice, but also made it possible to replenish the supply trains at the beginning of the campaign such that the army set off on the march having enough hard tack with it in its mobile magazines for 24 days and, in addition, regiments carried ten days' worth of provisions on the man and in their organic transport.

The resupply of clothing and footwear to the troops was also stepped up. Our regiment, having received cloth from the Duchy of Warsaw, managed to stitch up coats and greatcoats, and due to the lack of gray cloth, white and blue were used for greatcoats. Linen for summer trousers was

95 M.B. Award nominations, bundle 14, No. 8.

96 *Feldwebel* Ivan Buylov and Ivan Popkov; non-commissioned officers Nikolay Spiridonov, Pyotr Sidorov, Nazar Zakharov, Stepan Artemiev, Lukyan Kondratiev, Nikolay Yermolin, Andrey Parfentiev, Klim Zhukov and Yegor Gramotkin; drummer Addulman-Yekubov; privates Yuda Lomakin, Pavel Barabanshchikov, Nikoay Demyanov, Mikhey Terkin, Timofey Shchepetov, Matvey Ivanov, Nikita Torin, Moisey Yermolaev, Nikita Yegorov, Zakhar Usaltsev, Arefy Fedyankov, Ivan Paliev, Pavel Belorukov, Makar Pankratiev, Ivan Zelentsov, Ivan Bocherov, Vasily Timofeev, Parfen Shalin, Dmitry Morozov, Pyotr Zhizhenko, Gavriil Martemyanov, Trofim Gavrilov, Yekim Bulagov, Andrey Shchuravin (extracted from minutes of the Department of Inspections, desk 5, second section, 1814, register 137, bundle 95, No. 91, pp. 33 to 35).

97 For details of the reserve battalion, see Appendix IV to Chapter 6.

purchased in Silesia. A total of 200,000 pairs of boots were brought to the army from Russia. Thanks to all these arrangements, our regiment, as with other units, was able to set out on the new campaign in adequately good clothing and footwear.[98]

At the time when the regiment, having been replenished its ranks from the reserve battalion, was intensively preparing for a new campaign, a new reserve battalion was raised within the Empire, which was first stationed in the Bielostock [Białystok] *Oblast* in the village of Krupets [*sic*, Krupice?], Drogichin [Drohiczyn] *Uezd* (later in the Grodno Governorate), and then moved to the Duchy of Warsaw, in July to the village of Okuniew.[99]

The operational army's units had already been brought into full order by mid [late] June; in late June [early July], the Tsar began to inspect each of the corps stationed in Silesia one by one and found them in a most satisfactory condition. Among those present at the review of the Guard Corps was the eldest daughter of the King of Prussia, 15-year-old Prinzessin Charlotte von Preußen, later Empress Alexandra Feodorovna [wife of Tsar Nicholas I].[100] Meanwhile, in view of the peace negotiations that had begun in Prague, the armistice was extended for another three weeks, that is, until 29 July [10 August].[101]

The plans by all sides upon the resumption of hostilities in the autumn of 1813.

Diplomatic negotiations with Austria continued in the midst of the most active preparations for war, the result of which was the conclusion of a convention with this power on 15 [27] June, signed in Reichenbach im Eulengebirge. The essence of this convention was that Austria pledged to declare war on Napoleon if he did not satisfy the demands of the states that had concluded the convention. A congress was convened in Prague in order to negotiate with Napoleon, which, while supposedly intended to be a peace conference, in reality served only as a mask to gain time for mutual preparations for the decisive struggle.

Could peace be expected when Napoleon wanted to concede nothing, while the Coalition was demanding his immediate withdrawal behind the Rhine and the cession of its entire right bank? Time was passing and the period remaining for the congress soon began to be calculated not in days, but in hours and minutes. Finally, midnight on 30 July [11 August] arrived and Barclay de Tolly's announcement of the end of the armistice was sent to the French vanguard. The Prague Congress dispersed, and Austria declared war on France, joining the Coalition with Russia and Prussia.[102] By this time, every unit was already at full readiness for the offensive: on 11 [23] July, the cautious Barclay de Tolly had issued an order,[103] which he confirmed on 22 July [3 August], regarding being at immediate readiness to advance.[104]

On the eve of the termination of the armistice, the commander of the Guard Corps, General Lavrov, submitted a report that due to his worsening health, he was unable to command the corps; on that same day, Lieutenant General Yermolov was appointed in his place.[105]

According to the general operational plan worked out at Trachenberg [Żmigród], the Coalition

98 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, p. 382; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, pp. 266 to 267.

99 For details of the reserve battalion, see Appendix IV to Chapter 6.

100 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 268.

101 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 279.

102 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 276 to 282.

103 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 35.

104 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 134.

105 M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 299.

decided to form three armies, of which one, composed of troops from all three states, under the command of the Austrian *Feldmarschall* Prinz Schwarzenberg,[106] would be stationed in Bohemia, covering Prague; another, the so-called Army of Silesia, under Blücher's command, would be concentrated in Silesia, covering Breslau;[107] and the third, the Army of the North, under the Swedish *kronprins* Bernadotte,[108] would be in the vicinity of Berlin, covering the capital of Prussia. The Army of Bohemia, concentrated on the left bank of the Elbe, was to cross the Riesengebirge [Krkonoše], move into Saxony towards the French lines of communications to the Rhine and take possession of either Dresden or Leipzig, depending on the circumstances. This movement was already set to begin as soon as Napoleon, in order to prevent the union of the Coalition armies, turned his main force against Blücher or the *kronprins* of Sweden. The latter were supposed to evade a pitched battle, to distract Napoleon from Dresden and to commit to battle only when an opportunity presented itself to operate against a weaker enemy.[109]

At the beginning of the new campaign, finding himself thus enclosed from three directions, Napoleon decided to take full advantage of his internal lines of operations. Believing that there were only Austrian formations in Bohemia, which would be operating along the right bank of the Elbe through Gabel [Jablonné v Podještědí] and Zittau, and that the entire Russo-Prussian force was concentrated in Silesia, he made Dresden and its environs, which he had fortified during the armistice, as his base of operations, and ordered Saint-Cyr to be stationed in Pirna with his corps, a force of 26,000 men, in order to cover the roads from Bohemia to Saxony and to guard the bridge at Königstein; then, facing the Army of Silesia with 105,000 men under Macdonald, and the Army of the North with 71,000 men under Oudinot, he ordered the main force, numbering 122,000 men,[110] to be held at Görlitz and from there, depending on the circumstances, to attack whichever of the enemies came closest to them, and, by defeating the Coalition armies in detail, to prevent them from uniting.[111]

The march to Bohemia.

At the end of the armistice, only Austrian units for the planned Army of Bohemia or Main Army were stationed on the left bank of the Elbe at Mělník. It was necessary to add some of the Russo-Prussian forces located in Silesia to them. These formations included the Guard Corps. Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Trachenberg, the Coalition, taking advantage of the six-day notice period at the end of the armistice, began to carry out the necessary troop movements. It was decided to move the Russo-Prussian forces assigned to the Army of Bohemia from Silesia to Bohemia through the Riesengebirge in six columns and concentrate them in camp at Budin an der Eger [Budyně nad Ohří]. As a result, the Guard regiments assembled at Silberberg [Srebrna Góra] on 29 July [10 August], then marched to Neurode [Nowa Ruda] on 30 July [11 August], where they had a rest day on 31 July [12 August]. From Neurode the Russian Guard, having united with the Prussian, forming the Sixth Column, commanded by Lieutenant General Golitsyn, followed the

106 Strength of the Army of Bohemia: 261,000 men, 672 guns; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 291.

107 Strength of the Army of Silesia: 99,000 men 340 guns; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 292.

108 Strength of the Army of the North: 162,000 men, 387 guns; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 293.

109 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, pp. 286 to 288; Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, pp. 390 to 391.

110 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, pp. 294 to 295.

111 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 1, pp. 393 to 395; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 304.

Fourth Column to the Elbe through the Braunauer Wände [Broumovské Stěny].[112]

During the first days of the march, the heat was quite intense, but in the valleys surrounded by dense forests, it was less noticeable, and, moreover, the longest marches were made at night. The weather was beautiful. The columns slowly descended from the mountains one after another, like waves on the tide. A long line of guns and a forest of bayonets glittering in the moonlight; the silence of the night, occasionally broken by the neighing of horses, the songs of the vanguard, or the drawn-out roll of drums calling in the stragglers; the very sight of wild nature, presenting overhanging, moss-covered cliffs, centuries-old forests, noisily cascading waterfalls, and crosses erected on hills or chapels with the image of St. John of Nepomuk - all signs of Catholic lands - all this made a powerful impression with every step. The local population looked on in astonishment seeing foreign troops for the first time, because such martial sounds had not been heard in Bohemia at all since the Seven Years' War. The soldiers marched cheerfully, because a Russian soldier is always cheerful when advancing. They were reminiscing that exactly a year had passed since they had wandered the sandy ground around Smolensk, tormented by thirst and hunger, knowing rest neither by day nor by night in their wearisome retreat. Their situation had changed since then: victories had brought them to the hospitable and fortunate lands of Germany, so little like dull Lithuania and Belarus. Although they sometimes missed their cantonment quarters in Silesia, where they had been coddled and given vodka to drink, then the hope of visiting Saxony again made them forget Prussia. While the soldiers moved onwards without a care, the mood of the officers was far from placid. The following words, spoken to one of his regimental comrades by Colonel Petin, who was later to die with honour at Leipzig, clearly express the mental state and thoughts that troubled the officers:

> "At last these false rumours about peace and returning to Russia, spread at headquarters by lovers of balls and soirées, have been eradicated. A new campaign begins and presents the clear route to danger and glory. We shall fight the French once more, haughty from two fresh victories, and eventually, this spectre of their invincibility, which has blinded the eyes of the people in enlightened Europe for so long, shall disappear. Where will the first engagement take place? When will we so gladly hear the first cannon shot at the beginning of the campaign and producing an incomprehensible feeling in hearts ablaze with war?"[113]

After a week-long march, our regiment finally arrived at Elbekosteletz [Kostelec nad Labem] on the banks of the Elbe on 7 [19] August.[114] It is impossible not to note here the unjust attitude of the Austrian administration towards our troops that they encountered during the march. This carelessness became apparent almost at our first step into Austrian territory: as early as 4 [16] August, the commander of the Guard Corps, General Yermolov, reported to Miloradovich that the Austrian commissars were issuing so little straw that it was neither enough to thatch shelters, nor even enough for bedding. This incompetence by our ally Austria took on even greater proportions when it came to supplying the troops with provisions during their time in Bohemia.[115]

The Guard were supposed to go to Budin from Elbekosteletz, but on 7 [19] August orders were received from headquarters to go to Klumtschan [Chlumčany] rather than Budin, and they were ordered to set off at midnight or at two o'clock in the morning at the latest; they were to make a

112M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 254.

113Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, pp. 60 to 62.

114The march-route: 1 [13] August, Politz [Police nad Metují]; 2 [14] August, Skalitz [České Skalice]; 3 [15] August, Nedielischt [Nedělitě]; 4 [16] August, rest day; 5 [17] August, Skohowitz [Skochovice]; 6 [18] August, Lautschin [Loučeň]; 7 [19] August, Elbekosteletz (M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 254).

115M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 329.

halt for two or three hours at the halfway point.[116] The regiment marched in accordance with orders and, thanks to forced marches, reached at Brüx [Most] on 9 [21] August.

The Russian troops joined forces with the Austrians at Brüx, about whom one of our officers, a participant in the campaign, stated that:

> 'The cavalry and Hungarian infantry had a well-regulated and martial bearing, but the other infantry regiments were made up of all kinds of rabble: gypsies, Jews, Illyrian Slavs and those Croats who are now far from those light troops who became famous in the Seven Years' War under Laudon's and Nádasdy's leadership. The artillery that was used for the training of the men was in perfect condition, but all their equipment items were too heavy; the harness was in poor condition. It is astonishing that the Austrians have no horse artillery, rather, their gunners were seated on some sort of long, ugly cart, similar to a bench, one behind the other. In addition, the Austrian army was burdened with a massive supply train. The camp followers, women and pack mules dragged on behind them. All of this, of course, was bound to make crossing the mountains difficult.'[117]

Thus, the concentration of the Army of Bohemia was not completed until 9 [21] August, and could only begin the invasion of Saxony the next day. Thus, five whole days (5 to 9 [17 to 21] August inclusive), from the end of the armistice, were lost at the very beginning of hostilities. As a result, it was not the Army of Bohemia that was to begin operations, as the Coalition had planned, but the Army of Silesia, whose commander-in-chief, Blücher, having learned of the encroaching of enemy patrols into the neutral zone on 1 [13] August, immediately ordered the corps from his army to move forwards and seize it, without, however, crossing its extreme limit on the Katzbach river; on 4 [16] August, just as military operations could recommence, Blücher went forward. The dispersed French units began to retreat. Having learned of this, Napoleon decided to move against Blücher with the majority of his force and to push him back as far as possible. Whereupon, acting in accordance with the war plan developed in Trachenberg, Blücher began to fall back, drawing the French away from Dresden. On 9 [21] August, the eve of the day decided for the advance of the Army of Bohemia into Saxony, Napoleon was at Löwenberg with his reserves, that is, no less than 150 to 160 *versta* [100 to 107 miles] from Dresden.

The advance to Dresden.

The Army of Bohemia had to cross the Erzgebirge [Ore Mountains] in order to invade Saxony. This mountain range, rising 2,000 to 2,500 feet, runs parallel to the valley of the river Eger [Ohře]; the slopes facing Bohemia are very steep and mostly wooded; the crest is fairly level, in the form of a plateau, on which hills rise here and there and there are open clearings; the northern slopes of the range, towards Saxony, are very gentle, but are intersected by many river valleys, which present an even greater obstacle to troop movements than the steep slopes bordering Bohemia.[118]

On 10 [22] August, the entire Army of Bohemia marched into Saxony in four columns. In undertaking this movement, the Coalition headquarters believed that Napoleon was on the left bank of the Elbe with the bulk of his forces near Leipzig, as a result of which it had been decided to send one column (the right) towards Königstein, Pirna and Dresden in order to seize the crossings over the Elbe, and to send the remaining three columns through Freiberg and Chemnitz towards Leipzig, where they expected to attack Napoleon.[119]

116M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 361.
117Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 63.
118Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 108.
119Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, pp. 109 to 110.

The right column, consisting of the Russian I and II Corps, commanded by Count Wittgenstein, was sent from Teplitz [Teplice] along the highway towards Dresden via Nollendorf and Pirna. The 1st Guards Infantry Division was to follow this column as a reserve, and on 10 [22] August they set off from Brüx to Teplitz.[120] Our division was held here until 12 [24] August and then moved slowly into Saxony due to the Tsar believing that Napoleon could move into Bohemia from Silesia and disagreeing with the commander-in-chief, Prinz Schwarzenberg.[121]

Of the four columns, only Count Wittgenstein's encountered any resistance; a French division from Saint-Cyr's corps was in battle formation at Berggießhübel; Wittgenstein attacked them, drove them back, and occupied Pirna that same day, while General Helffreich's detachment,[122] which was at Großcotta, was sent to monitor Königstein. Saint-Cyr, aware of the impossibility of holding out against superior forces, began to draw his corps in towards Dresden and sent a report to Napoleon about the danger threatening this city.

In the meantime, the Coalition had learned from intercepted French dispatches, that Napoleon was deep in Silesia and that Dresden was held by just a single corps. Whereupon *Feldmarschall* Schwarzenberg was obliged to head towards Dresden rather than Leipzig, and he wheeled the three left columns north-east, directing them through Dippoldiswalde. Count Wittgenstein's column, moving towards Dresden, retained its previous line of march, with the exception of Helffreich's detachment, left at Königstein, and Prinz Eugen von Württemberg's II Corps, left at Pirna. On 13 [25] August, half of the Coalition army (87,000) was already concentrated near Dresden, but the Coalition was wary of immediately storming the city, which had no more than 30,000 defenders, and the troops spent that day in complete inaction. Taking Dresden was very important for the Coalition, since it would put Napoleon in a critical position, but to achieve this it was necessary to act decisively and quickly, because it was to be expected that Napoleon, operating along internal lines, would have time to come to the rescue of Dresden. And so it transpired: leaving only Macdonald to face Blücher, he hurried to help Saint-Cyr in Dresden with the rest of his force, and ordered one of his corps commanded by Vandamme to move towards Königstein, cross the Elbe there and, striking the rear of the Coalition army, sever its main and shortest route back to Bohemia.

Schwarzenberg, in moving towards Dresden with his army, paid particular attention to his right flank, for the protection of which the majority of Wittgenstein's column had been left at Pirna and Königstein.[123] 1st Guards Infantry Division was assigned and ordered to proceed to Dresden in order to reinforce the latter; on 13 [25] August, they arrived in Großcotta;[124] setting off from there in the early hours of 14 [26] August, they arrived at Ottendorf [Bahretal] at around midday.[125]

Meanwhile, Prinz Schwarzenberg, considering his right flank to be completely secured, decided to storm Dresden on 14 [26] August at four o'clock in the afternoon, but it was already too late: Napoleon had already arrived with his best troops and repelled Schwarzenberg's half-hearted attempt.[126]

120Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 111.

121Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 112.


122Tenginsk and Estland infantry regiments, Grand Duchess Yekaterin Pavlovich's Battalion, two squadrons of Lubny Hussars, one Cossack regiment and six guns (Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 113).

123Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, pp. 117 to 120.

124M.S.A. No. 1760.

125Aster, *Die Kriegsereignisse zwischen Peterswalde, Pirna, Königstein und Priesten im August 1813 und die Schlacht bei Kulm*, book 1, p. 84.

126Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, pp. 323 to 325.


Plan of Operations
From Pirna to Kulm
Pirna
to Dresden
Sonnenstein
Elbe
to Dohna
Zehista
Lilienstein
Königstein
Cotta
to Maxen
Gottleuba
Berggießhübel
Langenhennersdorf
Gottleuba
Hellendorf
Peterswald
Nollendorf
Tellnitz
Kninitz
Arbesau
Kulm
to Ebersdorf
Karbitz
Sobochleben
to Teplitz
Aussig

Operations by the Guard Jägers on the Pirna Plateau from 14 [26] August.

On that same day, Vandamme crossed the Elbe at Königstein, pushing back our relatively insignificant force with a corps of 37,000 men supported by artillery fire from this fortress. Prinz Eugen von Württemberg decided to move from Zehista to a more advantageous position in order to shield the rear of the Coalition army, namely, to Krietzschwitz and Struppen, where, taking advantage of the very rugged terrain, he hoped to delay and slow down the debouching of the French force, but, attacked here by superior numbers, he was forced to retreat in the early hours of 15 [27] August, and, considering the protection of the Coalition rear at Dresden more important than covering the routes to Bohemia, he withdrew to Pirna and Seidewitz [Bahretal] where he took up a position behind the Gottleuba river on the high ground between Lindin [*sic*, Lindigt?] and Großseidnitz [*sic*], rather than towards Nollendorf, as would have been more advantageous for the accomplishment of the second mission. Having retreated to the new position, Prinz Eugen von Württemberg lost communications with Helffreich's detachment, which had been isolated by the enemy.[127] Reporting to headquarters on the evening of 14 [26] August regarding the outcome of the action at Krietzschwitz and the measures he had taken, Prinz Eugen asked for the speedy dispatch of reinforcements to the troops of II Corps. *Feldmarschall* Schwarzenberg was surprised at the weakness of the detachment left at Königstein and ordered Barclay to strengthen this formation. Barclay limited himself to dispatching only 1st Guards Infantry Division under Lieutenant General Yermolov to assist the Prinz von Württemberg, which reached Zehista in the early hours of 15 [27] August and took up positions behind the Kohlberg.[128] In the division's ranks were 12 battalions, 9½ squadrons, 36 guns, 12 of which were horse artillery; numbering 7,000 infantry, 1,200 cavalry, for a total of 8,500 men.[129]

It had been raining since 12 o'clock that night, and as the wind picked up, the rain intensified to such an extent that it was impossible to kindle a fire.[130] Command of the combined forces at Pirna was taken on by Count Osterman-Tolstoy,[131] sent from headquarters, who thus assembled some 17,500 men, namely: 32 battalions, 13½ squadrons, one Cossack regiment, and 62 guns, that is, 8,500 guardsmen, 7,000 men from II Corps and Helffreich's detachment of 2,000 men.[132]

With these forces, in positions that did not quite meet the requirement of covering the shortest lines of communications with Bohemia, Count Osterman-Tolstoy had to expect most decisive operations by Vandamme, who had twice these numbers.

Throughout the next day, 15 [27] August, our infantry stood in battle formation, holding their muskets at the ready. The artillerymen were at their guns and the cavalry were formed up by divisions [pairs of squadrons] on the right flank. Rain and fog concealed the enemy movements and strength. However, a French detachment was visible forwards of our right flank, located on the Kohlberg, lying 600 paces from Zehista. The forward outposts of this detachment were located within pistol range of Zehista, which was held by two of Prince Shakhovsky's jäger battalions (4th and 34th Jäger Regiments). Firefights broke out here from time to time, interrupted by the rain, but Vandamme did not undertake any other operations and remained static all day on the Pirna plateau.

There was no word from the main army. It was true that a strong cannonade had been audible

127Aster, book 1, p. 84.
128Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 172.
129Aster, book 1, p. 88.
130M.S.A. No. 1760, document 3.
131Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 168.
132Aster, book 1, p. 88.

from the direction of Dresden since early morning, and no one in Osterman's detachment doubted that this was fire from a general battle. All was quiet around Königstein. There was also no word from Helffreich's detachment. Nobody knew what had happened to him. Eventually, Count Osterman-Tolsoy, greatly worried about his fate, ordered the commander of the Lifeguard Jägers, General Bistrom, to send one battalion to reinforce Prince Shakhovsky, who was holding Zehista (see Plan of Operations from Pirna to Kulm), and to go in search of Helffreich's detachment with the other two, and rescue him at all costs.

As the first battalion, commanded by Colonel Petin, having joined the 4th and 34th Jäger Regiments, drove the enemy skirmishers back to the crest of the Kohlberg with a bayonet charge, the second and third battalions, led by the regimental commander himself, bypassed Zehista and moved towards Königstein in column of route, in sixes. Two squadrons from the Tatar Ulan Regiment with six horse artillery pieces moved ahead of the Lifeguard Jägers, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bistrom. One of the battalion adjutants had been sent forward with several lancers by the regimental commander in order to scout out the route. Having passed a ruined manor house, where everything indicated the recent presence of enemy marauders, the jägers captured some young conscripts - Belgians and Badenese, from whom, however, they would learn nothing, and continued to head for Königstein in the same order. The Guard Jägers marched silently for a long time, in heavy rain, along difficult roads, tired and hungry, in order to search for Helffreich's detachment with the aim of rescuing him, remembering that helping one's own is the sacred duty of every warrior.

Suddenly, in the evening, the two battalions of Lifeguard Jägers were alerted as one: they could hear a firefight in the forest to their left. They immediately perked up and, quickening their pace, briskly marched towards the long-anticipated sound. The regiment soon reached the edge of a deep wooded ravine and immediately saw Helffreich's detachment apparently retreating on the far side. They were holding out in a small village and, with a deep ravine behind them, could easily be overrun. Darkness was already falling and it was vital to hurry and help the brave soldiers somehow. General Bistrom immediately placed the guns on the lip of the ravine under the protection of second battalion and straight away ordered Lieutenant Colonel Bistrom to open fire on the enemy column that had already broken into the village. At the same time, our third battalion, led by its commander, Colonel Makarov, scrambled directly across the ravine in order to reinforce Helffreich's detachment. The village caught fire from the very first shells lobbed by our artillerymen, and the flames halted the enemy. The ravine was deeper and wider than had appeared at first glance; despite every effort by the jägers, it was already dark by the time they had crossed the stream and climbed up the opposite bank and the fighting had to cease. Nevertheless, the effective artillery fire and the emergence of Colonel Makarov in the village forced the enemy to retreat behind the village and gave Helffreich's force the chance to join our regiment. Leaving an advanced screen force along the ravine, the jägers settled down to rest near a ruined village not far from the Elbe with a satisfied sense of mission accomplished. Thus, the Guard Jägers accomplished another modest, inconspicuous, yet difficult act of war.

The rain, which had stopped at dusk, resumed all night. Fires were extinguished. The Lifeguard Jägers lay in the mud, wrapped in their greatcoats; some officers put on their capes. The river and forest thundered. Ulan vedettes nodded drowsily on their horses, leaning on their lances; Cossacks scoured the roads and, encountering enemy patrols, exchanged fire. The north wind drove clouds scudding southwards and mountain peaks were hidden in the overcast; fog was spreading across the fields.

General Bistrom took advantage of this to obscure his withdrawal to Zehsta and, after giving his

detachment some rest, began the march. The enemy followed them: their cavalry took to ploughed fields and advanced at walking pace; their artillery, up to its axles in mud, was occasionally unlimbered and exchanged fire with ours. Eventually, after several hours of tiring marching, General Bistrom and his detachment reached the village of Zehista in the early hours and immediately received orders here to rejoin second and third battalions with the first.

At the same time as the two battalions from our regiment commanded by General Bistrom were so selflessly rescuing Helffreich's detachment, the first battalion had also not been idle under their commander Colonel Petin. They were located in Zehista, on the Pirna *chaussée* a point therefore of particular importance, since under the prevailing situation, control of this location gave the only hope of maintaining direct communications with Bohemia. The enemy stationed opposite Zehista could not observe our positions due to the bad weather and launched a reconnaissance in force in the evening. Several French battalions descended from the Kohlberg and attacked Colonel Petin's Guard Jägers. The Lifeguard Jägers, languishing in inactivity for almost the whole day, were just waiting for this. A fierce firefight ensued, but the rapid and accurate fire from the jägers did not hold the French back; they burst into the village, driving its defenders out of the first houses, who, however, held out in the last buildings. The jägers abruptly ceased firing and, as one man, inspired by Colonel Petin, charged with lowered bayonets at the French, who could not withstand this coordinated and powerful bayonet attack and retreated to the crest of the Kohlberg. The forward outposts from both sides returned to their original locations. In this action, our first battalion lost several men killed and some 30 men wounded. The enemy also left some 40 men killed or wounded between the village and the high ground. The darkness of night falling stopped the fighting. The high ridge dominating the Kohlberg and located within cannon range of it was illuminated by enemy campfires. Everyone was expecting a pitched battle the following day.[133]

Meanwhile, Napoleon, taking advantage of the success achieved the day before and the arrival of fresh reinforcements, decided to attack Schwarzenberg's army on 15 [27] August. Napoleon now had some 120,000 men,[134] while the Coalition had as many as 160,000 men.[135] Napoleon decided to exploit Prinz Schwarzenberg's mistakes in the disposition of his army by driving in both Coalition wings with simultaneous attacks. He was not entirely successful in this, because all the French attacks were broken by the stubborn resistance of the Russian troops on our right flank, but the defeat of the Austrians on the left flank, where an entire division under General Mesko was cut down or taken prisoner (some 13,000 Austrians had immediately thrown down their weapons), forced Schwarzenberg to begin a retreat and the entire Army of Bohemia had to recross the ridge of the Riesengebirge [*sic*, Erzgebirge] (via the same roads along which it had proceeded to Dresden), in inclement weather, burdened with baggage trains and a multitude of wounded and pursued by a tireless enemy.[136]

Osterman's detachment knew nothing of this retreat by the Coalition army for quite some time. Having sent all the trains to Peterswald [Petrovice] via Berggießhübel on the evening of 15 [27] August, where, having escaped danger, they arrived safely at nine o'clock in the evening, the entire detachment remained in its previous positions.[137]

Our regiment, after taking every precaution against a surprise attack, being obliged to be alert due to the proximity of the enemy, stood to arms and lay in wait at the entrances to the village. The

133Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, pp. 74 to 78.
134Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 137.
135Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 138.
136Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, pp. 154 to 158.
137Aster, book 1, p. 90.

artillery, leaving the horses in harness, unbridled them only to give them some oats and halted outside the village. The cavalry and Helffreich's detachment were positioned on the right. Enemy campfires were visible from the windows of the manor house in the middle of Zehista, covering the Kohlberg and the dominant high ground. Everything was quiet, when suddenly musket shots rang out in the forward screen. General Bistrom immediately sent an officer there to find out what was going on. It turned out that a Badenese officer, sent to the commander of their pioneers with dispatches from a French general, was accidentally led to our outposts in the dark by his guide, where he was mortally wounded. The documents carried by this officer contained orders to repair the roads already occupied by the enemy leading to our rear through the forests.

Yet what was most important and unpleasant for Osterman's detachment was that these documents also spoke of the victory won over the Army of Bohemia. The news, although written in an extremely boastful style, nevertheless seemed to agree with reality, since the cannonade that was audible all day on 15 [27] August and constantly increased from Dresden towards the mountains, as well as the crowds of marauders and wounded Austrians scattered across the fields, confirmed it. General Bistrom immediately sent an officer to Yermolov with all the documents taken from the captured Badenese. Everyone in Osterman's detachment was extremely surprised that the detachment had to learn of an event of such importance by chance and from the enemy. The question inevitably arose as to whether the army would have retreated beyond the Riesengebirge [*sic*, Erzgebirge], forgetting our corps and without issuing them any orders.[138] But soon, in the early hours, *Flügel-Adjutant* [equerry] Wolzogen returned to Osterman;[139] he had been sent by him to the commander-in-chief the day before with a report on the state of affairs around Pirna. Wolzogen brought official news of the Coalition failure on 15 [27] August at Dresden and their retreat towards the Teplitz valley; then, at dawn, Osterman received orders from Barclay de Tolly, which told him to retreat towards Teplitz with the forces entrusted to him, and: 'if the enemy has managed to block the line of retreat towards Peterswald, then the units stationed at Pirna must move to Maxen to rejoin the army.'[140]

Napoleon, convinced of the Coalition army's retreat from Dresden, vigorously pursued them at first, and he went through Pirna after Osterman himself with the *Garde*, whose path was to be blocked at Peterswald by Vandamme, who had orders to seize Teplitz.

Had Vandamme actually succeeded in occupying this location, the retreating Coalition army, numbering some 140,000 men, would have been placed in a critical position, because the French could have advanced from Teplitz to engage our columns descending from the mountains, where the units were being obstructed at every step by the supply trains and artillery, slowly making their way along the narrow, winding paths, while Murat, Marmont, Victor and Saint-Cyr were pursuing the army from behind.

Osterman's force represented the only possible obstacle to Vandamme on his way to Teplitz, but, firstly, they were too few for this objective - only 17,000 men against Vandamme's 37,000 men; secondly, Napoleon was moving up behind them with his *Garde*; and thirdly, Barclay's orders for Osterman to retreat towards Maxen, if carried out, would have given Vandamme free access to Teplitz. Fortunately, on 16 [28] August, Napoleon stopped pursuing the Coalition forces in Pirna, for an unexplained reason (it has been claimed that he felt ill),[141] and returned to Dresden, although this remained unknown to both Russian forces and Vandamme.

138Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, pp. 78 to 79.
139Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 171.
140Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 171.
141Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 169.

From Osterman's point of view, the small number of troops he had could not be a compelling reason for refusing to confront Vandamme; these units were elite, tested, and led by such generals as Yermolov, Prinz Eugen von Württemberg, Baron Rosen, Potemkin, Khrapovitsky, and Bistrom. The matter, then, notwithstanding Barclay's orders, came down to, firstly, securing a line of retreat as quickly as possible and, secondly, a method of executing this in such a way as to secure the Army of Bohemia's possible lines of retreat and thus save it from catastrophe. There was only one way to accomplish this, namely, to make a flanking march along the Pirna *chaussée* from Zehista to Berggießhübel for a distance of two German *Meilen* across the front of Vandamme's entire corps, and to forestall him at Teplitz. The original concept for such a bold move belonged to Prinz Eugen von Württemberg.[142] However, Count Osterman did not immediately commit to carrying out this completely correct plan and continued to talk for some time about retreating to Maxen, considering himself not to have the right to expose the Guard to danger. The Prinz von Württemberg vainly tried to convince the Count that nothing could be more honourable for the Guard than to sacrifice themselves for the salvation of the entire army. Eventually, after the prinz had declared that he "would even go to Peterswald with his force alone" Osterman, ready to face any danger, but still unconvinced by the prinz's arguments, went to Yermolov and, after consulting with him, said: "Well, I have also decided to go to Peterswald!"[143] Thus, only Yermolov's influence could force Osterman to agree with the Prinz von Württemberg's entirely correct reasoning. And so, it was decided to retreat to Peterswald. The units of Osterman's detachment were taking on a combat mission that rarely falls to the lot of such an insignificant formation. Their feat was great, but they were not afraid of it and with the selflessness of the Russian soldiery they went forward, remembering that the existence of the entire retreating army and even the precious life of the beloved Emperor accompanying it depended on them.

The retreat to Nollendorf.

The route that Osterman's detachment had to travel from Zehista to Peterswald was extremely disadvantageous: steep ascents and descents were encountered on it every minute, often reaching 15 degrees or more. The road itself was narrow, strewn with stones, splintered rock, and potholes; there were exposed tree roots in places, and the path often ran along the slope. The mountain slopes on either side of the road were covered for the most part with smooth, almost polished rock outcrops, which made movement dangerous. Tussock grass grew between the boulders, the stems of which were covered with an extraordinary number of small thin blades, as a result of which the entire surface of the soil was covered as if with a thick green carpet.

When making one's way across such a carpet, it was impossible to step out confidently, and even less possible to see the rocks hidden under the tussocks; thus the men often stumbled and also got entangled in the long, elastic and strong stems of this grass. As a result, every step was unsteady and more tiring even than on the bare rock.

There were often places where there was a danger of falling into deep pits or crevices, through similarly treacherous carpets of moss. A significant obstacle to movement here were the fallen pine and spruce needles, which made the ground as slippery as ice. Occasionally, no sooner had the men had struggled to the top of a steep slope, than they immediately slipped back down again and had to make the climb once more.[144]

Taking all these obstacles into account, one can judge what dire labour the troops had to endure

142Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 171.
143Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 171.
144Aster, book 1, p. 10.

here, especially if one remembers that these troops, short of food and without a moment's rest, were forced to fight against a much more numerous enemy and literally break into battle with every step.

The orders for the move to Peterswald were as follows: the Prinz von Württemberg was to immediately attack the enemy position in the direction of its weakest point, at Krietzschwitz, with the greater part of his corps and with Helffreich's detachment; General Yermolov was to attack the Kohlberg with the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, 4th Jägers, Reval Infantry and Tatar Ulans; Osterman decided to immediately set off along the *chaussée* himself, with the remaining regiments of 1st Guards Infantry Division, a significant portion of the artillery and the Guard cavalry, under cover of the attacks by the Prinz von Württemberg and Yermolov, in order to reach Peterswald as quickly as possible. The units from II Corps were to follow him, while the rearguard under Major General Knorring was at the tail of the column.[145] *Flügel-Adjutant* Wolzogen was immediately sent to the Tsar to report on the situation in Osterman's detachment. The Tsar received this important news on the evening of 16 [28] August in Altenburg.[146]

On the morning of 16 [28] August the weather was cloudy; the day broke calmly. The units from II Corps assigned to operate against Krietzschwitz, took up positions on the right flank of our regiment along the main road. At eight o'clock in the morning, enemy skirmishers descended from the Kohlberg, crossed the stream and opened fire, spreading out across the kitchen gardens surrounding Zehista. Our marksmen from third battalion, commanded by sub lieutenants Yermolov and Krylov, holding the village but having no orders to go into action, responded weakly to this fire; but then Sub Lieutenant Yermolov, having lost patience and noticing that the French, having pushed back our marksmen, had already captured the outer houses, assembled the skirmishers' reserve and rushed at the enemy with bayonets fixed. The French were unable to withstand the sudden and concerted onslaught by the Guard Jägers, retreated in disarray to their shelters on the slopes of the Kohlberg and opened up heavy musket volleys from there.[147] During this attack by the jägers, Sub Lieutenant Yermolov suffered a bullet wound to the neck, and Sub Lieutenant Krylov suffered a severe contusion. At this point, the battalion commander, Colonel Makarov, galloped up to our marksmen and, seeing that they were already deeply involved in combat, sent the 7th and 8th jäger companies to reinforce them, with which, as usual, they drove the enemy from the Kohlberg at bayonet point into the ravine separating it from the dominant high ground opposite. Having captured the Kohlberg, Colonel Makarov placed his half-battalion on its very crest, not entirely successfully, under enemy artillery fire.[148]

By this time the French had taken Großcotta, near the location of Helffreich's detachment. The Prinz von Württemberg came up in support of this detachment and the French not only had to abandon Großcotta, but also retreat beyond Krietzschwitz.[149]

The weather cleared up at around midday and the French, noticing the extended positions of the Russian units, decided to break through the centre, right where our regiment was stationed. Every French battery opened up a general bombardment. The summit of the Kohlberg, held by our 7th and 8th jäger companies, was pelted with a hail of round shot, while infantry masses, having crossed the ravine, were ascending the slopes at a rapid pace. The Guard Jägers involuntarily recalled Bautzen. They strove to hold their position with all their might, but, disordered by artillery

145 4th Jägers, Reval Infantry and Tatar Ulans.
146 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 172.
147 Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 80.
148 Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 81.
149 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 172.

fire, despite their steadfastness and courage, despite the 3rd carabinier and 9th jäger companies coming to their aid, they could not hold out: under the onslaught of an enemy five times stronger, they were driven from their position and pursued all the way to Zehista.[150] Nevertheless, the Guard Jägers third battalion had achieved their aim: covered by their actions on Mount Kohlberg, Osterman had managed to form his division into column and, dressing by the left, had led them to Zehista. It was necessary to pass through a defile and the valley in which the village lay, within musket range of the enemy, who had retaken the Kohlberg. General Yermolov, in order to cover and disguise this flanking movement, decided to operate on the offensive, for which he gave orders to General Bistrom to retake the Kohlberg by storm. The first and second battalions of our regiment, commanded by Colonel Richter, formed into attack columns, under the heaviest small arms fire, charged with fixed bayonets and in the blink of an eye flew up to the crest of the Kohlberg.[151] Here is how Lieutenant General Yermolov summarised this attack in his report to Count Osterman (see Appendix V to Chapter 6): 'I had only just issued the order to Major General Bistrom to attack the Kohlberg when the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment appeared on the summit. The obstacles were gone, the enemy was gone.'[152]

This is what Count Osterman reported to the commander-in-chief (see Appendix VI to Chapter 6): 'On the morning of 16 [28] August, Major General Bistrom attacked the Kohlberg heights, which were very important in this situation. The battalions of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment rose like a whirlwind and the high ground was taken.'[153]

These two reports serve as an outstanding assessment of our regiment's attack on the Kohlberg; they show that the Lifeguard Jägers carried out this difficult mission brilliantly and truly shielded the movement by their division, which passed through the defile unhindered and reached the Peterswald road. Having been pushed back into the ravine by the valiant jägers' attack, the enemy reformed on the opposite bank of the ravine and began to produce a most powerful suppressive fire, to which the Guard Jägers' marksmen, led by their officers, responded no less ardently and extremely effectively.

Captain Penskoy 4th, lieutenants Tolmachev, Count Voinovich, Kirsanov, Schumann, Krivtsev, Bolkashin, Baturin; sub lieutenants Volkov, Strandmann and ensigns Barnovolokov, Chernyshev 1st, Chernyshev 2nd, Tiesenhausen, Yedashev and Saveliev 2nd stayed in the firing line the entire time and encouraged the lower ranks through their example of courage and fearlessness. Many of them were wounded, some also very seriously: Captain Penskoy, with a bullet in the leg; Count Voinovich, in the chest and both legs; Kirsanov, with two bullets in the leg; Chernyshev 1st, with a bullet in the right shoulder; Chernyshev 2nd, with bullets in both legs; Bolkashin, with a bullet in the leg; Colonel Richter, Krivtsev, Baturin and Barnovolokov suffered severe contusions.[154] Count Voinovich later died from the wounds he received in this action. Every effort by the French to recapture the Kohlberg was in vain.[155]

Our intensive attacks on the Kohlberg and Krietzschwitz and the stubborn defence of these points misled the French; they began to concentrate troops from their left flank toward Krietzschwitz and even recalled some of the units there that had been placed between Langenhennersdorf and

150Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 81.

151Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 83.

152Yermolov's report No. 1296 to Osterman, dated 22 August [3 September] 1813 in M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, p. 502.

153Count Osterman-Tolstoy's report to the commander-in-chief, in M.S.A. No. 1760.

154M.B. Award nominations, bundle 14, No. 4.

155Aster, book 1, p. 103.

Berggießhübel with the aim of severing Osterman's route. All that was left near Berggießhübel was one fairly significant detachment.[156]

In the meantime, Yermolov continued moving towards Berggießhübel with the Guard and artillery. The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment were at the tail of his column, whose battalions had been relieved on the Kohlberg by the 4th Jägers, Reval Infantry and Helffreich's detachment.

The battle against the numerous enemy was still ongoing at Krietzschwitz and the Kohlberg; fearing that these troops would be overwhelmed by superior French numbers, Count Osterman ordered Yermolov to halt the Guard.[157]

At this point, the Prinz von Württemberg noticed from the Cottaer Spitzberg that Vandamme, remaining in a defensive position at the Kohlberg and Krietzschwitz, had sent a strong column into the forest to envelope us and forestall us at the Berggießhübel defile.[158] Thus, Osterman's order to halt the Guard only facilitated this French manoeuvre, and therefore the Prinz von Württemberg, having seen that the enemy was already at Bahra [five miles south of Krietzschwitz], that is, closer to Berggießhübel than the head of the Russian column, immediately sent a report on this to Osterman, warning him that he would certainly run into the enemy at Berggießhübel.[159] However, Vandamme, deceived by false intelligence of Russians moving from Rosenthal [six miles south of Königstein] towards his left flank, withdrew his units from Bahra, without even reinforcing his detachment already at Berggießhübel.

It was one o'clock in the afternoon. Count Osterman ordered the Guard to break camp and move forward, while the units defending the Kohlberg and Krietzschwitz were to abandon them and hold only Zehista with the rearguard until the entire detachment had reached the main Peterswald road, after which they were to follow the rest of the force. Everything was executed in accordance with these orders. The rearguard, with horse artillery and deployed skirmishers and flankers, shielded the movement of all of Osterman's units, marching in a single column. The enemy advanced slowly behind our force, pelted with canister and a hail of musket balls. Flankers from both sides closed with each other, sounding first the attack and then rallying calls.[160]

At two o'clock the regiments from 1st Guards Division passed the village of Berggießhübel without hindrance, but as soon as the head of the column, having passed the village, began to climb the steep slopes of the Dürrenberg and entered the forest beyond this mountain,[161] they were engaged with artillery and small arms fire: the French, having batteries on the road, were stationed on both verges in columns in two echelons and had completely blocked the route.[162] The Preobrazhensky Regiment, which was at the head of the column, drove the enemy back with a bayonet charge and put them to flight. The advance continued. The Lifeguard Semenovsky relieved the Preobrazhensky. Two battalions of Guard Jägers, on Yermolov's orders, were left to guard the newly crossed defile under their regimental commander until the arrival of II Corps.[163] The Lifeguard Jägers' third battalion were ordered to pursue the defeated French into the forest towards Langenhennersdorf, while at the same time holding back the increasing enemy numbers with their flankers. The rest of the Guard continued the hasty retreat towards Hellendorf with their

156Mixailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, p. 344.
157Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 173.
158Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 83.
159Aster, book 1, p. 106.
160Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 84.
161Aster, book 1, p. 109.
162Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 85.
163Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 174.

artillery aiming to reach this defile before the French;[164] however, they did not succeed. The French, advancing along country roads parallel to the main road, thanks to their superiority in numbers, pushed our flankers back, cut through to the main road and, having captured the high ground at Hellendorf, blocked the route to Peterswald once more. The Semenovsky Regiment, after varying success with the assistance of artillery, eventually forced the enemy to retreat into the forest and cleared the road.[165]

Helffreich's detachment proceeded directly behind the Guard, followed by the Murom and Minsk infantry regiments commanded by Prince Shakhovsky. As they approached the Dürrenberg, these regiments were attacked by significant forces sent there by Vandamme, who had become convinced that the rumour of a Russian offensive from Rosenthal was unfounded.

The Prinz von Württemberg moved to assist the Murom and Minsk men himself with the Chernigov Regiment,[166] but he did not manage to arrive in time, and elements of Prince Shakhovsky's regiments were cut off and scattered. The Chernigov Regiment, deployed as skirmishers, were overrun. Whereupon General Bistrom, staying behind at the Dürrenberg near the forest to await the arrival of II Corps, went to their rescue with his jägers.[167] Led in orderly fighting formation by Bistrom, the Guard Jägers moved up to the Chernigov Regiment and stood in column astride the road. The Chernigov men, yielding to the superior enemy numbers, were forced back, passing through the jägers' ranks, who halted the French advance with their chests.[168] The onward retreat by units of II Corps continued under the protection of the Guard Jäger skirmishing screen, who began to fall back behind II Corps, continuing to exchange fire with the French as far as the edge of the Hellendorf forest. Thus, the jägers saved a significant part of II Corps from a terrible danger, gloriously rescuing their comrades in arms once again, valiantly fighting against a numerous enemy.

The marksmen from II Corps relieved the Lifeguard Jägers at Hellendorf. The day was drawing to a close; it was already four o'clock by the time the Guard passed through Peterswald. The Guard regiments, exhausted by the fierce fighting, formed two lines and halted to spend the night behind the village on gentle slopes. Helffreich's detachment was bivouacked forwards of the Guard, and ahead of them stood Prince Shakhovsky's units, positioned in front of Peterswald. General Knorring was ahead of Prince Shakhovsky with the Tatar Ulans.[169]

Due to some of the rearguard having been cut off from the main body, as well as due to the losses of that day, II Corps was greatly weakened and had no more than 2,000 to 2,500 men in its ranks.[170]

The French reached Hellendorf at six o'clock in the evening, after the Russian units had occupied all the aforementioned positions, and their skirmishers immediately began to exchange fire, but due to the onset of darkness, this soon ceased. The French position was separated from ours by a ravine; the forward screens from both sides stood in sight of each other. Campfires flickered in both armies and illuminated the gloomy forests of the Riesengebirge [*sic*, Erzgebirge].[171]

Kulm on 17 [29] August.

164Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 174.
165Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 86.
166Aster, book 1, p. 112.
167Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 175.
168Aster, book 1, p. 112.
169Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 175.
170Aster, book 1, p. 114.
171Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 86.

In the early hours of 17 [29] August, Osterman sent a message to the King of Prussia in Teplitz that he considered himself obliged to retreat beyond the Eger river. Having received this news, the King ordered his *Flügeladjutant* Natzmer to go to Osterman immediately and, having informed him of the state of the army and the movements of the various corps, pleaded with him to resist the onward enemy advance to the bitter end; otherwise, the complete disintegration of the entire army was feared and - moreover - might endanger the emergence of Tsar Alexander, who was still in the mountains.[172]


Osterman had already sent his trains to Kulm [Chlumec] during the night; they spread alarm and disorder upon arriving there and then went through Karbitz [Chabařovice] to Außig [Ústí nad Labem] and onwards towards Prague, jettisoning baggage from the wagons along the way. Some of the trains were torched due to the impossibility of saving them; others were abandoned along the road.[173]

The day of 17 [29] August was dawning, a glorious day in the annals of Russian military history. At daybreak, the first thing the troops saw, as fog and smoke from the bivouacs covered the mountains and the overcast sky was illuminated by the glow of dying fires, was a long line of wagons loaded with wounded being sent to Teplitz.[174] At six o'clock in the morning, our lancers, who were stationed at the front, were attacked suddenly by French cavalry and driven off; they smashed into Prince Shakhovsky's infantry column passing through the village at the time, with the aim of taking up positions behind Peterswald and serving as the rearguard of the entire detachment, which had been ordered to begin the withdrawal to Nollendorf, where it was intended to take up positions and delay Vandamme. The enemy cavalry, taking advantage of the fog, crashed into the column in several places and scattered the infantry. The disorder in Prince Shakhovsky's force obliged Osterman to accelerate his retreat, while our cavalry raced up to engage the French, but could not hold them back. By supporting the cavalry with infantry, the French persistently pursued the retreating Osterman, and the enemy skirmishers, intermixed with the Russians, kept them under pressure all the way to the Nollendorf plateau. General Yermolov had managed to deploy Khrapovitsky's brigade - the Lifeguard Izmailovsky and Jäger regiments with several guns - into battle formation. The Guardsmen, having let the units from II Corps back, halted the enemy.[175] Whereupon the French began a cannonade and firefight, despite the thick fog that prevented them from observing anything for two hours.

However, this fire did little harm to our regiments, since most of the round shot smashed into the forest, where centuries-old pine trees fell to the ground with a crash. The rallied regiments from II Corps relieved the Guardsmen, who withdrew to Kulm. As the fog cleared and the French artillery began to cause significant damage to our rearguard, they began to fall back behind the Guard. At this moment, General Knesebeck came to Osterman and handed him a handwritten letter from the King of Prussia, in which the King, notifying him of the dangerous situation of the Coalition army, which was struggling in the mountains in the greatest difficulties at that moment, urged Osterman to hold out to the bitter end in his position at Nollendorf, with the aim of securing the army's exit from the defiles.[176] But the enemy had already managed to seize the Nollendorf plateau. It was impossible to even think about wresting back control of it, and therefore, making the most of the Guard regiments passing through Kulm at the time, Osterman instructed Yermelov to take up the

172Aster, book 1, p. 131.
173Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 178.
174Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 87.
175Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 179.
176Notes on the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, part 2, p. 87; Aster, book 1, p. 131.

first advantageous position and place the Guard on it. As a result, having come down from the mountains, Yermolov formed the Guard and cavalry up in battle order on positions behind Kulm at Priesten [Přestanov] behind the Straden [Stradov] stream.[177] This position was extremely weak, but it was the last one before Teplitz, and therefore 1st Guards Division together with the regiments from II Corps had to stop the incomparably stronger enemy there at all costs.



This position is located seven *versta* [4⅔ miles] in front of Teplitz, at the point where the picturesque valley is constrained by the high ground at Strisowitz [Střížovice] and Böhmisch-Neudörfel [Český Újezd], before opening out again towards Teplitz. The right flank of the position was open ground, undulating and dotted with trees. On the left flank were the great mountains, covered with dense scrub and forest. The mountains were cut by steep, deep ravines and streams. The village of Straden lies at the foot of these mountains. The *chaussée* runs through the middle of the position, along which are the villages of Kulm, Priesten and Sobochleben [Soběchleby](see Plan

177Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 181.

of the First Battle of Kulm).[178] The left flank was of the greatest importance in this position, since this was where the shortest route to the Coalition army's exits from the mountain passes lay. Were they to quickly seize this route, firstly the enemy could work their way right around the Coalition army or at least to envelope its flank and, secondly, could have pushed Osterman's force back to the south, that is, away from the Army of Bohemia. It was obvious that when deploying units at the Kulm position it was vital to pay particular attention to this flank.

During the retreat to this position and the redeployment of units there, the 4th Jägers, Reval Infantry and Tatar Ulans were left as the rearguard at Kulm, while the rest of Count Osterman's force, having withdrawn to the position, were deployed as follows: three battalions of Guard Jägers, numbering about 1,350 men,[179] and two battalions of Murom Infantry were on the left flank under Major General Bistrom at Straden in the mountainous and wooded terrain.

The defence of the Kolocha crossing at Borodino, the defence of Großgörschen in the battle of Lützen, and Litten in the battle of Bautzen, the operations of the Guard Jägers throughout the whole of 16 [28] August - all this had long earned our regiment the reputation of steadfast and unwavering warriors, whose resistance could not be overcome even by an enemy five times stronger. Thus the defence of Straden in the Battle of Kulm was entrusted to the Lifeguard Jägers, led by their commander, General Bistrom.

The village of Priesten was held by nine weak battalions from II Corps under the overall command of Prinz Eugen von Württemberg. Behind this village, 500 paces away were the Izmailovsky and Semenovsky regiments forming the first line in attack columns, while the Preobrazhensky Regiment formed the second line, as a general reserve. The Lifeguard Hussars and Her Majesty's Cuirassiers were formed up between the villages of Priesten and Krichvits [*sic*, Karbitz] along the river that flows through the extensive meadows there. The artillery was positioned forwards of the front line: one Guard light company, one heavy, one light and one horse battery. The total of the entire force in the position did not exceed 15,000 to 16,000 men, namely: 6,700 Guardsmen, 5,500 men from II Corps and 2,500 cavalry, for a total of 14,700 men, or 16,000 men including gun crews while together with the reinforcements that arrived towards the end of the battle, it rose to 20,000 men.[180]

Of these units, the Prinz von Württemberg's battalions had been extremely disordered by the earlier fighting, and therefore the whole burden of the Battle of Kulm fell on the regiments of 1st Guards Division in the main. These units would have to repel Vandamme's entire corps, which had at least 30,000 men and which wanted to drive us away from the mountains and to seize the passes at all costs.

The rising sun dispersed the fog and illuminated the field of impending battle. The units were already in their assigned locations. Count Osterman and Yermolov rode around every unit and announced to them that it had been decided not to retreat another step and that they had either to be victorious or to die a glorious death on the battlefield. A thunderous, enthusiastic Hurrah was the response from the valiant force; this Hurrah swept like a hurricane along the line following the galloping commanders.

178Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 183.

179M.B. Monthly returns for June to September, bundle 476.

180These figures are from Colonel Heldorf's account. According to the account by Prinz Eugen von Württemberg, the following were in the position at Kum: 6,500 men in 12 Guard battalions; 2,500 men in nine battalions from II Corps; 2,000 cavalry, for a total of 11,000 men. Or 12,300 men including artillerymen (Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 184).

This readiness to risk one's life was universal: the Guard Jägers proudly took their assigned place, fully aware of the importance of the mission entrusted to them and determined to lay down their lives to the last man, rather than to let the foe pass. The Izmailov men, watching the jägers enviously, shouted that they had been waiting for this day for a long time and asked to be first to go into action. No one wanted to be left out: the wounded returned to the ranks, musicians, drummers, and clerks asked for muskets and cartridges and went to the firing line.[181]

In the meantime, the French were closing in on our position. The detachment left at Kulm, having delayed the enemy for a short time, retreated towards Priesten in good order. The French broke into Kulm, hot on their heels. It was 10 o'clock in the morning. The peaceful residents of Kulm were leaving chapel, where the morning service had just ended. They were calmly returning to their homes. But not even a few minutes had passed before round shot began to ricochet along the streets of the village and a leaden rain of enemy bullets began to fall, whereupon French columns appeared, thousands of bayonets glittered, lit by the sun, war cries rang out, blood flowed and close quarter combat began to rage. Some residents, having lost their presence of mind, fled, trusting to luck, wherever they happened to be looking, while others rushed into their homes in order to save their most valuable belongings, but they were greeted there by the shrieks of children, the sobs of frightened women, and hand-to-hand combat with bayonets and rifle butts. Following this, Vandamme placed his batteries on Kapellenberg and opened a strong cannonade on the troops retreating from Kulm. Shots could be heard from all sides, repeated several times by the mountain echoes. Thus began the famous Battle of Kulm.[182]

The King of Prussia reached the battlefield once our units were already in their positions, but after a conference with Osterman, he rode back, remaining nearby the whole time and sending his aides de camp out with orders to direct the columns coming out of the mountains towards Kulm. Emperor Alexander I was en route from Altenberg at this time and was still in the mountains. Upon hearing the gunfire, the Emperor and his entire retinue rode out to one of the peaks from which the enemy movements could be seen. He immediately understood what Vandamme was striving for, and therefore immediately sent orders for the Austrian troops to rush towards Kulm from the mountains. He also ordered our regiments to go there, while ordering General Kleist's Prussian corps to move to Nollendorf, to get behind Vandamme's corps. Count Osterman's force would have to hold out at Kulm for the entire day while awaiting the successful execution of all these orders.[183]

Meanwhile, having observed the small number of Russians in the position, Vandamme hoping to force them to a further retreat merely through his appearance and, in a hurry to reach Teplitz, did not wait for the concentration of his force and directed the attack against Osterman as soon as Reuß's brigade, which was at the head of his corps, managed to exit Kulm.

Units from this brigade were sent towards the village of Straden at around midday against the most important locations of the position - the left wing. Six of Reuß's battalions attacked our regiment, shielded as was usual for the French with a swarm of skirmishers and *voltigeurs*. The Lifeguard Jäger battalions, inspired by their commanders - colonels Petin, Makarov and Richter, who were always there wherever the greatest danger threatened - engaged a foe twice as numerous in unison. Simultaneous bitter struggles ensued in the gardens, in the village and in the forest along the mountainsides. Colonel Richter had suffered a severe contusion the day before, and now received a wound through his arm, but remained at the front of his battalion until

181 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 354; Koldevin, the Action and Battle of Kulm, p. 8.

182 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 182.

183 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 183.

another bullet wound to the chest forced this exemplary officer to hand over command of the battalion to Captain Penskoy 3rd. The French and Russians became intermingled. Both sides leaped over the ditches and piles of stones separating the gardens and orchards in small groups, clashing in the clearings and engaging in bayonet charges more than once. If any platoon fell back, the officers would race forwards, dragging the men along with them, and dashed at the enemy with a handful of skirmishers, or sometimes alone.[184] Particularly distinguished in this were Captain Rall 3rd; staff captains: Baryshnikov, Andreevsky, Litvinov, Bistrom, Suchtelen; lieutenants: Prince Kozlovsky, Ushakov and Bublik, who throughout the entire action always remained in front of their companies, repeatedly driving the enemy back at bayonet point. It was here that Suchtelen was wounded shot through both legs, Prince Kozlovsky, through the left arm, and Ushakov, through both legs.[185]

The fighting at Straden continued with varying success until, with the help of the Semenovsky Regiment, which had arrived on Yermolov's orders, Reuß's brigade was finally repulsed; Prinz Reuß was himself killed in the process. Whereupon, determined to drive the Guard Jägers out of the gardens and the village at all costs, Vandamme sent nine battalions under Mouton-Duvernet against us, having moved them up from the Nollendorf heights,[186] and the foe, more than three times as numerous, managed to drive our tireless marksmen out of the forest near Straden.[187] Nevertheless, they were unable to do more. The jägers held firm and only on the left flank was there some minor confusion, but Lieutenant Arbuzov quickly rallied the men, even leading them with fixed bayonets, which not only restored proper order, but also drove the strongly pressing enemy back with heavy losses.[188] Whereupon the French deployed their artillery and began pounding our left flank and centre with round shot. Our men responded in kind. This continued until two o'clock in the afternoon.[189]

At two o'clock 14 battalions from General Philippon's division reached the French. Wanting to finally settle the matter, Vandamme sent these fresh troops against our position in two columns - four battalions towards Straden, and the rest towards Priesten. These fresh battalions fell upon the Lifeguard Jägers, but they stood firm. Every officer, led by their beloved regimental commander, General Bistrom, was fighting ahead of their subordinates, showing them examples of valour and courage, while the lower ranks, led by such superiors, seemed to want to surpass themselves: the veteran jägers, recalling Smolensk, Borodino, Lützen and Bautzen, showed the juniors how to work the *Stutzer* and bayonet, while the juniors simply tried to keep pace with the veterans. It was as if they all wanted to outdo each other.

Straden was ablaze by this time and Major General Bistrom, seeing the impossibility of defending himself in a village engulfed in flames, led the fearless defenders of Straden - the Lifeguard Jägers and Murom Infantry - back into the forest, where he occupied the Eggen-mühle buildings, which would serve as a stronghold for the left flank of the position.[190]

Bistrom gave commands with calm and unperturbed composure, issuing orders through the officers accompanying him. Following the example of their admired commander, Staff Captain Kurzhevsky, Lieutenant Repnin, and ensigns Norov, Loman, Bistrom, and Kushelev calmly listened

184Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 355.
185M.B. Award nominations, bundle 14, No. 4.
186Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 185.
187Koldevin, p. 10.
188M.B. bundle 14, No. 4.
189Koldevin, p. 10.
190Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 185.

to these orders and then, with casual disregard for every danger of combat, fearlessly carried them out, passing them on with precision before returning again to General Bistrom.[191]

The French were following persistently on the shoulders of the jägers falling back to the Eggen-mühle; two French battalions descended from higher ground, through the forest not far from the mill, wanting to break through to a small forest clearing on the far side of a ravine. The jägers stationed in the forest noticed the approaching French in time and therefore quickly concealed themselves in the forest on two sides of the clearing. The French, scrambling along the slopes, noticing that the clearing was unoccupied, quickly raced forward, but the concealed jägers fired a volley from the scrub from two sides and, with a roar of Hurrah, charged as one with lowered bayonets at this enemy mass, the majority of whom, after stubborn resistance, were taken prisoner.[192]

Captain Penskoy 3rd, commanding second battalion after taking over from the seriously wounded Colonel Richter, was mortally wounded in this action. Having learned from the surgeon that he had only half an hour to live, Penskoy asked for one matter to be reported to Karl Ivanovich Bistrom, his beloved commander. His comrades surrounding the wounded man carried out his wish. Penskoy said to Bistrom: "Karl Ivanovich, I have only a few minutes left to live, and I want to die by your side." Half an hour later, the brave officer breathed his last on the chest of his good commander. Karl Ivanovich later said: "I have suffered many losses, many have died before my eyes, but no loss has made such a strong impression on me as Penskoy's death."[193]

Meanwhile, the second enemy column had launched two attacks on Priesten village, but was repelled both times with heavy losses. Having repelled these attacks, the Prinz von Württemberg ordered batteries to be moved to the left of the village and to open fire on the dense French columns returning once more to attack the forest where the Guard Jägers were holding out. The canister shot whistled from our guns, pelting the enemy columns like a squall, yet they did not flinch and continued their advance with deafening shouts of "*En avant! Vive l'Empereur!*" Whereupon the Izmailovsky Regiment were sent up to assist the Lifeguard Jägers, and, led by their commander, General Khrapovitsky, deftly attacked the enemy in the flank, and the nearest French columns broke and ran. The entire Russian line surged forward.

The jägers, with shouts of "Hurrah" closed as the French turned their backs. A powerful cannonade was unleashed from all the batteries in the position. The French fell back everywhere, blanketing the battlefield with dead and wounded.

Vandamme placed 24 guns on the high ground near Straden in order to counter the Russian artillery placed to the left of Priesten. The action of this battery, working at long range, would not cause much harm to our units, but one of the round shot fired from there severed Count Osterman's left wrist.[194]

As the Preobrazhensky soldiers lifted him from his horse and were laying him on the ground, he said: "This is how I pay for the honour of commanding the Guard. I am satisfied."[195]

Yermolov assumed command of the force, and his first act was to reinforce the heroic spirit of the Guard regiments, saying to them: "Comrades, look at your valiant, wounded commander. Do not let his enemies laugh at him. Remember the glory of past battles, the greatness of Russia's name.

191M.B. Award nominations, bundle 14, No. 4.
192Aster, book 1, p. 138.
193Lukyanovich, Biography of Adjutant General Bistrom, p. 111.
194Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 187.
195Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 358.

Consider what you stand to lose and what you stand to gain now. Your motherland is watching you from your children's cradles, from the graves of your forefathers. The Tsar himself looks to you, entrusting this precious pledge to us now sent from heaven itself. Show that you are his loyal bodyguard! Prove to your foes that you are Russians." The Guard, once again inspired by the words and example of their beloved commander, rushed at the enemy like furies.[196]

The Russian troops were fighting like lions, but they had all been committed to action. Only two companies from the Preobrazhensky Regiment remained in reserve, while enemy reinforcement after reinforcement kept arriving. At around five o'clock the French moved to attack the village of Priesten once more, took the village, broke through the centre of the position and were about to celebrate their victory. They were already closing in on our batteries, but at that moment squadrons of Guard Dragoons and Ulans appeared, dashing up to assist. They attacked the enemy with great skill, rescued our batteries and forced the foe to retreat.[197] Whereupon Yermolov ordered all units to pull back into the forest, where he repositioned them to await new attacks.[198] The French attacks were renewed, but not simultaneously, without a coordinated plan or common direction. At seven o'clock the cannon salvoes ceased and only the crackle of musketry could be heard until late at night. At eight o'clock, regiments from the Coalition army began to reach the Kulm position from the mountains.[199] When Count Miloradovich arrived with the reserves, he took command of all units assembled to face Vandamme. 1st Grenadier Division took the place of our division on the front line, which was withdrawn for a time in order to bring the disordered battalions into order.[200]

Thus, the French failed to dislodge us from our position; thus, by enabling the army to retreat into Bohemia, our detachment saved the rest of the army, earned the gratitude of three Monarchs who were in danger that day, and prepared the way for the destruction of Vandamme's corps, which redressed the outcome of the Coalition attempt on Dresden. For six hours the Guard had withstood attacks by a foe several times their strength.

'I cannot present any of the gentlemen field officers or subalterns as particularly outstanding: it would be necessary to present a general list of all of them. I cannot even present the lower ranks: it would be necessary to include every file from the brave regiments who have the good fortune to bear the title of Lifeguard to the Tsar, whom they idolise." Thus Yermolov, one of the perpetrators of this feat, testified to the merits of his worthy comrades in his report on the battle at Kulm.[201]

It is possible to repeat the words of one of the contemporaries of this glorious battle without exaggeration:

> Be proud, Russia, the spirit of your sons has surpassed the greatness of Greece and Rome! You no longer need to point to the homelands of Leonidas and Scipio as an example to your pupils: you may transport them to your sacred land with these heroes. Your descendants will no longer say of new extravagant feats of valour: "They fought and died like the Spartans at Thermopylae!" No, our sons and grandsons will now say: "They fought and won like the Russians at Kulm..."[202]

The day of 17 [29] August cost the Russian contingent dearly: 6,000 men from Osterman's force

196Lazhechnikov, Campaign Notes of a Russian Officer.
197Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 187.
198Yermolov's report to Osterman (M.S.A. No. 1760).
199Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 1, p. 359.
200Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 188.
201Yermolov's report to Osterman (M.S.A. No. 1760).
202Lazhechnikov, Campaign Notes of a Russian Officer.

were killed or wounded, while the Guard regiments lost 2,800 men that day, of which 600 alone were jägers. On 16 and 17 [28 and 29] August, our regiment's losses were as follows: 66 men killed,[203] and 887 men wounded, of whom one was a field officer and 16 were subalterns;[204] of these, Captain Penskoy 3rd, staff captains Count Voinovich and Ushakov died of their wounds.[205] It emerged that the regiment suffered over 70 percent losses. Enemy losses were also quite significant: some French battalions were completely wiped out.



Medallion commemorating the Battle of Kulm.

The next day, 18 [30] August, it was decided to give battle again, in which all the Coalition units that had arrived from the mountains were to take part. In total, 68 battalions, 83 squadrons and 107 guns were concentrated on the Coalition position at Kulm, and together with Kleist's corps, sent to Nollendorf by the Tsar, the Coalition had 98 battalions, 115 squadrons and 183 guns, that

203Five non-commissioned officers, one musician and 60 privates.
20471 non-commissioned officers, 16 musicians and 783 privates.
205M.B. Monthly returns for September, bundle 476.

is, a total of 115,000 to 120,000 men.[206] Vandamme had about 30,000 men that day. Command of the Coalition force was entrusted to Barclay de Tolly. 1st Guards Division, which had borne the brunt of the entire battle the day before, was placed in reserve at Sobochleben. At eight o'clock in the morning, a firefight broke out on both sides; at nine o'clock, the Coalition forces launched an attack on the French. Kleist's Prussian corps soon emerged behind the French, and the enemy, attacked from the front by the Russians, from the left flank by the Austrians, and from behind by Kleist, were pinned against the mountains, and would not be able resist the Coalition forces for long. At two o'clock Vandamme was taken prisoner by the Russians, and by three o'clock the battle was completely over with a total enemy defeat. The Coalition trophies on this day consisted of: two Eagles, three *drapeau* and all the enemy artillery, numbering 82 guns, 200 ammunition and cartridge caissons, their entire trains and some 12,000 men taken prisoner, including the corps commander, Vandamme, and another three generals. Some 5,000 Frenchmen had been killed, including three generals. In this battle, in which the success of the Coalition forces had been founded upon the fighting that had taken place the day before, our regiment did not participate, because even without 1st Guards Division the Coalition had a significant superiority in numbers over the French.

For the Battle of Kulm, which immortalised the glory of the Guard Jägers, our regiment, having already received St. George Colours for the 1812 campaign, received St. George Trumpets with the inscription: '*За отличие, оказанное въ сражении при Кульме 17-го августа 1813 г.*' [for distinction shown at the Battle of Kulm on 17 [29] August 1813]. The other Guard regiments received St. George Colours.[207]

In addition to this award, which belonged to the entire regiment, every general, officer and lower rank who was on duty on 17 [29] August received the *Eiserne Kreuz Orden* (the 'Kulm Cross') from the King of Prussia, a witness to the feat of the Russian forces on that day. When these crosses were distributed, the orders issued by Count Miloradovich, commanding the entire Guard, stated:

> 'May these new marks of distinction on your chests increase in number those which you have acquired through labour and bloodshed in the battles for the salvation of the Fatherland, for the glory of the Russian name and the freedom of Europe.'[208]

All the officers of our regiment, who demonstrated exemplary conduct to the lower ranks with such selflessness in this unforgettable battle, always leading from the front, received the following awards: the regimental commander, Major General Bistrom, the Order of St. Anne 1st class;[209] Colonel Makarov, the Order of St. George 3rd class; Colonel Petin, the Order of St. Anne 2nd class with diamonds; staff captains Baryshnikov, Andreevsky, Suchtelen, lieutenants Bublik, Tolmachev, Captain Penskoy 4th, Sub-Lieutenant Volkov, lieutenants Schumann, Krivtsev, Baturin, Frolov-Bagreev, Staff Captain Kurzhevsky, lieutenants Repninsky, Arbuzov, sub-lieutenants Yermolov, Krylov, Ensign Norov, the Order of St. Anne 2nd class; Staff Captain Litvinov, lieutenants Ushakov, Balkashin, ensigns Strandmann and Barnovolkov, the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class; Staff Captain Bistrom, a Golden Sword inscribed '*За храбрость*'; ensigns Chernyshev 1st and Chernyshev 2nd, Tiesenhausen, Ryzhov, Yedashev, Saveliev, Loman, Bistrom, Kushelev, the Order of St. Anne 3rd class.[210] Awards were issued to the following officers on extra-regimental duty: Captain Bistrom,

206Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 218.

207For the text of the Supreme Rescript awarding St. George Colours and Trumpets to the Guard, see Appendix VII to Chapter 6.

208Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 189.

209Lukyanovich, Biography of Adjutant General Bistrom, p. 14.

210M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 5, No. 43.

serving with General Barclay during the fighting from 13 to 15 [25 to 27] August at Dresden, received a Golden Sword inscribed '*За храбрость*',[211] while Lieutenant Raevsky, aide-de-camp to Count Vorontsov, received the Order of St. Anne 2nd class for 11 and 25 August [23 August and 6 September].[212]

Of the lower ranks, 212 men received the cross of the Military Order. Besides them, 43 lower ranks were also nominated for the award, but since they already had the cross of the Military Order, then, on the basis of the Supreme Manifesto dated 13 [25] February 1807, they received double (30 men)[213] and triple (13 men)[214] pay bonuses.

This, however, was not the only award bestowed upon the heroes of 17 [29] August: the King of Prussia, in addition to the *Eiserne Kreuze* given to all lower ranks without exception, also sent one gold medal and 12 silver medals on ribbons to each Guard Regiment for their most deserving men,[215] while the Austrian Kaiser sent two silver and one gold medal to each regiment which, in our regiment, were awarded: the gold to grenadier Pavel Mamontov, while the silver went to non-commissioned officer Mikhail Soloviev and jäger Vasily Petrov. All lower ranks received two roubles each for the fighting on 18 [30] August.

The glorious memory of the Battle of Kulm was immortalised not only by the awards received by the participants; a year later, Emperor Alexander I, in memory of the days of 17 and 18 [29 and 30] August, established a committee to assist all disabled soldiers who had shed their blood on the field of honour.[216] Moreover, the Battle of Kulm was commemorated by the erection of a monument at the site of the battle in accordance with a concept by Kaiser Franz of Austria. This monument was dedicated 22 years after the battle, namely on 17 [29] August 1835, in the presence of Emperor Nicholas Pavlovich. At the dedication of this monument, recalling how 22 years before the steadfastness of the Guard on the fields of Kulm had saved the army and the life of their Tsar, and remembering that the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment had distinguished itself here most of all, Tsar Nicholas I ordered that the regimental holiday of this regiment be transferred to this very day, when the memory of the Hieromartyr Saint Myron of Cyzicus is also celebrated.[217]

211M.S.A. bundle 14, No. 8.

212M.S.A. bundle 12, No. 3.

21317 non-commissioned officers, five grenadiers, four marksmen and four privates.

214Five *Feldwebel* and eight non-commissioned officers.

215M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 5, No. 45; Extract from the files of the Department of Inspections for 1813, Second Section, Fifth Desk, register 137, bundle 94, No. 87.

216Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 195; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, p. 374. The 18 August 1814 Committee was formerly the Committee for the Wounded. The Supreme Orders issued on this day state: 'Warriors! A year ago to this very day, on the fields of Kulm, where your chests halted the enemy striving for Bohemia, I offered solemn thanks to the Almighty, together with you, for His ineffable mercy towards us. Courage, valour, patience and love for Faith and the Fatherland have been your constant companions, have crowned you with new laurels, opened the gates of Paris, granted peace and granted the warrior the complementary pleasure of returning to his State with honour. It is grateful for the service and toil that you have endured. I express gratitude to you in its name. It is on its behalf that I welcome you back to your fatherland. Your heroic deeds have always caught my attention. In order to further commemorate them, and especially the day of 18 [30] August, I am now opening a most convenient path for all those crippled in the last war, unforgettable for their resounding deeds, for generals, field officers and subalterns, both those who have already retired, and those who will henceforth leave the service due to wounds and injuries from this war, and those who have no other income other than a pension determined upon retirement, to revert to me for all their needs. And so that their requests are considered, verified and presented to me immediately, I am establishing a dedicated committee, whose duty will be to accept requests, take care of providing every possible assistance to the poor and injured generals and subalterns, and present their reports on them.'

217Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, p. 376. For Alexander Semchenko's song in memory of the Battle of Kulm, see Appendix to Chapter 6.

Operations in the Bohemian Mountains.

On the evening of 18 [30] August, the Guard settled down for the night between Kulm and Teplitz, and the following day the entire Army of Bohemia was stationed along the sector from Teplitz to Komotau [Chomutov], with the vanguard at Nollendorf. The Guard remained at Teplitz, where on 20 August [1 September] the Tsar reviewed his victorious Guard together with Kaiser Franz and the King of Prussia, after which a thanksgiving service was held.

The entire Army of Bohemia remained in a wait-and-see position until 24 August [5 September]. It had been decided to act in strict accordance with the Treaty of Trachenberg, that is, to attack only once Napoleon had moved against Blücher or Bernadotte.

Meanwhile on 16 [28] August, Napoleon had received news of Oudinot's defeat at Großbeeren, inflicted on him by the Coalition Army of the North; he had barely begun to issue orders for the *Garde* to move to Oudinot's aid under his personal command, when he received further news of Macdonald's defeat at the hands of the Army of Silesia on the Katzbach river. At the same time, the remnants of Vandamme's corps brought him word of the defeat at Kulm. Whereupon Napoleon ordered Victor to hold in Freiberg and Saint-Cyr in Pirna in order to shield his lines of communications and Dresden from attack by the Army of Bohemia, while the corps under Marmont and Latour-Maubourg, located along the Bohemian border, were to return to Dresden and, upon joining the *Garde*, were to head towards Bautzen to face Blücher. On 22 August [3 September], Napoleon advanced from Dresden towards Bautzen with the reserves.[218]


Having received intelligence of this and believing that Napoleon had moved against the Army of the North, the Coalition decided to make a 'significant show of force' towards Dresden with the Army of Bohemia.[219] As a result, on 23 August [4 September], the Guard received orders to be at full readiness to march, such that they could set off immediately upon command; on 24 August [5 September], they moved from Teplitz to a position between Sobochleben and Kulm, where they set up camp.[220]

Having learned that Napoleon and the *Garde* were marching against him, Blücher immediately began to fall back, drawing Napoleon away from Dresden. The *empereur des français* understood Blücher's manoeuvre and, having received word from Saint-Cyr of the movements of the Army of Bohemia, immediately moved towards the Elbe and on 27 August [8 September] managed to reinforce his units under attack by Wittgenstein at Dohna and Heidenau and obliged the latter to retreat to Pirna and Zehista. On 28 August [9 September], the Guard concentrated at Kulm in order to support Wittgenstein. On 29 August [10 September], Napoleon renewed the attack, but Barclay de Tolly, leaving a vanguard at Peterswald, withdrew to a position at Sobochleben. Napoleon was wary of attacking the Coalition at Sobochleben and sent all his corps, except Saint-Cyr's and Mouton's, to Dresden. Saint-Cyr's corps was positioned by the Geiersburg [Kyšperk, overlooking Hohenstein/Unčín], while Mouton's corps (formerly Vandamme's) was between Peterswald and Nollendorf.[221]

As the French reached the crest of the mountain ridge, a magnificent spectacle opened before them: the entire Army of Bohemia were stood to arms following a service of thanksgiving, held in the presence of the three Monarchs, on the occasion of receiving news from the Army of the North of the victory they had won over Ney at Dennewitz. After the church parade, the infantry

218Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, p. 36.
219Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 247.
220M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 488.
221Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 250.

and artillery had fired a three-salvo salute and a hundred thousand cheers of ‘Hurrah’ had filled the air.[222]



Monument to the exploits of the Russian Guard on 17 (29) August 1813, the eve of the Battle of Kulm.

222Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, pp. 42 to 43.

Napoleon, having abandoned the idea of an immediate invasion of Bohemia, decided to turn towards Silesia to face Blücher once more, who was operating very successfully against Macdonald. Whereupon the Guard, together with other reserves, received orders to move to Brüx under Barclay's command in order to support the Austrians. The remaining formations, commanded by Wittgenstein and Kleist, were tasked with guarding the exits from the Bohemian Mountains. The Army of Bohemia was to remain in these positions until they were relieved by formations expected from Silesia (Bennigsen's Army of Poland), after which a general offensive was to be undertaken into Saxony.[223]

Before any of these Coalition plans could be carried out, intelligence was received of another offensive by Napoleon with the reserve in order to assist the corps facing the Army of Bohemia. Indeed, on 4 [16] September, Napoleon attacked the Russians and Prussians, who, after several clashes and rearguard actions, concentrated at Kulm. The reserves were positioned near Sobochleben.[224] 1st Guards Infantry Division were stationed on the right flank, while our regiment was in the second line together with the Izmailovsky.[225]

On the morning of 5 [17] September, despite the thick fog, the French attacked the Coalition, but were driven back.[226] The Army of Bohemia spent the entire next day waiting for the French to attack, but all that resulted were a few clashes with their outposts.[227]

Napoleon went to Pirna, where he also drew back the reserve. The leading French corps also withdrew a considerable distance.[228] They were greatly disordered by this time: forced marches, lack of provisions, inclement weather and constant reverses had a very unfavourable effect on the morale and discipline of the French army. However, the Coalition troops, exhausted by the constant moves along difficult mountain roads in rainy weather, were also suffering from a shortage of food and having lost far more men from the influence of these unfavourable causes than in combat with the enemy during the Battle of Kulm, were in great need of rest. In view of this, it was decided to grant a rest period to every unit in the Army of Bohemia and to postpone the march into Saxony until the arrival of Bennigsen's army.[229]

Meanwhile, Blücher had begun to put pressure on Macdonald once more, and Napoleon decided to go back to Silesia with the reserve, placing other formations to shield Dresden along the main roads leading there from Bohemia. Upon his departure for Silesia, the Army of Bohemia was stationed at Teplitz, Dux and Brüx, with the Guard stationed at Teplitz, close to the Coalition headquarter located in Turn [Trnovany].

It was not a pleasant period for the troops to be stationed there. They had to camp in bivouacs, while the weather was extremely foul. It rained incessantly, and the mud was axle deep. No one left their houses or the shelters built at the bivouacs. The troops were suffering severe illnesses. The provisions, due to the negligence and dishonesty of Austrian officials, were far from sufficient, and the prices for all foodstuffs were incredible. The pitiless population demanded exorbitant prices for everything: a single small *Groschen* bun sold for 60 kopecks in our money; a small piece of roast pork (there was almost no other meat) cost five roubles or more; a *funt* [14½ ounces] of

223Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 250.
224Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 255.
225M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 510.
226Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 256.
227M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 534.
228Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 257.
229Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 258.

sugar cost 13 to 15 roubles. The officers suffered from this in particular.[230]

While the regiment was stationed here, Staff Captain Loman died and Ensign Golenishchev-Kutuzov went missing.[231]

In the meantime, the Coalition sovereigns had decided at headquarters that the Main Army, once relieved in Bohemia by Bennigsen's Army of Poland, would turn against Napoleon's lines of communications with the Rhine, towards Chemnitz and Leipzig; the Army of Silesia and Army of the North were to cross the Elbe immediately in cooperation with each other and strive to take Leipzig as quickly as possible - the fulcrum of Napoleon's entire communications system.[232]

On 14 [26] September, Bennigsen reached Leitmeritz [Litoměřice] and the leading units of the Army of Bohemia on 15 [27] September.[233] On this day, the anniversary of Emperor Alexander I's coronation, His Majesty attended mass together with the Austrian Kaiser and King of Prussia in a field chapel erected on a hilltop near Teplitz. The Russian and Prussian guard were stationed in a hollow square around the chapel. After the liturgy, the troops marched past the Sovereigns in a ceremonial parade, after which the Russian infantry officers had the good fortune to host the three monarchs at a banquet, to which all the honourable Austrian and Prussian generals, as well as all the officers of the Prussian *Garde* in general, were invited.[234]

The march on Leipzig.

On 16 [28] September, the Army of Bohemia began its offensive. Everyone was delighted to set off again, even though they had to travel in inclement autumn weather along the worst of roads. The Guard set off for Brüx at half-past eight on the morning of 18 [30] September, which they reached that same day, having bypassed Teplitz.[235] The Guard remained here for some time with the rest of the reserve, while the Army of Bohemia advanced extremely slowly through the mountain passes. The weather these days was autumnal and cold. The Guard regiments were ordered to build barracks in order to spare the men, with particular attention paid to maintaining good order: the surrounding villages were divided into sectors in order to locate the necessary materials. The villages of Paredl [Pařidla] (13 households), Kummerbursch [Konobrže] (12 households), Rotschitz [*sic*] (60 households) and Lakowitz [*sic*] (30 households) were allocated to the 1st Guards Division. Dedicated parties led by officers were sent to these villages to collect firewood and straw.[236]

The reserve remained in Brüx until 24 September [6 October], while the Guard advanced to Sebastiansberg [Hora Svatého Šebestiána] on that day, taking only cartridge caissons and infirmary *lineika* [ambulances]. The remaining trains were left at Brüx.[237] Despite the weakness of Murat, who was covering Leipzig at this time, the leading corps of the Army of Bohemia were advancing very slowly: Prinz Schwarzenberg was wary of an engagement with Napoleon. It took the Army of Bohemia eight days to debouch from the mountains, and on 24 September [6 October], it was positioned between Chemnitz and Zwickau, with its vanguards advanced along the Altenburg and Penig roads.[238]

230Glinka, Letters from a Russian Officer, p. 73.
231M.B. Monthly returns for September, bundle 476.
232Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, pp. 282 to 283.
233Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, pp. 283.
234Shishkov, Brief Notes, p. 173.
235M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, No. 1611.
236M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, No. 164, p. 452.
237M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, No. 1650.
238Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 339.

Meanwhile, the Army of Silesia had crossed the Elbe at Wartenburg on 21 September [3 October], while the Army of the North crossed on 22 September [4 October] at Aken and Roßlau; on 23 September [5 October, the two armies established close communications, having taken up positions at Düben and Jeßnitz. Napoleon was in Dresden as this general offensive by the Coalition was taking place, where at the same time he received reports of the march by the Main Army on Chemnitz and Zwickau, and the crossing of the Elbe by Blücher and Bernadotte. Having ordered Murat to delay the advance by the Main Army, he decided to march first against Blücher and Bernadotte and push them back beyond the Elbe before the Army of Bohemia could reach Leipzig.[239]

Having learned of Napoleon's movement down the Elbe, Schwarzenberg ordered his army to continue marching towards Leipzig as quickly as possible. Under these circumstances, the Army of Bohemia should easily have arrived there on 1 [13] September, but instead, its leading corps, delayed by Murat's force and unsupported by the other corps trailing behind, advanced just 40 *versta* [27 miles] in five days, approaching Leipzig only on 3 [15] October. The army's reserves proceeded equally slowly: on 27 September [9 October], the Guard reached Marienberg, arriving at Chemnitz on 28 September [10 October]. On this day, having become convinced that Dresden was defended by an insignificant force, Emperor Alexander I ordered Bennigsen's army to also move towards Leipzig, leaving elements of the force to monitor Dresden and Königstein.[240]

On the evening of 29 September [11 October], after marching all day in battle formation, the Guard occupied Penig; on 30 September [12 October], having set off from Penig at seven o'clock in the morning, they crossed to the left bank of the Mulde and took up positions there, but were soon moved up towards Altenburg, where they arrived that same day.[241]

Murat slowly withdrew towards Leipzig, making the most of Schwarzenberg's near-total lethargy.[242] The Army of Bohemia continued to assemble near Leipzig, and on 2 [14] October, the Guard arrived in Meuselwitz.[243]

Upon extracting intelligence from prisoners regarding Napoleon's imminent arrival in Leipzig, and in view of the proximity of the Army of Silesia stationed at Halle, it was decided in Coalition headquarters to attack the French with combined forces on 4 [16] October in order to deprive them of the opportunity of defeating the Army of Bohemia or Army of Silesia separately.[244]

On the morning of 3 [15] October, Napoleon had between 160,000 and 170,000 men assembled near Leipzig, of which 100,000 to 120,000 were facing the Army of Bohemia to the south of the city, and 50,000 were to the north, the rest of the units made up the Leipzig garrison.[245] Having learned of the proximity of the Army of Bohemia, Napoleon decided to attack them on 4 [16] October and, having driven them back, turn on Blücher or Bernadotte.

Both sides spent the whole of 3 [15] October preparing for their attacks. The Russian Guard reached Pegau that day and took up positions near the village of Audigast.[246] The Army of Silesia, 60,000 strong with 315 guns,[247] was at Schkeuditz, 10 *versta* [6⅔ miles] from Leipzig; the Army of

239Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, pp. 103 to 105.
240Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 341.
241M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 618.
242Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 342.
243M.S.A. No. 777, p. 154.
244Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, p. 124.
245Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 365.
246M.S.A. No. 1777, p. 155.
247Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 369.

the North, 58,000 strong with 256 guns,[248] was near Zörbig; while the Army of Poland, 54,000 strong with 186 guns, was at Waldheim.[249] Thus, on 3 [15] October, the Main Army could only be confident of the assistance of the Army of Silesia, while the arrival of the Army of the North and Army of Poland, due to them being so distant, could not be expected before 5 [17] October.[250]

Darkness fell on the night of 3 to 4 [15 to 16] October. A north-easterly wind sprang up, and a raging gale, mixed with rain, uprooted trees, blew roofs from houses, and extinguished the campfires.

On Barclay's orders, the corps commanders informed the lower ranks of the enemy's anticipated stubborn resistance the following day, who would be defending desperately, because the loss of this battle would mean the loss of everything, while valour and courage on our part would decide the fate of Europe that day and end the long and bloody war.[251]

The Battle of Leipzig from 4 to 7 [16 to 19] October.

Early in the morning of 4 [16] October, the Army of Bohemia formed up in battle order: the Austrian contingent were on the left bank of the Pleiße, making up the left wing; the right wing was on the right bank of the Pleiße, commanded by Barclay de Tolly, this Russo-Prussian force was formed in three echelons: in the first were the corps under Kleist, Prinz Eugen von Württemberg, Prince Gorchakov, Count Pahlen, Klenau and Count Platov; the second echelon consisted of Raevsky's Grenadier Corps and 2nd Cuirassier Division; the third echelon was the reserve commanded by Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich.[252] Our division was also part of this reserve, and, having set out at three o'clock in the morning through the village of Peres, marched to the village of Rötha, crossed the Pleiße here and settled down near Magdeborn.[253] In total, the Coalition had 133,000 men and 578 guns here,[254] and together with Blücher's Army of Silesia, had 193,000 men and 898 guns. The enemy army occupied positions extending in a semicircle from Connewitz to Holzhausen, with reserves at Probstheide. The Coalition battle plan was to attack the enemy frontally with the right wing and push them towards Leipzig, in order to facilitate the left wing's (the Austrians) crossing of the Pleiße at Connewitz and thence to operate on Napoleon's flank and rear (see Plan No. 21).[255]

Just after nine o'clock, the first cannon shot was fired from the French side. Immediately after this, the Coalition forces headed towards the villages of Markkleeberg, Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz in three columns. About two hours later, following fierce fighting from both sides, the first two villages were in our hands. At this point, French columns began to move forwards from all sides in order to hold back the further onslaught from their adversaries.

Markkleeberg, Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz repeatedly changed hands and the bitterest combat was taking place at these villages, during which time the Tsar was at Güldengossa. Noon arrived. The battle raged across every sector held by the units, and the ground heaved from the extraordinarily strong artillery fire. Napoleon managed to repel every Coalition attack. He eventually decided to attack them in the centre at Güldengossa in order to breach their battle line. He allocated 12,000 cavalry under Murat for this attack, and in the event of a breakthrough he

248Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, pp. 130 to 131.
249Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, pp. 130 to 131.
250Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, pp. 130 to 131.
251M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 639.
252Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 369.
253M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 640.
254Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 369.
255Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, pp. 133 to 135.

intended to follow the cavalry with a mass of infantry concentrated south of Leipzig. At three o'clock the French cavalry set off at the trot and, gradually accelerating their pace, streamed towards Güldengossa. This onrushing mass actually succeeded in pushing back the left flank of our right wing. The infantry on the front line were overrun; the reserves stationed behind them were scattered; the Guard Light Cavalry Division, sent to their aid, was driven back. The enemy emerged near Güldengossa itself, persistently pursuing the Russian regiments, closed up to no more than 800 paces from the place where the Coalition sovereigns were located, but at this moment the Lifeguard Cossack Regiment, serving as the Tsar's escort, attacked the French cavalry in the flank while two horse artillery companies, which had been brought up in good time, rode into position. These two actions gave our light cavalry time to recover and counterattack the French.


The reserve artillery, called up by the Tsar, numbering about 100 guns, had managed by this time to unlimber on the high ground behind Güldengossa and open fire. Whereupon the enemy were checked and then forced to retreat. The French responded with equally powerful artillery fire. The cannonade continued for a full 1½ hours at a range of no more than 1,000 paces. Meanwhile, in the village of Güldengossa, where some of the front line units overrun by Murat had retreated, a bitter struggle was raging. The cannonade by our reserve artillery made it possible to reinforce the units fighting in Güldengossa.[256] By this time the Guard, protected by its artillery, had crossed the marshy stream at Magdeborn and began to form up in battle order. General Yermolov, understanding the importance of holding the village of Güldengossa, which secured our centre, ordered the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment to bypass the other regiments of the division and hold Güldengossa immediately.

The regimental commander, General Bistrom, having made the necessary arrangements, immediately advanced his regiment.[257] Upon reaching Güldengossa, he found that the Tauride Grenadiers and Petersburg Grenadiers that had been holding it, had been driven out of the village. He immediately ordered Major General Makarov to assault the village directly with the Guard Jägers' second and third battalions and to clear the enemy out of their positions in the houses and enclosures, while the first battalion, commanded by Colonel Petin, was to move around the right side of the village, charge the enemy with bayonets fixed and, having thrown them into disorder through this surprise attack, was to drive them out of the village completely. Major General Makarov, standing in front of the battalions, drove the enemy off at bayonet point without firing a single shot, and seized the village. Colonels Penskoy and Rall 3rd marched at the heads of their battalions. The success of Makarov's assault had also been facilitated by the first battalion's attack, which broke into the village under the leadership of its commander, Colonel Petin at the same time as the other two. Colonel Petin was killed during this swift assault.[258]

256Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 381.

257M.S.A. No. 2101, Yermolov's dispatches to Miloradovich.

258M.B. Monthly returns for October, bundle 476. Colonel Petin was an extremely brave and knowledgeable officer. He completed his course at the Moscow University boarding school with distinction, from where he was accepted into the Page's Corps to study military science. His favourite subject was mathematics, but later he began to study literature and published his translations and original articles in the *Voenny Zhurnal* [Military Journal], an excellent publication by Colonel Rakhmanov. Batyushkov, who was good friends with Petin and who served under Raevsky at Leipzig, stated the following: 'I spent the whole day of 5 [17] October on the battlefield, almost until nightfall, riding around from one end to the other and checking the bloody corpses. The sky was overcast. Everything worsened the gloominess of this most terrible scene, the mere memory of which exhausts the soul: the sight of a recent battlefield, littered with cadavers of men, horses, broken caissons, and so on. While passing through Güldengossa, I stopped my horse and enquired of a jäger, disfigured by terrible wounds, where our colonel had been killed. "Behind that ditch, where so many of the dead are." I recoiled in horror from that deadly place.' (Essays on the life of Batyushkov, *Russky Arkhiv*, 1867, pp. 1357 and 1458).



Coalition Forces		**French Forces**	
A.A.	Graf Merveldt's Austrian corps.	a.a.	Prince Poniatowki's *8e Corps*.
B.B.	Bianchi's & Weissenwolf's Austrian divisions.	b.b.	Augereau's reserve corps.
C.C.	Nostitz's cavalry.	c.c.	Victor's *2e Corps*.
D.D.	Kleist's force.	d.d.	Lauriston's *5e Corps*.
E.E.	Prinz Eugen von Württemberg's force.	e.e.	Macdonald's *11e Corps*.
F.F. G.G.	Lieutenant General Count Pahlen's cavalry.	f.f.	Kellerman's *4e corps de cavalerie*.
H.H.	Prince Gorchakov's force.	g.g.	Milhaud's *5e corps de cavalerie*.
I.I.	Pirch's Prussian brigade.	h.h.	Latour-Maubourg's *1er corps de cavalerie*.
K.K.	Klenau's force.	i.i.	Sébastiani's *2e corps de cavalerie*.
L.L.	Zieten's Prussian brigade.	k.k.	Mortier's two divisions of the *Jeune Garde*.
M.M.	Röder's reserve cavalry.	l.l.	Oudinot's two divisions of the *Jeune Garde*.
N.N.	Platov's Cossacks.	m.m.	*2e Division* of the *Vieille Garde*.
O.O.	Raevsky's grenadier corps.	n.n.	*1er Division* of the *Vieille Garde*.

P.P.	Lifeguard Light Cavalry Division.	o.o.	Nansouty's *cavalerie de la Garde*.
Q.Q.	2nd Cuirassier Division.		
R.R.	1st Cuirassier Division.		
S.	Lifeguard Cossack Regiment.		

Having seized the village, Bistrom took command of the regiments nearby and placed the Tauride Grenadiers on the right flank, the Petersburg Grenadiers on the left, and the Lifeguard Jägers in the centre, sending skirmishers forward. By skilfully managing his units, General Bistrom and his jägers held out here for more than three hours. Lieutenant Kaminsky, Lieutenant Colonel Barnovolkov, ensigns Loman, Perkurov, Saveliev, Kushelev, Bistrom, Ryzhov, Dashev were with the skirmishers the entire time and encouraged the lower ranks through their own examples. While the French repeatedly attempted to attack Güldengossa, they boldly charged with fixed bayonets and each time drove the adversary back with valiant blows. But the enemy, acknowledging the full advantage of possessing the village of Güldengossa, reinforced their disordered battalions with fresh forces and attacked the Guard Jägers. There was some confusion among the skirmishers. Noticing this, Captain Bistrom abruptly charged the enemy with his company, restoring order.

However, despite the bravery and resilience of the heroes of Kulm, a much more numerous enemy forced them to abandon the village. Whereupon the Lifeguard [formerly Leib] Grenadier and Lifeguard Finland regiments were sent to assist the Guard Jägers. Having received these reinforcements, the jägers, led by Colonel Baryshnikov, Captains Andreevsky and Litvinov, staff captains Repninsky, Bublik, Tolmachev, Schumann and lieutenants Baturin and Volkov, quickly broke into the midst of the enemy and reoccupied the village in the blink of an eye. The French quickly fell back, even removing their batteries from their positions. The Guard Jäger marksmen pursued the enemy, advancing half a *versta* [⅓ mile] beyond the village.[259]

Thus, the attack on Güldengossa, through which Napoleon thought he could achieve a decisive victory, lead to no such outcome. The stubborn defence of this village destroyed Napoleon's hopes, in which our regiment had played a major part, having reached the village at the most difficult moment and held out there for four hours, despite every effort by a much stronger enemy.

Night fell and the fighting ceased. Both armies settled on the same start lines where they had begun in the morning. General Yermolov ordered the recall of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment marksmen and their redeployment around the edges of Güldengossa village, while the regiments occupying the village were to move to their left.

While the Army of Bohemia had been fighting the French, the Army of Silesia was seriously engaged four *versta* [2⅔ miles] north of Leipzig at the village of Möckern, and by evening Blücher had forced the French to retreat towards the city itself.

As for the Army of the North and Army of Poland, they did not take any part in the fighting on 4 [16] October - the former, due to the hesitancy of Bernadotte's operations, and the latter - due to their distant location.

Prinz Schwarzenberg had intended to renew the battle the next day, 5 [17] October, but since Bennigsen's army, expected that day, had not arrived, it was decided to attack the enemy on 6 [18] October.[260] As a result, on 5 [17] October, both sides stood passively all day at the closest range

259Bistrom's report No. 453 to Yermolov, dated 21 October [2 November] 1813 (M.B. Barclay de Tolly's papers, register 208, bundle 5, Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 17, No. 3, p. 251).

260Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 403.

from each other. On this day, in both armies, as usually happens during preparations for battle, guns were repositioned, regiments were moved from place to place, skirmishers were relieved, pouches were filled with cartridges, and ammunition caissons with projectiles.[261]

The Army of the North reached Breitenfeld on 5 [17] October at eight o'clock in the morning. The main body of the Army of Poland was positioned between Naunhof and Fuchshain late in the evening of that day. Thus, for the battle on 6 [18] October - the Battle of the Nations - all four armies on the Coalition side could take part, with a strength of about 300,000 men and 1,335 guns. Only 30,000 reached to Napoleon - the corps under Ney and Reynier, thus his forces increased to 170,000 men.[262] In total, about 500,000 men would fight at Leipzig.

In the early hours of 6 [18] October, Napoleon ordered his army to abandon its positions and move closer to Leipzig, about seven *versta* [4⅔ miles] from the city. The French army was redeployed into new positions in a semicircle between the rivers Parthe and Pleiße, with its left wing adjacent to the village of Schönefeld and its right wing towards Connewitz, with a vanguard to the front.[263]

The Coalition decided to attack the French from the south in three columns. The centre consisted of Russian formation under Barclay's command. The Guard were in reserve behind the centre.

The attacks began at seven o'clock in the morning on 6 [18] October. The Main Army and Army of Poland initially pushed the vanguards back without difficulty, but the Coalition encountered stubborn resistance at the main position. At 11 o'clock Wittgenstein, at the head of the centre, was ordered to seize the key to the enemy position - the village of Probstheide. After much effort, he still failed. Whereupon the Tsar ordered a pause in anticipation of operations by the Army of the North, as well as the left wing of the Main Army, and to open a cannonade on Probstheide in the meantime. By this time, the Army of Silesia, having crossed the Parthe at Mockau, was ready to march to Schönefeld and was only waiting for the appearance of the Army of the North to their left. Eventually, the Army of the North reached its designated locations, to the right of Paunsdorf, and thus closed the ring around the enemy position. It was 12 o'clock. Whereupon the Coalition forces converged on the enemy position from all sides. Combat raged everywhere, but was particularly bitter at Probstheide and Schönefeld, that is, in the centre and on the French left flank. This is where the Lifeguard Jägers took part in the general massing of Russian units.

Napoleon, deprived of the opportunity to manoeuvre, exhausted every defensive resource in order to repel the attacks and prepare a secure withdrawal for himself. The entire field was covered with our columns, ready to relieve or reinforce each other. Meanwhile, night was falling. In the gloom, the Coalition attacks were halted, and the fighting was continued only by artillery fire, which continued until late into the night. Several villages and one of the city's suburbs were engulfed in flames.

The Coalition monarchs conferred with the *Feldmarschall* without dismounting from their horses, and agreed that the following day, 7 [19] October, they would storm Leipzig with their combined forces and in the same order of battle, thereby completing the defeat of the French so long as they did not retreat that night. Emperor Alexander I thought it vital to transfer the Guard and grenadiers across the Elster immediately to Pegau in order to operate on Napoleon's flank and rear. The commander-in-chief begged the Tsar not to send the exhausted Guard and grenadiers on this mission, and therefore the Austrian corps under Gyulay was sent beyond the Elster. At nine o'clock the sovereigns left the battlefield for the night. The enemy army had already begun to retreat from

261Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Campaign Notes from 1813, pp. 394 to 396.
262Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 366.
263Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, p. 165.

Leipzig towards Lützen by this time. Throughout the early hours of 7 [19] October, some movements were audible from the French. By dawn the Coalition were convinced that Napoleon was in full retreat. Only detachments had been left on the battlefield in various places, which were supposed to delay the Coalition advance towards Leipzig.

The Tsar arrived on the field of battle at about seven o'clock in the morning on 7 [19] October, and rode around the Coalition force, formed up in closed columns on the fortified high ground surrounding the city, and thanked the men for the courage they had shown over the previous days.

The fog soon began to thin. In less than an hour the Coalition had driven the enemy out of the villages they still occupied and pushed them back into the city suburbs. The Guard marched in the column headed towards the Sandtor and Windmühlentor, located on the southern side of the city. The enemy, having placed batteries at the entrance to the suburbs, opened fire, which was countered by the Coalition artillery. Eventually, the order to attack was received. Barclay de Tolly's force, having crossed themselves, were steeling themselves to storm the city, but were suddenly ordered to halt, as other columns had already broken into the suburbs through other gatehouses, and it was clear the enemy would soon be forced to abandon the city. Indeed, by midday all the suburbs had been taken, and at one o'clock Emperor Alexander I entered the city.[264] Thus ended the three-day battle of Leipzig, which would put an end to Napoleon's dominion.

Casualties on both sides were enormous. The Coalition lost some 50,000 men, including 22,000 Russians; the French lost some 70,000 men.[265]

Our regiment lost Colonel Petin, Ensign Tiesenhausen, and 75 lower ranks killed on those days. The wounded included 155 lower ranks, while 94 lower ranks were missing in action.[266]

In this Battle of the Nations, or Battle of the Giants, the Guard Jägers took part, accruing glory and honours for themselves. To the names of Smolensk, Borodino, Krasny, Lützen, Bautzen and Kulm, the Lifeguard Jägers could also now add Leipzig.

For the fighting on 4 [16] October, the following officers received awards: the regimental commander, General Bistrom received a sword decorated with diamonds; Major General Makarov, the Order of St. Anne 1st class;[267] Colonel Penskoy, the Order of St. George 4th class; Colonel Rall, the Order of St. Vladimir 3rd class; Captain Bistrom, the Order of St. Anne 2nd class with diamonds;[268] Colonel Baryshnikov, Captain Andreev both received Golden Swords inscribed '*за храбрость*'; Captain Litvinov, the Order of St. Anne 2nd class; Captain Kurzhevsky, a Golden Sword inscribed '*за храбрость*'; Lieutenant Kaminsky and Lieutenant Colonel Barnovolokov, the Order of St. Anne 2nd class; Ensign Loman the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class; Ensign Perkurov the Order of St. Anne 3rd class; ensigns Savelov, Kushelev, Bistrom, Ryzhov, Yedashev, the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class; staff captains Peninsky, Bublik, Tolmachev, Schumann, lieutenants Baturin, Volkov, Frolov-Bagreev, Yesakov, the Order of St. Anne 2nd class with diamonds.[269] The following awards to officers of the regiment on detached duty that day, were received: Bennigsen's aide-de-camp Staff Captain Lanskoy 2nd, a Golden Sword;[270] in addition, this officer received the Order of St. Anne 2nd class with diamonds for his participation in the actions at Dohna on 27 September [9 October] and

264Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, pp. 172 to 191.
265Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, pp. 444 to 445.
266M.B. Monthly returns for October, bundle 476.
267M.B. Award citations, register 17, No. 3, p. 153.
268M.B. Award citations, register 17, No. 3, p. 251.
269M.B. Award citations, register 17, No. 3, p. 253.
270M.B. Award citations, register 13, No. 32.

at Dresden on 10 October [new style].[271] Captain Pankratiev,[272] serving with Baron Wintzingerode, and Captain Peninsky, serving with Barclay de Tolly, both received the Order of St. Anne 2nd class; Staff Captain Chebyshev,[273] serving with Prince Trubetskoy and Staff Captain Lanskoy,[274] serving with Prince Golitsyn, both received Golden Swords inscribed '*за храбрость*.'

The pursuit of Napoleon to the Rhine.

The entire French force was retreating from Leipzig in disarray along the Lindenau road.

The Coalition forces bivouacked around Leipzig and the surrounding villages. The Guard spent the night at Pegau.[275]

There was only one fortified city held by an enemy garrison and supplied with munitions on the road from Leipzig to the Rhine, namely the city of Erfurt, where Napoleon might also halt before crossing the Rhine and still give battle.

Napoleon headed from Lindenau towards Erfurt via Weißenfels and Freyburg, the Army of Bohemia was moving towards Erfurt in two columns. The left column also included the Guard Corps. On 8 [20] October, the Guard arrived in Teuchern, reached Naumburg on 9 [21] October, and Bad Kösen on 10 [22] October.[276] While the Army of Bohemia was calmly advancing towards Weimar, the leading corps were pressing hard on the French. The Guard reached Groß Reis [*sic*, Oberrossla?] on 11 [23] October, on 12 [24] October they spent the night near Weimar in the village of Ulla.[277]

All this time the French continued to move without stopping through Buttelstedt and strained the last of their strength in order to reach Erfurt as quickly as possible, where they arrived on 11 [23] October.

Prinz Schwarzenberg, believing that Napoleon would give battle at Erfurt, paused the advance by Coalition forces and took steps to concentrate the Army of Bohemia in front of Weimar. At the same time, the Army of Silesia was ordered to envelope the French left flank.[278] In view of Schwarzenberg's assumptions, the Guard had a rest day in Weimar on 13 [25] October.[279]

The disorder in the French army and its weakening with every step from stragglers forced Napoleon to bring forwards his departure from Erfurt, especially since he received intelligence here of the moves towards Würzburg by an Austro-Bavarian army under General Wrede, in order to intercept him. Having brought his army into some order and resupplied the artillery with projectiles from the Erfurt arsenal, Napoleon set off from Erfurt on 13 [25] October towards Gotha and Eisenach.[280] His two-day stay in Erfurt had presented Prinz Schwarzenberg with the opportunity to attack him with superior forces, but the *Feldmarschall* was wary of a decisive engagement with the brilliant adversary and therefore lost a lot of time in concentrating his forces. He did not advance until 14 [26] October, that is, the day after Napoleon departed from Erfurt.[281]

271M.B. Award citations, register 13, No. 48.
272M.B. Award citations, register 17, No. 1, p. 63.
273M.B. Award citations, register 17, No. 10, p. 432.
274M.B. Award citations, register 17, No. 11, p. 438.
275M.S.A. No. 1777, p. 158.
276Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 451.
277M.S.A. No. 1777, p. 158.
278Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 455.
279M.S.A. No. 1777, p. 160.
280Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 456.
281Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 458.

The Army of Bohemia set off from the outskirts of Weimar in three columns. The left column was commanded by Barclay de Tolly and included the Russian Guard, which reached Kranichfeld on 14 [26] October.[282] From here the Guard marched through the Thüringer Wald towards Würzburg and Frankfurt am Main. With Blücher's pursuit in mind, the French marched from Eisenach towards Vacha and Fulda by forced marches also leaving evidence of extreme disruption and disorder at every step.[283] Meanwhile, believing that Napoleon would not go to Hanau, where Wrede was approaching, rather, would head along the open road towards Gießen and Koblenz, Blücher turned away from Fulda towards Gießen. To that same end, Wittgenstein's column (the right column of the Army of Bohemia) was directed towards Borka, Bad Hersfeld and Alsfeld, but this plan did not come to fruition. Napoleon marched on Hanau and thus shook off Blücher's and Wittgenstein's pursuit.

At this time, the centre and left columns of the Army of Bohemia were proceeding through the Thüringer Wald through snow and mud, making frequent stops due to the steepness of the inclines and passes, sometimes so narrow that two horses could not move side by side. Overall, the march by these two columns was extremely difficult.[284]

On 15 [27] October, the Guard reached Arnstadt with the left column of the Army of Bohemia, Mehlis on 16 [28] October, leaving the Thüringer Wald on 17 [29] October for the open ground to Meiningen.[285] The Guard were given a rest day here on 18 [30] October, while the centre column took their rest day in Schmalkalden. Thus, the Army of Silesia and Wittgenstein's column deviated to the right of the enemy line of retreat, and the other two columns of the Army of Bohemia moved to the left; only raiding detachments were pursuing the French, which gave Napoleon the opportunity to attack the Austro-Bavarian army under Wrede with his entire force, which reached Hanau on 17 [29] October.[286] On 18 [30] October, Napoleon closed in and, with no pursuit from behind, managed to defeat Wrede and make his way to Frankfurt, which he reached on 19 [31] October. The next day the French army marched towards Mainz, and crossed the Rhine near that city on 21 October [2 November].[287]

Meanwhile, the Coalition army was also approaching the Rhine. Alexander I, having learned of the battle of Hanau on 20 October [1 November], immediately ordered the Russian units to advance to Frankfurt without stopping. The Guard had been in Mellrichstadt on 19 [31] October[288] and in Münnerstadt on 20 October [1 November].[289] From here, following the Tsar's orders, forced marches were conducted, sometimes making 40 *versta* [27 miles] a day or more. It was not a difficult march: the roads were good and the weather was fine the whole time. The population came out in large numbers to greet the troops and welcomed them warmly.[290] This was the situation when the Guard arrived in Schweinfurt on 21 October [2 November],[291] while on 22 October [3 November] they crossed the Main at Würzburg, and, having settled into quarters, had a rest day on 23 October [4 November];[292] Our division reached Gamburg on 25 October [5

282M.S.A. No. 1777, p. 161.
283Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 459.
284Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 460.
285M.S.A. No. 1777, pp. 162 to 163.
286Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 466.
287Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, p. 474.
288M.S.A. No. 1777, p. 165.
289M.S.A. No. 1777, p. 166.
290Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Campaign Notes for 1813, pp. 486 to 487.
291M.S.A. No. 1777, p. 166.
292M.S.A. No. 1777, p. 167.

November].[293] On this day, Emperor Alexander I made a ceremonial entry into Frankfurt, where he rode at the head of the Guard Cavalry. The Guard Infantry reached Frankfurt on 27 October [8 November][294] and immediately took up quarters both in the city itself and in its environs. Our regiment occupied Senbach [*sic*], which consisted of 187 households.[295]

The next day, 28 October [9 November], the Austrian contingent, having passed through Frankfurt, at Hochheim was in action with a French corps under Bertrand, which was forced to retreat. This minor action, which took place on the same day as Napoleon's return to Paris, marked the end of military operations by the Army of Bohemia, and they all settled down in quarters between the Main and the Neckar. By this time the Army of Silesia and the Bavarians had reached the Rhine. The former took up positions between Koblenz and the Main, while the latter occupied the left bank of the Neckar.[296]

Upon the arrival of the Coalition armies on the Rhine, Alexander I immediately wanted to shift the seat of war into France and, in his own words, 'to expect the most favourable peace terms from new victories.'[297] But not all the allies shared the conviction of the necessity of continuing the war, and so in the end it was decided to prepare for war and at the same time enter into negotiations with Napoleon. The ambiguity of his response to the proposed peace terms gave rise to correspondence that continued throughout November.[298]

During this period, the Russian troops were resting, getting reorganised, being replenished with reserve troops coming up from the Duchy of Warsaw, and were resupplied with clothing, footwear, weapons, and ammunition. The five weeks spent around Frankfurt in continuous activity and amidst various pleasures refreshed the strength of the tired troops, and no one thought of the hardships of war any more; everyone set off on the long-desired campaign into France cheerfully and with a favourable outlook.

From mid [late] November the Army of Bohemia began to move upstream along the Rhine.[299] In late November [early December], Russian units were issued medals brought from Russia in memory of the war of 1812.[300]

The Guard left their quarters on 27 November [9 December]. On this day, our regiment was blessed with the appointment of Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich as its Colonel-in-Chief, as a result of which the 1st Grenadier Company began to be designated as His Highness' company.[301]

The Guard proceeded along the picturesque, so-called Bergstraße to Heidelberg,[302] and on to Durlach,[303] where our division stayed from 5 to 17 [17 to 29] December, and to Freiburg im

293M.S.A. No. 1777, p. 168.

294The march-route was: 25 October [6 November], Essenbach [*sic*]; 26 October [7 November], Aschaffenberg (M.S.A. No. 1777, p. 168).

295M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 3, No. 32, p. 667.

296Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Campaign Notes for 1813, p. 502.

297Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, p. 276.

298Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, part 2, p. 278.

299Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Campaign Notes for 1813, pp. 509 and 515.

300Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Campaign Notes for 1813, p. 514.

301Lieutenant General Baron Steinheil (Tabular Chronicle of the Russian Imperial Guard, p. 51; M.B. Monthly returns for December, bundle 476.

302The march-route was: 27 November [9 December], Archeimengen [*sic*, Arheiligen?]; 28 November [10 December], Zwingenberg; 29 November [11 December, rest day; 30 November, [12 December], Weinheim; 1 [13] December, Heidelberg (M.S.A. No. 1777, pp. 172 to 173).

303The march-route was: 2 [14] December, Zuzenhausen; 3 [15] December, rest day; 4 [16] December, Fürfeld; 5 [17] December, Durlach (M.S.A. No. 1777, pp. 174 to 176).

Breisgau,[304] where they spent Christmas day; eventually, on 28 December [9 January], they arrived in the vicinity of Basel-Lörrach,[305] and on 1 [13] January 1814, the Russian Guard reached the bridge over the Rhine.[306]

And so, exactly one year after crossing the Russian border, the Guard reached the border of France.



His Imperial Highness Grand Duke Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich
Regimental Colonel-in-Chief.

The war of 1813 was over, its objective achieved: Napoleon's dominion over Germany was destroyed; nevertheless, Emperor Alexander I did not think it possible to end the war, considering general peace in Europe impossible so long as Napoleon remained as the head of the French state. The 1814 campaign we are about to describe does not present any brilliant actions by the regiment; its participation, like that of almost the entire Guard, was limited to supporting operations by the Coalition armies. The total strength of Coalition forces in the entire theatre of military operations reached 900,000 men; at the opening of the campaign, only elements of the

304The march-route was: 18 [30] December, Rastatt; 19 [31] December, Achern; 20 December [1 January], Offenburg; 21 December [2 January], rest day; 22 December [3 January], Mahlberg; 23 December [4 January], Emmendingen; 24 December [5 January], Freiburg; 25 December [6 January], rest day (M.S.A. No. 1777, pp. 181 to 182).

305The march-route was: 26 December [7 January], Heitersheim; 27 December [8 January], Schliengen; 28 December [9 January], Lörrach (M.S.A. No. 1777, pp. 184 to 185).

306Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Campaign Notes for 1813, p. 523.

Main Army and Army of Silesia, no more than 200,000 men, were in the main theatre of military operations. The forces which Napoleon could bring to bear against this vast Coalition, despite all the energy he had expended in strengthening his army, amounted to just 300,000 men. Despite possessing such weak forces for waging war, Napoleon nevertheless decided to open the campaign with a decisive offensive; this plan, however, was disrupted by the unexpected offensive by the Coalition, who, at the suggestion of Emperor Alexander I, were to march through Switzerland with the Main Army to Langres in order to seize the Langres plateau and thereby bypass a number of terrain obstacles (the Vosges, the river Saar, the Ardennes, the Moselle and Meuse rivers, the Forêt d'Argonne and fortresses), which in essence would not have any significance, since Napoleon did not have enough troops to defend them; thereafter, the Main Army was to head for the valleys of the Seine and the Marne; the Army of Silesia was earmarked to advance from Mannheim towards Metz and Nancy and was intended to distract enemy attention from the flanking movements by the Main Army.[307] The latter was under the command of Prinz Schwarzenberg; its reserve was commanded by Barclay de Tolly; the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment was also included in the reserve.[308]

Crossing the French border on 1 [13] January 1814.

On 1 [13] January 1814, the Lifeguard Jägers set off from Lörrach towards Basel.[309] During their march they were caught in terrible weather; snow and rain with gusty winds slowed their progress somewhat, but eventually the jägers reached the banks of the Rhine. Deep snow covered the banks with a white shroud, while the blue Rhine raged and swirled menacingly... Emperor Alexander I personally supervised the crossing. He stood right by the bridge itself, and the jägers, despite the terrible weather, marched as if on parade in a ceremonial style, moving straight down to the bridge and quickly crossed the river in an orderly manner.[310] After passing the fortress of Basel, the reserves were directed towards Langres (see Plan No. 22).

Meanwhile, intelligence reached Prinz Schwarzenberg that Napoleon held Langres. Wishing, however, to take possession of this city, the commander-in-chief ordered Barclay de Tolly to speed up the march by the Russian reserves as much as possible, and on 6 [18] January the Guard took Scey,[311] and on 10 [22] January the Lifeguard Jägers arrived at Langres and took up quarters assigned to them at Orbigny-au-Val.[312] The road to Langres was very difficult. Rain, snow, thaws, and frosts made the marches significantly more difficult, but the presence of the Monarch encouraged the Guardsmen, and they overcame their fatigue.

The Tsar repeatedly confirmed to the commander-in-chief that he would maintain a passive attitude towards the local population. As a result of this, on 8 [20] January, the commander-in-chief issued orders to all armies, demanding strict discipline be enforced in units by their commanders, the gentlest treatment of the French, such that they would understand that the war was being waged only to give them peace. Deviation from these order entailed the most severe penalties.[313] The resupply of provisions to the vast number of troops entering France was fraught with great difficulty; requisitions were generally resorted to. These disadvantages were further increased by the fact that orders from authorities of various powers often contradicted each other, and while these were being sorting out as to which was right and which was incorrect, the soldiers

307Leer, Review of Russia's Wars, volume 2, pp. 197 to 200.
308Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1814, pp. 36 to 37.
309Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1814, p. 54.
310*Russkaya Beseda*, 1860, volume 1, p. 81.
311M.S.A. No. 2317, p. 156.
312M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 10, No. 74, p. 9.
313M.S.A. No. 2315.

were starving. An eyewitness to all this, Cancrin, notes that the Russian government's concessions to the Coalition, forcing them to donate much for their allies benefit, sometimes made it difficult to resupply their own units.[314] Initially, the local population willingly brought provisions, hay, oats and firewood to the bivouacs, but later, embittered by the indiscipline in the Coalition armies and incited by Napoleon, they began to hide or destroy all they could, and a guerilla war almost broke out.[315]

The advance to Paris and entry into the French capital.

The Lifeguard Jägers remained at Langres until 16 [28] January,[316] until the question was resolved whether to continue military operations or, being satisfied with what had been achieved, to conclude a peace. Emperor Alexander I was opposed to the latter proposal, and his opinion prevailed; on 16 [28] January, it was decided to continue military operations and for the Main Army to advance on Paris.[317] On the night of 17 [29] January, intelligence was received that Napoleon was moving against Blücher's army, stationed near Brienne. That same night the Tsar left for Chaumont, ordering that the reserves be moved there. Prinz Schwarzenberg decided to go to Blücher's aid and to attack the French, as a result of which on 18 [30] January the Main Army headed towards Giran [*sic*], while the reserve (including the Lifeguard Jägers) were stationed at Bologne.[318] In view of the imminent clash with the enemy, every man was ordered to have a four-day supply of hard-tack with them. A trains and parks were to be left behind at the village of Veisseignes [*sic*] along the main road on the left bank of the Marne. A field officer from the Guard Corps was sent to monitor order in the *wagenburg*.[319]

An attack on the French position at La Rothière was scheduled for 20 January [1 February]. All attacking units came under Blücher's command. The Lifeguard Jägers and other regiments of the Guard, forming the reserve, were stationed at Arsonval, 10 *versta* [6⅔ miles] from La Rothière and 16 *versta* [11 miles] from Brienne.[320]

The Battle of La Rothière was the first in which units from six of the Coalition Powers had taken part. In order to enable them to distinguish their own from the enemy, everyone, from soldier to general, was ordered to wear white brassards on their left sleeves; these armbands were subsequently taken by the French as a manifestation of favour towards the Bourbons.

The Guard Jägers were not required to take part in this battle, which ended in defeat for the French. Although the Coalition did not exploit the victory by pursuing the enemy, it nevertheless had the most dire consequences for Napoleon, thanks to the moral influence it had on the people in the countryside, who were dissatisfied with the extraordinary conscriptions.[321]

After the battle ended, the Guard remained in Trannes. On 22 January [3 February], the jägers moved to Dolancourt and, crossing the Aube there, moved towards Vendeuvre-sur-Barse. The Guard encountered Colloredo's column here, which had received orders too late to march on Troyes; as a result of this misunderstanding, the greater part of the Guard spent the night in bivouacs, in the open in a severe snowstorm.[322]

314Bogdanovich, 1814, pp. 49 to 50.
315Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the Campaign of 1814, p. 34.
316M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 10, No. 74 and No. 70.
317Bogdanovich, 1814, p. 103.
318M.S.A. No. 2317, p. 202.
319M.S.A. No. 2328, p. 4.
320Bogdanovich, 1814, p. 110.
321Bogdanovich 1814, p. 129.
322Bogdanovich 1814, pp. 133 to 134.

Continuing to advance, the jägers reached Bar-sur-Seine on 24 January [5 February],[323] and were in the vicinity of Villeneuve-l'Archevêque on 30 January [11 February].

The Coalition armies had separated after the Battle of La Rothière. Napoleon, acting along internal operational lines, took advantage of this, sliced into Blücher's army at Champaubert (29 January [10 February]) and scattered part of his army (Olsufiev's corps). When news of this was received in the Main Army, the reserves were immediately transferred to Méry-sur-Seine.[324] Napoleon then attacked Blücher's army at Montmirail (30 January [11 February]), Château-Thierry (31 January [12 February]), Vauchamps and Étoges (2 [14] February) and forced him to retreat towards Châlons-en-Champagne. On 2 [14] February, the reserves were transferred to the vicinity of Pont-sur-Seine.[325]

Having beaten back Blücher's army, Napoleon went on the offensive against the Main Army in order to force it to retreat behind the Seine. Napoleon's plan was entirely successful. News of Pahlen's defeat at Mormant on 5 [17] February forced Schwarzenberg to begin to retreat, and that same day the Lifeguard Jägers, along with other Guard regiments, were transferred to Perenelle [*sic*, Traînel],[326] and on towards Troyes on 6 [18] February. The hasty onward retreat of the Main Army from Troyes exhausted the troops and weakened them through large numbers of stragglers. Moving through devastated countryside and suffering from a shortage of provisions, the soldiers lost confidence in their leadership, and the retreat from Troyes caused general discontent directed at the commander-in-chief; nevertheless, the retreat continued. On 14 [26] February, the Lifeguard Jägers moved through Chaumont towards Langres. Fortunately, on that same day Count Wittgenstein reached the headquarters with intelligence that almost no one was pursuing the Main Army and that Napoleon had turned against Blücher once more. The King of Prussia insisted on stopping any further withdrawals and going on the offensive the next day. The troops greeted this news with loud cheers and beating drums.[327] The Lifeguard Jägers, however, were not required to take part in the advance for a long time; they remained in reserve at Chaumont until 1 [13] March.

During this time, on 27 February [11 March] one of the battalions of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment was sent from Arc-en-Barrois to Val des Choues along with two squadrons of Prussian *Garde-Kavallerie*, under the overall command of Colonel De la Garde,[328]with the mission of neutralising insurgents who were harassing the local population and indulging in banditry there. Colonel De la Garde was ordered to find out whether there were any insurgents hiding in the Essarois forest while maintaining the utmost secrecy, and if there were any, to seize them at night, while at the same time holding the villages of Val des Choues, Essarois and Saint-Germain-le-Rocheux with his force; these villages were supposed to be the homes of the main ringleaders. The detachment commander paid particular attention to maintaining a passive attitude towards the population. He was supposed to disarm them and promise a full pardon if they would hand over the main ringleaders of the attacks against Austrian units. The ringleaders were ordered to be sent to headquarters, and at the end of the expedition the detachment were to return to their regiments.[329] This expedition ended on 7 [19] March without the slightest loss: thanks to the resourcefulness of Ensign Kuzmin, the two main ringleaders were caught, peace was restored in the area, and the population returned to their villages. On 11 [23] March, Colonel De la Garde's

323M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 10, No. 74 and No. 156.
324M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 10, No. 74 and No. 90.
325Bogdanovich 1814, p. 157.
326M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 10, No. 74 and No. 107.
327Bogdanovich 1814, pp. 271 to 273.
328M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 10, No. 74 and No. 111.
329M.S.A. No. 2300, p. 1377.

battalion rejoined the regiment.[330]

The offensive by the Main Army, which had begun on 14 [26] February, was successful and the Coalition forces began to push the French back. On 5 [17] March, the Guard were moved to Brienne and onwards towards Saint-Remy-sous-Barbuise. On 9 [21] March, the Main Army attacked the retreating French and that same evening communications with Blücher's army were restored.[331]

On 13 [25] March, the Main Army moved towards Paris. The reserve passed through Sompuis, Poivres and Montépreux near Fère-Champenoise,[332] where a battle also took place on 13 [25] March that ended in the defeat of the French, thanks to the brilliant actions of the Coalition cavalry. From Fère-Champenoise the Main Army advanced non-stop towards Paris. Finally, on 17 [29] March, the jägers sighted Paris. In the early hours of 18 [30] March, a disposition was issued for an attack on the suburbs. The Guard and the remaining reserves were to support attacks by Raevsky's corps on the high ground at Romainville and Belleville.[333] Before the battle, the residents of the French capital were asked to surrender the city.[334] The assault began at five o'clock in the morning on 18 [30] March. Having driven the enemy from the high ground between Romainville and Pantin, Barclay de Tolly ordered the regiments to halt the onward advance.[335] Once the right and left wings of the Coalition armies had gone into action, with the exception of comte Langéron, who had not yet arrived at Montmartre, the time had come for a decisive attack in the centre. The Tsar was just about to order the entire Guard to support the attack on Belleville, when a French officer came to him with a proposal from Marshal Marmont to cease military operations and agree on a truce. The Tsar expressed his consent on condition of the immediate surrender of the city. This condition was accepted. At four o'clock in the afternoon, the order to cease firing began to be passed along our battle line, and at the same time the joyful news of the capture of Paris spread.[336]

That same evening, Supreme Orders were issued: by nine o'clock in the morning of the following day, all units were to be in full dress uniform, standing in closed columns and awaiting thus the arrival of the Sovereign Emperor.[337] The order of entry into Paris was as follows: Prussians - *Garde Kavallerie*, *Garde Leichte Kavallerie Division*; Austrians - *Grenadier Brigade*, *Königliches Grenadier Korps*, *Garde Infanterie*; Our 2nd Guard Division, *Preußisch-Badener Brigade*, Russians - 1st Guard Division, 1st, 2nd and 3rd cuirassier divisions.[338]

Upon receiving the order, the Lifeguard Jägers immediately began to clean and smarten up their clothing and equipment; the whole night passed in this way, and no one thought about sleep.

The day of 19 [31] March dawned into the most beautiful morning; the spring-like, calm, warm weather seemed to increase the general joy and festivity. Everyone was preoccupied with one thought: today we will be in Paris; the officers impatiently paced up and down the chaussée,[339] while battalions were gathering and forming up between Pantin and the Faubourg Saint-Martin.[340]

330M.S.A. No. 2300, p. 1373.
331Bogdanovich, 1814, pp. 382 to 411.
332M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 10, No. 74, p. 148.
333Bogdanovich, 1814, p. 520.
334Bogdanovich, 1814, p. 521.
335Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the Campaign of 1814 in France, p. 345.
336Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the Campaign of 1814 in France, p. 353.
337*Russkaya Beseda*, 1860, volume 1, p. 94.
338Bogdanovich, 1814, p. 563.
339*Russkaya Beseda*, 1860, volume 1, p. 94.
340Bogdanovich, 1814, p. 557.

At last all was ready, a deep silence fell, the units stood in orderly columns, awaiting the arrival of the Supreme Commander. Suddenly, a mighty Russian Hurrah rang out in the air, announcing the arrival of the Tsar. The Tsar rode on a pale grey horse, next to him was the King of Prussia, surrounded by a large retinue. The newly promoted Field Marshal Barclay de Tolly, with a drawn sword at the head of the Guard, greeted the Coalition powers. The parade began... With drums beating, bands playing, and banners flying, the jägers entered the capital. As they approached Paris, the crowds of spectators grew thicker and thicker; it was almost as if it were welcome guests rather than victors that were entering the capital of France. The people crowded into the streets and, although the *Garde nationale* were posted on the verges, they could not hold back the curious, who, breaking through their lines, fell into the ranks of our soldiers. Charmed by the Russian Tsar's gentle manner, the French greeted him with shouts of: "*Vive Alexandre! Vive la Russie!*" The Russian troops were the object of their insatiable curiosity; everyone was eager to see those who had come from the far north, presented by French propagandists as crude barbarians, desert Tatars, cannibals who had developed a taste for children's flesh. But what a surprise it was when, instead of all that had been said above, they were struck by the cut of Russian uniforms, the polish of their weapons, their healthy appearance and the cheerfulness of the soldiers, the courtesy of the officers, and their witty repartee in French.[341]

This is how an eyewitness, the British General Stuart, responded: 'Anything that could be said about the martial bearing of these troops would be an understatement; their dress and equipment were admirable, and when one thought of what they had endured, and that a certain number of these Russians had left the mountains of Tartary (which border the Chinese Empire), had crossed their country and had gone, in the space of a few months, from Moscow to beyond the Rhine, one was seized with a certain terror for the colossal empire to which they belonged.'[342] As was said above, the Guard brought up the rear; the French noticed this and said among themselves: '*C'est un coup de maitre* - first prepare the audience for a surprise, gain more and more power over them and finally amaze and astound them.'[343] After passing along countless streets through the suburbs, the boulevards of Paris and the Place de la Concorde, the Lifeguard Jägers turned into the avenue dividing the Champs-Élysées. On the right side stood Emperor Alexander I with the King of Prussia, surrounded by his retinue. The units performed a ceremonial march past. The parade ended at around five o'clock in the afternoon and the Tsar departed for Talleyrand's residence.[344]

The Guard were ordered not to take up quarters on the city's residents and to bivouac in the main squares, mostly on the Champs-Elysées. By nightfall everything had calmed down and the tired soldiers fell into a deep sleep; the silence in the streets was interrupted by calls of: "*Kmo uƋem?*" and "*Wer da?*" [Who goes there?].[345]

The next morning our officers were delighted to see their orderlies with the baggage trains; it turned out that they had entered Paris on the same day as the combatants, but only after dark, so that the Parisians would not be able to witness the ragged appearance of the support personnel and the baggage trains.[346]

On 20 March [1 April], the jägers and other regiments of the Guard were stationed in barracks in Paris, where they remained until 22 May [3 June]. To ensure order in the city during the Coalition

341Bogdanovich, 1814, p. 566.
342Londonderry, *Histoire de 1813 et 1814*, volume 2, p. 48.
343Lazhechnikov, Campaign Notes of a Russian Officer, p. 233.
344Bogdanovich, 1814, p. 565.
345Bogdanovich, 1814, p. 572.
346*Russkaya Beseda*, 1860, volume 1, p. 95.

occupation, General-of-Infantry Sacken was appointed military governor of Paris; two field officers and two subalterns were assigned to assist him, whose duty it was to inspect the barracks occupied by our Guardsmen daily, to ensure that they were kept clean and that all their belongings were secured; the hospitals to which Russian soldiers were admitted were inspected in a similar manner.[347]

Serious garrison duties began very quickly. The Lifeguard Jägers had to go on sentry duty five days in every six, and each time a significant number of officers and lower ranks were assigned to duty. The sentries were divided into three sections. The sentries from the first section would assemble at the Place de la Concorde, where a ceremonial change-over took place in the presence of the Sovereign Emperor, who arrived daily with a huge retinue, including all the marshals of France.[348]

A Duty Officer was appointed for the regiment and for each battalion for the maintenance of order. It is unknown whether the Lifeguard Jägers conducted sub-unit training, as no information about this has been preserved, but in any case, it had successfully been replaced by rehearsals for reviews and parades, of which there were many during the Jägers' residence in Paris. We shall not dwell on a description of each of them; in general, they were very similar to each other; it will suffice to describe the parade on 29 March [10 April] as the most ceremonial.

Early in the morning, the units quartered in Paris marched from their barracks to the Place de la Concorde and took up their assigned positions there: 1st Guard Infantry Division, in column of four-platoons, with their backs to the jardin des Tuileries; the Prussian and Baden contingents, with their backs to the pont de la Concorde; 2nd Guard Infantry Division facing the 1st.[349] Between the units, in the middle of the square, stood a dais, right on the spot where the King of France, Louis XVI, had been beheaded twenty years earlier. Seven Russian priests performed a thanksgiving service on this dais for the recent victories, for the capture of Paris and for the return of the Bourbons to the throne.[350] At 12 o'clock the Coalition monarchs arrived, accompanied by the staff, French marshals and generals. Having ridden around the units, they approached the dais. At the end of the service, the Tsar knelt, followed by all the troops and the large crowd of Parisians standing on the surrounding boulevards; the scene was truly astonishing; such silence reigned that every word spoken by the priests could be clearly heard. At the acclamation ‘he is risen’ the roar of Russian guns was heard. At the end of the service, the Tsar, descending from the dais, embraced the French marshals, saying that it was the Russian custom to kiss friends on Easter day. This manifestation of royal grace was met with cheers from the people: “*Vive Alexandre!*” and the mighty soldiers’ Hurrah! Whereupon the Tsar walked around the ranks of the troops, and the priests sprinkled the soldiers with holy water. The parade ended with a ceremonial march-past.[351]

The regimental command had to pay serious attention to lower ranks’ uniforms; long campaigning had left their clothing very threadbare. Some of the items were taken from the French *Garde* stores; boots were bought in Paris, and some in Leipzig.[352] The regiment's provisions were well

347Archive of the Headquarters of the Guard and St. Petersburg Military District, 7 [19] April 1814.

348List of officers' sentry posts in the city of Paris: 1st Section: the Sovereign Emperor’s; the Governor General’s; Commandant Rochechouart’s; the grain and fodder magazines; Palais-Royale; Grand-Opéra; Théâtre Français. 2nd Section: the main *Hauptwache* in the town hall; Bicetre; St. Antoine suburb; Porte Saint Denis. 3rd Section: His Majesty the King of Prussia’s; the main *Hauptwache* in the Ecole militaire; commander-in-chief, Barclay de Tolly’s; place Maubert; Saint-Michel; Enfer; Hôtel des Invalides; Le Pont Neuf; Manufacture des Gobelins (Dirin, History of the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment, volume 1 pp. 442 to 443).

349Dirin, History of the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment, volume 1 p. 443.

350*Russky Arkhiv*, 1870, p. 168.

351Dirin, History of the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment, volume 1, p. 444.

352Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1814, p. 50.

supplied, thanks to French hospitality. The regiment's current manning was far from consistent with its establishment. As a result, on 8 [20] April, Adjutant General Sipyagin was sent to Langéron's corps to select men for the Guard.[353] On 3 [15] May, 170 men arrived to replenish the Lifeguard Jägers.[354] On 4 [16] May, the Tsar personally inspected all lower ranks selected from the line in order to replenish the Guard on the Champs-Élysées. The regiment's manning also gradually began to increase with new arrivals from the hospitals.

Our officers had become completely at home in Paris; in their free time off duty they went out to see the city, the theatres, and were greeted everywhere with courtesy and refined politeness by the French, which often turned into ovations. During the negotiations that had begun with Napoleon, many French officers came to Paris who were not very friendly towards the Coalition, which was quite natural; occasionally the misunderstandings that arose ended in duels; however, in most cases, these clashes occurred with the Prussians. To avoid a recurrence of such incidents, officers were ordered to wear civilian clothes.[355]

On the day of Louis XVIII's entry, an order was issued that neither officers nor soldiers were to appear on the streets that day. This was done with the delicacy characteristic of Emperor Alexander I.[356] Negotiations with Napoleon were finally concluded. He abdicated the throne; the Bourbon dynasty was restored; a peace treaty was signed with France on 18 [30] May.

The return to Russia.

Having thus brought the war to its desired end, the Tsar inspected his troops for the last time and set off for London on 22 May [3 June], having promised the Coalition to go to Vienna, where the final conferences on the affairs of all the powers were to take place. On that same day, the sentry posts were handed over to the *Garde Nationale* and our army began its return journey from France.[357] On 22 May [3 June], the Lifeguard Jägers moved from Paris to Cherbourg, from where they were to be transported to the Peterhof by sea.[358] This march was carried out with all possible comforts for the soldiers, and the stages were very short.

In early [mid] June, the jägers arrived in Cherbourg and, having settled into cantonment quarters, began to prepare for the imminent voyage. The regiment did not take any of their trains with them; a dedicated *Wagenburg* was formed from them.[359]

Oranienbaum, Peterhof, Strelna and Ropsha were designated as the assembly areas for the Guard arriving by sea;[360] The jäers remained in these quarters until 27 August [8 September] and then moved on to Yekatrinhof. On 29 August [10 September], the Guard officers were invited to a banquet by the St. Petersburg merchants at the Krasny Kabachek [Red Tavern]. On 3 [15] July, at about four o'clock in the afternoon, the Tsar arrived at the second *versta* post on the Peterhof highway with a brilliant suite, where the 1st Guard Infantry Division were waiting for him. A resounding Hurrah! was the response to the Tsar's greeting. The Empress then arrived and the Tsar accompanied her carriage as they inspected the troops. Once the tour was over, Their Majesties headed towards St. Petersburg, while the Guard entered the city behind them through a triumphal

353M.S.A., No. 2301, p. 688.
354M.S.A. No. 2301, p. 743.
355Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the Campaign of 1814, p. 395.
356*Russkaya Beseda*, 1860, volume 1, p. 108. This was also so as not to remind Louis XVIII *qu'il est roi par la grâce des baïonnettes*.
357Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the Campaign of 1814, p. 416.
358M.S.A. No. 2332, p. 372.
359Archive of the Guard Staff and St. Petersburg Military District, 18 [30] May 1814, p. 35.
360M.S.A. No. 2332, p. 372.

arch erected in the name of an entire grateful fatherland. The jägers performed a ceremonial march-past for Their Majesties and returned to their barracks after a three-year absence. In the evening the whole city was illuminated.[361] The lower ranks who entered St. Petersburg on this day were honoured with the Tsar's 'thank you' and received a rouble, a *charka* [⅕ pint] of wine, and a *funt* [14½ ounces] of meat per man.[362]

The march to Vilna in the summer of 1815.

Following the end of the wars of liberation, a period of peace set in, a lull that Russian forces had long become unaccustomed to after the past three years. It goes without saying that continuous warfare and the constant difficulties of combat operations could not but affect the army's administrative elements. Various irregularities, which had not been noticed during wartime, made themselves felt soon after the conclusion of peace. Inevitable reforms were required in all areas of regimental administration, which, as everywhere else, had fallen into disarray, which was especially undesirable in the peacetime environment of regimental life. Meanwhile, the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, having barely begun to recover its bearings, had to undertake another campaign in that same year of 1815. In March, the whole of society was alarmed by rumours of Napoleon's escape from the island of Elba; it was claimed that the exiled emperor, having unexpectedly appeared in France, had once again gathered an army around himself and was threatening the newly established public order.

Emperor Alexander I was at the Congress of Vienna at that time. The Guard commanders, having not yet received any specific instructions, began preparing their units for what, by all accounts, was an imminent campaign. This was all the more difficult because the entire administrative element - as mentioned above - had fallen into complete disrepair after the war; the trains were in a most deplorable condition in every respect; the manning of the regiment had not yet been brought into proper definition and it was to be expected that the regiment would set off on campaign with a great shortage of manpower. In addition, all sorts of misunderstandings arose at every step, for which the highest military authorities turned to the Grand Duke Tsarevich for a resolution. The latter, living in Warsaw, was considered the commander of an independent corps, which included the Guard, 1st Reserve Cavalry Corps and 1st Grenadier Division; in reality, in St. Petersburg, these formations were under Count Miloradovich's command. In 1815, the headquarters of the Guard Corps was established in order to directly administer the Guard, with Adjutant General Sipyagin appointed as its head.

To every question the Guard chief-of-staff put to the Tsarevich regarding the departure on campaign, the Grand Duke answered, and approved all the measures taken and, by way of his specific orders, indicated the means for eliminating many administrative difficulties.[363]

361*Russky Invalid* 1814 1 [13] August.

362M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 160, bundle 10, No. 74, p. 559.

363We present the note from Adjutant General Sipyagin with questions regarding the imminent movement of the Guard and with the Tsarevich's own notes thereon (shown in italics and with conclusions in brackets): 'Notes in the event of a movement by the Guard, dated 7 [19] April 1815. 1. How many infirmary carriages should be ordered to take? The infantry regiments are preparing four each. Is this enough? (*Take*). (*Sufficient*, noted in His Imperial Highness, the Tsarevich's handwriting). Field chapel and tent box carts? (*Leave*). Regarding officers' baggage, should we follow the commander-in-chief's orders dated 29 May [10 June] 1813? (*Be guided by this*). 2. What uniforms should we wear - interim or new ones? (*Interim*). 3. Should one field officer per division be left in St. Petersburg and one subaltern per regiment in order to form the men returning from hospital? (*Leave*). 4. Which shakos should we wear - new or old? There are not enough old ones. (*In the old ones, add new ones*). 5. If departing in May, take breeches? (*Take*). 6. Should companies have *artel* carts or should this be left to the discretion of regimental commanders? (*Leave it to them*).' M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 123, No. 1691.

All these preparations were in full swing when the Guard eventually read the Supreme Decree regarding the departure on campaign. The decree was signed by the Tsar in Vienna on 27 April [9 May] 1815. On that same day, by Supreme Decree addressed to Prince Gorchakov, the entire Guard was subordinated to General-of-Infantry Count Miloradovich pending the arrival of the Tsarevich. The infantry regiments were ordered to set off with three battalions, and before departing, to leave in St. Petersburg 'one able-bodied captain, preferably one of those still recovering from wounds, with a decent number of subalterns and non-commissioned officers in order to receive convalescing soldiers and thereafter to form them into companies and battalions.'[364]

By late April [early May], all training had been completed and the Guard Corps was completely ready to march. The trains had been brought into order, and the arming of the force with every necessity was nearing completion. Provisions wagons had been obtained from the artillery arsenal, and draught horses were supposed to be appropriated from the reserve artillery; but subsequently the artillery department refused to supply them due 'to impossibility' and the Ministry of War was forced to issue 145 roubles for each horse with harness;[365] infirmary wagons and apothecary box carts (one per regiment) were built with the money raised from the sale of the baggage trains when the units had embarked on ship in 1814.[366] Everything was ready and Adjutant General Sipyagin reported to His Highness the Tsarevich that 'the men were well equipped and in good order thanks to the efforts of the regimental commanders, the morale of the troops was excellent and the Guard only regretted that they were far away from the Tsar and the Grand Duke and, due to the remoteness of the theatre of military operations, were afraid of not being able to get there in time for the action.'[367] The departure of the units on campaign was preceded by a whole series of orders in which the leadership tried to clarify all possible ambiguities and to define as precisely as possible every military and administrative aspect of the imminent movement. Regimental commanders were instructed to take particular care of the soldiers' health; orders were issued for 100 civilian carts to be assigned to each infantry regiment in order to facilitate the march for lower ranks, and that these be paid for from travel allowances;[368] it was confirmed on the basis of the Supreme Will, announced on 31 December 1812 [12 January 1813], that one man in six in each regiment would be supplied with bandages, compresses and lint charged to funds for consumables;[369] if for some reason these items could not be carried on the men themselves, then it was prescribed to hold them in the regimental pharmacy. Orders were issued for the sick to be left in hospitals set up at several locations along the detachments' route.

Provisioning magazines were located and established in exactly the same way, where the regiments were to replenish their ten-day resupply.[370]

On 28 May [9 June], the Guard began its march. Shortly before this, orders were issued to units, which indicated the objective and significance of the campaign being undertaken.[371] From that day

364M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 123.

365M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 123, No. 3653.

366M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 1691. The Jäger Regiment received 2,700 roubles from the sale of the trains.

367M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 1691. Note from Adjutant General Sipyagin, dated 7 [19] April, received in Warsaw on 14 [26] April.

368M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 123, No. 202.

369One bandage each - from standard linen, four inches wide, 10 *arshin* [23 feet, four inches] long. One compress each, one *arshin* [28 inches] square. A half-*funt* [7¼ ounces] of lint each (M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 122, No. 202).

370M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 122, No. 202.

371Order No. 48 dated 19 [31] May 1815, to the corps on the occasion of the Guard's departure (M.B. Tsarevich's

on, the men were gratified to receive meat rations three times a week, and wine rations on the other four days; officers were provided with 'rations in kind in accordance with the Ordinances for a Large Operational Army.'[372]

By this time, every Guard regiment, despite significant difficulties and obstacles, had been brought into full order; in this respect, the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment had achieved particular perfection, standing out among other regiments due to the number and exemplary condition of its men, as well as the insignificant numbers of those who fell ill along the way. Following the issuance of an order to take only willing volunteers from among the lower ranks who had already served their term along with them on campaign, it emerged that only in the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment did everyone, without exception, express the wish to go on campaign. Drawing the Tsarevich's attention to this, Adjutant General Sipyagin wrote: 'How great must the morale of the regiment have been and how much was due to the influence of the unforgettable Karl Ivanovich [Bistrom]!'[373] Thanks to this gratifying solidarity among the jägers, the number of combatants in the regiment during the march significantly exceeded that of every other regiment, which is clearly seen from the following comparative table:

Lifeguard Regiments	Field Officers	Subalterns	Non-Commissioned Officers	Musicians	Privates	Support Personnel
Preobrazhensky	7	53	199	112	2,705	130
Semenovsky	6	59	181	118	2,503	124
Izmailovsky	6	45	173	91	2,659	99
Jägers	7	62	236	89	2,740	117

As for the sub-units that remained in St. Petersburg, our regiment had the smallest number.

For completeness, we attach a similar table:

Lifeguard Regiments	Field Officers	Subalterns	Non-Commissioned Officers	Musicians	Privates	Support Personnel
Preobrazhensky	7	25	44	23	329	35
Semenovsky	9	32	47	27	421	56
Izmailovsky	10	30	67	23	361	48
Jägers	9	25	26	9	267	18

From the table it is evident that 34 field officers and subalterns stayed behind from the regiment;

Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 123).

372M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 123, No. 2480.

373M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 123, No. 2604.

however, it should be noted that most of them were on detached duty, serving as aides-de-camp to various persons; there were far fewer actual combatant officers left in St. Petersburg.[374]

The units assigned to the campaign were divided into two columns.

The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, as part of the first column commanded by General Prince Golitsyn, set off on 9 [21] June through Tsarskoye Selo, Luga, Porkhov, Velikie Luki and Polotsk to Vilna, where they arrived on 4 [16] August, having covered 869 *versta* [580 miles] in 57 days.[375] Throughout this journey, there was only one case of illness in our regiment, while in other regiments there were at least 14 sick.[376]

This campaign, which had demanded so much effort, ended in nothing, and the force had barely reached Vilna when Emperor Alexander issued a decree, signed by him in Paris on 16 [28] July, in which the Tsar thanked the Guard for their continued diligence and zeal in service and ordered the troops to return to St. Petersburg. Peace and tranquillity were restored to Europe, the significance and magical influence of Napoleon was finally and irrevocably smashed, and therefore there was no longer any need for Russian forces.[377]

The return to St. Petersburg on 11 [23] October 1815.

On 17 [29] August 1815, as part of the first column (General-of-Cavalry Prince Golitsyn's), the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment moved back through Polotsk and Velikie Luki towards St. Petersburg. Throughout the entire return journey, the Guard units were greeted everywhere with a warm and attentive welcome from the authorities and population of the governorates they passed through. The Vitebsk Governorate were particularly hospitable, with the nobility, led by the governor, Herzog Alexander von Württemberg, offering wine to the soldiers several times and providing them with carts free of charge.[378]

The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment returned to St. Petersburg on 11 [23] October.

From this moment on, regimental life returned to its usual routine. During this period, the Tsar's attention to 1st Guard Infantry Division was generally expressed in the fact that 1,000 roubles per regiment were allocated by Supreme Command for the care of the sick during the return march.[379]

374M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 123, No. 3941 (to the Tsarevich from Prince Gorchakov, dated 18 [30] June 1815).

375M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 123. For details of the march-route, see Appendix X to Chapter 6.

376Shown here is a report on the number of those left in hospitals due to illness, those who deserted, and those who died. In the Preobrazhensky Regiment - 14 left in hospital, four died; in the Semenovsky Regiment - 17 left in hospital, one combatant deserted, one died; in the Izmailovsky Regiment - 18 left in hospital, one support staff deserted, one died; in the Jäger Regiment - one left in hospital, one support staff deserted, two died (M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 123, No. 4507).

377M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 123, No. 4244.

378M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 22, No. 123, No. 4878 (Adjutant General Sipyagin's report to the Tsarevich).

379Commissioner Yurlov's report dated 24 August [5 September] 1815 (Archive of the Guard Staff and St. Petersburg Military District).

APPENDIX I TO CHAPTER 6.

List Of Regimental Officers In 1813.

Serial	Rank and Name	Year entered service	Assignment
1	Major General Bistrom	1790	Regimental commander.
	Colonels		
2	Makarov	1787	
3	Fedorov	1793	Commander of 4th Jäger Regiment.
4	Richter 2nd	1798	Battalion commander.
5	Matsnev	1802	On secondment.
6	De la Garde	1801	Wounded.
7	Bartholomäi	1798	Aide-de-camp to His Imperial Highness, Prinz Georg von Holstein-Oldenburg.
8	Yafimovich	1800	With the commander-in-chief, His Serene Highness Prince Kutuzov-Smolensky.
9	Petin	1806	Wounded.
10	Bogaevsky	1806	Sick in Vilna.
	Captains		
11	Buddenbrock	1806	Aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Baggovut.
12	Penskoy 3rd	1806	Sick in the town of Johannisburg.
13	Penskoy 4th	1806	
14	Korenev	1799	Aide-de-camp to Adjutant General Uvarov.
15	Saint-Priest 3rd	1806	With Adjutant General Saint-Priest 1st.
16	Akhsharumov		Aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn.
17	Svechin	1801	Wounded.
18	Rall 3rd	1803	
	Staff-Captains		
19	Andrzheikovich	1806	Aide-de-camp to General-of-Cavalry Bennigsen.
20	Baryshnikov	1806	Wounded.
21	von Loman	1807	Regimental paymaster; sick in Plotsk.
22	Kromin	1803	Aide-de-camp to General-of-Infantry Barclay de Tolly.
23	Poleshko	1803	Aide-de-camp to Major General Baron Rosen.

Serial	Rank and Name	Year entered service	Assignment
24	Prince Bagration	1807	With the Army of Moldavia.
25	Andreevsky	1806	
26	Baron Bode	1807	Aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Steinheil.
27	Kurzhevsky		Aide-de-camp to Major General Bistrom.
28	Kashintsev	1806	Aide-de-camp to General-of-Infantry Barclay de Tolly.
29	Lieders	1807	
30	Bistrom	1806	
31	Suchtelen	1808	Sick in Vilna.
32	comte de Rochechouart	1806	*Flügeladjutant* to His Imperial Majesty; with Adjutant General duc de Richelieu.
33	Shcherbinin	1807	Temporary orderly to His Serene Highness, the commander-in-chief, Prince Kutuzov-Smolensky.
34	Tolstoy 2nd	1806	Wounded.
	Lieutenants		
35	Prince Bagration	1806	On secondment.
36	Lanskoy 1st	1807	Aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Golitsyn.
37	Pankratiev	1807	Aide-de-camp to His Serene Highness, the commander-in-chief, Prince Kutuzov-Smolensky.
38	Count Voinovich	1811	
39	Lanskoy 2nd	1807	Aide-de-camp to General-of-Cavalry Bennigsen.
40	Yesakov	1807	Regimental adjutant.
41	Repninsky	1807	Battalion adjutant.
42	Korsakov	1807	
43	Prince Kozlovsky 2nd	1806	
44	Schumann	1809	Regimental quartermaster.
45	Ushakov	1809	Aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Rapp.
46	Mukhanov	1809	
47	Krivtsov	1809	
48	Raevsky	1813	
49	Bublik	1810	
50	Tolmachev	1810	

Serial	Rank and Name	Year entered service	Assignment
51	Bolkashin	1810	
52	Kvitsinsky	1810	
53	Arbuzov	1810	
54	Khlopov	1807	
55	Frolov-Bagreev 2nd	1807	
56	Baturin	1808	
	Sub-Lieutenants		
57	Lvov	1809	Battalion adjutant.
58	Gederstern	1810	
59	Volkov	1810	
60	Meftodovsky	1810	
61	Tsarevich of Georgia, Ilya	1812	
62	Tsarevich of Georgia, Okropir	1812	
63	Cherenkov	1810	
64	Yermolov	1812	
65	Davydov	1812	Aide-de-camp to Major General Bakhmetiev.
66	Kaminsky	1812	
67	Buturlin	1811	
68	Yermolaev	1811	
69	Strandmann	1811	
70	Kiselev 2nd	1811	
71	Nashchokin	1811	
	Ensigns		
72	Shchepotiev	1812	
73	Gederstern	1812	
74	Korsakov	1812	
75	Norov	1812	
76	Barnovolokov	1812	
77	Engelhardt 1st	1812	
78	Engelhardt 2nd	1812	
79	Bibikov	1812	

Serial	Rank and Name	Year entered service	Assignment
80	Perkurov 1st	1812	
81	Krivtsev	1812	
82	Perkurov 2nd	1812	
83	Golenishchev-Kutuzov	1812	
84	Chernyshev 1st	1812	
85	Zasetsky	1812	
86	von Loman	1812	
87	Merkurov		
88	Kuzmin		
89	Chernyshev 2nd		
90	Valuev	1812	
91	Savelov 1st	1812	
92	Sevelov 2nd	1812	
93	Baron von Schilling	1813	
94	Shiryaev	1795	Invalid half-company.
	Titular Councillor		
95	Tverenikov	1798	Auditor.
	Collegiate Assessors		
96	Volsky		Battalion physician.
97	Alexandrovich		Battalion physician.
98	Shafransky		Battalion physician.
	Junkers		
99	Ilinsky		
100	Lanevsky-Volk		

Departed during the year of 1813:

Major General **Makarov** - transferred to command the Lifeguard Pavlovsk Regiment.

Colonel **Kashintsev** - transferred to the Malorussia Grenadier Regiment.

Major General **Bartholomäi** - appointed commandant of Frankfurt.

Colonel **Petin** - removed from the lists as deceased.

Colonel **Penskoy** - died of wounds.

Staff-Captain Count **Voinovich** - died of wounds.

Staff-Captain **Ushakov** - died of wounds.

Ensign **Tiesenhausen** - removed from the lists as deceased.

Captain **Buddenbrock** - transferred to the Kremenchug Infantry Regiment as a colonel.

Lieutenant **Mukhanov** - removed from the lists as deceased.

Colonel **Bogaevsky** - transferred to the 3rd Jäger Regiment.

Staff-Captain **Lieders** - transferred to the 4th Jäger Regiment as a major.

Captain **Korenev** - appointed to the army as a lieutenant colonel.

Colonel **Matsnev** - transferred to the 11th Jäger Regiment.

Ensign **Valuev** - transferred to the 3rd Jäger Regiment.

Lieutenant **Korsakov** - transferred to the Lifeguard Hussars.

Staff-Captain **Shcherbinin** - retired.

Arrived during the year of 1813:

Transferred in:

Lieutenant **Anosov** from the Tambov Infantry Regiment, aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Rtishchev, while remaining in the same appointment.

Captain **Raisky** from the 7th Jäger Regiment, aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Sabaneev.

Ensign **Choglokov** from the Pernov Grenadier Regiment, with promotion to sub-lieutenant for distinction in combat.

Lieutenant **Kasparov** from the 15th Jäger Regiment.

Captain **Bistrom** from the Highways Department, as a Staff-Captain.

Staff-Captain **Litvinov** from the Noble Regiment.

Ensigns **Kushelev**, **Tiesenhausen**, **Barkov**, **Bistrom**, **Yedishev** and **Ryzhov** from the army.

Portepée-Junker **Lanevsky-Volk** on promotion to ensign.

The grand total for 1813 was: 93 officers, one invalid officer, one auditor, three physicians, two *Junker.*

During the year, 16 officers and one *Junker* departed.

During the year, 13 officers and three *Junker* arrived.

By 1 [13] January 1814 it included 90 officers, four *Junker,* one invalid officer, one auditor and three physicians.

APPENDIX II TO CHAPTER 6.

List Of Officers Left Behind At The Start Of The 1813 Campaign Due To Illness And Wounds.

Serial	Rank and Name	For what reason and since when	Assignment
1	Colonel De la Garde	For wounds since 26 August [7 September] 1812 (wounded at Borodino).	In Vladimir.
2	Captain Petin		
3	Staff-Captain Svechin		
4	Staff-Captain Baryshnikov		
5	Lieutenant Repninsky		In Ryazan.
6	Lieutenant Korsakov		
7	Lieutenant Krivtsev		
8	Sub-Lieutenant Khlopov		In Yaroslavl.
9	Sub-Lieutenant Gederstern 1st		In St. Petersburg
10	Ensign Buturlin		In Vladimir.
11	Ensign Strandmann		In Ryazan.
12	Ensign Shchepotiev		In Kostroma.
13	Ensign Engelhardt 1st		In the Smolensk Governorate.
14	Ensign Engelhardt 2nd		
15	Ensign Savelov 1st		
16	Ensign Perkurov 1st		In the Moscow Governorate.
17	Ensign Golenishchev-Kutusov		In the St. Petersburg Governorate.
18	Ensign von Loman		
19	Ensign Merkurov		In Yaroslavel.
20	Lieutenant Tolstoy	For wounds since 6 [18] November (Krasny & Dobroe).	In Novgorod.
1	Captain Bogaevsky	Catarrhal fever	In Vilna since 28 December 1812 [9 January 1813].
2	Lieutenant Suchtelen	Delirious fever	
3	Sub-Lieutenant Kvitsinsky	Fever	
4	Ensign Yermolaev	Catarrhal fever	
5	Ensign Bibikov	Delirious Fever	
6	Ensign Valuev	Fever	
7	Court Councillor Vladimirsky, regimental staff-physician	Bilious fever	In Vilna since 28 December 1812 [9 January 1813].

Serial	Rank and Name	For what reason and since when	Assignment
8	Staff-Captain Kurzhevsky, aide-de-camp to Major General Bistrom	Delirious fever since 17 [29] October 1812.	In Kaluga.
9	Sub-Lieutenant Lvov	Catarrhal fever	In Molodechno since 23 November [5 December] 1812.
10	Sub-Lieutenant Cherenkov	Delirious fever	In Smorgon since 26 November [8 December] 1812.
11	Sub-Lieutenant Arbuzov	Delirious fever	
12	Ensign Kiselev	Fever	In Merecz since 3 [15] January 1813.
13	Battalion Physician Shafransky	Catarrhal fever	
14	Ensign Krivtsov	Delirious fever	In Senno since 6 [18] January 1813.
15	Lieutenant Count Voinovich	Delirious fever	In Lida since 12 [24] January 1813.
16	Ensign Krylov	Delirious fever	

For a total of 34 officers and two physicians.

M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 161, bundle 7, No. 60.

APPENDIX III TO CHAPTER 6.

General Lavrov's Report To Grand Duke Konstantin, 30 April [12 May] 1813.

Report by Lieutenant General Lavrov, Commanding General, V Corps.

In the battle of this 20 April [2 May] at the town of Lützen, the Corps Lifeguard regiments Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky, entrusted to me by the Supreme Commander, were sent to the village of Großgörschen, where they were deployed to support a corps from the Prussian force and were under the command of their brigade commander, Major General Baron Rosen; the Lifeguard regiments Lithuania, Grenadier and Pavlovsk were sent to the right flank under the command of Major General Khrapovitsky to support III Grenadier Corps, while the Lifeguard Finland Regiment went to the left flank. I myself remained with the Lifeguard Izmailovsky and Jäger regiments in the centre in order to shield the batteries stationed there and to hold back the enemy advance. Both of these regiments, with their characteristic bravery, withstood the enemy battery's crossfire for three hours until nightfall. Following the withdrawal by the units to their front, the enemy determinedly attacked the screens of marksmen sent from the Lifeguard Izmailovsky and Jäger regiments with their skirmishers, who were supported by two strong columns; their courage and outstanding bravery held the enemy advance up, while the artillery action from four guns on the enemy columns forced them to halt and fall back; the screen of marksmen poured fire down on the enemy and prevented them from closing in. It was in this situation that I received orders from the honourable Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armies, General-of-Cavalry Count Wittgenstein, that once the cavalry arrived, I should retreat to rejoin the other units. Upon their arrival, as the enemy batteries fell silent, I withdrew to the road leading to Pegau, where I remained until the arrival of His Excellency the honourable Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armies. It is my duty as a matter of justice to specifically and most humbly present the honourable Major General Bistrom and Colonel Kozlyaninov for their outstanding courage and bravery, as well as the other field officers and subalterns who participated in this action and who are named in the attached list. With regard to the regiments sent during the battle and the artillery company, I have the honour to present the original reports from their commanders for the discretion of Your Imperial Highness.

Lieutenant General Lavrov.

No. 629, from the camp at Bautzen, 30 April [12 May] 1813.

M.B. Tsarevich's Papers, register 160, bundle 128, No. 1046, No. 629.

APPENDIX IV TO CHAPTER 6.

Reserve Battalions of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment.

Upon departing St. Petersburg, the regiment's first reserve battalion consisted of: one field officer, 15 subalterns, 46 non-commissioned officers, 16 musicians, 618 privates and nine support personnel. They collected two musicians and 11 men from various hospitals en route (three men in Pskov, three men in Jurburg, three men in Polotsk, two men in Kalisz, two men in Bernstadt [Bierutów]).

They also left the following behind in hospitals en route: two subalterns in St. Petersburg; 17 privates in Gatchina; one non-commissioned officer and 10 privates in Luga; one subaltern, one non-commissioned officer, two musicians and 39 privates in Pskov; 12 privates, one support staff in Ostrow [*sic*]; 19 privates in Jakobstadt [Jēkabpils]; four non-commissioned officers, three musicians, 27 privates and one support staff in Jurburg; four privates in Gumbinnen; 18 privates in Polotsk; four privates in Kalisz. In addition, on the march, two musicians, 62 privates and one support staff died and six privates deserted.

The total left behind was three subalterns, six non-commissioned officers, seven musicians, 218 privates and three support personnel. The following reached the regiment: one field officer, 12 subalterns, 40 non-commissioned officers, 11 musicians, 411 privates and six support personnel.

Upon leaving St. Petersburg, the Guard and line reserve battalions each left behind a sub-unit from which one over-strength company was formed for each regiment. These companies were consolidated into six combined battalions. The first battalion included companies from the 1st Guards Infantry Division. There were also additional sub-units from regiments and invalid half-companies in St. Petersburg.

According to the weekly report dated 23 June [5 July] 1813, No. 395, the Jäger Company consisted of:

	Field officers	Subalterns	Non-commissioned officers	Musicians	Privates	Support personnel
ON THE ROLLS						
Sub-unit left behind by the reserve battalion.		6	11	4	254	9
Sub-unit left behind by the regiment	1	5	8	1	29	12
Invalid half-company		1	11		73	
TOTAL:	1	12	30	5	356	21
SICK						
Sub-unit left behind by the reserve battalion.			1		90	3
Sub-unit left behind by the regiment	1	5			4	
Invalid half-company					2	

	Field officers	Subalterns	Non-commissioned officers	Musicians	Privates	Support personnel
TOTAL:	1	5	1		96	3
PRESENT						
Sub-unit left behind by the reserve battalion.		6	10	4	164	6
Sub-unit left behind by the regiment			8	1	25	12
Invalid half-company		1	11		71	
TOTAL:		7	29	5	260	18

The sub-units from the reserve battalions formed the St. Petersburg garrison and carried out sentry duties (M.B. Tsarevich's papers, register 161, bundle 6, No. 47, No. 958).

The second reserve battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Mantsurov from the Noble Regiment, who signed monthly reports and other dispatches, referring to himself as the battalion commander. The battalion's officers included ensigns Merkurov and Bibikov, both of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, who had been wounded during the 1812 campaign and were therefore left in Russia. The battalion, like the battalions of the active regiment, consisted of one grenadier and three jäger companies; it consisted of the following: three officers, 17 non-commissioned officers, three drummers and 294 privates; of the latter, only 243 privates were present. According to the Supreme approved establishment, the battalion should have had 16 officers, 85 non-commissioned officers, 17 musicians and 400 lower ranks. The deficient numbers in the battalion's ranks had to be replenished with recruits. By July the battalion already consisted of six officers, 37 non-commissioned officers, 16 musicians and 480 privates, of whom half were recruits. The replenishment of senior ranks was carried out by transfer from various regiments, both jäger and line; there were even two non-commissioned officers and 15 privates from the Guard *Équipage*.

By 1 [13] August, excluding its commander, Lieutenant Mantsurov, the battalion officers were Sub-Lieutenant Kiselev, ensigns Engelhardt, Bibikov, Merkurov, Saveliev and Valuev from the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, and seconded to the battalion were: Sub-Lieutenant Zubov 2nd and Ensign Danilov from the 40th Jägers; Sub-Lieutenant Bartenev from the 50th Jägers and Ensign Krestinsky, formerly from this corps. Two officers, Lieutenant Karpinsky from the 30th Jägers and Lieutenant Likhachev from the 40th Jägers, having been seconded to the battalion, did not arrive. Thus by 1 [13] August, our regiment's second reserve battalion had 11 officers (M.B. Monthly returns for the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, bundle 476).

APPENDIX V TO CHAPTER 6.

General Yermolov's Report To General Osterman-Tolstoy, 22 August [3 September] 1813.

(As published in Bogdanovich's History of the War of 1813 [English translation by P.G.A Phillips, volume 2, Appendix XX, pp. 196 to 200]).

'Report to the honourable Lieutenant General and Chevalier, Count Osterman-Tolstoy, from the Commander IV Corps, Lieutenant General Yermolov:

Having had the honour of being under Your Excellency's command of the Lifeguard with the 1st Division, I humbly present the report on their operations.

On the will of Your Excellency, having taken up a position on 15 [27] August, facing Pirna from the direction of the town of Dohna, together with II Corps under Lieutenant General Prinz Eugen von Württemberg, I dispatched Major General Bistrom to the village of Zehista with the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment in order to restore communications with Major General Helffreich, whose detachment, had been cut off by the approaching enemy. Major General Bistrom frustrated the enemy effort and linked up with Major General Helffreich's detachment without hindrance.

On 16 [28] August, Your Excellency deigned to announce the movement of the forces subordinate to you to Peterswald on the road to Teplitz. Once the detachment under Major General Helffreich had gone to occupy the village of Cotta on your orders, and II Corps had moved to block the road there from Zehista, the enemy, seeing the significant separation of the elements of the force, raced to break the link between them. It became essential to push the enemy away. An attack on the Kohlberg heights was unavoidable, whose slopes were extremely steep and, due to the rain-soaked soil, almost inaccessible. No sooner had Major General Bistrom received orders to attack, than the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment appeared on the peak of the mountain - the obstacle had disappeared, the enemy were removed, the Lifeguard Division passed the difficult Zehista defile freely. The Lifeguard Izmailovsky Regiment, sent to reinforce the Jägers, was repulsed by enemy emerging from another direction. The third battalion of the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment came to their aid, and the Kohlberg returned to our hands. It was taken for a third time by the second battalion of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment. The Lifeguard Division passed through Cotta and the troops descended into the frightful defile at Berggießhübel. The Preobrazhensky Regiment were at the head of the column. Behind them were 24 artillery pieces. As soon as they emerged from the defile, they encountered the enemy in twice their strength astride the road. Major General Baron Rosen ordered the skirmishers forward. The first battalion were to go right flanking, while the second battalion were to strike with bayonets fixed. Your Excellency was witness to their success. Nothing compared with the swiftness of the Preobrazhensky's second battalion, and the enemy flight cleared the way for the following units, the artillery was saved. The Lifeguard Jägers relieved the second battalion of the Preobrazhensky Regiment. The Jägers were relieved in turn by troops from II Corps.

The enemy forestalled us once again, occupying the defile and the surrounding high ground near the village of Hellendorf. Once again it was necessary to clear the way by force of arms. Major General Potemkin was directed to attack the enemy blocking the road with the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment; none could resist. The first and second battalions prevented the enemy from blocking. Even the steepness of the slopes could not protect

them. The artillery passed through safely.

Having ordered Prinz Eugen von Württemberg to hold the enemy, Your Excellency ordered the tired Lifeguard Division to rest. The action was ended by the darkness of the night. We spent the night at Peterswald.

Before dawn on 17 [29] August, Your Excellency ordered me to withdraw with the Lifeguard Division and take up positions nearby. I was stationed on the high ground at Nollendorf, behind which a steep descent immediately begins from the crest of the mountains. Soon II Corps arrived. The enemy coming behind them were engaged with heavy fire from the batteries and skirmishers from the Lifeguard. II Corps deployed. Your Excellency ordered me to descend from the mountains and take up the first position suitable for holding back the enemy. You remained with II Corps yourself in order to discern enemy intentions. Having passed the town of Kulm, I deployed the Lifeguard Division; their left wing extended towards the mountains, the village to our front was held by a battalion of the Jäger Regiment. The cavalry took up positions on the right flank.

We waited in this location for the arrival of the enemy forces, and they appeared in great strength. A powerful bombardment began as the batteries confronted one another. The enemy attacked the village and the entire line in column. I reinforced the fighting line by order of Your Excellency, and within a short time most of the division was in action. The Lifeguard Izmailovsky Regiment struck with fixed bayonets, neither the overwhelming enemy forces nor the fierce fire could stop them. At the head of the regiment, General Khrapovitsky paved the way for those following him. A severe wound took him out of the battle, but the regiment covered the valley with enemy corpses. The artillery commanders, Colonel Baikov and Lieutenant Colonel Bistrom, facilitated the attack through the skilful work of the batteries. Their stronger and heavier-calibre batteries fell silent.

I could not conceal from the Lifeguard regiments that our army was in the mountains and were unable to arrive soon, that the Sovereign Emperor was with them and had not yet returned. I was not in a position to cheer the soldiers up - the undaunted spirit of their commanders served as an example to them. All of them were impassioned, but they found it necessary to tame their ardour. Everyone outdid themselves. After a long resistance, the enemy broke through at one point in strong columns, and after passing through the forest, emerged onto the plain. The Lifeguard Ulans and Lifeguard Dragoons, commanded by Major General Shevich, struck the columns with incredible intent. One disappeared into the forest, the other had the flames of their audacity extinguished with their own blood. The dead lay in rows, covering the plain in all directions. The second battalion of the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment drove the column back and cleared the forest. The Preobrazhensky Regiment marched across the corpses of those who had dared to oppose them. The first battalion of the Izmailovsky Regiment went at the enemy flank through the conflagration of the blazing village. The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment and the third battalion of the Semenovsky Regiment pushed the large numbers of enemy back to the tip of the left wing.

The enemy batteries fell silent in horror. Only two companies remained in my reserve. An advance would be unsafe, the superiority of the enemy numbers was obvious. I gave orders to retreat into the forest. Your Excellency, having suffered a wound, was forced to ride away; it was deemed fit to entrust me with command. Leaving some of the troops in the forest, I directed Major General Potemkin to command the left flank and to form a reserve. Everything was in perfect order, in anticipation of new enemy attacks. Their attacks

resumed with ferocity, but not simultaneously and not at multiple locations. The Lifeguard regiments resisted fearlessly, and God blessed them with complete success.

The action had ended by eight o'clock in the evening. The 1st Grenadier Division, which arrived with Lieutenant General Raevsky, relieved the reserves, but the forward outposts and skirmishers from the Lifeguard regiments remained until nightfall.

Having witnessed the diligence, fearlessness and resolve of the honourable generals: I have the honour to present for the favourable attention of the authorities, the commanders from the division, Baron Rosen, Potemkin, Bistrom and Khrapovitsky, with particular respect for services rendered by them this day.

I cannot present particularly outstanding exploits by individual field officers and subalterns. This would necessitate the provision of a list of everyone present. I cannot even present the lower ranks: this would necessitate counting all ranks of the valiant regiments that have the good fortune to bear the title of the Tsar's Lifeguard, whom they idolise.

I have the honour to present the original lists from the honourable unit commanders that I have received. I shall soon present those from other units not from 1st Lifeguard Division, which were under my command, or had been previously, as well as the officers upon whom I was especially reliant.

No. 1296.

22 August [3 September] 1813.

The town of Teplitz in Bohemia.

APPENDIX VI TO CHAPTER 6.

Count Osterman-Tolstoy's Report To The Commander-In-Chief.[380]

Having received orders from Your Excellency to proceed with the forces entrusted to me through Mozhen [*sic*, Maxen] or Peterswald, if this latter road were not occupied by the enemy, and to cover the army's passage through the difficult defiles of the Bohemian Mountains by this movement. The 1st Lifeguard Division had reached me commanded by Lieutenant General Yermolov and II Corps under Lieutenant General Prinz Eugen von Württemberg were located facing the mountains rising above Pirna, the enemy were at close quarters, their superior forces were visible, the road to Peterswald was already within their reach. I decided to take the risky route to Peterswald such that the enemy could not forestall our units along the shortest route to Teplitz. The good fortune of commanding His Imperial Majesty's Guard justified the boldness of my undertaking.

On the morning of 16 [28] August, Major General Bistrom attacked the Kohlberg heights, which were extremely important due to the situation. The battalions of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment ascended like a tornado and the high ground was taken. The third battalion of the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment arrived and contributed to their consolidation.

I ordered Lieutenant General Yermolov to pass the village of Peterswald, settle down for the night and give the exhausted Guard Division a rest.

On 17 [29] August, II Corps retreated beyond the village of Nollendorf, where the enemy were engaged by batteries and marksmen from the Guard Division. Remaining with the units from II Corps myself in order to assess enemy intentions, I entrusted Lieutenant General Yermolov with selecting a position forwards of Teplitz from which to confront the enemy, and ordered the deployment of the Guard Division. The enemy quickly captured the village of Nollendorf and appeared in front of the position.

The action began in the bitterest fashion. In general, every unit fought with incredible courage. The Lifeguard regiments covered themselves with glory. The enemy renewed their attacks, using all their strength, but they were all broken against the solid chests of the fearless. There are no horrors that can shake the valiant regiments of the Lifeguard.

The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment repeatedly counterattacked the enemy along the almost impregnable cliffs, and the enemy could not hold out. The enemy continued to viciously attack various points until seven o'clock, but met death everywhere, and flight was their only salvation.

380M.S.A. No. 1760.

APPENDIX VII TO CHAPTER 6.

Supreme Rescript to the Guard, dated 26 August [7 September] 1813.

'To the Russian Imperial Guard.

On the memorable 17th [29th] day of this month, you, the valiant Guard units, covered yourselves with new unfading laurels and rendered an important service to the Fatherland. With a small number of men with unheard-of courage you held back and defeated an adversary superior in strength, who was trying ferociously to extend his foothold at Teplitz further into Bohemia. You stopped him with your chests, dealt him a terrible blow and thus paved the way for the complete victory that was to follow the next day. The notable enemy corps was completely defeated, destroyed and scattered. Its commander-in-chief, with all surviving generals, field officers and subalterns and 12,000 privates, were taken prisoner. 81 guns with many ammunition caissons and vehicles fell into our hands. Warriors and defenders of the State! You have proven that you bear the honour of this title with dignity and righteousness. I express the gratitude of the entire Fatherland to you. Along with this, you have bought immortal glory through your bloodshed and deeds. As a token of due gratitude, I present St. George Colours to you, the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky Regiments and the Guard Naval *Équipage*, and St. George Trumpets to you, the Izmailovsky and Jäger Regiments. May the hand of the Lord keep you who fight in accordance with faith and truth.

Teplitz, 26 August [7 September] 1813.'

(Shishkov, Brief Notes, pp. 161 to 162).

APPENDIX VIII.

Alexander Semchenko's Song Commemorating the Battle of Kulm.

In our regiment there remains a modest monument to the glorious Battle of Kulm still, left by one of the jägers, non-commissioned officer Alexander Semchenko, who many years after the battle, inspired by the heroic deeds of the former Guard Jägers, composed a soldier's drinking song in memory of the Battle of Kulm:

Saint Myron's day is here,
A sacred day for jägers!
Honour we now the memory
Of our heroic fathers!

How on this day at Kulm
To the death they fought the foe,
Like lions in mortal combat
With bayonets laid them low.

That battle was bloody and bitter,
Yet no Russian steel could fail:
It bequeathed a crown immortal
Kulm's glory shall not pale.

And now we, like our forebears,
As friends all gathered in,
Let our cups be filled to brimming,
We valiant jäger kin.

Let us toast first to the glory
Of the Liberator-Tsar,
Then to the Heir Presumptive,
And to Holy Rus. Hurrah!

In memory of their valour,
Raise up your cups once more,
Sing honour to fallen jägers
To eternal glory we pour.

Drain a third glass to the health
Of our local heroes all
And to our faithful nation
Za zdorovye brothers all!

These lyrics were extracted from Koldevin's book: The Battle of Kulm, pp. 21 to 22.

APPENDIX IX TO CHAPTER 6.

General Bistrom's Report To General Yermolov, 21 October [2 November] 1813.[381]

On 4 [16] October at one o'clock in the afternoon, Your Excellency ordered me to proceed to the village of Külten-Kozha [*sic*, Güldengossa] with the regiment entrusted to me in order to hold back the enemy advance who were attempting to seize it. Upon arrival there, I found that the Tauride Regiment, commanded by Major General Sulima, and the St. Petersburg Regiment, under the command of Colonel Acht, had been driven out of the village. I immediately ordered the honourable Major General Makarov to storm the village with two battalions of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment and drive the enemy who had entrenched themselves in the houses and behind the fences out with fixed bayonets. I left one battalion in reserve as reinforcements, which I ordered to go around the right side of the village, charge the enemy with bayonets fixed and, having thrown them into disorder from the unexpected attack, drive them completely from the place; Major General Makarov carried out this mission with astounding courage and speed, such that I succeeded in taking control of the entire village, and placed the Tauride Regiment on the right flank, and the St. Petersburg on the left flank, the Lifeguard Jägers in the centre of the village and having held out there for more than three hours, by order of the honourable Commander-in-Chief of the armies, General-of-Infantry and Chevalier Count Barclay de Tolly, I took the above-mentioned regiments under my command; but the enemy reinforced his disordered forces in the village, which had been mostly laid low on the spot by bayonet, with three more strong columns and, having had the great advantage of capturing the village of Külten-Kozha, tried to push us out of it and, noticing this, Your Excellency sent me the Lifeguard Finland Regiment and the Guard Grenadier Regiment as reinforcements, of which I placed two battalions of the Finland Regiment on the left flank of the village to support the St. Petersburg Regiment under the command of Major General Kryzhanovsky, while leaving one battalion in the centre, the Lifeguard Grenadier Regiment and supports on the right flank of the Tauride Regiment were under the command of Major General Zheltukhin, I ordered the strong, superior force to attack the enemy pressing us from all points with bayonets fixed, which was carried out with great courage; the honourable Major General Kryzhanovsky, as you well know, is a brave general, completely drove the enemy out of the left side of the village with his detachment, that is, with the Finland and St. Petersburg regiments. The gentlemen who particularly distinguished themselves were Colonel Acht of the St. Petersburg Regiment, Steven and Gervais of the Finland Regiment, the latter taking command of the regiment after the honourable Major General Kryzhanovsky and Colonel Steven had suffered wounds. On the right flank, Major General Zheltukhin sprang the surprise, having bravely blocked the enemy route to the village, having engaged them with strong combat fire and thus thrown them into disorder, he charged with fixed bayonets, which completely decided the battle for that day, while the honourable Major General Sulima contributed greatly to the destruction of the enemy assembling to counterattack against us for a second time, by charging with bayonets fixed at a column approaching the village, driving the enemy more than two *versta* [1⅓ miles] beyond the village. Your Excellency, having witnessed this, ordered the skirmishers to fall back and placed them at the edge of the village, while the regiments were to form up in columns within it. At this point, I have the particular honour of presenting Colonel von Wiesin to Your Excellency, who is accompanying you, who, as you well know, is a brave field officer, who brought me orders from Your Excellency, with total disregard for the hail of bullets that were obstructing him en route, and, seeing some of the skirmishers who had become disordered under strong enemy pressure, he

381M.B. Barclay de Tolly's Papers, register 208, bundle 35.

rallied them and charged at the enemy with fixed bayonets, driving them completely beyond the village. To the other gentlemen field officers and subalterns involved in this action, I have the honour to present a list of names, being confident that Your Excellency, an eyewitness to this brutal action, will not fail to give due reward to the honourable generals, field officers and subalterns whom I have presented for their courage and outstanding valour.

Major General Bistrom.

No. 453, from headquarters in the village of Proferschtorf [*sic*], 21 October [2 November] 1813.

APPENDIX X TO CHAPTER 6.

March-Route From St. Petersburg to Vilna, June to August 1815.

9 [21] June	Tsarskoe Selo	8 [20] July	Sinkova [Senkovo]
10 [22] June	Gatchina	9 [21] July	Zherebtsy [Zherebenets]
11 [23] June	Rest day	10 [22] July	Nevel
12 [24] June	Rozhdestveno	11 [23] July	Rest day
13 [25] June	Sorochkino	12 [24] July	Renenova [*sic*]
14 [26] June	Dolgovka	13 [25] July	Magulishshe [*sic*]
15 [27] June	Rest day	14 [26] July	Rest day
16 [28] June	Luga	15 [27] July	Dretun
17 [29] June	Gorodets	16 [28] July	Yurovichi
18 [30] June	Rest day	17 [29] July	Polotsk
19 June [1 July]	Zapole	18 [30] July	Rest day
20 June [2 July]	Velika	19 [31] July	Vetrino
21 June [3 July]	Chernevizi	20 July [1 August]	Prozorka [Prozaroki]
22 June [4 July]	Rest day	21 July [2 August]	Rest day
23 June [5 July]	Borovichi	22 July [3 August]	Plisa
24 June [6 July]	Porkhov	23 July [4 August]	Glubokoe [Hlybokaye]
25 June [7 July]	Rest day	24 July [5 August]	Rest day
26 June [8 July]	Golodusha [*sic*]	25 July [6 August]	Danilovichi [Dunilavičy]
27 June [9 July]	Sorokino	26 July [7 August]	Luchai
28 June [10 July]	Rest day	27 July [8 August]	Rest day
29 June [11 July]	Ashevo	28 July [9 August]	Gaibovshchina [*sic*]
30 June [12 July]	Rest day	29 July [10 August]	Konstantinovo
1 [13] July	Bezhanitsy	30 July [11 August]	Rest day
2 [14] July	Porkhovka [*sic*]	31 July [12 August]	Mikhalishki [Smolzavod]
3 [15] July	Rest day	1 [13] August	Vorona
4 [16] July	Pryskukha [*sic*]	2 [14] August	Rest day
5 [17] July	Theofilova [*sic*]	3 [15] August	Lavarishki [Lavoriškės]
6 [18] July	Velikie Luki	4 [16] August	Vilna [Vilnius]
7 [19] July	Rest day		

APPENDIX XI TO CHAPTER 6.

List Of Generals, Field Officers And Subalterns Of The Lifeguard Jäger Regiment From 1796 To 1815.

1. **Rachinsky**, Anton Mikhalovich; lieutenant colonel and battalion commander. Transferred from the Gatchina Force on 9 [20] November 1796, where he commanded the Jäger Company. In 1797, he was promoted to colonel. In 1798, he was promoted to major general. In 1800, he was promoted to lieutenant general. On 10 [22] June 1800, he became a Privy Councillor with the right to wear Lifeguard Jäger uniform and was appointed *Ober Polizeimeister* for St. Petersburg. He was dismissed from his post as *Ober Polizeimeister* on 25 October [6 November] 1800. He died in 1825.
2. **Miller**, Ivan Ivanovich; lieutenant. Transferred from the Jäger Company of the Gatchina Force on 9 [20] November 1796. Dismissed from service such that he should not be reassigned anywhere on 24 November [5 December] 1796, for a two-day absence and insolence to his superiors. He was pardoned on 28 November [9 December] 1796 and reassigned to this battalion. On 13 [24] May 1799, as a colonel, he was promoted to major general and appointed colonel-in-chief of Chubarov's former Jäger Regiment [renumbered 7th Jägers in 1800].
3. **Mistrov**, Sergey Ivanovich; lieutenant. Transferred from the Jäger Company of the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment on 9 [20] November 1796. He was removed from the rolls as deceased on 22 March [2 April] 1797.
4. **Pushkin**, Sergey Lvovich; lieutenant. Transferred from the Jäger Company of the Lifeguard Izmailovsky Regiment on 9 [20] November 1796. Discharged from service on 16 [27] September 1797, to the civil service with the rank of collegiate assessor.
5. **Rogachev 1st**, Nikolai Ivanovich; lieutenant. Transferred from the Lifeguard Preobrazhensky Regiment on 9 [20] November 1796. On 31 December 1797 [11 January 1798], he was discharged to the civil service with the rank of collegiate assessor.
6. Prince **Dolgorukov**, Yakov Alexeevich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from the Jäger Company of the Lifeguard Izmailovsky Regiment on 9 [20] November 1796. On 31 December 1797 [11 January 1798], he was discharged to the civil service with the rank of collegiate assessor.
7. **Leichner**, Ivan Ivanovich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from the Jäger Company of the Gatchina Force on 9 [20] November 1796. As a colonel, on 4 [15] July 1799, he was promoted to major general and appointed colonel-in-chief of Verevkin's Jäger Regiment [renamed 15th Jägers in 1801].
8. **Rogachev 2nd**, Vasily Ivanovich; ensign. Transferred from the Jäger Company of the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment on 9 [20] November 1796. Discharged from service on 16 [27] September 1797 as a lieutenant.
9. **Krasilnikov 1st**, Dmitry Matveevich; ensign. Transferred from the Jäger Company of the Lifeguard Izmailovsky Regiment on 9 [20] November 1796. On 19 June [1 July] 1800, he was retitled collegiate councillor for assignment to the civil service.
10. **Gvozdev**, Akexei Vasilievich; captain. Transferred from the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment on 10 [21] November 1796. In 1798 he was promoted from colonel to major general and assigned to 3rd [later 2nd] Jäger Regiment as a brigade commander in the Finland Division.

11. **Desyatov**, Dmitry Petrovich; ensign. Promoted from *Junker* in this battalion on 10 [21] November 1796. Discharged from service with uniform rights on 19 November [1 December] 1802.
12. **Rachinsky**, Viktor Denisievich. There is no information on his date of joining the regiment. Retitled collegiate councillor on 19 June [1 July] 1800 on assignment to the civil service.
13. **Dubyansky**. There is no information on his date of joining the regiment. Discharged from service as a sub-lieutenant on 16 [27] November 1796, with the rights of his rank.
14. **Potemkin**, Alexei Vasilievich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 23 January [3 February] 1797. Transferred as a colonel to the Tauride Grenadier Regiment on 27 February [11 March] 1803.
15. **Gvozdev**, Alexander Vasilievich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 23 January [3 February] 1797. Discharged from service as a captain with uniform rights on 6 [18] December 1801.
16. **Barantsov**, Alexei Grigorievich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 22 March [2 April] 1797. Discharged from service as a captain on 28 June [10 July] 1801.
17. **Krasilnikov 2nd**, Pavel Matveevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 28 October [8 November] 1797. Discharged from service at his own request on 7 [18] October 1799.
18. **Neelov**, Ivan Alexeevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 28 October [8 November] 1797. Discharged from service at his own request on 7 [18] October 1799.
19. **Rusinov**, Ivan Grigorievich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 22 January [2 February] 1798. Discharged to the civil service and promoted in rank on 8 [20] November 1801.
20. **Chebyshev 1st**, Pavel Sergeevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 22 January [2 February] 1798. Promoted to colonel and reassigned to 1st Jäger Regiment on 14 [26] April 1809.
21. **Chebyshev 2nd**, Dmitry Sergeevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 19 [30] April 1798. Promoted to colonel and reassigned to 2nd Jäger Regiment on 14 [26] April 1809. Died in 1870.
22. **Stankevich**, Alexander Yepofroditovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 19 [30] April 1798. Promoted to staff-captain in January 1801 and assigned as a permanent orderly to the Person of His Majesty Emperor Paul I. Discharged from service as a staff-captain on 19 [31] May 1801. Died in 1872.
23. **Wolf**, Nikita Ivanovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 28 June [9 July] 1798. Killed in action as a captain on 24 May [5 June] 1807 at Guttstadt on the Passarge river (Supreme Orders, 17 [29] July 1807).
24. **Lykoshin**, Bogdan Mikhailovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 27 September [8 October] 1798. Discharged from service at his own request as a lieutenant with uniform rights on 30 April [12 May] 1802.
25. **Tolbugin**, Pavel Petrovich; ensign. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 8 [19] October 1798. Transferred as a colonel to 7th Jäger Regiment on 9 [21] March 1804.

26. **Sazonov 1st**, Ivan Vasilievich; ensign. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 8 [19] October 1798. Discharged as a colonel on reassignment to the civil service on 28 March [9 April] 1805.

27. **Trunov**, Pavel Ivanovich; ensign. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 8 [19] October 1798. Retitled as collegiate assessor on reassignment to the civil service on 11 [23] June 1800.

28. **Briere de Marteret**, Karl Lvovich; lieutenant. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 8 [19] October 1798. Discharged due to ill health as a captain with uniform rights on 23 May [4 June] 1803.

29. Baron **Nettelhorst**, Pyotr Andreevich; lieutenant. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 10 [21] February 1799. Discharged without *Abschied* [in disgrace] on 8 [20] December 1800.

30. **Turchaninov**, Andrei Petrovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 6 [17] June 1799. Transferred to 3rd Jäger Regiment as regimental commander on 9 [21] February 1810.

31. Prince **Bagration**, Pyotr Ivanovich; major general and colonel-in-chief. Appointed on 9 [21] June 1800. Enlisted as a sergeant in the Caucasus Musketeer Regiment in 1782, he was promoted to second-major in 1792 and transferred to the Kiev Cuirassier Regiment. He was transferred to the Sofia Carabinier Regiment in 1794, in the rank of premier-major. In 1798, he was appointed colonel-in-chief of the 6th Jäger Regiment in the rank of colonel. In 1799 he was promoted to major general. For his distinguished service during the Italian campaign, he was awarded the Order of St. Anne, 1st class, and Commander of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. After completing the campaign across Switzerland, he was appointed colonel-in-chief of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion. He commanded the vanguard of the Russian army during the war of 1805 against the French. He was promoted to lieutenant general for the action at Hollabrunn. For his distinguished service during this war, he was awarded the Order of St. George, 2nd class. During the war of 1807, he commanded the vanguard of the Russian army; for his distinguished service in this campaign, he was awarded the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky and a Golden Sword with diamonds, inscribed: '*за храбрость*.' While commanding the 21st Division in 1808 during the war against the Swedes, he was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir, 1st class. He was promoted to General-of-Infantry in 1809, for his distinguished service in the war with the Swedes. In August of that same year, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the army operating against the Turks, and was awarded the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called for this war. In 1812, during the war against the French, he was appointed commander-in-chief of Second Western Army. On 26 August [7 September] 1812, during the Battle of Borodino, he was wounded in the right leg by a shell fragment. Prince Pyotr Ivanovich died on 12 [24] September (Supreme Orders, 20 October [1 November] 1812).

32. Prince **Gagarin 1st**, Nikolai Petrovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from non-commissioned officer in this battalion on 20 June [2 July] 1800. Discharged from service as a colonel on 9 [21] December 1807.

33. **Vyrubov**, Nikolai Petrovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 20 June [2 July] 1800. Discharged from service as a lieutenant with uniform rights on 30 April [12 May] 1802.

34. Count **Grabovsky**, Alexander Alexandrovich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from Polish service on 25 June [7 July] 1800. Killed in action at Krasny on 5 [17] November 1812, in the rank of colonel (Supreme Orders, 11 [23] January 1813).

35. Prince **Sapega**, Pavel Sergeevich; ensign. Transferred from Polish service on 14 [26] August 1800. On 18 [30] August 1801, he was promoted to captain and reassigned to the Moscow Dragoon Regiment.

36. **Minin**, Sergei Yevgrafovich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from the Chevalier Garde Regiment on 15 [27] March 1801. Discharged from service as a lieutenant with uniform rights on 30 April [12 May] 1802.

37. **Iritskoy**, Ivan Petrovich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from the Chevalier Garde Regiment on 15 [27] March 1801. Discharged on transfer to the civil service on 5 [17] December 1801.

38. **Rtishchev**, Dmitry Yakovlevich; lieutenant. Assigned to the battalion on 18 [30] March 1801 from the retired lieutenants of the Lifeguard Preobrazhensky Regiment. Dismissed as a lieutenant to the 20th Jägers on 12 [24] September 1803, for vulgar behaviour unworthy of the Guard.

39. **Potemkin**, Yakov Alexeevich; lieutenant. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court to lieutenant in the Lifeguard Horse on 19 May 1799. Discharged from service on 28 November [10 December] 1799. He was readmitted as a lieutenant in the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion on 29 March [10 April] 1801. During the 1807 campaign, for the distinction shown on 24 May [5 June] during the attack on the village of Lomitten, he was awarded the crosses of St. George 4th class, and the Prussian *Pour le Mérite*. On 20 November [2 December] 1809, he was appointed colonel-in-chief of the 2nd Jäger Regiment. On 17 [29] January 1811, he was appointed commander of the 48th Jäger Regiment. On 12 [24] December 1812, he was appointed commander of the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment with the rank of major general (received for distinction at the Battle of Vitebsk). He was awarded the Order of St. George, 3rd class, and the Prussian *Eisernes Kreuz* for distinction in the actions at Pirna and Kulm on 17 [29] August 1813. On 5 [17] March 1814, he was appointed adjutant general. He was appointed commander of 2nd Guard Infantry Division on 13 [25] April 1821. On 22 July [3 August] 1821 he was transferred to command 4th Infantry Division. He was promoted to lieutenant general on 12 [24] December 1824. He was awarded the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky upon his return from campaign in 1828. He was commander of all active duty corps in the Caucasus from 21 June [3 July] 1829, for which he was awarded diamond decorations to his Order of St. Alexander Nevsky. He was appointed military governor of the Volhynia and Podolia Governorate on 28 November [10 December] 1830. He was removed from the lists as deceased on 16 [28] February 1831.

40. Comte **de Modène**, Ivan Karlovich; lieutenant. Brought out of retirement on 18 [30] May 1801. Discharged at his own request on 30 April [12] May 1802, for appointment to the civil service as a titular councillor in the Foreign Affairs Collegium.

41. **Riedinger**, Alexander Karlovich; lieutenant. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 5 [17] October 1801. He was appointed commandant of Villmanstrand and commander of the garrison battalion there on 10 [22] April 1809, at his own request, as a colonel with Guard uniform rights.

42. **Ogon-Doganovsky**, Pyotr Alexandrovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 25 January [6 February] 1802. Killed in action as a lieutenant at Guttstadt

on the Passarge river on 24 May [5 June] 1807 (Supreme Orders, 17 [29] July 1807).

43. **Vlasov**, Theodor Sergeevich; ensign. Brought out of retirement on 25 January [6 February 1802, having been a cornet in the Lifeguard Horse. Killed in action as a staff-captain at Friedland on 2 [14] June 1807 (Supreme Orders, 17 [29] July 1807).
44. **Bronevsky**, Alexander Alexandrovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Junker* in this battalion on 30 April [12 May] 1802. Transferred as a staff-captain to the Moscow Grenadier Regiment on 9 [21] September 1802.
45. Prince **Gagarin 2nd**, Yakov Petrovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 30 April [12 May] 1802. Taken prisoner by the French at the Battle of Austerlitz on 20 November [2 December] 1805 and held until 13 [25] February 1806. Discharged from service as a captain on 11 [23] December 1808, due to wounds received in battle, with the rank of colonel, uniform rights and a pension equal to full salary.
46. **Ofrosimov 1st**, Afonasy Pavlovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Junker* in this battalion on 30 April [12 May] 1802. Removed from the lists as a lieutenant, deceased, on 20 May [1 June] 1805.
47. **Ofrosimov 2nd**, Alexander Pavlovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Junker* in this battalion on 11 [23] September 1802. He was promoted to colonel and transferred to the 4th Jäger Regiment on 19 February [3 March] 1810.
48. **Uvarov**, Andrei Ivanovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Fahnenjunker* in the Chevalier Garde Regiment on 22 September [4 October] 1802. Discharged from service at his own request as a captain on 10 [22] April 1809.
49. **Davydov**, Yevdokim Vasilievich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Fahnenjunker* in the Chevalier Garde Regiment on 22 September [4 October] 1802. Returned to the Chevalier Garde as a cornet on 26 March [7 April] 1803.
50. **Ladomirsky**, Vladimir Nikolaevich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Fahnenjunker* in the Chevalier Garde Regiment on 22 September [4 October] 1802. Removed from the lists as deceased on 26 March [7 April] 1806.
51. **Matsnev**, Mikhail Nikolaevich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 23 September [5 October] 1802. He was seconded to the militia of the St. Petersburg Governorate during the war of 1807 with the French. Colonel Matsnev was appointed colonel-in-chief of the 11th Jäger Regiment on 2 [14] July 1813. He was promoted to major general in December 1814, for distinction at Craonne and Laon. In 1815 he was appointed commander of third brigade, 7th Infantry Division; was commander of first brigade, 9th Infantry Division from 28 July [9 August] 1821. Discharged from service due to ill health on 30 January [11 February] 1823.
52. **Sazonov 2nd**, Theodor Vasilievich; lieutenant. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 24 September [6 October] 1802. He was wounded by a bullet in the leg during the war of 1805, at the battle of Austerlitz, and for his distinction in this action he was awarded a Golden Sword inscribed '*за храбрость*.' He was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class for the action on the river Passarge in 1807. In 1809 he was assigned to raise reserves for the regiments of the Army of Finland. He was appointed commander of the 11th Jäger Regiment on 27 March [8 April] 1810; he was also appointed commandant of the fortress of Brailov that same year. On 30 May [11 June] 1811, he was appointed

commander of the 40th Jäger Regiment. On 26 August [7 September] 1812, he participated in the recapture of the Raevsky battery with this regiment; his horse was killed under him, he suffered a contusion himself to the left torso, and three teeth in his upper jaw were knocked out by a musket ball. In 1813 he took part in the blockade of Modlin; after which he brought reinforcements up to France from the reserves. He was promoted to major general on 6 [18] March 1814. On 25 December 1815 [6 January 1816], he was appointed commander of third brigade, 11th Infantry Division. Discharged from service on 8 [20] February 1816 due to wounds received.

53. **Beklemishev**, Pyotr Petrovich; lieutenant. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 5 [17] October 1802. Discharged from service as a staff-captain on 19 [31] October 1803.

54. **Gribunin**, Alexei Lvovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 4 [16] November 1802. Discharged and promoted to collegiate councillor on transfer to the civil service on 17 [29] April 1810.

55. **Kologrivov**, Alexei Semyonovich, sub-lieutenant. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 4 [16] November 1802. Transferred to the 49th Jäger Regiment as its commander on 29 October [10 November] 1811. Later becoming colonel-in-chief of that regiment upon promotion to major general on 15 [27] September 1813. On 11 [23] December 1816, he became commander of third brigade, 27th Infantry Division, and was discharged from service with uniform rights and a full pension, due to wounds received.

56. Prince **Shcherbatov**, Vladimir Grigorievich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred on 9 [20] January 1803 from the Tenginsk Musketeer Regiment. Removed from the lists on 16 [28] January 1806, died of wounds.

57. Prince **Shakhovsky**, Ivan Leontievich; colonel. Transferred on 19 February [3 March] 1803 from the Kherson Grenadier Regiment. As a major general, Prince Shakhovsky was assigned by Supreme Orders as colonel-in-chief of the 20th Jägers on 26 December 1804 [7 January 1805].

58. Prince **Turkistanov**, Nikolai Vasilievich; ensign. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 10 [22] December 1803. Discharged from service as a captain on 30 December 1808 [11 January 1809] due to ill health.

59. Comte **de Rastignac**, Karl Gavrilovich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred on 14 [26] March 1804 from the Pavlovsk Grenadier Regiment. Discharged from service as a captain on 22 October [3 November] 1810 due to ill health. On 20 May [1 June] 1811, he was readmitted to the Lifeguard Preobrazhensky Regiment.

60. Comte **Saint-Priest**, Emmanuil Frantsevich; colonel. Transferred to the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion on 20 February [4 March] 1805 from the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment. From the French nobility, entering Russian service on 3 [14] February 1793, as a lieutenant in the Noble Artillery Engineering Corps. In 1795, he transferred to the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment. In 1799, he retired and, holding the post of aide-de-camp to the duc d'Angoulême, joined the Prince de Condé's Corps. On 31 May [12 June] 1801, he was re-accepted into Russian service as a colonel in the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment.

    On 7 [19] March 1805, he was appointed commander of the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion. In 1805, he was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th class for his distinguished service at Blasowitz [Blažovice] during the war with the French. When the Lifeguard Jäger Battalion

was reorganised as a regiment, he was nominated as regimental commander (12 [24] June 1806).

On 19 November [1 December] 1809, he was appointed colonel-in-chief of the 6th Jäger Regiment. On 14 [26] June 1810, he was promoted to Major General for his distinguished service during the assault on Bazardjik [Dobrich]. For his distinguished service in the Battle of Shumla [Shumen] he was awarded the Order of St. George 3rd class. On 14 [26] September 1810, he was appointed adjutant general to His Imperial Majesty. For his distinction at Sistovo [Svishtov] he was awarded the Order of St. Anne 1st class. In 1811, he was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir 2nd class for his distinguished service against the Turks. In 1812, during the war against the French, he was appointed chief of staff of Prince Bagration's Second Western Army. In 1813, he commanded the vanguard of Miloradovich's corps. In August 1813, he was appointed commander of VIII Corps with the rank of lieutenant general. On 28 February [12 March] 1814, he took Reims by storm, for which he was awarded the Order of St. George 2nd class. On 29 February [13 March], he was mortally wounded in the shoulder by round shot outside this same city, in action against the French. He died from this wound on 17 [29] March 1814 and was buried in Laon Cathedral.

61. Prince **Khilkov**, Grigory Alexandrovich; sub-lieutenant. Brought out of retirement from the Lifeguard Horse on 17 [29] March 1806. Discharged from service on 23 January [4 February] 1808 due to ill health. Readmitted as a *Rittmeister* in the Mariupol Hussar Regiment on 22 November [4 December] 1812.
62. **Voeikov 2nd**, Alexander Grigorievich; captain. Transferred from the Leib Grenadier Regiment on 18 [30] May 1806. Removed from the lists as a colonel on 18 [30] May 1810, deceased.
63. **Voeikov 1st**, Fyodor Grigorievich; staff-captain. Transferred from the Leib Grenadier Regiment on 18 [30] May 1806. Discharged from service as a colonel with uniform rights on 19 [31] January 1810, due to ill health.
64. **von Mengden**, Mikhail Alexandrovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] May 1806. Transferred to the Lifeguard Finland Regiment on 7 [19] October 1811.
65. **Bogaevsky**, Vasily Ivanovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] May 1806. Transferred as a colonel to the 3rd Jäger Regiment on 20 May [1 June] 1813.
66. **Penskoy 3rd**, Nikanor Ivanovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this battalion on 18 [30] May 1806. Died of wounds received at Kulm as a colonel on 17 [29] August 1813 (Supreme Orders, dated 23 November [5 December] 1813).
67. **Penskoy 4th**, Ivan Ivanovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] May 1806. Awarded the Order of St. George 4th class, for distinction at the Battle of Leipzig on 4 to 5 [16 to 17] October 1813. Transferred to the 8th Jäger Regiment as their commander on 1 [13] January 1816. Died in 1871.
68. Comte **Saint-Priest 3rd**, Ludovik Frantsevich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] May 1806. Descended from French nobility. Discharged from service as a colonel on 2 [14] October 1814 due to ill health. Remained in France upon the Bourbon restoration. In 1822, with the rank of lieutenant general and as adjutant

general to the duc d'Angoulême, he commanded the vanguard of the army sent by Louis XVIII to Spain in order to restore Ferdinand VII to the throne. For distinction shown in this campaign, Emperor Alexander I awarded Count Saint-Priest the Order of St. George 3rd class.

69. Prince **Bagration**, Alexander Kirilovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Kammerjunker* at His Majesty's Court on 18 [30] May 1806. From staff-captain, he returned to be a *Kammerjunker* at His Majesty's Court on 15 [27] May 1816.
70. Prince **Gruzinsky**, Pyotr Yakovlevich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] May 1806. Killed in action during the Patriotic War, as a staff-captain at Borodino on 26 August [7 September] 1812 (Supreme Orders, dated 31 October [12 November] 1812).
71. **Levshin 1st**, Nikolai Gavrilovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] May 1806. Discharged from service as a staff-captain with uniform rights on 19 [31] December 1809, due to wounds received in the previous campaign against the French.
72. **Venyukov**, Ivan Mikhailovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] May 1806. Transferred and promoted from lieutenant to captain to His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermaster's Department on 2 [14] February 1809.
73. **Svechin**, Alexei Alexandrovich; sub-lieutenant. Brought out of retirement as a midshipman on 25 May [6 June] 1806. Appointed commander of the 19th Jäger Regiment on 28 February [12 March] 1817.
74. **Schneider 2nd**, Ivan Yakovlevich; sub-lieutenant. Brought out of retirement as an horse artillery staff-captain on 5 [17] June 1806. Transferred as a staff-captain to the 2nd Artillery Brigade on 15 [27] January 1807.
75. **De la Garde**, Avgust Iosifovich; lieutenant. Assigned to the regiment as a sub-lieutenant in Maltese service. Descended from French nobility. Promoted to major general on 21 May [2 June] 1814, for distinction in combat, with a post in the army.
76. Prince **Golitsyn 2nd**, ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in the Lifeguard Preobrazhensky Regiment on 27 August [8 September] 1806. Removed from the lists on 27 December 1806 [8 January 1807], deceased.
77. **Andrzheikovich**, Ivan Fadeevich, ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 27 August [8 September] 1806. Appointed *Flügeladjutant* to His Majesty on 3 [15] May 1818. Promoted to major general on 1 [13] January 1821, and appointed commander of first brigade, 3rd Grenadier Division.
78. **Engelhardt**, Andrei Vasilievich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 27 August [8 September] 1806. Promoted major general on 8 [20] September 1810 and assigned to the army.
79. **Engelhardt 5th**, Yakov Petrovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 27 August [8 September] 1806. Discharged from service as a staff-captain with uniform rights on 31 March [12 April] 1810, due to wounds received in combat.
80. Prince **Cherkassky**, Ivan Nikolaevich, ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 27 August [8 September] 1806. Removed from the lists as a staff-captain on 17

[29] February 1812, deceased.

81. Prince **Golitsyn**, Nikolai Mikhailovich, sub-lieutenant. Transferred from the Kexholm Greandier Regiment on 27 August [8 September] 1806. Died of wounds received during the Patriotic War at the Battle of Borodino on 26 August [7 September] 1812, as a staff-captain (removed from the lists on His Highness the commander-in-chief's Orders dated 1 [13] January 1813).

82. **Rall 3rd**, Theodor Theodorovich; sub-lieutenant. Selected for the Leib Grenadier Regiment in 1803 from the pages at His Majesty's Court. Transferred into this regiment on 5 [17] October 1806. Transferred as a colonel to the 1st Carabinier Regiment as their commander on 20 December 1815 [1 January 1816].

83. **Rall 4th**, Vasily Theodorovich; ensign. Selected for the Leib Grenadier Regiment in 1805 from the pages at His Majesty's Court. Transferred into this regiment on 5 [17] October 1806. Transferred to the 2nd Jäger Regiment on 2 [14] March 1808 retaining this rank, and returned on 27 April [9 May] 1808. Transferred to the Lifeguard Finland Regiment on 7 [19] October 1811.

84. **Petin**, Ivan Alexandrovich; lieutenant. Promoted from chamber-page in His Majesty's Court on 26 November [8 December] 1806. Killed in action as a colonel at Leipzig on 4 [16] October 1813 (Supreme Orders, dated 18 [30] January 1814).

85. **Plyuskov**, Andrei Yakovlevich; lieutenant. Transferred from the Kexholm Musketeer Regiment on 17 February [1 March] 1807. Removed from the lists as a captain on 26 January [7 February] 1811, deceased.

86. **Zykov**, Grigory Sergeevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 16 [28] February 1807. Transferred and promoted from sub-lieutenant to staff-captain in the Moscow Musketeer Regiment on 23 January [4 February] 1808.

87. **von Loman**, Ivan Borisovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 17 February [1 March] 1807. Removed from the lists as a staff-captain on 5 [17] January 1815, deceased.

88. **Ofrosimov 3rd**, Konstantin Pavlovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 17 February [1 March] 1807. Transferred to the Lifeguard Finland Regiment on 7 [19] October 1811.

89. **Ofrosimov 4th**, Andrei Pavlovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 17 February [1 March] 1807. Transferred to the Lifeguard Finland Regiment on 7 [19] October 1811.

90. **Levshin 1st**, Nikolai Pavlovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 17 February [1 March] 1807. Removed from the lists on 12 [24] August 1807, died of wounds.

91. **Levshin 2nd**, Alexander Pavlovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 18 February [2 March] 1807. Killed in action as a staff-captain during the Patriotic War at Borodino on 26 August [7 September] 1812 (Supreme Orders, dated 31 October [12 November] 1812).

92. **Levshin 3rd**, Pyotr Gavrilovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 17 February [1 March] 1807. As a lieutenant, died of wounds received during the Patriotic

War at Borodino on 26 August [7 September] 1812 (Supreme Orders, dated 31 October [12 November] 1812).

93. **Kasperov**, Grigory Ivanovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 17 February [1 March] 1807. Transferred as a sub-lieutenant to the 15th Jäger Regiment on 24 August [5 September] 1809. Returned to this regiment as a lieutenant on 1 [13] October 1813, for distinction in combat. Transferred as a captain to His Majesty the Kaiser of Austria's Grenadier Regiment [Kexholm Grenadiers] on 23 July [4 August] 1816.

94. **Naryshkin**, Alexander Ivanovich; ensign. Transferred and promoted from *Junker* in the Alexandria Hussar Regiment into this regiment on 27 June [9 July] 1807. Removed from the lists as a sub-lieutenant on 12 [24] November 1809, deceased.

95. Baron **Bode**, Lev Karlovich; ensign. Transferred from service with Kassel as *Portepée-Junker*. Commissioned on 8 [20] September 1807. Discharged from service as a colonel with uniform rights on 27 January[8 February] 1816.

96. **Makarov**, Pyotr Stepanovich; colonel. Transferred from Army service into this regiment on 13 [25] September 1807. Transferred as major general to command the Lifeguard Pavlovsk Regiment on 12 [24] November 1813.

97. **Batyushkov**, Konstantin Nikolaevich; ensign. The renowned poet. Born on 18 [29] May 1787. After completing his education in a private boarding school, he was assigned to serve in the Ministry of Public Education in 1802. On 22 February [6 March] 1807, he was appointed as a *Sotnik* [junior officer] in the marksman battalion of the St. Petersburg Militia. Taking part in the war against the French that same year, he was wounded in the leg on 29 May [10 June] 1807, at the Battle of Heilsberg. He was transferred to this regiment on 25 September [7 October] 1807, for distinction in that campaign. In the Finnish War of 1808 to 1809 he took part in the actions at Idensalmi and in the Åland expedition. He was discharged from service as a sub-lieutenant with uniform rights on 28 May [9 June] 1809, due to wounds received. In April 1812 he was appointed assistant curator of manuscripts at the Imperial Public Library. On 29 March [10 April] 1813, he was appointed staff captain in the Rylsk Infantry Regiment. He participated in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 and transferred to the Lifeguard Izmailovsky Regiment in 1816, while in April 1816 he was discharged from service and promoted to collegiate assessor. In November 1817 he was appointed honorary librarian in the Imperial Public Library. In 1818 he was assigned to serve in Naples in the diplomatic service. In 1820 he was assigned to the diplomatic mission in Rome. On 28 April [10 May] 1821, he was sent on indefinite leave to recover from an illness. From August 1822, Konstantin Nikolaevich began to suffer from a deterioration in his mental health. Despite his incurable illness, he remained in service until 1833, receiving his usual salary. Batyushkov died on 7 [19] July 1855. Public attention to Batyushkov as an author was expressed through his election in 1818 as an honorary member of the Voluntary Society for Lovers of Russian Literature. He was also a member of the Kazan Society for Lovers of Literature.

98. **Bistrom**, Karl Ivanovich; colonel. His military service began in 1784 as a corporal in the Lifeguard Izmailovsky Regiment. In 1790 he transferred to the Neva Musketeer Regiment, transferring again in 1796 to the 1st Jäger Regiment. In 1803 he was appointed commander of the 20th Jäger Regiment. He was wounded three times during the war of 1806 and his outstanding achievements brought him to the attention of Emperor Alexander: for the battle at Czarnowo he was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th class; for Pultusk he

received the Prussian *Pour le Mérite*; for Preußisch-Eylau, he received a Golden Sword *за храбрость*; and for rearguard actions, the Order of St. Vladimir, 3rd class. He transferred to this regiment as a colonel and battalion commander on 25 September [7 October] 1807, while becoming regimental commander on 20 December 1809 [1 January 1810]. He was promoted major general for the distinguished defence of the village of Borodino on 26 August [7 September] 1812. He was awarded the Order of St. George 3rd class for the action at Dobroe. The Lifeguard Jägers were awarded St. George Colours for their deeds during the Patriotic War under his command. The regiment were also awarded St. George trumpets for the actions at Kulm in 1813, while their commander received the Order of St. Anne 1st class. For the defence of the village of Güldengossa in 1813, he was awarded a Golden Sabre decorated with diamonds. In 1821 he was appointed commander of 2nd Guard Infantry Division. In that same year he was also awarded the Order of St. Vladimir 2nd class. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1824. On 3 [15] March 1825 he became commander of the entire infantry component of the Guard Corps. He was appointed adjutant general to His Majesty on 20 December 1825 [1 January 1826]. For distinguished service during the siege of the fortress of Varna in 1818, he was awarded the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky. He was awarded the Order of St. George 2nd class for the battle of Ostrołęka in 1831. For the capture of Warsaw, he was promoted to General-of-Infantry. He was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir 1st class in 1835. In 1837 he was appointed assistant commander to His Imperial Highness of the Independent Guard Corps. Adjutant General Bistrom died on 16 [28] June 1838. Tsar Nicholas Pavlovich ordered the Guards Corps to impose a day of mourning for Bistrom. At the suggestion of Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, a monument was erected over his grave with the inscription: 'To Adjutant General Bistrom of the Guard Corps, as a token of gratitude.'

99. **Tolstoy 2nd**, Vasily Alexeevich; ensign. Transferred from the 25th Jäger Regiment on 23 October [4 November] 1807. Discharged from service as a colonel with uniform rights on 15 [27] April 1816, due to wounds received.

100. **Rall 5th**, Andrei Theodorovich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from the 29th Jäger Regiment on 23 October [4 November] 1807. Transferred as a lieutenant to the Lifeguard Finland Battalion on 7 [19] October 1811.

101. **Shcherbinin**, Pyotr Andreevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 23 October [4 November] 1807. Discharged from service as a staff-captain on 23 August [4 September] 1813, due to ill health.

102. **Lanskoy 1st**, Alexei Pavlovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 23 October [4 November] 1807. Promoted to colonel and transferred to the Siberia Ulan Regiment on 30 October [11 November] 1816.

103. **Lanskoy 2nd**, Mikhail Pavlovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 23 October [4 November] 1807. Promoted to colonel and transferred to the Yelisavetgrad Hussar Regiment on 8 [20] November 1816.

104. **Yesakov**, Dmitry Semyonovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 23 October [4 November] 1807. Transferred as a colonel to the Lifeguard Volhynia Regiment on 6 [18] December 1819, as regimental commander while retaining the duties of aide-de-camp to His Imperial Majesty.

105. **Repninsky**, Nikolai Yakovlevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this

regiment on 23 October [4 November] 1807. Transferred on promotion to colonel to the Lifeguard Lithuania Regiment on 22 October [3 November] 1816.

106. **Zagryazhskoy**, Pavel Mikhailovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 7 [19] November 1807. Transferred as a staff-captain to the Pavlovsk Grenadier Regiment on 22 October [3 November] 1810.

107. **Richter 2nd**, Boris Khristoforovich; [staff-captain?]. Transferred from the Lifeguard Horse Regiment as a *Stabsrittmeister* on 15 [27] November 1807. Promoted major general on 15 [27] September 1813, for distinction. Transferred to the Lifeguard Finland Regiment on 6 [18] June 1815.

108. **Andreevsky**, Konstantin Stepanovich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from the 1st Pioneer Regiment on 22 November [4 December] 1807. Transferred as a colonel to command the 39th Jäger Regiment on 22 January [3 February] 1819.

109. **Fedorov**, Alexander Ilich; lieutenant colonel. Transferred from the 4th Jäger Regiment on 12 [24] December 1807. Removed from the lists as a colonel on 7 [19] February 1814, killed in action.

110. **Baryshnikov**, Pavel Petrovich; lieutenant. Transferred from the 21st Jäger Regiment on 20 January [1 February] 1808. Appointed commander of the 7th Jäger Regiment as a colonel on 3 [15] March 1816.

111. **Yuriev**, Alexander Vasilievich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 20 January [1 February] 1808. Discharged from service on 1 [13] November 1808, due to ill health.

112. **Bartholomäi**, Alexei Ivanovich; staff-captain. Transferred from the 3rd Jäger Regiment on 23 January [4 February] 1808. Appointed *Flügeladjutant* to His Imperial Majesty on 3 [15] September 1813. Promoted to major general and assigned to His Majesty's Suite on 6 [18] October 1813. Appointed commandant of Frankfurt on 27 October [8 November] 1813. Appointed commander of third brigade, 14th Infantry Division on 15 [27] August 1814. Promoted to lieutenant general on 22 August [3 September] 1826. He received the Order of St. Anne 1st class in 1828; the Order of St. Vladimir 2nd class in 1829; a Golden Sword *за храбрость* with diamonds in 1831. In 1833 he was awarded the Order of the White Eagle. Removed from the lists on 2 [14] January 1840, deceased.

113. Prince **Vadbolsky**, Vladimir Mikhailovich; staff-captain. Transferred from the 4th Jäger Regiment on 23 January [4 February] 1808. Discharged from service as a captain with uniform rights and a full salary pension on 14 [26] January 1809, due to wounds received in battle.

114. **Kromin**, Pavel Yevdokimovich; lieutenant. Transferred from the Pavlovsk Grenadier Regiment on 23 January [4 February] 1808. Awarded the Order of St. George 4th class on 10 [22] July 1815, for distinction in combat. Appointed regimental commander of the 36th Jäger Regiment on 30 August [11 September] 1816, as a colonel

115. **Engelhardt 4th**, Pyotr Petrovich; lieutenant. Transferred from the Moscow Grenadier Regiment on 23 January [4 February] 1808. Discharged from service as a staff-captain with uniform rights on 13 [25] November 1810, due to wounds received.

116. Prince **Bagration**, Alexei Kirilovich; lieutenant. Promoted from *Kammerjunker* into this regiment on 23 January [4 February] 1808. Discharged from service as a staff-captain

on 14 [26] January 1814, with his previous *Kammerjunker* status.

117. Prince **Kozlovsky 1st**, Alexander Nikolaevich; ensign. Transferred from the Astrakhan Grenadier Regiment on 23 January [4 February] 1808. Discharged from service on 5 [17] April 1809. Readmitted into the 14th Jäger Regiment on 29 December 1809 [10 January 1810], as an ensign.

118. Prince **Kozlovsky 2nd**, Vladimir Nikolaevich, ensign. Transferred from the Astrakhan Grenadier Regiment on 23 January [4 February] 1808. Transferred back to the Astrakhan Grenadiers on 28 December 1817 [9 January 1818], as a colonel.

119. **Yafimovich**, Ivan Lvovich; staff-captain. Transferred from the Moscow Grenadier Regiment on 2 [14] March 1808. Promoted to major general with a post in the army on 27 December 1815 [8 January 1816], for distinction shown in combat during the storming of the city of Melun.

120. **Bistrom**, Yegor Antonovich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from the 20th Jäger Regiment on 18 [30] March 1808. Awarded the Order of St. George 4th class on 10 [22] December 1813, for distinction in combat. Transferred as a colonel to the Borisoglebsk Ulan Regiment on 23 April [5 May] 1817.

121. **Buddenbrock**, Theodor Theodorovich; staff-captain. Transferred from the 4th Jäger Regiment on 2 [14] June 1808. Transferred as a colonel to the Kremenchug Infantry Regiment on 16 [28] December 1812.

122. **Poncet**, Mikhail Ivanovich; staff-captain. Recruited from the Saxon nobility into the 3rd Jäger Regiment as a sub-lieutenant, from where he was transferred to this regiment on 26 December 1808 [7 January 1809]. Transferred to His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department as a lieutenant colonel on 9 [21] December 1811.

123. **Suchtelen**, Konstantin Petrovich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department on 21 March [2 April] 1809. Transferred as a colonel to the Yamburg Ulan Regiment on 19 [31] July 1817.

124. **Schumann**, Krestyan Krestyanovich, ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 30 March [11 April] 1809. Died of wounds received at Leipzig as a staff-captain on 4 [16] October 1813 (Supreme Orders, dated 5 [17] January 1815).

125. **Ushakov**, Nikolai Pavlovich, ensign. Transferred from column-guide in His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department as *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment. Promoted to ensign on 30 March [11 April] 1809. Died of wounds received at Kulm as a staff-captain on 17 [29] August 1813 (Supreme Orders, dated 23 November [5 December] 1813).

126. **von der Howen**, Vasily Vasilievich; ensign. Transferred from column-guide in His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department as *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment. Promoted to ensign on 30 March [11 April] 1809. Killed in action as a lieutenant during the Patriotic War at the Battle of Borodino on 26 August [7 September] 1812 (Supreme Orders, dated 31 October [12 November] 1812).

127. **Mukhanov**, Pavel Ivanovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 30 March [11 April] 1809. Removed from the lists as a lieutenant on 1 [13] April 1813, killed in action.

128. **Nitterfeld**, Abram Theodorovich; lieutenant. Transferred from the St. Petersburg

Grenadier Regiment on 16 [28] April 1809. Discharged from service as a staff-captain with uniform rights and full salary pension on 15 [27] May 1811, due to wounds received.

129. **Korenev**, Pyotr Ivanovich; staff-captain. Transferred from the Siberia Grenadier Regiment on 24 August [5 September] 1809. Promoted from captain to lieutenant colonel and reassigned to the Army on 1 [13] June 1813.

130. **Krivtsov**, Nikolai Ivanovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 2 [14] September 1809. Promoted from captain to lieutenant colonel and reassigned to the Army on 15 [27] July 1815.

131. **Khlopov**, Ivan Yevgrafovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 21 September [3 October] 1809. Promoted from staff-captain to major and transferred to the Seversk Mounted Jäger Regiment on 17 [29] April 1816.

132. **Shidlovsky**, Stepan Yevdokimovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 6 [18] October 1809. Discharged from service on 24 May [5 June] 1810, due to ill health.

133. **Lieders**, Alexander Nikolaevich, lieutenant. Transferred from the Bryansk Musketeer Regiment on 29 January [10 February] 1810. Promoted from staff-captain to major and transferred to the 4th Jäger Regiment on 20 May [11 June] 1813.

134. **Bekhteev**, Stepan Vladimirovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 12 [24] February 1810. Transferred to the 48th Jäger Regiment on 1 [13] February 1811, as a lieutenant.

135. **Gederstern**, Karl Karlovich, ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 12 [24] February 1810. Died as a staff-captain of wounds received during the Patriotic War at Borodino on 26 August [7 September] 1812 (Supreme Orders, dated 20 April [2 May] 1816).

136. **Frolov-Bagreev 2nd**, Viktor Alexeevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 12 [24] February 1810. Reassigned to the Army on 9 [21] March 1819, as a colonel. Reassigned to this regiment on 24 May [5 June] 1824, as a colonel. Promoted to major general for distinguished service on 25 March [6 April] 1828, and appointed commander of the 4th Brigade of Military Cantonists.

137. **Baturin**, Sergei Gerasimovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 12 [24] February 1810. Transferred to the 13th Jäger Regiment on 21 December 1819 [2 January 1820], as a colonel.

138. **Theodorov**, Alexander Ilich;[382] colonel. Enlisted as a corporal in 1793 in the Lifeguard Preobrazhensky Regiment, he soon transferred to the Chevalier Garde Corps and then served in the army. In 1809 he was appointed commander of the 4th Jäger Regiment, and on 4 [16] March 1810 he was transferred to the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment while retaining his previous position. Killed in action at Leipzig on 4 [16] October 1813, while commanding the 4th Jägers (Supreme Orders, dated 7 [19] February 1814).

139. **Koch 1st**, Alexei Theodorovich; ensign. Transferred as Conductor 2nd class from the Corps of Engineers. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 19 [31] March 1810. Transferred to the 20th Jäger Regiment on 18 [30] October 1811, as a lieutenant.

382Duplicate entry; see also serial 109. **Fedorov**, Alexander Ilich.

140. **Korsakov**, Pavel Matveevich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted to sub-lieutenant in the Leib Grenadier Regiment from page in His Majesty's Court in 1807. Transferred to this regiment on 4 [16] April 1810. Transferred to the Lifeguard Hussar Regiment on 20 July [11 August] 1813, as a lieutenant.

141. **Lvov**, Pyotr Ivanovich; ensign. Commissioned as an ensign into the Leib Grenadier Regiment from the 2nd Page's Corps in 1809, he transferred into this regiment on 4 [16] April 1810. Discharged from service as a captain on 2 [14] February 1816, due to ill health.

142. **Paskevich**, Stepan Theodorovich; captain. Commissioned into the Fanagoria Regiment as a lieutenant from the chamber pages of His Majesty's Court in 1803, from where he was transferred to this regiment on 16 [28] June 1810. Promoted to lieutenant colonel and transferred to the Orël Infantry Regiment on 19 [31] March 1812.

143. **Bublik**, Yakov Petrovich; sub-lieutenant. Commissioned into the Army as a sub-lieutenant from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1810, then transferred into this regiment on 8 [20] October 1810. Transferred as a colonel to the 50th Jäger Regiment on 17 [29] March 1818.

144. **Tolmachev**, Afanasy Yemelyanovich; sub-lieutenant. Commissioned into the Army as a sub-lieutenant from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1810, then transferred into this regiment on 8 [20] October 1810. Transferred as a colonel on 5 [17] January 1823, as commander of the 4th Carabinier Regiment.

145. **Bolkashin**, Nikanor Nikolaevich; sub-lieutenant. Commissioned into the Army as a sub-lieutenant from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1810, then transferred into this regiment on 8 [20] October 1810. Discharged from service due to wounds received as a staff-captain, on 19 [31] May 1815, as an honorary captain with uniform rights.

146. **Kvitsinsky**, Onufry Alexandrovich; sub-lieutenant. Commissioned into the Army as a sub-lieutenant from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1810, then transferred into this regiment on 8 [20] October 1810. Promoted from staff-captain to major and transferred to the 11th Jäger Regiment on 27 January [8 February] 1816.

147. **Arbuzov**, Alexei Theodorovich; sub-lieutenant. Commissioned into the Army as a sub-lieutenant from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1810, then transferred into this regiment on 8 [20] October 1810. Transferred as a colonel to command the Lifeguard Pavlovsk Regiment on 14 [26] March 1825. Appointed as *Flügeladjutant* to His Imperial Majesty on 15 [27] December 1825. Promoted to major general on 6 [18] December 1826. Awarded the Order of St. Anne 1st class on 16 [28] September 1828, for distinction. Received the Order of St. Vladimir 2nd class on 6 [18] December 1833. Promoted to lieutenant general on 6 [18] December 1835. Appointed commander of the 3rd Guard Infantry Division in 1837; also awarded the Order of the White Eagle that same year. In 1842 he was appointed commander of the entire infantry component of the Guard Corps. He was appointed adjutant general to His Majesty and commander of the reserve battalions of the Guard Corps on 1 [13] January 1844. In 1849 he received the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky. He was promoted general-of-infantry on 8 [20] April 1851. In 1852 he was appointed a member of the 18 [30] August 1814 Supreme Approved Committee. On 8 [20] February 1853, he was stripped of the status of adjutant general and the positions he held and was assigned to serve in the Line. He was reinstated as adjutant general to His Majesty on 13 [25] April 1854, and was restored to the lists of the Lifeguard Pavlovsk Regiment on 19 April [1 May]. On 29 August [10 September], he was appointed commander of the units remaining in St. Petersburg not on campaign. On

30 August [11 September] 1855 he received diamond decorations to the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky. On 1 [13] January 1856, he was appointed to serve the Person of His Majesty. Removed from the lists on 14 [26] April 1861, deceased.

148. **Volkov**, Ivan Stepanovich; ensign. Commissioned into the Army as an ensign from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1810, then transferred into this regiment on 8 [20] October 1810. Transferred as a staff-captain to the Penza Infantry Regiment on 9 [21] November 1815.

149. **Meftodovsky**, Ivan Ananievich; ensign. Commissioned into the Army as an ensign from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1810, then transferred into this regiment on 8 [20] October 1810. Appointed commander of the 48th Jäger Regiment, as a colonel on 12 [24] September 1820.

150. **Cherenkov**, Nikolai Nikitich; ensign. Commissioned into the Army as an ensign from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1810, then transferred into this regiment on 20 October [1 November] 1810. Promoted from captain to lieutenant colonel and transferred to the Orenburg Ulan Regiment on 22 June [4 July] 1818.

151. **Kaminsky**, Platon Theodorovich; ensign. Commissioned into the Army as an ensign from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1810, then transferred into this regiment on 20 October [1 November] 1810. Removed from the lists as a colonel on 2 [14] November 1824, deceased.

152. **Zhilin**, Alexander Ivanovich; ensign. Commissioned into the Army as an ensign from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1810, then transferred into this regiment on 20 October [1 November] 1810. Died of wounds received during the Patriotic War at Borodino on 26 August [7 September] 1812 (Supreme Orders, dated 31 October [12 November] 1812).

153. **Kashintsev**, Alexander Ivanovich; lieutenant. Transferred from the 3rd Jäger Regiment on 31 December 1810 [12 January 1811]. Transferred as a colonel to the Malorussia Grenadier Regiment on 4 [16] November 1813.

154. **Krishtofovich**, Yegor Konstantinovich; lieutenant colonel. Transferred to this regiment on 31 January [12 February] 1811, while commanding 1st Marine Regiment, he retained his previous duties. Appointed commander of the Yekaterinoslav Grenadier Regiment on 5 [17] October 1811.

155. Comte **de Rochechouart**, Leonty Petrovich; lieutenant. Transferred from the Line on 8 [20] February 1811. Discharged from service on 18 [30] May 1814, with the rank of colonel and status of *Flügeladjutant* to His Majesty, with a promotion, uniform rights and a half pension.

156. **Buturlin**, Nikolai Ivanovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 1 [13] April 1811. Died as a lieutenant, from wounds received during the Patriotic War at Borodino on 26 August [7 September] 1812 (Regimental Orders, dated 6 [18] August 1816).

157. **Pankratiev**, Nikita Petrovich; lieutenant. Transferred from the 29th Jäger Regiment on 18 [30] July 1811. Appointed *Flügeladjutant* to His Imperial Highness on 13 [25] December 1813. Promoted to major general on 6 [18] October 1817 and assigned to the commander of 1st Grenadier Division. Promoted to lieutenant general on 25 June [7 July] 1829. Awarded the Order of St. George 3rd class for distinction on campaign in 1831; also that year, appointed adjutant general to His Majesty. In 1832, he received the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky, and was awarded diamond decorations to this Order in 1834. He was removed from the lists as deceased on 30 June [12 July] 1836, with the status of member of

the Governing Council of the Kingdom of Poland, permanent member of the State Council for this Kingdom and Warsaw military governor.

158. **Yermolaev**, Vasily Stepanovich; ensign. Promoted into this regiment from *Feldwebel* of 2nd Cadet Corps on 4 [16] August 1811. Appointed commander of the Carabinier Training Regiment as a colonel on 17 [29] October 1822.

159. **Nesterov**, Theodor Dmitrievich; ensign. Promoted into this regiment from *Feldwebel* of 2nd Cadet Corps on 4 [16] August 1811. Removed from the lists as deceased on 14 [26] November 1812.

160. **Krylov**, Dmitry Sergeevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 9 [21] August 1811. Discharged from service as a colonel with uniform rights on 27 October [8 November] 1821, due to ill health.

161. **Izvolsky**, Grigory Pavlovich; ensign. Promoted from *Junker* in this regiment on 9 [21] August 1811. Discharged from service as an ensign on 10 [22] January 1812, due to ill health.

162. **Leontiev**, Dmitry Nikolaevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 9 [21] August 1811. Killed in action during the Patriotic War at Borodino on 26 August [7 September] 1812 (Supreme Orders, dated 31 October [12 November] 1812).

163. **Strandmann**, Karl Wilhelmovich; ensign. Enlisted as a *Junker* in this regiment from the State Admiralty Department and commissioned on 9 [21] August 1811. Promoted from lieutenant to captain and transferred to the 1st Carabinier Regiment on 20 July [1 August 1816.

164. **Poleshko**, Stepan Grigorievich; staff-captain. Enlisted as a *Junker* in the 1st Jäger Regiment in 1800. Transferred to this regiment as a staff-captain on 28 August [9 September] 1811. Promoted to colonel on 30 November [12 December] 1813 and assigned to the Army. Commanded the 34th Jäger Regiment in 1814. Awarded the Order of St. George 4th class for distinction at the capture of Paris. Nominated to become commander of first brigade, 18th Division in 1828 for distinction in the war against the Turks, awarded a Golden Sword with diamonds inscribed *за храбрость*, and the Order of St. Anne 1st class. Promoted to major general and appointed commander of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment on 23 September [5 October] 1828. He was awarded the Order of St. George 3rd class for distinction at Rudka in the war of 1831; he was also promoted to lieutenant general in 1831. On 22 August [3 September] 1831, he was appointed commander of the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade. He received the Order of the White Eagle in 1836. He was removed from the lists as commander of 2nd Grenadier Division on 17 [29] December 1837, as deceased.

165. Count **Voinovich**, Vladimir Markovich; lieutenant. Enlisted from the pages of His Majesty's Court as a sub-ensign in the 6th Jäger Regiment in 1810, transferring to this regiment as a lieutenant on 30 August [11 September] 1811. Died of wounds received at the Battle of Kulm on 17 [29] August 1813 as a staff-captain (Supreme Orders, dated 23 November [5 December] 1813).

166. **Kiselev 1st**, Alexander Dmitrievich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 12 [24] October 1811. Killed in action during the Patriotic War at Borodino on 26 August [7 September] 1812 (Supreme Orders, dated 31 October [12 November] 1812).

167. **Kiselev 2nd**, Sergei Dmitrievich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this

regiment on 12 [24] October 1811. Transferred as a colonel to the Army on 19 [31] October 1820. Discharged from service with uniform rights on 26 December 1821 [7 January 1822], for domestic reasons.

168. **Shchepotiev**, Ivan Petrovich; ensign. Promoted from non-commissioned officer of the 2nd Cadet Corps on 19 February [2 March] 1812. Promoted to colonel and transferred to the Lifeguard Preobrazhensky Regiment on 23 February [7 March] 1823.

169. Tsarevich of Georgia **Ilya**; sub-lieutenant. Assigned to the regiment on 15 [27] March 1812. Promoted to colonel and transferred to the Lifeguards Izmailovsky Regiment on 13 [25] March 1823.

170. Tsarevich of Georgia **Okropir**; sub-lieutenant. Assigned to the regiment on 15 [27] March 1812. Discharged from service as a lieutenant on 23 May [4 June] 1816, due to ill health.

171. **Akhsharumov**, Dmitry Ivanovich; captain. Transferred from the 20th Jäger Regiment on 26 May [7 June] 1812. Assigned to the Army as a colonel on 4 [16] February 1817.

172. **Korsakov**, Nikolai Matveevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 13 [25] August 1812. Removed from the lists as a sub-lieutenant on 5 [17] December 1815, deceased.

173. **Norov**, Vasily Sergeevich; ensign. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 27 August [8 September] 1812. Transferred as a captain to the 18th Jäger Regiment on 20 March [1 April] 1822.

174. **Barnovolokov**, Alexander Petrovich; ensign. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 27 August [8 September] 1812. Discharged from service as a lieutenant with uniform rights on 25 January [6 February] 1816, due to wounds received.

175. **Gederstern**, Anton Karlovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 13 [25] September 1812. Promoted from captain to lieutenant colonel and assigned to the Army on 4 [16] April 1821.

176. **Engelhardt 1st**, Alexander Petrovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 20 October [1 November] 1812. Promoted from lieutenant to captain and transferred to the Ingermanland Dragoon Regiment on 10 [22] June 1817.

177. **Engelhardt 2nd**, Sergei Petrovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 20 October [1 November] 1812. Transferred to the 50th Jäger Regiment as a lieutenant on 25 July [6 August] 1817.

178. **Bibikov**, Apollon Ilich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 20 October [1 November] 1812. Transferred to the 49th Jäger Regiment as a lieutenant on 25 July [6 August] 1817.

179. **Perkurov 1st**, Nikolai Nikolaevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 20 October [1 November] 1812. Discharged as a staff-captain from service on 5 [17] July 1820, with captain status and uniform rights.

180. **Perkurov 2nd**, Alexander Nikolaevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 20 October [1 November] 1812. Transferred to the 48th Jäger Regiment as a lieutenant on 25 July [6 August] 1817.

181. **Kurzhevsky**, Vladimir Grigorievich; staff-captain. Commissioned as an ensign in the

Line from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1807, remaining in this corps in the Noble Battalion. Transferred to this regiment on 31 October [12 November] 1812. Appointed commander of the 13th Jäger Regiment as a colonel on 15 [27] December 1819.

182. **Chernyshev 1st**, Dmityr Nikolaevich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] December 1812. Promoted from sub-lieutenant to staff-captain on 17 [29] April 1816 and transferred to the Penza Infantry Regiment.

183. **von Loman**, Pyotr Borisovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] December 1812. Promoted from staff-captain to major on 23 March [4 April] 1822, and transferred to the Line.

184. **Golenishchev-Kutuzov**, Pavel Vasilievich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] December 1812. Discharged from service as a staff-captain on 28 January [9 February] 1822 due to wounds received in combat, as a captain with uniform rights and a full salary pension.

185. **Zasetsky**, Pavel Ivanovich; ensign. Promoted from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] December 1812. Discharged from service as a lieutenant on 8 [20] November 1818, due to ill health.

186. **Merkurov**, Ivan Grigorievich; ensign. Promoted from *Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] December 1812. Discharged from service as a lieutenant on 5 [17] February 1819, due to wounds received in combat, as a staff-captain with uniform rights and a full salary pension.

187. **Kuzmin**, Pyotr Vasilievich; ensign. Promoted from *Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] December 1812. Promoted from captain to lieutenant colonel and transferred to the Tula Infantry Regiment on 2 [14] January 1824.

188. **Chernyshev 2nd**, Pavel Nikolaevich; ensign. Promoted from *Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] December 1812. Discharged from service as a staff-captain on 25 December 1822 [6 January 1823], due to wounds received in combat, as a captain with uniform rights.

189. **Valuev**, Nikolai Dmitrievich; ensign. Promoted from *Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] December 1812. Transferred to the 3rd Jäger Regiment on 2 [14] July 1813.

190. **Savelov 1st**, Pyotr Borisovich; ensign. Transferred from the Odessa Infantry Regiment on 18 [30] December 1812. Removed from the lists as a lieutenant on 22 January [3 February] 1818, deceased.

191. **Savelov 2nd**, Dmitry Borisovich; ensign. Promoted from *Junker* in this regiment on 18 [30] December 1812. Discharged from service as a staff-captain on 26 January [7 February] 1823, as a captain with uniform rights.

192. **Krivtsev**, Vladimir Ivanovich; ensign. Promoted from *Junker* in this regiment on 24 December 1812 [5 January 1813]. Discharged from service as a lieutenant on 13 [25] December 1814, due to ill health.

193. **Yermolov**, Mikhail Alexandrovich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermaster's Department on 25 December 1812 [6 January 1813]. Transferred to the Podolia Infantry Regiment on 25 July [6 August] 1817, as a colonel.

194. **Davydov**, Lev Vasilievich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from the 26th Jäger Regiment on 25 December 1812 [6 January 1813]. Promoted to colonel on 25 August [6 September]

1818, on transfer to the 22nd Jäger Regiment.

195. Baron **von Schilling**, Yegor Karlovich, ensign. Promoted from page at His Majesty's Court on 3 [15] January 1813. Discharged from service on 14 [26] October 1817 as a lieutenant with uniform rights, due to wounds received.

196. **Raevsky**, Alexander Nikolaevich; lieutenant. Transferred from the 5th Jäger Regiment on 5 [17] January 1813. Promoted to colonel on 17 [29] May 1817, on transfer to the Ryazan Infantry Regiment.

197. **Nashchokin**, Pyotr Alexandrovich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from the Moscow Infantry Regiment on 20 January [1 February] 1813. Discharged from service as a sub-lieutenant on 30 April [12 May] 1816.

198. **Choglokov**, Andreyan Nikolaevich; ensign. Transferred from the Pernov Grenadier Regiment on 20 March [1 April] 1813. Promoted from staff-captain to major on 25 March [6 April] 1820, on transfer to the 2nd Carabinier Regiment.

199. **Chebyshev 3rd**, Sergei Sergeevich; staff-captain. Transferred from the 19th Jäger Regiment on 23 March [4 April] 1813. Promoted to colonel on 15 [27] May 1816, on transfer to the Borodino Infantry Regiment.

200. **Anosov**, Mikhail Yakovlevich; lieutenant. Transferred from the Tambov Infantry Regiment on 27 April [9 May] 1813. Discharged from service as a captain with uniform rights on 8 [20] February 1816, due to ill health.

201. **Bistrom**, Theodor Antonovich; staff-captain. Transferred from the Corps of Engineers Lines of Communications on 21 May [2 June] 1813. Promoted to colonel and transferred to the Army on 15 [27] May 1816.

202. **Litvinov**, Ivan Vasilievich; staff-captain. Transferred from the Noble Regiment on 1 [13] June 1813. Appointed commander of the 42nd Jäger Regiment on 17 [29] January 1820.

203. **Kushelev**, Luka Ivanovich; ensign. Transferred from the Line on 12 [24] June 1813. Promoted from staff-captain to major on 23 October 1822, on transfer to the Prince of Orange's Hussar Regiment [Belarussia Hussars].

204. **Tiesenhausen**, Alexander Vladimirovich; ensign. Transferred from the Line on 12 [24] June 1813. Killed in action at Leipzig on 4 [16] October 1813 (Supreme Orders, dated 18 [30] January 1814).

205. **Barkov**, Dmitry Nikolaevich; ensign. Transferred from the Line on 12 [24] June 1813. Discharged from service as a staff-captain with uniform rights on 26 January [7 February] 1823, for domestic reasons.

206. **Bistrom 5th**, Ferdinand Antonovich; ensign. Transferred from the Line on 12 [24] June 1813. Promoted from captain to lieutenant colonel on 1 [13] October 1824, on transfer to the 5th Jäger Regiment.

207. **Ryzhov**, Ivan Ivanovich; ensign. Transferred from the Line on 12 [24] June 1813. Transferred to the 19th Jäger Regiment on 3 [15] June 1817, as a staff-captain.

208. **Yedishev**, Bogdan Yakovlevich; ensign. Transferred from the Line on 12 [24] June 1813. Removed from the lists on 5 [17] December 1815, deceased.

209. **Raisky**, Ivan Stepanovich; captain. Transferred from the 7th Jäger Regiment on 20 September [2 October] 1813. Discharged from service as a colonel with uniform rights on 16 [28] January, due to ill health.

210. **Lanevsky-Volk 2nd**, Alexander Vladimirovich; ensign. Promoted from *Junker* in this regiment on 21 September [3 October] 1813. Discharged from service as a captain with uniform rights on 23 February [6 March] 1824, due to ill health.

211. His Imperial Highness Tsarevich and Grand Duke **Konstantin Pavlovich**. Appointed regimental colonel-in-chief on 27 November [9 December] 1813. Died after a serious illness on 15 [27] June 1831.

212. **Bezobrazov**, Nikolai Mikhailovich; ensign. Transferred from the Lifeguard Izmailovsky Regiment on 5 [17] December 1813. Transferred to the Lifeguard Moscow Regiment on 6 [18] April 1824, as a colonel.

213. **Rostovtsev**, Ilya Ivanovich; ensign. Promoted from chamber-page at His Majesty's Court on 22 January [3 February] 1814. Promoted to colonel on 28 January [9 February] 1826, on transfer to the Lifeguard Finland Regiment. Died in the fortress of Kyustendil (Ottoman Bulgaria) on 11 [23] August 1828.

214. Marquis **de Monpezat**, Lev Osipovich [Léopold Augustin d'Ainesy de Monpezat]; staff-captain. French émigré. Transferred from the prince de Condé's corps into Russian service in 1806 as a column-guide in His Majesty's Suite, and transferred from there into this regiment on 2 [14] April 1814. Appointed aide-de-camp to the commandant of Paris on that same day. Discharged from service at his own request on 1 [13] March 1815.

215. **Chelishchev**, Alexander Alexandrovich; sub-lieutenant. Promoted to ensign in the 49th Jäger Regiment from page to His Majesty's Court in 1812. Transferred into this regiment on 5 [17] April 1814. Promoted from staff-captain to major on 20 March [1 April] 1822, on transfer to the 16th Jäger Regiment.

216. **Navrozov**, Vladimir Matveevich; lieutenant. Transferred from the Yekaterinoslav Grenadier Regiment on 25 April [7 May] 1814. Discharged from service as a staff-captain on 17 [29] October 1817, due to ill health.

217. **Tishevskoy**, Ignaty Ivanovich; staff-captain. Transferred from the 4th Jäger Regiment on 30 April [12 May] 1814. Promoted to colonel on 19 June [1 July] 1818, on transfer to the 14th Jäger Regiment.

218. **Verevkin**, Andreyan Mikhailovich; sub-lieutenant. Enlisted into the 2nd Jäger Regiment from 1st Cadet Corps in 1812. Transferred into this regiment on 3 [15] May 1814. Transferred as a lieutenant to the Lifeguard Finland Regiment on 14 [26] October 1817.

219. **Manuilov**, Matvey Ivanovich; staff-captain. Transferred from the 6th Jäger Regiment on 5 [17] May 1814. Transferred to the 45th Jäger Regiment as a colonel on 23 October [4 November] 1818.

220. **Markov**, Nikolai Pavlovich; lieutenant. Commissioned as an ensign into the Kexholm Grenadier Regiment from page at His Majesty's Court. Transferred into this regiment on 17 [29] May 1814. Transferred to the 24th Jäger Regiment as a colonel on 20 March [1 April] 1822.

221. **Ovander**, Vasily Yakovlevich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from the Pernov Grenadier

Regiment on 17 [29] May 1814. Transferred to the 47th Jäger Regiment as a sub-lieutenant on 25 July [6 August] 1817.

222. **Baturin 2nd**, Theodor Gerasimovich; ensign. Transferred from the 19th Horse Artillery Company, 1st Reserve Artillery Brigade on 17 [29] May 1814. Removed from the lists as a captain on 28 March [9 April] 1825, deceased.

223. **Ganskau**, Yakov Fyodorovich, captain. Commissioned from non-commissioned officer of the 1st Cadet Corps as an ensign in the Nizov Infantry Regiment in 1805, he transferred to the 34th Jäger Regiment that same year. Transferred into this regiment on 20 July [1 August] 1814. Transferred as a colonel to the Chernigov Infantry Regiment on 26 June [8 July] 1817.

224. **Ivensky**, Alexander Dmitrievich; ensign. Commissioned from *Feldwebel* of the Noble Regiment on 25 August [6 September] 1814. Promoted from staff-captain to major on 3 [15] April 1824, on transfer to the 10th Jäger Regiment.

225. **Litarev**, Nikolai Grigorievich; ensign. Commissioned from non-commissioned officer of the Noble Regiment on 25 August [6 September] 1814. Promoted from sub-lieutenant to staff-captain on 20 March [1 April] 1818, on transfer to the 30th Jäger Regiment.

226. **Pankratiev**, Feofil Petrovich; ensign. Transferred from the 14th Jäger Regiment on 3 [15] September 1814. Returned to the 14th Jägers as a lieutenant on 20 March [1 April] 1822.

227. **Farafontov**, Pyotr Nikolaevich; ensign. Commissioned into the Line from non-commissioned officer of the Noble Regiment in 1812. Transferred into this regiment on 3 [15] October 1814. Transferred into the Pernov Grenader Regiment on 31 October [12 November] 1816, as a lieutenant.

228. **Mikhno**, Arkady Semyonovich; ensign. Commissioned into the Line from non-commissioned officer of the Noble Regiment in 1812. Transferred into this regiment on 3 [15] October 1814. Transferred to the 11th Jäger Regiment on 17 [29] April 1816, as a lieutenant.

229. **Svet**, Mikhail Yakovlevich; ensign. Commissioned into the Line from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1812. Transferred into this regiment on 3 [15] October 1814. Transferred to the 42nd Jäger Regiment on 10 [22] January 1817, as a lieutenant.

230. **Goloushev**, Alexander Theodorovich, ensign. Commissioned into the Line from non-commissioned officer of the Noble Regiment in 1812. Transferred into this regiment on 3 [15] October 1814. Transferred to the Carabinier Training Regiment on 21 October [2 November] 1821, as a captain.

231. **Vorobievsky**, Kuzmin Mikhailovich; ensign. Commissioned into the Line from 2nd Cadet Corps in 1812. Transferred into this regiment on 3 [15] October 1814. Transferred to the 1st Carabinier Regiment on 21 January [2 February] 1816, as a lieutenant.

232. Baron **von Korff**, Theodor Ivanovich; ensign. Commissioned into the Line from 1st Cadet Corps in 1813. Transferred into this regiment on 3 [15] October 1814. Discharged from service as a staff-captain on 26 January [7 February] 1823.

233. **Pasynkov**, Konstantin Vasilievich; ensign. Commissioned into the Line from 1st Cadet Corps in 1813. Transferred into this regiment on 3 [15] October 1814. Removed from the

lists on 18 [30] April 1827, deceased.

234. **Strandmann**, Nikolai Gustavovich; ensign. Commissioned from the Smolensk Cadet Corps as an ensign in the Borodino Infantry Regiment in 1813. Transferred to His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermaster's Department later that year. Transferred into this regiment on 1 [13] March 1815. Removed from the lists on 23 January [4 February] 1818, deceased.

235. **Lermantov**, Vladimir Nikolaevich; lieutenant. Transferred from the Kremenchug Infantry Regiment on 19 [31] May 1815. Transferred to the Lifeguard Finland Regiment on 23 February [7 March] 1823, as a colonel.

236. **Shatilov**, Ivan Vasilievich; lieutenant. Transferred from the Line on 31 May [12 June] 1815. Transferred to the cavalry of the Line on 19 [31] October 1820, as a colonel.

237. **Gagin**, Luka Mikhailovich; sub-lieutenant. Transferred from the 1st Jäger Regiment on 4 [16] June 1815. Discharged from service as a staff-captain on 14 [26] February 1824.

238. **Semyonov**, Alexander Vasilievich; ensign. Page at His Majesty's Court. After completing his studies at the Imperial Moscow University, he joined the Kaluga *Opolchenie* in 1812. Transferred to the 3rd Grenadier-Jäger Regiment in 1814. Transferred into this regiment on 6 [18] October 1815. Discharged from service as a captain with uniform rights on 27 December 1824 [8 January 1825].