

**A Century of The Russian Ministry of War
1802-1902
General Staff Historical Department
The Reign of Emperor Alexander I
1801 - 1805**

[translated into English from the original Russian by Peter G.A. Phillips]

28. The Progression In The Generation Of Armies And Corps From 1802 To 1805.

There were no higher all-arms formations in peacetime; this situation continued until 1806, when the permanent allocation of troops into divisions was introduced. In making an attempt to trace the gradual development of improvised formations over the period 1802 to 1805, we consider it necessary to dwell on this issue in more detail because: the entire series of orders relating to one or other occasion of military preparations indicates fruitful almost continuous work in perfecting the reorganisation of the army; the lessons from these improvised formations make it possible to establish some of the disadvantages that had such a strong impact in the war of 1805, as well as the basic principles that guided the generation of these ad hoc formations;¹ by doing so, the logical necessity of establishing permanent higher formations and the nature of the transition to them are clarified.

The contemporaneous question of organisation may be divided into the following periods: the formation of an army and corps in March and April 1803 and the cancellation of these orders; the orders of June 1803; the drafting of secret schedules and orders in 1803 and 1804; the generation of armies and corps in 1805.

However, for the sake of convenience in discussing these periods, it is necessary to make some specific subdivisions, focusing on such details that either relate to several periods or are of particular significance.

As a result, we will analyse the question of the generation of higher formations from 1802 to 1805 in the following progressive manner:

- a. Military preparations in March and April 1803, the formation of an army and corps, cancellation of the orders and conclusions.
- b. Military preparations in June 1803 and orders for the artillery by Count Arakcheev.
- c. Preparations by the *General-Proviantmeister* department, the secret schedule of the armies and corps in 1803 and 1804 and a discussion of their composition and conclusions.
- d. Orders for the wartime manning of 36 regiments from garrison troops and the significance of the report that 'there is nobody to select from.'
- e. The generation of armies and corps in November 1805, their composition and conclusions.
- f. The reorganisation of General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov's army in November 1805 and the formation of a reserve corps facing Galicia.
- g. The reorganisation of the forces returning from campaign.
- h. The generation of ad hoc formations in the Caucasus.
- i. Regarding the Russian corps in the Ionian Islands.
- j. Regarding mobile artillery parks.²

1 Unfortunately, the fragmentation and dispersion of primary sources, which consist mainly of individual documents with incomplete data, with the dispersal of documents across various files and books, and at times the unreliability of this fragmentary information, has prevented us from shedding light on the issue of ad hoc formations to the extent that would be desirable.

2 The issue of parks is presented in serial j. because it has a link to the orders for 1803 (serial a.) and serves as a

k. Conclusions.

28a. Military Preparations In March And April 1803, The Formation Of An Army And Corps, Cancellation Of The Orders And Conclusions.

In March 1803, the first preparations were made ‘for departure on campaign.’³ Supreme orders were issued to some inspectors of troops: ‘specifying which regiments and battalions of cavalry, infantry and artillery were ordered to be at 24 hours readiness to move.’ These forces, as indicated in Supreme orders to the Intendant General of the Army, Prince Volkonsky, dated 30 March [11 April] 1803, ‘were all assigned to Finland.’⁴ A ‘listing by army corps’ was issued,⁵ which had been compiled by Quartermaster General Sukhtelen.⁶ Although this listing was presented to the War Minister for Land Forces on 22 March [3 April], not even the file copy has survived.⁷ Based on the incomplete data, the following may be reconstructed:

1. Initially, 60,000 men were placed ‘on 24 hours readiness to move’ while the size of the army was quickly increased to 72,000 men. Orders were issued that at least ‘a full annual allocation of both provisions and fodder’ was to be supplied for this total.⁸
2. The army was to consist of four corps: Abborforce, Memel, Pardokoski and ‘a corps located on the far bank of the Vuoksa.’⁹
3. In addition to these corps, the following were also assigned: the Vederlax reserve and ‘three regiments attached to the flotilla.’
4. The Nyslott garrison was to be strengthened with an additional two companies of musketeers.
5. ‘Two years worth of provisions and fodder were to be stockpiled.’

In addition to the above, it should be mentioned that magazines,¹⁰ the main ration and commissariat depot, as well as locations for hospitals, were allocated.

The regiments were assigned by orders dated 17 and 27 March [29 March and 8 April] 1803, namely:¹¹

On 17 [29] March: one cuirassier regiment, one hussar regiment, four dragoon regiments, four grenadier regiments, 21 musketeer regiments, six jäger regiments, three field artillery battalions, one siege battalion, two horse artillery companies, 96 regimental artillery pieces,¹² 50 pontoons

supplement to the organisation of the army of General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov (serial f.).

3 Archive of the Chancellery of the War Ministry (A.C.W.M.), classified department, 1803, minute No. 2b.

4 Report by the Intendant General of the army to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 617, dated 31 March [12 April] 1803.

5 Quartermaster General, General Sukhtelen’s report to the War Minister for Land Forces, dated 22 March 1803.

6 War Minister for Land Forces’ orders to Quartermaster General Sukhtelen, No. 4, dated 18 [30] March 1803 and *General-Proviantmeister*, General-of-Infantry Svechin’s despatches to the War Minister for Land Forces, dated 17 [29] March 1803.

7 See the report by the Intendant General of the army to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 617, dated 31 March [12 April] 1803; there are 196 pages from other documents containing almost all the original correspondence.

8 War Minister for Land Forces instructions for the *General-Proviantmeister*, No. 8, dated 18 [30] March 1803 and Supreme order for the Inspector of All Artillery, General-of-Artillery Korsakov, dated 26 March [7 April] 1803.

9 Quartermaster General, General Sukhtelen’s report to the War Minister for Land Forces, dated 22 March [3 April] 1803.

10 Quartermaster General, General Sukhtelen’s report to the War Minister for Land Forces, dated 22 March [3 April] 1803; magazines in Rochensalm, Davydov and Wilmanstrand, and Kexholm; arms, equipment and uniforms stores in Friedrichsham, Wilmanstrand and Vyborg; hospitals were also assigned to the latter three locations; the main depot was in Vyborg.

11 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1803, minute No. 2b; Adjutant General Count Lieven’s despatches to the War Minister for Land Forces, General-of-Infantry Vyzamitinov, dated 17 [29] March, and No. 676 and No. 689, dated 31 March [12 April].

12 Of these 81 were in St. Petersburg, five in Vyborg and ten in Friedrichsham, for a total of 96 guns, each regiment was to have six guns.

from St Petersburg,¹³ one pioneer company, four Cossack regiments.

In addition, 18 garrison battalions and six garrison artillery companies in the Livonia Inspection, and two companies from 3rd Siege Artillery Battalion (assigned to coastal fortifications in Reval and Baltisky Port)¹⁴ were placed on notice to move.¹⁵

These Supreme orders, and how many regiments were to be prepared, were addressed (on 17 [29] March) to: His Imperial Highness - the cuirassier regiment; Platov - the four Cossack regiments; General-of-Artillery Korsakov - two artillery battalions and two horse artillery companies; General-of-Infantry Baron Meyendorff - all the regiments of his inspection;¹⁶ General-of-Cavalry Baron Bennigsen - one hussar regiment and two of jägers; Field Marshal Saltykov 2nd - one dragoon regiment and six of musketeers; Lieutenant General Essen 1st - one grenadier regiment and three of musketeers; General-of-Infantry Prince Golitsyn - one grenadier regiment, three of musketeers and one of jägers; General-of-Cavalry Herzog Alexander von Württemberg - one dragoon regiment; General-of-Infantry Count Tatishchev - all the regiments of his inspection.¹⁷

On 31 March [12 April], three dragoon regiments and five musketeer regiments were added. The following were tasked to prepare these additional regiments: Field Marshal Saltykov - two dragoon regiments; General-of-Cavalry Herzog Alexander von Württemberg - one dragoon regiment; General-of-Cavalry Baron Bennigsen - two musketeer regiments; General-of-Infantry Prince Golitsyn - three musketeer regiments.

By way of the Supreme orders dated 26 April [8 May] 1803, it was announced to some of these same Inspectors that: 'due to a change in the circumstances that had required the movement of troops, I command the regiments assigned to set out on campaign from your inspections, to stop all preparations and remain as before.'¹⁸ Despite such a short period of time, a number of significant shortcomings were discovered in administrative terms, which cannot but be mentioned, and in addition, there were some innovations.¹⁹

We have noted the following:

Firstly, the editing of the Supreme orders leads to the conclusion that:

1. Sometimes the inspectors prepared the regiments 'for campaigning' (for example, in the Supreme orders dated 27 March [8 April] for General-of-Cavalry Herzog Alexander von Württemberg, it stated: 'I order you to place the Riga Dragoon Regiment immediately on a campaign footing), yet for the most part the inspectors had to order the colonels-in-chief to put the regiments 'on a campaign footing so that, in the event of being ordered, they could set out from their quarters within 24 hours along the march routes assigned to them.'²⁰
2. The inspector was only informed regarding the departure on campaign, while the colonel-in-chief received a dedicated Supreme order: 'to set out from permanent quarters within 24 hours and follow the attached march route, attempt to move as quickly as possible at the

13 War Minister for Land Forces despatch to the Inspector of All Artillery, No. 11, dated 19 [31] March 1803.

14 Inspector of All Artillery's report to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 1704, dated 12 [24] April 1803.

15 War Minister for Land Forces despatch to the Inspector of All Artillery, No. 41, dated 14 [26] April 1803.

16 According to the Schedule Of The Army By Inspections Of 1802 (A.C.W.M. classified department, 1802, minute No. 2a), three musketeer regiments and two of jägers, ten garrison battalions and six garrison artillery companies.

17 Although no evidence has been found that General-of-Infantry Count Tatishchev was an inspector in the Livonia Inspection at that time, nevertheless, based on the Guidelines For Concentrating Armies On Various Borders, it can be said with certainty that we are talking specifically about the Livonia Inspection, which was composed of: two dragoons regiments, two grenadier regiments, six musketeer regiments, one jäger regiment, eight garrison battalions, one siege artillery battalion and another of field artillery, and one pioneer company.

18 Copies of all Supreme orders forwarded to the War Minister for Land Forces are in Count Lieven's despatch No. 929, dated 26 April [8 May] 1803.

19 See below, in particular, regarding regimental artillery, and regarding the strength of Don Cossack regiments.

20 For example, Supreme orders for General-of-Cavalry Herzog Alexander von Württemberg, dated 17 [29] March, regarding the Kazan Dragoons.

moment without exhausting the men.’²¹ This procedure led to the inspectors possibly not having time to verify the ‘preparations’ for the campaign, and his orders might have remained unfulfilled... In just such a case, the 3rd, 4th and 5th jäger regiments set out 14 days after having received orders ‘to be ready to march.’

Secondly, the regiments had to travel enormous distances to the designated assembly areas, and each regiment proceeded independently. For example, the 3rd Jägers were intended to arrive in Ropsha from Skuodas, covering 655 *versts* [437 miles] in 28 stages, each of 17 to 36 *versts* [11 to 24 miles], with 15 rest days [*rastakh*],²² for a total of 43 days; the 4th Jägers from Keydan to Gostilitsa, 776 *versts* [517 miles], in 50 days, of which 16 were designated as rest days, while for 34 days they were marching from 18 to 30 *versts* [12 to 20 miles]; the 5th Jägers from Oshmyany to Rozhestven, 761 *versts* [507 miles], in 47 days, of which 15 were rest days, while for 32 days they were marching 18 to 32 *versts* [12 to 21 miles].²³ The Don Cossack regiments had to cover thousands of *versts*.²⁴

When the ‘change in circumstances’ occurred, the regiments received Supreme orders to halt on the designated march routes, give the men ‘sufficient time to rest, then return along the same route to their previous quarters.’²⁵

Under these conditions, the regiments were under the unsupervised direction of their colonels-in-chief for months, in this case about two months.²⁶

Thirdly, the military units, upon being brought up to full manning, encountered the following difficulties:

1. ‘The total number of recruits allocated by the Military College’ did not arrive, since ‘a large number of exemption certificates’ were presented (in the Moscow Governorate),²⁷ and therefore correspondence and orders had to be made for the ‘immediate’ induction and transfer of recruits from other places.²⁸
2. ‘If the recruits have not yet joined’ their regiments ‘ordered to prepare for campaigning’ then ‘immediately add them to the peacetime complement of the garrisons’²⁹ and the recruits were to be sent to garrisons.
3. Some regiments required dedicated orders for manning, for example, ‘there was significant under-manning in the Nasheburg Musketeer Regiment, due to the assignment of two grenadier companies to the newly formed Kura Musketeer Regiment...’³⁰
4. It had not been established ‘should the wartime supplement of 24 men per company be assigned’ and therefore, specific orders were also needed here, that they ‘currently are not supposed to be assigned.’³¹

Fourth, the artillery did not maintain a full complement of horses in peacetime and therefore it was necessary to order ‘the horses are to be brought up to strength as soon as possible and certainly within three weeks, if possible, such that all the horses are acquired and delivered to their places.’³²

21 Supreme orders to the colonels-in-chief of 3rd, 4th and 5th jägers, dated 31 March [12 April]; War Minister for Land Forces’ response to Count Lieven’s despatch No. 689, dated 31 March [12 April] 1803.

22 That is how rest days were referred to at that time, from the German *Rasttag*.

23 The march routes are from Supreme orders, dated 31 March [12 April].

24 See [Diagram 1 – Disposition of troops in 1801](#).

25 Supreme orders to the colonels-in-chief of 3rd, 4th and 5th jäger regiments.

26 The regiments’ marches lasted 26 days (one way).

27 The Inspector of All Artillery’s despatch to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 1385, dated 24 March [5 April] 1803.

28 The War Minister for Land Forces’ despatch to the Inspector of All Artillery, No. 24, dated 24 March [5 April] 1803.

29 The War Minister for Land Forces’ despatch to Field Marshal Saltykov, No. 33, dated 2 [14] April 1803.

30 Field Marshal Saltykov’s despatch to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 1195, dated 25 March [6 April] 1803.

31 The War Minister for Land Forces’ despatch to Field Marshal Saltykov, No. 33, dated 2 [14] April 1803.

32 The Inspector of All Artillery’s report to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 1291, dated 19 [31] March 1803.

The civil governors of St Petersburg, Novgorod, Pskov, Livonia, Estland, Vilna and Kurland governorates were ordered ‘to provide those commissioning agents with all possible assistance for the successful implementation of this purchase through the *zemstvo* authorities.’³³ It soon became apparent that ‘now is a most inconvenient time for the acquisition of horses.’ For example, it was also impossible for the 4th Artillery Battalion ‘to source such a large number of horses quickly in that region.’³⁴ In total, it was necessary to buy 2,160 horses ‘for the artillery units assigned to Finland’ but by 4 [16] April, only 1,155 had been purchased, subsequently 1,005 horses were deficient, and ‘891 horses were also needed for those quartered in Riga and Wenden’ for a total shortfall of 1,896 horses.³⁵ In view of this, the 4th Battalion were permitted to take 400 horses ‘from the battalions closest to them’ while the rest were ‘to be acquired as and when.’³⁶ Such was the effect of the maintenance of a reduced number of horses, for reasons of economy, on the combat readiness of the artillery.

Fifth, the question of artillery parks had arisen,³⁷ but their establishment was cancelled due to the change of circumstances.³⁸ General-of-Artillery Korsakov, Inspector of All Artillery, found that, ‘according to the current preparation of forces, it will be necessary to have parks in various locations that would have two resupply loads of shells for the artillery and some three resupply loads of cartridges in reserve.’³⁹

Sixth, ‘inspections of the fortresses and fortifications in Finland and Livonia’ had to be ordered in order to bring them ‘into a proper defensible state’⁴⁰ and ‘to inspect the serviceability of the garrison artillery.’⁴¹ The state of the garrison artillery turned out to be as follows:

It was deemed necessary to have shells ‘for a three-month siege of the fortresses.’⁴²

Fortress	Guns				
	According to engineer General Knyazev’s total of 1798	Present	Awaiting delivery	Deficiency	Surplus
Kronstadt & Alexander field works	303 ⁴³	163	134		6
Reval	667	596		71	
Vyborg	505	353	18	134	
Nyslott	125	98		27	
Friedrichsham	315	288		27	

33 Despatch from the War Minister for Land Forces to the Minister for Internal Affairs, Count Kochubey, No. 14, dated 21 March [2 April] 1803.

34 The Inspector of All Artillery’s report to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 1576, dated 2 [14] April 1803.

35 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1803, minute No. 2b, serial 140, the calculation was unsigned, but marked 6 [18] April.

36 The Inspector of All Artillery’s reports to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 1576, dated 2 [14] April 1803 and No. 2018, dated 30 April [12 May].

37 Supreme decree for the Inspector of All Artillery, dated 26 March [7 April], who was ordered to set up these parks.

38 Supreme orders dated 26 April [8 May] (Count Lieven’s despatch to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 929, dated 26 April [8 May], and the Inspector of All Artillery’s report to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 2018, dated 30 April [12 May].

39 The Inspector of All Artillery’s despatch to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 25, dated 22 March [3 April] 1803.

40 Engineer General Sukhtelen’s despatch to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 545, dated 23 March [4 April], tasking Major General Opperman.

41 The Inspector of All Artillery’s report to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 1401, dated 24 March [5 April], tasking major generals Ulanov and Voronov.

42 The Inspector of All Artillery’s report to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 31, dated 31 March [12 April] and returns 1 and 2.

43 291 on the original.

Fortress	Guns				
	According to engineer General Knyazev's total of 1798	Present	Awaiting delivery	Deficiency	Surplus
Rochensalm & Kyumenegorod	440	409		31	
Wilmanstrand	120	144			24
Kexholm	135	121		14	

A significant amount of ammunition and guns had to be transported, namely:

From which places	How many places	Guns	Carriages	Various Ammunition Natures
St Petersburg	6	167		52,080
Kronstadt	2		23	100
Vyborg	5			7,357
Kexholm	1			5,239
Rochensalm	1			670
Total:		167	23	65,456

But 'having said that' as the Inspector of all Artillery reported, 'there are enough guns and shells in all the fortresses to repel any assault.' It is also interesting to note that a colleague of the Minister for Naval Forces, Admiral Chichagov, notified the War Minister for Land Forces that 'in this case it is not possible' to provide transport ships for moving guns and ammunition to Vyborg, since 'we ourselves have a great lack of these and will be forced to charter from civilians for the impending necessities.'⁴⁴ That, in order to bring the fleet up to strength, it is possible that only 15 of the requested guns would be released for Reval, yet 'nevertheless, there are only 13 carriages for these' (instead of 71 guns), and only 18,129 shells instead of 25,283.⁴⁵

In addition, there was a lack of garrison artillery in Reval; two companies of the 3rd Siege Battalion had to be assigned there.⁴⁶

Once preparations for the campaign had been suspended, then, by Supreme command, 'the overdue rearmament of the aforementioned fortresses' was continued, but at the same time it was announced that 'there is no need for extreme haste.'⁴⁷

Seventh, it was planned that from the earmarked 96 guns, there would be regimental artillery for 16 regiments, while artillery appointments would be filled in accordance with the following schedule:⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Admiral Chichagov's despatch No. 538, dated 4 [16] April 1803.

⁴⁵ Admiral Chichagov's despatch No. 538, dated 4 [16] April 1803, returns.

⁴⁶ The Inspector of All Artillery's report to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 1704, dated 12 [24] April 1803.

⁴⁷ From proposals of the State Military Collegium, Artillery Department, No. 50 (serial 187), dated 7 [19] May 1803.

⁴⁸ Report by the Inspector of All Artillery, No. 1312, dated 19 [31] March 1803, and its two returns.

Appointment	In each regiment	For all 16 regiments	Present in one siege battalion	Deficiency
Officers	2	32	32	
<i>Feuerwerker</i>	6	96	120	
Bombardiers, Gunners & <i>Handlanger</i>	60	960	960	
Officers and non-commissioned officers of the trains	2	32	20	12 ⁴⁹
Drivers		449	40	409 ⁵⁰

It was intended to assign 100 rounds for each gun.⁵¹

Of the six guns intended for each regiment,⁵² eight regiments had guns of three calibres, five regiments had guns of four calibres, and three regiments had guns of three calibres.⁵³

Eighth, ‘by way of the specific Supreme will of the Sovereign Emperor’ the Don regiments were assigned a new establishment: ‘officers according to the usual manning, but with 600 Cossacks each.’⁵⁴

Ninth, even in the provisioning department there was ‘a shortage of *Wächter* [guards] and storemen’ but out of the requested 100 men, only 50 were ordered to be seconded ‘from nearby garrisons...’⁵⁵

In general, these preparations for a campaign which lasted one month, cost the artillery department alone 392,967 roubles 59 kopecks.⁵⁶

28b. Military Preparations In June 1803 And Orders For The Artillery By Count Arakcheev.

Active preparations for military operations continued from June 1803; these preparations, as we said above, had been suspended in April.

In directed Supreme orders dated 3 [15] June 1803, Lieutenant General Count Arakcheev was informed: ‘Today I issued orders to six regiments of heavy infantry and one of jägers to be on 24 hours notice to move, upon receipt of orders to that effect, therefore, I order you to prepare four companies of field artillery from the Livonia Inspection for them, assigning half a company to each of the first six regiments, three light guns to the jäger regiment, while the remaining nine guns are to be heavy pieces, so that, upon receipt of orders, they are to set off within 24 hours along the designated march route.’⁵⁷

Points to note: firstly, the allotment of half a company of artillery to a heavy infantry regiment or two guns per battalion; secondly, the allotment of only three guns to the jäger regiment, that is, one gun per battalion; thirdly, the allocation of nine guns ($\frac{3}{4}$ of a company), that is, slightly more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of the total number of guns (48), to form a battery, as stated in the Supreme orders, ‘nine guns are to be heavy pieces;’ fourth, the absence of cavalry.

49 From 12th Artillery Battalion in Moscow.

50 300 from this same battalion; 50 from the Moscow Pontoon Depot; 59 made up of recruits; for a total of 409.

51 According to the establishments, 120 charges were required.

52 This norm was introduced in the artillery establishment Supremely approved on 19 [31] March 1803 (Complete Collection of Laws (C.C.L.), Vol. XLIII, part II to No. 20672.

53 Report by the Inspector of All Artillery, No. 1546, dated 1 [13] April 1803.

54 Lieutenant General Platov’s report No. 1027, dated 24 March [5 April] 1803; overall, the regiments were initially composed of 501 men, and later 578 men.

55 War Minister for Land Forces despatch No. 44 to the *General-Proviantmeister*, dated 17 [29] April 1803.

56 The Inspector of All Artillery, Count Arakcheev’s report No. 70, dated 18 [30] June 1803, with two returns.

57 A.C.W.M. classified department, book 22, original Supreme order.

It is interesting to note the orders for making good the shortfall in horse numbers.⁵⁸ Count Arakcheev ordered the following: ‘According to the report sent to my predecessor (General-of-Artillery Korsakov) on 25 April [7 May] last (from Major General Rezvoy), your battalion has 390 artillery horses purchased by your Excellency, there being 200 already in the battalion, for a total of 590. Therefore, you are to make up the deficiency from Stavitsky’s company of the Horse Artillery Regiment, if necessary, together with all their horse furniture, in which regard I am enclosing an open order to him from me, thereafter, if you have not yet acquired the horses, then you are to take any that are suitable from the Riga Pontoon Depot and from the Riga Garrison, and if there is still a shortfall after that, then from 3rd Siege Artillery Battalion’s draught horses, about which I also enclose an open order...’⁵⁹ Should Your Excellency need to buy a small number of artillery horses from the above-mentioned places in order to make up the numbers, then I would allow that too, limiting the cost of a horse at 70 roubles.’

Four companies were short just 214 horses,⁶⁰ and to that end it was considered most suitable to take horses from four locations, and in return, paying cash for this, to take measures ‘to fill the places...’⁶¹ Thus, this example once again confirms that subordination to budgetary constraints caused serious damage to the combat readiness of the artillery;⁶² ‘preparations for the campaign’ were accompanied by the borrowing of horses from other companies.

The preparation of all the artillery for the impending war continued invisibly. Count Arakcheev had the amazing ability to foresee many shortcomings and long before the regiments, battalions and artillery companies were ‘placed on a campaign footing’ he had issued a mass of preliminary orders himself.

By way of Supreme orders dated 3 [15] December 1803, 20 March [1 April] 1804 and 4 [16] May 1804,⁶³ the following artillery units had been ordered to be completely at 24 hours notice to move ‘along their ordered march routes’: 2nd and 3rd artillery regiments, three companies from 1st Horse Artillery Battalion, ‘also the Riga and Vilna pontoon depots’; 4th and 5th artillery regiments, two companies from 6th Artillery Regiment, one company from 1st Horse Artillery Battalion and the Kherson Pontoon Depot; 8th Artillery Regiment. For a total of five artillery regiments, two companies from 6th Artillery Regiment, four horse artillery companies and three pontoon depots.

Yet as early as 10 [22] November 1803, Count Arakcheev had instructed the colonels-in-chief and inspectors with regard to impending ‘preparations for a move.’

Here is the content of one of these instructions:⁶⁴ ‘I find it necessary to instruct your Excellency in advance, in order thereby to give you sufficient time for the completion and preparation of the artillery and rest assured on my part that in the event of any failures to meet the tasks by the date indicated below, responsibility will apply solely to the colonel-in-chief of the regiment:

1. The assessed time for 2nd Artillery Regiment to be fully ready is 1 [13] April 1804.⁶⁵
2. Field and regimental artillery are to be battle-worthy together with their ammunition wagons, or old style ammunition caissons if there is a deficiency, or ammunition wagons located with the remaining field artillery converted for the regimental guns of the former 4th Artillery Battalion.

58 A.C.W.M. classified department, book 22, addressed to Major General Rezvoy, dated 3 [15] June 1803.

59 A.C.W.M. classified department, book 22, addressed to Major General Rezvoy, dated 3 [15] June 1803.

60 Inspector of All Artillery’s report to His Imperial Highness No. 5, dated 3 [15] June 1803.

61 Inspector of All Artillery’s report to His Imperial Highness No. 5, dated 3 [15] June 1803.

62 See also the notes and conclusions to the March/April 1803 mobilisation.

63 From the original Supreme orders.

64 Each of the instructions were similar to the example given. In the diary for the Inspector of All Artillery, 1803, it records that they were sent on 10 [22] November 1803 to: Major General Rezvoy, No. 11 for 2nd Regiment; Lieutenant General Kantsevich (colonel-in-chief, 3rd Regiment), No. 12; Major General Prince Myshetsky, No. 13 for 4th Regiment; Lieutenant General Baron Meller-Zakomelsky, No. 14, for 5th Regiment; Major General Grave, No. 15, for 6th Regiment; Major General Bulygin (colonel-in-chief), No. 16, for 8th Regiment.

65 Issued instructions to Major General Rezvoy for 2nd Artillery Regiment.

3. Modify the field gun carriages by removing the ammunition chests from these in order to create a proportionate weight for mobility, in accordance with the six horse teams currently required.
4. Exchange the iron covers on the caisson limbers for canvas for the regimental artillery.
5. Preparation of the entire trains, not omitting the company mobile forges.
6. Modify the spikes for the trails for the total holdings of artillery pieces.
7. Prepare ammunition, but having these bagged separately, such as Armenian [camel hair] ones for round shot and shell with a *Spiegel*,⁶⁶ a specific order will follow from me in due course with regards to arming them.
8. Maintain the full number of artillery horses assigned to the regiment in peacetime until that time; the necessary methods are to be taken from me with regard to an adequate number of horses for movement.
9. Train the crews in the knowledge of the duties of an artilleryman.

Having identified and prescribed the first principles for this preparation, it only remains for me to expect the most active methods from Your Excellency in this regard, and upon encountering any difficulties, being informed, on my part, of my approval and orders.'

The foregoing is sufficient confirmation that Count Arakcheev found it necessary to prepare for the campaign up to five months before receiving Supreme orders.

28c. Preparations By The *General-Proviantmeister* Department, The Secret Schedule Of The Armies And Corps In 1803 And 1804 And A Discussion Of Their Composition And Conclusions.

Preparations were no less busy for the *General-Proviantmeister*.⁶⁷ A secret decree addressed to the War Minister for Land Forces dated 25 December 1803 [6 January 1804] yields the following information: 'It is necessary to have provisions and fodder for a three month supply of rations for the force assigned to be stationed from Kobrin to Brest Litovsk and from Dubno to Radziwiłłów, attaching a listing of them herewith, hence, I command you to declare My will to the *General-Proviantmeister* such that the required amount of both will be immediately available in those places and those closest to them have been prepared.'⁶⁸ In actual fact, correspondence about this procurement had begun on 14 [26] December 1803,⁶⁹ while on 17 [29] December,⁷⁰ a Supreme decree was issued to the War Minister for Land Forces to announce to the *General-Proviantmeister* that 'provisions and fodder would need to be prepared as quickly as possible':

In which locations:	Provisions		Fodder		
	Flour	Cereal	Oats	Hay	Straw
	<i>Chetvert</i> [5¾ bushels]		<i>Chetvert</i>	<i>Pud</i> [36 pounds]	
Tauroggen & Keidany	18,000	1,800	16,400	304,000	
Olita, Merez & Orany	14,000	1,400	18,800	212,000	
Grodno	26,800	2,800	42,400	520,000	5,600
Total:	58,800	6,000	77,600	1,360,000	5,600

⁶⁶ *Spiegel* [sabat] - a wooden cylinder or cone with a hemispherical recess, to which the projectile was attached.

⁶⁷ Note: It is necessary to say a few words about these preparations because they are closely related to the issues of the grouping of larger or smaller ad hoc formations, from which the armies were subsequently formed for the campaign of 1805.

⁶⁸ A.C.W.M. classified department, catalogue No. 1, Supreme decrees etcetera, book of secret directed decrees, No. 145; the original decree is in the handwriting of General-of-Infantry Vyazmitinov and signed by Alexander.

⁶⁹ A.C.W.M. classified department, bundle No. 1, 1803, minute No. 4, serial 5.

⁷⁰ A.C.W.M. classified department, bundle No. 1, 1803, minute No. 4, serial 8.

In which locations:	Provisions		Fodder		
	Flour	Cereal	Oats	Hay	Straw
	<i>Chetvert</i> [5¾ bushels]	<i>Chetvert</i>	<i>Chetvert</i>	<i>Pud</i> [36 pounds]	
Libau	58,800	6,000	77,600	1,360,000	5,600
Grand Total:	117,600	12,000	155,200	2,720,000	11,200

Leaving aside the detail, it is necessary to mention that according to the ‘calculations’ by the *General-Proviantmeister*, this procurement would cost ‘2,847,180 paper roubles.’⁷¹

In accordance with the planned preparations, secret rosters of troops were also made, which makes it possible to trace, so to speak, the preliminary organisation of ad hoc formations of all combat arms. By 1805 these organisational links had changed.

Through the Supreme decree of 25 December 1803 [6 January 1804], the troops had been assigned, divided into two groups: one ‘from Kobrin to Brest Litovsk’ and the other ‘from Dubno to Radziwiłłów’⁷² but there is a suggestion⁷³ that these groups were intended to form ‘an army consisting of two corps.’⁷⁴ Their composition was as follows:⁷⁵

Troop Types	Regiments	Squadrons	Battalions	Companies	Men	War Horses	Draught Horses
I Corps							
Dragoons	2	10			1,844	1,454	180
Hussars	1	10			1,664	1,491	118
Musketeers	6		18		12,728		1,014
Jägers	1		3		1,532		133
Foot Artillery			2	8	2,358		1,196
Horse Artillery				1	306	179	130
Pioneers				1	190		41
Pontoon Depots	1				177		64
Cossacks	2	10c			1,170		2,244
Cavalry & Cossack Total:		20/10c			4,678	2,954	2,542
Infantry Total:			21		14,260		1,147
Artillery & Engineers Total:				9+1+1 ⁷⁶	3,031	179	1,431
II Corps							
Dragoons	1	5			922	727	90

71 Report by the *General-Proviantmeister* to the War Minister for Land Forces, No. 44, dated 11 [23] February 1804.

72 A.C.W.M. secret department, Supreme decrees etcetera, No. 1, book No. 145.

73 A.C.W.M. secret department, bundle 1, minute No. 4, serials 17 and 18.

74 On serial 18, in General-of-Infantry Vyazmitinov’s handwriting, there is a written calculation for the procurement of provisions and forage for I and II corps, and on the draft list on serial 17 - there is an ‘army’ of two corps.

75 Compiled according to the schedule in the Supreme decree of 25 December 1803 [6 January 1804](book No. 145), and according to the calculations by *General-Proviantmeister* Svechin in the report dated 6 [18] January 1804 to serial 17 (minute No. 4).

76 Artillery companies + Pioneer companies + Pontoon depots.

Troop Types	Regiments	Squadrons	Battalions	Companies	Men	War Horses	Draught Horses
Cuirassiers	1	5			878	687	32
Hussars	1	10			1,664	1,491	118
Poland Horse	1	10			1,186	1,091	48
Grenadiers	2		6		4,186		338
Musketeers	4		12		8,372		676
Jägers	1		3		1,532		133
Foot Artillery			1	4	1,149		598
Horse Artillery				1	306	179	130
Pioneers				1	190		41
Cossacks	2	10c			1,170		2,244
Cavalry & Cossack Total:		30/10c			5,820	3,996	2,532
Infantry Total:			21		14,090		1,147
Artillery & Engineers Total:				5+1	1,645	179	769
I Corps Total:		20/10c	21	9+1+1	21,969	3,124	5,120
II Corps Total:		30/10c	21	5+1+0	21,555	4,175	4,448
Army Total:⁷⁷		50/20c	42	14+2+1	43,524	7,299	9,568

On 9 [21] February 1804, a schedule was drawn up, to which the assigned force consisted of three battle-groups: one ‘in Taugoggen and Keidany and the surrounding area’ another ‘in Olita, Merecz and Orany’ and the third ‘in Grodno and its environs.’

By analogy with the previous description,⁷⁸ it can presumably be said that these three battle-groups would have constituted an army divided into three corps. The composition of these corps was assigned as follows:⁷⁹

Troop Types	Regiments	Squadrons	Battalions	Companies	Men	War Horses	Draught Horses
I Corps							

⁷⁷ A comparison of this army with the armies of 1800 will be shown below.

⁷⁸ A.C.W.M. classified department, 1803, minute No. 4, instructions from the War Minister for Land Forces to the *General-Proviantmeister*, No. 7, dated 9 [21] February 1804.

The analogy can be seen in the following: firstly, this schedule is laid out similarly to the previous one. Secondly, the force was divided into three formations, which in the schedule are referred to as I, II and III, therefore they were not assigned for independent operations. Thirdly, each battle-group was an all-arms force. Fourthly, the strength of the first battle-group is similar to the corps given above...

In addition, the report by the Inspector of the Lithuania Inspection, General-of-Cavalry Bennigsen to His Imperial Highness, dated 21 February [4 March] 1804, and in the correspondence in general, it refers to the entire force according to the schedule, and does not separate any of the battle-groups.

⁷⁹ The table was compiled from the schedule of troops, and the totals from the report by the *General-Proviantmeister*, No. 44, dated 11 [23] February 1804.

Troop Types	Regiments	Squadrons	Battalions	Companies	Men	War Horses	Draught Horses
Dragoons	2	10			2,022	1,454	184
Grenadiers	2		6		4,628		410
Musketeers	3		9		6,942		615
Jägers	1		3		1,532		133
Foot Artillery			1	4	1,179	704	252
Horse Artillery				1	306	305	48
Pioneers				1	190		41
Pontoon Depots	1				177		64
Cossacks	1	5c			585		1,122
Cavalry & Cossack Total:		10/5c			2,607	1,454	1,306
Infantry Total:			18		13,102		1,158
Artillery & Engineers Total:				5+1+1	1,852	1,009	405
II Corps							
Dragoons	1	5			1,011	727	92
Musketeers	4		12		9,256		820
Jägers	1		3		1,532		133
Foot Artillery			1	4	1,179	704	252
Horse Artillery				1	306 ⁸⁰	305	48
Cossacks	1	5c			585		1,122
Cavalry & Cossack Total:		5/5c			1,596	727	1,214
Infantry Total:			15		10,788		953
Artillery & Engineers Total:				5	1,485	1,009	300
III Corps							
Dragoons	1	5			1,011	727	92
Cuirassiers	1	5			963	687	84
Hussars	1	10			1,809	1,341	118
Grenadiers	1		3		2,314		205
Musketeers	6		18		13,884		1,230
Jägers	2		6		3,064		266
Foot Artillery			2	8	2,372 ⁸¹	1,408	504
Horse Artillery				1	306	305	48
Pioneers				1	190		41

⁸⁰ Report No. 44 erroneously shows 360.

⁸¹ For some reason, 14 more men are shown, since one battalion had 1,179 men, it follows that two battalions had 2,358 men.

Troop Types	Regiments	Squadrons	Battalions	Companies	Men	War Horses	Draught Horses
Pontoon Depots	1				177		64
Cossacks	2	10c			1,170		2,244
Cavalry & Cossack Total:		20/10c			4,953	2,755	2,538
Infantry Total:			27		19,262		1,701
Artillery & Engineers Total:				9+1+1	3,055	1,713	657
I Corps Total:		10/5c	18	5+1+1	17,561	2,463	2,869
II Corps Total:		5/5c	15	5+0+0	13,869	1,736	2,467
III Corps Total:		20/10c	27	9+1+1	27,260	4,468	4,896
Army Total:⁸²		35/20c	60	19+2+2	58,690	8,667	10,232

On 4 [16] May 1804,⁸³ Supreme orders were issued addressed to some regimental colonels-in-chief 'to prepare for campaigning such that, upon receipt of orders, these regiments could set out from their permanent quarters within 24 hours and immediately follow the intended march routes.' The total numbers assigned were:⁸⁴

Troop Types	Regiments	Squadrons	Battalions	Companies	Men	War Horses	Draught Horses
Cuirassiers	1 ⁸⁵	5			963	687	84
Dragoons	1 ⁸⁶	5			1,011	727	92
Grenadiers	1 ⁸⁷		3		2,314		205
Musketeers	7 ⁸⁸		21		16,198		1,435
Jägers	1 ⁸⁹		3		1,532		133
Foot Artillery			2 ⁹⁰	8	2,358	1,408	504
Cossacks	2	10c			1,170		2,244
Cavalry & Cossack Total:		10/10c			3,414	1,144	2,420
Infantry Total:			27		20,044		1,773
Artillery Total:				8	2,358	1,408	504
Grand Total:		10/10c	27	8	25,546	2,822	4,697

⁸² A comparison between this army and the armies of 1800 will be shown below.

⁸³ A.C.W.M. classified department, bundle I, 1803, minute No. 4, Count Lieven's despatch to the War Minister for Land Forces, dated 5 [17] May 1804.

⁸⁴ The table was compiled according to this despatch, while the number of men and horses is from establishments.

⁸⁵ From the Moscow Inspection.

⁸⁶ From the Smolensk Inspection.

⁸⁷ From the Smolensk Inspection.

⁸⁸ Two regiments from Smolensk, four from Kiev, and one from the Dniester inspections.

⁸⁹ Transferred from the 'Army of the North.'

⁹⁰ One battalion from the Kiev Inspection, the second from the Moscow Inspection.

A supply of three-months worth of provisions was ordered to be prepared for these ‘regiments’ and, judging by the rescript dated 6 [18] May 1804, addressed to the War Minister for Land Forces,⁹¹ these ‘regiments’ were to assemble in the area of Zaslavl and Stary Konstantinov... In one draft,⁹² in the War Minister for Land Forces’ handwriting, these ‘regiments’ were to be referred to as ‘the Auxiliary Army’;⁹³ In addition, it is also mentioned here that a jäger regiment ‘was being transferred from the Army of the North’⁹⁴ and had been part of III Corps, which was assigned ‘to Grodno and its environs...’

Thus, on the basis of this fragmentary information, it can be established that it was proposed to form two armies ‘upon receipt of Supreme orders’ each of three corps: one Army of the North, in the region of Tauroggen, Keidany, Olita, Merecz, Orany and Grodno and its environs’ while the other Auxiliary Army was to be in the area of ‘Kobrin, Brest-Litovsk, Dubno, Radziwiłłów, Zaslavl, and Stary Konstantinov.’ And indeed, by 3 to 8 [15 to 20] March, supplies of provisions and fodder were almost complete,⁹⁵ in accordance with the calculation above,⁹⁶ while orders were issued for 400,000 roubles to be allocated for the regiments ‘added to the Auxiliary Army’ so that ‘these (preparations) could be completed without losing time.’ The total amount allocated for the procurement of provisions exceeded 3,000,000 roubles...

Turning to a discussion on the composition of the corps, as well as the ratios between various combat arms, we come to the following conclusions:

Regarding the composition of the corps:

Supreme Instructions:	25 December 1803		9 February 1804			4 May 1804
Corps:	1	2	I	II	III	Aux.
Cavalry Squadrons	20	30	10	5	20	10
Cossack Sotnia	10	10	5	5	10	10
Infantry Battalions	21	21	18	15	27	27
Foot Artillery Companies/Guns	8/96	5/60	4/48	4/48	8/96	8/96
Horse Artillery Companies/Guns	1/12	1/12	1/12	1/12	1/12	
Pioneer Companies	1	1	1		1	
Pontoon Depots	1		1		1	

1. As before, the typical number of combat units that should constitute a corps had not been established, and therefore each corps had its own particular composition.
2. There were no engineering troops in two of the corps (II Corps and Auxiliary), while there was also no horse artillery in the latter.
3. The number of squadrons in a corps ranged from five to 30, and of *Sotnia* from five to ten.
4. The number of battalions in a corps ranged from 15 to 27.
5. Horse artillery was assigned regardless of the number of squadrons or *Sotnia*, as we note in two corps (2 Corps and II Corps) in particular.

91 A.C.W.M. classified department, bundle I, 1803, minute No. 4, serial 125.

92 A.C.W.M. classified department, bundle I, 1803, minute No. 4, serial 123.

93 *Auxiliares* - literally auxiliary troops (Leer’s Encyclopaedia of Military and Naval Science, Vol. I); auxiliary or supplementary.

94 The assumption that battle-groups I, II and III should form one army is implicitly confirmed.

95 A.C.W.M. classified department, bundle I, 1803, minute No. 4, reports by the *General-Proviantmeister*, No. 66, dated 3 [15] March 1804, and No. 67, dated 8 [20] March 1804.

96 In the second army area and in Libau.

6. The number of foot artillery pieces ranged from 48 to 96, with the number of infantry battalions playing little role; the 21 battalions each (of 1 Corps and 2 Corps) were assigned 96 guns⁹⁷ and 60 guns each, respectively.

Regarding the ratios between various combat arms:

Corps:	1	2	I	II	III	Aux.
Regular Cavalry	3,508	4,650	2,022	1,011	3,783	1,974
Cossacks	1,170	1,170	585	585	1,170	1,170
Cavalry Total:	4,678	5,820	2,607	1,596	4,953	3,144
Infantry	14,260	14,090	13,102	10,788	19,262	20,044
Foot Artillery	96	60	48	48	96	96
Horse Artillery	12	12	12	12	12	

1. For every cavalryman there were between two and seven infantrymen (2 Corps and II Corps).
2. The Cossacks constituted between $\frac{1}{4}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$ of all cavalry in the corps (see these same two corps).
3. There were between six to seven and four to five guns per 1,000 infantrymen (see 1 Corps and Auxiliary).
4. There were between two and eight guns per 1,000 cavalymen (see 2 Corps and II Corps).

We have given here the extreme figures of the ratio; but if we take the averages, we come to the conclusion that in most of the corps the ratios of the various combat arms approached Napoleonic norms,⁹⁸ deviations are found only in horse artillery, only in I Corps were four guns assigned per 1,000 cavalymen.

Comparing the cases we have just reviewed with those of 1800,⁹⁹ we note:

1. By 1804, the strength of a corps had increased, almost twice as many infantry and artillery were assigned as before, that is, instead of 14 to 18 battalions there were 15 to 27 battalions, instead of 45 guns there were 48 to 96 guns.
2. By 1804 it was considered necessary to assign both horse artillery and engineering troops to a corps, while in 1800 this was not done.
3. In the corps of 1804, cavalry were assigned unevenly. In earlier corps, fluctuations in the number of squadrons were found to be only between 18 to 30 squadrons, yet now they were from five to 30 squadrons, but in compensation for this, one to two Cossack regiments were assigned to a corps, therefore, some corps had a greater proportion of cavalry in 1804.
4. Some corps also had pontoon depots assigned.¹⁰⁰

While in 1800 only one of the projected armies¹⁰¹ was divided into corps,¹⁰² then in 1804, as mentioned above, both the Army of the North and Auxiliary Army were supposed to be formed of three corps each.

⁹⁷ A similar number of guns were also assigned to 27 battalions.

⁹⁸ One cavalryman for every three to four infantrymen, and four guns per 1,000 infantrymen or cavalymen.

⁹⁹ Note: Through the Supreme order of the day for 30 August [11 September] 1800, the army under General-of-Cavalry Count von der Pahlen was divided into five corps (see Appendix 1 to Part 1).

¹⁰⁰ We must remember that the Pontoon Artillery Regiment was only formed in June 1804 (see Part 23).

¹⁰¹ Supreme orders of the day for 14 [26] August, 30 August [11 September], 12 [24] September and 14 [26] December 1800 (see Appendix 1 to Part 1).

¹⁰² Count von der Pahlen's army.

Thus, there is already a noticeable desire to create more self-sufficient corps, while applying the principle of manageability in the armies.

In general, the strength of the armies of 1804 was inferior to the armies of 1800, mainly in the number of cavalry, and then somewhat in infantry, but it was superior in artillery. The best evidence for this latter statements would be the following table:

Armies:	1804		1800						
	Army of the North	Auxiliary Army	14 August		30 August	12 September	14 December		
			2	1	Pahlen's	3	I	II	III
Cavalry Squadrons	35	60	90	48	100	56	53	90	20
Cossack <i>Sotnia</i>	20	30	80	75			30	35	
Infantry Battalions	60	69	71	73	71	52	56	71	15
Foot Artillery	192	252	180	240	201	168	180	240	105
Horse Artillery	36	24	24	24			24	24	
Pioneer Companies	2	2	3	3			3	3	
Pontoon Depots	2	1							
Sapper-Miner Sub-Units			1	1			1	1	

Looking at this table, we note that in three of the armies of 1800 there were neither engineering troops nor horse artillery, but this is partly explained by the fact that at that time we had only ten pioneer companies, four of which were in internal inspections; the horse artillery had six companies or 72 guns, of which $\frac{2}{3}$ had been assigned to the army.

And thus, by 1804 efforts were being made to create more self-sufficient corps, and introduce ease of management into the army.

28d. Orders For The Wartime Manning Of 36 Regiments From Garrison Troops And The Significance Of The Report That ‘There Is Nobody To Select From.’

Eventually, on 22 December 1804 [3 January 1805], Supreme orders were issued to bring some regiments ‘up to wartime manning’; preparations were taking of an even more active nature. To which end, the Supreme decree addressed to General-of-Infantry Vyazmitinov stated as follows:¹⁰³

‘Having recognised it as beneficial to bring some grenadier and musketeer regiments up to a manning total in accordance with wartime establishments, and including a listing herewith, I authorise an additional total of 288 privates and three drivers¹⁰⁴ in each of those regiments to be sent from garrison regiments and battalions annotated in the same listing. Therefore, announce my command to whomever it is appropriate:

Firstly, the selection of these men from those of the most recently inducted recruits received to ensure that they are completely capable of field service, at least in other respects, and having

¹⁰³ Archive of the Chancellery of the War Ministry (A.C.W.M.), catalogue I, Supreme decrees and reports, book No. 145, folio No. 5.

¹⁰⁴ See the establishment tables in Part 6.

removed them from their previous regiments and battalions, send them to their destination upon receipt of orders, without losing the slightest time; for the detachment, entrust command to reliable field officers and subalterns from these same garrisons with several non-commissioned officers, who, after bringing and handing over those men to the receiving regiments, should be immediately returned to their own...¹⁰⁵

Thirdly, whichever is the most direct and convenient avenue for the assigned regiments to follow, it is vital that the inspectors of troops from whose inspections the garrison regiments and battalions are from, provide the accompanying field officers or subalterns with march routes, copies of which are to be presented to those regiments via mail in advance, informing them of the date and under whose command the selected men are to set off...¹⁰⁶

Fifth, these men are also to proceed in good order on the road and are not to waste time anywhere without reason, making from 20 to 30 *versts* [13 to 20 miles] every day, while in inclement or blizzard conditions or in severe frosts from 10 to 15 *versts* [$6\frac{2}{3}$ to ten miles], with rest days on the third day, and sparing the men to the maximum.

Sixth, in the event that there are insufficient men in those garrison regiments and battalions from which selection and dispatch has been assigned, due to detachments to escort recruits or other absences, then having sent as many as are available, send those who remain outstanding upon their return, and thereafter only those who are fit for field service from those coming in through the ongoing recruitment process. Meanwhile, until the garrison regiments and battalions have had the detached personnel replaced, the manning of their guard posts may be reduced wherever possible and appropriate, such that the remaining personnel are sufficient for three shifts.

Seventh, as soon as the assigned men have been allocated to regiments, they are to be distributed across the companies equally, until each reaches the establishment of 165 men and their uniforms are to be brought into alignment with regimental dress.'

According to the above-mentioned listing, it was intended to man six grenadier and 30 musketeer regiments 'with the additional number of lower ranks' while strengthening field regiments at the expense of the garrison force by a total of 10,476 men... It should be noted that over 800 or even 1,700 men were selected from some garrisons. Overall, the following were assigned:¹⁰⁷

582 from Vyborg; 873 from Pernau and Dünamünde; 291 from Narva; 592 from Reval; 291 from Schlüsselburg; 291 from Kronstadt; 873 from Riga; 291 from Grodno; 291 from Vilna; 291 from Mitau; 1,746 from Moscow; 291 from Vladimir; 873 from Kiev; 291 from Minsk; 291 from Kherson; 291 from Yekaterinoslav; 582 from Voronezh and Tambov; 291 from Nizhegorod; 582 from Vitebsk, Mogilev and Smolensk; 291 from Tver; 291 from Pskov, for a total of 10,476 men.

These orders for the manning of several regiments were issued on 22 December 1804 [3 January 1805], while in the most humble report dated 29 July [10 August] 1805,¹⁰⁸ General-of-Infantry Vyazmitinov was already reporting: 'as of today, according to the reports I have received so far from the gentlemen Inspectors of troops, 10,164 have been selected and sent to field regiments within the state,¹⁰⁹ with the exception of a small loss that occurred along the way, almost all were at full strength and arrived at their intended locations; therefore, only 290 men have not been sent...'¹¹⁰

The gentlemen inspectors of troops explained this shortfall as follows:

105 The second article covered uniform items to be taken, and equipment, weapons, etcetera, to be received from the regiments.

106 The fourth article covered issuing permits to officers, releasing funds for the hire of resupply carts and so forth.

107 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 6, containing a draft of the decree and listing.

108 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 6, serial 342.

109 In addition, 768 men had been selected for distribution to the Corfu force. See Part 28i: Regarding The Russian Corps In The Ionian Islands.

110 This calculation yields 10,454 men, which is only 22 men short of the 10,476 men assigned.

1. General-of-Infantry Rimsky-Korsakov reported that 138 men¹¹¹ were ‘on various assignments’ but that upon their return they too would be sent to the assigned regiments. Supreme orders replied that: ‘if they have not yet been sent, not to send them.’¹¹²
2. General-of-Cavalry Baron Bennigsen reported that ‘there is nobody to select from for the remaining 162 privates (from the Minsk Garrison Battalion)’ but that ‘there are no more than 20 *Gefreiter* [trained soldiers] left to take over non-commissioned officer posts, which is all the garrison battalions have to maintain some order, as the officers have all been assigned as being unfit for service.’¹¹³ Supreme orders replied that: ‘the further departure of these men should now be abandoned.’¹¹⁴

In order to clarify the phrase, ‘there is nobody to select from’ we present some facts on the nature of the composition of garrisons from which manpower had been assigned.

Inspector General-of-Cavalry Apraksin of the Smolensk Inspection was asked: ‘why are there so few lower ranks shown capable of continuing field service in the garrison battalions of Smolensk, Mogilev and Vitebsk?’ The following answer was received: ‘the lower ranks of said garrison battalions arrived there from field regiments due to their inability to perform field service as a result of wounds, illness, injuries and old age;¹¹⁵ as evidence of this, I forward the nominal roll of the Smolensk Garrison Battalion of those who remain for selection, with an indication of each invalidity.’

In total, 418 ineligible men were listed and against each there was a ‘description of invalidity’;¹¹⁶ suffice to say that the ages ranged from 19 to 61 and even up to 75 (who had deserted as recruits), and their period of service covered from 1779 to 1804.

In the Vitebsk Garrison Battalion, out of 542 men enlisted,¹¹⁷ 18 men were selected as fit for field service, 481 men turned out to be ineligible for it, and the remaining 43 men were assigned either to be retired or to be invalidated.

In the Smolensk Garrison Battalion, 465 men turned out to be ineligible, while 34 men were fit for field service, of whom eight men ‘were scarred with *Spitzruten* [the lash] for desertion.’¹¹⁸

The Inspector of Infantry of the Livonia Inspection, General-of-Infantry Count Buxhoeveden, reported that ‘although there are still a small number (over 1,000 fit men)¹¹⁹ of whom, together with those capable of serving in the field’ he nevertheless ‘considers it necessary to leave the majority of good men in the garrisons, both for training and inducting recruits, in order to mentor them and in general in the administration of the sizeable daily guard, in order to hold *Gefreiter* posts and other most essential reasons, equally, the various craftsmen should also be left. The guards are said to be sizeable in all these locations, and in Riga in particular, and this year three companies left this regiment for the newly formed Vilna Battalion, and in their place a large number of recruits and privates from internal garrisons arrived, of whom the latter have not yet been trained at all, then after all this, when those who are incapable arrive from field regiments every year and are sent to field garrisons, then eventually, they will be no better than those on the internal establishment, and most of all, now, if we take all the best men without exception, these garrisons will be deprived of

111 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, his report No. 1466, dated 5 [17] July 1805, of the 3,201 men assigned.

112 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, War Minister for Land Forces’ despatch No. 157, dated 2 [14] August 1805.

113 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, his report No. 2037, dated 16 [28] July 1805.

114 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, General-of-Infantry Vyazmitinov’s despatch No. 158, dated 2 [14] August 1805.

115 General-of-Cavalry Apraksin’s report No. 2264, dated 27 December 1804 [8 January 1805], and its return with ten listings.

116 ‘Members of medical boards’ participated in determining ‘ineligibilities’; we have omitted the listing of all possible disabilities.

117 General-of-Cavalry Apraksin’s report No. 2279, dated 31 December 1804 [12 January 1805], and its return with 22 listings.

118 One of these had deserted on four occasions.

119 Of 2,529 men assigned.

any means of training or inducting recruits, and as a result, when they are needed, it will be impossible to make a selection from them in order to man field regiments, regardless of where they are needed.'¹²⁰ But Count Buxhoeveden received the following response to his reasonable report: 'As you now know the Supreme will¹²¹ regarding the selection of privates from garrisons and their dispatch to the designated army regiments, then His Majesty will only deign to accept reports regarding its precise execution.'¹²²

Thus, by 29 July [10 August] 1805, some of the regiments were already manned 'to wartime establishment...'

120 Count Buxhoeveden's despatch No. 4735, dated 4 [16] December 1804.

121 A.C.W.M. catalogue I, Supreme decrees and reports, book No. 145, folio No. 5, decree dated 22 December 1804 [3 January 1805].

122 General-of-Infantry Vyazmitinov's despatch of January 1805.