HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN

21st JÄGER REGIMENT

1805 - 1814

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[Translated into English from the original Russian and edited by Peter G.A. Phillips].



Tsar Alexander I

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CHAPTER 1.

Raising the regiment.

A brief outline of the origins of the jägers. - Potemkin's instructions. - Formation of the 2nd Battalion of the Finland Jäger Corps. - Raising the 21st Jäger Regiment. - The first colonel-in-chief of the regiment. - Troop training drills. - Training of the force. - Publication of military regulations. - The aims of military punishment.

The era of the introduction of standing armies into European states is characterised by the absence of any more or less precise grouping of troops within strictly defined categories.

In the initial era of the creation of armies, the most notable feature for the classification of troops was the equipment itself that distinguished one type of unit from another from afar. In this way, the distinction between infantry, cavalry and artillery appeared, entirely based on the type of weapons and equipment.

From here arose the first grouping of infantry into heavy and light.

The appearance in standing armies of more detailed classification of troops into categories dates from a much later era.

In Russia, in particular, the more subtle and sophisticated grouping of troops took place only in the second half of the 18th century.

As for the emergence of jägers in Russia, according to the information available, it is possible to establish that Count Panin[1] should be considered the innovator of jäger units.

In 1763, appointed as the commander of the forces stationed in Finland, he conceived the idea of forming a specialised jäger corps, which, by the nature of its equipment and pure fighting qualities, would be more suitable for operations in Finland, or, as Panin pointed out, the operations there by light and more capable infantry could be used 'to advantage.'[2]

In order to form this corps, five men were taken from each infantry company, who were to be trained for open order and marksmanship for this purpose. The military commission found obvious benefits from this innovation; in 1763 the establishment of special jäger sub-units was ordered for 'each regiment of the Livonia, Finland, Smolensk and Estonia divisions' numbering '60 men, no taller than two *arshin* and five *vershok* [five feet 4¾ inches], yet of the best, most athletic and healthy constitution; officers were to be selected for their particularly quick aptitude for drill alignment and for intelligent commentary on the variety of all military situations and useful formations in accordance with the state of the military situation.'[3]

By 1767, the strength of all jäger sub-units reached 3,540 men.[4] The usefulness of the jägers was proven in the war with the Polish Confederates and in the First Turkish War. By 1769, jäger sub-units had been established in every musketeer and grenadier regiment.

Because the jägers had shown themselves in their best light during the suppression of the Pugachev rebellion, where they, while providing great services, at the same time distinguished themselves favourably compared to the rest of the infantry, both in the accuracy of their fire and in their ability to move quickly, they received ardent support in the person of the vice-president of the Military Collegium, Prince Potemkin.[5] In accordance with his proposal, on 22 February [5 March] 1775, the

1 Pyotr Ivanovich Panin (1721-1789).

2 *История Лейбъ-Гвардии Егерсого Полка* [History of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment].

3 Military Encyclopaedia, published in 1854, book 5, page 322.

4 Maslovsky, *Записки по истории военного искусства в России 1683—1794 годов*. [Notes on the history of military art in Russia from 1683-1794], 2nd edition 1894, page 59.

5 Grigory Alexandrovich Potemkin (1739-1791).

Military Collegium decided to consolidate the jäger sub-units into the following six-company independent jäger battalions each of 990 men: 1st Siberia, 2nd Siberia, Belorussia, Bug, Kabardia, Georgia, Dniepr and Finland.[6]

In 1785, the independent jäger battalions (except for the two Siberia) were reformed into four-battalion jäger corps with the addition of men from various regiments, these including the Finland Jäger Corps.

By the end of Catherine II's reign, that is, by 1795, the number of jägers had already reached 38,922 men.[7]

In wartime, each jäger battalion was to operate independently, and was usually assigned two to three light guns. Jägers carried no Colours.

In 1788 Potemkin drafted instructions for jäger training, which became mandatory in 1789. Among other things, he was required: 'to handle a musket and maintain it to the necessary cleanliness, without extending this to polishing the ironwork, which is damaging to the weapon and increases the soldier's pointless tasks. Teach him the ratios of the gunpowder charge to ball, to prepare rifle ball with a patch for longer range. Teach them to load quickly but efficiently, aim truly, and fire correctly and quickly. Train them to run swiftly, to crawl into cover, to hide in holes and depressions, to hide behind rocks, bushes, high ground and, having taken cover, to shoot, and reload a musket lying on their backs; show them the tricks of the huntsman for deceiving and concealing their locations, such as: placing a helmet off to one side, so as to give the enemy an empty target and thus preserve oneself, playing dead and killing the approaching enemy...

The movements used for such training cannot be harmful, but on the contrary, through them the limbs are straightened, the men become more lively and athletic, and courage is often born from this. Select 20 men from each company, the best, healthiest and most athletic, who, having been trained first, then use them to mentor the others. It is desirable that the jägers do not practice any other type of fire except for target shooting and snap-shooting, from which combat shooting will result.'[8]

The jäger corps received unique uniforms.


In 1794, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Finland Jäger Corps were sent to Kovno [Kaunas] and Vilna [Vilnius], where, by virtue of the decree of 3 [14] August 1795, they were retitled the Lithuania Jäger Corps.

The same decree ordered the raising of new 2nd and 3rd battalions for the Finland Jäger Corps.

And since the 21st Jäger Regiment traces its origins back to the 2nd battalion of the Finland Jäger Corps, it is necessary to dwell on the raising of this battalion, as well as its later transformations.[9]

This raising took place under very difficult conditions. The personnel allocated by the 1st battalion of the corps were insignificant, and according to the decree re-creating this battalion, its first four companies, at constant readiness to set off on campaign, were supposed to consist of 212 jägers each, and only two 'replacement' companies, in accordance with the previous establishment, consisting of 136 jägers each; replacement companies were made up of men less able to endure the hardships of war and were intended to train recruits, replenish the active companies and maintain order in quarters when the unit went on campaign.

6 *Полное собрание законов Российской империи* [Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire (C.C.L.)], XVIII, No. 14257 and No. 14614.
7 Maslovsky, page 62.
8 History of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment, page 6.
9 C.C.L. XXVII, No. 20304.



Subaltern of 21st Jägers and Private of 22nd Jägers 1805-1807.

Wanting to create a truly elite unit, the commander of the Finland Division, Lieutenant General M.I. Kutuzov (later Field Marshal) transferred the most educated and best-trained officers from infantry regiments in his division to the newly formed battalion. These officers, despite their small numbers at the beginning of the raising, formed a sound cadre that immediately gave the unit a certain bearing. All of them, with a few exceptions, were relatively young men who possessed both solid theoretical knowledge and serious combat experience.

The selection of non-commissioned officers was so good that almost all of them were competent and 80 percent of them had taken part in combat operations.

The personnel of the lower ranks were of equal quality - 'the veteran jägers;' a significant number of them, about half, had taken part in the late war with the Swedes, yet each company had no more than 40 to 50 of these veteran jägers.

By 1 [12] January 1796, the shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers had almost been made good and the battalion began to take on the appearance of a fully organised fighting unit.[10]

After the death of Empress Catherine II, Emperor Paul I ascended the throne in 1796, and from the first days of his reign he began to carry out reforms of the military, which included, in addition to the introduction of new military regulations for infantry field service, a new structure for jäger units.

Thus, on 29 November [10 December] 1796, by Supreme orders, the ten jäger corps were reorganised into independent jäger battalions, numbered from 1st to 20th, each having five companies, while some jäger battalions were disbanded. The 2nd Battalion of the Finland Jäger Corps was renamed the 3rd Jaeger Battalion and the following year on 17 [28] May, the battalions were redesignated as regiments consisting of two five-company battalions, with the 3rd Battalion receiving the title 3rd Jäger Regiment while from 31 October [11 November] it began to be referred to by the name of its colonel-in-chief: Major General Gvozdev's Jäger Regiment.[11]

In 1800, Major General Sutthoff's Jäger Regiment was disbanded,[12] while on 31 March [11 April] 1801, Emperor Alexander ordered all regiments to be redesignated by number, which is how Major General Gvozdev's Jäger Regiment became known as 2nd Jäger Regiment (Major General Sutthoff's Regiment had been designated 1st Jäger Regiment).

In 1804 and 1805 the regiment, with the exception of the headquarters and two companies that remained in the Davydovsky fort (Davidstad [Taavetti], Vyborg Governorate), set out to work on the Likola fort and the town of Togikotti.

Emperor Alexander I, soon after ascending the throne, began reforms and acknowledged the need to make improvements in the organisation of Russian forces and, as a result of the resumption of war [between Britain and France], found it necessary to increase the size of the army, which took place in 1803 and 1805.

Among other newly raised regiments, on 29 August [10 September] 1805, 12 companies were formed into three battalions of the 21st Jäger Regiment from the six even-numbered companies of 2nd Jäger Regiment, and the following were received for the raising of the regiment:

Major Gine, captains Kulman, Anfimov, Svobodsky 1st, Ivanov, Kanishchev; Staff-Captain Yelistratov; lieutenants Grigorov 2nd, Galsky 2nd, Grigoriev 1st, Shchukin, Golubev, Sytensky 1st; sub-lieutenants Tishchenko, Davydov 2nd, Pekur, Shchutskoy 2nd, Rogovtsev and Sinebryukhov; two *Portépée-Junkers*, three *Junkers*, 43 non-commissioned officers, 19 drummers, 563 privates

10 Rantsev *История 96-го пехотного Омского полка* [History of the 96th Infantry (Omsk) Regiment, 1902].

11 Alexey Vasilievich Gvozdev.

12 Johann Sutthoff or Ivan Yefimovich Sutgof (?-1806). 1st Jäger Regiment was disbanded following its alleged poor performance during the Anglo-Russian invasion of North Holland in 1799.

one battalion *Feldscher* [medic], six barbers, six infirmary attendants, two battalion clerks, six locksmiths, three armourers, three blacksmiths, six carpenters, 18 drivers, 20 orderlies, for a total of 720 men.

On 16 [28] September 1805, the newly formed 21st Jäger Regiment, consisting of six companies, set out from the Vyborg Governorate under the command of Major Gine for St. Petersburg, where they arrived on 22 September [4 October] and then proceeded on to Libau [Liepāja] and Goldingen [Kuldīga, both in Latvia], which had been assigned as their quarters.

Before the regiment's departure, the men of 2nd Jäger Regiment were given the following uniform and equipment items:

1. Grenadiers received grenadier caps with fittings.
2. Jägers received shakos and hats in accordance with the articles.
3. Greatcoats, jackets and trousers with buttons.
4. All annual consumables and munitions items and cash for 1805.
5. Sheepskin short coats.
6. Forage hats.
7. Knapsacks with buckles and straps.
8. Bread sacks with buckles and straps.
9. Canes and gloves for non-commissioned officers.
10. Soldiers' company *Artel* [mess] kettles.
11. Entrenching tools, shovels, carpentry, locksmith and blacksmith tools.
12. Medicines and hospital items; caps, shirts, sheets, pillowcases, mattresses, towels, dressing gowns, blankets, stockings, vests and shoes.

In early [mid] October, the regiment arrived in Libau and became part of the Livonia Inspection.[13]

Upon the arrival of the regiment at its quarters, the regiment's colonel-in-chief, Major General Sutthoff, appointed by Supreme Orders dated 4 [16] September, arrived. His large family, consisting of his wife and ten children, arrived at the regiment with him.[14]

In addition to him, the following arrived to replenish the regiment, assigned by the same order: majors Lashkevich and Chernozipunnikov; Staff-Captain Feonas; lieutenants Bukhovetsky and Simashko; sub-lieutenants Deszert and Zagryadsky; Ensign Rodichev and Auditor [legal advisor] Yakovlev.

13 Inspections had been established in 1796 by Emperor Paul instead of divisions and had the significance of later Military Districts. The senior person in the inspection was the inspector of infantry, to whom the regiments came under command authority (C.C.L. XXVIII, No. 21882; Monthly summary of Supreme orders for 1805, archive of the Ministry of War, miscellaneous business, No. 20, pages 105, 113).

14 Major General Ivan Yefimovich Sutthoff, Chevalier of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem and Order of St Anne, 3rd class, was of the Lutheran faith. He was a bourgeois volunteer who could read and write in Russian and German. He entered service as a soldier in the Tobolsk Musketeers in 1773, was promoted sergeant in 1774, adjutant in 1778, quartermaster in 1780, captain in 1786, and retired as a major in 1788. He returned to service as a premier-major in the Finland Jäger Corps in 1789, was promoted lieutenant colonel in 1790, colonel in 1797, and major general in 1798, when he also became colonel-in-chief of the 1st Jägers. In 1801 he became colonel-in-chief of the Rochensalm Garrison Regiment. He took part in the war with Sweden in 1790. On 28 July [8 August] 1799 he sailed from Reval to Holland via the Sound. On 9 [20] September he commanded the vanguard at the Battle of Bergen. His annual income was 1,000 roubles. He was married and had five sons and five daughters (Moscow Archive of the General Staff, staff-list of the Rochensalm Garrison Regiment).

From the very first moment of their arrival in Libau and Goldingen, the regiment's officers were faced with a hard task: the organisation and building of an entirely new establishment. Firstly, 12 companies were to be formed from six companies, with each company contributing half a company to form another, while Major Gine and Lieutenant Shchukin were sent to collect recruits who were being conscripted from Latvians and Estonians in the districts of Riga, Wenden [Cēsis], Dorpat [Tartu] and Pernau [Pärnu], numbering 912 men; the recruits who arrived were between the ages of 19 and 30 and all were literate.

The weapons and munitions items were received by the regiment in Riga from the commissariat, where Lieutenant Sytensky had been sent, and as they were collected, he delivered them to the regiment.

The colonel-in-chief, while reorganising the regiment, immediately encountered a great deal of deficiencies; among other things, following the march there were many sick men in the regiment; but since there were no doctors, and although medicines had been issued by the 2nd Jägers it was apparently only on paper, because it became necessary to hire private doctors in Libau and Goldingen, and to buy medicines for use by the sick. There was no regimental chaplain to perform the services. Among the privates who arrived to reconstitute the regiment, there were absolutely no men worthy of being promoted to non-commissioned officers, of whom there was a great shortage (about 80 men). The 2nd Jägers had not provided a single musician to form a choir in the 21st Jägers.

Which is why the following was reported (No. 3412 dated 21 November [3 December] 1805, No. 3307 dated 15 [27] November 1805, No. 1718 dated 20 December 1805 [1 January 1806], Archive of the Ministry of War, miscellaneous business, No. 20):

1. Doctors were to be assigned to the regiment.
2. Senior Chaplain, Father Pavel Ozershchkovsky informed the Minister of War that Father Vasily Matveyev, who had joined the regiment on 20 December 1805 [1 January 1806], had been appointed chaplain to the 21st Jägers.
3. The Minister of War permitted competent privates to be taken from the Riga Garrison Regiment in order to fill the non-commissioned officer vacancies.
4. Ten pupils from military orphanages were permitted to be assigned to become horn players and drummers.

The end of the year was marked by the death of the regimental colonel-in-chief, Major General Sutthoff, and from the day of his death until April of the following year the regiment was commanded by Major Chernozipunnikov.

Upon arrival, the recruits began intensive training, which took up most of the time. The training itself was very difficult; according to the regulations mentioned below, 'there were more than three times as many musket commands, and with the number of movements almost six times more than the current number (there were 31 commands with 116 movements); they were not performed as they are now, by counting, but had to be performed with the soldiers turning their heads to the right, between each movement, equally holding back and counting by eight, following the right-marker stationed on the right flank who doubled forwards before performing the commands. In those days, the musket was held vertically in the left hand, and it sat, so to speak, on the palm of this hand, being only leaned against the left shoulder. Given the weight and length of muskets at that time, this required great dexterity, skill and experience.' In addition, the recruit was required to listen, understand and remember such expressions as, for example: *point de vue*, *charge plutong* and so on.[15]

15 Lifeguard Finland Regiment.

On 18 [30] January 1806, Colonel Laptev, who had transferred from the 6th Jägers and was promoted to major general, was appointed colonel-in-chief of the 21st Jägers; he was a man with combat experience as a participant in the campaigns of 1789, 1790 and 1805;[16] he arrived in Goldingen in April with eight of his own orderlies. At this time the manning of jäger regiments was amended: first of all, by decree of 4 [16] July, the number of officers in the regiment was increased by 12 ensigns, one per company, and then on 16 [28] August, jäger regiments were to have equal manpower strength with musketeer regiments; despite this, the strength of the regiment increased little.

	Numbers per establishment	Present on 1 [13] September
Field officers	7	5
Subalterns	54	36
Non-commissioned officers	120	109
Privates	1,980	1,215 + 720 recruits
Musicians	56	32
Support staff	148	124
Orderlies	94	37 + 39 privately employed
Total:	**2,459**	**2,278**

During the year, the following joined the regiment: Lieutenant Colonel Kulikovsky, who was recruited from the Borisoglebsk Dragoon Regiment and was promoted to colonel on 8 [20] July and appointed regimental commander, and the following transferred from various units and promoted: one major, one staff-captain, three lieutenants, seven sub-lieutenants and 19 ensigns.[17]

Hard service and intensive training led to many recruits going absent during the year (about 90 men), some of them were caught, and some returned voluntarily.[18] Until that time, soldiers had worn curls,[19] the length of which had to be natural, and in addition a queue hung a palm width long ending with a ribbon; the queue was thinner towards the end. Off duty, privates could wear their hair clubbed. On 2 [14] December 1806, Supreme orders were issued to all lower ranks to cut their hair short, while officers were left to their own choice.[20]

In view of the imminence of a new war, which Russia was to wage against Napoleon, the 21st Jäger Regiment began to actively prepare for it, for which: weapons and equipment were put in order, the training of recruits continued at an accelerated rate; Lieutenant Sytensky 1st was sent to Vilna to draw gunpowder and lead; in addition, the deficiencies in the regimental trains was rectified, for

16 Major General Vasily Danilovich Laptev (1758-1825) was a Chevalier of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, of St George, 4th class of St. Vladimir 4th class and of St. Anna 3rd class, and could read and write in Russian. He entered service as a Fourier in the Preobrazhensky regiment in 1776, became a sub-ensign in 1777, a sergeant in 1778, and was commissioned as a line regiment captain in the Tambov Musketeers in 1789. He was promoted major for distinction at the capture of Izmail in 1791. He transferred to the Bryansk Musketeers as a lieutenant colonel in 1798, becoming a colonel in 1799. He became colonel-in-chief of 8th Jägers in 1802. He was denounced by a retired Polish officer, Major General Kurdovanovsky, was tried by Court Martial, and his acquittal received Supreme confirmation. Retired 17 [29] March 1805. Rejoined on 4 [16] September 1805. Appointed colonel-in-chief 6th Jägers. Promoted major general in 1806. Had seen combat service in 1789, 1790, 1792, 1794 and 1805 (Moscow Archive of the General Staff, service lists).

17 Supreme orders; Moscow Archive.

18 Monthly reports, Moscow Archive of the General Staff.

19 Military Regulations for Infantry Service, 1797, Part 10, Chapter 6.

20 C.C.L. XXIX, No. 22382.

which draught horses were purchased, the number of which was increased to 90.[21]

With the opening of military operations in the campaign of 1806-1807, the 21st Jäger Regiment was to take a most active part.

The foundations of troop training in the era in question were no different from the foundations of our time: the same desire to develop a military sense of duty, the same strict discipline, the help of a comrade, the habit of meekly enduring the hardships of wartime - all these most important issues of training, sharply put forward by Peter the Great, had been sanctified by the personal example of the Great Sovereign and laid the cornerstone of the foundations of Russian military affairs.

Demanding strict compliance with the regulations of garrison service, uncomplaining obedience, endurance, fearlessness and determination, the Tsar demanded that unit commanders, under threat of 'the most severe punishment' exercise 'judgment' when applying the statutory demands, 'because the procedures are written there (in the statutes), but there are no timings or cases. The integrity of the soldier' is one of the main duties of an officer - 'because all military affairs consist of this.'[22]

The reign of Elizabeth Petrovna, who strictly retained the Petrine principles, became a school for the personalities of Catherine's era.

The company commander, according to Vorontsov's instructions, was obliged, among other things, to instil in the soldier 'how he should be mindful of the importance of his duty when he is standing guard, and whomever at that time, no matter what his rank or title, had no right to curse at him or use verbal abuse or, in general, show any kind of impoliteness...'

If it were noticed that a soldier 'does not punish someone who has been rude to him with a weapon' then he was to be harshly punished upon his change of duty. 'Gentlemen officers are not at all prevented from speaking roughly and impolitely to a sentry, but they must wait for the changing of the guard.'

It is not without interest to cite information from Vorontsov's instructions here concerning disciplinary sanctions imposed on lower ranks, where the basic provision was: 'Punish for each offence, assessing each, one does not fight with a musket in training, rather it would be necessary to punish a liar, a lazy person, a slob, a drunkard, then no more than 40 lashes without severity.'[23]

When non-commissioned officers from the nobility were promoted to officers and the latter were promoted, a certificate was presented, signed by all available officers, regarding the dignity of those being promoted to their first officer rank, and a similar certificate, signed only by officers of senior rank for those subject to promotion to vacancies, always with a personal note from the unit commander, 'having the force of the colonel's orders, who was worthy of promotion and who was not worthy and for what specific failings' and a general sworn statement with the original signatures of the officers.

The oath was as follows: 'We, the below-named, pledge and swear by Almighty God and before His Holy Gospel that we desire and must testify to the dignity of the ranks that follow us, to their promotion by certification, without encroaching on anyone, not out of envy, or friendship, or gifts, in the most essential justice: in which may the sincere Judge help us.

In conclusion, we kiss the words of our Saviour and the cross. Amen.'

Month, Day and Year.

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21 Monthly reports, Moscow Archive of the General Staff.

22 Maslovsky, Part I, page 99.

23 Mikhail Semyonovich Vorontsov (1782-1856), *Некоторыя правила для обхождения с нижними чинами в 12-й пехотной дивизии* [Some Rules for Dealing With Lower Ranks in 12th Infantry Division (1815)]; Maslovsky, Page 102.

Then followed the original signatures of all the officers, starting with the most junior.[24]

The most important memorial to military legislation from the 18th century is the Military Regulations for the Infantry Field Service of 1796.

Without setting out to clarify the many curious details from these military regulations, we shall strive to give a brief description of it as one of the most remarkable military legislative memorials to the 18th century.

Part 1: The composition of the regiment, on the distribution of regimental appointments by company on parade (three chapters).

Part 2: On training recruits, on commands and musket drill and firing (four chapters).

Part 3: How the company forms up and trains on the parade ground and how the sentries march out from the company, also what officers should note regarding the spontoon (one chapter).

Part 4: How the battalion of regiment forms up and trains on the parade ground (four chapters).

Part 5: How to form companies up after training, how to mount guard after training, how to carry the Colours from the parade ground and the best way to train soldiers and put the regiment in good order without exhausting the men.

Part 6: How battalions and companies should be fully manned and armed during inspections and in those months when there are exercises and at the beginning of a campaign (five chapters).

Part 7: On the carriage of spontoons, halberds and Colours (three chapters).

The actual regulations on infantry service end here, with the addition of instructions related more closely to the regulations on garrison service and to the duties of unit inspectors.

Part 8: Garrison service, duties of governors and commandants, sentries, changing of the guard and sentries, patrols and watches; executions, funerals for officers and lower ranks, consecration of Colours and admission of doctors to service and care of the sick (16 chapters).

Part 9: On the subordination of officers, on the posts of regimental adjutant, quartermaster and auditor, on the promotion of officers, on deserters, resignations, leaves of absence, marriages, and company rounds by field officers (ten chapters).

Part 10: On the contents of uniform, weapons, and munitions (six chapters).

Part 11: The departure of a regiment or battalion on campaign from permanent quarters and on the duty of care for soldiers on campaign and at night halts (six chapters).

Part 12: Camp service: how an army breaks camp to go on the march; the arrangement of camps, on field and camp guards, saluting by sentries, about generals' guards, about orderlies, about the password and the response, about pickets, about the performance of Divine service, about the training of the regiment on campaign, about leave from camp for officers and privates, about foraging, what regiments should be mindful of on the march, in cantonments and in the outposts, what convoys and escorts should observe; what is required of an officer during battle, how to act during a siege, the number of officers carriages on campaign, generals' desks in the field; about the debts of officers, about sutlers, about the sick and about maintaining good health.

Appendices: on guards in fortresses, about carriages in wartime. Plans and diagrams (32 chapters).

From this it is clear that the regulations concerned every part of military training, excluding the limits of the military-judicial elements, since such would find their place in the general military code.

24 Maslovsky, Footnote 37 to Chapter 2, Page 10.

The purpose of the publication of the military regulations of 1796 was to establish internal procedures within military units and to regulate the performance of guard duty, which was given great significance at that time.

N.I. Faleev in his book: *Цели воинского наказания* [The Objectives of Military Punishment], dwells on the clarification of the issue of military criminal legislation of the era of Paul. He stated that at that time neither legislation nor judicial practice had developed any specific provisions.

A crime was considered any action for which a punishment had been assigned, even if the perpetrator was not under threat of any such punishment according to the law.

Emperor Paul invented new crimes almost daily, in view of this their growth occurred with incredible speed: one day, the process for attending masquerades would be regulated in the most detailed manner; the next, tailors were forbidden to make up military uniforms for personnel from un-soaked cloth; they were forbidden to dance the waltz; from wearing low, large curls, braids cut off at the end, high collars, and so on; newly spawned crimes entailed severe penalties for the perpetrator; crime was growing; life was becoming unbearable.

As for the classification of military crimes according to their severity, complete arbitrariness reigned here: no one, not even the attorney for the prosecuting authority in the forces, could determine in each individual case: whether the guilty party would be dismissed from service, or given a severe reprimand, or, on the contrary, sent to Nerchinsk for hard-labour.

Dwelling on the details of individual punitive measures, it should be noted that hard labour, as the severest punishment, assigned for military and general crimes, was sometimes applied without trial; this punishment entailed various consequences: deprivation of rank, deprivation of noble status, deprivation of rank and exclusion from military service, and so on.

It was also impossible to establish exhaustively the crimes that entailed the use of hard labour, and along with robbery and extortion, we encounter the theft of government property, inaction by the authorities, extortion of bribes, insulting superiors, withholding items and pay from lower ranks, and so on.

Imprisonment in a fortress was used in most cases only when the given crime violated either the monetary interests of the treasury or the inviolability of private property; therefore, imprisonment was often imposed for embezzlement of public funds, failure to provide provisions and pay to lower ranks, misuse of lower ranks for private work, appropriation of public property, its deliberate damage, causing offence to the general public, occupying quarters for billeting, and so on; but all this did not exclude the possibility of using the fortress against those guilty of violating service duties, abuse of power and other purely military crimes.

In the first instance, the sentencing authority, having in mind compensation for losses to the treasury, directly indicated punishment with confinement for employment or generating revenue, and in the second case, they replaced corporal punishment with confinement for privileged military personnel.

Exile to a settlement was always accompanied by deprivation of rank; it was used quite often in cases of assault, violence, or torture, which did not exclude the possibility of assigning this punishment in other cases. The consequences of exile included: loss of status and military rank.

Sometimes the convicts were sent to live in the Siberian Governorates.

Exclusion from service was applied either as a punishment or as an administrative measure before trial. It was applied for: misusing lower ranks for private work, failure to report a crime, wearing orders that did not belong to them, borrowing money from lower ranks, failure to pay *artel* fees, embezzlement of passes, cruel punishment of subordinates, unauthorised absences, contempt of

court, drunkenness, forgery, careless guarding of detainees, riot, false reporting sick, seducing another man's wife, and so on. Demotion, or reduction to the rank of private, was quite common, as was deprivation of rank.

CHAPTER 2.

The War Of 1806-1807 - The Regiment's Baptism Of Fire.

Causes of the war. - Preparations for war. - Beginning of the war. - The 21st Jäger Regiment as part of 3rd Division crosses the Prussian border. - Field Marshal Count Kamensky - The actions at Łopacin and Gołymin. - Disagreements among military commanders. - Retreat to Johannisburg. - Battle of Preußisch Eylau. - Retreat of the army to Königsberg.

The war with France in 1806-1807 was a direct continuation of the war of 1805, which ended, as is well known, with the Austerlitz *pogrom*. Having lost almost all of its artillery and missing many of its comrades, our main army returned to the borders of Russia. Emperor Alexander, under the effects of the lost campaign, showed an inclination toward reconciliation with France.

Meanwhile, Napoleon, having formed the *confédération du Rhin* from the minor states of western Germany, took it under his protection.

After the defeat of Austria, Napoleon began to look for a pretext to start a war with Prussia, showing overt disrespect to the king. Whereupon the Prussian king, having secured the promises of Emperor Alexander to help with troops and not having waited for them, presumptuously advanced his army to the left bank of the Saale river at the end of September 1806 and demanded the removal of French troops beyond the Rhine. While our forces were gathering on the border, Napoleon defeated the Prussian army in one day, on two adjacent battlefields at Jena and Auerstedt, and then moved further into the borders of Prussia.

Before the start of the war, the main concern of Emperor Alexander I had been to bring the armed forces of Russia into a formidable defensible state, in order to be ready to go to the aid of their neighbours if they were attacked by Napoleon. The first measure taken to implement these plans was the creation of 13 divisions from the inspections, to which units had hitherto been assigned. The divisions included cavalry, infantry, artillery and Cossacks and were numbered from 1 to 13; in addition, new regiments were raised. But circumstances had changed and instead of a war beyond the Elbe and joint operations with the Prussian army, the theatre of military operations suddenly shifted to the near bank of the Vistula; we shifted from an offensive stance to a defensive one; instead of intending to drive Napoleon beyond the Rhine, we had to think about protecting Russia's borders. Emperor Alexander declared war on 18 [30] November without the slightest hesitation, stating in a manifesto that:

> The sword, drawn with honour to defend the allies of Russia, in all fairness should look to the defence of its own security for the homeland.

Officers on leave were ordered to report to their units, with the exception of those on leave recovering from wounds. Retired lower ranks were recalled for military service. Those of them who served for three years were promised a medal worn on a red ribbon in their buttonhole with the inscription: *За усердие къ службе* [for diligence in service]. Anyone who wished to remain in service after three years would receive a pay rise and, after four years, in addition to the medal, the rank of non-commissioned officer, if he did not have it before. Those who served for six years received a medal to wear in the buttonhole on a blue ribbon with the inscription: *Въ честь заслуженному воину* [in honour of the worthy warrior], non-commissioned officer rank and lifetime pension of full soldier's pay. In the infantry, spontoons were abolished. The medal of the Military Order was instituted as an award for lower ranks.[1]

While Napoleon was reaping the fruits of his victories over Prussia, Emperor Alexander I ordered

1 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Tsar Alexander's Second War With Napoleon, 1806-1807, chapter 3 [English translation by Phillips]; Oskar von Lettow-Vorbeck, *Der Krieg von 1806 und 1807*, volume III.

Bennigsen[2] to march to Breslau [Wrocław] via Warsaw with the army located between Grodno and Jurburg [Jurbarkas]. Bennigsen's corps consisted of four divisions: Count Osterman's 2nd Division; Sacken's 3rd Division; Prince Golitsyn's 4th Division and Sedmoratsky's 6th Division;[3] the following regiments were part of Sacken's 3rd Division: Malorussia Cuirassiers, Kurland Dragoons, Sumy Hussars, Ilovaisky 10th's Cossacks, Papuzin's Cossacks, Tauride Grenadiers, Lithuania Musketeers, Koporsk Musketeers, Murom Musketeers, Chernigov Musketeers, Dnieper Musketeers, 21st Jägers.



Count Bennigsen.

In total, this corps numbered about 60,000 men with 276 guns; Buxhöwden's other corps had 40,000 and 216 guns.[4]

The forces of the Russian army that entered the theatre of war amounted to 100,000 men, with the

2 Levin August von Bennigsen (1745–1826).

3 Alexander Ivanovich Osterman-Tolstoy (1771-1857); Fabian Gottlieb von der Osten-Sacken (1752-1837); Dmitry Vladimirovich Golitsyn (1771-1844); Alexander Karlovich Sedmoratsky (?-1807).

4 Friedrich Wilhelm von Buxhöwden (1750-1811).

exception of Essen's corps,[5] which did not take part until January 1807. The Prussian forces, completely destroyed by Napoleon, amounted to 11,000 in L'Estocq's corps and some 8,000 in the garrisons of the fortresses.[6] Later, in April 1807, the Lifeguard arrived in the theatre of military operations from St. Petersburg. Because the hospital and artillery units had not been supplied with everything necessary, our army could not cross the border before 17 [29] October. Following Emperor Alexander's orders, Bennigsen crossed the border at Grodno and headed towards Pułtusk. On 31 October [12 November], 3rd Division moved through Ortelsburg [Szczytno] and Pezaßnitz [Przasnysz].

The 21st Jäger Regiment crossed the border led by the regiment's colonel-in-chief, Major General Laptev, and the regimental commander, Colonel Kulikovsky, with the following composition: five field officers, 31 subalterns, 100 non-commissioned officers, 31 musicians, 1,098 privates, 720 recruits, 194 support staff and 89 draught horses.[7]

The local population were hostile to our troops, which led to them refusing to provide provisions and hiding food supplies. Our generals and regimental commanders, receiving neither provisions in kind nor cash in lieu in order to buy them, were forced to spend their own money first on purchasing provisions, and when that was spent, they turned to the soldiers' *artel* and other regimental funds, but this method, of course, could not continue for long, and after that was expended, the troops had no other means of subsistence than to collect food supplies and forage from the population in the surrounding areas by force; but this method, which usually exhausts all the resources of even a rich country, turned out to be unsatisfactory.[8]

In mid [late] November, the enemy army of 150,000 had reached the Vistula, by three avenues, towards Thorn [Toruń], Plotzk [Płock] and Warsaw. On 14 [26] November, the first shots in this stubborn six-month war were fired. Bennigsen, having no hopes of holding the French on the Vistula line, gave the order for a general retreat.[9] Our vanguard retreated beyond the Vistula. On 19 November [1 December], 3rd Division withdrew from Pezaßnitz to Dalewo [Drążdżewo?]. The French immediately took advantage of the retreat by our forces, occupied Praga and Thorn and set up crossing points at these locations. Davout[10] continued moving towards the Narew and began to build a bridge at Okunin [opposite Czarnowo].

Having learned of the Prussian evacuation of Thorn, Napoleon ordered that L'Estocq be cut off from Russian forces, moving towards Willenberg [Borki Wielbarskie] and Pułtusk. The Russian force had not yet finished their retreat when, on 22 November [4 December], Bennigsen ordered the reoccupation of their previous positions, but the order came so late that units continued their retreat and on 26 November [8 December] 3rd Division moved to Zechenau [Ciechanów]. Our vanguards were holding the line of the Wkra and Narew, while the main body of the corps was at Pułtusk. Meanwhile, Buxhöwden's corps reached Ostrolenka [Ostrołęka] on 22 November [4 December].

Bennigsen, an energetic and talented man, was junior in rank to Buxhöwden and, moreover, was at odds with him. The reluctance to join forces with his fellow soldier forced Bennigsen to avoid linking up with him and going on the offensive. Emperor Alexander was aware of the enmity that existed between the two corps commanders, and so, in order to maintain unity in their operations, he sent Lieutenant General Count Tolstoy,[11] who had his full authority, to the army. At around this time, Essen's corps, numbering about 37,000 men, reached Brest from the banks of the Dnieper.

5 Ivan Nikolaevich Essen 1st (1758-1813).
6 Anton Wilhelm von L'Estocq (1738-1815).
7 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, Monthly returns.
8 O. Zatler, St. Petersburg, 1860, page 63.
9 Karpov, Archive of the General Staff, No. 1587.
10 Louis Nicolas Davout (1770-1823).
11 Pyotr Alexandrovich Tolstoy (<1770-1844).

Wanting to coordinate the operations of the corps, the Emperor appointed the once glorious Field Marshal Count Kamensky[12] as commander-in-chief, to whom, by a rescript of 10 [22] November, he entrusted 'the glory of the Russian armed forces, the security of the Empire and the peace of my subjects.' Kamensky joined the army in Pułtusk on 7 [19] December and, feeling completely incapable of commanding the army, reported to the Tsar:

> 'I am too old for the army, I cannot see anything, I can hardly ride a horse, but not out of laziness, like others, I cannot find places on the maps, and I do not know the ground.
>
> I dare to submit for consideration the smallest part of the correspondence, consisting of six documents, which I was supposed to have in one day, which I cannot endure for long, for which I dare to ask for relief for myself. I sign, I know not what.'[13]

From the first day of his arrival in Pułtusk, Count Kamensky ordered an offensive to be launched from the east to push the French back beyond the Vistula.

On the day of Kamensky's arrival in Pułtusk, Napoleon arrived in Warsaw, where he was welcomed as the restorer of Poland and greeted with the ringing of bells and cannon salutes. He believed that with a few strong blows he could push the Russians back into the depths of their homeland. Two days later, on 9 [21] December, the French army began a general offensive:

1. The left wing went from Thorn towards Strasburg [Brodnica], intending to isolate L'Estocq from the Russian army, and then operate on our right flank and rear.
2. The centre - Soult and Augereau[14] - proceeded from Plotzk towards Sochocin and Kolozomb [Kołoząb].
3. The right wing, led by Napoleon, advanced from Warsaw along the right bank of the Vistula towards Czarnowo, where Davout's corps was located.

Count Kamensky, wishing to drive Soult and Augereau beyond the Vistula, ordered Bennigsen's corps to go from Pułtusk to Kolozomb and Sochocin, cross the Wkra and attack the enemy. On 12 [24] December, the French began to cross the Wkra opposite Kolozomb on rafts and had quickly laid a bridge. As the French were taking the crossings on the Wkra and Narew, our main forces, fulfilling the orders from Count Kamensky, were advancing towards the Wkra. Bennigsen had been ordered to concentrate his corps at Strzegocin, while Count Buxhöwden was ordered to place divisions at Gołymin, Mława and Pułtusk. Our forces were in these positions as Napoleon crossed the Narew and the Wkra, intending to cut off the Russian army's crossing point on the Narew at Pułtusk with his right wing, and to attack its flank and rear with his left. Thus, on 12 [24] December both sides were in full motion, but snow and rain was making the roads impassable, slowing the march. By midnight on 12 [24] December, Bennigsen's forces had barely assembled at Strzegocin when news was received of the appearance of the French at Pułtusk. This was Lannes' corps,[15] hurrying to block our troops from crossing at this point, but they had been forestalled by Baggovut's detachment,[16] just arrived from Zegrze. As a result, in accordance with orders, Bennigsen retreated towards Pułtusk. Sacken, who remained at Łopacin with 3rd Division, without receiving orders for a long time, decided to retreat there too.[17]

Our troops had just left Strzegocin; Davout's corps, coming up from Nasielsk, occupied it, cutting the road to Pułtusk for Bennigsen's rearmost units, who were falling back from the banks of the Wkra and had not yet managed to reach Strzegocin. The following regiments had been cut off by

12 Mikhail Fedotovich Kamensky (1738-1809).
13 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 46.
14 Jean-de-Dieu Soult (1769-1851) and Charles Pierre François Augereau (1757-1816).
15 Jean Lannes (1769-1809).
16 Karl Fyodorovich Baggovut (1761-1812).
17 Karpov, Archive of the General Staff, No. 1587.

the French: Military Order Cuirassiers, Malorussia Cuirassiers, Pskov Dragoons, Pavlograd Hussars, Sumy Hussars, Tauride Grenadiers, Dnieper Musketeers, Kostroma Musketeers, 21st Jägers and two Cossack regiments.[18]

During this retreat towards Pułtusk and Gołymin, many carts and more than 50 cannon were abandoned in the mud.

The 21st Jägers were in Count Pahlen's detachment,[19] where, in addition to them, there were eight squadrons of Sumy Hussars and Pirogov's horse artillery company. During the general offensive, this detachment had been on the extreme right flank between Zechenau and Sochocin; seeing that everyone was retreating, they headed for Pułtusk, but before reaching Łopacin, they were attacked by Murat's force,[20] hurrying from Warsaw with the *chasseurs à cheval de la Garde* towards Łopacin where they attacked us. A fierce battle took place, Count Pahlen's detachment turned away to the north along the right bank of the Sona river. With the arrival by this time of Wathier's brigade, *7e corps* and Klein's division,[21] the French began a general attack, which was supported from the other bank by Lasalle[22] throwing back our vanguard, which had already crossed the bridge.[23] The 21st Jägers held out for a long time, taking the full brunt of the attack. Lieutenant Colonel Lashkevich with the 2nd Battalion repelled the advancing enemy from the right flank; 1st Battalion, commanded by Captain Kulman, sent out the 3rd and 4th companies as a 'skirmishing screen' under Captain Feonas; they brought the French under fire, but due to the superiority of the enemy forces, they retreated in good order towards Zechenau.


The detachment had to halt constantly because of the poor road across marshy terrain. The artillery was bogging down in the mud and the jägers had to constantly pull them out; three guns were spiked and abandoned due to lack of time, while the horses were harnessed to other guns.[24] By this time, Bennigsen had managed to assemble about 45,000 men at Pułtusk, where Lannes was closing in on that same day, and all the other corps were on the march towards Gołymin. Napoleon suddenly stopped in Nasielsk, perplexed by our confusing retreat, in which the Russian regiments were wandering along various routes and came into view of the French now at one place, then at another.[25]

On 14 [26] December, due to illness, Kamensky left the army for Ostrolenka and then on to Grodno. Bennigsen's corps, having retreated to Pułtusk, contrary to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, began their wait for the enemy in the positions taken up the day before, in order, in accordance with the previously adopted intention, of allowing the regiments lagging behind the army to catch up and then, if necessary, to fall back as a united force. Following a fierce attack by Lannes' corps, our troops went on the offensive. Lannes persisted in a desperate defence that lasted for several hours in the darkness of a December evening, and seeing that it was impossible to hold out, he began to retreat at seven o'clock in the morning.

At the same time, Count Buxhöwden, fulfilling Field Marshal Kamensky's orders, which he had received from Maków, set out for Pułtusk. One division under Prince Golitsyn had moved forward to Ślubowo in order to monitor the enemy with patrols. During the night and in the morning of 13 [25] December, the above-mentioned regiments, separated from their divisions, began to approach

18 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 58.
19 Peter von der Pahlen (1777-1864).
20 Joachim Murat (1767-1815).
21 Pierre Wathier or Wattier (1770-1846), Dominique-Louis-Antoine Klein (1761-1845).
22 Antoine Charles Louis de Lasalle (1775-1809).
23 Oskar von Lettow-Vorbeck, III, 107.
24 Memoirs of General Ivan Eduard Löwenstern [English translation by Summerfield] 17-19; General Laptev's report No. 1083, dated 20 December 1806, Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, bundle 563, minute No. 5.
25 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 59.

Ślubowo: Dnieper Musketeers, Tauride Grenadiers, Malorussia Cuirassiers and two squadrons of Sumy Hussars, they had been marching towards Strzegocin.



Having learned that Strzegocin was already occupied by the French, Prince Golitsyn kept the named regiments with him. Having assembled all these units and finding himself in the midst of the French, the prince retreated to Gołymin with this mixed detachment, where he linked up with Dokhturov's[26] division on the morning of 14 [26] December. At the time of the actions described here, Augereau, Davout and Soult were on the march towards Gołymin, from where they were ordered by Napoleon to turn through Maków towards the right wing and rear of our army. Prince Golitsyn and Dokhturov took up positions forwards of Gołymin. The numerous enemy, on the advance, enveloped our force from all sides, our men stubbornly defended themselves, waiting only for evening to begin their retreat.[27]

Let us leave this detachment for a while and turn to the detachment under Count Pahlen, in which the 21st Jägers were serving. Pressed by the enemy, the above-mentioned detachment reached Zechenau, where they encountered the detachment under Major General Chaplits,[28] with the Pavlograd Hussars and Colonel Yermolov's[29] horse artillery company and, having united, they set off for Gołymin. At this time, the detachment of Prince Golitsyn and Dokhturov was defending itself in a fierce, bitter struggle,[30] which could have taken an unfavourable turn for the Russians, when at three o'clock the enemy appeared on the high ground to the right of the road along which Count Pahlen's detachment were proceeding. Having observed this envelopment by the French, Count Pahlen immediately deployed his detachment into battle formation in order to engage the enemy and, despite the fatigue caused by the regiment marching aimlessly along impassible roads for five days and having endured a powerful onslaught from the enemy corps the day before, all ranks of the 21st Jägers made every effort to drive the enemy away. The regimental commander's battalion, Colonel Kulikovsky's, was in the front line. The skirmishers had barely had time to run out when two French regiments attacked our detachment, but were repelled by the lethal fire of our jägers and the Sumy Hussars.

Whereupon four horse artillery pieces, under escort by our jägers and three squadrons of Sumy Hussars, quickly drove into position and engaged the enemy with canister fire on the left flank of our location.

The French had no success here and again rushed to the right flank, where they received another stubborn rebuff. After this failure, the French rolled out 16 guns and began to hammer our detachment. Their round shot fell right among the regiment's ranks.[31]

The unexpected arrival of Count Pahlen's force, which was immediately brought into action, gave our generals the means of holding their ground during the remainder of the short December day.

At this point, the head of Soult's corps appeared, Napoleon arrived at the scene of battle and ordered the Russians to be relentlessly pressed back. The French followed our men into Gołymin, where they fought with the Russians in the dark, fighting with bayonets and musket butts,[32] after which our force began to retreat and Gołymin went up in flames. The line of retreat lay through Czechow and was possible only along one road, which ran along a narrow and muddy causeway. Count Pahlen's detachment held out until six o'clock in the evening and began to retreat under the cover of the 21st Jägers and Sumy Hussars. The jägers, under the command of the valiant Colonel Kulikovsky, fought with all their might, holding back the pressure of the oncoming enemy and allowing the detachment to pass along the difficult defile.[32]

26 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 71.
27 Dmitry Sergeevich Dokhturov (1759-1816).
28 Yefim Ignatievich Chaplits (1768-1825).
29 Alexei Petrovich Yermolov (1777-1761).
30 Oskar von Lettow-Vorbeck, III, 106.
31 I.E. Löwenstern, and the regimental colonel-in-chief's report No. 1083.
32 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 72.
32 History of the Sumy Dragoon Regiment.

Thanks to the steadfastness and resourcefulness of the rearguard, the French had no success. The next day, Prince Golitsyn and Dokhturov joined Count Buxhöwden's corps in Maków, having lost about 1,000 men at Gołymin and having endured a bitter fight.

The regiment's losses were as follows: Captain Kanishchev and Ensign Yeremeev wounded, the latter in the right leg, while the noble *Junker* Mochulsky was sabred in the left arm; 40 lower ranks were killed and 20 men wounded; there were about 200 men who fell behind during this exhausting forced march and were reported missing, most of whom later rejoined the regiment; Sub-Lieutenant Gubin, who, being battalion adjutant, was bravely carrying out his duties delivering orders to the most remote and dangerous places, was wounded in the arm and, left alone, was taken prisoner, from where he returned to the regiment on 19 [31] July, 1808.[33] During these battles and marches, the men lost a lot of equipment, weapons and various support personnel, in addition, the regimental trains had fallen behind from the very first days, resulting in the regiment being unable to use it.

Awards issued for this battle were: the regimental colonel-in-chief, Major General Laptev, received a Golden Sword decorated with diamonds. The regimental commander Colonel Kulikovsky, a Golden Sword inscribed *за храбрость* [for valour], Captain Kanishchev and Staff-Captain Maslov the Order of St. Anna 3rd class, *Junker* Mochulsky was promoted to ensign. All officers of the 21st Jägers were nominated for Supreme Commendations by the Commander-in-Chief Bennigsen.[34]

The following lower ranks especially distinguished themselves: non-commissioned officers Radyakin, Fedor Vasiliev, *junkers* Romanov, Kotlubay, Vasilenko, Schopp and Savitsky, receiving the medal of distinction of the Military Order (see Appendix VI).[35]

The courageous, valiant and timely assistance provided by Count Pahlen's detachment to the defending force had very important results. By taking on the decisive blow directed by the French at Gołymin and retreating to Maków, Count Buxhöwden's corps was able to retreat and unite, thereby distracting Napoleon's attention, thanks to which Bennigsen's detachment had the opportunity to freely retreat at that time, that is at dawn on 15 [27] December, from Pułtusk towards Ostrolenka.

For the 21st Jägers, the fighting on 13 to 14 [25 to 26] December, where they and other units of Count Pahlen's detachment took a most lively and active part in the defence, which brought eloquent lines of heroic indestructible spirit to the pages of the history of the Russian army, had a particular significance.

In relation to the 21st Jägers especially, this battle was their first: here the regiment for the first time took an intimate and most active part in military operations and for the first time proved its combat capability: it left the field after all other units and thereby covered their retreat, thanks to which the detachment under Prince Golitsyn and Dokhturov safely reached the main body.

His Imperial Majesty, having duly appreciated all this, in Supreme Orders dated 21 January [2 February], 1807, deigned to declare his Supreme Commendations: 'to those who distinguished themselves on 13 [25] December at Łopacin, and on 14 [26] December at Gołymin, to all officers of the Sumy Hussar Regiment, the 21st Jäger Regiment and Major Pirogov's horse artillery company.' Therefore, for the men of the regiment, this day of their first military feat, the day of their baptism by fire, should be as unforgettable as the regiment's formation day on 29 August [10 September] 1805.

Bennigsen, moving through Rozan [Różan], Ostrolenka to Nowogród, crossed the Narew on 17 [29] December and burned the bridge, thereby completely isolating himself from Count Buxhöwden. He avoided linking up with him by every possible means until the question of who would be

33 Colonel-in-Chief, Major General Laptev's report, see Appendix VII.

34 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, bundle 563, No. 1, part 12, No. 5, award recommendations signed by General Bennigsen.

35 Archive of the Chapters of Orders, book 1, on the medal of distinction of the Military Order.

commander-in-chief had been decided. For example, on the march from Pułtusk to Ostrolenka, Bennigsen was 15 *versta* [ten miles] from Maków, but did not go there to Count Buxhöwden, despite the obvious need to agree with him on mutual operations. On 19 [31] December, both corps finally established communications.

L'Estocq's corps, pressed by the French at Bieżuń, retreated through Neidenburg [Nidzica] to Königsberg [Kaliningrad]. The King of Prussia was very concerned for the ancient capital of Königsberg, where large reserves of provisions had been stored and new units were being formed.

The French had suffered great hardships. Napoleon wrote that he encountered a fifth element in Poland - the mud. The enemy could only drag up a small number of light guns with great difficulty.

On 18 [30] December, the French called off their pursuit. Napoleon returned to Warsaw, placing his army in winter quarters from the Narew to the lower Vistula, hoping to resume military operations in the spring.

Marshal Ney,[36] who was shielding the quarters of the French army with his corps, advanced without permission to Guttstadt [Dobre Miasto]. At a council of war held on 19 [31] December in Nowogród, it was decided to transfer our entire army to the right bank of the Narew and march on Johannisburg [Pisz] in order to block the enemy's route to Russia. But since the bridge of boats in Nowogród had been broken by ice, the two corps only linked up on 28 December [9 January 1807] at Tykocin, where there was a strong bridge. Having rested here for three days and replenished our provisions, our army set off for Johannisburg on 30 December [11 January 1807]. On the march to this town, the Supreme decree was received appointing Bennigsen as commander-in-chief. Buxhöwden was appointed military governor of Riga.[37]

Taking command of the entire army united at Bialla [Biała Piska] and assuming that Napoleon would advance towards Königsberg, Bennigsen intended to prevent him from carrying out this plan; to that end, he decided to secretly cross onto the Mława to Königsberg road, establish liaison with the Danzig [Gdańsk] garrison and settle in quarters, wait for reinforcements to arrive from Russia and then reinforce the Danzig garrison with L'Estocq's entire corps. In executing his plan, he left Sedmoratsky's division in Gonionds [Goniądz] in order to guard the lines of communications, while he set off from Bialla himself, with the rest of the force on 4 [16] January, reaching Bischofstein [Bisztynek] on 9 [21] January and Heilsberg [Lidzbark Warmiński] on 11 [23] January.

As soon as Napoleon became convinced that the Russian army was advancing, he immediately made a plan to envelope Bennigsen's left wing, cut him off from Russia and push him into the Vistula. To that end, Ney and Augereau were to concentrate their corps between Mława and Neidenburg. Soult, Davout, Murat and the *Garde* were to assemble at Willenberg, Bernadotte[38] was ordered to go from Löbau [Lubawa] to Neidenburg to link up with Ney and Augereau. Allenstein [Olsztyn] was designated as the rendezvous point. On 15 [27] January, the French army began to move, and on 19 [31] January, Napoleon arrived in Willenberg.

Having received Napoleon's intercepted dispatches, Bennigsen ordered all corps to concentrate at an assembly area at Jonkowo [Jonkendorf];[39] on 22 January [3 February], they had taken up the following positions: the centre and right wing were adjacent to dense scrub, while the left was resting on Mondtken [Mątki], but at night Bennigsen, concerned that with the loss of the bridge he would be put in a difficult position, decided to abandon the position, especially since our supply

36 Michel Ney (1769-1815).

37 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 80.

38 Jean-Baptiste Jules Bernadotte (1763-1844).

39 On 14 [26] January, according to a new schedule drawn up by order of Bennigsen, the force was divided into four corps: L'Estocq's I Corps broken out of Graudenz; Tuchkov's II Corps at Osterode; Prince Golitsyn's III Corps at Allenstein; Sacken's IV Corps at Seeburg, having Prince Bagration's vanguard at Löbau, and Prince Dolgorukov's at Passenheim.

trains in the rear near Guttstadt had fallen into the hands of the French.[40]

Our army in three columns (Sacken's, Prince Golitsyn's and Tuchkov's)[41] retreated to Wolfsdorf [Wilczkowo] and Arnsdorf [Lubomino]. On 23 January [4 February], Napoleon, having learned of the retreat by the Russian army, intended to block Bennigsen's route to Russia. The retreat of the Russian army was extremely slow, deep snow and narrow roads made the movement of units extremely difficult. The enemy moved after our troops as they retreated to Arnsdorf, Open [Opin], Kaschaunen [Kaszuny], Frauendorf [Babiak] towards Landsberg [Górowo Iławeckie].

Napoleon assumed that Bennigsen would give battle at Landsberg, which is why he issued orders for combat, but Bennigsen abandoned the position on the night of 25 to 26 January [6 to 7 February] and headed for Preußisch Eylau [Bagrationovsk], intending to link up with L'Estocq and shield Königsberg. Having learned of the retreat of the Russian army, Napoleon gave orders for Ney to go to sever L'Estocq's route to the Russian army, Davout was to envelope our left wing. Napoleon kept all the other corps together, with the exception of Bernadotte, who had been ordered to hurry to join the army. Our rearguard, commanded by Prince Bagration,[42] was to hold the French back until all the heavy baggage and units had passed Preußisch Eylau.

On 26 January [7 February] at eight o'clock in the morning Murat approached Prince Bagration's position behind Landsberg. Bagration retreated and took up a second position at Grünhöfchen [Grądzik]. French units advanced towards Preußisch Eylau and quickly occupied it, where fierce fighting flared up; at about five o'clock 4th Division arrived and reinforced our troops, whereupon close-quarter combat began again with renewed vigour.

The night of 26 to 27 January [7 to 8 February] was spent preparing for the battle. The Russian army was located between Schloditten [Zagorodnoe] and Sausgarten [Bolshoe Ozernoe], shielding the routes towards Russia and Königsberg. Serpallen [Kashtanovka] was held by the detachments under Baggovut and Barclay de Tolly,[43] four divisions, starting from the right, 5th, 8th, 3rd (Sacken's)[44] and 2nd were formed up in two waves, 11 regiments were stationed in line in the first, in the second were 10 regiments in battalion columns. Powerful batteries were stationed forwards of the front line, the cavalry were stationed on the flanks and behind the centre.

The right wing was commanded by Tuchkov, the centre by Sacken and the left by Count Osterman-Tolstoy.

Convinced of Bennigsen's intention to give battle, Napoleon ordered Soult to form the left wing, to the left of the Königsberg road, Augereau in the centre, resting his left flank on Soult. Murat commanded the cavalry, standing behind Eylau, where the *Garde* was stationed under Napoleon's personal command.

The French had barely begun to form up when 60 Russian guns on the right wing opened fire. Soult responded with a cannonade from 92 guns. Our left wing was shielded by high ground. Our troops pushed part of Soult's force back; at this point (10 o'clock in the morning) a snowstorm began. The French units lost their direction and when it cleared, Augereau's corps found itself very close to our batteries. The French suffered huge losses as they were engaged with canister. The 21st Jägers and other jäger regiments in the skirmish line, supported by the reserves, rushed in with the bayonet. A close-quarter struggle ensued. Augereau's corps was completely disordered. Napoleon hastened to rescue the disorganised force. Murat advanced to engage the Russian cavalry pursuing the retreating troops with the reserve cavalry, but the French were turned back. A cavalry division came to


40 Karpov *Действие русских войск 1806-1807* [operations by the Russian Forces (1806-1807); Archive of the General Staff, No. 1587.

41 Nikolai Alexeevich Tuchkov 1st (1765-1812).

42 Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration (1765-1812).

43 Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly (1761-1818).

44 21st Jägers were in the front line with the other jägers, forming the skirmishing screen.



The Battle of Preußisch Eylau

Engraving by Bovinet, after a painting by Swebach. From the collection of P. Ya. Dashkov.

reinforce the French, but it was also completely defeated. Davout arrived on the battlefield at around midday, and having reinforced the enemy, forced our left flank to abandon the Auklappen manor [Maloe Ozernoe]. At this critical moment, as the formations on our left wing became disordered and were falling back, our horse artillery arrived, whose fire forced the evacuation of Auklappen.

This was the position of the combatants when L'Estocq arrived. Our commander-in-chief was preparing to attack the French with the right wing, for which purpose he ordered Count Osterman to prepare for an attack, while Laptev was to precede him with the 21st Jägers and other jäger regiments.

The Russian columns happily formed up and Laptev moved forwards, but soon, due to the onset of darkness, Bennigsen halted him and cancelled the decision to attack the French. Having freed himself from pursuit and pressure, Davout continued the cannonade,[45] which lasted until nine o'clock in the darkness of the evening by both sides.

All the surrounding villages were ablaze. The reflections of the fires flickered over the tired troops. Fires were lit and the wounded crawled to them in groups. But at around 10 o'clock in the evening, unexpectedly, shots were heard to the rear of our army and we learned of the approach of Ney's corps.

At the first shots from Ney's corps, someone cried out, "We're surrounded!"

"So what? We'll break out," said a soldier standing nearby. These words, spoken in time, had a calming effect on the Russians. The troops that were enveloping us were thrown back. This circumstance prompted the commander-in-chief to begin the retreat towards Königsberg after midnight.

Our losses in the Battle of Eylau amounted to 26,000 killed and wounded.



The Battlefield at Eylau


An old engraving, from the collection of P. Ya. Dashkov.

45 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 115.

Second Plan of the Battle of Preußisch Eylau

Evening of 27 January [8 February] 1807

№15.



It has not been possible to find out more detailed information on the participation of the regiment and its losses in this battle; but since the regiment was in the front line and repeatedly faced enemy attacks during the day, it is believed that the losses were quite significant.

The regimental commander, Colonel Kulikovsky, lieutenants Bukhovetsky, Misanvosky, ensigns Volkov, Varnin and Blonsky were wounded.

The following officers were decorated for this battle: colonel-in-chief Major General Laptev with the Order of St. Vladimir 3rd class, Colonel Kulikovksy with the Order of St. Anna 2nd class, Lieutenant Colonel Lashkevich with the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class on a bow,[46] in addition, the following officers were awarded specially made gold crosses to be worn in the buttonhole on a St. George ribbon:[47] captains Kulman and Anfimov, lieutenants Pekur and Kulikovsky, sub-lieutenants Domashnev and Baryshnikov and Ensign Buschen.

The lower ranks who took part in the battle received silver medals on a St. George ribbon with the inscription: *Победа при Прейсишъ-Эйлау - 27 января 1807 г.* [Victory at Preußisch-Eylau - 27 January 1807].

The Commander-in-Chief reported on the Battle of Preußisch-Eylau to the Tsar: 'I have made it my absolute duty to say in conclusion that on this eternally famous day, Your Imperial Majesty's army crowned itself with unfading glory and showed the world how a people truly devoted to the Tsar and the Fatherland can perform. The enemy, despite all their desperate attacks, inevitably met death everywhere. The battlefield was strewn with their corpses. The French commander, despising the danger, vainly strove in every way to encourage his troops: nothing could resist the courage of the Russians.'[48]

The retreat of the Russian army to Königsberg was carried out calmly, in two columns, since the French were unable to follow us. Our troops were covered in bivouac smoke, icy frost, with their shakos and greatcoats riddled with bullet holes.

Napoleon, having paused for nine days on the battlefield, retreated beyond the Passarge [Pasłęka] on 5 [17] February and dispersed his forces into quarters, leaving Ney's corps as a vanguard at Guttstadt.[49]

46 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, Library bundle No. 866, No. 1068, page 72.

47 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, Library catalogue 152, bundle 563, No.6.

48 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky.

49 Leer, *Обзор войн России от Петра Великого до наших дней* [Overview of the Wars of Russia from Peter the Great to the Present Day], Volume I.

CHAPTER 3.

The Spring Campaign Of 1807.

Army provisioning. - 21st Jägers in Prince Bagration's vanguard. - Sickness in the regiment. - The move to relieve Danzig. - The fighting at Danzig. - The regiment's move to Königsberg and onwards to Heilsberg. - The Battle of Heilsberg. - The march to Königsberg. - The fighting at Königsberg. - The retreat of the army to Tilsit. - The end of the campaign. - The Tsar's honours.

On 29 January [10 February], Bennigsen entered Königsberg, filled with wounded, wagon trains, and men separated from their regiments. The army was positioned forwards of the city in a hastily fortified position. The halt at Königsberg was beneficial for the Russian army. The Prussian local authorities provided: carpenters, locksmiths, tailors, cobblers. Upon entering Prussia, on the basis of the treaty concluded with Russia, the King was obliged to issue provisions and forage to the Russian troops against receipts, each soldier receiving daily from the landlord with whom he was quartered: 2½ *funt* [2¼ pounds] of flour, ½ *funt* [7¼ ounces] of meat, boiled into a soup with potatoes or some greens, a mug of beer or a glass of wine, and, in addition, the landlord was obliged to provide straw for bedding for men and horses. Despite the agreement with the Prussian government, the regiments constantly complained of a lack of provisions and forage and had great difficulty obtaining them at a high price.

One consequence of this receipt system was that the Russian Government paid three times more for food. Many *proviantmeister* and other officials assigned to collect provisions and forage gave fictitious receipts to the *Richter* and elders in the villages, for example: 'someone was there, someone collected, someone issued a receipt.'[1]

The regiment's men got themselves into order as best they could, provisions and ammunition were replenished, the sick and wounded were admitted to hospitals in Königsberg, and some were sent to Grodno.

The regiments were very weak after the losses they had suffered. The 21st Jäger Regiment had about 350 men with the Colours.

Having confirmed Napoleon's retreat, Bennigsen waited for several days at Königsberg, after which, on 7 [19] February, he followed him.

The vanguard under Prince Bagration's command, which included the 21st Jägers,[2] moved ahead; on the second stage at Landsberg, a sudden thaw halted Bennigsen for a week in completely devastated country.

Eylau, Landsberg and the surrounding villages had been plundered by the French during their nine-day stay in Eylau. Napoleon had ordered the burial of his fallen soldiers, but the frozen ground and snow made it difficult to carry out this order.

The peasants who were later sent from Königsberg to bury the corpses by Bennigsen also encountered this obstacle. Several weeks passed before the dead were removed from the surface of the earth. Even our generals were forced to bivouac, unable to spend the night in houses; sometimes upon finding an intact room, they discovered rotting corpses inside.[3]

As Prince Bagration's vanguard advanced, it was constantly harassed, in particular by the leading units from Ney's corps on 3 [15] February at the village of Mahnsfeld [Polevoe], while on 14 [26]

1 History of the Lifeguard Jäger Regiment and Levshin's home memoirs, 1876, p. 64.
2 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, Monthly returns.
3 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, p. 127.

February the French disturbed us at the village of Peterswalde [Piotraszewo, 6½ miles north of Guttstadt], where the 21st Jägers were holding the forward outposts; during this night attack, the regiment's companies were subjected to strong pressure from the French, but thanks to the reserve (third battalion) that arrived in time, the enemy were forced to retreat towards Allenstein. During this action, seven privates were killed on our side, and the following were wounded: Lieutenant Tishchenko, Ensign Derevyanko, one non-commissioned officer and six privates.[4]



The King of Prussia inspects the forward outposts of Prince Bagration's vanguard at Peterswalde.

From a drawing by St. Priest, from the collection of P.Ya. Dashkov.

On 17 February [1 March], once the frost had hardened the ground, Bennigsen marched from Landsberg to Launau [Łaniewo] and occupied Bartenstein [Bartoszyce] as his headquarters on 20 February [4 March], placing the army around Heilsberg in cantonment quarters, where they remained inactive until May. The vanguard, which included 21st Jägers, was located near Launau, where all the detachments from Prince Bagration's vanguard concentrated.[5] Ney was stationed at Guttstadt by this time, making frequent forays on the forward units of the vanguard, pushing them back, but with the arrival of reinforcements, our troops forced the French to retreat in turn towards Allenstein.

Foreseeing the importance of Guttstadt, Napoleon ordered Ney to recapture the town. Ney set out from Allenstein. At Altkirch [Praslity, 3½ miles north-west of Guttstadt] he encountered Prince Shcherbatov's[6] detachment on 20 to 21 February [4 to 5 March]; this detachment, yielding to the enemy's superiority, retreated into the Schmolainen forest [Smolajny, three miles north of Guttstadt], where the Russians again counter-attacked and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. At the same time, the 21st Jägers, having faced up to the enemy onslaught, slowly retreated towards Launau, where by that time Sacken's 3rd Division had arrived. This gave our force the opportunity

4 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, Monthly returns.
5 Military College Archive, No. 1590.
6 Alexei Grigorievich Shcherbatov (1776-1848).

to go on the offensive and push the French back. However, Ney managed to achieve his mission by holding on to Guttstadt. In this action, the regiment's losses were as follows: Ensign Domashnev, Lieutenant Rogovtsev and five privates killed; Major Samen, Captain Yelistratov, Staff-Captain Gavronsky, Sub-Lieutenant Grigoriev, ensigns Zbursky and Kostselkovsky, five non-commissioned officers and 24 privates wounded, all the wounded were sent, either to Bartenstein, or to Grodno.[7]



Prince Bagration.

After these actions the force was in complete idleness, due to the extreme exhaustion of the men; the lack of provisions here reached the final extreme; our regiment, which was in the vanguard and located in a more desolated area, suffered extreme shortages, which reached the point that the soldiers became bloated, fell ill and many died of hunger. The reason for such shortcomings was also the impossibility of assembling the required number of carts to deliver supplies from Königsberg, even though Königsberg to Heilsberg was no more than 70 *versta* [47 miles].[8]

The regiment's numbers were reduced to a minimum; it consisted of about 227 more or less healthy lower ranks (see Appendix V), in addition, 10 draught horses died due to a lack of forage.

Meanwhile, April was drawing to a close. The main army was inactive, but during this time the army's manpower was strengthened slightly. This included 186 men from the Riga Garrison and the Yelisavetgrad Hussar Regiment who arrived to reinforce our regiment.[9]

7 Moscow Archive, Monthly returns.
8 Zatler's papers, p. 63.
9 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, Monthly returns.

Emperor Alexander had arrived in Memel [Klaipėda] on 24 March [5 April]; with the arrival of the Emperor, Prussia and Russia began negotiations with Austria, Britain and Sweden, inviting them to take an active part in the struggle against Napoleon.

While awaiting their responses, it was decided to free Danzig from the French siege, where a stubborn struggle was going on at that time; to that end, Bennigsen first sent a detachment of three garrison battalions and three Cossack regiments under the command of Prince Shcherbatov through Pillau [Baltiysk] along the Frische Nehrung spit [Mierzeja Wiślana], while on 15 [27] April, Emperor Alexander ordered Count Kamensky 2nd[10] to go to Pillau with another detachment, cross the straits and hurry along the same Frische Nehrung to Danzig. It was extremely important for the Coalition to prevent the French from taking Danzig, since with the fall of this fortress Napoleon could add some 40,000 men to the army and thus gain a large numerical superiority over the Coalition. The French had begun to bombard Danzig on 13 [25] April. Lefebvre[11] had transported some of his force to the right bank of the Vistula and constructed new fortifications there. Wanting to completely isolate Danzig from the sea, he attacked the island of Holm [Ostrów] and, taking advantage of the negligence of the detachment stationed there, defeated them, taking possession of the island and establishing themselves on it. The position of the Danzig garrison was becoming more and more difficult.[12]

The following regiments were assigned to Count Kamensky's detachment: Navaginsk Musketeers, Arkhangelogorod Musketeers, Tobolsk Musketeers, Polotsk Musketeers and Mogilev Musketeers, 21st Jägers, one Cossack regiment and a company of pioneers, a total of eight battalions - 5,300 men. On the day of departure, 21st Jägers included:

	Enlisted	Present
Field officers	4	2
Subalterns	53	28
Non-commissioned officers	85	28
Musicians	22	16
Privates	921	306
Recruits	188	106
Total:	**1,273**	**486**


This large shortfall of available personnel (787 men) was explained, as stated above, by mass illness due to the exhaustion of the troops, desertion and missing persons, who subsequently rejoined the regiment from time to time. The sick and wounded had been admitted to various hospitals in Königsberg, Rossieny [Raseiniai, 19 miles north-east of Jurburg] (where our junior doctor Egerts was the resident doctor), Grodno, Heilsberg and Bartenstein.[13]

The regiments assigned to Count Kamensky's detachment were in various locations, even at the outposts themselves, the 21st Jägers were with the vanguard behind Launau, from where they proceeded to the assembly area at Königsberg, which the regiments reached by the evening of 17 [29] April, and the next day all the assembled Russian and Prussian troops passed through Königsberg. Their Majesties the King and Queen honoured the parade with their presence, after which all the generals, field officers and subalterns were invited to the common table.

10 Nikolai Mikhailovich Kamensky (1777-1811).
11 François Joseph Lefebvre (1755-1820).
12 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, p. 147-148.
13 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, Monthly returns.

Plan of Operations at Danzig

In May 1807



In Königsberg, the 21st Jägers were very comfortably accommodated, as were other regiments of the Russian army, in quarters in the city itself that had been vacated by the owners by order of the King, while the Prussian units were located outside the city.

On 19 April [1 May], this entire assembled force set out on a two-stage march to Pillau, where they arrived by nightfall on 20 April [2 May], settling partly in the city and partly in the surrounding villages.

But the detachment did not move on immediately; the delay to their arrival in Danzig occurred as a result of Bennigsen's orders, who, having cancelled the initial direction of the detachment along the Frische Nehrung, ordered Count Kamensky to board ships and go to the mouth of the Vistula by sea, and it was not until the evening of 28 April [10 May] that the last units had boarded ship, which were taken out of the harbour to the roads. The ships on which the troops were transported were the following: the Swedish 74-gun ship-of-the-line *Adolf Fredrik*, the British frigate [*sic*, sloop] *Falcon* with 22 guns, two small British 10-gun cutters and five merchant vessels under various flags. The detachment consisted of 6,621 men with 14 light guns.[14]

Despite the contrary winds, the ships began to approach Neufahrwasser [Nowy Port] from 29 to 30 April [11 to 12 May]. By this time Lannes and Oudinot,[15] sent by Napoleon as reinforcements, had reached Langfuhr [Wrzeszcz] and Schellmühl [Młyniska]. Therefore, Count Kamensky ordered an attack on the right bank of the Vistula and an attempt to take control of the island of Holm. The disposition had already been drafted, but the Swedish ship-of-the-line, on which 1,200 men were embarked, could not approach the shore closer than one *Meile* [4⅔ miles], even then, although small ships, the British cutters and frigate had been sent to it on the morning of 1 [13] May, the troops were not landed before 2 [14] May around midday, which is why, although the entire detachment had already stood-to-arms, due to the non-arrival of these units, the attack was postponed until the following day, meanwhile the commandant of the fortress, General Kalckreuth,[16] reported by telegraph that the enemy in Oliva [Oliwa, six miles west of Neufahrwasser] and Langfuhr had become very strong.[17]

The attack by the landing force was to be supported by a sortie of 3,000 men from the fortress garrison and a feint attack on the left bank of the Vistula by 600 men from Festung Weichselmünde [Twierdza Wisłoujście]. In addition, the British promised to sail one frigate into the Vistula with the intention of cutting off communications between the island of Holm and the left bank of the Vistula.

Count Kamensky, having transferred his force to the right bank, deployed them in four columns: the first column under General Arseniev,[18] consisting of the Navaginsk Musketeers, two battalions of the Tobolsk Musketeers, 200 Cossacks, a Prussian infantry battalion and a squadron of dragoons, was to go along the coastline, protecting our left wing from being outflanked and, if necessary, supporting the second column, assigned to attack the fortified forest; the second column under the command of the colonel-in-chief of the 21st Jägers, General Laptev, consisting of the 21st Jägers, one battalion of the Tobolsk Musketeers and a mixed battalion of skirmishers. In the third column were the Mogilev Musketeers, Polotsk Musketeers, 200 Cossacks and four guns, in the fourth column, which remained in reserve, were the Arkhangelogorod Musketeers, the Prussian battalions and a *Sotnia* [squadron] of Cossacks.

General Laptev moved forward with his column, deploying it in the following order: the right flank

14 Count Kamensky's War Diary.
15 Nicolas Charles Marie Oudinot (1767-1847).
16 Friedrich Adolf von Kalckreuth (1737-1818).
17 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, bundle 563, No. 17, Count Kamensky's report to Bennigsen, dated 11 [23] May 1807.
18 Nikolai Mikhailovich Arseniev (1764-1830).

consisted of skirmishers commanded by Staff-Captain Count De Balmain[19] of the Lifeguard, on the left flank were the 21st Jägers commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Lashkevich, the Prussian skirmishers were proceeding as the vanguard, a battalion of Tobolsk Musketeers were in reserve commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Demyanov. As soon as this column emerged, fire was opened on them from numerous enemy batteries, yet the speed with which they dashed into the forest prevented the enemy fire from doing them much harm; at the same time, fierce musket fire opened up from the forest, which did not hinder the bold jägers, fearlessly striving to break into the forest and encouraged by the example of their commanders, despite enemy numbers, drove the enemy out of their front line position and pursued them to the support line, where they were engaged by a new, stronger enemy column; during this advance, the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lashkevich, was wounded, whereupon Captain Kulman took command of the regiment.

Thereafter Major General Laptev ordered Lieutenant Colonel Demyanov to attack these support trenches and thereby reinforce our jägers and skirmishers, who then rushed forward with renewed vigour and drove the enemy out of the support trenches, but by this time the reinforced enemy began to put pressure on our troops, so Major General Laptev ordered them to pull back a little, and since all this happened in a very short time, the third column, which had been in reserve, received new orders from Count Kamensky, diverting from its previous direction to move closer to the forest, reinforcing the column under Major General Laptev. Both columns struck the French in the flank and captured two guns from the enemy; a bitter fight ensued. Count Kamensky brought two battalions from the first column into action.

The French also brought in fresh units. The battle continued with varying success. Finally, Count Kamensky, seeing himself deprived of the support of the garrison and the British frigate, held up by contrary winds, lost all hope of dislodging the superior enemy and retreated to Neufahrwasser. The French pursued weakly. This battle had lasted from half past three o'clock in the morning until ten o'clock. The troops had fought with extraordinary courage and fearlessness, overcoming all the obstacles of the forest, cut up by countless deep pits dug to extract amber, and numerous enemy fortifications and batteries. On our side, 13 officers and 432 lower ranks were killed, 41 officers and 916 lower ranks were wounded. In this heated action the losses to 21st Jägers were as follows: lieutenants Sakharny and Filimonov, seven non-commissioned officers, two musicians and 62 privates killed; Lieutenant Blonsky and Captain Feonas taken prisoner. The following awards were made: regimental colonel-in-chief, Major General Laptev received the Order of St. Anne 1st class, Lieutenant Colonel Lashkevich received a Golden Sword inscribed *за храбрость*, Captain Kulman received the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class, Sub-Lieutenant Buschen received the Order of St. Anne 3rd class.[20] In addition, the King of Prussia awarded Major General Laptev the *Rote Adlerorden* [Order of the Red Eagle] and Lieutenant Colonel Lashkevich the Order *pour le Mérite*.[21]

At the end of the battle, by order of Count Kamensky, all the wounded were transported to Neufahrwasser (near the mouth of the Vistula), and since we had a great shortage of doctors, the British sent their own for operations and wound dressing. In order that the corps would not be left without provisions, Count Kamensky gave orders to issue all the bread that had been prepared in advance to the troops, but since most of it had spoiled, flour prepared in Neufahrwasser was issued instead of what was missing. Moreover, demands were sent to Pillau for new bread and flour.

Thus the attempt to relieve Danzig was unsuccessful and Danzig surrendered in a capitulation that was concluded by Kalckreuth and according to which the French were to enter this city on 15 [27] May. This circumstance forced Count Kamensky, on the eve of that day, an hour after dawn, to load all the troops on board and proceed to Pillau, and from there to Königsberg to link up with

19 Karl Antonovich De Balmain (1786-1812).

20 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, bundle 563, No. 17, Major General Kamensky's report to Bennigsen, dated 11 [23] May 1807.

21 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, No. 355, Bennigsen's report No. 229.

L'Estocq's corps. The relief of Danzig could not be accomplished (according to Kamensky) due to the weakness of the resources committed. The skill and courage shown by the troops during this expedition won the deserved approval and praise of Their Majesties the Emperor and the King of Prussia, and Bennigsen. The ships left the harbour at dawn on 15 [27] May and arrived at the Pillau roads. The winds were contrary for entering the harbour and forced the ships to tack into the roads, and thanks to this only a small number of them managed to reach the piers, while the rest dropped anchor as close as possible to the straits, and were subsequently brought in by tow, after which the troops immediately began to disembark, while His Majesty the King was present on the shore. On 18 [30] May, the detachment set off for Medenau [Logvino, 12 miles north-west of Königsberg] and on 19 [31] May, they entered Königsberg in a ceremonial parade in the presence of the King and Queen, after which all the generals, regimental and battalion commanders were invited to a banquet.

On 20 May [1 June], following the route-card sent by General L'Estocq, Count Kamensky's force travelled in two stages from Königsberg to Hanswalde [Jachowo, 34 miles south-west of Königsberg] (with 21st Jägers taking a rest day in Schönwald), and having overcome all the obstacles that the enemy put in front of them, proceeded by skilful moves to Zinten [Kornevo, 25 miles south of Königsberg], where they linked up with L'Estocq's force. Further on, proceeding ahead of L'Estocq's corps, Count Kamensky hastily headed towards our main army, located near Heilsberg, with his detachment. Kamensky had not asked L'Estocq for permission for this move towards the main army due to the following incident: a courier had been travelling from Bennigsen to L'Estocq, who was 30 *versta* [20 miles] from Count Kamensky. Having opened the courier's documents, Count Kamensky found orders from Bennigsen in them, informing L'Estocq of an impending battle, and ordered him to send at least some units to Guttstadt or Heilsberg for the anticipated fighting there. Having calculated that a lot of time would be lost before the courier reached L'Estocq, and he would be responsible for executing the order at such a point in the war when every minute was precious, Count Kamensky decided to march towards the army with his detachment and reported this to L'Estocq.[22]

On the way, on 28 May [9 June], he encountered a numerous enemy force, consisting of the corps under Soult, Ney and Bernadotte, which, after stubborn resistance, he escaped without any loss and proceeded towards Heilsberg.[23] At five o'clock in the morning on 29 May [10 June], having reached Reimerswalde [two miles south-west of Retsch], west of Heilsberg, he halted to give the troops a rest, since they had covered more than 10 *Meilen* [47 miles] in 32 hours. From this point the detachment arrived in Heilsberg, where our entire army was already awaiting the enemy, having settled early in the morning forwards of Heilsberg on both banks of the Alle [Łyna] in a position defended by redoubts. On the right bank stood the 3rd, 7th and 14th divisions, with the Guard in reserve, while the remaining formations of the army were on the left bank. Kamensky's detachment was stationed on the right flank and was shielding it, having arched its line back.

At this time the French army was advancing from Guttstadt along the left bank of the Alle; Murat was leading, followed by Soult and Lannes, with Ney and the *Garde* in reserve. Napoleon had wanted to attack the Russians frontally with this force, while the corps under Davout and Mortier[24] were to cut Bennigsen off from Königsberg, where our main stores were located. Count Kamensky's detachment formed up in two echelons, with 21st Jägers commanded by Captain Kulman positioned in the front line,[25] having sent the skirmishers forward under Captain Yelistratov's command. The Third Battalion commanded by Captain Dubrovin was detached to cover the central battery. This detachment had hardly taken up its positions when at 10 o'clock in the morning Murat attacked our vanguard with overwhelming force, while by this time Soult had

22 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky; Count Kamensky's War Diary, p. 28.
23 I. Smirnov, The Life and Military Works of Count Kamensky, Moscow, 1814, p. 29.
24 Adolphe Édouard Casimir Joseph Mortier (1768-1835).
25 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, bundle 563, No. 75, part I, p. 88.

reached the battlefield and began to pressure us, as a result of which our vanguard retreated. The French advanced rapidly.

At about five o'clock in the afternoon the valiant but reckless Murat led an attack on the strongest part of our position without carefully examining it. The 3rd and 14th divisions were transferred to left bank. At this point, Napoleon arrived on the battlefield with elements of Lannes' corps, who marched forwards. Gorchakov,[26] commanding in the centre, moved to counter him with five regiments and these checked the enemy advance for a while. However, the French bravely moved forwards and broke into the redoubts, where a great massacre took place. At this point, Count Kamensky, marched up bringing three regiments, including 21st Jägers, and struck the French left flank, forcing the enemy to retreat; at the same time, Captain Yelistratov, with the skirmishers, suffered two wounds, while Lieutenant Oldenburg was wounded in the right leg. At the same time, ensigns Kostselkovsky and Schopp, advancing ahead of the column, directed their musket fire very effectively, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, and captured one captain and 45 privates.[27]

The arrival of fresh French units forced us to retreat. The setbacks did not stop Napoleon and, although it was already getting dark, he reinforced his left wing with the rest of Lannes' newly arrived corps and attacked our right wing. Yet despite this, our troops, especially Count Kamensky's detachment, courageously checked Napoleon's advance, who was then forced to limit himself to a cannonade.

Night was falling, it was 10 o'clock in the evening, and the fighting seemed to be at an end, but Ney's corps had arrived, reinforcing the French army, and Napoleon renewed the attack, but every effort was useless. Napoleon ordered them to break contact and to retreat beyond the Spibach stream.

The Russian troops were driving and stabbing at the French. The bravest of our jägers crossed the stream, but Bennigsen ordered everyone to return to their positions. On our side, some 6,000 men had been killed or wounded. The French lost some 13,000 men killed or wounded and some 864 men taken prisoner.[28]

The losses in the 21st Jägers were very significant, since they had to stand and endure a number of attacks from a strong enemy; they were given as follows: four non-commissioned officers and 239 privates killed; the colonel-in-chief of the regiment, Major General Laptev, Captain Yelistratov, lieutenants Simashko and Oldenburg, Sub-Lieutenant Baryshnikov, three non-commissioned officers and 72 privates wounded,[29] only one third of the regiment remained with the Colours. Following this battle, captains Kulman, Dubrovin, Yelistratov; lieutenants Simashko, Oldenburg and Sub-Lieutenant Kostselkovsky received Supreme Commendations, Sub-Lieutenant Baryshnikov was awarded the Order of St. Anne 3rd class, while Sub-Lieutenant Schopp was promoted.[30]

During the rainy night after the Battle of Heilsberg, the *Garde* and Ney's remaining divisions reached Napoleon. At six o'clock in the morning of 30 May [11 June], the Russian army stood to arms. The fog prevented seeing what was happening in the enemy force. Noticing that the French had moved towards Retsch, Bennigsen strengthened his right wing on 30 May [11 June]. At 10 o'clock, having confirmed the movement of the French towards Landsberg, Bennigsen ordered Count Kamensky, having crossed the Alle river in Heilsberg with his detachment, to proceed towards Bartenstein, where he was to recross the same river, to march on Mühlhausen [Gvardeiskoe, seven miles north of Eylau] in order to link up with General L'Estocq and shield

26 Andrei Ivanovich Gorchakov (1779-1855).
27 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, bundle 563, No. 75, part I, p. 88.
28 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, p. 166.
29 Major General Count Kamensky's War Diary, 2nd edition, 1809, St. Petersburg.
30 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, bundle 563, No. 75, part I, p. 88.

Königsberg, together with his corps, whereupon Count Kamensky set off at 11 o'clock in the evening; after resting for two hours, at five o'clock in the morning on 31 May [12 June] the corps moved from Bartenstein along the direct road to Mühlhausen, arriving at Neuken (south of Mühlhausen), receiving intelligence that a strong enemy column, having occupied Preußisch-Eylau, was advancing on Mühlhausen, therefore, wishing to link up with L'Estocq, Count Kamensky's detachment made a right turn and went through Palpasch, Galitten [Pesochnoe, four miles west of Domnau], Schuwehnen, Abschwangen [Tishino, six miles north-west of Domnau], to Uderwangen [Chekhovo, 9½ miles north-west of Domnau], where they arrived at nine o'clock in the evening, without fear of being isolated from L'Estocq and settled in quarters in this village. The force had thus got around the entire left flank of the French army, having covered eight *Mielen* [37 miles] in 22 hours, despite every effort to isolate General L'Estocq by the strong French corps, marching towards Königsberg; and the force suffered no losses.[31]

At dawn on 1 [13] June, the detachment set off for Borchersdorf [Zelenopole, 12 miles south-east of Königsberg], and having taken up positions, linked up with L'Estocq.

The next day [14 June, new style], Murat's leading units appeared and an artillery exchange ensued. An attack on the position at Königsberg did not take place, however, because Murat received orders to hurry to rejoin Napoleon.

By this time, Bennigsen's army had retreated from Heilsberg to Friedland, where on 2 [14] June the famous Battle of Friedland took place, after which Bennigsen and the Russian army would retreat to the Neman. Soult, remaining near Königsberg and being unable to attack the Coalition corps with his own force, invited the Coalition to surrender Königsberg on the most favourable terms, but was refused. Later on 2 [14] June, on the orders of General L'Estocq, the entire corps retreated to Neufahrwerk, where a new position was taken, but orders soon came for it to be abandoned, to proceed to Königsberg and to occupy both the main rampart and the forward earthworks there. Our force entered the city through the Friedländer Tor without being pursued by the enemy and took up positions between the Friedländer Tor and Brandenburger Tor [south of the Pregel river]. The 21st Jägers, reorganised into a single battalion, occupied the mills near the Friedländer Tor, but since these mills, being close to the fortifications, would be very disadvantageous to us should the enemy capture them, the regiment was ordered to burn them without delay as soon as French troops approached.

Following our occupation of the position, dense, strong enemy columns emerged, therefore the men assigned by the regiment executed their orders and set fire to these mills, but, having no chance of holding out near them for long, the regiment was forced to retreat into the city without completing its mission. Having captured the palisades closest to the fortification, which had not yet burned down, enemy skirmishers poured intensive fire into the position held by the 21st Jägers, their firepower causing considerable losses to the men holding the forward earthworks.

Our artillery immediately opened fire both from the upper rampart and from the forward trenches, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, who did not dare to attack again, but limited themselves to skirmishing alone until nightfall.[32]

On 2 [15] June, having retreated from Friedland after losing the battle, Bennigsen ordered Count Kamensky to leave Königsberg and hurry to rejoin the main army, which was done. Count Kamensky's detachment, leaving the city at three o'clock in the afternoon, proceeded through Labiau [Polessk] towards Tilsit [Sovetsk].

The 21st Jägers, having suffered heavy losses at Heilsberg, were replenished by reinforcements sent

31 Major General Count Kamensky's War Diary; I. Smirnov, The Life and Military Works of Count Kamensky, Moscow, 1814, p. 29.

32 Count Kamensky's War Diary, p. 116-117.

for a total of 84 recruits and about 100 men rejoining from the Bartenstein and Königsberg hospitals, but in defending Königsberg, they had lost many of their comrades, where the regiment's losses were given as: one non-commissioned officer and 36 privates killed; 44 privates wounded, some of whom had to be left behind in Königsberg.



The Meeting of Emperors Alexander and Napoleon, and King Friedrich at Tilsit on 13 [25] June 1807.

From an engraving by Deling. From the collection of P. Ya. Dashkov.

General L'Estocq and Count Kamensky, in executing their orders with their detachments, through the speed of their marches, eluded Murat and Davout sent by Napoleon to cut across their route, and on 5 [17] June they linked up with Bennigsen in Schillupischken [10 miles south of Tilsit].

Having learned of the departure of Coalition forces from Königsberg, Soult occupied this city, where he captured huge amounts of booty.

The campaign had ended with an unsuccessful day at the Battle of Friedland. The army moved

sadly towards Tilsit. At Schillupischken, Bennigsen assembled the Coalition army and wanted to give battle, but the lack of provisions and other factors forced the Commander-in-Chief to abandon this idea.

On 6 [18] June, our army crossed the Neman and took up positions between Pogegen [Pagėgiai] and Mikieten [Mikytai].

On 12 [24] June, the armistice was ratified in Tilsit and the following day Napoleon met with Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, as a result of which peace was concluded.

With the announcement of the end of the war and the Peace of Tilsit, which was concluded on 27 June [9 July], Emperor Alexander expressed his commendations to the State and the army. Among other things, he stated: 'Wherever the voice of honour called upon the troops, all the dangers of battle faded before them. Their famous deeds will remain unforgettable in the annals of national glory, and the grateful Fatherland shall always remember them as an example to posterity.'[33]



Troop manoeuvres in the presence of two Emperors at Tilsit on 16 [28] June 1807.

Engraving by Bovinet, from a painting by Swebach from the collection of P. Ya. Dashkov.

Thus ended the campaign of 1806 to1807, which laid a solid fighting foundation for the 21st Jäger Regiment. Their combat qualities were tested here. And they succeeded in proving that the spirit of the army was alive and would grow stronger: they emerged victorious, they sacrificed many on the field, but their sacrifice was atoned by the glory and honour with which they surrounded themselves.

In addition to the awards listed above, 58 Military Order medals were awarded to lower ranks for

33 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, p. 203.


distinction in this campaign (see Appendix VI).

Looking through the regiment's accounts for the entire campaign, one can see that regimental manpower was much reduced, for example, from January until 1 [13] June, there were about 300 privates, 30 non-commissioned officers and about 25 officers on average, and the companies consisted of 21 to 25 men. The highest number of sick and wounded occurred in June, when there were 795 lower ranks and 18 officers in hospital; subsequently, many of these turned out to be permanently disabled.[34]

The Emperor, who had witnessed the privations and exploits of his army, showered it with favour and ordered that each widow of a general, field officer or subaltern killed or died of wounds should receive a pension equal to their husband's full salary. The pensions were transferable to their children, upon the death of the widow.

Those discharged from active service due to serious wounds received in battle were given their full salary as a lifetime pension and travel allowances to resettle in their chosen locations.

Lower ranks who were unable to continue serving due to their wounds were placed in homes for invalids. Those of the discharged lower ranks who did not want to go to invalid homes were awarded a full-pay pension and were transported at government expense to a place of residence of their choice.[35]



Memorial to the Russian Fallen in the Fighting at Fortress Danzig.

1734, 1807, 1813.

34 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, Monthly returns.

35 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 203-204.

CHAPTER 4.

The war against Sweden in 1808 and life in the regiment from 1807-1812.

Reconstitution of the regiment. - Training. - Firearms. - Regimental administration. - Causes of the war with Sweden. - Defence of the Baltic coast. - Sad events in the regiment. - Appointment of a new colonel-in-chief. - End of the war. - Reorganisation in the army. - Quartering of the 21st Jäger Regiment.

At the end of the campaign, on 2 [14] July 1807, the 21st Jägers set off from Kartsevichi and Pogeldinen under the regimental commander, Major Lashkevich, as part of the corps under Lieutenant General Tuchkov.

By 29 July [10 August], they had already reached Disna and included: two field officers, 27 subalterns, 43 non-commissioned officers, 13 musicians, 470 privates and 236 recruits, for a total of 791 men.

However, by the end of September the regiment had moved to winter quarters in Tuckum [Tukums], where they were placed in quarters, some in the town and others in villages.

This time in the regiment was marked by a particularly attentive attitude towards training newly arrived recruits in all the rules of the military regulations of that time.

As an illustration of the state of military affairs at that time, it would not be without interest to cite, among other things, a description of weapon handling; at that time, cleaning of the gun, both inside and out, was done with abrasives, and the coarsest sand was often used. In order to polish the barrels ‘like a mirror’ they would be braced against the edge of a wooden table, which often caused the barrels to bend in one direction or another.

Loosening bolts, disassembling locks, and removing various metal parts was done with the help of spikes, bayonets, and generally the first convenient metal object that came to hand. The lock retaining bolts ‘when spring pressure needed to be adjusted’ would be knocked out ‘with blows from a hammer or some other object’; the bolts were not properly replaced, ‘thick bolts were forced into the holes for thinner bolts, while thin ones barely held in place of the thicker ones.’

All the stocks were poorly routed out where parts were in-set, which made it necessary to pack filler into the stock, which had a detrimental effect on their integral strength. The stocks were also sometimes glued together, while the butts were glued to the rest of the parts. The insertion of the lock retaining bolts in place was often done so carelessly and ineptly that the priming pan did not align with the touch-hole, rendering the musket incapable of firing. Soldiers would loosen nuts and bolts in order to make the musket rattle when performing drill movements.

Such a state of affairs inevitably had a very detrimental effect on the quality of the musket and marksmanship. In view of this, in 1809, ‘Brief Instructions on the Soldiers’ Musket’ were published, compiled under Supreme Command. These instructions included the naming of component parts of the musket, the rules for cleaning, assembly, disassembly and repair, techniques for making cartridges, casting bullets and some rules for marksmanship. In the section on cleaning the musket it states: ‘Cleaning the musket is a matter of particular importance in itself, but it is no less vital to know how to clean the musket in the most appropriate way, because if one does not know how to handle a musket when cleaning it, one can easily ruin it. The main objective when cleaning a musket is to prevent it from rusting or to clean off the rust that is already there.’

Emery was permitted for cleaning rust from a musket, and if this was not available, burned-brick dust and any other sandstone and ash; they were able to use brick dust to rub down non-steel parts.

To protect iron parts from rust, a specific lubricant made from a mixture of lard, camphor and

charcoal or pencil-lead was recommended.



Jäger Subalterns 1809-1811.

The preparation of cartridges, as well as their placement in chests, was carried out by the regiments themselves, and since the closing of the cartridges did not present a neatly manufactured appearance, then for better aesthetics, the cartridges were placed with the bullets facing up, which, of course, resulted in the gunpowder being compressed into clumps, and this in turn had a

detrimental effect on ballistics. The flints also presented a lot of trouble: particular skill was needed to position them, which determined their service life; a good flint lasted for 40 to 50 shots.

The 'Brief Instructions' give the following original and characteristic data concerning the ballistic properties of musketry stating:

> 'The maximum range of a shot from an horizontal infantry musket of the current model is about 120 *sazhen* [280 yards], and when the musket is elevated to 43½ degrees, which is the angle for maximum range; the bullet impacts at 500 *sazhen* [1,167 yards]. However, beyond 120 *sazhen*, shots are no longer accurate at all, and the most accurate and lethal shots are made at 70 *sazhen* [163 yards], therefore, an exchange of fire, beyond 120 *sazhen*, is merely a waste of cartridges, which, moreover, by accustoming the enemy not to fear and not to respect our musketry, gives them a clear advantage. For training in target shooting, six live cartridges per year have been allocated for each man.'[1]

This was the situation in the most important fighting units in the army. As for regimental administration, in this regard it is necessary to state the dominance of the so-called 'commercial rights' of the powers that be.

The fact is that the commanders of individual units received all state allowances in the amount determined by law, but deductions were made by them entirely at their own discretion, with the sole concern 'that all items and all soldiers' provisions were of the specified pattern, in the specified quantities and of the required quality.'

Regimental reporting was very simple: everything received was recorded as income and immediately written off in full as an expense for the same item for which the money had been allocated. Controls ensured that units did not over-demand anything and that everything was recorded according to the ledgers. The income and expenditure books were verified annually by a special commission consisting of field officers and subalterns, and then by 15 [27] February they were sent with the signatures of those who had verified them to the accounting 'expeditions' [issuing offices]. The law threatened the commander for delays in submitting books with a fine of 100 roubles for one month, 200 for two months, 300 for three months, 400 for four months, and outlawry and exile with hard labour for life for five months.[2]

After the Peace of Tilsit, Russia's friendly relations with Sweden had been undermined, because Russia had pledged to keep the Baltic Sea closed to the fleets of Western powers. Sweden's failure to do this, in connection with Russia's desire to secure the situation of the northern capital by conquering Finland, served as the causes of the war.

A corps of some 24,000 men commanded by Buxhöwden was formed for operations in Finland, and they crossed the border on 9 [21] February 1808.[3]

In the autumn of 1807 and the spring of 1808, a breach with Great Britain occurred, and Russia now had concerns about reinforcing the main locations along the coast of the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea. As a result, the construction of batteries began in Narva, Baltisky Port [Paldisky], Pernau, Riga, Windau [Ventspils] and Libau, while the units assigned to protect the coast were subordinated to the Minister of the Navy, Chichagov.[4] These formations included: Lavrov's 2nd Division in Estland and Prince Dolgorukov 5th's 3rd Division (who had taken over this division from General Sacken) in Kurland and Livland.[5] Each division was given given set distances to

1 History of the Lifeguard Finland Regiment.
2 Rostovsky, History of the Lifeguard Finland Regiment.
3 History of the 103rd Petrozavodsk Regiment [formerly 20th Jägers]; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the Finnish War by Land and Sea, 1808-1809.
4 Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov (1767-1849).
5 Nikolay Ivanovich Lavrov (1761-1813), Vasily Yurievich Dolgorukov (1776-1810).

guard. The 3rd Division was assigned the sector from Polangen [Palanga], through Libau and Windau to Dünamünde [Daugavgrīva] and Pernau, from Pernau to Baltisky Port and the islands of Ösel [Saaremaa] and Dagö [Hiiumaa]. The first battalion of 21st Jägers was assigned to the fortress of Dünamünde, the second and third battalions were in Tuckum; in the summer, the entire regiment moved to the island of Ösel, where the colonel-in-chief of the regiment, Major General Laptev, was appointed Governor-General over all forces on the islands of Ösel and Dagö.[6]

The year 1809 was marked by sad events in the life of the regiment. Some officers filed a complaint claiming that the regimental colonel-in-chief, Major General Laptev, and the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lashkevich, had indulged themselves in a number of illegal acts, and when the case was examined by the investigative commission, Major General Laptev was found guilty: 'of failure to maintain proper order in the regiment, of ill-treatment of officers, of appropriating powers to coerce lower ranks into repairing state-owned items with their own money, of incorrect accounting for the soldiers' *artel* funds, of incorrectly presenting these funds, of falsely reporting that this money had been taken by the enemy, of falsely nominating an officer for a gold medal for distinction at the Battle of Preußisch Eylau, when this officer was on secondment in Russia at that time, for all this Major General Laptev has been discharged from service and fined an amount collected from his estate to compensate the lower ranks, in total: one *Imperial*, 970 roubles, 27 kopeks, 8,334 roubles, 30 kopeks in banknotes, 300 Dutch *Chervonets* [gold coins], and 189 *Thaler*'; while Lieutenant Colonel Lashkevich was found guilty 'of using the soldiers' own money while commanding the regiment, a total of 125 roubles, 45 kopeks in silver and 2,704 roubles, five kopeks in banknotes, and of taking no action to prevent the unlawful acts of his colonel-in-chief in dealing with the officer's complaints, rather of doing the same himself; of cruelly beating an innocent sergeant major who had the Military Order medal, as well as other lower ranks; made unjustified allegations' - for all of which he had to return the money to the lower ranks and, in addition, was held under arrest. For failing to file the complaint in good time, according to the rulings of the Court Martial, Captain Jung and Lieutenant Grigoriev were demoted one rank, while majors Yelistratov, Kanishchev, Kulman, Dubrovin and Lieutenant Derevyanenko were held under arrest for two weeks.[7] Colonel Plattsev from the 20th Jäger Regiment, was the newly appointed colonel-in-chief, and joined the regiment in December.[8] Immediately upon joining the regiment, he began to put the household and every element of its domestic life in order.

Besides him, during 1808 the following joined the regiment: Captain Feonas, lieutenants Perfiliev, Gubin and Blonsky released prisoners of war; Captain Yazykov and Lieutenant Nechaev transferred from other regiments.

The following arrived to replenish the regimental manpower: 38 Tula Militiamen, 100 Tver Militiamen, 36 Pskov Militiamen, 263 Moscow Militiamen, 49 Kaluga Militiamen, 296 Livland Militiamen, 130 Yaroslavl Militiamen, 92 Orël Militiamen, all aged between 18 and 36 years.

Forty men listed as deserters from various regiments were rounded up, and the total increase was

6 First (colonel-in-chief's) Battalion - colonel-in-chief's company, Major Dubrovin's company, Captain Feonas' company, Major Kulman's company; Second (Major Knishchev's) Battalion - Major Kanishchev's company, Captain Maslov's company, Captain Gavronsky's company, Major Anfimov's company; Third (regimental commander's) Battalion - Lieutenant Colonel Lashkevich's company, Captain Shchukin's company, Captain Yazykov's company, Major Yelistratov's company.

7 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, book 420, p. 69, Major General Pahlen's report to the Minister of War, dated 25 January [6 February] 1809.

8 Colonel Pavel Timofeevich Plattsev, chevalier of the Order of St. Anne 2nd class and St Vladimir 4th class. Of the Orthodox faith. Literate in Russian. Single. Entered service in 1784 as a *Kaptenarmus* in the Bug Jäger Corps; sergeant in 1785; ensign in 1790; adjutant in 1791; lieutenant in 1792; captain in 1794; major in 1800; lieutenant colonel in 1806; colonel in the 20th Jägers in 1807. Served on campaign in 1788, 1789, 1790, wounded and promoted ensign, promoted captain for distinction in 1794; promoted for distinction in 1806 and 1807. Moscow Archive of the General Staff, service lists.

1,044 men.

Following the end of the war with Sweden and the conclusion of Treaty of Fredrikshamn [Hamina], according to which all of Finland up to the river Torne went to Russia, a whole series of reforms took place in the Russian army, among other things, cavalry regiments were removed from the divisions leaving six infantry regiments in each division, and the latter were transferred from one division to another; the following regiments joined 3rd Infantry Division, commanded by General Konovnitsyn:[9]

Major General Tuchkov 4th's 1st Brigade: Tauride Grenadiers, Chernigov Musketeers.

Colonel Voeikov's 2nd Brigade: Murom Musketeers, Kaporsk Musketeers.

Major General Prince Shakhovsky's[10] 3rd Brigade: 20th Jägers, 21st Jägers.[11]

Moreover, in jäger regiments, each battalion consisted of one grenadier company and three jäger companies; the battalions and companies themselves were designated by number, and the numbering of these and other companies was unique throughout the regiment, that is, 1st, 2nd and 3rd grenadier companies and 1st to 9th jäger companies. In the event of war, it was intended to send only the 1st and 3rd 'active' battalions on campaign, while the 2nd 'replacement' battalion would be left in quarters, whereupon the jäger companies would go to replenish the remaining battalions, and the [2nd] grenadier company would join the 1st and 3rd battalions on campaign. When all six regiments of one division were united, the grenadier companies of their 2nd battalions would form two combined grenadier battalions, each consisting of three companies.[12]

In order to facilitate the command and control of armies, higher tactical formations were introduced - the corps, which consisted of two to three divisions.

From September 1809, the 21st Jägers were successively quartered: in Arensburg [Kuressaare] as part of 3rd Division, then in September were sent to the Austrian border, where they arrived in late autumn and settled in Vladimir-Volynsky [Volodymyr-Volynsky], occupying this city and its surroundings (31 villages);[13] in the spring of 1810 the regiment headed from Vladimir-Volynsky to the Grodno Governorate, where they arrived in April and were stationed as follows: 1st and 3rd battalions in Mir, Grodno Governorate, while the 2nd replacement battalion was in Leipuny [Leipalingis], Vilna Governorate, having the following present:

In 1st and 3rd battalions there were:[14] five field officers, 41 subalterns, 80 non-commissioned officers, 35 musicians, 1,320 privates, 157 support personnel, 85 horses.

In 2nd battalion there were: two field officers, 18 subalterns, 40 non-commissioned officers, 13 musicians, 660 privates, 70 support personnel, 60 horses.

In the autumn, Major Anfimov's 2nd battalion went to the fortress of Bobruisk to work on the construction of fortifications, while the 1st and 3rd battalions went to the Minsk Governorate, with 1st battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Lashkevich, located in Borisov, and 3rd battalion in Zembin, where they stayed until the spring of 1811, by which time the entire regiment was already concentrated in the fortress of Bobruisk[15] and settled into barracks.

Since Colonel Plattsev had taken over the regiment, his efforts to put its administration and

9 Petr Petrovich Konovnitsyn (1764-1822).
10 Alexander Alexeevich Tuchkov 4th (1777-1812); Yakov Andreevich Voeikov; Ivan Leontievich Shakhovsky (1777-1860).
11 As at 29 September [11 October] 1809.
12 C.C.L. XXXI, p. 420, No. 24400.
13 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, 3rd Directorate, No. 531.
14 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, 3rd Directorate, No. 655.
15 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, 3rd Directorate, No. 418.

domestic life in order had been crowned with complete success. The Inspector's examination carried out soon afterward testified that the regiment had been put in order in quick time.

The divisional commander, General Konovnitsyn, after conducting a review in 1810, wrote in his report, among other things:

> 'The 21st Jäger Regiment also cannot but be justly credited for their success in many areas, especially in comparison with last year, and despite the fact that they arrived at their current quarters from the coastal defences on the island of Ösel in March, later than all the other regiments from 3rd Division, and therefore had less time to prepare their men, also even their uniforms, thanks to the efforts of the colonel-in-chief of the Regiment, Colonel Plattsev, all was brought to completion in the desired condition at the same time as the others.
>
> From 1 [13] January to November, the regiment had: 13 deserted; 22 died; 344 sick.
>
> The muskets seen in the regiment were of the same calibre and in good working order.
>
> Vehicles and munitions items are in good order.
>
> During the inspection, the following cash funds were seen: pay 37 roubles, 56 kopeks; munitions two roubles, 83 kopeks; regimental 782 roubles 84 kopeks, and *artel* 7,779 roubles 59 kopeks.
>
> There were no deserters from Captain Feonas' company, to whom a Supreme Commendation has been presented.'[16]

In February 1812, the commander of 3rd Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn, inspecting the 21st Jäger Regiment, found them to be in excellent condition, with the following particularly notable: battle-worthiness, successful target shooting and the absence of desertion, the companies under Captain Shchutskoy (1st Grenadier), Captain Buschen (1st Jäger) and Staff-Captain Vietinghoff, which were brought to the attention of the Sovereign Emperor, who, having remained confident of their diligence and zeal for service, declared his Supreme Favour for the commanders of these companies, which was announced in army orders. As a result of these reviews, Colonel Plattsev was honoured to receive a Supreme Commendation.[17]

At the beginning of March, the 1st and 3rd battalions were moved to the Vilna Governorate; the 2nd battalion, commanded by Major Yelistratov with three companies, consisting of 10 officers, 42 non-commissioned officers, 15 musicians and 532 privates, set off for Bauske [Bauska].

16 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, minute 460, No. 1254.

17 Supreme Orders dated 20 November [2 December] 1810 and orders for the Minister of War dated 12 [24] February 1812, Military Science Archive of the General Staff, 1st Directorate, No. 282.

CHAPTER 5.

The Patriotic War of 1812, from the Neman to Smolensk.

Causes of the war. - Preparations for war. - Plans of each side and concentration of forces: the deployment of the 21st Jäger Regiment with the vanguard. - The enemy invasion of Russia. - Retreat of the 21st Jägers with the army rearguard to Drissa and onwards towards Vitebsk. - The Battle of Ostrovno. - Army provisioning. - Retreat to Smolensk.

The peace we concluded in Tilsit after the war of 1807 was unsustainable. Napoleon's ambitious plans extended to the point that he, seeing the Russian Tsar as the main obstacle to achieving his goals, strove to break his power and, having removed the burdensome mask of friendship with Emperor Alexander, began to violate the terms of the Tilsit Treaty. He refused to ratify the convention proposed to him by Emperor Alexander on the Duchy of Warsaw and the non-restoration of Poland; he annexed part of Tyrol, Holland, half of the Kingdom of Westphalia, the land between the Baltic Sea and the free cities to the French Empire, and generally ruled in Europe as hegemon, while Emperor Alexander's uncle, the Herzog von Oldenburg, had his territory confiscated by Napoleon. Emperor Alexander protested against this, but received evasive responses and a demand from Napoleon that Russia strictly observe the Continental System and cease trading with neutral powers.

Not knowing Napoleon's future operational plans, Emperor Alexander began to actively prepare for a defensive war. These preparations began in 1811 with the reformation of some of the garrison battalions, the strengthening of infantry and cavalry regiments and artillery brigades; the establishment of internal security battalions and permanent recruit training depots. At the same time, a conscription was called: four men per 500 souls. The most important fortresses were put into a defensible state; large reserves of provisions and military supplies were collected on the Dnieper, Dvina and in the border governorates.

In March 1812, 18 infantry and eight cavalry divisions were formed from all reserve units, which were subsequently used to replenish the active units.

The 2nd or replacement battalion of the 21st Jägers (less the grenadier company) and the newly raised 4th or reserve battalion were incorporated into the new 33rd Infantry Division, one of those 18 others newly formed. The 2nd Grenadier Company commanded by Captain Sorokin became part of the 2nd Combined Grenadier Battalion of 3rd Infantry Division, which was formed from the 2nd grenadier companies of the Kaporsk Infantry, Chernigov Infantry, and 21st Jägers. As a result, on 16 [28] April, 21st Jägers gave up: two majors, two captains two staff-captains, four lieutenants, four sub-lieutenants, four ensigns, 38 non-commissioned officers, 15 musicians, 642 privates, 33 support staff and 24 orderlies. The 2nd and 4th battalions were stationed in the Dünaburg [Daugavpils] fortress, where they came under the command of Adjutant General Meller-Zakomelsky.[1]

The combined grenadier battalions of the 1st Grenadier Division and 3rd Infantry Division were part of the 5th Infantry Corps, whose commander was His Imperial Highness Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich.[2]

Three armies were formed from the regular forces, assigned to repel the enemy invasion, namely: First Western Army numbering around 120,000, commanded by General-of-Infantry Barclay de Tolly, consisting of: I Corps, II Corps, III Corps, IV Corps, V Corps and VI Corps; I Cavalry Corps, II Cavalry Corps and III Cavalry Corps, and the light detachment under Force Ataman Platov.[3]

1 Yegor Ivanovich Meller-Zakomelsky (1767-1830); Moscow Archive of the General Staff, monthly returns.

2 Konstantin Pavlovich Romanov (1779-1831); Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1812 [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips], Volume 1, p. 82.

3 Matvey Ivanovich Platov (1753-1818).



Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st

From an engraving in the collection of P. Ya. Dashkov.

[The Second Western Army under General-of-Infantry Prince Bagration, numbering around 37,000, consisted of three infantry corps one cavalry corps and nine Cossack regiments].

The Third Reserve Army of Observation under General-of-Cavalry Tormasov,[4] numbering around 43,000, consisted of three infantry corps, one cavalry corps and nine Cossack regiments, thus the total for the three armies was around 220,000 [*sic* 193,000] bayonets and sabres, with 1,000 guns.

In early May, our forces were drawn up on the western border of the empire. First Army held the line from Rossieny to Lida for 200 *versta* [133 miles], Second Army was located between the Neman and the Bug. Tormasov's army was concentrating around Lutsk, covering the roads to Kiev [Kyiv]. The western part of the empire, where the armies were located was divided by Polesia and represented two theatres of military operations.

The significant superiority in Napoleon's forces exposed the extreme danger of dividing our forces, which forced Emperor Alexander to change our original plan and, instead of operating with separate forces, strove to unite them. With this in mind, from the beginning of military operations, it was planned that the corps from First Army would retreat to Sventsiany [Švenčionys] and onwards to the Drissa [Verkhnedvinsk] camp, while Second Army would go to Vileyka to link up with First Army, and if this could not be accomplished, to head for Minsk and on to Borisov.[5]

4 Alexander Petrovich Tormasov (1752-1819).

5 G.L. Leer, Summary of Wars, 1893, Volume 1, p. 186.

By the end of 1811 Napoleon had completed preparations for the campaign in Russia. At the beginning of 1812, troop movements began across Europe: units streamed towards the Elbe from Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, France and Germany and, as they approached the Vistula, they were joined by the forces of Austria and Prussia. Napoleon's army numbered about 608,000 men and more than 180,000 horses.[6]

General Tuchkov 1st's III Corps was part of First Western Army. It included 1st Grenadier Division and Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn's 3rd Infantry Division. The entire corps consisted of 24 battalions, four squadrons, one Cossack *Sotnia* and seven artillery companies.

The composition of 21st Jägers [1st and 3rd battalions] was as follows:

1st Grenadier Company: colonel-in-chief, Colonel Plattsev; company commander, Captain Buschen; lieutenants Kurilov and Kvashnevich; regimental adjutant, Lieutenant Frolov; colonel-in-chief's aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Reikhel; paymaster, Lieutenant Plaksenko; Sub-Lieutenant Basov; Ensign von der Launitz.

1st Jäger Company: divisional senior aide-de-camp, Staff-Captain Yakovlev; company commander, Lieutenant Zvyagin; Sub-Lieutenant Smolensky; Ensign Porokhovnikov.

2nd Jäger Company: company commander, Staff-Captain Kotlubay; Lieutenant Shchutskoy; Sub-Lieutenant Varnin; ensigns Girsevanov and Skibitsky.

3rd Jäger Company: Major Shchutskoy; company commander Captain Varnin; Sub-Lieutenant Bravchinsky; Lieutenant Andreev; Ensign Yanov.

3rd Grenadier Company: Major Stepanov; company commander, Staff-Captain Mochulsky; Lieutenant Kononovich; Sub-Lieutenant Yeremeev; ensigns Gutovsky and Fride.

7th Jäger Company: Major Shchukin; company commander Lieutenant Savitsky; Sub-Lieutenant Narbut; Ensign Petrov.

8th Jäger Company: company commander, Staff-Captain Derevyanko; Sub-Lieutenant Shamshev; ensigns Vasilevsky and Kosyak.

9th Jäger Company: Major Galsky; company commander, Staff-Captain Schmidt; Sub-Lieutenant Khrapovitsky; ensigns Shchukin, Malinin and Arapov.

For a total of: 42 officers, 68 non-commissioned officers, 158 support staff, 1,091 privates and 81 horses.[7]

III Corps was located on the border at Novy Troki [Trakai] in the centre between the other corps, having pushed 20th Jägers, 21st Jägers, the Lifeguard Cossacks and Teptyar Cossacks up to Wysoki Dwór [Aukštadvaris] as the vanguard commanded by Major General Prince Shakhovsky; the vanguard was responsible for protecting the area from Rumszyszki [Rumšiškės] to Olita [Alytus]. Before the start of military operations, the regiments were ordered to have a 10-day supply of hard-tack and to pay particular attention to the conservation of the men's equipment and uniforms, moreover, a uniform and munitions resupply for 21st Jägers had been received from the Smolensk Commissariat.[8] The regiment had been crowded into poor villages. The officers generally lived extremely poorly, especially in the infantry, who, for the most part, ate from the same pot as the soldiers and had one draught horse, at most two, per company, on to which they sorted and loaded their modest belongings.[9] From all the orders it was clear that the army was preparing for a long campaign and came up with ways to improve their arrangements.

6 Bogdanovich, Volume 1, p. 94.
7 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 209, bundle 67, minute 67, part 34, and monthly returns.
8 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, catalogue I, No. 282
9 N.E. Mitarevsky, Memoirs of the War of 1812, Moscow, 1871.

By the end of May 1812, the French army was positioned on the Vistula as follows: the main body of 220,000 men, commanded by Napoleon, consisting of Davout's *1e Corps*, Oudinot's *2e Corps*, Ney's *3e Corps*, Nansouty's *1e corps de cavalerie*, Montbrun's *2e corps de cavalerie*,[10] and the *Garde* were deployed between Danzig and Thorn; Jérôme's 80,000 men were at Warsaw;[11] the *Vice-roi*, Eugène's 80,000 men were at Plotzk;[12] Macdonald's corps was at Königsberg and Schwarzenberg's right-hand corps was at Lublin.[13]

Napoleon's plan of military operations was as follows: he wanted to march from Kovno to Vilna with the main body himself in order to launch a surprise attack on the centre of First Army and defeat it before it could concentrate. King Jérôme was supposed to make a similar move from Grodno against Second Army. The *Vice-roi* was to sever communications between our armies and, depending on the circumstances, reinforce Napoleon or his brother Jérôme. Macdonald was ordered to threaten our right flank, while Schwarzenberg was to march on Slonim and once there either stand facing Tormasov or turn against Prince Bagration.[14]

Napoleon issued the orders for his force to invade Russia without having declared war.

On 11 [23] June, Napoleon's main body approached the Neman in the vicinity of Kovno. Not far from Kovno, at Panemunė, a crossing was arranged on pontoon bridges, and on 12 [24] June, the main body of the *Grande Armée* managed to cross the Neman and occupied Kovno, where Napoleon moved his *quartier général*. The news of the enemy crossing of the Neman reached Vilna on the night of 12 to 13 [24 to 25] June; the Tsar, who was at the ball, having informed our forces that same night of the enemy incursion onto our territory, ordered the corps from First Army to retreat towards Sventsiany, while Prince Bagration and Platov were to march to link up. The enemy crossing of the Neman prompted the Commander-in-Chief of First Western Army to avoid piecemeal actions, rather to unite all the corps first, as a result of which on 14 [26] June III Corps and IV Corps retreated to Vilna and took up positions in front of the city, resting their right flank on the river Viliya [Neris], and their left adjoining the high ground at Dwór Podwysokie; On 16 [28] June at four o'clock in the morning, III Corps and IV Corps, withdrew from Vilna in three columns. The first column, consisting of 3rd Infantry Division, proceeded via the Green Bridge [Žaliasis Tiltas], Kalwaria [Kalvarijų], Werki [Verkiai], the Resha tavern to Lyubovo [Liubavas], where they spent the night. The second column, consisting of 1st Grenadier Division, passed through Vilna and the suburb of Antokol [Antakalnis] to the Tarshan tavern, through Antovil to Britanishka [Bratoniškės] on the right bank of the Viliya, where they spent the night. The rearguard of this column, composed of 21st Jägers, the Lifeguard Cossacks and Kargopol Dragoons and a half-company of horse artillery, was attacked by the enemy an hour after setting out on the march in the suburb of Antokol and had a heavy exchange of fire.

In the process we captured one captain and eight lower ranks. On our side the losses were quite insignificant. Our rearguard inflicted considerable losses on the enemy during its retreat and halted at the Antovil tavern in the evening, where it remained until late at night covering the retreat of the division and IV Corps. At two o'clock in the morning the rearguard of the second column crossed the Viliya and burned the bridge at Britanishka. Continuing onwards on 17 [29] June, the second column arrived for the night in Podbrodzie [Pabradė, 15 miles north-east of Niemenczyn]; 21st Jägers, proceeding in the rearguard, spent the night at the Yusin tavern, nine *versta* [six miles] from the column, having established communications with the rearguard of II Corps.

During their onwards advance, near Podbrodzie on 18 [30] June at midnight, enemy cavalry,

10 Étienne Marie Antoine Champion de Nansouty (1768-1815); Louis-Pierre de Montbrun (1770-1812).
11 Jérôme Bonaparte (1784-1860).
12 Eugène de Beauharnais (1781-1824).
13 Étienne Jacques-Joseph-Alexandre Macdonald (1765-1840); Karl Philipp Johann Nepomuk Joseph zu Schwarzenberg (1771-1820).
14 Military Encyclopaedic Lexicon, Volume X, p. 62.

supported by infantry, attacked some of our outposts, drove them back, but then were put to flight themselves by jägers bringing them under fire; at two o'clock the enemy made another attack, directed to the left against the outposts of 3rd Division.



Count Barclay de Tolly.

III Corps and IV Corps set off towards Sventsiany on 19 June [1 July] and took up positions on the high ground two *versta* [1⅓ miles] from the city. The 21st Jägers, being in the rearguard of the second column, halted at Sora [Sariai], setting up outposts in conjunction with the outposts of II Corps.

At the same time, the entire First Western Army had assembled in the vicinity of Sventsiany in such a way that, if necessary, within 12 hours, all its units could be concentrated and ready for battle. Here, hard tack, meat and wine rations for two days were received; cattle were being driven in herds behind the force.

At three o'clock in the afternoon of 20 June [2 July], our rearguard was attacked by seven

squadrons of enemy cavalry with two guns, but the attack was repelled with losses on the enemy side. The exhausted rearguard, including 21st Jägers, were relieved by fresh units.[15]

The continuing retreat took place in the following order: the main body, which constituted III Corps, proceeded from Sventsiany to Vidzy [Widze] and Belmont [Akhremovtsy] and on to Leonpol and entered the fortified camp at Drissa on 29 June [11 July], III Corps being located in its centre; the 21st Jäger Regiment occupied two lunettes, protected by *chevaux de frise*. The regiment's moves from Vilna had been very difficult: all had been forced marches, the roads were all minor and bad, they passed through forests, the weather was rainy; the stages were tough, they halted for very short breaks to rest and then moved on again; they marched day and night, despite the rain and mud, without regularly allocated rest days; they cooked meals whenever they had a chance: in the morning, during the day, and in the evening; they rarely spent the night in one place. Our supply trains were in front of the corps, about 15 *versta* [10 miles] or more from us. Several soldiers with a non-commissioned officer from each company and regiment went ahead with an officer of the Suite to mark out places to camp for the night. It often rained, but after that the weather cleared up and it became so hot that steam rose from the soldiers' wet clothes.

In the bivouacs they were always stationed facing the pursuing enemy. Trestles were made from poles for the men, roofing them with straw, and fires were lit in front. Such were our bivouacs, but they were poor protection from the rain. The granaries and threshing floors were dismantled for firewood, but despite the fact that they sometimes halted by forests, the trees were not cut down for firewood because they were difficult to kindle. Shelters were built on similar trestles for the officers, roofed with straw on both sides. When it rained, the trestles were covered with rawhides, which were carried in the baggage train.[16]

The enemy had pursued the Russian force weakly along the line of retreat from Sventsiany to Drissa. The enemy army, commanded by the King of Naples [Murat], consisting of the corps under Ney and Oudinot, some divisions from Davout's corps and the cavalry corps under Nansouty and Montbrun, followed First Western Army towards the Drissa camp.

The Drissa fortified camp was located in a bend formed by the Dvina between Drissa and Shatrovo, over an area of about four versta [2⅔ miles] long and three versta [two miles] wide. The fortifications consisted of three lines of lunettes and redoubts; a strong barrier of palisades had been constructed forwards of the front line; both flanks rested on the Dvina. Four bridges were built across the river behind the position for communications with the right bank, and with fortified bridgeheads to protect them. All this was begun long before the start of military operations, costing considerable effort and expense, but were of no use as long-term defences or for operations against the enemy.[17]

The Tsar, having inspected the camp and learned of its shortcomings, ordered the troops to move along the right bank of the Dvina on 2 [14] July, which was done. After the fortified camp was abandoned by the army, all manoeuvres by First Army were aimed solely at linking up with Second Army, which was moving towards Smolensk by a roundabout route.

Due to the constant retreat, even thinking about rest days was out of the question. There were no provisions or forage, the officers' own reserves were with the trains that had gone far ahead, and it was not easy to get to them. There was no bread, no hard tack, and for the horses, no hay, no oats. The population, knowing of the approach of our army, pursued by the French, hid both bread and everything that was worth hiding, and drove their cattle into the forest. Cows and pigs would emerge from the forest and into the village and wander about, as well as sheep and all kinds of poultry. From this livestock, whoever came across it, took it. There was no actual permission for

15 Military Science Archive, II directorate, No. 29180.
16 Mitarevsky, p. 20.
17 Bogdanovich, Volume 1, p. 120-121; *Russky Arkhiv*, Volume X, p. 1931; Tuchkov 3rd, Memoirs of 1812.

them to take it, but the authorities paid no attention. The concern for the provisioning of men and horses rested solely on the company commanders, and therefore the young officers endured this campaign well enough, their only concern was to get enough to eat and to get enough sleep. During the tiring marches, everyone realised that sleep was overwhelming them all. After marching the whole night, everyone felt very ponderous, especially in the morning. Occasionally soldiers would start to stumble as they walked and fall; one would fall, hit another, then another, then two more, three more. They were falling by the dozen.[18] On 6 [18] July, they reached Polotsk and, having passed through, set up camp along the Vitebsk road.

On 11 [23] July, all the corps crossed to the left bank of the Dvina. During the crossing at the Budilovo wharf opposite Beshankovichy, a small detachment was left in order to secure the passage of VI Corps, due to the withdrawal of the rearguard and to cover the transportation of grain, this included the 3rd battalion of the 21st Jägers, which prevented the enemy from crossing the river, pushing them back.[19] Following this, our troops set up camp near the Luchosa river and the main Beshankovichi road, near Vitebsk.[20]

At this time the French army was also moving towards Vitebsk. Murat went from Zamosha to Disna with Ney's corps, three divisions from Davout's corps and the cavalry under Nansouty and Montbrun, there he transferred Montbrun's corps to the right bank of the Dvina and on 10 [22] July continued moving through the village of Ulla towards Beshankovichi, while Oudinot's corps, having reached Drissa that same day, destroyed the fortified camp there and moved towards Polotsk. The *Garde* and *4e Corps* under the *Vice-roi* proceeded to the right of Murat, towards Glubokoe and Dokshitsy, crossed the Ula at Bocheikovo and reached Beshankovichi on 12 [24] July at the same time as Murat's force.

Once the main body of our army was located on the Luchosa river on 11 [23] July, misled by the news that Bagration had occupied Mogilev, Barclay considered the unification of the armies to be assured, but when it was discovered that Bagration had not managed to reach Mogilev, Barclay decided to hold out at Vitebsk, and then go to meet Second Army at Senno via Babinovichi.[21]

On 12 [24] July, a solemn thanksgiving service was held in the camp with cannon salutes to mark the occasion of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Turkey. Barclay received intelligence that Napoleon's army was advancing on both sides of the Dvina, so on 12 [24] July he dispatched IV Corps under Major General Osterman to Ostrovno to delay the enemy, where a battle between this corps and the French vanguard took place on 13 [25] July. On the night of 13 to 14 [25 to 26] July , Barclay sent Konovnitsyn's 3rd Infantry Division to relieve Osterman, who set off in good time to support IV Corps and, after going nine *versta* [six miles], halted in reserve, then relieved the units of IV Corps in the evening, settling eight *versta* [5⅓ miles] from Ostrovno near Kukovyachino, Osterman retreated behind this position and formed Konovnitsyn's reserve.

On 14 [26] July, at eight o'clock in the morning, Murat approached the position occupied by the regiments of 3rd Infantry Division with units under Nansouty and Delzons.[22] There was a deep ravine in front of our position, the right flank rested on the Dvina where there were deep fords; the left flank was shielded by a swampy and dense forest.

The 1st battalion of 21st Jägers had formed a firing line forwards of our position. The enemy skirmishers of *8e régiment d'infanterie légère*, having approached the edge of the ravine, began a firefight with our jägers, while Delzons gave the order to attack; General Huard[23] moved against the

18 Mitarevsky.
19 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, service records (Sub-Lieutenant Shamshev); Yermolov's Notes.
20 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, Minute No. 29180.
21 Bogdanovich, Volume 1, p. 136-137.
22 Alexis Joseph Delzons (1775-1812).
23 Léonard Jean Aubry Huard de Saint-Aubin (1770-1812).

right wing of our position with the Croatian skirmishers [*1er régiment d'infanterie croates*], supported by *84e régiment d'infanterie de ligne*, and General Roussel[24] with the *92e ligne* and one battalion of skirmishers from *106e ligne*, moved through the dense forest against our left wing, consisting of 21st Jägers, the rest of the units stayed in reserve.



The Battle of Ostrovno.

A small element from Murat's cavalry had crossed to the far side of the Dvina in order to threaten Konovnitsyn's right flank with an enveloping attack. The attack on the left flank of our position was repelled. The 21st Jägers commanded by the regimental colonel-in-chief, Colonel Plattsev, steadfastly withstood the enemy onslaught and whose adroit fire had repelled the enemy, and thereafter those who had broken in with bayonets fixed, without retreating a single step. Captain Sorokin, having been sent to protect our two guns with a grenadier platoon, which were attacked by French *chasseurs à cheval*, steadfastly withstood their attacks, thanks to which the guns were saved and the enemy *chasseurs* were forced to retreat.[25] At this time Huard was pushing back our battalions of the right flank, but our reserves, which had arrived in time, drove the enemy back. The right wing was in good order. Seeing this, Murat advanced his cavalry and threw back the nearest infantry, while Delzons' division resumed the offensive with his reserves.

At this time, Roussel's force, having seized the forest, enveloped the left flank of the position, and our battery, located in the centre, was exposed to great danger.


Konovnitsyn, noticing this, ordered a retreat.

Napoleon, who had arrived by this time, ordered the offensive to continue. Our units retreated in good order from one position to another until they reached Komary, where Konovnitsyn held out until five o'clock in the evening with 9,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry against 20,000 men, and then retreated to Dobreika and joined forces with III Corps under Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st, who, having taken command of the rearguard, led them away after dark beyond the Luchosa. Major General Pahlen, who took command of the new rearguard, composed mainly of cavalry and horse

24 Jean-Charles Roussel (1771-1812).
25 Army Order No. 214, 1814.

artillery, covered the retreat by 3rd Division and IV Corps.

On our side, 827 men were killed, 1,855 men were wounded, and 1,082 men were missing.[26] The losses to 21st Jägers were as follows: Sub-Lieutenant Bravchinsky, one non-commissioned officer, one musician and nine privates killed; those wounded included Major Shchukin; commander of 1st company, Staff-Captain Kurilov who had his left femur broken by canister shot; Sub-Lieutenant Yanov who suffered four wounds from musket balls in the chest, with entry and exit wounds on the right and left sides; Sub-Lieutenant Baryshnikov, four non-commissioned officers, two musicians and 54 privates; one non-commissioned officer and 31 privates were reported missing in action.[27]



The Actions around Ostrovno.

The enemy suffered 3,704 casualties, of whom 300 men were taken prisoner.


General Konovnitsyn described this battle in a letter to his wife:

> '16 [28] July, 10 *versta* [6⅔ miles] from Surazh.
>
> I did not disgrace myself in front of everyone, I was at the front with the skirmishers, I had two corps and Bonaparte himself facing me, and I even saw him myself, recognisable from statements by prisoners, on a small white horse with a docked tail; I had four regiments and two battalions of combined grenadiers from eight o'clock in the morning until five o'clock in the afternoon against, dare I say, 60,000 men.
>
> I shall tell you, my dear, I did not shame myself, neither you nor my children need blush for me...
>
> I held Napoleon himself in check all day, who wanted to dine in Vitebsk, but he did not get there that night, nor even the next day. Our men fought like lions, but we were not united: Bagration, Platov and Wittgenstein are detached from us.'[28]

26 Bogdanovich, Volume 1, p. 144.
27 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, Library catalogue 209, bundle 12, p. 25.
28 Ludwig Adolf Peter zu Sayn-Wittgenstein (1769-1843); Military Science Archive, works of Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, p. 430.

In his report on the actions around Vitebsk to the Tsar, Barclay de Tolly stated:

> 'Your Imperial Majesty's forces have fought against a superior enemy with amazing courage and spirit over the past three days. They fought like Russians, disregarding danger and risking life for Tsar and Fatherland. I cannot decide whether to give the vanguard units, IV Corps and 3rd Division, preference over the others: all competed in courage, diligence and valour...'[29]



The Battle of Vitebsk.

By Adam, from the collection of P.Ya. Dashkov.

The next day the regiment sorrowfully began to lay their fallen comrades to rest. While the wounded were being bandaged, graves were being dug for those killed; once the graves were ready, they began interring the dead. The moving moment of the funeral had arrived. At around two o'clock in the morning, a huge crowd of Lifeguard Cossacks, jägers and artillerymen stood in a semicircle with lit wax candles in their hands near a shelter hastily knocked together from fresh birch and spruce branches. The hunched, decrepit figure of a little old man, a priest in shabby, badly wrinkled, funeral robes, stood out sharply against the illuminated background in front of this congregation. A squad was stationed facing the entrance to the shelter in order to pay their last respects. And after this, all those who had fallen that day on the field of battle and honour were carried out of the shelter on folding stretchers by officers and soldiers and placed side by side. The Cossacks and soldiers, crossing themselves with exaggerated movements, whispered: "rest with the Lord." Many of those present had tears in their eyes. The deceased were in full dress uniform, their faces were uncovered. Some of them had gaping head wounds, while others had faces that were horribly gashed by sabre cuts. After a short memorial service, the priest knelt down and said in a trembling voice: "O Lord, grant rest to the souls of your departed servants killed in battle and grant

29 Barclay's report No. 538, dated 15 [27] July 1812, Military Science Archive, No. 1873.

them eternal remembrance." They sang to their eternal memory, and muffled sobs could be heard. The officers and non-commissioned officers surrounded the mortal remains of these heroes, covered them with their greatcoats and, taking hold four to each stretcher, moved towards the small mound of fresh earth to the sound of the funeral march. At the end of the Litany, they began to bring the deceased one by one to the grave and carefully lowered them into it. Once all had been laid to rest, the priest threw a handful of earth. In the midst of the deep silence all around the grave and the entire camp, suddenly, somewhere far away, a shot rang out...

Everyone standing near the grave became agitated. Meanwhile, in the distance near the Luchosa, the clatter continued. A terrible bustle arose throughout the camp, sharp, hurried alarm signals were sounded, and officers galloped in all directions. Once the grave was filled in and a rough cross made of two poles was erected on it, everyone bowed low and whispered "Lord, give me rest" and quickly hurried to their posts.[30]

The steadfastness of our troops had held back the enemy advance. By the evening of 15 [27] July, Barclay was retreating towards Smolensk.

Passing through Vitebsk, the troops involuntarily took in the terrible sight of dressing stations, hastily set up in warehouses on the banks of the Dvina. In front of the entrances to the warehouses there were puddles of bloody water, which the *Feldschere* had poured out of basins used to wash the wounds, while severed arms and legs were thrown out right there... and screams and groans could be heard from inside...[31]

In Vitebsk, the Commander-in-Chief issued the following command: he ordered that all supplies be taken from private individuals, issuing promissory notes in payment for them, and in cash for manufacturers. He ordered that the regiments be given a ration of wine and fresh meat every four days and that these rations should always be kept with the units; herds of oxen for meat rations, as well as carts with wine rations, should follow at a set distance from the regiments. At first, no one had believed that the war would move so deep inside Russia, and this was the reason that few reserves of provisions had been collected beyond the Dvina. It so happened that when the operational axis shifted towards Smolensk, the troops had to collect supplies themselves from the inhabitants once more.[32] Porechye, through which we retreated, was the first old Russian town on our way and showed us a completely different attitude from the population. Until then we have been passing through the Lithuanian governorates, in which the nobles were hostile to us and incited the population. Here in the Smolensk Governorate the troops were greeted as saviours. The villagers came to ask: would they be allowed to arm themselves against the enemy and would they not be held accountable for it?[33]

On the approaches to Smolensk, orders were received to send men to draw provisions and bakers who were to bake grain into hard tack.


The allocation of provisions were issued by Inspector General Cancrin.[34]

Both the houses and the yards in front of the houses were filled with recipients from every regiment on distribution days. It was difficult to get into the room where General Cancrin was sitting at the table in the middle with the members of the reception. Demands were being handed to him from all sides. There was little order, everyone was shouting that the soldiers were dying of hunger and asking for a rapid allocation. Those receiving their allocation went to the warehouse to draw it. There was great turmoil in the warehouse, since Cancrin in the reception would pick up the demands and almost instantly sign, without looking at it: 'to be issued as seen. Cancrin.'

30 Shakhovskoy, Lifeguard-Cossacks at Vitebsk in 1812.
31 Mitarevsky.
32 F. Zatler, Notes on the Provisioning of the Troops, 1860.
33 Yermolov, Notes on the War of 1812.
34 Georg Ludwig Cancrin (1774-1845).

Some came to him with demands several times on the same day.

Cancrin commented: ‘You have already drawn yours’ but they would insist that they had just arrived for the first time.[35]



The 1812 Memorial in Smolensk.

Bakers were deployed on the near side of the Dnieper in order to issue bread and baked the bread into hard tack for two days in specially constructed ovens, after which they would bake again for two days, and so on. To that end, orders were issued to the army to send 60 men from each unit, and then another 100, in order to bake bread and toast the hard tack. This detachment of men from the firing line was very painful for the regiment, especially since the regiments had already lost many

35 Mitarevsky.

men, because at the beginning of the army's retreat from our borders, first all the Poles, then the Lithuanians, during the regiments' night marches would straggle behind and then return to their homes, thus the regiment's ranks had thinned considerably.[36]

In Smolensk, the 21st Jägers were replenished by their 4th reserve battalion, which had arrived around 11 [23] July, commanded by Captain Varnin, who, having handed it over, took command of 3rd Jäger Company.[37]

On 20 July [1 August], all the corps, having united at Smolensk, set up camp on the right bank of the Dnieper, the 20th Jägers and 21st Jägers were stationed on the left flank of 3rd Division, separately, between Shklyanka and Gorazhenka, two *versta* [1⅓ miles] from Smolensk.[38]

36 *Russky Arkhiv*, Volume X, p. 1937, my memories of 1812, P.A. Tuchkov 3rd.
37 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, minute No. 1873, p. 243.
38 Military Science Archive, plan 1980.

CHAPTER 6.

From Smolensk to Tarutino.

The link up of First and Second Armies. - The advance on Rudnya. - The regiment in the battle of Smolensk. - The retreat of the armies. - The Battle of Lubino. - The onward retreat to Tsarevo-Zaimishche. - The arrival of Kutuzov. - The part played by the regiment in the Battle of Borodino. - The retreat to Moscow and on to Tarutino. - The dispatch of the regimental cadre to be replenished in Arzamas. - The description of operations by the replacement battalion of the 21st Jägers. - The retreat of the French from Russia.

After the unification of both our armies near Smolensk on 22 July [3 August], the situation became better: the risk of being divided disappeared, new reinforcements arrived, we were on the direct route to Moscow and the difference in strength, although not evened out, had changed quite noticeably in a direction favourable to us. Barclay de Tolly, remaining true to the basic concept of the plan of retreating into the depths, decided to yield to the general demand and go on the offensive, but only for a short period. He called a council of war, which, however, did not come to any decisions. Barclay ordered an offensive to begin towards Rudnya, as the centre of Napoleon's deployment, wishing to prevent the concentration of his corps and the artillery and parks left behind rejoining; to that end, on 26 July [7 August], the combined armies were to make an offensive movement in three columns in this direction in order to defeat the enemy in detail, namely: First Army were to march in two columns towards Kovalevskoe and Prikaz Vidra, while Second Army were to march to Katan, the flanks were to be guarded by dedicated observation detachments: on the right by the Yelisavetgrad Hussars, Cossacks, 20th Jägers and 21st Jägers and a half company of horse artillery under the command of Major General Vsevolozhsky,[1] sent towards Kasplya, and on the left by Neverovsky's division.

The hearts of the commanders were encouraged, and delight emerged among the soldiers; this was the first offensive movement in the campaign. The next morning the Commander-in-Chief gave the order to halt. Barclay de Tolly, concerned lest he be cut off from Smolensk, would change the direction of his offensive movement three times over the course of six days. Five times the army was sent forward along the road to Rudnya, always heading for Shelomets. And since the latter name was encountered at each discontinuation of the march, the soldiers called these the stunned and confused moves [a play on the words Shelomets and *oshelomlyony* - stunned and confused], and indeed, we ourselves could not understand the reasons for our marches and counter-marches.[2]

Yermolov wrote in his notes:

> 'the soldiers grumbled about the continuous retreats and hoped to find an end to it in battle, were dissatisfied with the Commander-in-Chief; whose main fault was that he was not Russian.'

Yet our armies had barely covered two stages in the direction of Vitebsk when Napoleon, having concentrated some 180,000 of his troops, quickly crossed the Dvina at Rossasno and moved up the left bank of the river towards Smolensk. The occupation of this city by the French would have cut our army off from Moscow and the southern governorates.

All there was on the path chosen by Napoleon were just the 27th Infantry Division commanded by Neverovsky, ⅔ of which consisted of recruits,[3] with a small number of cavalry and 14 guns, located

1 Alexey Andreevich Vsevolozhsky (1769-1813).

2 Zhirkevich's Notes, *Russky Starik*, 1874, August issue, p. 646.

3 Dmitry Petrovich Neverovsky (1771-1813); [the inexperienced Odessa Infantry and Tarnopol Infantry had been replaced in this division by the veteran Poltava Infantry and 41st Jägers in order to mitigate against the proportion of recruits prior to this action].

at Krasny, where this detachment withstood a stubborn battle on 2 [14] August and, repelling the enemy through firepower, had retreated to Korytnya by the night of 3 [15] August, and linked up with Raevsky's division the next day,[4] which was holding the city itself.

The 21st Jägers, who were part of the detachment commanded by Major General Vsevolozhsky, formerly General Tuchkov 3rd's,[5] were returning from Kasplya to Smolensk, but, while still 10 *versta* [6⅔ miles] short of the city at dawn, heard cannon and small-arms fire, from which it could be concluded that the regiment was approaching the battlefield.

No matter how tired the men were from the 30 *versta* [20 mile] night march from Kasplya, no one thought about resting; everyone's eyes were turned towards the battlefield, which opened up like a panorama.

The enemy army was positioned near the city fortifications, lying on the left bank of the Dnieper, and formed a large semicircle, both flanks of which rested on the river.[6]

Both our armies had concentrated near Smolensk overnight. The enemy made several attacks on the city before darkness fell, but were repelled everywhere by General Neverovsky's detachment along with Lieutenant General Raevsky's corps. Barclay de Tolly, concerned for the security of the route to Moscow and finding the position near Smolensk disadvantageous for a decisive battle, decided to retreat. Second Army was to retreat first, while First Army was ordered to defend Smolensk in order to facilitate the retreat.[7]

The defence of Smolensk itself was entrusted to VI Corps under Dokhturov and Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn's 3rd Infantry Division, who, before dawn on 5 [17] August, had relieved the units of VII Corps, which followed Second Army marching along the Dorogobuzh road.

VI Corps held the outskirts of the city, while 3rd Infantry Division was positioned in reserve near the Malakhov Gate.

As the sun rose, small-arms fire began around the entire city.

At 10 o'clock the suburbs were still in our hands. The enemy, having burst into the streets, had taken buildings more than once, but they were driven out everywhere. From 10 o'clock onwards, however, attacks by numerous enemy forces, which had taken on a more decisive aspect, forced Dokhturov to cede the suburbs. Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn crossed the city with 3rd Division as reinforcements and occupied its right flank. The nearest houses, in the suburb adjacent to the Dnieper, were still held by us and our skirmishers were still outside the city walls. The units that entered the city were partly positioned along the walls protecting the battlements, while some were protecting the batteries.[8]

The enemy, having reinforced their leading units, launched an attack, but, upon being engaged with artillery fire and bayonets, were forced to retreat almost out of cannon range.[9]

Once Napoleon had been informed of the retreat of Second Army, which was clearly visible from the high ground at Shein Ostrog, he ordered the launching of a general attack.


No sooner had the enemy advanced their batteries than cannon fire flared up from all sides. On the river bank, on the suburban streets and in the gardens, our infantry began to be pushed back to the fortress walls. The enemy attacked desperately and tried to break into the fortifications, first from one side, then from the other, but most of all they were striving to reach the Malakhov Gate.

4 Nikolay Nikolaevich Raevsky (1771-1829).
5 Pavel Alexeevich Tuchkov 3rd (1776-1858).
6 Tuchkov 3rd, p. 1934.
7 A.N. Petrov, The Russian Armed Forces, volume 2, p. 277.
8 Yermolov's Notes on the War of 1812.
9 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, The War in Russia in 1812, No. 29180.



The Battle of Smolensk, 5 [17] August 1812.

An old engraving [P.A. Lebeau, painted by Naudet] from the collection of P.Ya Dashkov.



Plan of the Battle of Smolensk

The 1st battalion of the 21st Jägers commanded by Major Shchutskoy and 3rd battalion under Major Galsky had been fighting since early morning. All four companies from 1st battalion had sent skirmishers forward, who stubbornly held the positions taken up; the 1st Grenadier Company under Sub-Lieutenant Basov and 3rd Jäger Company under Captain Varnin, having moved forward in order to hold the enemy back and prevent them from entering the suburbs, executed their mission brilliantly, repelling the foe with musketry and with bayonets fixed, moreover, Sub-Lieutenant Basov, wounded in the right arm, would not leave the firing line, while Captain Varnin was killed. Nevertheless, despite the destructive fire, the loss of their commander and the redoubled enemy offensive, the companies did not waver... 2nd Jäger Company, with its commander, Staff-Captain Kotlubay, was immediately sent to reinforce 3rd Jäger Company and drove the reinforced enemy out with fixed bayonets, while Staff-Captain Kotlubay was wounded in the left arm. Sub-Lieutenant Varnin, having taken command of 3rd Jäger Company after Captain Varnin was killed, charged the advancing enemy with fixed bayonets and boundless bravery, inflicting heavy losses on them. He avenged the death of the company commander, but was himself wounded in the left arm.

One platoon from 6th [*sic*, 9th] Jäger Company, 3rd battalion, was sent to the right side of the suburb into the ditch under the command of Sub-Lieutenant Malinin, from where the skirmishers enfiladed the advancing enemy.[10]

The fire was getting more intense. Shells were exploding all over the city; the French were pressing our men hard from the suburbs; our infantry fell back to the city walls. The personal example of generals Dokhturov, Konovnitsyn and Prinz Eugen von Württemberg[11] encouraged our soldiers to such an extent that they, striking with bayonets fixed, drove the enemy back, trampling them and chasing them over the corpses, continuing to cut down the fugitives. On the bombed out site of Smolensk, set ablaze on all sides, there was now only a continuous mass of flame. The conflagration had spread so far that it became dangerous to replenish the batteries with charges. The evening weather was fine and calm, there was not the slightest wind; the fire and smoke, rising in a column, spread out under the heavens themselves. On the eve of the Feast of the Transfiguration, the bells were ringing out from every church.

Despite the fact that tongues of fire were already enveloping the bell towers and churches, the overnight vigil continued. The city would be held until midnight.

In the evening, by order of General Yermolov, the miraculous icon of Our Lady of Smolensk was taken out of the city and handed over to 3rd Infantry Division, where it accompanied the troops on their continuing campaign.


On 6 [18] August at one o'clock in the morning, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, VI Corps and 3rd Division crossed to the right bank of the Dnieper, with the 20th Jägers and 21st Jägers crossing last and taking up positions in the suburbs in order to protect the crossings, while a small part of the artillery were stationed on the slopes. Once our units had crossed the Dnieper, the bridge caught fire and the fire spread, setting houses on fire; our jägers holding them had to evacuate. The enemy, taking advantage of the opportunity, immediately began to cross at the ford by the bridge itself under the cover of a battery and, having quickly occupied the suburb, instantly emerged onto the slopes. Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn, having rallied the jägers, rushed at the enemy, put them to flight and pursued them all the way to the river, where many of the fugitives drowned.

The heavy cannonade and exchange of fire continued throughout the whole day; the burned out houses down near the river left our jägers exposed, positioned forwards of our position in order to delay the enemy should they decide to cross the river again; it was impossible to make the slightest movement without being pelted with canister shot. Our jäger losses in this action of minor

10 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 208, minute No. 106, p. 139.

11 Friedrich Eugen Karl Paul Ludwig von Württemberg (1788-1857).

importance were very great.[12]



Plan of the Battle of Lubino

After leaving Smolensk, the situation of First Western Army, located on the Porechye road, became very grave, since the enemy, through a rapid forward movement, could cut them off from Prince Bagration's Second Army, retreating along the Dorogobuzh road. General Barclay de Tolly, aware of the importance of this factor, set off with the army on 6 [18] August at nine o'clock in the evening in two columns towards the Solovieva crossing, which he planned to reach in two stages. The first column was to march through Krakhotkina, Gedeonovo, Karely, Psartsy, Stupino to Bredikhino. The second, or left column, was to proceed through Zykolino, Popsilova, Marshulina and Sushchevo to Prudishche. As the army moved, the rearguard of the army, commanded by Adjutant General Korff,[13] was ordered to retreat little by little along the road along which the first column was proceeding. The Commander-in-Chief, knowing that the enemy could use the shortest route to forestall the right column at the road junction in Lubino and thereby prevent First Army from joining Second Army retreating towards the Solovieva crossing, ordered Major General Tuchkov 3rd to proceed by forced marches an hour before the army's departure with three Cossack regiments, the Yelisavetgrad Hussars, the 20th Jägers and 21st Jägers, the Reval Infantry and a company of horse artillery, and operate as protection for the Smolensk road.

At eight o'clock in the evening this detachment set off, sending the cavalry first, followed by the jägers and the Reval Infantry. The country lanes along which the detachment was moving mostly passed through forests, swamps and streams, across which, although bridges had been built, due to their poor state of repair, were only suitable for the weight of peasant carts, thus the detachment took 12 hours to cover 20 *versta* [13⅓ miles], and only reached the main Moscow road on 7 [19] August at eight o'clock in the morning. Having marched two or three *versta* [one or two miles] along the main road, the detachment stopped for a break near Latishino, on a hill called Valutina

12 Mitarevsky; Yermolov, Memoirs of the War of 1812; Military Science Archive, minute No. 29180.
13 Friedrich Nikolai Georg von Korff (1773-1823).

Gora. The 20th and 21st Jägers commanded by Major General Prince Shakhovsky were ordered to occupy the scrub on both sides of the road along the bank of the Stragan river; the Reval Infantry remained on the slopes of Valutina Gora with the artillery.

The detachment awaited the enemy in these positions. Appearing on the road at 11 o'clock, their skirmishers entered into a firefight with our jägers, thereafter occupying the high ground opposite us and opened heavy artillery fire on our guns placed on the slopes.

Fearing the loss of his guns, Tuchkov 3rd ordered them to be limbered up and retreated to the main position beyond the Stragan together with the hussars and jägers; during the retreat, he ordered the bridge to be demolished. The enemy, having ascended the high ground we had abandoned and having set up a strong battery on it, opened fire; the skirmishers sent by the enemy to clear the road for their column tried hard to displace our jägers from the scrub they were holding on the left side of the road, but all their efforts were unsuccessful and our jägers, taking advantage of their advantageous location, did not yield a single step to the enemy.

From five o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy did not make a move for more than two hours and it seemed that the whole action was also over by this time, when suddenly at seven o'clock in the evening they opened a fierce cannon bombardment and launched an attack with all the battalions they had set up against the centre of our line also with strong columns,[14] which was repulsed by our force. At nine o'clock, once it was already completely dark, the enemy rushed our position. Tuchkov 3rd led the grenadiers to engage them, being at their head, but he was wounded and taken prisoner; the approaching regiments of II Infantry Corps blocked the enemy and prevented them from going further.

The fighting ceased, the resolve and courage of the troops in Major General Tuchkov's detachment had triumphed over the enemy, who were not only held back, but also suffered heavy losses. Our objective had been achieved: First Army was extracted from its difficult situation and reached the Moscow road, where all its elements were reunited.

Over the previous three days, from 5 to 7 [17 to 19] August, the ranks of the 21st Jägers were thinned significantly: the regiment had lost more than a third of its available personnel, namely: at Smolensk on 5 and 6 [17 and 18] August: Captain Varnin, Lieutenant Kononovich and Sub-Lieutenant Shchukin were killed; Major Galsky suffered bullet wounds to the chest, Staff-Captain Kotlubay was wounded in the left arm, Lieutenant Basov in the right. Sub-Lieutenant Varnin in the left arm, Sub-Lieutenant Vasilevsky in the head, Captain Sorokin suffered a contusion of the spine, Captain Schmidt was missing in action; on 7 [19] August, Lieutenant Smolensky and Ensign Miller were killed, Sub-Lieutenant von der Launitz was wounded in the left shoulder, 364 lower ranks were killed, wounded or missing.[15]

The following were decorated for these actions: Captain Sorokin, Staff-Captain Kotlubay and Lieutenant Varnin received the Order of St. Anne 3rd class; Sub-Lieutenant Varnin was promoted lieutenant, Lieutenant Frolov and Sub-Lieutenant Kuchnev received Supreme Commendations.[16]

On 8 [20] August, First Army, having crossed the Dnieper at Solovieva over bridges, halted at Mikhalevka. The supply trains and our wounded were sent to Vyazma. On 9 [21] August, both armies continued their retreat along the main Moscow road.

The army rearguard, reinforced by 3rd Infantry Division, retreated towards Vyazma, being strongly pursued by the entire enemy cavalry and the corps under Marshal Davout. At this point the army rearguard, which had hitherto been commanded by the military Ataman General-of-Cavalry Platov, due to his illness was entrusted to Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn, who held Murat up for two

14 Russky Arkhiv, 1873, volume X. p. 1943-1947; P.A. Tuchkov 3rd's memoirs.
15 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 209, bundle 12, p. 5-7.
16 Moscow Archive, Awards, bundle 10, No. 2882 and No. 23, p. 17.

days in front of Vyazma and outside the city, which had been set on fire by the residents as they fled from it. The retreat by our rearguard was carried out in such a way that several horse artillery pieces would be deployed under the protection of cavalry in open areas and light infantry on rough terrain at every point that presented an advantage for artillery action. These guns, firing at the approaching enemy, forced them to form the strongest of batteries to face them and to deploy their units into battle order, but then quickly fell back and drew the attackers towards other guns, which operated as before. By evening, the troops would be located in the most advantageous position and could hold there until nightfall.[17]



Prince Golenishchev-Kutuzov.

The main French army was at Vyazma; the *Vice-roi* was on the left wing in Novoe, on the right, Poniatowski was in Pokrovskoe. In Tsarevo-Zaimishchse our men built fortifications once more and were preparing for battle.

At this time, the 21st Jägers were in the army rearguard under General Konovnitsyn. The regiment's manpower had melted away, so to speak; in its ranks one could count just: four field officers, 17

17 Bogdanovich, History of the Patriotic War, volume 2, p. 88 [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips].

subalterns, 28 non-commissioned officers, 437 privates and 32 draught horses, and this included a number of wounded who remained in the ranks of the regiment.[18]

The endless retreat by the army had shaken confidence in the Commander-in-Chief; his disagreement with Prince Bagration had reached its nadir. At this dispiriting time, news was received of the appointment of Kutuzov as Commander-in-Chief of all armies and about his imminent arrival with the troops.[19]

Barclay and Bagration were left in command of First and Second Armies.

On 11 [23] August, Prince Kutuzov set off for the army, accompanied by the blessings and prayers of the people, and on 17 [29] August he arrived in Gzhatsk [Gagarin], from where the next day he went to Tsarevo-Zaimishche. He rode round the units amidst shouts of delight. All eyes and hearts turned to their commander, Russian in name and spirit, who had shared the toils, glory, failures and all the vicissitudes of the fickle fortunes of war for half a century with the soldiers.

The Russian army was invigorated, everyone became more cheerful, everyone became more joyful and waited only for the order to confront the adversary. However, circumstances forced Kutuzov to retreat from Tsarevo-Zaimishche, because this location was found to be unfavourable. At the same time, it was necessary to replenish the regiments with new troops brought up by Miloradovich,[20] to link up with some of the *opolchenie* [militia] that had set out from Moscow to join the army, and to replenish their munitions and projectiles.

The retreat by Russian forces over a distance of about 300 *versta* [200 miles], from Smolensk to Borodino, was a remarkable example of maintaining good order and discipline in the units. Herzog Eugen von Württemberg testified in his memoirs:

> ‘The rearguard fought with constant courage and success; everyone was watching its every move; the regiments vied with each other for the honour of participating in the actions; at the staging posts and bivouacs the men were cheerful and happy, and worried only for the peasants, whom the war was depriving of shelter and the last of their possessions.’

The rearguard, retreating to Gzhatsk, halted on 19 [31] August in order to delay the enemy force pursuing it and fell far behind the main body. Murat and Davout, taking advantage of this, attacked Konovnitsyn persistently at the very time when he should have been crossing the vast forest near Gzhatsk, then across the city and the bridge on the Gzhat river, but thanks to our two mounted regiments, the enemy cavalry was put to flight.


Meanwhile, the Russian army was retreating and on 22 August [3 September] reached the village of Borodino, where Kutuzov decided to give battle solely because there were no better positions until Moscow itself.

On 24 August [5 September], the French moved from Gridnevo towards the Kolotsky Monastery. Murat’s vanguard attacked the rearguard units under Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn, who held the enemy off quite successfully, but when the Viceroy began to outflank us, Konovnitsyn was forced to withdraw the force entrusted to him beyond the Kolocha, where they rejoined the corps stationed in the position. In the evening, an attack took place on the Shevardino redoubt, built in front of the left flank of the Russian army in order to more easily protect it and operate on the enemy flank advancing along the main road. After desperate resistance that lasted until late at night, the redoubt was abandoned and occupied by the enemy.

The Borodino position is located 10 *versta* [6⅔ miles] west of Mozhaisk. Its front was covered by the Kolocha, while the centre was shielded partly by the Kolocha, and partly by the Semenovka and

18 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 209, bundle 67, minute No. 67, serial 34.
19 Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov (1747-1813).
20 Mikhail Andreevich Miloradovich (1771-1825).

Kamenka (now Svetenka) streams flowing into it through deep ravines. The position extended for about seven *versta* [4⅔ miles]. At Borodino it was crossed by the new Smolensk road, while at Utitsa it was crossed by the old road; both of them linked up at Mozhaisk. This position was strong on the right flank and partly in the centre and extremely weak on the left flank, which was especially important in strategic terms, because the basic idea of all Napoleon's operations had been to push us back in a northerly direction, cutting us off from Moscow and the southern provinces.



The Battle of Borodino.

By the contemporary lithographer Hermann.

At the beginning, Barclay de Tolly's First Army was located in the centre and on the right flank, while Bagration's army was on the left flank. The immediate outcome of the Shevardino battle was the reinforcement of our extremely exposed left flank on 25 August [6 September] by III Infantry Corps, which was moved from the general reserve to the extreme left flank at Utitsa, on the old Smolensk road; there remained a gap of a *versta* [⅔ miles], covered with forest between III Corps and the left flank of the main position; 11th, 20th, 21st and 41st Jägers were positioned in this space as a general linking force under the command of Major General Prince Shakhovsky. The Jägers were deployed in extended line.

The total strength of the Russian army was about 120,000 with 640 guns; Napoleon's was 130,000 with 587 guns.

25 August [6 September] was spent in preparation for battle. French units converged on the positions occupied by our forces. Prince Kutuzov dedicated this day to the spiritual preparation of the troops for the looming battle. He ordered the miraculous icon of the Mother of God, which had accompanied our troops since the day of their departure from Smolensk and was held by 3rd Infantry Division, to be carried along unit lines.

The holy icon proceeded slowly, thousands of pious warriors fell on their knees, making the sign of the cross and praying with fervour. The Commander-in-Chief, surrounded by his entire staff, met the icon and bowed to the ground before it; throughout the day he rode around the units and spoke to the soldiers, arousing in them the readiness to sacrifice themselves for the defence of the fatherland.[21]

21 Bogdanovich, volume 2, p. 126

The Russian army felt that it was entering a decisive battle: ‘the officers had put on clean underwear the night before, and the soldiers, who had saved their shirts for the occasion, did the same. These preparations were not being made for a feast.’[22]

A vodka ration was ordered to be issued to the soldiers, but many of the soldiers responded: ‘that is not how we prepare, not for a day such as tomorrow.’

At five o’clock in the morning of 26 August [7 September], Napoleon mounted his horse and galloped to the right flank of the force, where at that time his orders were being read out:

> ‘Warriors, this is the battle we have been waiting for. Victory is dependent on you. It is vital for us; it will provide us with everything we need, comfortable quarters and a speedy return to our homeland.
>
> Let future generations remember with pride your exploits on this day. Let them say of each of you: he was at the great battle at Moscow.’

The momentous day had finally arrived. The sun, shrouded by the fog, continued the deceptive calm on both sides until six o’clock in the morning. Its first rays illuminated the place where the firm chests of the Russians marked the final limit of this retreat, the place on which every enemy footprint must be washed away by rivers of blood. At six o’clock in the morning the first cannon shot was heard from the enemy side and this sound did not stop right up until sunset.

The French opened fire immediately from almost 120 guns and launched an attack on Borodino and the centre, whereupon they took control of Borodino on our right flank, where they consolidated.

At seven o’clock in the morning Ney led the attack; the French plan was revealed: the Russians saw significant masses of infantry and cavalry concentrated on the right bank of the Kolocha, especially against the *flèches* in front of the Semenovka, behind the enemy centre stood the *Garde*. And while our reinforcements were approaching, Ney, at about eight o’clock, attacked the *flèches* and took them; at nine o’clock Bagration, strengthened by reinforcements, took these fortifications back, but soon the French were established within them once more. At 11 o’clock Konovnitsyn’s division came up, which, despite lethal fire from the enemy batteries, boldly raced forward, drove out the French and took back the *flèches*, but Bagration was wounded at this point and his units fell into disarray, and at about half-past 11 o’clock the French finally took possession of the *flèches* and occupied Semenovskaya. At this time, the divisions under Broussier and Morand[23] captured the Raevsky battery, but by good fortune it was retaken by General Yermolov. Meanwhile, the fire on our left wing intensified hour by hour. The approaches to the latter were very difficult, because the enemy had to pass through dense forest and scrub with artillery and cavalry, through which there was not even a path, and upon exiting it, had to form up into attack columns within canister range of our positions. The result of all this was that the heads of the first enemy columns that appeared in front of our fortifications were always driven back by the lethal fire from our artillery, and Shakhovsky’s jägers holding the forest.


Poniatowski and his corps captured Utitsa, where they halted. Dessaix’s division attacked the jägers commanded by Prince Shakhovsky holding the scrub, while Friant’s division and Girardin’s cavalry formed reserves to reinforce the attackers.[24] Our artillery and jägers coolly awaited the enemy and, having let them approach within point-blank canister range, opened heavy fire on them, causing great devastation within their columns. However, this did not put an end to French aspirations. In view of the fact that the advantage was swinging from one side to the other, Napoleon decided to bring his reserves into battle, but at that moment he received news that the Russians had appeared to

22 Glinka, Letters of a Russian Officer.

23 Jean-Baptiste Broussier (1766-1814); Charles Antoine Louis Alexis Morand (1771-1835).

24 Józef Antoni Poniatowski (1763-1813); Joseph Maire Dessaix (1764-1834); Louis Friant (1758-1829); Alexandre Louis Robert de Girardin d’Ermenonville (1776-1855).

his rear. The reason for this alarm was General Uvarov's attack on the left wing of the enemy army.[25]



The Battle of Borodino

26 August [7 September] 1812.

Napoleon, having learned of this attack, halted the attack on the Raevsky battery, and as a result lost about two hours in inaction; and during this time the Russian forces were able to consolidate, transferring IV Corps from the right flank into the space between the aforementioned battery and Semenovskaya.

At three o'clock in the afternoon Napoleon ordered a renewed attack on the Raevsky battery, which after a stubborn battle was eventually taken by the French.

At this time on the left flank, Junot's corps, consisting of divisions under General Ochs and General Tharreau,[26] intended to drive off our 11th, 20th, 21st and 41st Jägers holding out in the scrub. Shakhovsky, supported by the Minsk Infantry, moved forward with his jägers, but was engaged by lethal fire from the French and was forced to retreat, with the aforementioned regiments suffering heavy losses. Whereupon our II Corps, which had just arrived, forced the French to retreat. At that moment, the commander of III Corps, Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st, was mortally wounded and General Baggovut took command of the corps, who, foreseeing the danger of being isolated, fell back more than a *versta* [⅔ mile] along the old Smolensk road and took up positions level with the left wing of the army.

By six o'clock in the evening the Russians were holding a line one *versta* [⅔ mile] behind their original positions.

The Commander-in-Chief had intended to resume the battle the next day, but the losses were enormous. The total number of casualties was: Russians some 44,000 killed and wounded, French some 40,000. This convinced the Commander-in-Chief that it was unfeasible to defend himself any

25 Fyodor Petrovich Uvarov (1773-1824).

26 Jean-Androche Junot (1771-1813); Adam Ludwig von Ochs (1759-1823); Jean-Victor Tharreau (1767-1812).

longer with the forces remaining in the line without being exposed to the obvious danger of being driven back into the Moskva river by an attack from the enemy right wing.



Therefore, he ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk.[27]

In the regiment, Staff-Captain Kvashnevich, one non-commissioned officer, one musician and 20 privates had been killed; the regimental commander, Major Stepanov had a bullet wound to the left arm, sub-lieutenants Varnin and Malinin were also wounded in the left arm, Major Rykov suffered an head contusion, Lieutenant Reikhel from the combined grenadier battalion had been wounded in the right arm lieutenants Borodin in the left thigh, Gutovsky in the right leg, Major Kanishchev in the right thigh and Lieutenant Rozlach had a head wound; 11 non-commissioned officers, four musicians and 93 privates were also wounded; one non-commissioned officer and 38 privates were missing in action.

The following awards were made for this battle: the colonel-in-chief, Colonel Plattsev received the Order of St. Vladimir 3rd class; Major Rykov the Order of St. Anne 3rd class; Major Shchutskoy and Captain Buschen the Order of St. Vladimir 4 class on a ribbon; Captain Derevyanko, Staff-Captain Mochulsky, Lieutenant Reikhel and Sub-Lieutenant Varnin the Order of St. Anne 3rd class.[28]

1812 Memorial on Borodino Field.

The lower ranks of the 21st Jägers were awarded 27 Military Order medals; unfortunately, no list of names of those to whom these were awarded could be found.[29]

The survivors of 3rd Infantry Division remaining with the Colours numbered:

	Field Officers	Subalterns	Non-Commissioned Officers	Privates	TOTAL
Chernigov Infantry	2	14	35	326	378
Murom Infantry	1	5	10	107	130
Reval Infantry	1	13	29	211	283
Selenginsk Infantry	1	5	11	72	89
20th Jägers	2	24	33	338	425
21st Jägers	3	14	14	243	294

27 Bogdanovich, volume 2, p. 130-131, 133, 136-141, 147, 157-158; Glinka, Memoirs of a Russian Officer; Yermolov's Notes; Description of the Fighting at Borodino, published 1839.

28 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, awards, serials No. 17, No. 12, p. 345-346.

29 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, bundle 208, minutes 7 and 8, No. 27, in the library.

His Imperial Majesty, as a token of his favour for the victory won over the enemy on 26 August [7 September], most graciously granted all the lower ranks who were in the battle five roubles per man.

A more detailed description of the operations by the 21st Jäger Regiment in the Battle of Borodino has not been preserved, but the losses cited above indicate that the regiment took a most active part in this battle.

Early on the morning of 27 August [8 September], 21st Jägers, as part of 3rd Infantry Division, took part in the general retreat to Moscow, where on 1 [13] September, according to the popular belief of the Russians, they were to fight the enemy and win or die...

At five o'clock in the afternoon the Field Marshal held a council of war in his quarters in Fili, where the following question was raised: should he give battle in a disadvantageous position or retreat beyond Moscow? Opinions were divided. Kutuzov made the following decision, declaring to those assembled: 'The loss of Moscow, does not signify the loss of Russia; I make it my first duty to save the army, to get closer to our reinforcements and to prepare the inevitable demise of the enemy through the surrender of Moscow itself, and therefore I intend, having passed Moscow, to retreat along the Ryazan road.' He planned on reaching the old road to Kaluga from the Ryazan road by way of a secret flanking movement and to settle down in an advantageous position, covering the southern governorates and at the same time threatening the enemy right flank and rear.

On 2 [14] September, at three o'clock in the morning, the army, having only the Dragomilov bridge to retreat across, set off for Moscow in a single column in strict order and silence.

> 'From the elevated bank of the Moskva river near the Dragomilov bridge, one could observe the movement of the troops. Kutuzov rode calmly and majestically, and our regiments, gripped with astonishment, dragged on in deep silence, expressing neither despair nor indignation. They were still thinking they would at least fight in Moscow for Moscow. 'Let us outflank them' the soldiers reasoned among themselves. But the sight of Moscow, as the final few of the majority of the population abandoned it, did not permit any doubt of the sad truth. The remaining inhabitants of Moscow timidly asked: 'where are you going?'
>
> 'Outflanking' some answered. 'It is none of our business, the commanders know how.' The soldiers marched mournfully in their ranks, the generals and officers at their posts. During the passage of units along the embankment between the Kremlin wall and the river, the Commander-in-Chief of First Army stood at the masonry bridge to monitor their progress. The poor Muscovites pushed back and forth in confusion and fright. 'The army is leaving us' they said: 'let us go with them.'[30]

Leaving Moscow was dreadful.

The still, cloudless day gave it a dreamlike quality; the sun played benignly on the gilded crosses and domes of Moscow churches.

Nature took no part in the conflict between nations and its mood was not in harmony with the mood of our army.[31]

One eyewitness stated that soldiers and officers cried as they marched through the streets of Moscow. Kutuzov was handing it over to the enemy's mercy and if Barclay de Tolly had done this, there would certainly have been a mutiny among the troops (General Kovalevsky's papers).

While passing through the Kremlin, some of the commanders ordered: 'halt, remove headdress, pray.'

30 Glinka, Notes on 1812, p. 67.

31 Lyubetsky, Russia and the Russians in 1812.



French Forces Enter Moscow

Engraving by Bovinet, painting by Couche, in the collection of P.Ya. Dashkov.

Our troops had barely crossed Moscow before all the streets they had passed were again covered with carts, carriages and crowds of pedestrians heading towards the gatehouses on the opposite side to the Dragomilov suburb.[32]

On that same day, the French army entered Moscow behind our force at four o'clock in the afternoon, so that as the last Russian units were passing along the embankment by the orphanage, enemy troops were already in the Kremlin.[33]

Late in the evening, the 21st Jägers reached Panki, 15 *versta* [10 miles] from Moscow, where they went into bivouacs. The broad canopy of night had already begun to cover the entire surrounding area. Suddenly, over Moscow, it seemed as if dawn was breaking and its light began to spread more and more, brighter and brighter, the whole city stood as if under a fiery vault, but was soon darkened by black clouds of smoke.

Suddenly a scarlet flame flared up and the slender bell tower of Ivan the Great and the dark pyramid peak of the Sukharev Tower were clearly outlined on the horizon. Soon the flames grew into a whole sea of fire and a fiery rain of sparks poured from of it. Moscow was drowning in them. Everyone shuddered with horror. The soldiers cried out in despair as they looked at burning Moscow: 'Lord, what is this? Merciful intercessor, holy saints, our mother Moscow is burning. Burning, brothers, like a candle before God.'[34]

This terrible sight increased the soldiers' and officers' melancholy: it seemed like a personal

32 Glinka, Notes on 1812, p. 284.
33 From Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky's papers, Tutolmin's report; Military Science Archive of the General Staff.
34 Lyubetsky, Russia and the Russians in 1812.

reproach. Dejection noticeably took hold of everyone. Silence reigned in the bivouac. There was no singing to be heard, that constant companion of the Russian soldier; they were even reluctant to speak, as if ashamed of themselves, as if afraid of a comrade's reproach. But what for? Are you to reproach yourselves, heroes of Borodino? You did your job faithfully and no one will blame you if you did not do what was beyond human strength.

The night was dark and moonless,
The army dull and joyless;
The soldiers all in thought immersed,
Pensive, bitterly wept.
The great wonder had occurred:
The soldiers' tears flowed like rain.

That is how one of the soldiers' songs expressed the mood of the Russian army at that time.[35]

Miloradovich's rearguard, having stood at Vyazovka all day on 3 [15] September, retreated to Panki after dark. Murat followed them without a fight, while Napoleon remained in Moscow with the main body. Robbery, drunkenness and debauchery kept the enemy army in Moscow.

Having completed two stages along the Ryazan road, our rearguard turned west. On 5 [17] September, having rested the day before at the Borovsky ferry, they left the Ryazan road and turned, following the right bank of the Pakhra, towards Podolsk on the Tula road.

The crossing at the Borovsky ferry was extremely difficult due to the large number of vehicles; although orders had been issued to turn them towards Kasimov, and prevent them from crossing, there was no way of stopping them.

On 15 [27] September, the army reached Babenkova, where they halted for three days. On 17 [29] September, the rearguard endured a bitter fight with Murat's detachment at Chirikovo, delaying their advance.

On 20 September [2 October], the army, having crossed the Nara river, entered the famous Tarutino camp; with their arrival, a new, brighter era of the war had begun. The words of the Field Marshal, 'from now on, not a step back' spread like lightning throughout the entire army, inflamed the soldiers with new courage, gave birth to new hope and joy. The boundless trust that the army and the people had in His Serene Highness did not permit the slightest doubt that the time of Russia's grave trials had passed and that the time of triumph and vengeance was about to begin. But before proceeding to vindicate popular expectations, Prince Kutuzov wanted to restore order in the army, which had been disrupted by three months of retreat, bloody battles, and the clash of personalities over the division of the force into two armies.[36]

As they retreated along the Kaluga road, the troops understood Kutuzov's desire to sever the French line of retreat from Moscow in this way and were extremely happy, perceiving that Moscow had been given to the French for this very reason and began to praise the Field Marshal with various plaudits. The soldiers were also none too delicate in their praise, saying: 'Well done old man Kutuzov, he outwitted Bonaparte no matter how cunning he tried to be.' 'Kutuzov is a seasoned veteran.' 'Kutuzov is a wily fox.' And so on.

During the army's short stay at Tarutino, the regiment was in a hurry to put its equipment in order, as well as to repair and stock up on warm clothing where possible, since it was getting noticeably cooler, and no one imagined the war ending soon. Here the troops were given winter trousers of different types, from peasant cloth: trousers were sewn from this material in white, grey and black;

35 Lyubetsky, Russia and the Russians in 1812; History of the Lifeguard Lithuania Regiment.
36 Military Encyclopaedic Lexicon, volume X, p. 89.

officers also sewed for themselves: some made overcoats, some a raincoat, some a cape; they even sewed boots.

The soldiers had become very shabby during the campaign and were wearing worn-out greatcoats and tunics. Their shakos were kept under covers, their equipment was not being cleaned, no attention was paid to this and only the serviceability of their weapons and the supply of shells and cartridges were strictly monitored.

There were no tents in the camps, but only shelters made of brushwood and straw. In general, there was no decoration, gilding or silver in the camp, epaulettes were rarely seen; only muskets, sabres and artillery pieces were polished.

There were no rich and fashionable uniforms to be seen, just felt boots, rough cloth capes, dirty and torn greatcoats, and crumpled forage caps.

There were no boastful outpourings against the French among the soldiers and officers, only when talking about them they clenched their fists and shook them, thinking: 'When we meet, we shall show them.'

Due to the large number of men killed in the divisions of the active army, they had to be replenished, as a result, two regiments were ordered to be sent from each division: one of musketeers and one of jägers to form new units; to that end, the jäger regiments assigned to the extreme left flank of the divisions, namely: 18th, 21st, 34th, 36th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, 50th, were supposed to allocate a certain number of officers and lower ranks to form a cadre, and transfer the rest of the men to replenish the division's regiments; the cadres were to proceed to the commander of the reserves, General-of-Infantry Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky,[37] to be replenished with recruits from the 1812 conscription. The 21st Jägers were assigned for this purpose from 3rd Division (alone from 3rd Division), which by this time had the following composition, in eight companies: 53 officers, 74 non-commissioned officers and 1,403 privates on the rolls; 35 officers, 53 non-commissioned officers and 883 privates sick;[38] 18 officers, 21 non-commissioned officers and 570 privates present (of these men, two officers and 138 privates were from the Moscow *Opolchenie* and 22 were recruits).

The following personnel were assigned to form the cadre of the 21st Jäger Regiment: colonel-in-chief of the regiment, Colonel Plattsev, captains Buschen and Sorokin, lieutenants Reikhel and Plaksenko (the latter three had arrived from the combined grenadier battalion with one non-commissioned officer and six support staff), sub-lieutenants Shamshev and Malinin, and ensigns Arapov and Chernovsky. Six non-commissioned officers, 11 musicians and 60 privates, who had gone to Nizhny Novgorod in early October, and later to Arzamas.

Forty-four field officers and subalterns, 68 non-commissioned officers and 1,332 privates went to replenish the 20th Jägers, which included all the sick and wounded from the regiment, as well as recruits and Moscow *Opolchenie*; these officers were listed as seconded to this regiment for a long time; and of these officers, 34 were only permanently transferred to the 20th Jägers on 16 [28] June 1813 (Supreme Orders for 1813).

During the Patriotic Wars of 1812-1814, these officers and enlisted men, remembering the legacy of their native 21st Jägers, repeatedly upheld its honour in various battles where the 20th Jägers took part, which is attested to in the history of this regiment (later the 103rd Petrozavodsk Regiment), namely on 6 [18] October for the battle at Tarutino, Major Rykov received the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class, Major Shchutskoy received a Golden Sword for valour, Sub-Lieutenant Zvyagin and Ensign Lopatin were promoted, Ensign Libert received the Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

37 Dmitry Ivanovich Lobanov-Rostovsky (1758-1838).

38 680 men were in the main hospital, 19 in Minsk, 90 in Vilna, one in Karachaev, one in Kozel, 45 in Vitebsk, four in Kaluga, 32 in Smolensk, 11 in Mozhaisk, for a total of 883 (Moscow Archive of the General Staff, monthly returns).

On 13 [25] October, near Maloyaroslavets, Sub-Lieutenant Kosyak and Sub-Lieutenant Libert distinguished themselves; commanding the skirmishers at the village of Ignatievskoe, they fought off a cavalry attack that wanted to capture our guns.

On 28 October [9 November], at the battle at Lyakhovo, Lieutenant Zvyagin and Sub-Lieutenant Lopatin were awarded the Order of St. Anne, 3rd class.

For distinction in actions during the pursuit of the French, Major Rykov and Staff-Captain Mochulsky received the Order of St. Anne 2nd class.

Sub-Lieutenant Lopatin was promoted one rank for distinguished service in Seslavin's partisan detachment.

Napoleon's army, deprived of provisions in Moscow, was hoping for peace and stayed there for about five weeks. But soon military operations, begun by our army from Tarutino, deprived Napoleon of this hope. It became necessary to consider retreating from Russia, which, in the end, turned into a rout. Fatigue, hunger and frosts of more than 20 degrees completed the demise of the army, which lost the last vestiges of military organisation on the battlefield at Studyanka. Napoleon himself, realising that all was lost, abandoned his army and went to Paris to form new forces.

Our army, pursuing the enemy, took Vilna on 28 November [10 December], filled with thousands of enemy sick.

In early [mid] December, the last remnants of the French army crossed the Russian border.

From the start of military operations, the replacement battalion of the 21st Jägers, under the command of Major Yelistratov, was in Bauske near Mitau [Jelgava] among other units and came under the command of the Riga military governor General Essen 1st in Major General Velyaminov's division.[39] The strength of this battalion was two field officers, 17 subalterns 38 non-commissioned officers, 16 musicians, 771 privates and 36 support personnel.

This battalion was involved in operations against the leading enemy units: on 24 July [5 August] at Eckau [Iecava], on 6 [18] August at Sanktney and on 10 [22] August at Altkirchen [*sic*, Dahlenkirchen].

Upon the arrival of Steinheil's Finland Corps,[40] General Essen's detachment was ordered to leave an essential garrison in Riga and send a detachment along the left bank of the Dvina towards Friedrichstadt [Jaunjelgava] in order to distract Macdonald's attention; while the Finland Corps, having set out for Eckau, would attempt to capture the enemy siege artillery and then, taking the direction of Bauske, open a strong offensive together with the Friedrichstadt detachment towards Vidzy and Vilna. But this operation could not be fully executed because Steinheil had far fewer troops than previously assumed, and since his detachment turned out to be significantly weaker than Macdonald's detachment, the original plan was amended.

According to the new plan, it was decided to attack Yorck's detachment,[41] which was monitoring Riga. To that end our forces set off from Riga in three columns, and on 14 [26] September the main column of 19,000 men from the Finland Corps and the Riga garrison, including the replacement battalion of the 21st Jägers, headed for Dahlenkirchen. On 15 [27] September, Yorck stubbornly held out against Count Steinheil, then retreated beyond the river Aa [Lielupe] and settled between Bauske and Ruhenthal [Pilsrundāle], where Graf Kleist[42] and his detachment had rushed from Mitau in order to assist them. While the Prussians were thus assembling their forces, our generals weakened theirs by sending Colonel Eckeln's detachment of 3,000 men to Mitau. Yorck, taking

39 Ivan Alexandrovich Velyaminov (1771-1837).
40 Fabian Gotthard von Steinheil (1762-1831).
41 Johann David Ludwig von Yorck (1759-1830).
42 Friedrich Emil Ferdinand Heinrich von Kleist (1762-1823).

advantage of this mistake, moved down the Aa, crossed the river on 18 [30] September at Mesothen [Mežotne], following a rearguard action at Annenburg [Emburga], forced Steinheil to retreat to Olai [Olaine]; our remaining detachments also hastened to retreat to Riga.

This unsuccessful expedition, which cost us some 1,900 killed, missing and 578 wounded, ruined the attempt to carry out the operational plan presented by the Tsar. In these actions, the losses to the replacement battalion were given as: one non-commissioned officer and 38 privates killed; the commander of 6th Jäger Company, Captain Zagryadsky wounded and 59 lower ranks missing in action.

Subsequently, during the retreat of enemy forces from Russia, the replacement battalion of the 21st Jägers, as part of the formation under General Löwis,[43] set off from Riga in the footsteps of Macdonald's corps, operating on the offensive; General Löwis' force joined up with Wittgenstein's formation at Königsberg on 24 December 1812 [5 January 1813].[44]

Thus ended one of the greatest military enterprises in world history, which was shattered by the unwavering resolve of the Russian people and their boundless devotion and love for the crown and homeland.[45]

A medal was established as a memorial to Russia's liberation from the invasion of all the nations of Western Europe, intended to be worn by all those who participated in the battles of 1812, from Commander-in-Chief to ordinary soldier.

The Emperor issued the following manifesto regarding the establishment of this medal, which, among other things, stated:

> 'Warriors, in commemoration of your exploits, we have ordered that a silver medal be struck and consecrated, which, on a blue ribbon and with the inscription of the so memorable year just past of 1812, should adorn your chests which were the unconquerable shield of the fatherland. Each of you is worthy to bear this badge of honour, this testimony of hard work, courage and participation in glory; for you all bore the burden equally and drew breath with singular valour. You can rightly be proud of this medal: it shows that you have been blessed by God, as true sons of the fatherland. Let your enemies, seeing it on your chest, tremble, knowing that beneath it burns courage, not based on fear or self-interest, but on love for Faith and Fatherland and is, therefore, invincible.'[46]


Emperor Alexander I, wishing to perpetuate the memory of the Patriotic War of Liberation, decided to build the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, which was completed during the reign of Emperor Alexander III and consecrated on 26 May [7 June] 1883. In the lower aisle, 177 marble slabs were placed on the walls, which describe the course of military operations of the wars from 1812 to 1814 in chronological order, listing all the actions, the designations of the units that took part in them, the names of the killed and wounded officers and those who distinguished themselves and the total number of enlisted men *hors de combat*, and so on. The participation of the 21st Jäger Regiment and the officers who served in it is mentioned here (although with some errors).

43 Friedrich von Löwis of Menar (1767-1824).

44 Bogdanovich, volume 3; Military Encyclopaedic Lexicon, volume X, p. 92; Moscow Archive of the General Staff, monthly returns, reports and service records.

45 A.N. Petrov, Russian Armed Forces, volume 2, p. 291-292.

46 Bogdanovich, volume 3, appendix XXVII, p. 324-325.



Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow.

CHAPTER 7.

The War of 1813.

The necessity of continuing the war. - The border crossing by Russian forces. - Participation of officers from the regiment in the battles of Lützen and Göda. - The armistice. - The departure of the 21st Jäger Regiment for the theatre of military operations. - The regiment in General Roth's vanguard. - The action on 10 [22] August. - The regiment in the two-day Battle of Dresden. - The retreat of the Army of Bohemia. - Losses and awards.

The 21st Jäger Regiment, under the command of colonel-in-chief, Colonel Plattsev, as was stated above, marched from Tarutino to Arzamas in the Nizhny Novgorod Governorate and, upon arrival, immediately began to reform the 21st Jägers. The task was not easy. Recruits began to arrive to reconstitute the regiment, of whom 225 men had arrived by 24 October [5 November], 377 men in November, 70 men by 13 [25] December, so that by 1 [13] January 1813, the regiment included 11 field officers and subalterns, 21 non-commissioned officers, 22 musicians, 672 recruits, 95 support personnel, for a total of 821 men.

The recruits were arriving from the Nizhny Novgorod, Yekaterinoslav, Zhitomir and Kiev governorates. Upon reaching the regiment they were immediately given pouches with cross-belts, and knapsacks. The recruits were forbidden from selling the boots, warm foot-cloths, mittens and sheepskin coats they had been issued, and the sheepskin coats were tailored for wearing under their greatcoats. Muskets with accoutrements of various kinds were delivered to the regiment gradually, so at first not everyone had them. In December, the regiments being reformed, including the 21st Jägers, were transferred from the Nizhny Novgorod Governorate to the Chernigov Governorate and were positioned between the Dnieper and Sozh rivers in order to be closer to the border.[1]

After clearing the enemy from the borders of Russia at the end of 1812, some of our units continued to pursue them by various routes to the Vistula, while the other corps of the main army, having rested a little from the exertions they had endured since Moscow itself in cantonments in Lithuania, also set off for the border; on 1 [13] January 1813, they crossed the Neman at Merecz [Merkinė], where the Field Marshal issued that famous order in which, in the name of Russia, he greeted each soldier as a liberator of the fatherland and said: 'that it was necessary to complete the defeat of the enemy in their own fields.' With these words the whole secret of the campaign was revealed.

The army proceeded along the following routes towards the Vistula: the Main Army to Polotsk; Wittgenstein's via Königsberg to Marienwerder [Kwidzyn], while Admiral Chichagov, who was in the central position, via Guttstadt and Löbau to Thorn, one corps marched on Warsaw.

The military operations in early [mid] January had the immediate objective of destroying the remnants of enemy forces on the nearside of the Vistula and of facilitating our link up with Prussian units through our appearance on the left bank of the river.[2]

Failure to comply with the articles of the Treaty of Tilsit gave Prussia a pretext to declare war on Napoleon, and on 16 [28] February, a treaty of alliance was concluded between Prussia and Russia in Kalisz.

Russia pledged to contribute 150,000 troops, and Prussia about 60,000.

Command of Prussian forces was entrusted to General Blücher,[3] while Kutuzov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Coalition forces.[4]

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1 Military Science Archive, No. 310, p. 2 and returns on the arrival of recruits.
2 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the Campaign of 1813, p. 8.
3 Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher (1742-1819).
4 Bobdanovich, History of the War of 1813, volume 1 [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips].

The French forces occupying the capital of Prussia under the command of the *Vice-roi* withdrew beyond the Saale river and by the end of March had concentrated 40,000 men in the vicinity of Magdeburg. In the meantime, Napoleon had also not been wasting time and by early [mid] April he had managed to assemble a new army of 128,000 men in the Main valley.[5]

Prince Kutuzov had initially intended to transfer the war to Germany immediately, but due to circumstances he was forced to amend his intentions and even in the final days of his life he was advising not to go far beyond the Elbe and not to disperse the Coalition forces.

The Coalition advanced very slowly and only concentrated between Leipzig and Borna as a result of rumours of Napoleon's approach on 18 [30] April. The 3rd Infantry Division together with the 4th Division had been subordinated to II Corps since 3 [15] November 1812, the commander of which was Prinz Eugen von Württemberg, and included the 20th Jägers, in which men from the 21st Jägers were also serving.

II Corps, being in the vanguard under General Wintzingerode,[6] occupied Lützen. On the eve of the Battle of Lützen, the death of Prince Kutuzov, who passed in Bunzlau [Bolesławiec] on 16 [28] April, became known. Everyone was deeply saddened. Later, the Prussian King erected a monument in Bunzlau with an inscription in Russian and German: 'Prince Kutuzov-Smolensky led his victorious forces to this place. Yet death put an end to his days of glory. He saved his fatherland and cleared the way for the deliverance of Europe. Blessed be the memory of the hero.'

Having taken Kutuzov's place, Count Wittgenstein attacked Napoleon at Lützen, but the battle at this town did not have the desired outcome. In this situation, the Coalition decided to retreat, which they did on the night of 21 April [3 May]. All their formations retreated to the Elbe, and in late April [early May] they moved beyond it completely.

Napoleon, following the Prussians and Russians, occupied the capital of Saxony, Dresden, on 30 April [12 May]. The Coalition, who had retreated even further to the east, took up positions at Bautzen in early [mid] May, deciding to halt the onward French advance, but due to the superiority of the French army, the Coalition army, after the Battle of Bautzen on 9 [21] May, retreated to Silesia, where they settled in the vicinity of Schweidnitz [Świdnica]. Napoleon's main forces were located along a sector between Dresden and Glogau [Głogów]. A truce was concluded under these circumstances in Neumarkt [Środa Śląska] on 21 May [2 June], until 8 [20] July, which was subsequently extended into August.

During this truce, Austria and Sweden joined the Coalition against Napoleon. Thus, when hostilities resumed, the Coalition forces amounted to 500,000, while Napoleon had some 440,000 men.[7]

The men from the 21st Jägers, who had gone to replenish the 20th Jäger Regiment in accordance with the Supreme Command dated 25 September [7 October] 1812, apparently constituted a distinct battalion within this regiment during the campaign of 1813, since some printed sources mention that the 21st Jägers participated in the Battle of Lützen, at Göda on 3 [15] May, and at Reichenbach on 10 [22] May (Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1813, volume 1, p. 179, 209-210, 257, 259).

Over this same period, awards for distinction in combat were received: a Golden Sword inscribed *за храбрость* for Major Rykov on 25 April [7 May]; the Order of St. Valdimir 4th class for Captain Zvyagin, and the Order of St. Anne 3rd class for Ensign Tsydzik on 9 [21] May.

During the described military operations, the 21st Jägers, being reconstituted under the command of the regiment's colonel-in-chief, Colonel Plattsev, continued to stay in Chernigov Governorate, whereupon on 1 [13] March, part of this regiment, namely the 3rd battalion, under the command of

5 Petrov, Russian Armed Forces, volume 2, p. 294.
6 Ferdinand von Wintzingerode (1770-1818).
7 Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1813, volume 1; Petrov, Russian Armed Forces, volume 1, p. 296.

Captain Buschen, set off to reinforce our active army. In addition to this commander, the battalion included: 13 subalterns, 56 non-commissioned officers, 720 privates with muskets, 46 without and 17 musicians, for a total of 853 men; this battalion was heading to Warsaw in a detachment under Major General Bashutsky.[8] During the march, as with other military units, there were a lot of sick, so the small arms, equipment and even the uniforms of these sick men had to be transported on carts, which were difficult to find; as a result, the carts had to be driven several stages.

The sick had to be left in hospitals along the way. Thus, during this march the following from the battalion died: eight non-commissioned officers, one musician, 181 privates, three support personnel. As a result, the battalion arrived in Warsaw two days later than scheduled.

The battalion was inspected by General Neverovsky upon arrival in Warsaw, and a separate building was set aside for the surplus equipment, where it was held in storage.

On 23 April [5 May], the 3rd battalion, as part of the detachment with the Polotsk Infantry under Major Peshchansky, proceeded through Kalisz to Steinau [Ścinawa] along the following march-route:[9]

25 April [7 May] - Mkdonow - 21 *versta* [14 miles].
27 April [9 May] - Stefanow - 23 *versta* [15 miles].
28 April [10 May] - Głowno - 28 *versta* [19 miles].
29 April [11 May] - Zgierz - 27 *versta* [18 miles].
1 [13] May - Lutomiersk - 19 *versta* [13 miles].
2 [14] May - Szadek - 20 *versta* [13 miles].
4 [16] May - Warta - 24 *versta* [16 miles].
5 [17] May - Staw - 17 *versta* [11 miles].
6 [18] May - Kalisz - 21 *versta* [14 miles].
8 [20] May - Ostrowo - 24 *versta* [16 miles].
9 [21] May - Sulmierzyce - 11 *versta* [seven miles].
11 [23] May - Militsch [Milicz] - 20 *versta* [13 miles].
12 [24] May - Trachenberg [Żmigród] - 25 *versta* [17 miles].
13 [25] May - Winzig [Wińsko] - 21 *versta* [14 miles].
14 [26] May - Steinau - 15 *versta* [10 miles].

For a total of 21 days, 349 versta [233 miles].

Once our troops had crossed the border into Prussia, by agreement with the government, the regiment's ranks received provisions, fodder, wine and meat allowances along the way from magazines against receipts. The lower ranks were given one *charka* [4⅓ fluid ounces] of vodka and a half *funt* [seven ounces] of meat per day.

There was a tariff for officers, according to which they could demand meat allowances for themselves: four rations for colonels, 3½ for lieutenant colonels, three for majors, 2½ for captains and staff-captains, and two for lieutenants, sub-lieutenants and ensigns.

They could receive prepared meals by prior arrangement with their quartering hosts, but then they were not allowed to draw allowances from provisions magazines; in the event of a shortage of cereals, these could be substituted with beans.

Having crossed the frontier dividing Poland from Prussia, a more pleasant vista presented itself to the eyes of our troops, who bade farewell to the wretched forests. There are fewer forests here, and those that are occasionally found could be called woods; the land is so populated that there are attractive villages every two *versta* [1⅓ miles]. Almost every one of them had a tavern, although not

8 Pavel Yakovlevich Bashutsky (1771-1836).
9 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, No. 1892, p. 15.

a wealthy one, but where you could get coffee, good butter, decent *Bratwurst*, sausage, and such like. There was cleanliness and regularity everywhere about the village homes, surrounded by gardens.[10]

Officials, townspeople and villagers all tried to please us as best they could; every city, every town, without being notified in advance of our arrival, hurried to treat our soldiers with whatever they could: some hosted balls, and some with lunches and dinners.

Our soldiers were housed in quarters in the cities and villages where they were given excellent rooms with soft furnishings and mirrors. During dinner they sat at tables covered with tablecloths and instead of the *artel* cauldron, a small serviette with silver-plated cutlery was placed in front of each of them. The food consisted mostly of German *wasser-suppe* [consommé] and lamb with prunes. But such fare did not always suit Russian stomachs, and therefore, in addition to these meals, the soldiers received milk, butter and cheese.

Such a purely Russian diet surprised the good-natured Germans quite a bit. After dinner they served beer, and before it, wine or vodka, but the vodka was from potatoes and so weak that a Russian, accustomed to drinking a good *charka* [4⅓ fluid ounces] of neat vodka before dinner, had to drink a tumbler [half pint] of German vodka. The Germans were often horrified when they saw that our soldiers could drink a quart or more of their vodka without harm.

Encountering such satiation in everything, our soldiers, laughing among themselves, commented: 'what kind of life are we living, brothers, in this campaign it is as if we are moving from one friend to another. Our grandfathers were never so honoured as we are now.'[11]

The 21st Jäger Regiment rejoined the army during the armistice, becoming part of 3rd Division and was stationed in Bögendorf [Witoszów], Polnik, Weistritz [Bystrzyca] and Pilzen [Boleścin]. By 26 May [7 June], the 21st Jägers included: 11 subalterns, 45 non-commissioned officers, 423 privates for a total of 479 men, the deficient 374 men remained in various hospitals along the route (some of these rejoined the regiment later).[12]

The Coalition forces were deployed as follows:

1. The main Army of Bohemia was stationed in Bohemia, at Budin [Budyně nad Ohří] with a strength of 237,000, commanded by the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, *Feldmarschal* Prinz Schwarzenberg.
2. The Army of Silesia, some 100,000 strong, commanded by Blücher, concentrated between Schweidnitz and Ohlau [Oława].
3. The Army of the North under the Crown Prince of Sweden [Bernadotte], 150,000 strong, stationed around Berlin.

At the end of the armistice, as the Russian army moved to join the Austrians in order to envelope the right flank of the enemy defensive line, II Corps under the command of Prinz Eugen von Württemberg and consisting of 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions, was reassigned to the Army of Bohemia, and set off from cantonment quarters in Dittmannsdorf [Dziećmorowice] for Bohemia on 28 July [9 August], proceeding via Landeshut [Kamienna Góra], Trautenau [Trutnov], Neupaka [Nová Paka], Sobotka, Jungbunzlau [Mladá Boleslav], to Melnik [Mělník].

II Corps proceeded in three columns and, due to the poor roads, had no wheeled vehicles, which proceeded with the second column. In Landeshut, II Corps was inspected by His Imperial Majesty.

10 Radozhitskii, The Memoirs of a Russian Artilleryman, volume 2, chapter 2 [English translation by Dr. Mikaberidze and P.G.A. Phillips].
11 Radozhitskii, The Memoirs of a Russian Artilleryman, volume 2, p.42.
12 Military Science Archive, No. 2120. p. 87, and No. 2052, p. 56.

On 6 [18] August at six o'clock in the morning 3rd Infantry Division set off from Hirschberg [Doksy, 10 miles south of Böhmisch Leipa] for Gastorf [Hoštka, 10 miles east of Leitmeritz]; the column only brought cartridge caissons, while the trains proceeded behind the entire column. By 7 [19] August, the entire Army of Bohemia had assembled at Budin, from where they set off for Saxony on 10 [22] August in four columns. The first, consisting of I and II Infantry Corps, commanded by General-of-Cavalry Wittgenstein, was directed via Teplitz [Teplice] and Nollendorf [Nakléřov] towards Dresden.

In order to shield the movements of the force, the first column was preceded by a vanguard commanded by Major General Roth,[13] composed of Rodionov's Cossacks, the Grodno Hussars, 7th Horse Artillery Company, and 20th, 21st, 25th, 26th and 36th Jägers. Roth began offensive operations at dawn along the road to Königstein and Pirna. The main mission of the vanguard was to follow the road to Pirna, seize this location, and reconnoitre beyond the Elbe as far as possible.

II Corps, together with 14th Division, formed the main body and followed the vanguard along the main road.

Napoleon, anticipating that the main Coalition forces would head for Lusatia along the right bank of the Elbe, entrusted the defence of Dresden and the left bank of the Elbe to a strong corps under Saint-Cyr.[14] On 10 [22] August, some of these units, in positions at Berggießhübel, were attacked by the vanguard under Major General Roth.



The Forward Positions at Dresden.

From an old engraving in the collection of P.Ya. Dashkov.

The 21st Jägers reached Peterswald [Petrovice u Chabařovic] as the lead of the vanguard at eight

13 Loggin Osipovich Roth (1780-1851).

14 Laurent de Gouvion-Saint-Cyr (1764-1830).

o'clock in the morning, behind the town, behind an abatis, were about 1,000 enemy infantry and several squadrons of cavalry with four guns. General Roth, dividing the vanguard into three columns, attacked the enemy. Staff Captain Durakov of the 21 Jägers was sent to clear the enemy from the forest with a company; he got around their flank, where the French put up a desperate resistance, but despite this, his company drove the enemy back with bayonets fixed; in this action the company commander was wounded in the abdomen.

At the same time, a second company, commanded by Lieutenant Basov, operating on the left flank, resolutely pinned down the enemy holding the edge of the forest in great strength. However, the jäger company launched a coordinated attack and drove out the enemy, at which time Lieutenant Basov suffered a serious contusion from a bullet to the chest, but despite this he remained in the ranks, energetically directing the company's actions.

The successful operations by the vanguard forced the enemy to retreat in haste; they were pursued: on the right flank by II Corps and two squadrons of Grodno Hussars, and on the left by the vanguard under Major General Roth, who pursued the enemy as far as Colberg [*sic*].

Following intense exchanges of fire and mainly thanks to effective work by our artillery, the enemy were forced to abandon Pirna that same day and withdrew to Dresden after dark.


The fighting continued way into the night: the corps under the Prinz von Württemberg took up positions at Großcotta [4½ miles south of Pirna], the reserve under Prince Gorchakov remained at the town of Gottleuba; but, despite all the difficulties and strong enemy resistance, the losses on our side that day were no more than 400 killed and wounded, while enemy losses were much greater; they especially lost many during the retreat, where we took 380 lower ranks and 16 officers prisoner, among whom was Saint-Cyr's aide-de-camp, captured carrying important documents.

On 11 [23] August, our jägers were positioned on the high ground ahead of Pirna. Despite the fact that the 21st Jägers, for the first time after being reconstituted, had suffered relatively heavy losses and endured a stubborn fight, they carried out the mission assigned to them brilliantly, proceeding as the head of the vanguard. The regiment's losses were as follows: two non-commissioned officers and 84 privates killed or missing, the wounded were Staff-Captain Durakov, Lieutenant Basov, Sub-Lieutenant Lyutikov (a gunshot wound through the right arm), ensigns Motovilov (a gunshot wound to the left arm), Shatov (wounded in the right arm), 12 non-commissioned officers, one musician and 58 privates. In his report, Count Wittgenstein wrote: 'I cannot praise highly enough the bravery of the troops in this action, they all fought with the same courage and diligence with which the sacred cause of the great Coalition has inspired the hearts of each.'

On 12 [24] August, our army continued to move towards Dresden and, taking advantage of Napoleon's absence, could have captured Dresden, but instead of an energetic offensive, 13 [25] August was spent on a variety of meetings. Half of our army had managed to assemble at Dresden on that day, while all the remaining units were on the march. There was no doubt that even half of the Coalition army was quite sufficient to capture Dresden, but the Coalition had no idea of Dresden's fortifications or how many defenders there were.

From 13 to 14 [25 to 26] August, the Coalition army facing Dresden was deployed as follows: Count Wittgenstein's force, numbering 10,000 men, were to the right of Striesen and behind Gruna, Kleist's force was at Leubnitz, while other units were behind Räcknitz and opposite Plauen (in total, there were about 87,000 men near Dresden).

Although the assault on the city had been postponed, there was constant skirmishing between the vanguards of both sides and the cannonade did not cease; and in the meantime, while the Coalition were losing time, Napoleon was taking measures to drive them from Dresden, where the *Garde* had been sent, followed by Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, Victor's corps and Kellermann's cavalry, while


PLAN OF
THE BATTLE OF
DRESDEN
14 (26) August 1813
Scale
One English inch = one verst
0 100 200 300 400 500
1000 sazhen
to Radeberg
to Bautzen
Antons manor
Imperial Fort
Schwarzes Tor
Weißes Tor
Dresden-
Neustadt
Hopfgarten
Foundry
yard
Engelhardt
Hotel
Blasewitz
Elbe
DRESDEN
Ziegelschlag
Striesen
Tolkewitz
Ubigau
Briesnitz
Friedrichstadt
Briesnitzer
Schlag
Löbtauer Schlag
Wilsdruffer
Vorstadt
Dresden-
Altstadt
Schusterhaus
Zschonerbach
Weißeritz
Altona
Freiberger
Schlag
Falkenschlag
Dippoldiswalder
Schlag
Großer
Garten
Antons
Garten
Dohnaer
Schlag
Gruna
Grünewiese
Seidnitz
to
Pillnitz
Cotta
Klein Hamburg
Drescherhäuser
Löbtau
Feldschlößchen
Burgstädtel
Ockerwitz
Rothen Haus
Strehlen
Dobritz
Leuben
to
Pirna
Wölfnitz
Gorbitz
Naußlitz
Plauen
Räcknitz
Zschertnitz
Reick
Pennrich
Roßthal
Dölzschen
Leubnitz
Prohlis
Torna
Altfranken
to Freiberg
Pesterwitz
Coschütz
Mockritz
Gostritz
to Dippoldiswalde
Kaitz
Nöthnitz
Kauscha
Lockwitz
to
Dohna
Gittersee
to Maxen

Legend to the Plan of the Battle of Dresden

Coalition Forces		French Forces	
A.A.	Count Wittgenstein's force	a.a.	Roguet's division
B.B.	Roth's vanguard	b.b.	Decouz's division
C.C.	Zieten's vanguard	c.c.	Barrois' & Dumoustier's divisions
D.D.	Pirch's *10. Brigade*	d.d.	Teste's force
E.E.	Jagow's *11. Brigade*	e.e.	Latour-Maubourg's & Pajol's cavalry
F.F.	Prinz August's *12. Brigade*	f.f.	Doumerc's cavalry
G.G.	Braun's reserve artillery	g.g.	General Gros' attack
H.H.	Röder's reserve cavalry	**Coalition Forces**	
I.I.	Klüx's *9. Brigade*	K.K.	Moritz Liechtenstein's *1. leichte Division*
L.L.	Colloredo's division	M.M.	Chasteler's division
N.N.	Mesko's division	O.O.	Greth's brigade
P.	Mumb's brigade	R.R.	Schneller's cavalry
S.S.	Weissenwolf's division	T.T.	Bianchi's division
X.	Lukov's advance	Y.	Melissino's advance
Z.	Vlastov's advance		

Marmont's corps was moving along the Bautzen road.[15]

The disposition for operations on 14 [26] August, issued by the Commander-in-Chief, contained the following orders:

In order to monitor the city, the units were to form up in five columns, namely: Count Wittgenstein's first column, having seized the villages of Blasewitz and Striesen, was assigned to launch feints, in addition, they were ordered to advance as far as possible, at every favourable moment, and in the event of success they could even break into the Dresden suburbs; the second column was ordered to launch a feint attack on the Großer-Garten while the third was to advance to the high ground lying forwards of Kaitz.

Thus, in the disposition, orders were made for a general attack on Dresden, but there was no mention at all of taking possession of the city.

At dawn the enemy occupied the Großer-Garten, to the right of which a battery was identified, while eight guns were visible in front of Hopfgarten; on the right bank of the Elbe, along the roads from Radeberg and Bautzen, enemy infantry, cavalry, artillery and wagons were moving towards Dresden in large numbers. The enemy, noticing our artillery from beyond the Elbe, immediately opened heavy fire, to which we responded in kind. This terrifying cannonade continued for more than two hours and indicated the strength of the enemy force to us.

At eight o'clock in the morning Prussian forces captured the entire south-eastern part of the Großer-Garten and thus contributed to the success of Count Wittgenstein's attack, but all their efforts to capture the abatis constructed across the western part of the gardens were in vain. The vanguard of Count Wittgenstein's corps, commanded by Major General Roth, consisting of 20th, 21st, 25th, 26th and 36th Jägers with six guns, took the north-eastern part of the gardens by storm and moved along

15 Marie Victor Nicolas de Faÿ de Latour-Maubourg (1768-1850); Claude-Victor Perrin (1764-1841); François Étienne Kellermann (1770-1835); Auguste Frédéric Louis Viesse de Marmont (1774-1852).



BATAILLE DE DRESDE, LIVRÉE LE 26 AOUT 1813.

the plain between the gardens and the road. The French retreated into the Pirnaischer Vorstadt.

At around midday orders were issued to pause operations until the general offensive, which we began at Hopfgarten at around four o'clock.

General Roth moved to support the attacking Prussian units under General Zieten,[16] with the vanguard, including the 21st Jäger Regiment in the lead, deploying a skirmishing screen, while the rest of Wittgenstein's force headed towards the Windmühlenberg. In this offensive, Lieutenant Reikhel held off the enemy with a company of skirmishers for a long time, as they tried to take up advantageous positions, and eventually, charging with fixed bayonets, forced them to retreat, during which he was wounded by a bullet right through his leg. At the same time, Sub-Lieutenant Malinin, who was with the skirmishers to the right of Lieutenant Reikhel's company, swept along by the offensive and seeing that the enemy were beginning to consolidate, raced to the flank with his platoon, which forced the enemy to fall back, while he constantly encouraged the men and gave them strength through his fearlessness.

At five o'clock, Roth's force launched an attack along the Pirna highway once more along with Prussian units, but in the meantime Count Wittgenstein's force had been pushed back two *versta* [1⅓ miles] by the enemy. The gunfire continued into the darkness of the gloomy autumn evening and resembled fireworks. Roth's force, under pressure from the huge enemy forces located in the gardens and along the highway, retreated step by step to the north-eastern corner of the gardens, but still held out there all night, holding Gruna at the same time. The onset of night and inclement weather stopped the fighting.

The exhausted, sleepy troops spent the night in bivouacs in heavy rain and mud.[17]

On the Coalition side, it was decided to remain in the positions they currently occupied and wait for the arrival of Klenau's corps,[18] and then resume the attack on Dresden. On the morning of 15 [27] August, the Coalition forces were concentrated around Dresden.

During the night of 14 to 15 [26 to 27] August, reinforcements from the enemy *2e Corps* and *6e Corps* arrived.

Early in the morning both armies, ours and the enemy's, stood at very short range from each other under heavy rain, which bucketed down all day long.

It was as if the clouds had split above the troops, and any observation of the area, even at short range, became impossible: the damp air made it difficult to fire muskets, and therefore it was necessary for the entire line to open fire with cannon, which did not cease until three o'clock.

At dawn the enemy launched an attack on the Prussian force holding Strehlen.

At about 10 o'clock in the morning the French began an offensive against the right wing of our army, and after that Murat attacked the Austrians on the left wing. Major General Roth's force was on the Coalition extreme right wing, holding the sector between the Grünewiese manor and the Tolkewitz forest, in Gruna and Blasewitz. As early as eight o'clock in the morning, elements of the French division under Roguet[19] had moved through the forest towards Blasewitz and, after a minor exchange of fire, forced our weak detachment to retreat towards Tolkewitz. The fighting around Striesen was much more stubborn; here the French deployed significant forces and attacked the units from Roth's vanguard, who were forced to retreat to Seidnitz under enemy pressure, where they took up positions.

Our artillery and jägers held up the French pressure through strong firepower. General Roth, having

16 Hans Ernst Karl von Zieten (1770-1848).
17 Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1813, volume 2, chapter 27 [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips].
18 Johann von Klenau (1758-1819).
19 François Roguet (1770-1846).

received orders from Count Wittgenstein to retreat through Reick and Prohlis towards Torna in the event of enemy pressure and join the army right flank, refused his right wing back towards Tolkewitz, resting his left on Seidnitz and moving eight guns onto the high ground near Tolkewitz in order to fire on the enemy advancing along the Pillnitz road.

The prolonged defence of Seidnitz gave General Roth the opportunity to redeploy his units between this village and Dobritz. After several attacks, the French infantry, assisted by cavalry, took Seidnitz, where Napoleon arrived at 11 o'clock. He ordered General Pelet[20] to attack Reick with a *Jeune Garde* brigade, reinforced by units from Roguet's *4e Division*.

Our jägers, having retreated to Reick, lined the embankment and ditch that ran past this village on its northern and eastern sides.

The French raced into the attack with loud shouts of "*Vive l'empereur!*" The Russian batteries engaged them with canister. Roth's troops defended Reick so fiercely that the French could not dislodge them until they had set fire to the outer houses of the village. But our jägers continued to fight with fixed bayonets in the southern part of Reick and in the heat of battle, amid clouds of smoke, in heavy rain, they did not notice that the French had managed to envelope them on his right flank and also cut off their line of retreat to Prohlis. 'Roth's forces, paying no heed to this, held on to that part of the village they still occupied. Here the entire force fought and the cannon thundered and the muskets fired and the whole area was littered with corpses...'

Eventually French forces took Reick at noon. The Russian infantry retreated to the high ground near Torna. The French occupied Reick, Seidnitz, Dobritz and Leuben. According to a statement by one truthful foreign historian: 'General Roth executed the difficult mission assigned to him very successfully, to change front in full view of enormous enemy forces on waterlogged ground, with the enemy constantly pressing on the fulcrum of his movement.'[21]

On the left flank, the Austrians had been enveloped by Murat's force, and so Prinz Schwarzenberg ordered the Russo-Prussian forces to retreat towards Bohemia along the Pirna highway, with Count Wittgenstein's corps remaining as the rearguard near Dresden, with Major General Roth's detachment near Prohlis. The French remained at the site of the battle and only began to put pressure on General Roth's rearguard at three o'clock in the afternoon of the following day, but no longer with the same determination.

The retreat by the Army of Bohemia had to take place under very difficult circumstances: the storm did not abate, the muskets were so wet that it was impossible to fire them; swirling winds, mixed with rain, pelting directly in the face, prevented landmarks from being identified, and the ground was so soft that it was difficult for the men to lift their feet; the roads were almost impassable, men and horses got stuck in the mud, the troops were terribly tired, heavy rain, darkness and the howling wind increased the severity of the soldiers' suffering, the cries of the wounded and the curses of soldiers embittered by everything that was happening could often be heard. This was the most terrible period of the whole campaign, because the constant disagreements between the allies prevented us from retreating in due order, thus our retreat had the appearance of the rout of the defeated.[22]

But for Napoleon, the victory at Dresden was not as important as the fruits he hoped to reap from the pursuit of the Coalition forces. The difficult retreat by the Army of Bohemia was aggravated by another measure taken by Napoleon. On the first day of the battle he had sent Vandamme's 40,000 corps to Königstein,[23] ordered them to cross to the left bank of the Elbe and sever the Coalition

20 Jean-Jacques Germain Pelet-Clozeau (1777-1858).
21 Bogdanovich, volume 2, chapter 28.
22 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813, p. 231.
23 Dominique Joseph René Vandamme (1770-1830).

army's line of retreat through the mountains.

From the Coalition side, a 13,000-man detachment commanded by Count Osterman had been sent towards Königstein, consisting of the Guards Division and II Infantry Corps (excluding 20th, 21st, 4th and 34th Jägers, who remained in the rearguard under Major General Roth).

These formations sought to prevent the French from crossing the Elbe and to shield the only easy route through the mountains, that is, the highway leading through Peterswald to Kulm [Chlumec u Chabařovic] and Teplitz.

Initially it had been planned to send the Russian units along the highway through Peterwald, but then it was decided to direct them through Dippoldiswalde. The result of this decision was a terrible congestion of units and supply trains in the narrow defile at Dippoldiswalde.

Osterman's detachment carried out the mission assigned to them brilliantly, delaying and defeating Vandamme's corps near Kulm on 17 and 18 [29 and 30] August, where our forces restored Russian arms to their former glory.



Russian Troops in Bivouacs 1813.

From an etching in the collection of P.Ya. Dashkov.

Retreating with the rearguard, the 21st Jäger Regiment held back the onslaught of French forces and, despite terrible fatigue, prevented the enemy from outflanking our rearguard, while on 17 [29] August the regiment had to repel an enemy attack near Altenberg, then again at Zinnwald and Eichwald [Dubí] on 18 [30] August, where the enemy was pressing us hard. The regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Stepanov checked the attackers several times with fixed bayonets, while the company under Captain Derevyanenko, sent into the forest on the left flank, skilfully got around an enemy column and attacked them from behind with bayonets fixed and drove the column away, while another company under Staff Captain Zvyagin, sent a screen force into the forest and having veered to one side, prevented us from being outflanked. Both of these companies were in a critical situation, since the enemy was trying to cut them off, but then Ensign Bykov, who had been attached to the regiment, rescued them and, despite the increased enemy fire, passed them the order to retreat and thus prevented them from being isolated.

On 19 [31] August, the enemy attacks were repeated near Zinnwald once more. Major Kelderman, who was attached to the regiment and had been sent to support the right flank with two companies, got around the enemy flank and attacked with fixed bayonets, driving off the enemy who had been racing towards our right flank, thereby forcing them to retreat.[24]

On that same day, the whole of II Corps assembled at Eichwald and on 20 August [1 September], linked up with *Feldmarschall-Leutnant* Weißenwolf's command,[25] setting off for Zinnwald in order to attack the enemy corps located at the town of Altenberg. But this attack was subsequently cancelled, and II Corps withdrew to Eichwald on 22 August [3 September] before setting off for

24 Russian Armed Forces, volume 2, p. 298; Moscow Archive of the General Staff, combat awards, bundle 14, No. 4555. p. 98.

25 Nikolaus Ungnad von Weißenwolf (1763-1825).

Nollendorf on 23 August [4 September] in order to link up with the rest of Count Wittgenstein's army.

The following day, at the village of Hellendorf, II Corps were ordered to outflank the enemy. In the evening, the Corps struck at the village of Oelsen, where they drove the enemy from the positions they had taken up, with the 21st Jägers playing an active role in the fighting.

The regiment's losses from 14 to 24 August [26 August to 5 September] were very large in comparison to its available strength, as can be concluded from the table below:[26]

Date		Subalterns[27]	Non-Commissioned Officers	Musicians	Privates
14 [26] August 1813	Killed	1	2		3
	Wounded	1	4		30
	Missing				5
15 [27] August 1813	Killed		6		6
	Wounded	1	9		50
	Missing		2		50
17 [29] August 1813	Killed				
	Wounded		5		82
	Missing	1	1		50
18 [30] August 1813	Killed	1			6
	Wounded	3	5		53
	Missing				35
19 [31] August 1813	Killed				5
	Wounded				27
	Missing				
24 August [5 September] 1813	Killed				
	Wounded				2
	Missing				1
TOTAL:	Killed	**2**	**8**		**20**
	Wounded	**5**	**23**		**244**
	Missing	**1**	**3**		**211**

26 Report by regimental commander, Colonel Stepanov, Moscow Archive of the General Staff, Wittgenstein's operations, p. 253; Library of the Moscow Archive of the General Staff, bundle 12, p. 239.

27 14 [26] August: Ensign Sekletsky killed, Sub-Lieutenant Narbut, gunshot wound through the right arm; 15 [27] August: Sub-Lieutenant Klimov gunshot wound through the thigh; 17 [29] August: Ensign Kostopygo shot through the neck and taken prisoner; 18 [30] August: Ensign Melnikov killed, Captain Dervyanenko gunshot wound to the thigh, Lieutenant Basov suffered a contusion, Ensign Bykov gunshot wound to the abdomen.

The following awards were made for these actions: majors Buschen and Kelderman (attached to the regiment), the Order of St. Anne 2nd class; Captain Derevyanenko, Staff-Captain Durakov, Lieutenant Klimov and Sub-Lieutenant Malinin, the Order of St. Anne 3rd class; Ensign Basov, the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class; Lieutenant Reikhel was promoted to staff-captain. Staff-captains Kurtashev and Zvyagin, sub-lieutenants Vasilievsky, Montander, and Ensign Kuznetsov (all attached to the regiment from 6th Jägers) received Supreme Commendations.

Portepée-Junkers Bezobrazov and Podgulyarsky were promoted to ensign.[28]

The results of all these actions and Vandamme's defeat at Kulm deprived Napoleon of the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of the victory he had won at Dresden. Nevertheless, despite this series of defeats, Napoleon did not abandon the offensive.[29]

On 30 August [11 September], elements of the enemy *14e Corps* attacked our Corps, which forced 3rd Division to retreat from the high ground at Nollendorf at nightfall and take up positions at their foot. On 1 [13] September, the Army of Bohemia moved into Saxony for the third time, but as soon as Napoleon began to advance, Schwarzenberg retreated to positions around Kulm. During this period, the 21st Jäger Regiment participated in several small skirmishes, namely: in a night expedition at Nollendorf on 31 August [12 September]; during an attack and pursuit of the enemy towards the town of Gottleuba on 3 [15] September; at Peterswald on 4 [16] September, and at Kulm on 5 [17] September.[30]

Napoleon did not dare to push that far and on 5 [17] September ordered his forces to retreat to Dresden.

In view of the superiority of forces in the Coalition army, they were ordered to operate decisively. The arrival of Bennigsen's army (around 54,000 men and 126 guns) was anticipated in mid [late] September, so it was decided to await their arrival and then move towards Leipzig on Napoleon's lines of communications.

The Army of the North and Army of Silesia, which had united in the meantime, were also intending to arrive there.

As a result, the Prinz von Württemberg's II Corps remained at Kulm until 14 [26] September, and advanced towards Leipzig on 15 [27] September,[31] together with the Army of Bohemia, where the entire Coalition force had assembled by around 1 [13] October with a strength of 280,000 men. On 4 [16] October, the famous three-day battle began, which secured the fate of Germany.

28 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, combat awards, bundle 14, No. 4555, serials 667, 98, 99; catalogue 208, bundle 51, p. 111.

29 Petrov, Russian Armed Forces, volume 2, p. 300.

30 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, Major Buschen's service records.

31 From Teplitz on 15 [27] September; Dux on 16 [28] September; Golmitz on 17 [29] September; Bellingheim on 20 September [2 October]; Annaberg on 21 September [3 October]; Schwarzenberg on 22 September [4 October]; Zwickau on 23 September [5 October]; Gößnitz on 24 September [6 October]; Mockern on 25 September [7 October]; Altenburg on 27 September [9 October]; to Borna on 28 September [10 October].

CHAPTER 8.

From Leipzig to the Rhine.

Participation of the regiment in four days of fighting at Leipzig. - Death of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Stepanov. - Losses and awards. - Pursuit of the French to the Rhine. - Reinforcements for the regiment. - Provisioning of the regiment. - Participation of the reserve battalion in the blockade and capture of the Danzig fortress.

By this time, the main French force (some 130,000) under Napoleon's direct command was located between Wittenberg and Düben. On 1 [13] October, Wittgenstein received orders from Schwarzenberg to carry out a reconnaissance-in-force of the enemy in the direction of Leipzig, but due to the late arrival of Klenau's corps, assigned to the vanguard, the execution of this order was postponed until the following day. The reconnaissance carried out on 2 [14] October led to a major cavalry action at Liebertwolkwitz between Wittgenstein and Murat. By 4 [16] October, Napoleon had managed to concentrate his main forces at Leipzig such that he had about 172,000 men including the city's garrison.



The Battle of Wachau, 4 [16] October 1813.

From a painting by Martinet, in the collection of P.Ya. Dashkov.

According to the dispositions for 4 [16] October, the forces under Count Pahlen and Prince Gorchakov formed the right flank of Wittgenstein's army.

At the start of the fighting on 4 [16] October, Prince Gorchakov's divisions were located on the right flank of the corps under Eugen von Württemberg, along with Pirch's brigade,[1] between Störmthal and the Universitäts Waldung [Oberholz, three miles east of Güldengossa], holding part

1 Georg Dubislav Ludwig von Pirch (1763-1838).

of the forest itself.

The enemy, having also taken up positions resting their right flank on Wachau and their left on Liebertwolkwitz, consolidated in both of the above-mentioned villages.

Gorchakov's force was stationed in the Universitäts Waldung, while another woods, located in front of Liebertwolkwitz, was held by the French. According to the disposition, Prince Gorchakov was to attack the aforementioned village together with the Austrian corps under General Klenau, at the same time as an attack by Eugen von Württemberg on Wachau, while Count Pahlen was to form the link between them.

At nine o'clock the batteries thundered and the Russians were first into action with an attack on Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz, to begin the Battle of Leipzig. Prince Gorchakov moved towards Liebertwolkwitz. The infantry advanced in battalion columns into the attack. Count Pahlen's cavalry, having outflanked Güldengossa from the left, proceeded between the formations under Gorchakov and Württemberg in the direction of Wachau. The enemy unleashed terrifying salvoes from 100 guns along the entire length of his line and at the same time sent the greater part of his infantry back towards Wachau. Our artillery continued to rain fire upon the enemy, while the infantry protecting it stood firm under horrific fire from the enemy guns. Elements of our II Corps fought to defend Wachau against two enemy corps for some time; but eventually, weakened by heavy losses, our force had to retreat. To relieve them, the Chernigov Infantry and the 20th and 21st Jägers were called up from the reserve, joined by one company of Lifeguard Artillery; the Reval Infantry and Murom Infantry moved forward together with Klüx's Prussian brigade.[2] All these regiments bravely engaged the advancing enemy, halted them, and upon the arrival of the other regiments from II Corps, fought on under the command of the Prinz von Württemberg without reserves.

French cuirassiers, taking advantage of this opportunity, launched several attacks; but generals Prince Shakhovsky and Klüx, having formed their exposed units, weakened by losses, into square, repelled several fierce attacks by this cavalry. Almost all the regimental commanders in II Corps became casualties; the commander of the 21st Jägers, Lieutenant Colonel Stepanov, struck by round shot while forming the square, fell dead; the battalion commander, Major Buschen, went to report this to the commander of 3rd Division, Prince Shakhovsky, who, after listening to the report, replied to Major Buschen: 'well, what next? They are going to kill me too, take command of the regiment.' The composure of Prince Shakhovsky, who had been good friends with Stepanov, astonished everyone around him, but once the battle was over, this valiant warrior began to sob like a child.[3]

Command of the regiment was initially taken on by Major Buschen, who was soon wounded in the chest, and so Major Kelderman of the 20th Jägers was appointed regimental commander.

Following the cavalry attacks, this battalion of 21st Jägers, having suffered heavy losses, repositioned themselves in order to protect a battery, under heavy fire from enemy artillery. At this point, Prinz Eugen von Württemberg was forced to shore up his left flank in order to contain the enemy onslaught coming out of Wachau, and also in order to be able to maintain links with Kleist's column, for which he deployed the Kremenchug Infantry, 20th and 21st Jägers, who crossed over there from the right flank: the 21st Jägers were stationed on the left flank, adjoining Kleist's brigade, which had contested Wachau for a short time, but these regiments had spent more than half their strength in the defence of Wachau, and were no match for the French, who had launched an attack to the left of that village.

It was at about two o'clock in the afternoon that the enemy revealed the superiority of their forces at all points, both flanks were pushed back, only the centre under the command of the Prinz von

2 Joseph Friedrich Karl von Klüx (1774-1816).

3 Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1813, volume 2, chapter 39, footnote 55.

Württemberg held onto the high ground in front of Wachau. At around three o'clock all the units sent by Napoleon as reinforcements had arrived on the battlefield. Our reserves were still on the march. On our left flank the French were increasingly advancing towards us, against General Kleist's brigade and the 21st Jägers. At this point, the Austrian reserve cavalry under General Nostitz arrived to reinforce us,[4] and, moving towards the enemy, they drove their cavalry back. Once Napoleon noticed that the fighting on the left flank was wavering, he led an attack on the centre himself.

Numerous artillery units were moved up onto the high ground facing the Prinz von Württemberg's positions, and immediately opened heavy fire along the entire line of II Corps and especially along its left flank.

Almost all the guns from 6th Battery Company and 29th Company were quickly knocked out and Count Arakcheev's 33rd Company came up to take their place, but this battery also soon had several guns knocked out and they could only respond to the enemy fire weakly.

As bloody as the fighting had been, the ferocious cannonade endured by the men of the 20th and 21st Jägers and elements of the right flank of the Prussian brigade was even more destructive. Prince Shakhovsky assembled 1,100 men at Güldengossa, with whom he consolidated behind this village.[5]

The onset of darkness halted the fighting, the right flank and the centre had held their positions. Prinz Eugen von Württemberg, among other things, stated in his notes that 'military history can hardly point to bloodier scenes than those associated with the events of 4 [16] October. Looking at the battlefield, one involuntarily called to mind Schiller's poignant description, where the dead covered the place of slaughter in orderly rows as if still living.'

The losses of each side amounted to 30,000 men. II Corps lost: 15 field officers, 126 subalterns and 3,400 lower ranks, in total more than two-thirds of its pre-battle composition.

Prinz Eugen's aide-de-camp, Colonel Wachten,[6] reported on these terrible losses to Barclay de Tolly, but the Commander-in-Chief did not want to believe him. 'If Your Excellency does not believe the living, then when you look at the battlefield, the dead will convince you' Wachten responded.[7]

The day of 5 [17] October passed without incident on either side, only Blücher had a clash on the northern side of Leipzig at Möckern. Napoleon, having learned that the Coalition had been reinforced by the Army of the North and Army of Poland that had arrived that day, and well understanding the gravity of his situation, even began to talk of a truce. But this proposal remained unanswered. On the morning of 6 [18] October, French forces took up defensive positions in a large semicircle arcing around Leipzig from the south-east and north for 15 *versta* [10 miles], with their right flank resting on the Pleiße at Connewitz, and their left on the Elster, while their strength at the time reached 160,000 with 700 guns.[8]

Before the battle started, II Corps were behind Güldengossa on the southern side of Leipzig. At seven o'clock in the morning, the Army of Bohemia and Army of Poland, upon leaving their positions, moved forward in the following order: the centre of their forces were divided into two columns, of which the first, consisting of I Corps, II Corps and Count Pahlen's cavalry, 2nd Cuirassier division and 1st Grenadier Division, moved to the right toward Liebertwolkwitz. Despite

4 Johann Nepomuk von Nostitz-Rieneck (1768-1840).
5 Encyclopaedia of Military and Naval Sciences, volume 4, p. 528; Military Science Archive, No. 2137, War Diary of II Corps; Military Science Archive, No. 2159, p. 17, No. 21126, p. 221.
6 Hans Otto von Wachten (1786-1874).
7 *Voenny Sbornik*, 1864, volumes 9 and 10, Prinz von Württemberg and his papers.
8 Encyclopaedia of Military and Naval Sciences, volume 4, p. 530.

their great fatigue, the troops marched cheerfully and joyfully. The city, which on that day would fall victim to all the horrors of an assault, was visible in the distance, brightly lit by the sun.



The Battle of Leipzig.

Engraving after Klein in the collection of P.Ya. Dashkov.

The Tsar himself was stationed on the hill and, as the units passed by him, he encouraged the army with a short but heartfelt speech: 'Children! You have fought like heroes these days, today be merciful: the Tsar asks this of you.'


II Corps attacked the enemy between Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz with drums beating and bands playing, and, having driven them from this position, pursued them towards Probstheida. This village was attacked by the Prussian column under Prinz August,[9] but without success. The 20th and 21st Jägers, Kremenchug Infantry and Volhynia Infantry stormed this village and, despite the fact that its houses were surrounded by stone walls and the streets were blocked, the valiant jägers drove the strong enemy detachment out of Probstheida. It was here that II Corps and Kleist's force temporarily halted and held off the enemy with their fire until two o'clock in the afternoon. Probstheida proved to be the enemy key point for protecting their line of retreat, which is why the Vice-roi d'Italie rushed to this village with three corps of elite units. Kleist could not resist the enemy for long with the remnants of the weakened II Corps (about 1,800 men) and was forced to retreat to Holzhausen.

At about three o'clock Bennigsen began the assault of Schönefeld and, supported by Bernadotte, captured this location at about six o'clock.

The last rays of the dying sun lit up the units of the Coalition army, which were located three to four *versta* [two to three miles] from Leipzig.

Night fell and the fierce fighting ceased, the sky turned red with the glow: Stötteritz, Schönefeld, Dölitz and one suburb of Leipzig were engulfed in flames. Little by little a menacing silence fell across the battlefield, which seemed other-worldly after the thunder of 2,000 guns.

9 Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm Heinrich August von Preußen (1779-1843).



Plan of the Capture of Leipzig, 7 [19] October 1813.

On the morning of 7 [19] October, once the fog had cleared, our troops saw that the French had retreated into the city itself. The troops were ordered to attack the city; at nine o'clock the heads of the columns moved forwards and the units advanced. The corps under Count Wittgenstein, having crossed themselves, passed by the Tsar with bands playing and Colours flying; he greeted each battalion, encouraged the soldiers and asked them, out of love for him, to spare the civilian population of Leipzig. The columns surrounded the vast suburbs of Leipzig on all sides. The French skirmishers settled in buildings where they had made loopholes, behind fences, walls and in parks. However our forces, despite every obstacle, despite the ferocious small-arms fire, penetrated the suburbs from various directions, which were separated from the city by a fairly significant open space.

A bitter struggle ensued here, because this was, as it were, the point on which the French would make their last stand.

On the streets of Leipzig, the French no longer had chance to defend themselves: many were bayoneted, and those who still resisted were finished off with musket butts. Having received news of the capture of the suburbs, the Emperor and the King of Prussia entered the city at one o'clock through the so-called Grimmaisches Tor, following the first regiments that had entered there, which were still continuing to exchange fire. The troops were crowded into Leipzig to such an extent and were so congested that the Tsar could hardly ride through the narrow streets covered with the corpses of the fallen. Our columns poured through every gatehouse and quickly moved forwards, pursuing the enemy. The beating of drums, the signals sounded by the jägers' horns, the cries of the wounded, the jubilation of the population and the shouts of hurrah merged with the cannon and musket fire, while the enemy retreated in disorder and their retreat itself took on the character of a rout. To complete the disaster, the only bridge across the Elster, over which the retreat was taking place, was blown up, and French units, deprived of a line of retreat, either surrendered, or tried to swim across the Pleiße and Elster, and a significant number of them drowned.



The Battle of Leipzig.

Print by Scott, engraving by Krafft, from the collection of P.Ya. Dashkov.

Among the latter was Marshal Prince Poniatowski, having suffered a bullet wound. After the capture of the city, II Corps were stationed at the suburb of Hügeln.[10]

The casualties in II Corps during these four days were very significant; some regiments numbered just a few dozen men in their ranks.

In the 21st Jägers there were fewer than 100 men left.

Unfortunately, despite every effort, it was not possible to find precise figures in the archives for the regiment's losses during these days; it is only known that by 20 October [1 November], there were 188 men in the regiment,[11] which included the wounded and sick returned to duty, as well as those missing in action who had later rejoined the regiment.

In this battle, in addition to Lieutenant Colonel Stepanov killed and Major Buschen wounded, Major Kelderman, Ensign Bezobrazov, and Staff Captain Kurtashev, who was attached to the regiment from the 6th Jägers due to a shortage of officers, were also wounded.

For this battle the following awards were received: Major Buschen received a Golden Sword with an inscription *за храбрость*. Major Kelderman was promoted lieutenant colonel. Staff-Captain Kurtashev was promoted captain. Staff-Captain Zvyagin was promoted to captain, having been assigned to the skirmishing screen with a company on 4 [16] October, raced up with outstanding courage and bravery and led his subordinates on, thanks to which the company seized a village, where he encouraged and motivated the lower ranks, which in turn contributed to them holding the village. Sub-Lieutenant Malinin was nominated for the Order of St. Anne 3rd class, but since he already had this for Dresden, at the request of Field Marshal Barclay de Tolly (his report to the Tsar dated 14 [26] July 1814) he was promoted to lieutenant.[12]

The Battle of Leipzig did not end with the kind of energetic pursuit that usually concludes every decisive battle, which gave the disordered French army the opportunity to rally in the fortress of Erfurt by 10 [22] October. Napoleon lost a large number of his troops along the way, such that once he had retreated to the Rhine he counted only 40,000 combat capable men in the ranks of his army.

On 23 October [4 November] , he crossed the Rhine with these troops and ordered Victor's 2e Corps to stand at Strasbourg, Marmont to guard the middle reaches of the Rhine from Landau to Koblenz, and Macdonald to be stationed at Koblenz; he left for Paris himself on 26 October [7 November].[13]

The Coalition army moved in several columns in order to pursue the enemy. In one of the centre columns II Corps was directed towards Pegau, Naumburg and Buttelstedt and, having skirted around Erfurt, was moving towards Gotha on 17 [29] October.

Making the assumption that French forces would be concentrating near Koblenz, Wittgenstein's force moved from Gotha along the following route: Berka on 19 [31] October; Bad Hersfeld on 20 October [1 November]; Alsfeld on 21 October [2 November]; Grünberg on 23 October [4 November]; Hungen on 24 October [5 November]; and on 27 October [8 November] they settled into quarters near Friedberg, where they remained until 6 [18] November, after which they moved towards the river Main.

Having reached the Rhine in November, the troops settled into quarters.

During the time in quarters near the Rhine, the regiment was reorganised. The regimental commander, Major Buschen, having recovered from his wound, returned to the regiment and

10 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1813; *Voenny Sbornik*, 1864, volumes 9 and 10; Prinz Württemberg's papers.

11 Barclay de Tolly's report dated 29 October [10 November] 1813.

12 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, combat awards, serial 3, No. 73, serial 17, No. 290, p. 344.

13 Leer, War Review, volume 2, p. 185.

actively set about reconstituting it; at the beginning of December, reinforcements arrived for the regiment, consisting of four subalterns, 27 non-commissioned officers, four musicians, 140 privates, 293 recruits and four support personnel; a total of 472 men; with them came 14 horses, two cartridge caissons and two provisions wagons. These reinforcements were sent to the 21st Jägers from the forces under Adjutant General Lobanov-Rostovsky, while the reserves for I Independent Corps were under the command of Major General Alexopol.[14]

The officers of the 21st Jägers who joined from the reserves were: Staff-Captain Zolotarev, Lieutenant Brezhinsky, Sub-Lieutenant Varnin, Ensign Butsenovsky and Staff-Doctor Andreevsky.

These reserves for 3rd Infantry Division had set off from Gostynin on 8 [20] October and travelled in one independent and three combined battalions via Kalisz, Prague, Nuremberg [Nürnberg], and arrived in Würzburg on 28 November [10 December], having lost 16 privates, 10 recruits and one support-staff from these reserve battalions due to illness on the march. During the march, they received rations of meat, cereals and vodka against receipts from the local authorities where they were passing through.

The draught horses were very poor and, due to the mountainous roads, were exhausted, and as a result Major General Alexopol asked the Bohemian local government to allocate transport.

Upon joining their regiments, these reserve battalions for II Corps were inspected by Count Wittgenstein, and despite the long journey they had made, the men were found to be in good condition, their weapons and equipment had been carefully maintained; their uniform clothing, especially for the recruits, was completely ragged and unfit for further use, and they had almost no shirts or boots.[15]

By 1 [13] December, the ranks of the 21 Jägers had swelled to: one field officer, 13 subalterns, 43 non-commissioned officers, 590 privates and nine support personnel, for a total of 656 men, whereupon, the regiment, together with the 20 Jägers, formed the Jäger Brigade under Colonel Kapustin,[16] for 3rd Division under Prince Shakhovsky.

Thanks to the activities of Arakcheev,[17] the Russian army received support in the form of these reserves, which more than compensated for the losses they had suffered on the fields of Leipzig.

II corps, having arrived on the Rhine with a strength of about 3,700 men, by the beginning of 1814 numbered 10,524 men in its ranks.

The entire army was divided into six corps. The corps under Prinz Eugen von Württemberg, together with I Infantry Corps under Gorchakov, formed part of the force of *VI. Korpus* under Count Wittgenstein.[18]

During the entire campaign of 1813 and after reaching the Rhine, the regiment was content with the so-called Aschaffenburg tariff, which had been drafted by order of Barclay de Tolly. It allocated the following daily allowances:

For officers: two *funt* [one pound, 12.8 ounces] of bread, two *funt* of beef, ¼ *funt* [3.6 ounces] of Sarachin millet or cereals, one measure of vodka, beer or wine.

For lower ranks: two *funt* of rye bread or white bread, or 1⅙ *funt* [16.8 ounces] of hard tack. In the event of shortages, ¼ *funt* [3.6 ounces] of meat could be substituted for half the bread ration. A half *funt* [7.2 ounces] of meat, eight *charka* [34⅓ fluid ounces] of vodka or six *charka* [26 fluid ounces]

14 Fyodor Panteleimonovich Alexopol (1758-1817?).
15 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, No. 2090, p. 881, 952, 1061; Wittgenstein's report dated 18 [30] December, minute No. 2317, p. 876.
16 Ivan Fyodorovich Kapustin (1759-1816?).
17 Alexey Andreevich Arakcheev (1769-1834), at the time he was Chair of Military Matters in the Council of State.
18 Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1814.

of beer, ¼ *funt* [3.6 ounces] of cereals or Sarachin millet, beans or peas, one *funt* [14.4 ounces] of potatoes or fresh vegetables, one *funt* of salt per month.

The forage was issued in Austrian measures amounting to ⅛ measure of oats (about 2⅓ Russian *garnets* [13.45 dry pints]). Four parts of oats could be replaced with three parts of barley or rye plus 10 *funt* [nine pounds, five ounces] of hay. Riding horses were given 1½ rations of oats, 10 *funt* of hay and two *funt* [one pound, 12.8 ounces] of straw.[19]

When describing the activities of the 21st Jägers in the campaign of 1813, one cannot consider this description complete without mentioning the participation of the replacement battalion of the 21st Jägers in the other theatre of military operations during the blockade of the Danzig fortress.

From 1807 to 1812 Danzig was occupied by the French and during this time, thanks to the tireless activity of General Rapp,[20] it became one of the strongest fortresses in Europe.

Following the destruction of Napoleon's *Grande Armée* in Russia, as we have seen from the preceding chapters, that elements of Macdonald's corps joined the units in Danzig, and thus the garrison of the fortress had reached 40,000 men.

The initial blockade of Danzig was undertaken at the beginning of January 1813 by elements of Count Wittgenstein's army, but the weak detachment assigned this mission could not undertake serious operations and simply limited itself to observation. In early [mid] February, Count Wittgenstein moved off towards the Oder with the main force, while the corps under Lieutenant General Löwis (18,800 men and 72 guns) was left around Danzig.[21]

Our force was divided into four detachments and two reserves; the first of these detachments was commanded by Major General Velyaminov.

Among these units were combined jäger battalions; the 3rd Combined Regiment included the replacement (2nd) battalion of the 21st Jägers commanded by Major Yelistratov, consisting of Captain Zagryadsky, staff-captains Shemyakin and Fedorov, lieutenants Dyakov and Venyukov, nine non-commissioned officers, 82 privates, with 14 draught horses.

The garrison made daily sorties with the aim of mapping out the blockade line.

The detachment under Major General Velyaminov, consisting of five Cossack regiments, four combined regiments and two artillery companies (970 cavalry, 2,600 infantry, for a total of 3,570 men), held a line from the sea to Mikhau [*sic*, Müggau?].

Since it was very difficult to obtain provisions from the surrounding area, magazines had been established in Oliva [Oliwa] and Praust [Pruszcz Gdański], where all the produce from the area surrounding Danzig and from Pomerania had been brought.

From 22 to 23 February [6 to 7 March], the enemy fiercely attacked our blockade line, but were pushed back, losing about 600 men killed and wounded; most of the fighting was at bayonet point; losses amounted to 280 men in the detachment under Major General Velyaminov.[22]

A similar action took place on 12 [24] March at St. Albrecht [Św. Wojciech], where the French captured a large quantity of forage and provisions.

In late March [early April], the blockading force was reinforced by several groups of St. Petersburg *Opolchenie* and Novgorod *Opolchenie* and reserve battalions from various divisions. On 11 [23] April, the new Commander-in-Chief of the blockade corps, Herzog Alexander von Württemberg,[23]

19 Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1814, chapter 3, appendix IX.
20 Jean Rapp (1771-1821).
21 Leer, Encyclopaedia of Military and Naval Sciences, volume 3, p. 16.
22 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, Siege Diary, No. 2108.
23 Alexander Friedrich Karl von Württemberg (1771-1833).

arrived and found that his fighting force barely reached 13,000 men, thus he did not dare to immediately begin serious operations, but was obliged to engage only in preparations for a siege. At the same time, a Coalition fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Greig[24] entered the Danzig roads.

During the armistice between the Coalition armies and the French, that is, by 28 July [9 August], the blockading corps had been reinforced to 35,000 men. And in addition, siege weapons had arrived from Britain.

Herzog Alexander von Württemberg immediately decided to begin a formal siege, while continuing to adhere to the previous system of operations, namely, harassing the enemy with continuous night attacks.[25]

The strictest precautions were taken: the grain and cattle, within a *Meile* [4⅔ miles] of Danzig, were moved further behind the blockade line such that the besieged could not take them and in the event of them foraging they would have to go further. Our detachment prepared the necessary hurdles and fascines for a siege.[26]

After the armistice, military operations resumed. On 21, 22 and 23 August [2, 3 and 4 September], the Coalition attacked the forward French detachments at Schidlitz [Siedlce], Stolzenberg [Chełm] and Ohra [Orunia], captured two redoubts, pushed the enemy back to the fortress and closed up to such close range that it was even possible to begin an assault on the main ramparts.

The battalion of 21st Jägers took a most active part in these actions, contributing to the victory, for which the ranks of this battalion received the following awards: the commander of 3rd Combined Regiment, Major Yelistratov was awarded a Golden Sword inscribed *за храбрость*. Staff-Captain Shemyakin received two awards, promotion to Captain and the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class on a ribbon. Lieutenant Venyukov was promoted to staff-captain, Lieutenant Dyakov, who had been wounded, received the Order of St Anne 3rd class. Five lower ranks received the Military Order Medal.[27]

The Herzog von Württemberg considered it vital firstly to take possession of Schottenhäuser [Stare Szkoty] before laying the first parallel.

On the night of 29 September [11 October], after a fierce fight, the Coalition had captured both the village and the three redoubts located nearby. The bombardment of Danzig on the night of 21 October [2 November] set fire to and destroyed more than 100 buildings containing supplies of all kinds; on 22 October [3 November] the besiegers seized the suburbs of Schidlitz and Stolzenberg and laid the first parallel facing the Bischofsberg [Biskupia Górka].

From that day onwards, the battalion took part in the siege works up until the surrender of the fortress.

On 5 [17] November, all our batteries (130 guns) opened fire. General Rapp, no longer seeing any possibility of defending himself, surrendered on 16 [28] November, but this capitulation was not ratified by Emperor Alexander I, who demanded that the garrison surrender as prisoners of war.

After much wrangling, a new capitulation was eventually signed and on 21 December [2 January 1814], after 11 months of siege, General Rapp surrendered the fortress with its entire garrison. During the siege, the French lost 19,000 men killed or died of disease, while the Coalition lost some 10,000.

The Herzog von Württemberg, thanking the troops for their service, among other things, wrote: ‘Soldiers, your efforts, resolve and courage have already been rewarded; Danzig, this city, which

24 Alexey Samuilovich Greig (1775-1845).
25 Leer, Encyclopaedia of Military and Naval Sciences, volume 3, p. 16.
26 Military Science Archive, volume 2, No. 2109, p. 374.
27 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, combat awards, bundle 11, No. 314, 6174, p. 3; Archive of Orders, book 5.


our proud enemies considered invincible, after the most stubborn and firm defence was bound to fall before your steadfastness.

Your commander owes this military success to you and shows you all his total gratitude. In front of your eyes the haughty garrison have laid down their arms and acknowledges your superior courage.

Your numbers were not great, but your fearlessness made up for the lack of fighting men.'

In accordance with the Supreme Will, announced through Herzog Alexander von Württemberg on 10 [22] January, 1814, orders were issued that the units of the 3rd, 4th, 17th, and 21st Divisions that had been part of the siege corps were to be used to reconstitute the regiments of the 6th and 25th Divisions.

In pursuance of this order, the replacement battalion of the 21st Jägers, together with its field officers, subalterns and lower ranks, was sent to replenish the 31st Jägers, with Major Yelistratov appointed as its commander.[28]



Keys to the Cities of Danzig, Dresden and Leipzig.

28 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, volume 2, No. 1763, 24 January [5 February] 1814, No. 2087, 8 [20] March 1814.

CHAPTER 9.

The War of 1814.

Composition of the Coalition army. - Crossing the Rhine. - 21st Jäger Regiment at the Landau fortress. - The Coalition offensive. - Napoleon's operations. - The Battle of Bar-sur-Aube. - Participation of the 21st Jägers in the battles of Laubressel and Troyes. - The reconnaissance-in-force to Nogent. - The Battle of Arcis. - The Coalition march on Paris. - The Battle of Paris. - Casualties and awards. - Accommodation in quarters. - The return march to Russia by the 21st Jägers.

In order to firmly establish world peace, all that remained was to place insurmountable obstacles to Napoleon's future ambitions for hegemony, and to that end it was necessary to cross the borders of France. Thus began the war of 1814. It was not a new war, but simply a continuation of the campaign waged in 1813, initially by Emperor Alexander alone, and then by other powers that had joined with him in order to repel the conqueror. In the Tsar's opinion, it was essential to march on France and to force Napoleon, deep in its interior, to accept conditions that would ensure political equilibrium. During his stay in Freiburg im Breisgau, Emperor Alexander issued orders for Russian forces to cross the border into France.

During this campaign, as in the previous year, the troops of the Coalition powers were divided into three armies:

1. The Main Army, with which the Coalition monarchs were present, was commanded by Prinz Schwarzenberg. In this army, among other corps, was the corps under Count Wittgenstein, which consisted of: Prince Gorchakov's I Corps and Prinz Eugen von Württemberg's II Infantry Corps; in the latter, along with 4th Infantry Division, was Prince Shakhovsky's 3rd Infantry Division, consisting of six regiments, including 20th Jägers and 21st Jägers commanded by Colonel Kapustin.
2. The Army of Silesia was assigned to advance from Mannheim towards Metz and Nancy level with the main army.
3. The Army of the North was operating in the Netherlands.

As soon as it had been decided to invade France, the corps of the main army, on the basis of the general operational plan, having made a flanking movement to the left, approached their assigned crossing points in late December [early January 1814]. Count Wittgenstein, having arrived at his headquarters, issued the following orders: II Corps was to invest the Kehl bridgehead[1] in order to monitor the banks of the Rhine, from Mannheim to Kehl (175 *versta* [117 miles]).[2]

On 21 December [2 January 1814], despite the ice floes, a bridge was laid across the Rhine at the fortress of Fort-Louis (32 *versta* [21 miles] downstream of Strasbourg) and II Corps, having crossed the Rhine, set up camp by the aforementioned fortress. The next day a thanksgiving service was held to God on the left bank of the Rhine, directing the Russian Colours beyond the Rhine across the borders of France.

Once the Coalition had invaded France, Napoleon's situation became very grave: despite all his efforts to raise a new army, the French armed forces were inferior in both number (about 160,000) and quality to their opponents. However, the detachment of several formations in order to blockade fortresses greatly weakened the Coalition army.

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1 Kehl is on the right bank of the Rhine, facing Strasbourg.

2 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, The War of 1814; Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1814 in France [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips].

On 28 December [9 January 1814], Major General Prince Shakhovsky was dispatched to blockade the Landau fortress with the 20th Jägers, 21st Jägers and six guns from 27th Light Artillery Company. Upon arrival, they found General Sokolovsky's detachment there[3] and settled in the village of Kandel [10 miles south of Landau]. The enemy attempted to make sorties more than once, and eventually, on 4 [16] January at 10 o'clock in the morning, they attacked our forward outpost in Queichheim [one mile east of Landau] with 600 infantry and two squadrons of cavalry, but this outpost was supported by the reserve and held out. During the firefight, seven men from the infantry regiments (20th Jägers and 21st Jägers) and three Cossacks were wounded; all the outposts remained occupied by us as before.[4]



Count Wittgenstein.

From an etching by Cardelli in the collection of P.Ya. Dashkov.

3 Joseph Karlovich Sokolovsky (1763-1836).

4 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, No. 2309; Prince Shakhovsky's reports No. 20 and No. 52 to Count Wittgenstein.

According to deserters, the garrison of the fortress consisted of approximately 3,000 men. In view of this, when the order came for Prince Shakhovsky to rejoin II Corps with his regiments and four guns, leaving only the detachment under Major General Sokolovsky at the Landau fortress, the remaining detachment found it very difficult to maintain the blockade over such a large area, thus Prince Shakhovsky's detachment was replaced by 1,000 *Landwehr* infantry assigned to the blockade by the Herzog von Baden.[5]

On 14 [26] January, Prince Shakhovsky and the jäger brigade entrusted to him set off from Kandel to rejoin the corps.

Upon entering France, the Main Army was divided into nine columns; the corps under Count Wittgenstein was in the ninth column, which was at the tip of the right wing of the army; they were assigned to march in the interval between the Main Army and the Army of Silesia.

It had been decided to press on with the offensive at the insistence of Emperor Alexander. However, Napoleon forestalled his opponents. Initially he had intended to move immediately against the nearest corps under Schwarzenberg with the army assembled at Vitry and, having defeated them in detail, to hold on the routes towards Paris; but since our forces had taken Troyes without a fight on 26 January [7 February], he retreated beyond the Seine to Nogent with his force and, concerned that Blücher, advancing without pause, might seize Paris, decided to go to the aid of Macdonald (facing Blücher), and left a few of his units behind under the command of Victor and Oudinot in order to hold the Main Army on the Seine. This force, 36,000 in number, held the area from Provins to Nogent. On 31 January [12 February], Count Wittgenstein and Wrede,[6] having united the main bodies of their corps at Nogent the day before, decided to seize the crossing on the Seine in order to mount a diversion in favour of Blücher.

The enemy rearguard retreated towards Donnemarie and Nangis; at the same time, work began on laying a bridge at Nogent using boats found around that city. On 1 [13] February, Prince Shakhovsky rejoined II Corps in Pont-sur-Seine with the 20th Jägers, 21st Jägers and four guns from 27th Light Artillery Company (two guns had been left with Major General Sokolovsky at Landau). Wittgenstein crossed the river at dawn and headed for Villenauxe. Thanks to contradictory intelligence that Napoleon had begun to retreat towards Paris after the battle of Montmirail and had spent the night of 31 January to 1 February [12 to 13 February] in La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, *Feldmarschall* Prinz Schwarzenberg, intending to change front to the left with his army, sent the corps under Wittgenstein and Wrede towards Nangis, but when the rumours of Napoleon's retreat towards Paris turned out to be false and it became clear that Blücher was dealing with a very powerful enemy, he considered it essential to take up his previous positions once more and sent Count Wittgenstein orders to retreat to Villenauxe. Yet since Napoleon was actually exploiting his advantage over the corps under Yorck and Sacken, which had retreated beyond the Marne, and it was a likely concern that he would attack Blücher's corps and pursue him, Schwarzenberg decided it was vital to flank the enemy movements with the Main Army, ordering Wittgenstein and Wrede to operate to Napoleon's rear in order to divert his attention from the Army of Silesia as much as possible, and to shield the march of the other corps towards Arcis and Troyes in particular. Therefore, the corps under the Prinz von Württemberg was ordered (on 4 [16] February) to assemble at nine o'clock in the morning in positions in front of Nangis on the road to Donnemarie, in order to retreat towards Wrede's corps in Donnemarie should the enemy attack him in great strength.

Having pushed Blücher back, Napoleon and the *Garde* quickly went to the aid of Victor and Oudinot, concentrating about 60,000 men. The Commander-in-Chief, concerned about being enveloped from the right flank, issued orders on 4 [16] February for Wittgenstein to return to

5 Friedrich von Baden (1756–1817).

6 Carl Philipp von Wrede (1767-1838).

Provins from Nangis. In executing these orders, Wittgenstein did not inform Count Pahlen of his retreat, who was now 35 *versta* [23 miles] from the main body of Wittgenstein's corps with his vanguard of 4,000 men. Napoleon attacked the retreating force under Pahlen with 47,000 men at Pecqueux, who, having engaged in battle, found themselves in a desperate situation and, on reaching Grandpuits, near Nangis, became disordered and fled. The infantry regiments, surrounded by enemy on all sides, held out for a long time, but still 1,359 men were *hors de combat* in the Selenginsk Infantry and Reval Infantry (before the battle they had about 1,600 men). Following the battle, these two regiments were sent to the city of Plotzk for reconstitution.


Napoleon, having scattered the vanguard in detail, went on the offensive. Schwarzenberg, having received news of Blücher's reverses, decided to withdraw the forces entrusted to him towards Troyes and Arcis in order to link up with Blücher. II Corps, as part of Wittgenstein's force, retreated through Provins and Nogent towards Méry-sur-Seine. On 7 [19] February, the corps under Eugen von Württemberg was in the vanguard at Nogent, and in Châtres on 9 [21] February. Napoleon, pressing our force, took Troyes and was preparing to pursue them further, but learning that Blücher had separated from the Main Army at that time and was heading for the Marne valley, threatening Paris, leaving about 40,000 facing our Main Army, he chased after Blücher with the rest of his force.

The retreat by the Coalition from Troyes, which was carried out so hastily, as if it were a matter of saving the army after a lost battle, exhausted the troops and weakened them. A further retreat would have driven the army into complete disarray. Everyone was sure that the troops would halt only once they had retreated beyond the Rhine. The force was moving through devastated country and, suffering from a shortage of essential supplies, lost heart, losing confidence in their commander. The well-organised army almost turned into a wild mob, unrestrained by either a sense of duty or discipline.[7]

The retreat continued beyond the Aube, and on 14 [26] February, at five o'clock in the morning, both infantry corps under Count Wittgenstein went into bivouacs at Colombey-les-Deux-Églises (near Bar-sur-Aube), where Wittgenstein's infantry was reinforced by eight reserve battalions from 3rd and 4th Divisions, numbering 4,000 men, who had arrived from the fortress of Danzig. Schwarzenberg, having learned of Napoleon's moves against Blücher, decided to begin offensive operations with the leading corps and ordered Graf Wrede and Count Wittgenstein to move from Colombey up to Lignol-le-Château on the evening of 14 [26] February. This news of the imminent offensive was greeted with cries of hurrah, drumming and music. At seven o'clock in the morning of 15 [27] February, II Infantry Corps advanced to form the third line of the Austro-Bavarian force, whose second line was in the Bar-sur-Aube valley. Oudinot had deployed skilfully in anticipation of an attack. Bar is located in a valley, the near edge of which is quite far from the river and is also low, while on the northern side it closes in on the Aube and is steep. Oudinot left one division (Pacthod's) in Dolancourt,[8] holding Bar with another division, placed two divisions (Leval's and Rottembourg's)[9] on the plateau north of the city, with their front facing north, perpendicular to the general deployment of the force in order to secure the left flank from envelopment, where the Coalition intended to direct the main attack, and another division was positioned for inter-communication. Kellermann's cavalry was sent to support Leval's and Rottembourg's divisions, while Saint-Germain's cavalry[10] remained in the valley.

Since a frontal attack, even if the Coalition took the town, did not promise a decisive outcome, it was decided to outflank the enemy at Lévigny. Wittgenstein's corps, 16,000 strong, was ordered to advance on Arrentières and Arsonval towards the Dolancourt bridge in order to block the French

7 Bogdanovich, 1814; Military Science Archive, No. 2323, II Corps War Diary.
8 Michel Marie Pacthod (1764-1830).
9 Jean François Leval (1762-1834); Henri Rottembourg (1769-1857).
10 Antoine Louis Decrest de Saint-Germain (1761-1835).



	Coalition Forces		French Forces
A.A.	Frimont's Austrian division	a.a.	Duhesme's division
B.B.	Bavarian forces	b.b.	Bélair's brigade (Hamelinaye's division)
C.C.	Count Pahlen's force	c.c.	Jarry's brigade (Hamelinaye's division)
D.D.	Prinz Eugen von Württemberg's force	d.d.	Leval's division
E.E.	Prince Gorchakov's force	e.e.	Chassé's brigade
F.F.	23rd Jägers & 24th Jägers	f.f.	Rottembourg's brigade [*sic*]
G.G.	Pskov Cuirassiers & Lubny Hussars	g.g.	Pachtod's division
H.H.	Kaluga Infantry Regiment	h.h.	Saint-Germain's cavalry
		k.k.	Kellermann's cavalry

retreat beyond the Aube. At about 10 o'clock in the morning, the Russians, approaching the town, turned right off the main road and went right-flanking in three columns: the 3rd Division (Murom Infantry, Chernigov Infantry, 20th Jägers and 21st Jägers) together with Count Pahlen's cavalry advanced in the first column towards Arrentières and then to the right of Arsonval in the direction of the Dolancourt bridge; the centre column consisted of II Corps, while the left was Gorchakov's corps. Had Wittgenstein's force made the turn directly from Lignol-le-Château, they would have been crowned with complete success, because, having thrown the enemy into disarray, they would, without much effort, have captured a position which was not yet properly consolidated. The flanking movement executed by our force revealed their objective, thus Oudinot was able to occupy the forest at Lévigny immediately. Count Pahlen reached the forest near Lévigny with the cavalry of the first column and moved onwards towards Arsonval, while 3rd Division, following him, attacked the enemy in the forest and began to skirmish with them, and soon every unit was committed to this action.

Count Wittgenstein brought his army into position and opened a ferocious fire. It seemed that victory was on our side, when suddenly a mass of enemy cavalry emerged from the town. Upon their appearance the situation changed completely. Wittgenstein, anticipating an enemy move into the gap between his corps and Wrede's force, halted the envelopment and initially ordered II Corps and Count Pahlen to return, despite the fact that the corps had already reached Vernonfays and taken control of it.

The Coalition held the enemy back with the firepower of their battalions for quite some time, but nevertheless could not prevent the enemy infantry from moving against Prinz Eugen. At this point, Prince Gorchakov's corps struck the enemy flank while Prinz Eugen's force moved forward in co-ordination, and Count Pahlen was ordered to head back towards the Dolancourt bridge. At the same time, the jäger brigade under Colonel Kapustin (20th Jägers and 21st Jägers), supported by the Tobolsk Infantry, 4th Jägers and 34th Jägers, descended into the ravine between Vernonfays and Montier-en-l'Isle, in order to envelope the French left wing; at the same time, the men of the 21st Jägers commanded by Major Buschen, moving forward without pause under fierce enemy fire, forced their opponents to retreat, despite the terrible losses inflicted by enemy fire. Oudinot, seeing the general offensive, ordered his units to abandon their positions and retreat behind the Aube.

At that moment, Graf Wrede led an attack on the town and took it.

Count Pahlen, in pursuit of the enemy, drove them into disorder and forced them to retreat either across the Dolancourt bridge, or via a ford across the Aube, onto the left bank, after which the enemy concentrated and Vendeuvre. The Coalition halted for the night between Dolancourt and Bar, with II Corps bivouacking at Hertbise.

French casualties numbered some 3,000 men.[11]

The 21st Jägers lost one non-commissioned officer, one musician and nine privates killed; Ensign Butsenovsky was wounded in the right cheek, damaging his tongue; eight non-commissioned officers and 71 privates were also wounded, and eight men were reported missing in action, for a total of 99 men, thus, the 21st Jägers suffered more combat losses here than any other regiment in II Corps.[12]

A reconnaissance on 17 February [1 March] convinced Prinz Schwarzenberg of the weakness of the French corps stationed near Vendeuvre. Our forces passed through Trannes, Dienville, Piney and on 18 February [2 March] II Corps was stationed at Sacey. The following day the Commander-in-Chief

11 Bogdanovich, 1814, volume 1, chapter 12; Leer, Encyclopaedia of Military and Naval Sciences, volume 1, p. 356; Military Science Archive of the General Staff, No. 2316, War Diaries; Moscow Archive of the General Staff, combat awards.

12 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, No. 2300, p. 931; Moscow Archive of the General Staff, Wittgenstein's papers, catalogue 208, bundle 57, No. 20.

decided to attack with the leading corps the forces under Oudinot and Macdonald standing facing him. On 19 February [3 March], Wrede's corps was directed frontally at the enemy, while Wittgenstein moved out of Piney towards Rouilly in order to envelope Oudinot's flank. The corps under Eugen von Württemberg moved along the road to Laubressel along with Count Pahlen's vanguard, heading towards Troyes. The leading units of Count Pahlen's vanguard discovered the enemy holding positions at Laubressel. The enemy infantry and artillery occupied the sector between this village and Thennelières, with Saint-Germain's cavalry behind them at Saint-Parres.



The Battle of Bar-sur-Aube.

[*sic*, the battle of Claye, 27 March 1814]. From the collection of P.Ya. Dashkov.

On the basis of the general disposition, at about one o'clock in the afternoon our force formed up for battle. II Corps halted on the high ground facing Bouranton, awaiting the arrival of Wrede. In the event of an unanticipated enemy attack, II Corps were ordered to try, if possible, to hold the high ground between Bouranton and Thennelières and shield the right flank. At three o'clock the Russian force launched their attack on the enemy; Gorchakov raced towards Laubressel, and Prinz Eugen towards the Bouranton high ground. Prince Shakhovsky's artillery opened a heavy bombardment from 23 guns. Seeing II Corps' flanking movement, the French evacuated Laubressel and began to retreat towards Thennelières. The 21 Jägers sent forward two companies of skirmishers, commanded by Sub-Lieutenant Varnin and Ensign Yevnevich, who worked particularly effectively and pushed the French back, when Sub-Lieutenant Vanin, seeing that the enemy reserves were coming up in support of the leading units, reformed the jägers in close order, and charged at the enemy column with his marksmen and drove them off with fixed bayonets, thereby inflicting heavy losses on the French.

The enemy tried to hold on in Thennelières, but Prinz Eugen's infantry drove them out and, having captured seven guns and 600 prisoners, forced them to retreat to Saint-Parres.

It is impossible not to mention Major General Shakhovsky's aide-de-camp, Ensign Konovkin (later

transferred to the 21st Jägers), accompanying Major General Prince Shakhovsky, together with other aides-de-camp, Lieutenant Pilkhovsky of the Chernigov Infantry and Lieutenant De-Sazar of the 20th Jägers, as our skirmishers were driving the French out of Thennelières, saw that an enemy gun with a caisson was moving along the road under escort by a platoon of cavalry, with a couple of squadrons of enemy cavalry following 400 paces behind. Paying no heed to them, he raced towards this gun, together with the two other aides-de-camp, two mounted dragoons and one Cossack, and moved so quickly that the escort platoon, noticing them only after they had already managed to turn the gun around, abandoned it, after which they were able to drag the gun to our troops. For this feat, Ensign Konovkin was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class.[13]

Following this action, the French retreated to Troyes, and Wittgenstein's force settled on the battlefield. On 20 February [4 March], the Coalition, encouraged by their victory, wanted to drive the enemy out of Troyes. But since the troops were very tired, this could not be started before 10 o'clock in the morning, when Prinz Eugen von Württemberg, in agreement with the commander of the Bavarian corps, General Wrede, decided to attack the enemy, who had taken up positions in front of Saint-Parres.

Having made this decision, General Wrede moved his corps to the left of the road from Bar-sur-Aube, while II Corps proceeded along the road itself, with artillery to the right of it; the infantry marched in column. Having reached the enemy, the artillery opened fire, against which the enemy were unable to resist and began to retreat. Hot on the heels of the enemy, Prinz Eugen, exploiting his advantage, sent Major General Prince Shakhovsky to launch a decisive attack with the 20th Jägers, 21st Jägers and Tobolsk Infantry and to drive the enemy out of Saint-Parres. These regiments hastily moved forward, valiantly broke into the village and drove the enemy across an embankment, where they had vainly tried to rally. Despite heavy enemy fire, the detachment under Major General Prince Shakhovsky overcame every obstacle and forced the enemy to retreat all the way to Troyes, where they held out.

The commander of the enemy force, seeing that he could not halt the advance of our troops, sent a *parlementaire* asking for a truce in order to have time to evacuate the city. The Prinz von Württemberg, wishing to spare the city, agreed to conclude a truce, but only for half an hour. Once the agreed time had elapsed, he sent the Tobolsk Infantry around the damaged bridge, while the 20th Jägers and 21st Jägers went directly at the gates.[14] Major Buschen, having ordered Lieutenant Brezhinsky to deploy skirmishers and move towards the city, while Ensign Podolsky, having taken one division [pair of companies] of marksmen, having cleared the enemy from the road, moved forwards with the battalion; at the same time, Lieutenant Brezhinsky rushed towards the enemy with his company, having Ensign Schtamm's marksmen at his disposal, having caused chaos with their surprise attack, forced the enemy to clear the bridge despite the disparity in numbers; Brezhinsky and his company burst into the Troyes suburbs. At this point, Ensign Podolsky, having cleared the enemy from the road, was in hot pursuit, encouraging the marksmen entrusted to him with his fearlessness.[15]

Once the battalion of the 21st Jägers had captured the gatehouse, the city gates were opened and at half-past two o'clock in the afternoon our infantry entered Troyes; the barricades with which the enemy had blocked the alleys made progress very difficult, but II Corps, having overcome all obstacles, passed through the city and began to pursue the enemy along the road towards Méry-sur-Seine, while the artillery of II Corps, having exited the city in order to take up firing positions, managed to cause casualties among the French rearguard with their fire and forced them to accelerate their retreat.[16]

13 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, combat awards, bundle 17, No. 2881, p. 283.
14 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, No. 2323; II Corps War Diary.
15 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, combat awards, bundle 17, No. 2257, 2881, p. 283.
16 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, No. 2316; II Corps War Diary for 1814.

After the action, II Corps settled into bivouacs two *versta* [1⅓ miles] from Troyes, on the Méry road.

The enemy losses amounted to 3,000 men taken prisoner alone, not including the 900 seriously wounded left in the city. The victors captured 10 guns. On 19 and 20 February [3 and 4 March], one private was killed in the 21st Jägers; Captain Zolotarev was wounded (in the left eye), along with 13 privates.[17] The following awards were made to those who distinguished themselves in the fighting at Bar-sur-Aube, Laubressel and Troyes:

The regimental commander, Major Buschen was promoted to lieutenant colonel; Lieutenant Brezhinsky, ensigns Yevnevich, Podolsky and Schtamm were awarded the Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

Sub-Lieutenant Malinin was promoted to lieutenant. Sub-Lieutenant Varnin was nominated for the Order of St. Anne 3rd class, but as he had already been awarded this for Borodino, he was awarded a Supreme Commendation.[18]

Macdonald, taking advantage of the slowness of the Coalition, managed to retreat and position himself behind Nogent and Bray. Each corps was moving forwards along separate routes from Troyes towards Paris in accordance with orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief. On 21 February [5 March], Count Pahlen and his cavalry were headed along the main road towards Nogent, with II Corps behind them in several echelons. For the entire day, our units were unable to catch up with the enemy, who had left les-Grès early in the morning. But eventually, they attacked his rearguard consisting of infantry and artillery in positions at Saint-Hilaire-sous-Romilly before nightfall. A reconnaissance that was carried out showed the Coalition that the enemy had retreated beyond the Seine, thus Wittgenstein's corps went from Romilly straight towards Nogent.

A week after the occupation of Troyes, the Coalition decided to drive the enemy from the positions they had taken up on the Seine. To that end, Count Pahlen moved most of his force towards Pont-sur-Seine, having left part of his vanguard (Chuguev Ulans, 20th Jägers and 21st Jägers) in Nogent, under the command of Major General Lisanevich.[19] General Raevsky, who took command of the army in place of Count Wittgenstein, who had been wounded on 15 [27] February, received orders to cross at Pont-sur-Seine with his corps and attack the enemy positioned behind Nogent. On 3 [15] March, at seven o'clock in the morning, the corps moved in the direction of Plessis-Pigy, but before reaching this village, Count Palen's cavalry, which formed the head of the column, were attacked by the enemy, whereupon the French were driven back to Léchelle. Prince Shakhovsky pursued the enemy from Laplanche to Saint-Ferréol [La Saulsotte] with 20th Jägers, 21st Jägers and two light guns from 6th Company and, having reached the latter, halted for the night. The enemy were holding an advantageous position on the high ground near Saint-Nicolas with their rearguard, consisting of 12 squadrons of cavalry, two regiments of infantry and seven guns.

Prince Shakhovsky's detachment stayed behind to observe. On 6 [18] March at two o'clock in the morning our troops noticed the enemy withdrawing from Saint-Nicolas, whereupon Prince Shakhovsky immediately seized the Forêt Sourdun. Macdonald did not dare to remain at Provins any longer and retreated to Maison-Rouge. The French would not have been able to hold the Coalition Main Army back, but Napoleon's move from Reims towards Plancy and the Aube saved Macdonald and delayed the eventual outcome.

Leaving one corps to face Blücher, Napoleon had moved towards the rear of our army with the rest of his forces in order to divert us from Paris. Having learned of Napoleon's moves and concerned that the enemy might prevent the union of our corps, Schwarzenberg decided to concentrate the

17 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, No. 2316; II Corps War Diary for 1814.
18 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, combat awards.
19 Grigory Ivanovich Lisanevich (1756-1832).

army around Bar-sur-Aube. To that end, a disposition was issued according to which *III. Korpus* [Gyulay], *IV. Korpus* [Kronprinz von Württemberg] and *VI. Korpus* [Raevsky] were directed to retreat towards Troyes.

At this moment enemy infantry were stationed at Sourdun, while the Forêt Sourdun was held by the 21st Jägers; the rest of the detachment were deployed at Le Mériot. At 11 o'clock at night, Prince Shakhovsky received orders to fall back to Nogent, which he did in conjunction with Count Pahlen's detachment. They crossed the Seine at Pont-sur-Seine on 7 [19] March, at three o'clock in the afternoon, and, having destroyed the bridge there, reached Méry with II Corps. General Raevsky, having assembled all his units, marched off towards Troyes with them shortly after midday. Emperor Alexander was dissatisfied with the retreat, and at his insistence it was decided to attack the enemy. This decision led to a clash with the French at Arcis.

Schwarzenberg, concerned lest the French cross the Aube at Plancy, sent three corps there, while only two corps (about 40,000 men) remained at Arcis, held by Frimont's vanguard.[20]

On 8 [20] March, the French occupied Arcis without resistance and took up positions in front of the town. Only part of our Main Army took part in the fighting that day, and the battle did not lead to a conclusive outcome. In the early hours of 9 [21] March, reinforcements reached the French, and at eight o'clock in the morning Oudinot arrived, which contributed about 30,000 men in Napoleon's hands.

On 9 [21] March, *III. Korpus*, detached the day before, also arrived to join the Coalition force, and the Coalition army was deployed as follows: *V. Korpus* [Wrede] on the right flank, *III. Korpus* and *IV. Korpus* in the centre with Kaisarov's cavalry,[21] while Raevsky's *VI. Korpus* were on the left with the Guard in reserve.

At dawn, the Prinz von Württemberg's II Corps left their bivouacs at Prémierfait and moved towards Moulin-Neuf, but on the way received new orders to move to the right and, having crossed La Barbuise at Saint-Remy, to take up fighting positions on the high ground.

Napoleon, having carried out a reconnaissance and having received an erroneous report that part of the Coalition force was retreating, assumed that they were withdrawing, and therefore ordered Sébastiani[22] to move forward at nine o'clock in the morning, while Ney was to support him. The French had barely reached the plateau when they saw three lines of Coalition units with batteries to their front. Napoleon, convinced after Sébastiani's attack that the opposing forces were superior, ordered a retreat. Schwarzenberg, by moving forward with his entire force, could have crushed the enemy at the river crossing, but he remained in place, worried by a variety of concerns and not taking the enemy's state-of-mind into account.

During this time, as the Commander-in-Chief was going to summon the commanders for a short meeting, which lasted several hours, the troops continued fighting. Eventually, at three o'clock in the afternoon, orders were received to attack the enemy in Arcis; II Corps began to advance on the enemy with their artillery and drove them from the positions they were holding forwards of Arcis, in addition, heavy fire from our side forced the French to retreat into the town itself, and II Corps received orders to storm the town, which was carried out with extraordinary speed. Despite heavy enemy fire, the Russians captured the western outskirts within a quarter of an hour and broke into the town itself. The 21st Jägers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Buschen raced forwards and, having taken a battery that was firing at us at bayonet point, were the first to break into the town. Lieutenant Colonel Buschen was awarded the Order of St. Anne, 2nd class, with diamonds

20 Johann Maria Philipp Frimont von Palota (1759-1831).
21 Paisy Sergeevich Kaisarov (1783-1844).
22 Horace François Bastien Sébastiani (1772-1851).

for this.[23]



Commemorative Medal Struck for the Battle of Arcis.

Other units entered the town from the south-eastern side. The salvoes from both sides did not cease until late at night. The French main body retreated towards Sompuis and Mailly-le-Camp: Marshal Macdonald towards Ormes and Viâpres, while Oudinot remained on the right bank of the Aube, covering the retreat.[24]

The French losses during these two days ranged from 7,000 to 8,000 killed and wounded; the Coalition lost about 3,000 men. The 21st Jägers suffered four men killed and 14 wounded.[25]

On 10 [22] March, the Commander-in-Chief, having received intelligence in the early hours of the route the French had chosen for their retreat, decided to assemble his main force in positions behind Le Puits stream, such that, having the opportunity to communicate through Vitry, he could secure his links to Blücher. As a result, *IV. Korpus* and *VI. Korpus* crossed the Aube via a pontoon bridge, with the latter corps deployed to Ramerupt.

Napoleon, having retreated beyond the Marne, instead of defending Paris, decided to operate against his adversary's lines of communications. On 12 [24] March, at a council of war, the Sovereign Emperor decided to unite the corps and, taking advantage of Napoleon's absence, to march on Paris, where he would link up with his reserves and supplies.

The next day, the Coalition main forces moved towards Paris from Vitry-le-François to Sézanne, while Blücher's army, which was in Châlons-en-Champagne at that time, marched towards Étoges and Meaux, and shifted Wintzingerode's detachment towards Saint-Dizier in order to conceal this movement. Having defeated this detachment, Napoleon discovered that he was facing only a small part of the Coalition forces. Having failed to distract the Coalition from his capital, he no longer dared to shift the theatre of war into the eastern *départements* of France, but preferred to march on Paris by the shortest route behind the Coalition. On 13 [25] March, our vanguard under Count Pahlen clashed with the forces under Marmont and Mortier on the road to Fère-Champenoise, with units from II Corps supporting the cavalry. This battle significantly weakened the French forces and

23 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, combat awards, bundle 15, No. 178, No. 179.

24 Bogdanovich, 1814, volume 2, chapter 18; Military Science Archive, No. 2323; II Corps War Diary; Leer, Encyclopaedia of Military and Naval Sciences, volume 1, p. 204.

25 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 208, bundle 57, No. 20, p. 33, 36.

made it easier for the Coalition to move towards Paris. On 16 [28] March, the enemy destroyed the bridge at Trilport, as a result of which our forces had to lay a new pontoon bridge. Because this delayed the crossing of the entire army, on the evening of 16 [28] March, Raevsky's corps bivouacked at Trilport and, having crossed the Trilport bridges during the night, at five o'clock in the morning had already passed through Meaux, and by two o'clock in the afternoon had reached the Prussian forward outposts, who were awaiting their relief in the Moni forest [*sic*, Forêt de Bondy?]. By nightfall on 17 [29] March, II Corps were bivouacked around the village of Noisy-le-Sec, while Pahlen's vanguard occupied Pantin and Romainville, having pushed the enemy back to the high ground at Belleville.

The Coalition monarchs, realising that any delay on their part would give the enemy the opportunity to strengthen their forces scattered around the outskirts of Paris, decided to attack the capital with the majority of their armies.

The general command over all forces defending Paris had been entrusted by Napoleon to his brother, King Joseph,[26] and about 40,000 men were assembled in Paris for the defence.

The infantry under Marmont and Compans,[27] numbering 12,345 men, occupied the area around Romainville, where Raevsky's corps of 12,800 infantry and 3,200 cavalry was operating. Blücher's force was ordered to attack the high ground at Montmartre, Raevsky's corps, to attack the centre on the high ground at Belleville via Pantin; the Russo-Prussian reserves were to serve as reinforcements for his corps; the Kronprinz von Württemberg was ordered to seize the bridges at Saint-Maur and Charenton, clear the forest and invest the Château de Vincennes.

The commencement of operations had been scheduled for five o'clock in the morning of 18 [30] March. However, the flanking armies began operations several hours after the scheduled time, and so Raevsky's corps had to begin the unequal struggle alone.

At forty-five minutes past five o'clock the first cannon shot was fired in front of Pantin; it found the units from II Corps already under arms, because Prinz Eugen, having heard musketry, had immediately formed up his troops in the village of Noisy and moved in the direction of the mill at La Folie. According to the general disposition, II Corps was assigned to advance along the main road running through Pantin, while I Corps were on the left side of this village; Prinz Eugen considered an advance along the canal to be foolhardy until his force had occupied the commanding high ground. Once the fog had cleared, Prinz Eugen saw that enemy columns were preparing to move towards Romainville and seize this important location. Then, having decided to forestall them, he held out there until the army arrived, because had the enemy reached Romainville first, it would have been very difficult to approach Paris from that direction, as it presented very favourable conditions for defence, so, without waiting for I Corps, which was proceeding at some distance, he moved up to Romainville with 3rd Division himself, which had no more than 3,000 men, sending Colonel Kapustin's brigade ahead, consisting of 20th Jägers and 21st Jägers, in order to seize the forest between Romainville and Pantin; he also sent 4th Division towards Pantin.

In preparation for the great battle, Prinz Eugen sent the following note to General Dovre,[28] to be passed on to Barclay de Tolly: 'The village of Romainville is the key to the position and must be held. A bloody battle awaits the units of II Corps here. They are committing themselves to this. This is not the first time. I hope for swift assistance. Eugen.'

Barclay in return promised to support him with his grenadier corps. While awaiting the arrival of the grenadiers, Prinz Eugen calculated the possibilities of engaging an incomparably stronger enemy in combat, namely the 5,000 men of Compans' division.

26 Joseph Bonaparte (1768-1844).
27 Jean Dominique Compans (1769-1845).
28 Friedrich August Philipp Anton Dovre (1764-1846).



	Coalition Forces		French Forces
A.A.	Helffreich's 14th Division	a.a.	Arrighi's division
B.B.	Pyshnitsky's 4th Division	b.b.	Compans' & Ledru's divisions
B'.B'.	4th Jägers & 34th Jägers	c.c.	Lagrange's division
C.C.	Prince Shakovsky's 3rd Division	d.d.	Ricard's division
D.D.	Vlastov's brigade	e.e.	Boyer's division
E.E.	Mezentsov's 5th Division	f.f.	Secrétan's division
F.F.	Pahlen's cavalry	g.g.	Christiani's division
F.	Chuguev Ulans	h.h.	Belliard's cavalry
G.G.	Kretov's 2nd Cuirassier Division	k.k.	Curial's division
H.H.	Paskevich's 2nd Grenadier Division	l.l.	Charpentier's division
I.I.	Knyazhnin's brigade	m.m.	Chastel's & Bordesoulle's cavalry

K.K.	Choglokov's 1st Grenadier Division		**Coalition Forces**
L.L.	Alvensleben's Prussian *Garde* brigade	M.M.	Prinz Wilhelm von Preußen's division
N.N.	Katzler's cavalry	O.O.	Horn's division
P.P.	Wintzingerode's corps	Q.Q.	Kaptsevich's X Corps
R.R.	Rudzevich's VIII Corps	S.S.	Württemberg contingent

Colonel Wolf's brigade (3rd Division)[29] went right-flanking around Romainville, while Prince Shakhovsky broke into the forest with 20th Jägers and 21st Jägers, where Compans had joined Ledru des Essarts' division,[30] which was stationed on the high ground at Pré-Saint-Gervais. While Shakhovsky was defending every step with his brave jägers here, Raevsky moved through Montreuil towards Bagnolet with 5th Division and Pahlen's cavalry, whereupon Shakhovsky attacked the enemy, which led to bitter fighting. The units under Prinz Eugen moved forwards despite fierce enemy fire (which cost the Russians about 1,500 men), but were forced to halt, meeting resistance at every step from an increasing enemy. Then Prinz Eugen, having failed to wrest control of the position at Pré-Saint-Gervais, was given orders to limit himself to holding Romainville, with the intention of waiting for an attack by Mezentsev's brigade (5th Division),[31] and also to expect support from the Kronprinz von Württemberg.

By this point, Marshal Marmont's entire infantry had emerged onto the high ground, and immediately began to attack, forcing the weakened Russian regiments to give up all their hard-won gains. At around midday, the Commander-in-Chief, seeing that Raevsky's corps was too weak to hold out until the arrival of the Kronprinz von Württemberg's force, decided to commit his reserves, the 1st and 2nd Grenadier Divisions, in order to shore up our left wing. Our troops went an the offensive. Colonel Kapustin's jäger brigade (20th Jägers and 21st Jägers) moved forwards...

Noticing the approach of our forces, the enemy hastened to concentrate all their units, but their every effort was in vain. At around one o'clock in the afternoon, Shakhovsky's division, together with the Tenginsk Infantry, Estland Infantry and Vlastov's jäger brigade,[32] and also supported by the grenadiers, despite a desperate resistance by the French, broke through the Parc Brières and captured four guns.

Once the high ground at Romainville had been taken and Marshal Marmont had been pushed back, the Commander-in-Chief, Barclay paused the advance until the arrival of the Army of Silesia and the Kronprinz von Württemberg.

A cannonade could be heard from the northern side of Paris and Montmartre, announcing the arrival of Blücher's army. From the high ground at Belleville and Romainville, the officers were seeing Paris for the first time. The spectacle was majestic and magnificent: 'I cannot describe the emotions that overwhelmed us all at the sight of that great imperial capital (wrote the eyewitness Löwenstern in his memoirs[33]). Proud Paris lay like an amphitheatre at our feet. There were the towering cupolas: Notre-Dame, the Louvre, the Tuileries, the Hôtel des Invalides. The palaces shone there in the sunlight.' Löwenstern continued: 'I forgot about the cannonballs with which the French were striking us, I thought only of Paris, which for 10 years had laid down the law to Europe. I was proud that I was one of those brave men who, with sabre in hand, covered in blood, dust and powder smoke, had paved the way for himself from the banks of the Volga to Montmartre and was now

29 Peter Johann Paul Woldemar von Lüdinghausen-Wolf (1770-1828).
30 François Roch Ledru des Essarts (1765-1844).
31 Vladimir Petrovich Mezentsev (1782-1833).
32 Yegor Ivanovich Vlastov (1770-1837).
33 Woldemar Hermann von Löwenstern (1776-1858).

ready to storm the residence of the great commander.'[34]

At about three o'clock, as the Kronprinz was closing in on Vincennes, orders were received to begin the decisive attack. The units from II Corps, under the command of Prinz Eugen, captured Pré-Saint-Gervais, 5th Division driving the French back on the Belleville plateau, while 3rd Division, also with brilliant success, carried out an attack on the cemetery at Mont-Louis. General Bordesoulle's cavalry,[35] drawn up at the base of the slopes on which the cemetery lay, vainly tried to halt their columns with rapid attacks; the artillery holding these slopes vainly struck at them with canister; the losses did not slow down the advance by our regiments. The 21st Jägers, having spread out their skirmishers in a screen, moved forward without pause. The company commanders: captains Zvyagin, Kurtashev and Ryshkov led this attack and through their well-judged commands and bravery contributed to the French being put to flight. Captain Ryshkov was killed in this action.

The enemy squadrons were forced to flee, and our regiments, having reached the crest, captured eight guns. In addition, the 20th Jägers and 21st Jägers got their share of trophies, two flags taken from the French.[36] The 21st Jäger Regiment was so carried away by their hard-won triumph that they pursued the enemy right up to the suburbs.

Lieutenant General Count Pahlen, who was covering the left wing during the advance, drove the skirmishers of the *Garde nationale de Paris* out of the suburbs facing Vincennes and penetrated as far as the barrière du Trône.

By nightfall, marshals Marmont and Mortier, who were in command of the defences, seeing the impossibility of continuing further, signed the capitulation of Paris, under the condition of the right to free retreat.

An hour later, orders were received to send 1,000 men from II Corps into Paris and to occupy the Hôtel de Ville de Paris. Thus the claim by Prinz Eugen, made to Hoffmann at Troyes, was fulfilled: his formation had the honour of being the first to enter the capital of France.[37]

These orders, however, contained one stipulation set in stone: the soldiers were ordered to wear undamaged boots or at least not to wear wooden clogs; if this proved impossible, then they were forbidden from wearing tunics or other civilian clothing, and most importantly, no French uniform. This last condition was the vital issue, because the men of the entire II Corps, with the exception of a few mixed orders of dress, were wearing uniforms taken from *volontaires gardes nationaux* killed at Arcis, and from local units at Bar-sur-Aube, Laubressel and Troyes. Only the tall green sprigs on their shakos and the white brassards on their right sleeves distinguished the Russian soldiers from the French. Eugen's promise that 'truly Russian hearts would enter Paris' reassured Barclay de Tolly, who had drafted these conditions. On 19 [31] March at 10 o'clock in the morning, a select group from II Corps marched in exemplary order along the streets of Paris.

Helldorf stated:[38] 'The victory at Paris was a tremendous event, truly worthy of the sacrifice it cost. But too many sacrifices were made, and Schwarzenberg alone is to blame. Every unit that fought at Paris showed true courage. Every battalion, every squadron, even each individual fought with complete selflessness, and the glorious day was marked by countless examples of heroic spirit.'

In the Battle of Paris, the Coalition lost more than 8,200 men killed or wounded, of whom Raevsky's corps accounted for 4,300 men, that is, more than half.

34 History of 3rd Sumy Dragoon Regiment [formerly Sumy Hussars].
35 Étienne Tardif de Pommeroux de Bordesoulle (1771-1837).
36 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 208, bundle 57, Wittgenstein's papers, No. 20, p. 128, returns signed by General Kikin.
37 *Voenny Sbornik*, 1864, volumes 9-10, Prinz Eugen and his memoirs.
38 Heinrich August von Helldorf (1794-1862).



The Entry of Russian Troops into Paris.

An engraving from the collection of P.Ya. Dashkov.

The French lost 4,000 killed or wounded, 1,000 taken prisoner, 126 guns and two flags.[39]

The losses in the 21st Jäger Regiment were heavy. Captain Ryshkov, four non-commissioned officers and 28 privates were killed. Sub-Lieutenant Varnin, Ensign Wangenheim, 13 non-commissioned officers and 74 privates were wounded. Six non-commissioned officers and nine privates were missing in action, for a total of 137 men.[40]

To commemorate the war of 1814 and the capture of Paris, a medal was struck to be worn on the chest on a ribbon; half St. Andrew blue, half St. George black and orange, with the inscription: *ЗА ВЗЯТИЕ ПАРИЖА 18* [*sic*, 19] *МАРТА 1814* (for the capture of Paris on 30 [*sic*, 31] March 1814). It was issued to all participants in the battle of Paris, as well as those who took part in the 1814 campaign.[41]

As a reward for the capture of Paris, Count Barclay de Tolly was promoted to the rank of field marshal, and Prinz Eugen von Württemberg was promoted to general-of-infantry at the age of 26.

Captains Zvyagin and Kurtashev received the Order of St. Anne 2nd class; Lieutenant Khudekov was promoted to staff-captain; sub-lieutenants Varnin and Lyutikov were promoted lieutenants; lieutenants Malinin and Klimovich received the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class; Lieutenant Baranov received the Order of St. Anne 3rd class; ensigns Yevnevich and Podolsky received Supreme Commendations;[42] *junkers* Kharchenko and Wangenheim were commissioned as ensigns.

Staff doctor Andrievsky was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class, for the wars from 1812 to

39 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, No. 2316, p. 232-263; Bogdanovich, 1814, volume 2, chapter 22.
40 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 208, bundle 57, No. 20, p. 33-36.
41 C.C.L. No. 25671.
42 Moscow Archive of the General Staff, combat awards, bundle 15, No. 178-179, p. 114; No. 2954.

1814. Many lower ranks received Royal Prussian medals for the campaigns of 1813 to 1814.



Medal Commemorating the Fall of Paris.

On 19 [31] March, the ceremonial entry of Coalition troops into Paris took place.

While passing through the Barrière de Pantin, Prinz Eugen, whose units were on guard duty, greeted Emperor Alexander I. The Tsar, turning to the prinz, said: "I congratulate you on your promotion to General-of-Infantry, or rather, I congratulate you on the fact that I am able to award it to you."

In accordance with the capitulation, the barrières of the city of Paris were surrendered to Coalition forces; Raevsky's *VI. Korpus* occupied the sector between the Soissons and Montreuil roads.

Meanwhile, intending to march on Paris, Napoleon had concentrated his army at Fontainebleau. The number of troops collected by Napoleon did not exceed 36,000 men. As soon as this news reached the Coalition forces, both armies were ordered to form dense columns at Longjumeau and Juvisy. General Raevsky's force, having left their bivouacs, on 21 March [2 April] at four o'clock in the afternoon moved across the Austerlitz Bridge and halted on the right side of the road, between the ferme de Contin [Paray-Vieille-Poste] and Juvisy with *V. Korpus* in reserve.

On the morning of 23 March [4 April], Napoleon concentrated his entire army between the Essonne river and Fontainebleau, with his right flank at Melun and his left at La Ferté-Alais. He was ready to launch an offensive, but the French *Sénat* and *Corps législatif* had deposed him from the throne the day before.

After Napoleon was deposed from the throne, the two-year campaign of Russian forces in Germany and France ended, having destroyed French hegemony and freed all of Europe from the yoke of the fearsome conqueror...

Having concluded an armistice, the units settled in extended quarters, and so *VI. Korpus* passed through Versailles to cantonment quarters in the Oise *département*, where they settled under full military precautions.

The divisional headquarters of 3rd Division was located in Beauvais, while the 21st Jägers were located with their headquarters battalion in Troadère [*sic*], of 80 hearths, while the companies were in Verderel (120 hearths), Luchy (200 hearths), Sokez [*sic*] (60 hearths), Hilaire [*sic*] (100 hearths), Ludorge [*sic*] (60 hearths), Maisoncelle-Saint-Lucien (60 hearths), Tillé (140 hearths), Lincourt (60 hearths), Fontaine-Saint-Lucien (77 hearths).[43]

The best time of the year and picturesque locations in the finest region of France were most conducive to the regiment's relaxation. The population treated our jägers most amicably. During this time the regiment brought itself into good order as much as possible. As was mentioned above, the men were so raggedly dressed that almost no one had uniform and everyone was wearing whatever they could find. All this happened because the regiments had been replenished through an annual resupply of uniform clothing until 1814, and due to the difficult conditions on campaign, their footwear and clothing had became completely unusable.

Our wounded Lieutenant Varnin, Ensign Wangenheim and the lower ranks were being treated in a Paris hospital.

With the cessation of hostilities, preparations began for the departure of units from France and their return to Russia. Based on the orders issued, 3rd Infantry Division, including the 21st Jägers, as part of I Independent Corps, set out from their French cantonments for Russia on 28 April [10 May] and, having crossed the Russian border, reached Kovno on 20 August [1 September], having spent 116 days on the march.

As the Russians crossed the border of our fatherland and heard the sounds of their native dialect once more, they devoutly crossed themselves.

43 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, No. 442 (A).

Appendix I.

Uniform distinctions.

(Extracted from: Viskovatov, Historical Description of Clothing and Weapons of the Russian Forces and the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire.).

The jägers were to be issued with: a coat or caftan, trousers, boots, a neck-cloth, a forage cap, a hat, a greatcoat, a sheepskin jacket, a musket with bayonet, or a rifle with a sword-bayonet, a sword belt, a cartridge belt, a knapsack and a water canteen.

The coat was to be light green, double-breasted, and was buttoned up both in winter and summer, and its dimensions, assuming a man's height of two *arshin* and nine *vershok* [six feet], were as follows: collar height, front edges, two *vershok* [3½ inches], centre rear, 2½ *vershok* [4⅜ inches]; the top edge was two *vershok* [3½ inches] shorter than the bottom edge; the length of the coat, from collar to waist was 10 *vershok* [17½ inches], and from the waist to the ends of the tails was nine *vershok* [15¾ inches]; the width of the front overlap is 1¾ *vershok* [3$^{1}/_{16}$ inches]; the distance from the first button to the collar is ½ *vershok* [⅞ inches], 1½ *vershok* [2⅝ inches] between the first and second buttons and so on, ½ *vershok* [⅞ inches] between the button holes and the front opening. The lining on the turn-backs is red, 9⅔ *vershok* [16⅞ inches] along the straight edge, 8½ *vershok* [14⅞ inches] along the opposite edge, ¾ *vershok* [1⅜ inches] wide at the top end, 2¾ *vershok* [4⅞ inches] wide at the bottom. The width of the cuffs were 1¾ *vershok* [3$^{1}/_{16}$ inches], while the flap width was one *vershok* [1¾ inches] and flap length was 3½ *vershok* [6⅛ inches]. Shoulder straps were yellow, 3¼ *vershok* [5⅝ inches] in length, one *vershok* [1¾ inches] wide at the shoulder, ¾ *vershok* [1⅜ inches] wide at the button. The buttons were flat; 25 in number, namely: seven on the right side of the front opening, six on the left; two each on the cuffs opposite the flap opening, and one on the sleeve at the top of the flap opening; two at the lower edge of the collar for the shoulder straps, two on the waist two, at the seam ends, one each on the tail ends. The coat collar and cuffs were red with white piping.

The trousers were light green with red piping, their length stopped five *vershok* [8¾ inches] above the heel and had a waist-band in front that was wide enough to be covered by the hem of the coat. In front, below the waistband, and at the back, on the belt seam, at a distance of one *vershok* [1¾ inches] from the upper edge of the trousers, two covered buttons were sewn on for the braces, which in this design could be fastened and unfastened without difficulty, without removing the waist-belt. In summer, linen trousers were worn.

The boots, oiled, round-toed, eight *vershok* [14 inches] high from the heel, were made with a cutout at the back of the bootleg, and had leather tabs with buttonholes sewn onto the inside of the bootleg, fastened with small leather buttons sewn to the side seams of the trousers.

The greatcoat was grey with a collar of the same colour as the coat collar, had no shoulder straps, and seven buttons.

The neck-cloth with a small bibbed front was made of black cloth on a linen lining and was tied at the back with black ribbons.

The lower ranks wore a round hat with brim and a visor made of black patent leather. On the front of the hat, was a circular bow in the form of a cockade of black ribbon with an orange stripe fastened, in the centre of the bow with a brass button, and above it two woollen pompons in regimental colours. Non-commissioned officers had gold braid around the top edge of the hat.

A forage cap made of light green cloth with a red band and white piping along the seams. Its height from the bottom edge to the fold was meant to be five *vershok* [8¾ inches]; the distance from the fold to the tassel with the 'nut' was six *vershok* [10½ inches]; the width at the fold was six *vershok*

[10½ inches]; the width at the end by the ‘nut’ was ¾ *vershok* [1⅜ inches]; the tassel was 1½ *vershok* [2⅝]; the width of the band was two *vershok* [3½ inches]. The tassel was to be of two colours: green and the colour of the shoulder straps, while the ‘nut’ was assigned by company: white in each battalion’s first companies, red in the second, blue in the third, orange in the fourth.

Regarding the hairstyle, it was observed that the forelocks, or ‘laverget’ as they were then called and temples, were close cropped under a comb, while at the back the hair was tied into a thick, flat braid, intertwined with a black, woollen ribbon. Hair powder was used during major parades and holidays.

A musket with a spike bayonet, while twelve men from each company had a rifle with a sword-bayonet, with slings and lock covers of black leather.

A sword belt with a small sewn-on frog for a scabbard (bayonet or sword-bayonet) and with a brass buckle for fastening on the left side, was made from polished black leather as was the scabbard.

A black leather cartridge pouch was worn by jägers on the front.

The knapsack and water canteen were issued with black straps and were worn by jägers over the left shoulder, with the canteen, which was made of double-ply tin, fastened with a strap to the middle of the knapsack. The knapsack, made of black cowhide, with a linen lining, was cylindrical.

Non-commissioned officers had gold braid on their collars and cuffs, and their hats had mixed white, black and orange tassels. They carried rifles, sword-bayonets and all other weapons and equipment, similar to that assigned to ordinary jägers, in addition, they had reed canes with a bone knob, which, when in the ranks, was attached to a coat button by a leather lanyard.

The company drummers had similar lace stripes as in the line infantry, while the drum major and horn players wore non-commissioned officer’s braid on their uniforms. The drummers were armed with hangers, and the horn players with daggers. The drum slings and drumsticks were to be black.

Subalterns had a coat and trousers of the same colours and cut as those assigned to private jägers, but with horizontal pocket flaps on the tails, with three buttons, and the tails were somewhat longer. Narrow gold braid was sewn onto the edges of the shoulder straps. The neck-cloth consisted of a black silk kerchief tied at the back; gloves without cuffs, canes the same as those of non-commissioned officers, bicorne hats with a green plume of cock’s feathers, and a gold lace-loop sewn onto the hat.

Field officers also had riding boots with spurs; while generals had a white plume on their hats.

On 18 [30] October 1806, cartridge belts were replaced by pouches 7½ *vershok* [13⅛ inches] long and three *vershok* [5¼ inches] wide (C.C.L. XXIX, 22321).

On 15 [27] December, shoulder straps were to show the division number.

On 10 [22] March 1807, officers’ spontoons and canes were withdrawn, and instead of them, swords were to be carried on parade (C.C.L. XXIX, 22482).

On 17 [29] September, generals, field officers and subalterns in jäger regiments were issued epaulettes, with a cloth field, the same colour as the shoulder straps. The half of the field closest to the collar was trimmed with narrow gold braid, while a twisted pair of gold cords were placed along the edges of the outer half. Field officers had epaulettes with thin gold-thread fringe, and generals had thick fringes, and for everyone in general they were threaded through a counter-epaulette made of the same braid as was on the epaulettes, fastened with a button sewn onto the coat at the collar.

On 12 [24] May 1809, the epaulettes were to have the division number made of red cloth with white piping.

In 1806, light green coats and trousers were replaced by dark green ones.

The jägers were ordered to wear a sword belt and bayonet scabbard over the left shoulder under the cross-belt and of the same width as the latter. From that time on, instead of being lined with straw, hats began to be lined with thick leather for greater durability, and they were called shakos. Summer and winter trousers and boots were issued, like those of the grenadier regiments, with leather lining at the bottom, and summer ones made of Flemish linen with gaiters and covered buttons, as a result of this change, the stiff boot legs were replaced with soft ones.

On 17 [29] May 1808, the 21st Jäger Regiment were required to have white collars with red piping and red cuffs on the coat.

On 13 [23] February 1809, collars and cuffs were to be dark green with red piping.

On 24 May [5 June], field officers and subalterns of jäger regiments were issued gorgets of the same type as those in grenadier and musketeer regiments, with a raised rim and with an embossed double-headed eagle in the centre, which were worn on a black ribbon with an orange border, close to the collar: completely silver for ensigns, silver with a golden eagle for sub-lieutenants, with a gold rim and eagle for staff-captains, gold with a silver eagle for captains, while field officers had completely gold ones, and the gorgets were government issued regimental property; if an officer were killed, it had to be handed over or a replacement paid for.

On 8 [20] July, shoulder straps on coats were to be blue with the numeral 3.

On 9 [21] August, it became customary to wear the greatcoat rolled over the shoulder such that its bound lower ends were halfway down the thigh.

On 6 [18] December, field officers and subalterns were ordered to wear shakos of the same pattern as the lower ranks instead of bicornes on parade, but with cap cords and flounders of silver mixed with black and orange silk, having plain silver tassels and ‘nuts’.

In that same year, generals and officers were allowed to wear frock coats with red piping on the cuffs and collar, and hair powder was completely discontinued.

The new .70 calibre pattern musket was approved.

On 31 December [12 January 1810], on the cartridge pouches there were to be brass numerals corresponding to the regiment’s number.

On 9 [21] January 1810, the shako cockade was to be replaced with a brass grenade with a single flame.

On 4 [16] February 1811, horse-hair plumes were to be worn on shakos: black for privates, black for non-commissioned officers with a white tip with an orange stripe in the middle, and completely red for drummers and fifers players.

On 8 [20] April, grenadiers and marksmen of jäger regiments were required to have grenades with three flames on their shakos (C.C.L. XXXI, No. 24584).

Forage caps for lower ranks were to be in the style of a shako without a visor with a dark green band, with the company numeral on the band (C.C.L. XXXI, No. 24789).

On 3 [15] November, non-commissioned officers were no longer required to carry canes and gloves, but were also allowed to wear mittens.

On 1 [13] January 1812, a new pattern of shako was introduced, lower than the previous one, with a wider top.

At the same time, the previous high collars on the coats were replaced by low ones, fastened with hooks. Soldiers’ gaiters and officers’ boots were to be knee-high; while officers, to reduce their expenses, were allowed to have: linen flounders, sashes and cap lines instead of silver ones, and

forged brass fittings on their epaulettes instead of gold ones.

Appendix II.

Regimental Colonels-in-Chief and Commanders.

Colonels-in-Chief:

Major General Ivan Yefimovich **Sutthoff** - 1805.

Major General Vasily Danilovich **Laptev** - 1806-1808.

Colonel Pavel Prokofievich **Plattsev** - 1808-1815.

Regimental Commanders:

Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Andreevich **Chernozipunnikov** - 1805-1806.

Colonel Iosif Andreevich **Kulikovsky** - 1806-1807.

Colonel Pavel Petrovich **Lashkevich** - 1808-1811.

Colonel Alexander Stepanovich **Stepanov** - 1812-1813.

Lieutenant Colonel Khristiyan Nikolaevich **Buschen** - 1813-1819.

Appendix III.

Regimental Battle Honours.

War of 1806-1807:

13 [25] December 1806 - Action at Łopacin.

14 [26] December 1806 - Battle of Gołymin.

18 [30] January 1807 - Action at Rosen Krug [Passenheim?].

25 January [6 February] 1807 - Rearguard action at Preußisch-Eylau.

27 January [8 February] 1807 - Battle of Preußisch-Eylau.

3 [15] February 1807 - Action at Mahnsfeld.

14 [26] February 1807 - Action at Peterswalde.

20 to 21 February [4 to 5 March] 1807 - Action at Launau.

3 [15] May 1807 - Battle at the fortress of Danzig.

29 May [10 June] 1807 - Battle of Heilsberg.

2 [14] June 1807 - Rearguard action on the retreat to Königsberg.

3 [15] June 1807 - Battle of Königsberg.

War of 1812:

14 to 16 [26 to 28] June - Rearguard actions at Vilna and Werki.

11 [23] July - Clash at Budilovo wharf (3rd Battalion).

13 to 14 [25 to 26] July - Action at Kukovyachino.

14 [26] July to 5 [17] August - Rearguard actions on the retreat towards Smolensk.

24 July [5 August] [*sic*, 11 [23] July] - Battle of Eckau (Replacement Battalion).

5 to 6 [17 to 18] August - Battle of Smolensk.

6 [18] August - Action at Sanktney (Replacement Battalion).

7 [19] August - Battle of Lubino [Valutina Gora].

10 [22] August - Action at Altkirchen [Dahlenkirchen] (Replacement Battalion).

19 [31] August - Action at Gzhatsk.

22 August [3 September] - Action at Gridnevo.

24 August [5 September] - Action at the Kolotsky Monastery.

25 to 26 August [7 to 8 September] - Battle of Borodino.

6 [18] October - Battle of Tarutino.

War of 1813:

10 [22] August - Action at Peterswald.

11 [23] August - Action at Pirna.

13 to 15 [25 to 26] August - Battle of Dresden.

17 [29] August - Action at Altenberg.

18 to 19 [30 to 31] August - Actions at Eichwald and Zinnwald.

24 August [5 September] - Actions at Oelsen and Nollendorf.

28 August [9 September] - Covering the retreat to Berggießhübel.

29 August [10 September] - Clash at Kulm.

31 August [12 September] - Night attack at Nollendorf.

3 [15] September - Pursuit of the enemy to Gottleuba.

4 [16] September - Action at Peterswald.

28 September [10 October] - Action at Borna.

4 to 7 [16 to 19] October - Battle of Leipzig.

February to 21 December [2 January 1814] - Siege of Danzig (Replacement Battalion).

War of 1814:

4 [16] January - Action at the Landau fortress.

15 [27] February - Battle of Bar-sur Aube.

19 to 20 February [3 to 4 March] - Action at Troyes.

23 February [7 March] - Reconnaissance-in-force to Nogent.

3 [15] March - Actions at Laplanche and Saint-Ferréol.

9 [21] March - Battle of Arcis.

13 [25] March - Battle of Fère-Champenoise.

18 [30] - Fall of Paris.

Appendix IV.

Regimental Roll-Of-Honour.

Ensign **Domashnev**, killed in action, 21 February [5 March] 1807, at Launau.

Lieutenant **Rogovtsev**, killed in action, 21 February [5 March] 1807, at Launau.

Lieutenant **Pekur**, died of wounds suffered at Launau (5 March new style) on 6 [18] May 1807.

Ensign **Sakharny**, killed in action, 3 [15] May 1807, at Danzig.

Ensign **Filimonov**, killed in action, 3 [15] May 1807, at Danzig.

Sub-Lieutenant **Bravchinsky**, killed in action, 13 [25] July 1812, at Ostrovno.

Captain **Varnin**, killed in action, 6 [18] August 1812, at Smolensk.

Lieutenant **Kononovich**, killed in action, 6 [18] August 1812, at Smolensk.

Sub-Lieutenant **Shchukin**, killed in action, 6 [18] August 1812, at Smolensk.

Sub-Lieutenant **Smolensky**, killed in action, 7 [19] August 1812, at Lubino.

Ensign **Miller**, killed in action, 7 [19] August 1812, at Lubino.

Staff-Captain **Kvashnevich**, killed in action, 25 August [6 September] 1812, at Borodino.

Ensign **Sekletsky**, killed in action, 14 [26] August 1813, at Dresden.

Ensign **Melnikov**, killed in action 18 [30] August 1813, at Eichwald.

Colonel **Stepanov** (regimental commander), killed in action 4 [16] October 1813, at Leipzig.

Captain **Ryshkov**, killed in action, 18 [30] March 1814, at Paris.

Appendix V.

Regimental Strength Report For February 1807.

This regiment is under the supreme command of the Honourable General-of-Cavalry Baron Bennigsen in Lieutenant General Sacken's division, Lieutenant General Prince Bagration's vanguard, Major General Pahlen's detachment, within Prussian borders. 1 [13] March 1807.

First Battalion	Laptev's	Kulman's	Feonas'	Vacant	TOTAL
On the Rolls					
Field Officers	1			1	**2**
Subalterns	6	4	4	4	**18**
Non-Commissioned Officers	8	7	7	7	**29**
Musicians	5	1	1	1	**8**
Privates	63	62	62	63	**250**
Hospitalised					
Non-Commissioned Officers	4	5	5	4	**18**
Musicians	2	1	1	1	**5**
Privates	52	49	51	53	**205**
Local Sick					
Field Officers					
Subalterns	2	1	2	2	**7**
On Detachment					
Subalterns	1	1	1	1	**4**
Non-Commissioned Officers	1			1	**2**
Privates	1	3	4	1	**9**
Gapped Posts					
Field Officers					
Subalterns	2				**2**
Non-Commissioned Officers	1	2	2	2	**7**
Musicians	3	1	1	1	**6**
Privates	102	103	103	102	**410**
Present					
Field Officers	1			1	**2**
Subalterns	3	2	1	1	**7**
Non-Commissioned Officers	3	2	2	2	**9**
Musicians	3				**3**

Privates	10	10	7	9	**36**

Second Battalion	Vacant	Anfimov's	Jung's	Yelistratov's	**TOTAL**
On the Rolls					
Field Officers	1				**1**
Subalterns	5	4	4	4	**17**
Non-Commissioned Officers	7	7	7	7	**28**
Musicians	2	1	2	2	**7**
Privates	63	62	62	63	**250**
Hospitalised					
Non-Commissioned Officers	3	3	5	5	**16**
Musicians		1		1	**2**
Privates	54	48	43	51	**196**
Local Sick					
Field Officers	1				**1**
Subalterns	1	2	1	3	**7**
On Detachment					
Subalterns	1	1	1		**3**
Non-Commissioned Officers	2	2			**4**
Privates	3	5	2	2	**12**
Gapped Posts					
Field Officers	1				**1**
Subalterns					
Non-Commissioned Officers	2	2	2	2	**8**
Musicians	1	1			**2**
Privates	102	103	103	102	**410**
Present					
Field Officers					
Subalterns	3	1	2	1	**7**
Non-Commissioned Officers	2	2	2	2	**8**
Musicians	2		2	1	**5**
Privates	6	9	17	10	**42**

Third Battalion	Kulikovsky's	Ivanov's	Dubrovin's	Kanishchev's	TOTAL
On the Rolls					
Field Officers	1				**1**
Subalterns	5	4	4	4	**17**
Non-Commissioned Officers	7	7	7	7	**28**
Musicians	3		1	2	**6**
Privates	63	62	62	63	**250**
Hospitalised					
Non-Commissioned Officers	5	4	4	5	**18**
Musicians	1			1	**2**
Privates	46	45	48	53	**192**
Local Sick					
Field Officers	1				**1**
Subalterns	3	2	1	3	**9**
On Detachment					
Subalterns		2	1		**3**
Non-Commissioned Officers		1	1		**2**
Privates	7		6		**13**
Gapped Posts					
Field Officers					
Subalterns					
Non-Commissioned Officers	2	2	2	2	**8**
Musicians		2	1		**3**
Privates	102	103	103	102	**410**
Present					
Field Officers					
Subalterns	2		2	1	**5**
Non-Commissioned Officers	2	2	2	2	**8**
Musicians	2		1	1	**4**
Privates	10	17	8	10	**45**

Regimental Totals	On the Rolls	Sick	Detached	Gapped	**Present**
Field Officers	4	2		1	**2**
Subalterns	52	23	10	2	**19**
Non-Commissioned Officers	85	52	8	23	**25**
Musicians	21	9		11	**12**
Privates	750	593	34	1,230	**123**
Support Personnel					
Auditor	1				**1**
Chaplain	1		1		
Chaplain's assistant	1		1	1	
Senior Medical Officer				1	
Junior Medical Officer	2		1		**1**
Battalion *Feldscher*				3	
Barber	7	4	2	5	**4**
Infirmary Attendant	11	8	3	1	
Infirmary Supervisor	1		1		
Wagenmeister [Transport Officer]	1		1		
Regimental Clerk	1				**1**
Battalion Clerk	1		1	2	
Quartermaster's Clerk				1	
Paymaster's Clerk	1	1			
Locksmith	1		1		
Locksmith's Mate	11	2	7	1	**2**
Master Armourer				1	
Armourer's Mate	5		4	1	**1**
Blacksmith	5	2		1	**3**
Farrier				1	
Carpenter	11	1	8	1	**2**
Provost	3		2		**1**
Driver	37	8	17	4	**9**
State Orderlies	24	3	14	7	**7**
Private Orderlies	63		28		**35**
Support Personnel TOTAL:	**188**	**29**	**92**	**31**	**67**

Sick and injured officers:

Regimental commander, Colonel Kulikovsky, wounded, in Grodno.

Major Salin, wounded, in Grodno.

Captain Kanishchev, exhaustion, in Heilsberg.

Captains Feonas and Ivanov, fever, in Eylau.

Captain Anfimov, wounded, in Grodno.

Captain Yelistratov, wounded, in Königsberg.

Staff-Captain Maslov, sick, in Grodno.

Staff-Captain Ovsyanikov, wounded, in Grodno.

Staff-Captain Gavronsky, wounded, in Königsberg.

Lieutenant Bukhovetsky, fever, in Heilsberg.

Lieutenant Tishchenko, wounded, in Königsberg.

Lieutenant Sytensky, sick, in Rossieny.

Lieutenants Pekur and Kulikovsky, wounded, in Bartenstein.

Sub-Lieutenant Sakharny, fever, in Königsberg.

Sub-Lieutenant Kulkovsky, chest infection, in Grodno.

Ensigns Derevyanenko, Zbursky, Blonsky and Kostselkovsky, wounded, in Königsberg.

Ensigns Yeremeev, Varnin and Volkov, wounded, in Grodno.

Ensign Schmidt, fever, in Heilsberg.

Detached Officers:

Paymaster, Lieutenant Golubev, in Rossieny with the regimental heavy baggage.

Lieutenant Bolotov, has not reached the regiment on posting.

Lieutenant Rogovtsev, killed in action.

Sub-Lieutenant Oldenburg, collecting cartridges.

Sub-Lieutenant Lisanovsky, transporting sick to Grodno.

Sub-lieutenants Perfiliev and Gubin, missing in action.

Ensign Vietinghoff, collecting provisions from Königsberg.

Ensign Domashnev, killed in action.

Ensign Mochulsky, sent to the *Wagenburg* [wagon-lines].

Junior Medical Officer Egerts, in Rossieny with the sick.

Draught horses: two with the regiment; 69 with the *Wagenburg*; 12 in Rossieny.

Casualties:

Killed in action on 14 [26] February 1807: seven privates.

Wounded in action on 14 [26] February 1807: Lieutenant Tishchenko, Ensign Derevyanenko, one non-commissioned officer and six privates.

Killed in action on 20 February [4 March] 1807: five privates.

Wounded in action on 20 February [4 March] 1807: Captain Yelistratov; Staff-Captain Gavronsky, lieutenants Pekur and Kulikovsky; Sub-Lieutenant Grigoriev; five non-commissioned officers and 24 privates.

Total killed: 12 privates.

Total wounded: one captain, one staff-captain, three lieutenants, one sub-lieutenant, one ensign, six non-commissioned officers, 30 privates.

Total died: 13 privates, one infirmary attendant, one driver.

Actioned:

In accordance with the rulings of the court martial, on 4 [16] February 1807, the following were demoted: from captain to staff captain Kiril Jung; from lieutenant to sub-lieutenant Alexander Grigoriev.

By Supreme Order, promoted from *Junker* for distinction on 10 [22] February 1807: Ivan Mochulsky to ensign.

Signed: Regimental Colonel-in-Chief, Major General Laptev.

Appendix VI.

Awards Of The Military Order Medal To Lower Ranks Of The Regiment.

War of 1806-1807:

Feldwebel Stepan **Kuzmin**, medal No. 2456. On 14 [26] December 1806, killed an enemy officer and took his gorget at the town of Gołymin.

Feldwebels Sergey **Belopasov**, No. 2457; Timofey **Lukyanov**, No. 2458; Ivan **Andreev** No. 2459; Matvey **Zabegaev**, No. 2460. They were constantly present in every battle against enemy forces and always with the skirmishers, where they fearlessly repelled the enemy through their courageous exploits.

Junker Ivan **Kulikovsky**, No. 2461. On 27 January [8 February] 1807, during the pitched battle at Preußisch Eylau, he saved a company commander who, having been wounded, was surrounded by the enemy, whom the aforementioned Kulikovsky drove off.

Junkers Ignaty **Kotlubay**, No. 2462; Petr **Brezhinsky**, No. 2463; Ignaty **Kurilov**, No. 2464; Yakov **Savitsky**, No. 2465; Kuzma **Kulikovsky** No. 2466. They have distinguished themselves in every battle through their brave actions, being with the skirmishers, they defeated the enemy and set an example through such feats for the encouragement of others.

Junker Alexander **Schopp**, No. 2467. On 3 [15] May 1807, at Danzig, he was sent to seize a vital objective with his detachment, where he was engaged by an overwhelming number of enemy, whom he successfully drove away through his leadership and brought a considerable number of prisoners back to his unit.

Kaptenarmus [company storemen] Luka **Yelinsky**, No. 2468; Moisey **Andreev**, No. 2469; and Ivan **Makarov**, No. 2470. In 1806 and 1807 the whole group distinguished themselves as brave and fearless volunteers.

Non-commissioned officers Leonty **Fedorov**, No. 2471; Semen **Poluyanov**, No. 2472; Alexey **Alexeev**, No. 2473; Viktor **Yerukov**, No. 2474; Sidor **Zavyalov**, No. 2475; Seliverst **Sebirtsov**, No. 2476; Ivan **Drozdov**, No. 2477; Mikhail **Kazachkov**, No. 2478; Tikhon **Stepanov**, No. 2479; Stepan **Yefimov**, No. 2480; Grigory **Naumov**, No. 2481; Yestafy **Vikulin** No. 2482; Potap **Suchkov**, No. 2483. They performed their duties with diligence in every battle with fearless courage, volunteering to fight and thus setting an example for their subordinates.

Non-commissioned officer Fedor **Vasiliev**, No. 2484. On 19 [31] December 1806, at the town of Gołymin he was detached with the marksmen and was cut off by the enemy, where with a small number of privates, with fearless courage, he put all the enemy surrounding him to flight and took four men prisoner.

Non-commissioned officer Alexander **Brutov**, No. 2485. For his bravery in every action and the fearlessness with which he distinguished himself everywhere.

Privates Ivan **Avdeev**, No. 2486; Ivan **Patrukhin**, No. 2487; Ivan **Larukov**, No. 2488; Petr **Yakov**, No. 2489; Petr **Nesterov**, No. 2490; Mikhail **Yefimov**, No. 2491; Vavila **Grigoriev**, No. 2492; Parfeny **Danilov**, No. 2493; non-commissioned officers Gur **Romanov**, No. 2494; Mikhail **Andreev**, No. 2495; Mina **Timofeev**, No. 2496; Kondraty **Yemelyanov**, No. 2497; Stepan **Serebrennikov**, No. 2498; Alexey **Ivanov**, No. 2499; Ivan **Danilov**, No. 2500; Savely **Romanov**, No. 2501; Filip **Kulakin**, No. 2502; Login **Yakovlev**, No. 2503; Stepan **Samuilov**, No. 2504; Ivan **Fedorov**, No. 2505; Nikifor **Moiseev**, No. 2506; privates Afanasy **Fedorov**, No. 2507; Ivan **Antyshev**, No. 2508; Mikhail **Alexeev**, No. 2509; Andrey **Saveliev**, No. 2510; Ivan **Samuilov**, No. 2511; Ion **Makarov**, No. 2512; Stepan **Uvarov**, No. 2513. They executed their duties with all

diligence and fearless courage, and were always among the volunteers and thereby encouraged their comrades.

Privates Grigory **Fedorov**, No. 2514; Ivan **Petrov**, No. 2515; Grigory **Meshcheryakov**, No. 2516. They fearlessly distinguished themselves with their bravery everywhere in every action.

War of 1812:

Non-commissioned officer Semen **Afanasiev**, No. 19256; privates Ivan **Gerasimov**, No. 19257; Semen **Razumnov**, No. 19258; non-commissioned officer Andrey **Pavlovsky**, No. 19259; *Feldwebel* Leonty **Fedorov**, number unknown.

War of 1813-1814:

Non-commissioned officer Kirill **Nikitin**, No. 19262. For various actions at Troyes, Bar-sur-Aube and Paris.

Feldwebels Ivan **Fedorov**, No. 19263; Mikhail **Matveev**, No. 19267; non-commissioned officer Mikhail **Fomin**, No. 19266. for Dresden.

Feldwebel Varfolomey **Mishchuk**, No. 19264; Private Larion **Yegorov**, No. 19265. For Leipzig.

Non-commissioned officer Tomik **Mikel**, No. 19255. For 1812-1813.

Private Matvey **Fedorov**, No. 19268. For Paris.

Private Spiridon **Trofimov**, No. 19269. For Troyes and Paris.

Non-commissioned officers Yegor **Dreyn**, No. 19270; Ivan **Zhuravlev**, No. 23639; *Junkers* Fedor **Wangenheim**, No. 23608; Luka **Meshchenkov**, No. 23637; *Kaptenarmus* Nikolay **Yakovlev**, No. 23645. For Bar-sur-Aube.

Non-commissioned officers Vyacheslav **Vasiliev**, No. 23642; Luka **Ostapov**, No. 23643. Actions not recorded.

Feldwebels Dementy **Ivanov**, No. 24701; Andrey **Yakovlev**, No. 24702; Mikhail **Yakovlev**, No. 24703. Distinguished themselves in actions between 17 to 21 August [29 August to 2 September] 1813 at Danzig, on the recommendation of General-of-Cavalry, Herzog Alexander von Württemberg (Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 137, bundle 95, No. 12, p. 7).

Non-commissioned officers Ivan **Riznichenko**, No. 29544; Stepan **Semenov**, No. 29545; Yevdokim **Semenov**, No. 29546; privates Petr **Vorobiev**, No. 29547; Zinovy **Yevseev**, No. 29548. For Arcis.

Non-commissioned officer Parfen **Semenov**, No. 37151; privates Andrey **Yermolaev**, No. 37152; Yegor **Fedorov**, No. 37153; *Feldwebels* Vasily **Shutov**, No. 37154; Vasily **Alexandrov**, No. 40554. For service with the Replacement Battalion.

Appendix VII.

General Laptev's Report To Count Pahlen Dated 20 December 1806 [1 January 1807].

By order of the Honourable Lieutenant General von der Osten-Sacken, from the 11th of this month [23 December, new style] I had the honour of joining Your Excellency's command with the 21st Jäger Regiment entrusted to me and being employed along with various units wherever military necessity demanded, on the 13th [25 December, new style] in particular, before reaching Łopacin on the Sona river, on the 14th [26 December] at Gołymin, when attacked by an overwhelming number of French, I entered into battle, using the battalions wherever the enemy attempted to make their move, due to the newness of the regiment and its small numbers, as there are now a large number of sick men, I have noted the active diligence of all ranks for the glory of the armed forces of His Imperial Majesty.

The Regimental Commander, the Honourable Colonel Kulikovsky, who distinguished himself in particular through his bravery and resolute experience, assisted me perfectly in both of these actions and acted for the benefit of the service with the battalion, repelling the enemy everywhere. On the 13th [25 December], Major Lashkevich, commanding the second battalion, acted with great presence of mind to repel the enemy attacking from the right flank. Captain Kulman, commanding the battalion bearing my name, carried out all orders with great efficiency and was an example of courage to his subordinate commanders. Captain Feonas was deployed by me with his marksmen in both of these heated actions, he put himself at risk with rare zeal and prevented the enemy attempts to harm us with precision and courage. Captain Ivanov carried out all his duties with fortitude. Captain Kanishchev proved himself to be diligent in the latter battle, where he was personally wounded in the left leg during an enemy night ambush. Staff Captain Shchukin acted bravely and promptly in the village held by the marksmen on the 13th [25 December]. Staff Captain Maslov, who was ill in the latter action, due to his diligence in the service of His Imperial Majesty, having gathered his last strength, was seen there actively executing his duties. Sub-Lieutenant Rodichev was employed at the front with the marksmen in the second battle and performed his duties with distinction.

Sub-lieutenants Baryshnikov and Gubin, in the appointments of battalion adjutants, carried out all the orders issued to them promptly and with boldness, in dangerous locations; the latter remains missing in action as darkness fell at the end of the fighting.

In these actions by 21st Jäger Regiment, non-commissioned officer Radyakin with the marksmen and volunteers especially distinguished himself, going into every danger, while the noble *Junkers* also carried out the duties assigned to them with distinction, namely: Romanov, Kotlubay, Kulikovsky, Vasilenko, Schopp and Mochulsky, the latter was wounded in the left arm by sabre.

The losses to the regiment entrusted to me consist of the following: Ensign Yeremeev was wounded in the right leg by a bullet; Sub-Lieutenant Gubin is missing; 40 lower ranks were killed, 20 were wounded, and some 200 men remain missing, due to forced marches in unbearable air and unseasonable mud and the latter battle continuing until 11 o'clock at night, having lost the strength to follow the regiment, especially during the night actions with various enemy ambushes, which began to influence the limits of endurance of our troops; the loss of weapons, equipment, and soldiers' vehicles, therefore it is impossible to demand speed from them.

I present to Your Excellency a report of the lost and captured items and money, for which I most humbly ask you to give your testimony.

Herewith I make it my duty to testify to the outstanding bravery and diligence of all the lower ranks of the 21st Jäger Regiment entrusted to me, hoping for the evident testimony of Your Excellency, which will be presented to the Supreme Command by you in this manner.

No. 1083. 20 December 1806 [1 January 1807]. Major General Laptev.
(Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, document 563, No. 0038).

Appendix VIII.

The Tsarevich's Report To The Tsar Dated 15 [27] December 1807.

Report:

Resolution: For this he is awarded the Order of St. George, 2nd class, about which His Majesty has been informed.

Lieutenant General Malyutin has explained in his report to me that Colonel Kulikovsky of the Wilmanstrand Musketeers, having served previously in the 21st Jäger Regiment and currently in St. Petersburg recovering from a wound, had been wounded in the late war against the French at Preußisch-Eylau shot through the leg by a bullet, and had remained in the town of Tilsit to recover when at that time, by Supreme Orders from Your Imperial Majesty, he was transferred to the Wilmanstrand Regiment in order to ease his service.

Then, having gained some relief from his wound and being motivated by diligence for service, he returned to the army, but due to the location of the regiment being uncertain at that time, he went to the contemporary commander of the vanguard, Lieutenant General Prince Bagration, by whom he was employed in the battle at Heilsberg, where he was wounded a second time by a bullet in his right hand, losing the use of his index finger as a result; but due to his recent transfer he was not nominated and therefore has been denied Your Majesty's Sovereign award. Having attached the affidavit issued for him by Lieutenant General Prince Bagration that he was genuinely employed by him in the battle at Heilsberg, Lieutenant General Malyutin presents for the consideration of Your Imperial Majesty the outstanding service of Colonel Kulikovsky and the wounds he received in battle, asking for a most gracious reward.

Signed: Inspector General of all cavalry Tsarevich Konstantin. No. 490. Headquarters in Strelno manor, 15 [27] December 1807.

(Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, book or reports, 336, p. 19-21).

Affidavit.

This is issued for Colonel Kulikovsky, who was transferred from the 21st Jäger Regiment to the Wilmanstrand Musketeer Regiment for relief from wounds, who, not knowing where his regiment was, came to me and asked to be employed in the vanguard during operations against the enemy, which is why he was under my command in the battle at the town of Heilsberg on 29 and 30 May [10 and 11 June], carrying out his duties as befits a valiant and resourceful officer in every assignment, where he was wounded in the right hand by a bullet, from which he lost the use of his index finger, which I confirm with my signature and through the affixing of my coat of arms and seal. 22 November [4 December] 1807.

Signed: Lieutenant General Prince Bagration. Sealed in the presence of his aide-de-camp, Staff-Captain Ofrosimov.

Major General Laptev's Letter to the Tsar Dated 16 [28] December 1807.

Most Gracious Tsar!

Resolution 'Issue him 5,000' from the Cabinet.

Due to information from those who were ill-disposed towards me, I was subjected to Court Martial and although I have been acquitted by this court, during the proceedings I was passed over for promotion and received half my Colonel's salary rather than the full salary for the year; all ranks of the court were granted living expenses and, according to the law, subsistence was paid on my account. In addition to the fact that the annual issues to the regiment in full service, which was also

newly raised, were associated with significant costs in view of my inadequate expenses.

The justice and mercy of Your Imperial Majesty have returned to me that which was lost in rank, as I have been given the seniority of a Major General for a year and seven months. Keeping with reverence in my soul the feelings of gratitude for such benefaction, I dare to have recourse to your magnanimity, Most Gracious Tsar! and I ask, firstly, for an addition of a year and seven months from the date of the seniority given to me for the salary for the rank of Major General until the date of granting this rank, secondly, for the issuance of half of the Colonel's salary withheld for a year, and thirdly, for the return to me from the treasury of the thousands of roubles that I spent on the expenses and maintenance of the court officials. Such is the Supreme Mercy and view of my disordered state, to grant me the opportunity to pay my debts, into which I entered out of necessity during the trial, from which I was acquitted.

Most Gracious Tsar! Your Imperial Majesty's most obedient Major General Colonel-in-Chief of the 21st Jäger Regiment Vasily Laptev.

St. Peter, 16 [28] December 1807.

(Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, book of reports, 336, p. 55).

Appendix IX.

Dmitry Guriev's Letter To Count Lieven Dated 18 February [2 March] 1807.

For my most Gracious Tsar, via Count Khristofor Andreevich!

I hereby forward to Your Excellency a Golden Sword with diamonds, issued on Supreme Orders at the expense of the Cabinet for the Colonel-in-Chief of the 21st Jäger Regiment, Major General Laptev, who demonstrated outstanding courage and valour in combat against French forces, humbly asking you to submit this to His Imperial Majesty for approval, and then to notify me. At this time, I have the honour to inform my most Gracious Tsar, that this sword cost 1,457 roubles, and that I already have the good fortune to submit it to the Sovereign Emperor, and His Majesty was pleased to command that a silver binding be put on it instead of the original gold binding, which has been done.

With the greatest respect, I have the honour to be Your Excellency's most humble servant, Dmitry Guriev.

18 February [2 March] 1807.

To His Excellency, Count Kh.A Lieven.

(Moscow Archive of the General Staff, catalogue 152, book of correspondence, 367, p. 683).

Appendix X.

Barclay de Tolly's Report To The Tsar Dated 17 [29] November 1814.

To Your Imperial Majesty, from Field Marshal Count Barclay de Tolly,

I report:

That General-of-Infantry Prinz Eugen von Württemberg has testified that Captain Sorokin of the 21st Jäger Regiment, during the war with the French in 1812, on 14 [26] July, at the town of Ostrovno, was sent to cover a battery consisting of two guns with one grenadier platoon; and was charged by a considerable number of French *chasseurs à cheval*; however, he defended them with courage and fearlessness and rebuffed all their ferocious attempts; moreover, he has shown valour in other battles, most especially during the retreat to Smolensk, being sent to shield the Vitebsk road also with one grenadier platoon, he held back an ever increasing enemy with exemplary courage, until he was wounded by a bullet to the right side of the chest, and after that, while reconstituting a regiment in Russia and recovering from his wound, he remained unrewarded.

In acknowledgement of such excellent deeds by this officer, I, by the power most graciously vested in me, have now awarded him the Order of St. Anne, 3rd class, and for this I dare to most humbly beg for Your Imperial Majesty's Supreme Approval.

Field Marshal Count Barclay de Tolly. No. 5706. 17 [29] November 1814.

Appendix XI.

Regimental Officers.

This data was extracted from the service records stored in the Moscow and St. Petersburg Archives of the General Staff and Supreme Orders for the relevant years.

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
1	Major Boris Georgievich **Gine**	1805	Estland Nobility	Transferred to the Mitau Battalion, 23 October [4 November] 1806.
2	Captain Stepan Yemelyanovich **Ivanov**	1805	Soldier's child	Wounded in the chest with damage to two ribs in the war of 1789. Transferred to 20th Jägers on 16 [28] April 1807.
3	Lieutenant Colonel Dimitry Andreevich **Anfimov 1st**	1805	Nobility	Wounded, 21 February [5 March] 1807. Invalided out on 18 [30] October 1811 due to wounds received.
4	Sub-Lieutenant Vasily Mikhailovich **Svobodsky 1st**	1805	Nobility	Transferred to Reval Garrison Regiment, 13 [25] September 1806.
5	Lieutenant Colonel Vasily Vasilievich **Yelistratov**	1805	Soldier's child	Wounded in action, 20 February [4 March] 1807. Transferred to 31st Jägers, 10 [22] November 1814.
6	Staff-Captain Nikolai Ivanovich **Grigoriev 2nd**	1805	Nobility	Transferred to Fredrikshamn Garrison Regiment, 23 October [4 November] 1806.
7	Major Pavel Stepanovich **Galsky 2nd**	1805	Nobility	Believed died of wound, 1812.
8	Major Nikolai Samuilovich **von Kulman**	1805	Finnish Nobility	Transferred to Voronezh Infantry, 2 [14] April 1811.
9	Major Yegor Savinovich **Kanishchev**	1805	Subaltern's child	1806-1807 & 1812-1813 campaigns. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
10	Sub-Lieutenant Alexander Gavrilovich **Grigoriev 2nd**	1805	St. Petersburg Nobility	Demoted one rank, 8 [20] March 1807. Missing, 14 [26] September 1807.
11	Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Safonovich **Shchukin**	1805	Nobility	Wounded 5 [17] August 1802. 1806-1807 & 1812 campaigns.
12	Staff-Captain Vasily Danilovich **Golubev**	1805	Pskov Nobility	Regimental Paymaster. Transferred to Verkhne Ural Battalion, 10 [22] September 1810.

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
13	Lieutenant Alexander Alexandrovich **Sytensky 1st**	1805	Poltava Nobility	Medically discharged, 25 February [9 March] 1807.
14	Major Feodor Mikhailovich **Tishchenko**	1805	Malorussia Nobility	1806-1807 campaign. Invalided out due to wounds received, 24 December 1811 [5 January 1812].
15	Lieutenant Timofey Ivanovich **Davydov 2nd**	1805	Subaltern's child	No trace after 1811.
16	Lieutenant Pavel Grigorievich **Pekur**	1805	Chernigov Nobility	1806-1807 campaign. Wounded, 21 February [5 March] 1807. Died of wounds, 6 [18] May 1807.
17	Major Vasily Timofeevich **Shchutskoy 2nd**	1805	Smolensk Nobility	1806-1807 & 1812 campaigns.
18	Lieutenant Ivan Semenovich **Rogovtsev**	1805	Smolensk Nobility	1806-1807 campaign. Killed in action, 21 February [5 March] 1807.
19	Lieutenant Ivan Dimitrievich **Sinebryukhov**	1805	Smolensk Nobility	1806-1807 campaign. Discharged, 13 [25] August 1808.
20	Major Nikolai Sergeevich **Dubrovin**	4 [16] Sept 1805	Nobility	1806-1807 campaign. Transferred to Arensburg Garrison Battalion, 27 September [9 October] 1811.
21	Major General Ivan Yefimovich **Sutthoff**	4 [16] Sept 1805		1789-1790 & 1799 campaigns. From Rochensalm Garrison Regiment as colonel-in-chief. Died, 16 [28] January 1806.
22	Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Petrovich **Lashkevich**	4 [16] Sept 1805		From 18th Jägers. 1806-1807 campaigns. Wounded in the neck, 3 [15] May 1807. Regimental commander from 16 [28] April 1808. Discharged, 18 [30] November 1811.
23	Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Andreevich **Chernozipunnikov**	4 [16] Sept 1805	Subaltern's child	From 19th Jägers. Transferred to Kronstadt Regiment, 23 October [4 November] 1806.
24	Major Ivan Dimitrievich **Feonas**	4 [16] Sept 1805	Nobility	From 19th Jägers. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 12 [24] December 1810.
25	Staff-Captain Anton Iosifovich **Bukhovetsky**	4 [16] Sept 1805	Grodno *Szlachta* [Polish Nobility]	From 7th Jägers. 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded. Medically discharged, 30 April [12 May] 1810.

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
26	Major Iosif Timofeevich **Simashko**	4 [16] Sept 1805	Grodno *Szlachta*	From 7th Jägers. 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded, 26 January [7 February] 1807. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 19 April [1 May] 1812.
27	Lieutenant Anton Pavlovich **Deszert**	4 [16] Sept 1805	*Szlachta*	1805 campaign. From 7th Jägers. Transferred to Fredrikshamn Garrison Regiment, 23 October [4 November] 1806.
28	Captain Simeon Vasilievich **Zagryadsky 3rd**	4 [16] Sept 1805	Subaltern's child	Formerly Orenburg *Platz-Adjutant*. 1806-1807 & 1813 campaigns. Regimental Quartermaster. Transferred to 31st Jägers, 14 [26] November 1814.
29	Captain Dimitry Ivanovich **Rodichev**	4 [16] Sept 1805	Tver Nobility	1806-1807 campaign. Medically discharged, 23 October [4 November] 1811.
30	Staff-Captain Alexander Ivanovich **Yakovlev**	4 [16] Sept 1805	Soldier's child	Joined as Regimental Auditor (former *Feldwebel* from Vyborg Garrrison Regiment). 1806-1807 campaign. Promoted sub-lieutenant in 1808. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 25 May [6 June] 1812.
31	Staff-Captain Mikhail Antonovich **Ovsyannikov**	7 [19] Feb 1806	Orël Nobility	From Perekop Garrison Battalion. 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded 21 February [5 March] 1807. Discharged, 21 May [2 June] 1807.
32	Major General **Laptev**	18 [30] Jan 1806		1789-1790, 1792, 1794, & 1805 campaigns. From 6th Jägers. 1806-1807 campaign. Colonel-in-chief. Discharged, 30 August [11 September] 1808.
33	Major Kiril Andreevich **Jung**	7 [19] Feb 1806	Kurland Nobility	From Perekop Garrison Battalion. 1806-1807 campaign. Demoted one rank, 8 [20] March 1807. Promoted 6 [18] January 1809. Transferred to Arkhangelsk Garrison Regiment, 26 April [8 May] 1811.
34	Major Yevgraf Andreevich **Maslov**	7 [19] Feb 1806	Kursk Nobility	From Perekop Garrison Battalion. 1806-1807 campaign. Downgraded to Invalid Company, 30 April [12 May] 1810. Rejoined 20 February [4 March] 1813.
35	Colonel Iosif Andreevich **Kulikovsky**	7 [19] Feb 1806		From Borisoglebsk Dragoons. Regimental commander, 8 [20] July 1806. 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded, 26 January [7 February] 1807. Transferred to Wilmanstrand Regiment, 1 [13] May 07.

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
36	Lieutenant Yakov Pavlovich **Filimonov**	1 [13] March 1806	Nobility	From 21st Jägers *Portepée-Junker*. Killed in action, 3 [15] May 1807.
37	Lieutenant Konstantin Dimitrievich **Misanovsky**	1 [13] March 1806	Nobility	From 21st Jägers *Portepée-Junker*. Wounded. Died 24 February [8 March] 1807.
38	Ensign Merkury Alexandrovich **Sytensky 2nd**	1 [13] March 1806	Nobility with 43 serfs	From 21st Jägers *Portepée-Junker*. Discharged, 18 [30] October 1806.
39	Lieutenant Dimitry Grigorievich **Perfiliev**	1 [13] March 1806	Nobility	From 21st Jägers *Portepée-Junker*. Prisoner of war from 21 February [5 March] 1807. Rejoined, 19 July [1 August] 1808. Medically discharged, 23 October [4 November] 1811.
40	Lieutenant **Bolotkov**	1 [13] March 1806	Nobility	From 18th Jägers *Portepée-Junker*. Medically discharged, 5 [17] November 1807.
41	Lieutenant Peter Petrovich **Andreev**	1 [13] March 1806	Nobility	From the Military Orphanage. 1806-1807 & 1812 campaigns. Wounded 7 [19] August 1812. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
42	Sub-Lieutenant Dimitry Timofeevich **Gubin**	1 [13] March 1806	Civil Servant's child	From the Military Orphanage. 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded 14 [26] December 1807. Died 16 [28] April 1811.
43	Lieutenant Pavel Petrovich **Baryshnikov**	1 [13] March 1806	Nobility	From the Military Orphanage. Transferred to the Lifeguard Jägers, 20 January [1 February] 1808.
44	Staff-Captain Stanislaw Iosifevich **Kulikovsky**	8 [20] August 1806	*Szlachta*	1805 campaign. From Borisoglebsk Dragoons. General Raevsky's aide-de-camp. Discharged 22 January [3 February] 1810.
45	Sub-Lieutenant Pavel **Chernyshev**	17 [29] August 1806	Nobility	From Caucasus Grenadiers. Dishonourably discharged, 15 [27] July 1810.
46	Pavel Antonovich **Fedorov**	18 [30] Sept 1806	Nobility	1793-1794, 1798 campaigns. From Pernov Garrison Battalion. 1806-1807, 1812-1813 campaigns. Transferred to 31st Jägers, 14 [26] November 1814.
47	Staff-Captain Alexander Ivanovich **Vietinghoff**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806	Field officer's child	From Tauride Grenadiers *Portepée-Ensign*. 1806-1807 campaign. Medically discharged 12 [24] November 1811.
48	Major Yakov Ivanovich	23 Oct [4 Nov]	Vitebsk Nobility	From Tauride Grenadiers *Portepée-Ensign*. Wounded 5 [17] August 1812.

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
	Schmidt	1806	with 110 serfs	Prisoner of war.
49	Lieutenant Colonel Khristian Nikolaevich **von Buschen**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806		From Tauride Grenadiers *Portepée-Ensign*. 1806-1807, 1812, 1813-1814 campaigns. Wounded 4 [16] October 1813.
50	Captain Isidor Maximovich **Chernyak**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806	Nobility	From Koporsk Musketeers *Portepée-Ensign*. Adjutant. 1806-1807 campaign. Died 11 [23] May 1812.
51	Major Luka Gavrilovich **Dervyanko**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806	Nobility	From Koporsk Musketeers *Portepée-Ensign*. Wounded, 14 [26] February 1807. Discharged 16 [28] July 1813.
52	Captain Khristofor Khristoforovich **Varnin**	26 Oct [7 Nov] 1806	Livland Nobility	1805 campaign. From Koporsk Musketeers *Portepée-Ensign*. 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded, 21 February [5 March] 1807. 1812 campaign. Killed, 6 [18] August 1812.
53	Sub-Lieutenant Stepan Gavrilovich **Zbursky**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806	Subaltern's child	From Lithuania Musketeers. 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded, 21 February [5 March] 1807. Discharged, 12 [24] May 1809.
54	Sub-Lieutenant Mikhail Ivanovich **Kostselkovsky**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806	*Szlachta*	From Koporsk Musketeers. 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded, 21 February [5 March] 1807. Transferred to Kurland Jäger Battalion, 2 [14] February 1809.
55	Staff-Captain Yakov Lukyanovich **Domashnev**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806	Nobility	From Dnieper Musketeers *Portepée-Ensign*. 1806-1807 campaign. Transferred to Bobruisk Battalion, 22 October [3 November] 1810.
56	Lieutenant Trofim Feodorovich **Volkov**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806	Nobility	From Dnieper Musketeers *Portepée-Ensign*. 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded 27 January [8 February] 1807. Invalided out from wounds, 30 April [12 May] 1810.
57	Major Karl Ivanovich **Salin**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806	Livland Nobility	From Mitau Garrison Battalion. 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded 21 February [5 March] 1807. Transferred to Vyatka Garrison Battalion, 16 [28] April 1807.
58	Captain Iosif Kazimirovich **Gavronsky**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806	*Szlachta*	From Mitau Garrison Battalion. 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded 21 February [5 March] 1807. Discharged as major, 18 [30] November 1811.
59	Captain	23 Oct	Nobility	From Mitau Garrison Battalion. 1806-

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
	Sergey Feodorovich **Oldenburg**	[4 Nov] 1806		1807 campaign. Wounded 29 May [10 June] 1807. Discharged due to wounds, 18 [30] October 1811.
60	Lieutenant **Domashnev**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806	Nobility	From Mitau Garrison Battalion. 1806-1807 campaign. Killed in action, 21 February [5 March] 1807.
61	Lieutenant Andrey Ivanovich **Kulikovsky**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806	*Szlachta*	From Mitau Garrison Battalion. 1806-1807 campaign. Discharged, 5 [17] September 1810.
62	Lieutenant Vasily Alexandrovich **Yeremeev**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1806	Pskov Nobility	From Lithuania Musketeers. 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded 13 [25] December 1806. Discharged 13 [25] August 1808.
63	Staff-Captain Ivan Mikhailovich **Mochulsky**	21 Jan [2 Feb] 1807	*Szlachta*	From 21st Jägers *Junker.* 1807 & 1812 campaigns. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
64	Sub-Lieutenant Yevgeny Borisovich **Zgibnev**	7 [19] Feb 1807	Subaltern's child	From the Mountain Cadet Corps. 1807 campaign. Discharged 12 [24] March 1810.
65	Sub-Lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich **Kornilov**	7 [19] Feb 1807	Subaltern's child	From the Mountain Cadet Corps. 1807 campaign. Discharged, 15 [27] February 1811.
66	Sub-Lieutenant Nikolay Ivanovich **Bravchinsky**	26 May [7 Jun] 1807	Kursk Nobility	From Navaginsk Musketeers sub-ensign. 1806-1807 campaign. Killed in action, 13 [25] July 1812.
67	Lieutenant Colonel Peter Yakovlevich **Sorokin**	26 May [7 Jun] 1807	Nobility	From Navaginsk Musketeers. 1806-1807, 1812 campaigns. Wounded 5 [17] August 1812.
68	Lieutenant Vasily Dimitrievich **Romanov**	12 [24] August 1807	Simbirsk Nobility	From 21st Jägers *Junker.* 1806-1807 campaign. Transferred to Sevsk Musketeers, 18 [30] March 1810.
69	Staff-Captain Ignaty Mikhailovich **Kotlubay**	12 [24] August 1807	Nobility	From 21st Jägers *Junker.* 1806-1807 campaign. Wounded 5 [17] August 1812. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 13 [25] July 1813.
70	Lieutenant Petr Iosifovich **Brezhinsky**	12 [24] August 1807	*Szlachta*	From 21st Jägers *Junker.* 1806-1807 campaign. Transferred to 31st Jägers, 14 [26] November 1814.
71	Lieutenant Alexander Feodorovich **Schopp**	12 [24] August 1807	Subaltern's child	From 21st Jägers *Junker.* 1806-1807 campaign. Discharged, 25 March [6 April] 1811.
72	Lieutenant Yakov Ivanovich	12 [24] August	Nobility	From 21st Jägers *Junker.* 1806-1807, 1812 campaigns. Wounded in 1812.

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
	Savitsky	1807		Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
73	Captain Ignaty Petrovich **Kurilov**	12 [24] August 1807	Poltava Nobility	From 21st Jägers *Junker.* 1806-1807, 1812 campaigns. Wounded 13 [25] July 1812.
74	Sub-Lieutenant Kuzma Yakovlevich **Kulikovsky 1st**	12 [24] August 1807	Vilna *Szlachta*	From 21st Jägers *Junker.* 1806-1807 campaign. Discharged, 17 [29] August 1810.
75	Sub-Lieutenant Iosif **Kulikovsky**	12 [24] August 1807		From 21st Jägers *Junker.* Discharged, 19 April [1 May] 1812.
76	Sub-Lieutenant Ivan **Laushev**	28 Nov [10 Dec] 1807	Nobility	From 2nd Cadet Corps. Discharged, 12 [24] March 1810.
77	Staff-Captain Nikolai Mikhailovich **Zvyagin**	28 Nov [10 Dec] 1807	Nobility	From 2nd Cadet Corps. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
78	Lieutenant Nikolay Alexeevich **Khrapovitsky**	28 Nov [10 Dec] 1807	Nobility	From 2nd Cadet Corps. Died, 19 November [1 December] 1812.
79	Staff-Captain Petr Nikolaevich **Frolov 2nd**	28 Nov [10 Dec] 1807	Nobility	From 2nd Cadet Corps. Transferred to the Tauride Grenadiers, 13 [25] February 1813.
80	Sub-Lieutenant Ivan **Zhultovsky**	28 Nov [10 Dec] 1807	Nobility	From 2nd Cadet Corps. Transferred to the Pskov Garrison half-battalion, 29 April [11 May] 1811.
81	Staff-Captain Venedikt Semenovich **Rozlach**	28 Nov [10 Dec] 1807	Nobility	From 2nd Cadet Corps. Wounded, 26 August [7 September] 1812. Transferred to the 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
82	Staff-Captain Nikolay Ilich **Shemyakin**	1807	Subaltern's child	From 21st Jägers sub-ensign. Transferred to the 31st Jägers, 10 [22] November 1814.
83	Staff-Captain Matvey Dedyashevich **Kvashnevich**	23 Oct [4 Nov] 1807	*Szlachta*	From 21st Jägers sub-ensign. Killed in action, 1812.
84	Captain Nikolay Georgievich **Yazykov**	4 [16] Feb 1808	Pskov nobility with 60 serfs	From army staff. Transferred to the Kazan Musketeers, 15 [27] October 1810.
85	Lieutenant Efim **Nechaev**	9 [21] Aug 1808		From the Mitau Garrison Battalion. Transferred to the Minsk Governorate half-battalion, 4 [16] July 1811.

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
86	Lieutenant Nikifor Vasilievich **Blonsky**	18 [30] July 1808	Nobility	With the Lithuania Musketeers on 1806-1807 campaign, taken prisoner at Danzig. Transferred to the Bobruisk Battalion, 22 October [3 November] 1810.
87	Colonel Pavel Prokofievich **Plattsev**	30 Aug [11 Sep] 1808	Nobility	From 20th Jägers. Colonel-in-Chief.
88	Staff-Captain Yakov Ivanovich **Reikhel**	21 Jan [2 Feb] 1809	Kurland Nobility	From the militia. Wounded 5 [17] September 1813. Died of wounds, 30 April [12 May] 1814.
89	Lieutenant Yakov Timofeevich **Shchutskoy**	2 [14] Feb 1809	Smolensk Nobility	From 2nd Cadet Corps. Wounded, 7 [19] August 1812. Transferred to the 20th Jägers 16 [28] July 1813.
90	Lieutenant Voin Yakovlevich **Pavlov**	22 Feb [6 Mar] 1810	Nobility	From 2nd Cadet Corps. 1812-1813 campaigns. Transferred to the 33rd Jägers, 14 [26] November 1814.
91	Captain Petr Karlovich **Plaksenko**	21 May [2 June] 1810	Nobility	1805-1807 campaigns with 5th Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. 1812 campaign.
92	Sub-Lieutenant Iosif Benediktovich **Ginbush 2nd**	10 [22] May 1810	*Szlachta*	1805-1807 campaigns with 5th Jägers as non-commissioned officer. Transferred to the Moscow Musketeers, 20 December 1811 [1 January] 1812.
93	Sub-Lieutenant Stanislav Benediktovich **Ginbush 1st**	10 [22] May 1810	*Szlachta*	1805-1807 campaigns with 5th Jägers as non-commissioned officer. Reduced to the ranks, 5 [17] April 1813.
94	Lieutenant Onufry Yefremovich **Kononovich**	16 [28] August 1810	Nobility	From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. Killed in action, 6 [18] August 1812.
95	Captain Ivan Kirilovich **Shamshev**	16 [28] August 1810	Nobility	From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. 1812 campaign.
96	Captain Yakov Khristoforovich **Varnin**	16 [28] August 1810	Nobility	From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. Wounded, 26 August [7 September] 1812, and 18 [30] March 1814.
97	Lieutenant Stepan Stepanovich **Pichugin**	16 [28] August 1810	Subaltern's child	From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. Appointed *Platz-Adjutant* of fortress Bobruisk, 27 August [8 September] 1810. Died 18 [30] May 1813.
98	Lieutenant Vasily Ivanovich **Yeremeev**	16 [28] August 1810	Nobility with 12 serfs	From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. Transferred to Chernigov Mounted Jägers 3 [15] March 1814.

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
99	Lieutenant Iusus Petrovich **Basov**	16 [28] August 1810	Nobility with 10 serfs	From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. Wounded in action 5 [17] August 1812 and 10 [22] August 1813. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1814.
100	Lieutenant Ivan Izosimovich **Borodin**	16 [28] August 1810	Nobility	From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. Wounded in action 26 August [7 September] 1812. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
101	Lieutenant Grigory Ivanovich **Krutikov**	12 [24] Feb 1811	Nobility	From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. Wounded in action, 1812. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
102	Lieutenant Alexey Feodorovich **Narbut**	12 [24] Feb 1811	Nobility	From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. 1812 campaign. Transferred to 23rd Jägers, 1 [13] September 1814.
103	Sub-Lieutenant Yakov Vasilievich **Chelyuzin**	12 [24] Feb 1811	Nobility	From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. Transferred to Pskov Garrison half-battalion, 26 July [7 August] 1811.
104	Sub-Lieutenant Vasily Vasilievich **Lyutikov**	27 Nov [9 Dec] 1811		From the Preobrazhensky Guard as a non-commissioned officer. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
105	Sub-Lieutenant Filip Alexandrovich **Kuchenev**	25 Dec 1811 [6 Jan 1812]	Ryazan Nobility	From 21st Jägers as *Junker*. Wounded in action, 1812. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
106	Sub-Lieutenant Pavel Feodorovich **Dyakov**	25 Dec 1811 [6 Jan 1812]	Nobility	From 21st Jägers as *Junker*. Transferred to 31st Jägers, 10 [22] November 1814.
107	Captain Karl Ivanovich **Fride**	25 Dec 1811 [6 Jan 1812]	Kurland Nobility	From the Chernigov Infantry as *Portepée-Ensign*. 1812 campaign, Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] June 1813.
108	Sub-Lieutenant Ivan **von der Launitz**	25 Dec 1811 [6 Jan 1812]		From the Chernigov Infantry as *Portepée-Ensign*. Wounded in action, 26 August [7 September] 1812. Died of wounds, 16 [28] July 1813.
109	Sub-Lieutenant Feodor **Shirobokov**	25 Dec 1811 [6 Jan 1812]	Nobility	From the Chernigov Infantry as *Portepée-Ensign*. 1812-1813 campaigns. Transferred to 31st Jägers, 10 [22] November 1813.
110	Sub-Lieutenant Ardalion Vasilievich **Yanov**	25 Dec 1811 [6 Jan	Nobility	From the Chernigov Infantry as *Portepée-Ensign*. Wounded in action, 5 [17] August 1812. Transferred to 20th

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
		1812]		Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
111	Sub-Lieutenant Vasily **Petrov**	25 Dec 1811 [6 Jan 1812]		From the Chernigov Infantry as *Portepée-Ensign*. Believed wounded in action, 1812. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
112	Sub-Lieutenant Alexander Ivanovich **Gudovsky 3rd**	25 Dec 1811 [6 Jan 1812]		From the Chernigov Infantry as *Portepée-Ensign*. Believed wounded in action, 1812. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
113	Lieutenant Pavel ? **Gersevanov**	25 Dec 1811 [6 Jan 1812]		From the Chernigov Infantry as *Portepée-Ensign*.
114	Sub-Lieutenant **Smolensky**	13 [25] January 1812		From the Military Orphanage. Killed in action, 7 [19] August 1812.
115	Sub-Lieutenant ? **Shchukin**	13 [25] January 1812		From the Noble Regiment. Killed in action, 6 [18] August 1812.
116	Sub-Lieutenant Anton Lukyanovich **Skibitsky**	13 [25] January 1812		From the Noble Regiment. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
117	Sub-Lieutenant **Romanenko Bratanovsky**	13 [25] January 1812		From the Noble Regiment. Died, 16 [28] April 1812.
118	Sub-Lieutenant Ivan Petrovich **Poroxovnikov**	13 [25] January 1812		From the Noble Regiment. Wounded in action, 7 [19] August 1812. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
119	Sub-Lieutenant Mitrofan Feodorovich **Vasilevsky**	14 [26] Feb 1812		From 21st Jägers as *Junker*. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
120	Major Alexander Zakharovich **Gorikhvostov**	26 May [7 Jun] 1812		1805-1807 campaigns. From 20th Jägers. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 2 [14] July 1812.
121	Ensign Vasily Vasilievich **Meshkov**	18 Feb [1 Mar] 1812		From the Orenburg Garrison Regiment. 1812 campaign.
122	Captain Nikolay Nikolaevich **Malinin**	28 April [10 May] 1812	Nobility	From 4th Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. 1812-1814 campaigns.
123	Major	28 April	Nobility	From 1st Jägers. 1812-1814 campaigns.

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
	Ivan Petrovich **Montander**	[10 May] 1812		Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
124	Colonel Alexander Stepanovich **Stepanov**	16 [28] April 1812		1794, 1805-1807 campaigns. From 20th Jägers. Regimental commander. wounded 25 August [6 September] 1812, and 20 April [2 May] 1813. Killed in action, 4 [16] October 1813.
125	Sub-Lieutenant ? **Kosyak**	12 [24] April 1812		From 4th Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. Wounded in action, 1812. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
126	Ensign ? **Kanishchev**	24 June [6 July] 1812		From the Reval Infantry as *Portepée-Ensign*. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
127	Ensign ? **Miller**	24 June [6 July] 1812		From the Reval Infantry as *Portepée-Ensign*. Killed in action 7 [19] August 1812.
128	Ensign Ivan Nikolaevich **Shlyakhta**	24 June [6 July] 1812		From the Reval Infantry as *Portepée-Ensign*. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
129	Lieutenant Anton Grigorievich **Tsidzik**	24 June [6 July] 1812	Polish Nobility *Szlachta*	From the Reval Infantry as *Portepée-Ensign*. Wounded 14 [26] August 1813.
130	Ensign ? **Chernovsky**	25 April [7 May] 1812		From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. 1812 campaign. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
131	Ensign ? **Levashev**	25 April [7 May] 1812		From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. 1812 campaign. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
132	Ensign ? **Kuznetsov**	25 April [7 May] 1812		From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. 1812 campaign. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
133	Ensign ? **Gebauer**	25 April [7 May] 1812		From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. 1812 campaign. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.
134	Colonel Platon Petrovich **Lopatin**	25 April [7 May] 1812	Nobility	From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. 1812-1814 campaigns.
135	Major Lev Alexandrovich **Rykov**	25 May [6 June] 1812		1805-1807 campaigns. From 20th Jägers. Wounded 26 August [7 September] 1812. Transferred to 20th Jägers, 16 [28] July 1813.

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
136	Captain Nikolay Mikhailovich **Arapov**	25 May [6 June] 1812		From 21st Jägers as *Junker*.
137	Lieutenant Yegor Yermolaevich **Mikhailov**	20 Nov [2 Dec] 1812	Soldier's child	1806-1807, 1812 campaigns. From 21st Jägers as *Feldwebel*. Promoted to sub-lieutenant for distinction in combat. Regimental adjutant. 1813-1814 campaigns.
138	Lieutenant Sergey Semenovich **Belopasov**	20 Nov [2 Dec] 1812	Soldier's child	1806-1807 campaign. Wounded in the neck, 3 [15] May 1807. 1812 campaign. From 21st Jägers as *Feldwebel*. Promoted to sub-lieutenant for distinction in combat. 1813-1814 campaigns.
139	Captain Stepan Gavrilovich **Kuzmin**	20 Nov [2 Dec] 1812	Soldier's child	1806-1807, 1812 campaigns. From 21st Jägers as *Feldwebel*. Promoted to sub-lieutenant for distinction in combat. Wounded in action, 13 [25] July 1812. 1813-1814 campaigns.
140	Lieutenant Feodor Grigorievich **Khanyukevich**	20 Nov [2 Dec] 1812	Nobility	From 21st Jägers as *Junker*. Wounded in action, 7 [19] August 1812. Promoted to ensign for distinction in combat.
141	Lieutenant Petr Alexeevich **Bezobrazov**	30 Nov [12 Dec] 1812	Soldier's child	1812 campaign. From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. Wounded in action, 4 [16] October 1813. 1814 campaign.
142	Ensign Yegor Ivanovich **Podgulyarsky**	30 Nov [12 Dec] 1812		1812 campaign. From 21st Jägers as *Portepée-Junker*. 1813-1814 campaigns.
143	Lieutenant Iosif Timofeevich **Khranstovsky**	29 Sept [11 Oct] 1812	Subaltern's child	From Voronezh Jägers.
144	Staff-Captain ? **Durakov**	20 Feb [4 Mar] 1813		From Voronezh Jägers. Wounded in action, 10 [22] August 1813.
145	Staff-Captain Semen Petrovich **Zolotarev**	20 Feb [4 Mar] 1813	Nobility	1791-1796, 1808-1809 campaigns. From Voronezh Jägers. Wounded in action at Troyes, 18 February [2 March] 1814.
146	Ensign Ivan Iosifovich **Yaroslavsky**	20 Feb [4 Mar] 1813		From Voronezh Jägers.
147	Lieutenant Kapiton Savelievich **Klimovich**	20 Feb [4 Mar] 1813	Vitebsk Nobility	From Voronezh Jägers. Wounded in action, 15 [27] August 1813.
148	Ensign	20 Feb		From Voronezh Jägers.

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
	Dmitry Petrovich **Motovilov**	[4 Mar] 1813		
149	Sub-Lieutenant Yegor Maximovich **Butsenovsky**	27 Feb [12 Mar] 1813		From Noble Regiment. Wounded 15 [27] February 1814.
150	Ensign Petr Moiseevich **Zablotsky**	27 Feb [12 Mar] 1813	Novgorod Nobility	From Noble Regiment.
151	Ensign Pavel Yakovlevich **Kovedyaev**	27 Feb [12 Mar] 1813	Pskov Nobility with 22 serfs	From Noble Regiment.
152	Ensign Petr Dimitrievich **Khlopov**	27 Feb [12 Mar] 1813	Nobility	From Noble Regiment.
153	Ensign Vasily Ivanovich **Ivanov**	27 Feb [12 Mar] 1813	Nobility	From Noble Regiment.
154	Ensign Ludwig Ignatievich **Voinych**	27 Feb [12 Mar] 1813	Vitebsk Nobility	From Noble Regiment. Wounded in action, 15 [27] August 1813.
155	Sub-Lieutenant Ivan Feodorovich **Shatov**	27 Feb [12 Mar] 1813	Nobility	From Noble Regiment. Wounded 10 [22] August 1813.
156	Staff-Captain Yevstafy Semenovich **Yekaleev**	27 Feb [12 Mar] 1813		From Noble Regiment. Wounded 1 [13] September 1813.
157	Nikolay Vasilievich **Melnikov**	27 Feb [12 Mar] 1813	Nobility	From Noble Regiment. Wounded 17 [29] August 1813.
158	Captain Iosif Iosifovich **Yevnevich**	27 Feb [12 Mar] 1813	Nobility	From Noble Regiment.
159	Staff-Captain	27 Feb		From Noble Regiment.

	Rank & Name	Date joined	Background	Remarks
	Ivan Petrovich **Podolsky**	[12 Mar] 1813		
160	Petr Matveevich **Bykov**	10 [22] July 1813		From Voronezh Infantry. Wounded 18 [30] August 1813.
161	Petr Alexeevich **Simakov**	3 [15] Nov 1813	Nobility	From Grenadier Training Battalion. Wounded 31 September 1813 (*sic*).
162	Lieutenant Feodor Feodorovich **Wangenheim**	3 [15] March 1814	Nobility	From 21st Jägers as *Junker*. Promoted ensign for combat distinction in 1813-1814. Wounded 24 March [5 April] 1814.
163	Ensign Ivan Lukyanovich **Kharchenko**	3 [15] March 1814	Subaltern's child	From 21st Jägers as *Junker*. Promoted ensign for combat distinction in 1813-1814. Wounded 18 [30] March 1814.
164	Ensign Iosif Denisovich **Denisov**	6 [18] March 1814	Soldier's child	From 33rd Jägers.
165	Ensign Staislav Iosifovich **Malakhovsky**	6 [18] March 1814		1812-1814 campaigns. From 33rd Jägers as *Feldwebel*. Promoted ensign for combat distinction.
166	Ensign ? **Maslov**	6 [18] March 1814		1812-1814 campaigns. From 33rd Jägers as *Feldwebel*. Promoted ensign for combat distinction.
167	? Ilya Iosifovich **Osilov**	6 [18] March 1814	Peasant	1812-1814 campaigns. From 33rd Jägers as *Feldwebel*. Promoted ensign for combat distinction.
168	? Vasily Petrovich **Bykovsky**	16 [28] April 1814	Nobility	From Selenginsk Infantry.
169	Sub-Lieutenant Yakov Yakovlevich **Bazhenov**	18 [30] May 1814	Nobility	1813 campaign. From 21st Jägers as *Junker*.
170	Ensign Nikolay Semenovich **Biryukov**	18 [30] May 1814		1813 campaign. From 21st Jägers as *Junker*.